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SOCIOLOGY, ECONOMICS & POLITICAL SCIENCE

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Feminist Conceptualisations of the State: One Major Critical Paradigm

By Dr. Elcin Kurbanoglu

Abstract - This paper presents a literature review of liberal feminist, Marxist feminist, radical feminist, socialist feminist, all the “other”, i.e. lesbian feminist, ecofeminist, race and ethnicity based feminist and Third World feminist, and postmodern feminist accounts of the state. Keeping in mind the fact that feminism, as listed under the contemporary Western critical paradigm, carries the potential to transform the state, the paper ends with a brief overview of the possible inheritances of the above mentioned feminisms. Choosing to use gender inequality rather than patriarchy as an all-encompassing phrase, the paper concludes that in order to develop a common sense on the relationship between the state(s), the market and the (civil) society, finding historical data that are not contaminated by malestream knowledge remains at the top of the agenda of the feminist political struggle.

Keywords : Nation-state, feminist theories, gender inequality, the market/the (civil) society.

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FEMINIST CONCEPTUALISATIONS OF THE STATE ONE MAJOR CRITICAL PARADIGM

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Feminist Conceptualisations of the State: One Major Critical Paradigm

Dr. Elcin Kurbanoglu

Abstract - This paper presents a literature review of liberal feminist, Marxist feminist, radical feminist, socialist feminist, all the “other”, i.e. lesbian feminist, ecofeminist, race and ethnicity based feminist and Third World feminist, and postmodern feminist accounts of the state. Keeping in mind the fact that feminism, as listed under the contemporary Western critical paradigm, carries the potential to transform the state, the paper ends with a brief overview of the possible inheritances of the above mentioned feminisms. Choosing to use gender inequality rather than patriarchy as an all-encompassing phrase, the paper concludes that in order to develop a common sense on the relationship between the state(s), the market and the (civil) society, finding historical data that are not contaminated by mainstream knowledge remains at the top of the agenda of the feminist political struggle.

Keywords : Nation-state, feminist theories, gender inequality, the market/the (civil) society.

I. INTRODUCTION

Would men but generously snap our chains, and be content with rational fellowship instead of slavish obedience, they would find us more observant daughters, more affectionate sisters, more faithful wives, more reasonable mothers – in a word, better citizen. We should then love them with true affection, because we should learn to respect ourselves.

Mary Wollstonecraft, Vindication of the Rights of Women, 1792

Feminist conceptualisations of the state range from a highly militant stand point evident in the motto “The state is the greatest pimp” used by the English Collective of Prostitutes in the 1980s, to a more “naive” demand of the recognition of the personal as the political on the part of the radical feminists of the post World War II era. Throughout modern history (both written history and the feminist praxis with its various forms within the household, or outside in the “public” arena), we encounter not one but several feminist perspectives. Liberal feminist perspectives see the state as a neutral arbiter between different interest groups whereas Marxist feminist perspectives theorise the state as a capitalist superstructure that reproduces familial ideology, hence that also reproduces the basic source of women’s oppression. Radical feminist perspectives underline the state’s patriarchal nature while other feminist perspectives argue that a specific form of the state; i.e. the welfare state, had a woman-friendly structure through which women’s empowerment was

signified (Kantola, 2006: 4-8, 5-10). Postmodern feminists challenged all and saw the state as a differentiated rather than a unified institution.

My aim in this study is to prepare a brief literature review of the conceptualisation of the state in liberal, Marxist, radical, socialist, all “other” and postmodern feminist accounts. Such a literature review might contribute to the future feminist political struggle. In addition, analysing how various feminist approaches view the relationship between the state, the market, the (civil) society and patriarchy (or as I prefer to use in my own account, gender inequality) might help us refrain from ambiguous definitions that some feminist theoreticians have been making for a couple of centuries. In this regard, I will deliberately neglect the arguments of culturalist, essentialist and psychoanalytic feminisms¹ since I think they undermine the strength of feminism as listed under the critical paradigm in contemporary Western literature.

First and foremost, feminist political struggle is frequently held in relation to probably the most oppressive institution of the capitalist world-economy, i.e. the nation-state. If the state is an important creator and/or reinforcer of gender inequality, how shall feminist political activism relate to this institution? To what extent is it “emancipating” to continue the struggle in light of or by trying to change the legislations prepared by governments and oppositions? How shall we then further “emancipate” ourselves by trying to change the entire mentality of the legal system, by going and actually begging every single judge? What role does institutions such as the UN, the EU, and civil society institutions in the national scale have to play? Clarifying and criticising major feminist theories on the state is significant in order to be able to answer these questions and hold the feminist struggle accordingly.

Secondly, there is a commonly held view in Turkey and probably among lots of peripheral or semi-peripheral countries that state building process in the periphery and semi-periphery had emancipating effects on women. Indeed, it is a commonly stressed argument here in Turkey that the Ottoman Empire was highly misogynistic. Yet there are also Islamist feminists, who think that a different interpretation of Islam can have its part for the emancipation of women. Still the commonly

¹ For a more detailed discussion of these feminisms, see Donovan, 2006.

held belief is that when Mustafa Kemal and the Kemalist elite founded the Turkish Republic, they did not only rescue the people living in Anatolia from colonisation, but also rescued the women of Turkey from oppression. Most probably, similar arguments are made in other peripheral and semi-peripheral countries like Egypt, Afghanistan, Iran etc. since one of the major tools of the legitimisation of Third World nationalisms was the alleged emancipation of women brought by the foundation of the nation-state. However, if the state creates and/or institutionalises gender inequalities this may be quite the opposite. So it is crucial to investigate the theoretical conceptions as well as historical reality on the state and the state's attitude towards women as a social group in order to clarify several popular misconceptions.

In addition, many feminists neglected to examine whether the state is patriarchal or not, even though they linked women's oppression to capitalism (read the market). However, the state is the main producer and reproducer of the market. Given the argument that capitalism and patriarchy are mutually dependent, it can be suspected that the pioneer institution of capitalism, i.e. the nation-state has a role closely intertwined with patriarchy too. Thus, this rather blind-spot of feminist theory has to be investigated more closely.

While thinking on the state, we have to keep in mind the fact that the state is not an undifferentiated institution. Feminist scholars as well as mainstream/malestream ones have recently begun to accept this fact thanks to the contribution of postmodern social scientists. Keeping in mind the work of Foucault, this paper will recognise that "rather than there being a 'unity of state power' there is a 'complex strategical situation in a particular society'" (Pringle & Watson, 1998: 206). The paper will also recognise that the state and its history differ between the core, the periphery and the semi-periphery. However, due to the fact that both malestream and feminist literature about the state is based on the form that the state takes in the core, I will mainly be elaborating on the core section of the capitalist-world economy. One also has to keep in mind the unique characteristics particular states have, based on other important factors such as religion, customs and traditions, ethnicities etc. Such contingencies cause differences between various states and their relation to and attitudes towards women as a social group. However, since this paper will be a theoretical discussion rather than a historical research, it would be extending the limits of this paper to take into account each and every such difference.

II. LIBERAL FEMINIST ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE

Yes, ye lordly, ye haughty sex, our souls are by nature equal to yours; the same breath of God animates, enlivens, and invigorates us; and that we are not fallen lower than yourselves, let those witnesses who have greatly towered above the various discouragements by which they have been so heavily oppressed.

Constantia, On the Equality of the Sexes, 1790

Liberal feminism was born roughly in the 18th century and went through some changes over the last three centuries. Early liberal feminists of the Enlightenment, such as M. Wollstonecraft, J. S. Mill and H. T. Mill, E. C. Stanton etc. adhered to the basic premise of the Enlightenment, as given in the Encyclopédie, that underlined "...the autonomy of men, the secularisation of knowledge and thought, the natural goodness and perfectibility of human nature, and belief in reason and experience, science and progress" (Anchor, 1967: 69-70). Following the same line of thought but being highly critical of Enlightenment thinkers such as Rousseau, early liberal feminists insisted that women, as well as men, have the capacity of rationality; they maintained that men and women are alike, so that they should have the same rights and opportunities (Donovan, 2006: 33). In the struggle for equal rights, they saw the state as "a neutral arbiter between conflicting interests and a guarantor of individual rights" (Radtke & Stam, 1994: 141). While acknowledging that the institution was dominated by men and state policies pursued male interests, they adhered to the idea of the alleged distinction between the public and the private, between the state and the market and between the state and the society. Hence their primary goal was to include more women in the state in order to entail more women's policies (Kantola, 2006: 5). One of the greatest efforts made in this direction was the movement of suffrage, which was among the first steps towards defining women as citizens whereas previously only men were accepted as citizens of the state. It has to be noted that while some suffragists, like the British suffragists had a more militant political stand that involved the use of legitimate violence, others did not.

The idea that the minimal state, which belongs to the public sphere should interfere in the matters in the private domain was common in early liberal feminism. Although the most revolutionist voice of early liberal feminism, M. Wollstonecraft proposed that marriage was common and legal prostitution (Wollstonecraft, 1792: 626)², for the majority of the early liberal feminists the

² Wollstonecraft's arguments as presented in this paper are cited from the 1995 dated book, *The Portable Enlightenment Reader*, which is edited by Kramnick (Kramnick, 1995).

main duty of the minimal state was to protect women's property and inheritance rights within the "private" domain of the family. However, the liberal tone began to change in the mid twentieth century in dialectical tension with other feminisms of other political stands. As liberalism "came to be understood not as individualism and laissez faire but as a sense of social responsibility coupled with a more activist, bureaucratic and 'efficient' government", liberal feminists began to argue that the state was responsible for what is going on in the private domain via also social policies (Gordon, 1990: 72). These social policies would address to issues like male violence, child care, abortion etc.³, which were assumed to be aspects of the allegedly private sphere.

Although the liberal feminist approach that is based on the idea that the two sexes are essentially the same led to considerable improvements in especially areas like employment and divorce (Haney, 2000: 645), it still receives major criticisms, mainly from Marxist feminism.

III. MARXIST FEMINIST ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE

One of the reasons Marx is now rejected by many feminists is because he is wrongly thought to have believed in a static reality and possessed an empiricist concept of the objective.

Judith Grant, Gender and Marx's Radical Humanism in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 2005

Early liberalism and early Marxism both adhered to the norms and values of the Enlightenment. However, since the birth of modern history, liberal feminists have been criticised severely by Marxists feminists for not struggling for the transformation of capitalism but rather for what Clara Zetkin called "the ladies'" rights⁴ (Akal, 2003: 51).

Early Marxist feminists of the late 19th and early 20th century like Alexandra Kollontai, Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg followed Engels' arguments presented in the *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884) (Donovan, 2006: 89) that taming of cattle brought by men's acquisition of surplus value, which in turn led to the introduction of the father right in order to leave heritage the private property that men now acquired, resulting in the transition to monogamy (Engels, 1972: 220-221). This asymmetric material relation between husband and wife also held in modern industrial family, since it was the man, who brought food to the family by working outside the house, and the woman, who engaged in the so-called non-productive

household management, which lost its "public" character and became a "private" act in modern industrial society according to Marxist feminism (Donovan, 2006: 88). Hence Engels and early Marxist feminists claimed that women would be emancipated under socialism by entering into the public sphere and through the socialisation of housework and childrearing (Tong, 1989: 49).

Following this line of thinking but changing its path throughout the 20th century mainly with the rise of radical feminism, contemporary Marxist feminists do not see the capitalist state solely as an institution but as a form of social relations. According to Marxist feminists, oppressive gender relations are caused by the state's relation with the bourgeoisie:

Marxist feminists have argued that the male breadwinner family and women's dependence within it are supported by capitalist states because they have to ensure the reproduction of labour power and that women's unpaid domestic labour is the cheapest way of doing this (Charles, 2000: 17).

It is the dependence of women on men that consolidates men's power over women and it is the alliance between the state and capital that helps to produce and reproduce this dependence via the familial ideology.

Although such analyses focus solely on women's reproductive power, in due course came along later Marxist feminists that began to include in their analysis of the state the allegedly non-political issues belonging to the "private" sphere. One of those Marxists feminists was Margaret Benston, who defined women as a class of people producing simple use-values, and she was the first among many Marxists to realise that even when women entered into the labour force, they had to struggle with the "double day"⁵. Hence Benston argued that the socialisation of housework and childrearing is the single factor that will end women's oppression as a group (Tong, 1989: 53-54). Benston was followed by Mariarosa Della Costa and Selma James, who realised that domestic work, contrary to Engels' thesis and Benston's argument, is productive; i.e. housework produces surplus value. Thus, they started a campaign to wage housework rather than promoting women's entrance into the labour force in order to be emancipated (Tong, 1989: 54).

Despite all these efforts, contemporary Marxist feminists too examine issues concerning the allegedly private sphere in light of the dominant conceptualisations of orthodox Marxist theories and see law as an institution of the state that is constructed around the exchange and commoditisation of women

³ For a more detailed elaboration, see Charles, 2000.

⁴ Zetkin used this term to refer to the struggle for suffrage, which was the main motive of the feminists supported by social democrat leaders in the late nineteenth, early twentieth century. For a more detailed discussion, see Akal, 2003.

⁵ "Double-day" is the term used to indicate that women working outside the house have to deal with the double burden of both housework and their work outside the house.

(Haney, 2000: 644). Hence despite the Marxist feminist approaches that try to overcome the alleged distinction between the public and the private as well as the state and the society, the fact that Marxist feminists stick to Marxist categories makes them fall into the trap of reductionism and an overemphasis on economics just like Marxists do (Kantola, 2006: 9). In addition, the Marxist feminist argument that the dependent-breadwinner family form serves for capital, hence for capitalist states have shown to be empirically inconsistent (Charles, 2000: 18). This indicates, quiet ironically, that Marxist feminism remains rather a-historical in its approach to the state despite Marxism's own adherence to historical materialism.

IV. RADICAL FEMINIST ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE

It was part of women's long revolution. When we were breaking all the old hierarchies. Finally there was that one thing we had to give up too, the only power we ever had, in return for no power for anyone. The original production: the power to give birth. Cause as long as we were biologically enchained, we'd never be equal. And males never would be humanised to be loving and tender. So we all became mothers.

Marge Piercy, *Women on the Edge of Time*, 1976

Radical feminism that reached its peak after World War II was critical of both liberal and Marxist feminist perspectives, and the rise of radical feminism was probably the most important factor that created this notion I have used so far, as early and later/contemporary liberal and Marxist feminist accounts of the state. The rise of radical feminism challenged both liberal and Marxist feminist accounts. In fact its rise was a "reaction against the theories, organisational structures, and personal life styles of the male 'New Left' (Donovan, 2006: 155)". Unlike liberal feminists, radical feminists argued that men and women are essentially different. Unlike Marxist feminists, radical feminists claimed that it was patriarchy, or male-domination that cause women's oppression, not capitalism (Donovan, 2006: 156).

One of the most well-known radical feminists, Shulamith Firestone argued that patriarchy is the systemic subordination of women, the origins of which are based on biology, not economics as Marxist feminists claimed (Tong, 1989: 72-73). Firestone benefited from Marx and Engels' work and redefined the economic notion of class as "sex class" as a biological concept; i.e. men and women were two opposite sex classes (Eisenstein, 1990: 126). Firestone argued that just as the proletariat would be liberated once they seized the means of production, women's emancipation would be possible via artificial reproduction technologies since women would regain control over the means of reproduction⁶ (Tong, 1989: 74).

Other radical feminists like Mary O' Brien, Adrienne Rich, Andrea Dworkin, Margaret Atwood, Gena Corea, Robyn Rowland etc. criticised Firestone's approach, claiming that giving up biological motherhood would not liberate women (Tong, 1989: 77-81). Such radical feminists embraced women's reproductive powers and emphasised that women's power to create life makes men so jealous that they try to control reproductive technologies. Rather than using male-dominated technologies, according to these radical feminists, women would have to embrace their reproductive powers, realising that "the source of [their] oppression is also the source of [their] liberation" (Tong, 1989: 78).

The greatest accomplishment of radical feminism for the analysis of the state was the motto "the personal is political". In her famous work, *Sexual Politics* (1969), Kate Millet explained that the relationship between the sexes is political⁷ (Millet, 2000: 23). Millet argued that patriarchy is "a political institution built on status, temperament, and role [i.e. gender], a socially conditioned belief system presenting itself as nature or necessity" (Millet, 2000: xi). According to Millet, such an institution could be eliminated by eliminating status, temperament and role; i.e. gender as constructed under patriarchy (Tong, 1989: 96). Radical feminists like Millet and Marilyn French suggested that androgyny is a solution against patriarchy while other radical feminists like Mary Daly saw the solution in embracing genuine feminine values, and not the ones that are constructed under male domination (Tong, 1989: 98, 105).

In contrast to Marxist feminism that sees the state as representing class interest, radical feminist argue that the state represented "the interest of the dominant groups, that is, men" (Charles, 2000: 21). Radical feminism stresses the patriarchal nature of the state and argues that the state has an important role in perpetuating gender inequalities (Kantola, 2006: 5-6). Contrary to the popular view, radical feminism argues, state policies are related to the seemingly private issue of sexuality, which is neglected by both many liberal and Marxist feminists.

The radical feminist point of view is that states are not contingently but essentially patriarchal and that patriarchy is global. "The particular forms that states take are not particularly significant as are all patriarchal states (Kantola, 2006: 6)". Radical feminists have

⁶ Firestone praised artificial reproduction technologies since she saw biological motherhood as "the root of all evils, especially the vice of possessiveness that generates feelings of hostility and jealousy among human beings" (Tong, 1989: 76). This approach was also embraced by Marge Piercy.

⁷ Millet states that "the term "politics" shall refer to power-structured relationships, arrangements whereby one group of persons is controlled by another" (Millet, 1970: 23).

argued that “the basis of patriarchal power lies in male violence... Male control of women (and hence male dominance) is dependent on force – the state therefore supports male violence against women (Charles, 2000: 21)”. This means that as the legitimate monopoly of violence, it is the state that gives men the right to be violent against women (Charles, 2000: 21).

Radical feminists are hostile to state intrusion into women’s lives as individuals. According to the radical feminist account, it is the civil society rather than the state, which is the sphere, where women should fight against patriarchy (Kantola, 2006: 6) since it is the state that makes it possible for patriarchy to develop as a system of repressive power (Hoffman, 2001: 103). Hence they develop consciousness groups and non-governmental organisations to struggle against patriarchy and help support women’s problems.

As Betty Friedan explained in her famous work, *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), after World War II in the West, women began to be envisaged as solely housewives and were imprisoned within their homes. In *The Feminine Mystique* (1963), Friedan suggested that women should participate in the labour force and spare as little time to housework as possible (Bryson, 1992: 160-161). However, two decades later Friedan recognised that this suggestion was causing “the double day” and began to speak about a Feminist Mystique, in which “Superwoman” was this time trapped within the career-marriage combination (Tong, 1989: 24-25). This recognition; i.e. the recognition that equal rights are not enough to emancipate women led to what I called contemporary liberal feminism. In contrast to early liberal feminists, who believed that there was nothing that we can do to “emancipate” women other than struggling for equal rights and for the abolition of discriminatory practices, contemporary, so-called “welfare”, liberal feminists argue that it necessary to eliminate socio-economic, as well as legal, impediments to women’s progress today, via policies like preferential hiring or reverse discrimination (Tong, 1989: 29).

Although radical feminism managed to overcome the dichotomy between the public and the private spheres and did not simply see the state as belonging to the former sphere and the family belonging to the latter, it failed to understand that the distinction between the state, the (civil) society and the market is an illusionary one. Yet by putting into the analysis of the private domain the conceptualisation of sexuality, radical feminism left its heritage to feminist analysis other political waves tended to ignore. As a matter of fact, through their position against the state, radical feminists undermined the role of the social as the all encapsulating sphere. Still, through their slogan, “personal is political” and thorough their attempts to put both private and public experiences of women into the centre of the analysis of the state, radical feminists have

made significant contributions to the existing feminist conceptualisations of the state. Without the insights they offered, the allegedly private sphere would neither enter into the theory of the state, nor would feminist activism try to address to individual problems that women face in their everyday lives.

V. SOCIALIST FEMINIST ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE

As a socialist feminist, I argue that oppression and exploitation are not equivalent concepts, as they were for Marx and Engels. Exploitation speaks to the economic reality of capitalist class relations, whereas oppression refers to power as it is defined within patriarchal and capitalist relations.

Zillah Eisenstein, Constructing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism, 1990

In order to overcome the biological reductionism of radical feminism and the economic reductionism of Marxist feminism, socialist feminists like Zillah Eisenstein analysed the society in terms of capitalism and patriarchy and saw the state as a mechanism to reconcile the two systems (Randall & Waylen, 1998: 4). Inheriting the notion of patriarchy from radical feminism as a system of oppression and inheriting class oppression from Marxist feminism, dual-system theorist Eisenstein defined capitalist patriarchy as the existing mutual dependence of capitalist class structure and male supremacy (Eisenstein, 1990: 114). Within this framework, Eisenstein identified the state as serving simultaneously both bourgeois and male interests. She drew attention to the fact that there is no real distinction between the public and the private spheres. She argued that the liberal feminist conception of the state failed to recognise that “the structural relations of women’s lives – the family, the sexual division of labour, sex-class oppression” was indeed a part of the political life of the society.

Scholars like Kate Ferguson and Barrett took Eisenstein’s argument a step further. Ferguson underlined that “an exclusive focus on integrating women into state institutions produces a situation that perpetuates dominant patriarchal discourses and norms rather than challenges them” (Kantola: 2006: 5). On the other hand, Barrett sought the particular channels through which the state promotes women’s oppression. She argued that by excluding women from certain types of work through protective legislation, by exercising control over the representation of sexuality via pornography laws, by implementing housing policies that makes it rather difficult to satisfy the needs of the nuclear-family, the state becomes a major factor in women’s oppression (Kantola, 2006: 8).

Like Marxist feminists, socialist feminists like Barrett generally built a strong “link between the family and the economy as the theoretical key to women’s

oppression" (Radke & Stam, 1994: 143). However, this link seems rather secondary to some socialist feminists, who have claimed that the state's role in oppressing women is rather indirect. For instance McIntosh argues that since the state regulates both the family and wage-labour, the policies they pursue are usually implemented under contradictory pressures. What she implies, as does Heidi Hartmann in her analysis of the family wage (Hartmann, 1979: 18-19), is that the interests of capital and men may be contradictory. While the former might need women as cheap labourers in the work place, men might want them as unpaid domestic workers at home. Thus, McIntosh claims that due to these contradictory pressures, the state's gender policies are rather ambivalent (Radke & Stam, 1994: 143). Though her analysis is certainly different from that of Eisenstein or Barrett, McIntosh shares a common view that all socialist feminists share: though state policies' may have ambivalent results in terms of oppressing women or though they may seem like indirect or secondary, the state legitimises itself via the claim that it is a gender-neutral institution when in fact it is not (Radke & Stam, 1994: 144).

In her well-known article "Capitalism, Patriarchy and Job Segregation by Sex" another important socialist feminist⁸, Heidi Hartmann tried to make a more historical analysis of the interrelation between the state, capitalism and patriarchy. She suggested that men's interests begin to alter as a non-statist society transforms into a statist society:

With the advent of public-private separations such as those created by the emergence of state apparatus and economic systems based on wider exchange and larger production units, the problem for men became one of maintaining their control over the labour power of women. In other words, a direct personal system of control was translated into an indirect, impersonal system of control, mediated by society-wide institutions. The mechanisms available to men were (1) the traditional division of labour between the sexes, and (2) techniques of hierarchical organization and control. These mechanisms were crucial in the second process, the extension of a sex-ordered division of labour to the wage-labour system, during the period of the emergence of capitalism in Western Europe and the United States (Hartmann, 1976: 138).

Hartmann basically claims that social-male authority that was present in tribal customs turned into public-male authority through the political structure imposed by the state. "Since the state is interested in the alienation of the tribal resource base-its land and its

labour power -it finds it convenient to use the traditional gender division of labour and resources in tribal society and places them in a hierarchical relationship both internally (husband over wife and children) and externally (lords over peasants and serfs) (Hartmann, 1976: 145)". She gives some historical examples to show how the promotions of the state served male interests. For instance, she indicates that the men of the medical profession could only forestall midwifery through the state's assistance. If it was not for the state's promotion of "scientific" skills that are presumably gender-neutral, medical profession could not find a legitimate base for replacing midwifery (Hartmann, 1976: 151); undermining a very important occupation for women that did not only provide them economic independence but also a high social status.

Probably the greatest contribution made to feminist conceptualisations of the state came from Catherine MacKinnon in her 1989 dated book, *Toward A Feminist Theory of the State* (1989). MacKinnon argues that the state is a male institution. It institutionalises its power in its male form (Hoffman, 2001: 95). The state is assumed to be and acknowledged as rational, which is popularly considered as essentially a male trait. Its rationality translates into point-of-viewlessness, which is accepted as a norm and it is this objectivity and rationality that makes the state a male institution (MacKinnon, 2003: 189). In this framework, the law is a crucial element as it "perfects the state as the mirror of the society" (MacKinnon, 2003: 189). It is seen as the most important institution of the state that is the basic tool and symbol of male power that distorts "social reality in the interest of men and [is] thus integral to patriarchal culture" (Haney, 2000: 644). Thus, MacKinnon stresses that "even if the laws on rape, abortion and pornography are formally there, they are never fully enforced"⁹ (Kantola, 2006: 6).

Despite the fact that socialist feminist theories on the state are more comprehensive and include aspects that are underlined both by Marxist and radical feminists, they have been subjected to certain criticisms, mainly by black and Third World feminists. Despite the criticisms that it faces, socialist feminism has managed to analyse capitalism, the state and patriarchy in relation to each other. It has filled various gaps that neither radical nor Marxist feminists had not been able to fill for decades.

All the "others": Lesbian Feminism, Ecofeminism, Race and Ethnicity, Third World Impacts

All of the above mentioned waves of feminisms have been criticised by all the "others": lesbian

⁸ Some authors prefer to list Heidi Hartmann as a Marxist feminist because unlike Eisenstein, she was a single system theorist. I chose to list her under socialist feminism.

⁹ In fact, due to her efforts to integrate the "private" issues into the analysis of the state, some authors like Johanna Kantola regard MacKinnon as a radical feminist. However, she will be regarded as a socialist feminist in this paper since her theory of the state is based on the analogy between work in a Marxist sense and sexuality in a feminist sense. See MacKinnon, 2003.

feminists, ecofeminists, feminists of different colours and ethnicities, and feminists of the Third World.

One of the strongest attacks that feminisms of all sorts in the Western world had to encounter came from black feminists, who claimed that both Marxist and radical feminist analyses of the state fail to address the fact that state policies are shaped also in the light of race and ethnicity, not solely in accordance with class interests as Marxists claim or not solely in accordance with gendered interests as radical feminists claim (Charles, 2000: 21). Third World feminists have also criticised both radical and liberal feminisms with regard to the fact that they do not take into account the experiences of Third World women under post-colonial states (Kantola, 2006: 7). To the feminists of the Third World, feminist theories seemed to address only to the problems of white, middle class, First World women:

Third World feminists and feminists of colour began to talk about race, class and gender as intrinsic to each other, as social constructions, realities, identities emerging in particular social moments and local places, but shaped by processes such as colonialist capital expansion, nation building, and war (Acker, 1999: 51).

Roughly starting from the 1960s and the 1970s, lesbian feminist accounts also began to criticise other Western feminist branches for being homophobic and heteronormative. For instance Charlotte Bunch criticised the socialist feminist concept, family-wage, for not taking into account lesbian workers (Donovan, 2006: 177).

In 1971, a group of lesbian feminists called *Radicalesbians* set the grounds of lesbian feminist theory. "Trying to get away from the concept of lesbianism as a strictly sexual identity, the *Radicalesbians* argue[d] that the lesbian [was] really a natural, 'unconscious' feminist, a woman who devote[d] her energies to other women, who refuse[d] to be identified in terms of a man (Donovan, 2006: 174)". They refused "male-identified" categories and argued that "only women [could] give to each other a new sense of self", calling for "woman identified" women (Donovan, 2006: 175).

Among the most important contributions of lesbian feminists to feminist literature was the attempt to define heterosexuality. For instance Adrienne Rich saw compulsory heterosexuality as a political institution that was a beachhead of male dominance (Rich, 1980: 633, 637). According to Rich, this institution curtails woman-identification, which is a potential springhead of female power (Rich, 1980: 657).

Lesbian feminists' suggestion for women's emancipation was lesbian separatism; i.e. nonparticipation in the institution of heterosexuality (Tong, 1989: 125). Lesbian feminists like Martha Shelley and Elsa Gidlow saw "the lesbian" as a model for an independent strong woman (Donovan, 2006: 176) and

others like Sydney Abbott and Barbara Love argued that lesbianism was a model for egalitarian bonds (Donovan, 2006: 177).

Ecofeminism, which began to emerge roughly in the 1990s, was also critical of mainstream feminist accounts. Although feminists of various branches had also taken into account animal rights, it was not until the rise of ecofeminism that ecological issues began to be an integral part of feminist theory and practice:

One of the main theoretical projects of ecofeminism is to construct new ways of thinking about the relationship between human and nature, including animal, replacing the dualistic, objectifying mode characteristic of Western science (Donovan, 2006: 219).

Many ecofeminists establish a positive identification between women and nature (Donovan, 2006: 217). Ecofeminists argue that "the domination of women and the domination of nature are integral. (Donovan, 2006: 218)".

The problem with all these forms of "otherness" is that it carries contemporary feminist literature to postmodernism as a unifying social theory. While the ecofeminist cherish of the nature may sound lovely, it can not escape from the Enlightenment dichotomy between the natural and the rational as has been used to further marginalise women in various feminist accounts. Lesbian feminists' attempt to build "the lesbian" as the role model is also problematic. Quiet ironically, such a viewpoint becomes highly biphobic and transphobic, further ignoring the differences between women arising from sexual orientation and gender identity.

VI. POSTMODERN FEMINIST ACCOUNTS OF THE STATE

Postmodernism challenges the metanarratives of Western civilisation, particularly the Enlightenment idea of the presence of a historically progressive science (Donovan, 2006: 213). Hence postmodernists "make us sceptical about beliefs concerning truth, knowledge, power, the self, and language that are often taken for granted within and serve as legitimation for contemporary Western culture (Flax, 1990: 41)". Postmodernists like Foucault also reject the grand institutions of Western civilisation, which reify dominative practices (Donovan, 2006: 213).

Contrary to all the above examined waves of feminism, postmodern¹⁰ feminism defines the state as a "differentiated set of institutions, agencies and

¹⁰ Kantola prefers to use the term post-structuralism instead. I used to think in line with Kantola on this manner, yet in the 21st century, it seems that what we name as post-structuralism is actually postmodernism. Hence I would like to associate, from here onwards, structuralism with Marxist conceptualisations instead.

discourses” rather than a unitary body (Kantola, 2006: 12). Hence, postmodern feminists focus on state policies and discourses rather than state institutions per se. In this analysis, the state is not essentially patriarchal but “was historically constructed as patriarchal in a political process whose outcome is open” (Kantola, 2006: 12). In such an analysis, neither the state nor masculinity appears as singular sources of power (Kantola, 2006: 7). Postmodern feminists claim that all of the above mentioned theories analyse the state as if it was a unified, singular institution. They claim that the state is indeed composed of “a set of arenas that lack coherence” (Kantola, 2006: 12), thus that we cannot conceptualise it as a unified body. Drawing attention to the differences between and within states, postmodern feminism examines how states and state institutions like municipalities, home care centres etc. pursue various policies and discourses while constructing gender (Kantola, 2006: 137).

The most important criticisms that postmodernist feminists direct towards previous feminist theories are the conceptualisations, “woman” and “patriarchy” (Walby, 1992: 33). Postmodernist feminists argue that such concepts are essentialist, and are unable to deal with questions of difference:

...Not only is there no unity to the category of “woman”, but an analyses based on a dichotomy between “women” and “men” necessarily suffer from the flaw of essentialism. Instead, there are considered to be a number of overlapping, cross-cutting discourses of femininities and masculinities which are historically and culturally variable (Walby, 1992: 34).

In Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, Jane Flax defines “gender relations” as a category meant to capture a complex set of social processes that are constituted by and through interrelated parts (Flax, 1990: 44):

Through gender relations two types of persons are created: man and women... Nevertheless, gender relations so far as we have been able to understand them have been (more or less) relations of domination. That is, gender relations have been (more) defined and (imperfectly) controlled by one of their interrelated aspects- the man (Flax, 1990: 45).

Flax adds that “to the extent that feminist discourse defines its problematic as “woman”, it also ironically privileges the man as unproblematic or exempted from determination by gender relations (Flax, 1990: 45)” when in fact men too are prisoners of gender, “although in highly differentiated but interrelated ways” (Flax, 1990: 45).

Despite acknowledging the differences between and within states in constructing gender,

postmodernism faces severe criticisms. Some poststructuralist feminists like Chris Weedon stick to the argument that the state has a hegemonic language in reproducing both the fundamentals of capitalist mode of production and patriarchy (Weedon, 1987: 29). However, since they see language as a “site of disunity and conflict” in which social actors are active agents in interpreting and reinterpreting discourses, they believe that language carries the potential for feminist political struggle as well as the preservation of the status quo (Weedon, 1987: 12-29).

Another criticism that postmodernist feminism receives is that while analysing the state, they focus too much on discourses and undermine the role of institutions and policies (Kantola, 2006: 13). I think that the emphasis on discourses and the conceptualisation of the state as differentiated and constantly changing are meaningful contributions to a feminist theory of the state. Yet the political implication of postmodernism is that it blocks the possibility of generic political identity and political action (Donovan, 2006: 214). In addition, as Walby argues, postmodernist feminism not only neglects the social context of power relations, but also that “woman” and “man” as signifiers still have sufficient cross-cultural continuity (Walby, 1992: 36).

VII. INSTEAD OF CONCLUSION: ONE MAJOR CRITICAL PARADIGM

Bir yandan “kayıt düşmek” için, diğer yandan, harekette kadınların kendileri ve birbirleri üzerine düşünmelerinin, bu düşüncelerini paylaşmalarının değerine olan inancımızın bir ifadesi. Bizce ancak böyle bir düşünme/tartışma süreci yapıp ettiklerimizle birlikte bizi bir “hareket” haline getirebilir.

Aksu Bora-Asena Günel, 90'larda Türkiye'de Feminizm, 2002

It is obvious that existing feminist theories on the state provide important insights regarding the relationship between the state and the asymmetrical social relations. Though eclectic approaches are usually criticised for having inherited the flaws in the theories that are taken into account, I think that within the limits of this paper, it may still be meaningful to combine the strongest emphases of the theories that are elaborated.

The liberal idea that the state is a neutral arbiter should be abandoned. Socialist and radical feminisms express that historically, this is not the case and that all states have favoured the interests of the powerful. The socialist feminist argument that despite the interests of men and capital are at times contradictory, mostly through its allegedly neutral and rational institution, the law, state pursues policies that produce and reproduce the dominance of men over women, makes it easier for capital to benefit from women's cheap labour while

simultaneously defining women as housewives so that both men and capital benefit from women reproducing the labour force gratis, creates a potential for further analyses. At the same time, the state is an active agent in the commoditisation of bodies and sexualities through the legislations on pornography, prostitution/sex work etc.

How should the feminist political struggle approach the state is the important question to be answered after this literature review. I think that the radical feminist argument, which offers an anti-statist political struggle might appear fascinating in the first glance, but it has its own limitations. Although Marxist and socialist feminisms envisage that state policies, institutions and discourses are oppressive against women, none of them realise, as do radical feminists that it is the civil society rather than the state, which is the sphere, where women should fight against gender inequalities. Historically, no nation-state has ever struggled against unequal gendered relations. Anthropologic work has even shown that non-patriarchal societies were turned into patriarchal ones through divide and rule policies between men and women pursued by nation-states. The fact that historical socialisms have failed to emancipate women and other minority groups despite their theoretical claim to do so initially leaves a room for women to organise in their own right. Feminism, as one critical paradigm and various women's struggles all over the world indicate that active involvement in state policies may carry a potential to change how the state functions. In order to develop a common sense on the relationship between the state(s), the market and the (civil) society, finding historical data that are not contaminated by malestream knowledge remains at the top of the agenda of the feminist political struggle.

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Youth Participation in Programmes Intended to Benefit Them: The Case of Ghana's National Youth Employment Programme

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Abstract - The essence of governance and representative democracy is for elected leaders to formulate and implement appropriate policies on behalf of the people to deal with the quagmires of poverty and under-development among them. In doing this, sometimes it becomes necessary to consult the people, especially, the particular group that a policy is targeted at, to ensure that first-hand and adequate information is gathered to facilitate the design and implementation of appropriate policies to deal with that group's problems. In Ghana, since 1992, development plans have been formulated and implemented with little or no participation of the youth even though they constitute the bulk of the nation's labour force and voting population. The youth were also marginalized in the formulation and implementation of the National Youth Employment Programme, a programme intended to benefit them and to deal with unemployment among them.

Keywords : Youth; Participation; Employment; Programme; and Task Force.

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YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN PROGRAMMES INTENDED TO BENEFIT THEM THE CASE OF GHANAS NATIONAL YOUTH EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME

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Abstract - The essence of governance and representative democracy is for elected leaders to formulate and implement appropriate policies on behalf of the people to deal with the quagmires of poverty and under-development among them. In doing this, sometimes it becomes necessary to consult the people, especially, the particular group that a policy is targeted at, to ensure that first-hand and adequate information is gathered to facilitate the design and implementation of appropriate policies to deal with that group's problems. In Ghana, since 1992, development plans have been formulated and implemented with little or no participation of the youth even though they constitute the bulk of the nation's labour force and voting population. The youth were also marginalized in the formulation and implementation of the National Youth Employment Programme, a programme intended to benefit them and to deal with unemployment among them. Consequently, the programme is saddled with several challenges most of which could have been avoided if the youth had been part of the NYEP process. What is the NYEP all about? How was it formulated and implemented? What role did the youth play in the NYEP process? What explain their weak role in the NYEP process? What are the effects of the weak role of the youth in the NYEP process on the programme? What can be done to strengthen the programme to deliver on its mandate in solving the problem of youth unemployment? These questions are addressed in the paper.

Keywords : Youth; Participation; Employment; Programme; and Task Force.

1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

It has been estimated that youth unemployment has risen from 14.8% in 1992 to 16.4% in 2000 and came close to 29% in 2009 (ISSER, 2010). While several development policies have been formulated by the National Development Planning Commission, these have not yielded sufficient employment opportunities, a situation which has disproportionately affected the youth. Though about 250,000 young people enter the labour market annually, the formal sector is able to engage only 2% leaving 98% to strive to survive in the informal sector or remain unemployed (ibid:189). Indeed, the youth are about 3.5 times more likely to be unemployed than adults, suggesting that they have substantial difficulty in the labour market (ibid: 187). It is therefore evident that there is a need for a holistic and

sustainable youth employment programme, not only to help youth find meaningful work and a secure their future, but also to help avert the negative security implications youth joblessness could have on a country's peace, development and democratic dispensation (Amoo, 2011).

The essence of governance and representative democracy is for elected leaders to formulate and implement appropriate policies on behalf of the people to deal with the quagmires of poverty and under-development among them. In doing this, sometimes it becomes necessary to consult the people, especially, the particular group that a policy is targeted at, to ensure that first-hand and adequate information is gathered to facilitate the design and implementation of appropriate policies to deal with that group's problems. In many developed countries, several programmes have been put in place to tackle the employment needs of their youth. In the USA for example youth employment programmes including Jobs for America's Graduates, Youth-Build USA, and Job Corps have been formulated and implemented to deal with unemployment among different segments of their youth (Collura, 2010). Similarly, in Ghana, the National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP) is seen as a major programme initiated in 2006 by the administration of President J.A. Kufuor to deal with unemployment among the youth who according to the nation's 2000 Population and Housing Census constitute about 60% of the population of about 20 million. However, the programme has proven to be woefully inadequate in sustainably dealing with the huge problems of unemployment among Ghana's youth due to the serious setbacks it suffers. By the end of 2011, the NYEP had offered jobs to only about 108,000 Ghanaians (Attipoe-Fitz, 2010). But this can be described as a drop in an ocean considering the fact that this is statistically negligible and the programme does not address the specific interest of the youth to secure good and sustainable jobs for a sound future (Donkoh, 2010). Indeed, for the first time in the history of Ghana, the Unemployed Graduates Association of Ghana was launched in 2011 to protest about the alarming rate of youth unemployment among all segments of the youth in Ghana in spite of the existence and full operation of the NYEP.

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How such important programmes like the NYEP are formulated is crucial in ensuring that they benefit those they were meant for. In this regard, it is significant to note that in formulating the youth employment programmes in the USA for instance, the youth were consulted and they actively participated in the process, particularly at the community level (Collura, 2010). Indeed, the 1991 and 2001 Reports of the US Department of Labour clearly documents how different youth groups participated in the formulation and implementation of employment programmes meant for them in a manner that made those programmes relevant in effectively dealing with their joblessness. On the contrary, the situation is different in Ghana. The NYEP, a programme intended to benefit the youth is an elite-prescribed programme and has no room for the youth even in its implementation. If the youth had been part of its formulation and implementation, they would have made input and ventilated their peculiar challenges relating to unemployment and how the programme could advance their long term interest.

Studies of existing youth employment programmes show that they make less of a short-term impact but a few, particularly in the developed world have much more impact over the long term (Jekielek, Cochran, & Hair, 2002; O'Sullivan, 2000; Clymer, Edwards, & Wyckoff, 2002; Sum & Khatiwada, 2006; Small and Memmo, 2004; Cross, 2004; and Schochet, Burghardt, & McConnel, 2008). In general, youth employment programmes should emphasize long-term goals such as keeping a young person employed and advancing in the workforce (Attipoe-Fitz, 2010). Although youth in job training and employment programmes benefits from the immediacy of a paycheck, the long term benefits of excellent programmes can secure better jobs with higher salaries, benefits, and opportunities for advancement (Collura, 2010). This is the direct interest and aspiration of every young person that can effectively be championed by the youth themselves when they are made part of the process of formulating and implementing programmes meant for them (ibid).

This paper therefore takes an overview of the NYEP. It highlights how it was formulated and is being implemented with particular emphasis on the role of the youth, if any, in the processes. It explains the reasons for the particular role of the youth in the NYEP process and discusses the achievements and challenges of the programme. The paper concludes on the note that youth participation in the "NYEP process" could have strengthened the programme in effectively dealing with youth unemployment and averted the current situation where its challenges far out-weighs its gains and threatens its viability and sustainability.

II. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

The concept of participation underpins this study. The United Nations Declaration of Human Rights (1948) emphasized participation by all segments of society in decision making as a matter of right. Scaff (1975) defines participation from two distinct angles. Briefly, one angle emphasizes the idea of sharing in common life and acting on the basis of reciprocity in order to promote the "public good". The other angle looks at participation as an act of exchange, as an instrumental means for gaining power in order to increase the probability of realizing private benefits (ibid:449). Draht (2003) however emphasizes 'participatory development', as being the engagement of the greatest number of citizens in the formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of development programmes and projects in order to uplift their standards. Such programmes and projects are desirably community based.

According to the Karol Wojtyla's theory of participation, '...the term participation points to the ability of the person to exist and act together with others without losing oneself as he moves towards his self-fulfillment. As the antithesis of alienation, participation allows the person to fully experience himself as well as to experience the humanity of other persons. Participation is not simply the fact of being physically present to one another in a group activity. It is possible that people exist as a group yet pursue their goals individually or in isolation. Participation is not something which simply happens but is a result of a person's conscious striving for fulfillment...' (Mejos, 2007).

There are two levels of participation, 'pseudo' and 'genuine' participation. Participation is 'pseudo' when its purposes are to inform citizens about decisions, placate their complaints and manipulate their opinions. 'Genuine' participation which is encouraged by leaders who are willing to be accountable for their actions occurs only when the public is involved in administrative decision making and citizens are the owners of government and the co-producers of public goods (Wang, 2001:323). In 'genuine' participation, citizens are dominant discussants, decision makers and implementers and government's supplementary role is to set goals, provide incentives, monitor processes and provide information (ibid). Participation in decision making is seen as evidence of "genuine" or meaningful participation because it allows 'public beliefs and values' to be realized (Bryant and White, 1982: 208). According to Cohen and Uphoff, (1978:11), genuine participation has a notable counter insurgency quality about it and serves as an alternative to revolutionary movements. In the view of Dryzek (1996), participation in the polity is more crucial than participation in the state. Participation in the state is merely co-optation of a group's leadership into the state in a manner that

weakens the group's ability to effectively advocate its interest (ibid: 478). On the other hand, participation in the polity on the other hand refers to the exercise of rights by oppositional civil society groups as citizens without any hindrance. This takes the form of lobbying, strikes, demonstrations in order to champion their own interest and to keep governments on their toes (ibid: 480).

Bryant and White (1982) have identified several factors that may encourage or block participation. Notable among them include the fact that people's income level could either boost or weaken their participation in a process. People may also participate when their contribution is more apt to be noticed and make a difference. Moreover, the composite elements of social environment including education, training and mentorship programmes may also influence participation negatively or positively.

In measuring participation this study employs four major indices namely: representation; meaningful contribution to planning process; influencing planning process; and ownership of plans. Representation according to Pitkin (1967) denotes trusteeship and means acting in the best interest of the represented, in a manner responsive to them. There is substantive representative when leaders act independently and exercise discretion as well as judgment. Those who are being represented must have a say in the appointment of their leaders and their removal if such leaders fail to advance the cause of their constituents (ibid: 112). She argues further that if superior wisdom and ability resides in the representative, he must not subordinate them to the opinions of his ignorant and inferior constituents. Conversely, to the extent that a representative and his constituents are relatively equal in wisdom, and in capacity, he would be required to consult his constituents (ibid:142). According to her, the more people identify and get attached to their interests; and the more decisions to be taken are likely to affect local interests, the more likely representatives would be required to consult the constituents and act in response to what they require. When consulted, citizens should be deeply involved and must be able to contribute meaningfully to the decision making process. Such contributions should be able to influence the decision making process in a manner that satisfies their interests (Rosener, 1978: 459). Influence is the ability to convince a decision maker to reach a certain decision (Adler and Bobrow, 1956). Finally, citizens must own the final policy outcomes that are made. Ownership is the feeling of an exclusive right conferred by a lawful claim and subject to certain restrictions to possess, enjoy, protect and defend an item of property (Mackin, 1996). The extent to which people own or attach a sense of ownership to programmes determines the level of their participation. According to Rosener, (1978), having a

say in the selection of leaders and formulation of policies breeds ownership.

III. CLARIFYING OTHER CONCEPTS

The term "youth" refers to those young men and women between the ages of 15-35 years as defined by Ghana's 2010 National Youth Policy and the African Youth Charter. However, given that the NYEP employs Ghanaian youth between the ages of 18–35 years who are literate, illiterate, able and or disabled, the term is also used in accordance with the age bracket at which one could be employed under the NYEP. The term may be used interchangeably with "young people". The term "NYEP process" is used in this paper to refer to how the programme was formulated and is currently being implemented.

IV. OVERVIEW OF THE NYEP

From 2001, several attempts were made in Ghana to address the problem of youth unemployment and underemployment. The government first registered about, 950,000 young people from different educational, trades and professional backgrounds who needed employment. Other initiatives that followed include the Skills Training and Employment Placement (STEP) Programme, an attempt to establish a National Youth Fund (NYF) as well as various micro-credit schemes to support small-scale enterprises (NYEP Guidelines, 2006:1). While the government's efforts were largely acknowledged as being a step in the right direction, the problem of youth employment persisted and the unemployment rate among the youth rose to 25.6 percent in 2005 (NYEP Review Report, 2009:5).

The National Youth Employment Programme (NYEP), also called the National Youth Job Corps Programme, was a special policy initiated by the NPP government in 2006 based on a presidential directive to ensure that the youth including Junior High School (JHS) and Senior High School (SHS), Technical/Vocational School graduates as well as school dropouts and illiterate youth, would be actively engaged in some productive employment (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010). The objective of the programme was to help reduce unemployment, under-employment, satisfy national needs such as food security and equip the youth with some work experience for permanent employment (ibid). This programme was not backed by an act of parliament; it was designed to help achieve the Millennium Development Goal of reducing poverty (Donkoh, 2009). Young people recruited under the programme were to exit after two years to search for permanent jobs in other sectors of the economy or proceed for further education (NYEP, 2006:3). The programme was intended to cover a wide spectrum of economic ventures and social service activities in local communities.

The programme was initially developed as a Ten-Module Youth Employment Programme to form the first phase of a two-phased programme. The first phase focused on short term activities that would create jobs for the youth, while the second phase would take a long term view of employment issues within the context of the GPRS (II). The first phase of the programme covered all the ten modules; namely, Youth-in-Agri-Business; Youth-in-Trades and Vocations; Youth-in-ICT (Information, Communication and Technology); Community Protection System; Waste and Sanitation Management Corps; Rural Education Teachers Assistants; Paid Internships and Industrial Attachments; Vacation Jobs; and Volunteer Services (ibid:4). On assumption of office in January 2009, the NDC government added four more modules to the programme; namely, Youth in Eco Brigade, Youth in Afforestation, Youth in Road Repairs and Maintenance and Youth in Film Industry. The NDC government also extended the Trades and Vocation module to encompass Youth in Mobile Phone Repairs, Sachet Water Production and Bamboo Processing (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010).

V. NYEP- POLICY INITIATION

At a cabinet meeting on March 2005, the National Security Coordinator in the NPP administration, Dr. Sam G. Amoo presented a paper discussing the high incidence of youth unemployment in Ghana and its threat to national security, peace and stability. President J.A. Kufuor directed the National Security Coordinator to urgently put in place a team to identify the appropriate mechanisms and practical means to deal with the problem (Amoo, 2011). This directive marked the beginning of the processes towards the formulation of the NYEP, a quick a solution to youth unemployment in Ghana.¹

VI. FORMULATING THE NYEP

Initially, the National Security Coordinator put together a ten-member committee to brainstorm and formulate the programme. The committee comprised the National Security Co-ordinator and five senior members from the National Security Advisory Team and three senior officials of the NYC. The members were:

1. Dr. Sam Amoo- National Security Co-ordinator/Chairman of Committee;

2. Major Abubakar Sulemana – National Security Advisor
3. Colonel Ebenezer Ghartey- National Security
4. Naval Captain Nathaniel Ankobea- National Security
5. Mr. S.D Afari- National Security
6. Mr. Fiifi Mbiah- National Security
7. Mr. Achibald Donkoh - Acting National Coordinator, NYC
8. Mr. Amankwah Manu - Deputy National Coordinator (Finance and Administration) NYC
9. Mr. Alex Owusu- Director in Charge of Agric Project, NYC (NYEP Committee Report, 2005:2).

The tenth member of the committee, Mr. Kweku Adu Mensah, was recruited as a consultant by the National Security Coordinator to assist with policy formulation.² Membership of the committee was dominated by National Security in view of the security implications of youth unemployment and the need to find an immediate solution to it (Amoo, 2011). "It was also important to bring the top echelon of the NYC on board so that they could share their experience in youth development issues with the committee" (ibid). The Consultant was recruited to assist the committee because of his long standing experience in agricultural production and export. His knowledge and experience about the various sectors of agriculture that could provide employment to the youth and promote food sufficiency as well as national development was crucial (ibid). The main objective of the committee was to identify projects with economic potential that can generate immediate employment for as many young people as possible in order to check their idleness and drift from the rural to urban communities in search of non-existent jobs (NYEP Guidelines, 2006:2).

The meetings of the committee lasted six months during which a wide spectrum of economic and social service activities that could be pursued by the youth as employment were identified (NYEP Committee Report, 2005:10). However to ensure a cross sectoral planning and in view of the fact that issues relating to employment cuts across all sectors of the economy, the membership of the committee was later enhanced to include the ministers of Agriculture, Fisheries, Forestry, Local Government and Rural Development, and Trade and Industry and constituted into a Planning Team.³ The

¹ In an interview with Dr. Sam G. Amoo, former National Security Coordinator in the Kufuor regime in Accra on 26th January 2010, he showed me a Memorandum dated the 28th of March 2005 and signed by Mr. Frank Mpare, Secretary to Cabinet requesting him to constitute a team to design a well-coordinated and integrated national programme which will provide a quick solution to youth unemployment in a concerted and much focused manner. The programme to be designed was also to empower the youth to be able to contribute more productively towards the socio-economic and sustainable development of the nation.

² In a letter to Mr. Kweku Adu-Mensah, the then director of the Ghana Export Promotion Council and an expert in agricultural production and export, dated on 15th April 2005 and signed by the National Security Coordinator he was invited to serve as a consultant to the committee to formulate a well-coordinated and integrated national programme which will address youth unemployment in Ghana.

³ In a report of the first six months proceedings of the meetings of the ten-member committee put in place by the then National Security Coordinator, dated the 18th October, 2005, a decision was taken to enhance the membership of the committee to ensure a cross sectoral planning about how to tackle youth unemployment in the country. The specific ministries that were selected to be part of the planning team were the ministries of agriculture, fisheries, forestry, local government

Planning Team developed the first Ten-Module Youth Employment Programme and the implementation policy guidelines to form the first phase of a two-phased programme.

The programme was approved by cabinet and subsequently launched in March 2006 (Adu-Mensah, 2011). The MYS was then tasked to set up the NYEP Secretariat⁴ to commence recruitment and placement across the country (Adu-Mensah, 2011). As indicated earlier, the NDC government added four more modules to the programme (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010).

VII. IMPLEMENTING THE NYEP

The youth were expected to play crucial role in implementing the NYEP even though they did not participate in its formulation. However, even though the NYEP is expected to benefit the youth, they do not get the opportunity to directly participate in the implementation structures of the programme. A critical analysis of the implementation process of the NYEP shows that the participation of the youth in implementing the programme exists only in theory. First, an implementation task force on which youth groups in Ghana are represented was to be established to implement the NYEP. Indeed, the Youth Employment Implementation Guidelines (2006), states that “ there shall be established a National Youth Employment Task Force (NYETF) which shall have representation from the following state agencies as well as some relevant Civil Society Organizations (CSOs): Office of the President (Micro-Finance and Small Loans Center); Ministry of Youth and Sports (MYS); Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP); Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development (MLGRD); Ministry of Private Sector Development and Presidential Special Initiatives (MPSD&PSI); Ministry of Food and Agriculture; Ministry of Trade and Industry; Ministry of Communications; Ministry of Education and Sports; Ministry of Health; Two Members of Parliament; Ministry of Mines, Lands and Forestry; Ministry of Environment; Ministry of Interior; National Security Council Secretariat; National Disaster Management Organization; National Employment Task Force Co-ordinator; and Two representatives of the youth groups in Ghana” (NYEP Implementation Guidelines, 2006:12).

The functions of the NYETF include providing guidelines for the formulation of Short and Medium Term Strategic Plans for the NYEP; including: designing

and rural development, and trade and industry. The ministers in charge of these ministries were accordingly invited to serve on the planning team.

⁴ In a letter to Hon. Joseph Kofi Adda, the then minister for Manpower, Youth and Employment, dated 10th April 2006 and signed by the Chief of Staff, Mr. Kwadwo Mpiani, a directive was given for the NYEP Secretariat to be set up under the then Ministry of Manpower, Youth and Employment (MMYE).

guidelines for implementing the NYEP; approving programmes and projects; sourcing and allocation of funds and other resources; sensitizing and training of programme managers at all levels; monitoring and evaluating the programmes' activities; and setting targets and signing performance contracts with Metropolitan/Municipal/District Employment Task Forces (MMDETF); developing policy recommendations for government's consideration through the Ministry responsible for employment to strengthen employment programmes; and undertaking any other functions assigned it by the Ministry of MMYE to ensure the success of the programme (ibid:13).

The implementation of the NYEP at the district level is to be monitored at the regional level by a Regional Monitoring Team (RMT). This Team has the responsibility only to monitor, evaluate and report on the implementation and progress of the programme (NYEP Implementation Guidelines 2006:14). It is chaired by the Regional Minister or in his absence, his Deputy. A Regional Liaison Officer was to serve as Secretary to the Team (ibid). The RMT comprises: the Regional Minister or the Deputy Regional Minister; the Regional Co-ordinator for the NYC; the Regional Labour Officer; the Regional Cooperatives Officer; the Regional Director of Agriculture; the Regional Director of Education; the Regional Director of Health; and the Regional Liaison Officer (ibid).

At the metropolitan, municipal and district level, MMDETF chaired by the MMDCE is to assist in the successful implementation of the programme. This district body is entrusted with the responsibility of identifying, mobilizing and sensitizing the unemployed youth to participate in the programme; identifying potential economic and social activities in the districts for sponsorship; seeing to the timely disbursement of funds to the beneficiary groups and be accountable for the recovery of such funds; submitting monthly, quarterly and annual reports to the National Employment Task Force with copies to the RMT by the 10th day of the following month; and undertaking costing of programmes and projects (ibid:15). The MMDETF consists : the MMDCE ; the Metropolitan / Municipal / District Employment Coordinator; the Metropolitan / Municipal / District Director of Agriculture ; the Metropolitan/ Municipal /District Director of Health; the Metropolitan / Municipal / District Director of Education; two other members appointed by the MMYE; and two representatives each from youth groups at the district, one of whom must be a female (ibid:14).

VIII. ANALYZING AND CRITIQUING YOUTH PARTICIPATION IN THE NYEP PROCESS

a) Formulation

The analysis of youth participation in formulating the NYEP is based on the indices of participation as already discussed. The Committee that initiated the processes towards the formulation of the NYEP was dominated by national security officials. These were not experts on issues related to youth unemployment; yet they made no serious effort to seek the views of the youth on the problem.⁵ Ironically, the 2008 NYP which was initiated by the same NPP government received direct input from virtually all the youth groups in the country through the nation-wide workshops and symposia that were organized (Donkoh, 2010).⁶ Given that no one can claim mastery and understanding of youth problems better than the youth themselves, it would have been appropriate to have consulted them in formulating the NYEP. Youth ownership of the 2008 youth policy was not in question. According to some youth leaders, its implementation would have been smooth and successful had it not been jettisoned by the NDC government in 2009.⁷ Because the youth were not consulted in formulating the NYEP, they could not influence the process. Youth ownership of the programme is therefore problematic. "...Most of them see the NYEP not as their own programme. They have no feeling that it belongs to them and must be protected and sustained. Their lackadaisical attitude to work and misuse and abuse of office equipment at the various NYEP offices is an ample testimony of their lack of ownership of the programme..." (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010).

Again, as argued by Pitkin (1967), the NYEP, which is a programme developed for the youth is expected to promote the interest of its beneficiaries. In

reality the programme is bedeviled with several challenges that render it ineffective and weak in promoting the interest of the youth and dealing with the issue of unemployment among them. First of all, it is to be conceded that by the end of December 2011, the programme had provided employment opportunities to about 108,000 young people in Ghana. However in practice, this amounts to less than two percent of the youth in Ghana (ISSER, 2010) and therefore cannot be seen as a serious effort to advance the interest of the youth in the area of employment. The World Bank's 2011 country statistics for youth unemployment in Ghana states that 65 percent of Ghanaian youth are unemployed. Indeed, according to the Ghana Trades Union Congress (2011) every year, youth unemployment in Ghana increases by 250,000.

In the view of Obeng (2011) "even though the NYEP provides some employment for the youth, especially those with little or no education, its contribution to the fight against unemployment is seen as a drop in the ocean because only a few of the youth are employed under the scheme." Secondly, since 2006, funding for the programme has always been delayed besides being woefully inadequate. For example, by September 2010, the NYEP Secretariat had not received funding for that year. This had resulted in delays in the payment of employee allowances (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010). Table 1 tells the story of inadequate funding for the NYEP between 2006 and 2008.

Table 1: Funds Expected and Funds Received for the NYEP, 2006-2008.

YEAR	EXPECTED FUNDS (GH¢)	TOTAL RECEIPTS (GH¢)
2006	93,055,075.67	9,048,532.57
2007	53,258,724.90	44,123,012.77
2008	63,065,502.60	61,123,629.31

(Source: NYEP Report to the Transitional Team in February 2009)

In 2006 the government promised to pay an amount of GH¢ 100 billion as subvention for the programme every year. However, this has never been fulfilled. As table 8 depicts, a small fraction of this amount is paid annually while the cost of running the programme since 2006 has always exceeded the funds received from the government. Furthermore, the monthly stipend paid to employees under the programme is inadequate. For example, by July 2010, those with no formal education received GH¢ 50.00; SHS graduates received GH¢ 80.00; diploma holders were paid GH¢100.00; and those with first degrees were paid GH¢150.00. Such poor stipend has further dampened the morale of the youth and forced some of them to quit their jobs in search of alternatives (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010). Moreover, the programme does not provide sustained

⁵In an interview with Dr. Sam G. Amoo, former National Security Coordinator in the Kufuor administration in Accra on 26th January 2010, he admitted that he and his team who formulated the NYEP were not experts on issues related to youth unemployment and may have glossed over crucial issues that could have made the NYEP more effective in solving the problem of youth unemployment during its formulation process. He explained that the need to urgently tackle the problem of youth unemployment without delay was paramount and superseded "the luxury of consulting the youth themselves for their input". This, according to him would have been a time consuming exercise.

⁶ The initiative to consult and solicit direct youth contribution and influence in the drafting of the 2008 national youth policy was in tandem with the view of Pitkin (1967) who argued that representatives must consult their constituents in areas where the constituents and representatives are relatively equal in wisdom and capacity.

⁷ The three NUGS Presidents who made contributions to the formulation of the *Ghana Vision 2020* (Haruna Iddrisu) and the *Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy I* (William Yamoah) & *Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy II* (Ken Abotsi) made this point when I interviewed them separately between 14th and 20th October, 2010 in Accra.

employment opportunity for the youth, contrary to their aspirations to secure permanent jobs after school (Donkoh, 2010). They are employed under the programme for a maximum period of 2 years. If they fail to secure jobs elsewhere by the end of this period, they revert to their unemployed situation. For example, between 2009 and 2010, over 90 percent of those who exited from the programme could not secure alternative jobs and had no means to further their education (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010).

b) Implementation

In implementing the NYEP too, the composition of the NYETF of the NYEP can be described as lopsided and ambiguous as far as youth participation is concerned. Given that almost 4000 registered youth groups exist in Ghana, two representatives from the youth groups in Ghana on the Task force is inadequate. Moreover, there is no clarity regarding which of the youth groups to be selected to represent the youth on the NYETF. This has the tendency to allow politicians to co-opt or hand-pick their favorite youth groups to serve as members. These co-opted youth groups may work to champion partisan and not necessarily youth interest.

On the average, there are about 180 registered youth groups in every region of the country (Etsibah, 2010). However no youth group is represented on the RMT. Even though this situation poses a challenge to youth participation, Attipoe-Fittz (2010) has argued that "the role of the RMT is not to implement but merely monitor the implementation of the NYEP at the districts where the chunk of the beneficiaries are located." Perhaps, this explains why the Regional Co-ordinator for the NYC is made a member of the RMT and not the youth groups themselves.

At the district level, selecting two representatives from each youth group to represent young people on the MMDETDF would have brought views of the youth to bear on the implementation of the programme. In reality however, none of the Task Forces to be established at the national, regional and district level has been set up and made operational. It is the national secretariat of the NYEP that co-ordinates all activities relating to the implementation of the programme. Selasi Attipoe-Fittz, Deputy National Coordinator of the NYEP observed that "the Employment Task Force at the National, Regional and District Level have not been established and Regional offices of the NYEP merely exist in name. Everything about the NYEP and its implementation is done at the national secretariat" (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010). In effect, the youth are not only sidelined in formulating the programme. Their stated role and representation in the implementation process of the programme, as per the NYEP Implementation Guidelines (2006) is also not performed by them. Instead other institutions including

the national secretariat of the NYEP play the role expected to be played by the youth themselves.

IX. EXPLAINING THE MARGINALIZED ROLE OF THE YOUTH IN THE NYEP PROCESS

Elected leaders directly or indirectly through their appointees are expected to formulate policies for all segments of the population without necessarily consulting them (Pitkin, 1967). In this regard, the appointed officials who formulated the NYEP were not expected to consult the youth even though the programme was to deal with the problem of youth unemployment. Therefore in formulating the NYEP, the decision making structure was dominated by appointed officials whose role was to formulate the programme and the youth were to assist in implementing it. Again, the youth were not involved in the process because apart from the fact that they were inexperienced, the problem of unemployment among them was seen as a serious national security problem that required immediate solution (Amoo, 2011). "Involving them in the NYEP formulation process could have dragged the programme and wasted much time" (ibid).

The reason for the failure of the national, regional and district Task Forces to take off is, according to Attipoe-Fittz (2010), financial. The cost of running the programme has never been met since its inception in 2006. In 2006, the expected amount for running the programme was GH¢93,055,075.67. However only GH¢ 9,048,532.57 was received. Again, in 2008, the programme received GH¢ 61, 123,629.31 from the government; its expenditure for the same year amounted to GH¢ 69,851,762.68; and by September 2010, the programme had not received any financial allocation from the government for that year (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010). The establishment of the National and District Employment Task Forces under the NYEP would require money to remunerate members and pay for their sitting allowances. However, as stated above, governments have not paid the annual subventions to the NYEP in full since 2006. Indeed, raising funds to run the programme has been difficult and this has triggered several criticisms, protests, withdrawal of services, and other forms of civil disobedience by the youth who have been employed under the programme (Donkoh, 2010). "Given government's inability and lack of commitment to increase its allocation of funds to the programme one may risk compounding the situation and even grinding it to a halt by attempting to divert the little resources into setting up the Employment Task Forces" (Attipoe-Fittz, 2010). The lopsidedness of the Task Forces to be established, particularly at the national level, coupled with the enormity of financial challenges facing the NYEP has severely undermined the efforts to promote youth participation in the implementation of a programme meant for them.

X. CONCLUSION

From the foregone analysis, one can aptly come to the conclusion that the NYEP has been deficient and mediocre in solving the problem of youth unemployment in Ghana in a manner that truly promotes the interest of young people. Admittedly, some young people may be inexperienced and immature and dealing with problems facing them may have to be swift, prompt and timeous enough to ensure that they do not revolt against society or allow themselves to be used as arsenals to foment conflict. However, no matter how urgent the need to deal with their challenges may be, no one can claim to better understand the challenges of the youth than the youth themselves (Collura, 2010). Their knowledge about the challenges confronting them puts them on the same pedestal with policy makers and hence ought to be consulted as argued by Pitkin (1967). This could help avoid costly programme design errors and ensure that the youth reap the real benefits of programmes meant for them. Most of the challenges of the NYEP that have rendered it deficient could have been dealt with from the beginning if the youth had been part of its formulation process as no young person would agree to a programme that cannot guarantee a sustainable employment for the youth (Donkoh, 2010). Youth participation in the implementation of the NYEP is also crucial in ensuring that sound feedback regarding successes and failures of the programme among them are adequately reported for redress. Concentrating all activities regarding the NYEP implementation at the national secretariat sacrifices the need for proper implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the programme in an attempt to fine-tune it and make it an effective tool for reducing unemployment among the Ghanaian youth.

As a matter of urgency, governments must show commitment and political will to dealing with the problem of youth unemployment by first of all giving a legal backing to the NYEP. As it stands now, the programme remains an ad hoc initiative that can be scrapped at any time. Secondly, government must show interest in boosting youth participation in the NYEP process by revitalizing and reactivating the implementation task forces of the programme and increasing the physical youth representation on them to relieve the national secretariat of its huge burden and give it ample time to deal only with administrative issues. Better late than never, a cross-section of the youth must be invited to the annual reviews of the programme, for their input about how to sustain and improve it to deal with youth unemployment. In formulating the 2008 Draft National Youth Policy, virtually all the youth groups in Ghana participated in the process and this made them own the policy. A similar approach could be adopted in the annual reviews of the NYEP. The prospects for the NYEP in dealing with youth unemployment may be

bright if governments show commitment in tackling the challenges of the programme, particularly youth participation in its process. Anything short of this may compound the problem of youth unemployment and the nation may continue to sit on a time bomb until it explodes and destroy the peace, tranquility and democratic gains made since 1992.

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Theoretical Growth Model Space for Cities

By José Reyes Bernal Bellón

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Abstract - This work raises a theoretical model of spatial growth for the cities in which makes explicit that the growth of population and income growth determined the city's expansion in terms of area built for business and the area destined for housing. At the same time, shows that local public policy can slow down the growth of the population in the cities by avoiding that generate an unbalanced growth and thus increase the housing deficit.

Keywords : *City, dynamic urban, growth balanced space, population.*

GJHSS-C Classification: FOR Code: 910103, JEL Code: O11, O41



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Theoretical Growth Model Space for Cities

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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to propose a model of balanced spatial growth of cities. To this end, the paper is divided into five sections of which the first is this introduction. The second point is a brief presentation of the theoretical models of spatial growth while in the third and fourth presents the proposal of a balanced growth model together with its development and policy implications. In the fifth section draws the main conclusions.

II. THEORETICAL PROPOSALS GROWTH URBAN SPACE

The urban spatial growth can be understood as physical growth of the city and its people. Physical growth referred to the increase of housing, infrastructure and buildings for business within the urban area, while the population grows this accounted for as the rate at which expands people living within the city. Clearly this process can be understood as the dynamic behavior of the city. Understand what are the factors explaining this dynamic city, is what is known as a model of urban dynamics (MDU).

One of the first proposed to explain urban dynamics is based on the land transport systems. These systems are critical to the economy of a city and its planning because they can affect the location of families or households, the location of firms or companies, the paths of trade and because the levels of production and employment.

Micro theory is based on the individual consumer or consumers and was initially developed by Von Thunen. In this model we introduce transportation costs and their impact on the location and prices. After you were making changes to improve it to the point that their solution is to maximize the usefulness and benefits and of course in land rents.

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Krugman (1997,1999) has driven research in urban and regional context with the main analysis focuses on explaining the emergence, development and collapse of urban structures from the principle of self organization.

In the past years has produced a series of works related to the study of urban dynamics. Examples are the works cited by Ontiveros, Cirelli and Cavdeville. In this vein, the work done by Couclelis(1995), Batty(1995,2004, 2005), White and Engelen (1993), Clarke, K., S. Hoppen and L. Gaydos(1997). These works rescue the implementation of models to explain urban dynamics based on cellular automata theory. These cellular automata classified urban space into cells which may contain specific areas of trade, industry or housing or because of specific social groups.

The models developed have allowed the explanation of the growth of cities and focused on the processes of structuring of urban space and the quest for development.

Likewise, other applications of these cellular automata models relate to the dynamics of the real estate market and urban ecology. Particularly Wegener and Spiekermann (2005) used cellular automata to model the diffusion process of urban pollutants. Additionally, the cellular automata theory has been applied to different urban transport systems as shown by Nagel and Schreckenberg(1992).

Other developments in urban dynamics models have been developed by Forrester (1969). This development tries to find the internal forces that control the balance between population, housing and business structures in urban areas.

III. A MODEL OF URBAN GROWTH

The following is a specific growth model designed to Bogotá was originally based on urban dynamics models proposed by Forrester(1969) but including a lot of changes. The original idea of the model is to show the factors that control a hypothetical balance between population growth, housing and business. Therefore, this model will try to show the factors that affect the physical growth of the city along with population growth and the possible interactions that may occur to examine the balanced growth of the same.

a) *Urbangrowth model*

This model follows the logic of the city's growth is determined by population growth, the growth in physical units for housing and the growth of physical units designed for business. It starts with the following

assumptions: a) It is assumed that there is a certain area of the city and part of that area can be designed to increase the supply of housing or facilities whether they be commercial or industrial. b) It is considered that the remainder of the total area for other uses but are essentially determined by the local government such as parks, gardens, roads, public space and infrastructure ingeneral. Basedon the above factors arisestric population growth, growth of housing and business growth.

i. *Population growth*

The population growth (Gn) of the cityis directly related to the net growth rate of births (Gnac) with the growth rate of immigration (Ginm) and inversely with the growth rate of emigration (Gemi) .In formal terms would have the following:

$$Gn = f(Gnac, Ginm, Gemi) \quad (1)$$

Also, the growth rate of immigrationis directly determined by the employment rate of the city (Uu) for the wage gap between rural and urban (Ws) and other factors (Fs) in which are rural social conflicts, the demands of higher education and so on.These considerations have their theoretical support in the postulates of Todaro (1969), Lewis (1955) and Fayand Opal (2000). One of the initial relations that can be made between the process of economic growth and expansion of the city, created with the Lewis model of development which posed a structural change in production. He believed that in the rural labor was abundant with zero productivity which should migrate to the city where higher wages were paid and where they could trainto participate in amostly industrial area. The process should continue to generate a large industrialization to absorb the labor field, to the extent that such excess is exhausted and wages go up in the traditional sector. Todaro shown through a model ofthe impact of migration is generated in the labor market in the city. This whole process could involve an expansion or growth of the city both economically and interms of space. As the region's population continues to increase, the pressures of urbanization increase and open spaces will be more appreciated and more expensive. Formally it would:

$$Ginm = f_1(Uu, Ws, Fs) \quad (2)$$

Mean while, the net growth rateof births, which is the difference between birth rate and death rate depends on the rateof growth of income percapita (Gy) and the degree of education of women (Ged.) It is possible that these two variables are correlated, but it is also true, on the theory of endogenous growth in fertility to the extent that women are brought up the possibility of having a large number of childrenis also reduced. It is also possible to find that with higher income levels is possible to increase the birth rate or other wise

accessed to highe reducation and vice versa. Formally have the following:

$$Gnac = f_2(Gy, Ged) \quad (3)$$

Under the seconsiderations it is then that the rate of urban population growth is an inverse function of the emigration rate and directly related to urban employment, wage differences, socio economic factors, political and cultural etc. of income pecapita and level of education of women. Formally have the following:

$$Gn = F(Gemi, Ws, Uu, Fs, Gy, Ged) \quad (4)$$

(-) (+) (+) (?) (?) (-)

Signs in parentheses indicate the relationship between each variable and the rate of population growth. It is noted that the impacts of other factors and the rate of growth of income percapitaon the rate of population growth are not clear on the considerations above.

ii. *Physical growth in developable space*

As noted above, the total urban area is the sum of space allocated for the expansion of the city in terms of housing constructionin the construction of facilities for business, plus the area for the city's infrastructure and reserved area by the local government for different uses. Simplifying this division, the urban area is the sum of developable area and the residue for which local government provides.

In formal terms can have the following:

$$Au = Aurb + AUR \quad (5)$$

From where Auis the total urban area, Aurbis the area Aurb and AUR is developable and the remaining area of the city designed specifically according to the guidelines and central government planning. If we divide equation 5 for Aumust be developable are a involving more participation from the rest of the area of the city show 100% of urban space. The task nowis to show the factors that determine the physical expansion of developable space, expansion in the sense of the occupation of this space, both for use in housing construction and for construction of facilities for the industry or trade. Therefore arises as follows:

$$Aurb = Abv + Abn \quad (6)$$

Where Abv developable are ais intended for housing and Abnis intended for the construction of commercial and industrial establishments.

iii. *Expansion of built-up area for housing*

Within the area of developable space, the space for housing may be determined by several variables that affect the expansion and occupation of this space. The first factor affecting the rate of population growth than others is not strictly necessary to consider the close and direct relationship. It is well

known that a process of urbanization is accompanied by increases in population and increases in housing construction. Normally, in most countries and especially in the underdeveloped population growth is faster than the growth of housing, thereby causing housing shortage for homes. In this regard, the population growth punctuates the expansion of the housing and if there is a shortage of the same, will tend to which the expansion takes place faster.

An important factor in the expansion of the housing is credit constraints. This variable can be and indeed it is, the variable after the population growth could impact positively on the expansion of housing, ie greater availability of credit to higher demand for homeownership and therefore increased the constructed area.

Decisions made by local government on a given area can influence the expansion of built-up area for housing and likewise to reduce it. Additionally, the local government can make investments in any specific area thereby encouraging housing construction.

These factors affect the expansion of housing built area horizontally, but you can think of a vertical growth of the constructed area would condition a bit in the horizontal expansion. This variable may be referred to as the efficiency of utilization of the soil, so that to the extent that this factor increases land use horizontally is reduced. In formal terms would have the following:

$$Abv = f_3(Gn, Cd, Tdh, Dp, Tes, Ps) \quad (7)$$

In this function Abv is the share of housing intended for developable area within the total city area, Cd is the domestic credit, Tdh is the rate of housing deficits, Dp are the decisions of local government policy and Tes is the efficiency rate of soil showing the vertical growth of the city and Ps is the price of the area designated for housing.

iv. *Expansion of the built businesses*

Within this context of urban dynamics may be given multiple inter relationships between the variables being studied, for example, one can argue that the very process of population growth leads to the generation of goods and services essential to the survival and welfare. Under these considerations, it is possible to propose a direct relationship between the expansion of built area for the operation of business goods and services between the rate of population growth. Jones (1998) argues that population growth brings increased productivity because there are more individuals who can generate innovations that lead to the creation of new economic sectors and therefore the creation of new businesses. Also, changing economic conditions may cause a transformation of the space used for housing in an area for business, in this sense, there may be a rate of demolition of houses to be replaced by commercial and industrial establishments. Of course, this process

will take place in all areas of the city, but in areas where there are certain kinds of economic changes together with a large mass of the population but mostly because the displacement of the population of outlying areas is expensive. Formally have the following:

$$Abn = f_5(Gn, Tdv, Gy, Of) \quad (8)$$

In the equation 8 Abn is the ratio of built area for business within the total developable area, Gn is the rate of population growth, Tdv is the rate of demolition of houses to be transformed into business, Gy is the growth rate income that positively impacts the construction of new space for business and "of" are other factors that may affect the growth of built area business such as land prices, policy decisions of local government, etc..

b) *Dynamics of the model*


The basic idea of the model is the fact that any factor that affects the population growth alter either developable space for housing construction or construction business. For example, if you increase the level of education of women, then this will lead to a decrease in the rate of population growth by the negative effect on the net birth rate and therefore will reduce the pressures on the use of developable space. Undoubtedly, that because of the lack of planning in the early rapid expansion of the city, provided the rate of population growth resulted in a greater housing shortage. The model could show a balance where possible balanced growth among the population, housing and business. This could be illustrated through a graph that relates the population growth along with the occupation of the developable area of the city. It is necessary to note that it is just an exercise to illustrate the possible balance through curves that reflect the growth of population and developable space. For this purpose the three equations that reflect urban growth, but can be reduced to two since the developable space is the sum of space used for more housing used for business. Formally have the following:

$$Gn = F(Gemig, Ws, Uu, Fs, Gy, Ged)$$

$$Abv = f_3(Gn, Cd, Tdh, Dp, Tes, Ps)$$

$$Abn = f_5(Gn, Tdv, Gy, Of)$$

Putting together the last two equations could be expressed by the following hypothetical equilibrium chart (No.1) that relates the spatial growth along with population growth:



Source : Author

The figure shows a hypothetical equilibrium between the rate of population growth and the developable area reflected in paragraph a. The reality is that the city is at the point c, where the rate of growth is not compatible with the built-up area for housing and businesses. Thus it is possible to achieve a reduced hypothetical equilibrium if the rate of growth of the population so that this curve to shift down and this crossing point c. The conditions are that an increased level of education of women, socio-political conditions be improved and public order in the region or country, or to the extent that the government promotes employment in the rural sector.

At point b of the graph relates the total developable area of the city but this can be increased by local government regulations or because they increase efficiency in land use or decreases in the rate of population growth.

It is clear that the model can be used at the city or disaggregation by localities or blocks or specific sectors of the city. If you are thinking of implementing this model to the block level to be submitted only drawback is the lack of information on population per acre because the rest of the information would be available.

Overall and in every model is expected to have high explanatory power, which is simple, applicable to the information available, etc.. Urban growth patterns as those based on cellular automata are very complicated but mostly costly in time for calibration and money for the software to be acquired for simulation and implementation; example is a model applied to the city of St. Francis whose cost amounted to two million dollars because its calibration takes a little over two years. Therefore, it would not be feasible for the time adapt a model for urban growth like this, but it would be appropriate to start thinking about implementing it to be important benchmarks for policy decision-making planning even local government.

IV. DETERMINATION OF MODEL OF URBAN GROWTH

For calibration of the model of urban growth will take first the equations that make up the model and the analytical solution of the same. The equations comprising the model are as follows:

$$Gn = f(Gnac, Ginm, Gemig) \tag{1}$$

$$Ginm = f_1(Uu, Ws, Fs) \tag{2}$$

$$Gnac = f_2(Gy, Ged) \tag{3}$$

The solution of the first block of equations leads to the equation of population growth in terms of exogenous variables in parentheses and the signs reflect the expected relationship between the behavior of the variation in population growth and behavior of each of variables.

$$Gn = F(Gemi, Ws, Uu, Fs, Gy, Ged) \tag{4}$$

$$Au = Aurb + AUR \tag{5}$$

$$Aurb = Abv + Abn \tag{6}$$

$$Abv = f_3(Gn, Cd, Tdh, Dp, Tes, Ps) \tag{7}$$

$$Abn = f_5(Gn, Tdv, Gy, Of) \tag{8}$$

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important bench marks for policy decision-making planning even local government.

The reduced form of this model of urban growth in terms of population growth and physical expansion of the city may be reflected in the following equations:

$$dG_N = F_{1V0} \partial U_V + F_{1WS} \partial W_S + F_{1FS} \partial F_S + F_{2GY} \partial G_Y + F_{2Grcd} \partial Grcd + \partial Gemig + F_{2GY} \partial G_Y + F_{2Grcd} \partial Grcd$$

Where the sign of the coefficients are as follows:

$$F_{1VU} > 0, F_{1WS} > 0, F_{1FS} > / < 0, F_{2GY} > / < 0, F_{2Grcd} < 0$$

The physical expansion of the city may be reflected in the following equation:

$$\partial AuRb = F_{3GN} \partial G_N + F_{3cd} \partial cd + F_{3tdh} \partial Tdh + F_{3Dp} \partial Dp + F_{3TES} \partial TES + F_{5GN} \partial GN + F_{5TdV} \partial Tdv + F_{5Gy} \partial Gy + F_{5of} \partial of$$

Where the sign of the coefficients are as follows:

$$F_{3GN} > 0; F_{3cd} > 0; F_{3tdh} > 0; F_{3Dp} > / < 0; F_{3TES} < 0; F_{5Gy} > 0; F_{5of} < / > 0.$$

The last two coefficients are also positive because higher GDP growth of a city the greater the area designated for business.

The intention now is to try to find the coefficients more robust for making some kind of simulation in some cities that lead to consistent results in terms of population growth and growth in the use of the urban area whether for business or housing.

V. CONCLUSIONS

We have proposed a theoretical model of spatial growth for cities in which it is made explicit that the growth of population and income growth determine the expansion of the city in terms of built area for business and the area allocated for housing. It also plays a key role local public policy to curb population growth in cities leads to unbalanced growth generating increases in residential housing shortage.

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New Economic Structure for Vietnam Toward Sustainable Economic Growth in 2020

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Abstract - After a long period of unceasing economic growth and macroeconomic stability, Vietnam has become one of the attractive investment destinations for many foreign investors. The debating over the final goal of economies re-structures as well as the selection of growth model still rising in Vietnam nowadays. This paper attempts to present a quantitative analysis aims to carry out a new economic structure toward sustainable economic growth and avoid/reduce chronic trade deficit base on input-output systems which is originated from W. Leontief's research.

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Bui Trinh ^α, Kiyoshi Kobayashi ^σ, Trung-Dien Vu ^ρ, Pham Le Hoa ^ω & Nguyen Viet Phong [¥]

Abstract - After a long period of unceasing economic growth and macroeconomic stability, Vietnam has become one of the attractive investment destinations for many foreigner investors. The debating over the final goal of economies re-structures as well as the selection of growth model still rising in Vietnam nowadays. This paper attempts to present a quantitative analysis aims to carry out a new economic structure toward sustainable economic growth and avoid/reduce chronic trade deficit base on input-output systems which is originated from W. Leontief's research.

I. INTRODUCTION

In 1758, Francois Quesnay, an economist of Physiocrats published the "Tableau Economique" [1]. It was the first work to attempt to describe the inter-industrial relationships of the economy in an analytical way, and his work can be viewed as one of the first important contributions to economic thought. According to Marx 1867 [2], in a capitalist economy, technological improvement and its consequent increased production augment the amount of material wealth in society, whilst simultaneously diminishing the economic value of the same wealth, thereby diminishing the rate of profit — a paradox characteristic of economic crisis in a capitalist economy; "poverty in the midst of plenty" consequent to over-production and under-consumption. Keynes 1936 [3] introduced many innovations which still continue to be a central of macroeconomic. He spearheaded a revolution in economic thinking about recession which led to great change of the economists whose prior used GDP as the only way to judge the national economy. In 1941, Leontief [4] constructed input-output (I-O) table for the American economy and its analysis considers inter-industry relations in an economy, depicting how the output of one industry goes to another industry where it serves as an input, and thereby makes one industry dependent on other both as customer of output and as supplier of inputs.

Inherited from previous researches' including Marx's, Leontief [5] mathematically formulated a perfect

supply-demand relationship of the entire economy. In this research, he assumed production technology (in short-term for instance in one year) is linear algebra relationship between produced output and input such as materials, services and other costs. These relationships were presented through a system of linear functions with the technical coefficients.

After a long period of unceasing economic growth and macroeconomic stability, Vietnam has become one of the attractive investment destinations for many foreigner investors. However, the country starts to worry about its overall economic situation after overexciting the first half of 2007 when Vietnam officially joined the WTO in January the same year [6]. The debating over the final goal of economies re-structures as well as the selection of growth model still rising in Vietnam nowadays. This paper attempts to present a quantitative analysis aims to carry out a new economic structure toward sustainable economic growth and avoid/reduce chronic trade deficit base on input-output systems which is originated from W. Leontief's research.

II. METHODOLOGY

Within system national accounting includes two types of I-O tables: competitive-imports I-O table and non-competitive I-O table. The first type contains its limitation due to the lack of distinction is made between local and foreign imported inputs. While the second type, the non-competitive imports I-O table, intermediate demand and final demand have been separated into domestic output. Two columns of import and import tax are eliminated and two rows of import and import taxes have been extracted. Hence, when analyzing economic structure through the index of power of dispersion and/or the index of sensitivity, the policy makers can not distinguish which sector to be the "real key sector" in the entire economy.

Currently, Vietnam has launched number of I-O table, and the development of SNA for the country can be presented as follow :

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Table 1 : Development of I-O tables compilation.

Type of I-O table	Based year of compilation	Size of sector	Compiler
National competitive I-O table	1989	55 x 54	National Accounts Systems Department, General Statistical Office
National competitive I-O table	1996	97 x 97	National Accounts Systems Department, General Statistical Office
National competitive I-O table	2000	112 x 112	National Accounts Systems Department, General Statistical Office
National competitive and non-competitive I-O tables*	2005	112 x 112	Ministry of Finance
National competitive and non-competitive I-O tables	2007	138 x 138	National Accounts Systems Department, General Statistical Office
Other inter-regional I-O tables			Private research groups with financial supported from Japan

Note: *) This I-O tables were extended and developed to obtain SAM with 112 sectors and 5 institutions including household, government, state enterprises, non-state enterprises and FDI enterprises.

a) Basic relationships

Competitive import I-O table type: $X = (I-A)^{-1}.Y$ (1)

Non-competitive import I-O table type: $X = (I-A^d)^{-1}.Y^d$ (2)

Where: X is the vector of gross output, I is the unit matrix, A is the intermediate input matrix, A^d is the matrix of intermediate consumption of domestic products, Y and Y^d denote final demand and final demand of domestic products vector matrix.

Within input-output framework, there are two kinds of economic linkages between sectors. These linkages are used as the tools to measure relation between an industry and the rest of industries of the entire economy. The analysis of the strengths of backward and forward linkages allows identifying the most important sectors in the economy.

b) A backward linkage

A backward linkage is referred as a demand relationship. It presents the relationship between an industry and the suppliers of its inputs from the entire production system. If one sector increases its output, then there is increased demand on the sectors whose products are used as inputs to production in the mentioned sector above. A backward linkage can be computed as the ratio of the sum of the elements of a column of the Leontief inverse to the average of the whole system. This ratio was called the index of the power of dispersion and it is defined mathematically as follows:

$BLi = \sum r_{ij}$ (summing of the elements of a column of the Leontief)

And the index of the power of dispersion equal to $n.BLi / \sum BLi$

In which rij are the elements of Leontief matrix, and n is the number of sectors in the model.

The higher the value of this ratio is, the stronger backward linkages. It meant that the rapid increasing output of this sector leads to high growth's speed of intermediate inputs (commodities and services) of the entire economy. This index plays an important role and it can be used by policy makers/planners in decision-making process with highly consideration. It meant that if the backward linkage of sector i is higher than that of sector j then an expansion of its output is more beneficial to the economy, in terms of causing other productive activities, than an equal expansion in sector j 's output.

c) A forward linkage

A forward linkage is referred as a supply relationship. Increased output in sector i also means that additional amounts of product i are available to be used as inputs to production in the other sectors. If the forward linkage of sector i is higher than that of sector j , then an expansion of its output is more essential to the economy, in terms of productive activity that it would support, than an equal expansion in sector j 's output. A forward linkage can be computed as the ratio of the sum of the elements of a row of the Leontief inverse to the average of the whole system. This ratio was called index of sensitivity and it is defined mathematically as follows:

$FLi = \sum r_{ij}$ (summing of the elements of a row of the Leontief)

And index of sensitivity equal to $n \cdot FLi / \sum FLi$

In equation (3), the income multiplier is calculated as follows:

$$V = v \cdot (I - A^d)^{-1} \cdot Y^d \tag{3}$$

$$\Delta V = v \cdot (I - A^d)^{-1} \cdot \Delta Y^d \tag{4}$$

In which, V is total income; v is the coefficient matrix of value added.

The above relationship presents the change of income depends on change of domestic demand.

The relationships in Leontief system also allows to identify capital and labour requirements:

$$\Delta K = k \cdot (I - A^d)^{-1} \cdot \Delta Y^d \tag{5}$$

And

$$\Delta L = l \cdot (I - A^d)^{-1} \cdot \Delta Y^d \tag{6}$$

In which, k and l are the ratios between capital and labour over output, respectively. K and L are the capital and labour demands for final output.

Assuming that GCF is investment (accumulation) the year then :

$$\Delta K = GCF$$

Hence, equation (5) can be re-write as follows:

$$GCF = k(I - A^d)^{-1} \cdot \Delta Y^d \tag{7}$$

This relationship play an important role to use for qualitatively measuring the investment demand for the change of final domestic demand.

Notice that: $\sum Y^d + \text{Tax on product} = \text{GDP}$.

Table 1 : Supply and demand in 2007 and 2000. Unit: Bil. VND.

	2000		2007	
	Amount	%	Amount	%
Total supply	1,219	100	3,934	100
Domestic produced goods	966	79.25	2,904	73.82
Imports	253	20.75	1,030	26,18
Total demand	1,219	100	3,934	100
Intermediate consumption	524	42.99	1,783	45.32
Final demands	695	57.01	2,151	54.68
Final consumption	322	26.42	837	21.28
Total investment	131	10.75	482	12.25
Export	242	19.85	832	21.15

Table 2 : Ratio between intermediate inputs and value added by the year 2007 and 2000.

No.	Gross output	2000 (percentage)		2007 (percentage)	
		Intermediate input	Value added	Intermediate input	Value added
1	Wholesales and retails trade	0.46	0.54	0.32	0.68
2	Transportation and communication	0.4	0.6	0.56	0.44

III. EMPIRICAL STUDY

a) Current structure of the economy and situation of demand and supply

The I-O tables compiled in the years 2000 and 2007 represents for economy's structure in the period of 2000-2005 and 2007-2012, respectively. (Note that Vietnam became a member of WTO since 2007).

In the 2007 I-O table, total commodities and services supply are accounted at about 3,934 billion VND, in which includes domestic produced commodities accounted at 73.82% while 26.18% came from imports. Domestic produced commodities decreased 5.43% while imported of that increased 5.43% compare to the year 2000.

On demand side, the ratios of the intermediate consumption and the total demand slightly increased from 42.99% to 45.32% from the year 2000 to 2007. On the other hand, the ratios of the final demands decreased from 57.01% in the year 2000 to 54.68% in the year 2007, this change due to the big decreasing of final consumption.

Despite the increasing of the service sectors from 2000 to 2007 at 0.23%, the total percentage of the entire economy is remarkable changed. The ratio between the intermediate input per gross output of the whole economy in the year 2000 was 0.55% while in the year 2007 it was accounted at 0.62%. The reasons for these changes may come from: industry structural change, and inefficient in production process.

3	Finance, insurance, real estate services	0.35	0.65	0.37	0.63
4	Administrative, defense, security	0.46	0.54	0.36	0.64
5	Private and public services, other uncategorized services	0.37	0.63	0.4	0.6
	Total	40.32%	59.68%	40.09%	59.91%

Our study found that during the past ten years, within Vietnam's economy there have no index of power of dispersion of any specific sectors that greater than the average index of the whole economy, there have no change and/or not meets proportional with their share in GDP.

Hence, it seemed meaningless if the government intends to drive the economic structure of the country that considering with high priority on the group sectors III. Because, these sectors contained greater share in GDP than the others do but their index of power of dispersions are not higher than that of other sectors, then an expansion of its output is less essential to the economy. The greater shares in GDP of these sectors are only presents in term of quantity form; not for the economic structural changes.

Academically speaking, economic re-structure must come along with change of the index of the power of dispersion, for those sectors with their higher the index of the power of dispersion than that of average in the entire economy, their share in term of GDP should be increased. From those points, the economic re-structure will provide the positives stimulate to the economy. In addition, the ratio between intermediate inputs of those sectors and the output still keep increasing from 2000 to 2009, while their index of power dispersion are small, it proved that these sectors are performing under inefficient production process(see Figure 1 below). Bright signal for the economy, the index of sensitivity of transportation and communication sectors in this period is higher than that of average of the entire economy.




Figure 1 : The ratio between intermediate input and gross output of the group sectors III.

b) Scenarios for economic re-structure

i. Scenario 1

Assuming that the economic structure in the year 2020 would be changed.

A basic equation will be applied for this scenario as presented follows :

$$V = v.(I-A^d)^{-1}.Y^d \tag{8}$$

Where v is a diagonal matrix of value added coefficients, the diagonal matrixes are the elements of

the value added by sectors.

The equation 8 can be re-write as follows:

$$\Delta V = v.(I-A^d)^{-1}. \Delta Y^d \tag{9}$$

Or

$$\Delta Y = y.(I-A^d)^{-1}. \Delta(VA) \tag{10}$$

In which, A^d is a transposed matrix of A^d. and y is coefficient vector of domestic final demand (Y^d)

In the period of the years 2000 – 2009, investment proportion in GDP of Vietnam almost highest compare to that of over the world.






Figure 2 : Investment proportion in GDP of Vietnam

In general, investment means the purchases made by industry in new productive facilities or for production process in reality. However, the investment ratio in the GDP of Vietnam is greater than other countries cause by the country lacks of the appropriate understanding about definition of the investment.

According to Sachs-Larrain 1993 [6], investment is the accumulated output aim to increase future production capacity of the economy. Capital, at certain period of time, is defined as summation of total investment through the years. In general, current capital can be calculated by summing up all the previous investments subtract to the annual permanent asset

depreciation. Alternatively, investment can be calculated based on the current actual value of at market price of these assets. However, the difficulties of this method were raised; the second method only can be calculated base on the inventories all over the country.

Both definitions above have not been applied in Vietnam. Currently, General Statistical Office (GSO) introduced an investment norm, it is not actual investment, it was the amount of money purchased by industries for investing in single year, however, this amount of money seems do not goes to production process, and this matter can be seen in the Table 3 below :

Table 3 : Investment and asset accumulation (1994 price).

Unit : thousand billion VND

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
Investment	115.1	129.4	148.0	166.8	189.3	213.9	243.3	306.1
Asset Accumulation	83.5	92.5	104.3	116.6	128.9	143.3	160.2	199.0
Change	72.5%	71.5%	70.4%	69.9%	68.1%	67.0%	65.9%	65.0%

Source : Statistical Handbook.

ii. Scenario 2

Concept of overinvestment is defined as the comparison between capital incomes of the economy and net investments (excluding permanent asset depreciation), if income keeps smaller than the net

investment then the economy is under overinvestment, or inefficient investing. This is because of the total benefits could not been compensated for the total investments. Figure 3 illustrated for this problem in Vietnam :




Figure 3 : Efficiency of investment in Vietnam.

Hence, if the government keeps strengthening investment on the service sectors (the group sectors III), this could be led to an unsecured economy of the country. However, the investment for manufacturing sectors (the group sectors II) moves to service sectors but not greater than 15%, to remain growth in group II, under scenario of strengthen the investment for the III group until the year 2020. This will keep the index of

power of dispersion and the index of sensitivity unchanged as well as the share of service sectors in GDP only takes slightly change.

Moreover, the index of power of dispersion in the group I is quite high at the same time their share in GDP is too low, this leads to stimulate import in order to response to demand in group sectors II.

Table 4 : Scenario for moving investment from group sectors II to group sectors III.

	Structure of 2009	Move 15% investment from group II to group III	Index of dispersion of power (BL)	Sensitivity (FL)
Group I	0.2100	0.128889194	1.05519709	0.8320961
Group II	0.4024	0.456908175	1.076400812	1.259212519
Group III	0.3876	0.414202631	0.868402098	0.908691381

If all of the three groups have achieved more efficient production process when their rates VA/GO change in the year 2020 (see Table 5) then the structure

and the index of power of dispersion of three groups would be changed as a result (see Table 6).

Table 5 : The I-O coefficient of 2007 and 2020.

Group	I-O coefficient in the year 2007	I-O coefficient in the year 2020
Group I	0.3936	0.54056
Group II	0.2717	0.35188
Group III	0.5638	0.62428

Table 6 : The structure and the index of dispersion of power of three groups.

	Proportion in economy's structure in 2009	Structure with assumption of more efficient production process	The index of dispersion of power
Group I	0,2100	0,15464	0,9505
Group II	0,4024	0,40998	1,0459
Group III	0,3876	0,43538	1,0036

Thus, under the more efficient production process proved that the proportion of service sectors in the economic structure also increased. An important finding from this study was that the real structure of service sectors in the economy through index of dispersion of power is greater than 1. This proved that in recent years, Vietnam's economy have been affected from the inappropriate structure economic policies that incompatible with the development trend.

In order to the group sectors III acquire 50% GDP and the index of power of dispersion greater than 1, the following problems must be solved simultaneously :

- The country's economy must performs more efficient than recent years.
- Assuming that exports in service sectors account at 20% instead of export in the group sectors II. Because, the export in the group sectors II reported are imaginary numbers, especially, in foreign direct investment and state-owned enterprises including garment and leather industries. Hence, if a "shock" at this moment to be conducted, it will make a remarkable change in the proportion of the group sectors III in GDP and at the same time it does not affect to the index of power of dispersion in these sectors. (greater than 1).

- Substitute domestic goods for final expenditure instead of imported goods. (Accounts for 3% to 5% in total final expenditure).
- Substitute domestic goods for asset accumulation. (Accounts for 6% to 8% in total investment).

This is actually as a computable general equilibrium model with function formulated as follows :

$$\Delta V = \mu \cdot v \cdot (I - \alpha \cdot A^d)^{-1} \cdot \delta \cdot Y^d \quad (11)$$

In which

ΔV denotes the change of value added coefficients; μ . Is coefficients matrix of value added change, α is technical change coefficients matrix

δ is the matrixis of structure final demand coefficient of domestic goods and imported goods consumption and export.

$$\mu = F(k, l, t) \quad (12)$$

$$\delta = F(C^d, C^m, I^d, I^m, E^d, E^m) \quad (13)$$

Table 7: Scenario for economic structure in year 2020.

	Structure in 2009	Structure with above assumptions for 2020	Index of dispersion of power (BL)	Index of sensitivity (FL)
Group I	0.2100	0.12632	0.9505	0.830982788
Group II	0.4024	0.37049	1.0459	1.047308452
Group III	0.3876	0.50319	1.0036	1.121708760

iii. Scenario 3

Capital and labour demand in the above scenario for the year 2020.

Capital and labour demand

$$L = 1 \cdot (I - A^d)^{-1} \cdot (V) \quad (14)$$

$$K = k \cdot (I - A^d)^{-1} \cdot (V) \quad (15)$$

Assuming that GDP growth of the year 2012, 2011 in the period 2016-2020 are 6.5% , 7.5% and 7%, respectively.

In which 1 and k are the capital and labour coefficient matrices.

Table 8: Labor and capital demand changes in Vietnam's economy year 2007 - 2020.

	Labour demand in 2020	Labour increase compare to 2007	Capital demand in 2020	Capital increase compare to 2007
Group I	30,265	1.271	371,061,354	1.606948636
Group II	23,751	2.691	1,450,024,547	0.878209549
Group III	30,071	2.607	2,214,982,293	3.300116749
	84,086	1.904	4,036,068,194	3.841305033

Note : Capital value at 2007 price.

IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a) Conclusion

Currently, exports in manufacture sectors mainly come from minerals resources and processing industries. In order to achieve sustainable development, the country needs to decrease exports from natural resources. In addition, there have existing studies and surveys shown that the exports in manufacture sectors reported are imaginary numbers, especially, in foreign direct investment and state-owned enterprises including garment and leather industries. The exports of those industries not only contribute non-beneficial for the country's economy but also stimulate imports. Moreover, those industries are also reimbursed by current export promotion policy.

The assumptions in the model reflected the reality that decrease export in manufacture sectors and increase export in service sectors . An important assumption in the model is the substitution of export in manufacture sectors to service sectors in order to satisfy expectation in service sectors. I-O table analyses since 1989 up to present have shown that the commercial fee of Vietnam is the lowest in the world about 9-10%. Thus, in order to obtain higher proportion of commercial fee, it needs to increase to equal with that in middle-income countries, about 20% to 30%.

The development of manufacture sectors in Vietnam recognized as a "factory of the world", the more developing of this sector, the bigger of imaginary number and the higher of imports stimulating. The

products from manufacture sector are branded as “Made in Vietnam” and even they are sale in domestic markets but in fact all the parts of the product were imported, it is a kind of disguised import, and Vietnam is only received small income including transaction fee and labor in production processing. In order to achieve service sector’s proportion accounts at 50% in GDP and the index of dispersion of power greater than 1, it is necessary to reduce investing in the manufacture sectors. This might be shocked to many people; however, it is a reality of the country's economy that must be accepted.

b) Recommendations

- In term of total final expenditures including final expenditure of household, government and asset accumulation need to shift from imported commodities to domestic produced goods.
- Enhance the more efficient production process in all three groups of sectors.

Hence, the proportions of three sectors in the economy’s structure for the year 2020 are appropriate, the concentration must targeted on the key sectors with the high index of dispersion of power such as agriculture processing sectors. The results from our study also

recommends that industrial sectors are not the key sectors in Vietnam’s economy, in the other words, the government should not pay attention too much on how to attract investments in industrial development by any means.

The group sectors I (Agriculture, forestry and fisheries) is the most important sector in the economy of Vietnam then it should not to be too shrunken. It plays an important role as a fulcrum for the other sectors to develop. The products of this sector used as inputs for the group sectors II and more important, it aim to guarantee food security, settled life for two third of the people in the whole country.

The above conclusions are strongly supported by import analysis through I-O table model.

The chronic trade deficit has continuously increased since 2000 until present (Figure 4). The numbers of reasons come from both objective and subjective, this study refers to one of them and point out that some of sectors contain high import demand and which part in final domestic expenditures, including the demand for final consumption, the demand for investment/accumulation and export, cause to stimulate the most import.




Figure 4 : The chronic trade since 2000 to 2008.

The analysis has been originated from Keynes, Leontief and Miyazawa [8] when conducting analysis on trade coefficient. Import is divided in to import as intermediate inputs and for final demand. The basic equation of Keynes-Leontief is formulated as follows :

$$X - A^d.X - A^m.X = C^d + I^d + E + C^m + I^m - M$$

In which :

- X is output vector,
- $A^d.X$ is domestic intermediate input,
- $A^m.X$ is imported intermediate input
- C^d is the domestic goods for final consumption,
- I^d is the domestic investment/accumulation
- E is export,
- C^m is the imported goods for final consumption,
- I^m is the imported investment/accumulation,
- M is import.

The production process shows the total effect on import for a unit of final output. Total effect, or, total import demand, is understood as direct effect or indirect effect. It meant that to produce a unit of final output not only requires imported intermediate input but also spill over effect this requirement to other sectors in the entire economy.

This study also found that the sectors have the index of power of dispersion on import greater than the average of that on total import demand of the country’s economy. The entire economy shows that in order to produce a unit of final output, it will stimulate 1.44 unit of import. The group sectors II (including mining, processing and construction) is the strongest stimulate import and the chronic trade deficit occurred during last decade basically caused by this sector.

The study also considered to effects of domestic final demand (consumption, investment/accumulation and export) on import. The results shown that the import demand disseminated by domestic production investment/accumulation, export and intermediate input. Although the domestic productions are more increasing, especially the domestic goods used for investment/accumulation stimulate the most import. This supports and proves for above conclusion about the products from manufacture sector are branded as “Made in Vietnam” and even they are sale in domestic markets but in fact all the parts of the product were imported, it is a kind of disguised import, and Vietnam is only received small income including transaction fee and labor in production processing. This judgment against the idea in which convinces that Vietnam needs to strengthen supporting industries, because all the processing industries in Vietnam are actually the supporting industries.

Whilst, among the total output of garment industry's exports (supply size), the value added contribute for the economy accounts as small income from processing, more over, this stage always contain quite low ratio value added in output. At the same time, export in service sectors and agriculture are real export and services sectors require less amount of imported input for one unit of final output. A question is raising that: is it the country should restructured by this direction?

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The Menace of Secession in Africa and Why Governments Should Care: The Disparate Cases of Katanga, Biafra, South Sudan, and Azawad

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Abstract - If there were an imminent threat to the integrity of African states, it would be the possibility of a group or region breaking away. Ironically, secession is one threat which few African governments want to acknowledge exists because it implies giving tacit recognition to the most reprehensible behavior any group or a region can perpetrate against the state. Pursuing such a policy of not acknowledging the threat of secession has come at a price, since it has made governments woefully unprepared to address an actual secession effectively when it occurs. African governments' lackadaisical response to the menace of secession is not only bad policy but also counter-intuitive. The haphazard manner in which European powers spliced the continent into colonies makes every country vulnerable to potentially splitting up for myriad of reasons including a simple disagreement between a region and the central government. This paper makes the assertion that a region breaking away is such an imminent threat to African countries that governments need to pay attention and commit resources to address its causes. Mali splintering into halves in 2012 shows the imminency of the threat of secession and the unpredictable causes that may precipitate such an event. The paper analyzes Katanga, Biafra and South Sudan breaking up to underscore the unpredictability of events which may cause a country to break up.

Keywords : *Secession, Katanga, Biafra, Azawad, South Sudan, Casamance, Eritrea, Ethiopia, SPLA, MEND, Tuaregs, Igbo, Ojukwu, Lumumba, Tshombe.*

GJHSS-C Classification : *FOR Code: 160401, 160505, 160605*



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The Menace of Secession in Africa and Why Governments Should Care: The Disparate Cases of Katanga, Biafra, South Sudan, and Azawad

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Abstract - If there were an imminent threat to the integrity of African states, it would be the possibility of a group or region breaking away. Ironically, secession is one threat which few African governments want to acknowledge exists because it implies giving tacit recognition to the most reprehensible behavior any group or a region can perpetrate against the state. Pursuing such a policy of not acknowledging the threat of succession has come at a price, since it has made governments woefully unprepared to address an actual secession effectively when it occurs. African governments' lackadaisical response to the menace of secession is not only bad policy but also counter-intuitive. The haphazard manner in which European powers spliced the continent into colonies makes every country vulnerable to potentially splitting up for myriad of reasons including a simple disagreement between a region and the central government. This paper makes the assertion that a region breaking away is such an imminent threat to African countries that governments need to pay attention and commit resources to address its causes. Mali splintering into halves in 2012 shows the imminence of the threat of secession and the unpredictable causes that may precipitate such an event. The paper analyzes Katanga, Biafra and South Sudan breaking up to underscore the unpredictability of events which may cause a country to break up.

Keywords : *Secession, Katanga, Biafra, Azawad, South Sudan, Casamance, Eritrea, Ethiopia, SPLA, MEND, Tuaregs, Igbo, Ojukwu, Lumumba, Tshombe.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Observing African politics clearly reveals the continent is racked with conflict. These conflicts range from political protests to wars breaking out within countries and externally between countries that share a common border. Most conflicts which have occurred, however, have been confined within national borders. Conflict which occurs inside countries' borders often bears the hallmark of one or more groups squabbling over a natural wealth or a region deciding unilaterally to end its association with a government because of ideological or policy differences. A misunderstanding that arises between a region or an ethnic group and the central government can lay

dormant for several years until it explodes unexpectedly into mayhem which can destroy families, relationships, and traditions. The governments of Ethiopia and Sudan failing to address grievances of outlying regions satisfactorily for one-half century steered those regions to war, resulting in Eritrea and South Sudan separating to form new nations. In spite of several cases of internally-generated dissensions and weak governmental structures, it is remarkable that many more African countries have not been torn apart. However, the handful of cases on secession could be misleading because they offer a false impression the issues that can tear apart the relationship between a region and a central government have not been grievous or been adroitly resolved. In reality the sorry state of relationships between regions and central governments in Africa is far from clear. In each country, regions want the central government to address outstanding issues to their satisfaction as government also have wanted regions to play their part by being responsible partners and acquiescing to their edicts. No government can be complacent addressing the issues for which a region or group seeks redress. None may be redundant. Complacency may only push the region or ethnic group to the brink by seeking separation from the union with ramifications that are hard to foretell.

This paper draws on secondary sources of research sources as well as current news from the Internet to address secession by drawing attention to the imminence of its menace to the integrity of African countries. African governments, on the other hand, seem less troubled by it than they are about issues that revolve around people's daily subsistence. This may be a perilous miscalculation since, when a country is unexpectedly hit with the possibility of any of its regions wanting to break away, that country may never reclaim the cohesion and pride it once had. Suspicion is sown instantaneously into the relationships that used to exist among people, groups and regions. The paper uses Katanga, Biafra, South Sudan and Azawad breaking away to show the multiplicity of the causes which may precipitate a region deciding to leave a political union. The ongoing saga of northern Mali breaking away to

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form a new country— Azawad— is referenced to illustrate the imminency and unpredictability of the threat which discontented regions may pose to central governments. The demands groups make which can push a region to break away have usually been precipitated from the group or region perceiving unequal treatment from the central government relative to other regions or groups. The demands of grievances might lay dormant for years until a 'triggering incident' resuscitates it. A triggering incident could come in various forms such as Igbos being killed in Nigeria in 1966, or the people of Katanga believing in their exceptionalism relative to other Congolese and breaking away. Every African government, therefore, it seems must feel a sense of unease and be alert in order to ameliorate situations which may push a region or an ethnic group to the brink.

II. THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL BORDERS

One controversial but enduring legacy European colonialism left Africa was national borders. Breaking such a large continent into smaller sovereign nations has helped to create unique identities among people which have become powerful symbols of national pride and interest. At the same time, the haphazard manner in which nations were created has caused irredentist urgings by groups on other groups which might have been minimal had the colonialists taken greater care clustering groups into countries. Colonial administrators broke up or clustered people, languages, customs and alliances with little rational guidance from history, tradition, and logic. Not surprisingly, the conflicts that have occurred between nations are blamed on the haphazard demarcation of borders (Hughes, 2004). According to Herbst (1989), European colonialists ignored some basic guidelines for partitioning land such as making such important decisions on scanty information about Africa's geography, and dividing territories without taking time to consider demographic, ethnographic and topographic imperatives. The haphazardness shown for cartography was expected because, according to Stone, the Berlin Conference was called mainly to defend the traditional long-standing free-trading system which Europe had set up along the coast of Africa. Colonial administrators and new African governments tried to adhere closely to the boundaries they had inherited to uphold the principle of *uti possidetis*, which provides that states emerging from decolonization shall presumptively inherit the colonial administrative borders they held at independence (Ratner, 1996). That understanding has done little to dampen calls coming from some governments to clarify their boundaries with their neighbors, which is a euphemism for getting a piece of territory back.

Legum (1962) was an observer who, early in Africa's independence decade, denounced Africa's

artificial borders and called for abolishing or adjusting them. Delegates at the first Organization of African Unity (OAU) meeting in Addis Ababa in 1963, however, opted to support the inviolability of national borders as one of the organization's core principles. In 1964, the OAU formally backed this principle at the Cairo's Declaration of Border Disputes among African States. The OAU, obviously, was seeking to avoid opening a Pandora's Box as it sought to discourage groups from making irredentist claims on other group outside their common border. Memorable claims of such nature have occurred nonetheless. They have been between Egypt and Libya in 1977 when Libyan forces occupied Sallum in Egypt. Egypt and Sudan have had a dispute over the Hala 'ib Triangle wedged between them. Ethiopia and Somalia have fought over the Ogaden, and Libya and Chad over the Aouzou Strip. Nigeria and Cameroon had disputations over Bakassi, and Ethiopia and Eritrea have fought for control over Badme. Mazrui (1993) predicted that ethnic conflict would present continual problems in politics, and over the next century the outlines of present-day African states would change in one of two ways. The first would be ethnic self-determination which would create smaller states and the other— regional integration— will create larger political communities and economic unions.

Where a region or an ethnic group is located relative to other regions has been an important but often overlooked factor that determines whether a disenfranchised group or region will stay in a political union. A region or group hemmed in by other groups or regions is circumscribed by geography to accept a compromise with the government in a dispute, even if the group finds the solution distasteful. Secession is a treasonable act and is easier for those who participate in it to escape to a neighboring state if the plot goes awry. Location also affects an insurgent group's ability to get money outside its home base to resist government authority. The ability of rebel groups to get major funding from contraband such as opium, diamonds, or coca determines the duration of civil wars (Fear on, 2004). The considerable distance from Punt land and Somaliland to Mogadishu, where a weak provisional federal government has been battling insurgents, provided the impetus for the two renegade northeastern regions of Somalia to declare their autonomy.¹

III. DOMESTIC INSURGENCIES

a) Katanga

Belgium had vested business and commercial interest in the Congo, its colony, and was unwilling to grant it independence. This was the time when Africa's major colonial powers of France and Great Britain were granting their colonies independence. In late 1950, however, following protests in Kinshasa and other large cities Belgium was compelled to grant a hastily-

arranged independence to the Congo (Democratic Republic). Van Bilsen (1962) asserts that the choice Belgium faced was tragic: it either could grant independence immediately to a country which was in no way prepared for it or undertake a policy of slow decolonization with all the risk of misunderstanding, disorder, and repressive action involved. According to Bokamba (1986), Congo had serious regional and ethnic divisions (with some 200 separate language groups) and a weak sense of national identity. Besides, very few Congolese had had any meaningful political experience prior to independence, and there were only a handful of them with university degrees. Belgium failing to train the Congolese in administrative competence or giving them political experience or a system of government that might work contributed to plunging the country into the mayhem it experienced after independence.

An army mutiny occurred in Katanga Province (Shaba) and Southern Kasai soon after independence that led to bloodshed. These provinces were the center of diamond mining in Congo. The mutiny resulted in Katanga pulling out from Congo Leopoldville. The rebellion in Katanga lasted from 1960 to 1963. Kaplan (1967) asserts that Belgium, at the instigation of Moise Tshombe, the Prime Minister of Katanga Province, used the mutiny by the Force Publique against Belgian officers to intervene on behalf of Belgian civilians in the Congo as stories circulated of violence committed against Belgians by soldiers spread. Tshombe's rise to fame began in the 1950s when he became president of the Belgian-supported Conakat, the strongest political party in Katanga. When he attended the Brussels Congo Conference in 1960 he pressed for a loose federation of independent states in the Congo. In the general elections of 1960, Conakat gained control of the Katanga provincial legislature, and when the Congo became an independent republic, Tshombe proclaimed Katanga's secession from the country. He worked closely with Belgian business interests, appointed a Belgian officer to command his army, and refused to cooperate with either the United Nations or the central government led by Patrice Lumumba (Columbia Electronic, 2011).

Lemarchand (1962) also argues Katanga had a strong case for self-determination based on the extraordinary concentration of economic resources in the province, especially the presence of rare minerals such as cobalt and uranium. The province also had heavy industrial development compared with the rest of the Congo. According to Crowley (1963), Katanga was second only to Orientale in size among the six Congo provinces and was the richest, providing 65 percent of all Congo exports. The huge mining company of Union Minière du Haut-Katanga alone paid one-third of the Congo's budget. The province's riches helped to explain why nearly a third of all the non-Africans in the Congo

(28,455 out of 94,531 in 1955) lived in Katanga. In contrast, the Katanga's African population of one and one-half million was the smallest of any province. Katanga's sparse population called for migrant workers being imported from Europe and other parts of the Congo into the province with their cultural and linguistic differences causing ethnic tensions. According to Lemarchand (1962, p. 408), one settler organization in Katanga, *Union pour la Colonization (Uco)*, sought to make the province different from the rest of the Congo by using all efforts to get the white population the liberties granted by the Belgian constitution to the expatriates in the Congo and to promote, by all available means, the growth of European colonization. Belgium's role in helping Katanga to secede and taking additional measures to sustain the breakaway state to develop was beyond dispute, according to Boehme (2005). Belgium did not want its relationship with the newly-independent nation to end not only for sentimental reasons but economic considerations as well. Fresh from breaking away, Katanga asked Belgium for help and Prime Minister Gaston Eyskens' government obliged, and was willing to recognize Katanga's de facto independence. In July 1960, the Belgian government created the Mission Technique Belge (Mistebel), an organization that would supply assistance to the breakaway province. Belgian policymakers, however, were not unanimous in the government's decision to accommodate the breakaway state. On July 12, 1960, Congo's Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, lodged a complaint with the United Nations Secretary-General on behalf of the Congo government. It contained an official protest against the Belgian-backed partition of the southern province of Katanga under the leadership of Moïse Tshombé. The Security Council accepted the complaint and passed Resolution 143, which gave the Secretary-General the right "to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the government of the Republic of Congo, to provide the Government with such military assistance, as may be necessary."

b) Biafra

Tukumo (1970) asserts Biafra pulling away from Nigeria in 1967 was an overt act even though before that time, it had been an idea. Secessionist threats or separatist agitations in Nigeria date back as far as 1914, during the Lugard's Amalgamation of that year. Northerners believed the amalgamation was a mistake because they did not want anything to do with the Southern people. The disparate manner in which Nigerian nationalism developed foreshadowed the ethnic divisions that would emerge after independence. According to Nafziger and Richter (1976), ethnic nationalism grew stronger as other groups sensed their own lack of participation in the benefits of modernization and self-government and joined the struggle. Yoruba nationalism heightening in 1948 was partly in response

to the disproportionate weight Igbos were exerting on the leadership of the Nigerian nationalist movement. Hausa nationalism was aroused later in response to the threat of southern economic and political supremacy. Not surprisingly, politics in post-independent Nigeria became controversial as the three major groups— the Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo— failed to get along. According to Nafziger, the January 1966 coup epitomized this crisis. Nigeria's politics was pushed to the brink following the abortive counting of the population by region for federal parliamentary representation, the boycott of the federal election by one of the two major political alliances, and the resulting refusal of President Azikiwe to appoint a Prime Minister from the victorious party. Following the coup of 1966, relations between the major ethnic groups worsened, as thousands of Igbo living in the north were massacred. Ojukwu, the leader of the Igbo resistance, removed part of the eastern region from the Nigerian federation to form the Republic of Biafra. The federal government immediately declared war on Biafra in 1967 and successfully ended the secession in 1970.

Deciding whether Biafra had a claim to independence, Nixon (1972) asserts the distinct circumstance which led to the Biafran claim to independence began in May 1966, with a series of attacks against the people of the Eastern Region living in the North. New and even more extensive massacres in the North in September 1966 and the mass migrations that followed intensified the fears Easterners had for their physical safety. This worsened tensions between the Eastern Region and the federal government. Post (1968) believes Biafra pulling out of the federation was based on the unequal sharing of national wealth. The Nigerian Independence Constitution of 1960 redistributed revenue by a series of formulas, which allowed the regions to get between 65 and 75 percent of their funding from federal payments. The Eastern region's special grievance was that it was receiving only about 60 percent of the rents and royalties from the oil produced there. Easterners believed the other regions were cheating the region out of development capital for which there were no guidelines for its sharing. These grievances, together with others, precipitated the January 1966 coup, which was started by Igbo officers. The major victims of the coup were politicians and senior officers from the north. Since early 2000, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) formed with the sole purpose of driving away foreign oil companies from the Delta region and returning oil money to the indigenous people of the Delta. The 2003 "Niger Delta Manifesto" gives a rambling account of the history of the plunder of oil by colonialists and the Nigerian government in the Delta region ("The Niger Delta Manifesto", 2003).

c) *South Sudan*

Southern Sudan fighting a war of liberation for half a century against the Egyptian authority and later the Sudanese government seemed precipitated less by economic benefits than the cultural differences that exist between the North and South. The discovery of oil in commercial quantities in both the North and South in the 1980s, however, raised the stakes for the South to break away. The struggles for the peoples of South Sudan to be free came to fruition in July 2011, when an independent republican nation was born. Sudan was the largest country in Africa and, under the best of conditions, the vast expanse of land and diversity of its people posed a formidable challenge for any government wanting to keep an active line of communication with all its regions and peoples. Barbour (1964) and Deng (2006) describe the contrasting rates of development between the north and south as important in understanding the issues in Sudanese politics. They include the South's strikingly high gross reproduction and death rates, high infant mortality rates, poor diet, medical services, and education which fell far below the rest of the country. The most striking contrast was the North being occupied principally by Arabic-speaking Muslims, while the South was occupied by African Negroid peoples, some of which are Christian. Southerners believed the government in Khartoum, which was dominated by the Muslim North, was lukewarm to its development and imposed discriminatory laws on the people found there.

According to Tucker (1934), up to the first three decades of the twentieth century, the Sudan government paid no attention to developing any official language in the South. All official intercourse with southern natives was through Arabic, the official language of the North, even though pronouncing the sounds and arranging the syllables of Arabic or '*Bimbashi Arabic*' were distorted. Johnson (2003) also sees multiple causes for the North and South conflict, which include the British manipulating ethnic rivalry during colonial rule and the North continuing a long pattern of oppressing the South. Distrust caused southern soldiers to mutiny against the Khartoum government in 1955, plunging the country into a seventeen-year civil war; the so-called Anya Nya rebellion, which ended with a compromise for southern autonomy in 1972 (Bell, 1975). Despite the peace agreement between the North and South holding four years after signing, Kasfir (1977) was doubtful it would last. His pessimism was based on the pervasive suspicion which existed between the parties and the scattered incidents of violence and concessions which aroused dissatisfaction among influential groups in both the North and South.

War was rekindled in 1983, when President Nimeiri decided to impose Islamic law on all Sudan,

triggering the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) forming in response, seizing most of the South and starting another civil war. According to Hutchinson (2001), the birth of the SPLA caused the fighting between the North and South to intensify as the SPLA made overthrowing the northern-dominated, national, Islamic state in Khartoum one of its objectives. Khartoum and the SPLA reached a peace agreement in 2005 to end the rebellion, but the impromptu death of John Garang, the SPLA leader, rekindled distrust. Hutchinson asserts the hatred between the North and South ran deep, not the least of which was southerners not forgiving northerners for being accessories to the slave trade in the south in the nineteenth century during the Egyptian occupation. Despite deep geographical differences, Roden (1974), however, sees social rather than physical causes as the root of the problems in the Sudan, stemming from strong differences in culture, especially in attitudes. Cultural differences have been reinforced by wide disparities in the spatial sharing of investment. In recent years, water and oil have become major resource issues in the south. Present-day Sudanese politics also has been dominated by the plight of the thousands of refugees in Darfur and their slaughter by the Janjaweed who are government-backed militias, and the government's refusal to cooperate to prosecute the perpetrators of those crimes.

d) Other secessions: Successful, failed, and ongoing

Governments in several countries in Africa also have contended with threats that had come from groups wanting self-rule and ending their long association with the central political authority. Some of these agitations for self-rule have shown greater poignancy than others. In Ethiopia, the threat from its coastal colony to break away lasted thirty years and culminated in a costly war which ended in 1991, with Eritrea emerging as a breakaway state. Ethiopia officially agreed to Eritrea's independence in 1993 and made Eritrea the first successful breakaway nation in post-independent Africa. Eritrea breaking away from Ethiopia was attributable primarily to political rather than economic or cultural differences. The major ethnic groups of Ethiopia and Eritrea share a common history and culture. In Eritrea, the Tigrinya, Tigre and Kunama are found along the common border with Ethiopia, and politically, were governed under the Ethiopian flag for sixty years. The dominant religions in both countries are Christianity and Islam, and trade and cultural exchanges have always happened among the diverse groups living in the northeastern region of Africa for a long time. What brought marked changes to the region's political development was Italy colonizing Eritrea in 1890, which made Eritreans to see themselves differently from Ethiopians. Italy streamlining governance in both Eritrea and Ethiopia under its rule did not heal the rifts which strong imperious ambitions wrought. According to

Yohannes (1993), the British liberation of Eritrea and Ethiopia's resulting in annexation of Eritrea in 1942, were viewed skeptically by Eritreans from the start. Ethiopia desperately needed access to the Red Sea, but Eritreans opposed the blatant manner in which Emperor Haile Selassie interfered with its affairs when the Emperor declared it the fourteenth province. The poor living conditions in Ethiopia caused by drought and famine gave Eritreans little hope their living conditions would improve if their political association with Ethiopia continued. Eritrea's economy ironically, has not fared any better since it pulled out from its union with Ethiopia. According to Bereketab (2007), the second war with Ethiopia in 1998 set Eritrea's economy back.

There are other regions in Africa which, like Eritrea and Ethiopia, have had tensions caused by different colonial histories as well as cultural and linguistic differences. These are the Casamance and Senegal, Cabinda and Angola, The Volta Region of Ghana and Togo, and Anglophone Cameroon and Francophone Cameroon. Since the mid-1980s, Northern Uganda, which is populated chiefly by the Acholi, has suffered from civil unrest perpetrated by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) led by Joseph Kony, himself an Acholi and a smaller organization, the Allied Democratic Forces. Kony intends to rule Uganda according to "Ten Commandment Principles" and has abducted several thousand children and pillaged several villages in the northern region, leaving nearly half a million people homeless.² The Casamance, a region in southern Senegal, has become that country's most restless region since early 1980, when the Movement of Democratic forces of Casamance (MDFC) began a violent confrontation with the Senegalese government for self-rule. Casamance used to be a Portuguese region before France and Portugal negotiated a settlement which handed over the territory to France. The region's history, location, and poor economic condition have provided the impetus for separatism. Niger was plunged into civil war from 1990 to 1995 when independent-minded Nigeriens and ethnic Tuaregs opposed to the central government wanted autonomy for northern Niger. Rebels seeking autonomy attacked the capital, Niamey, followed by reprisal attacks from government forces arresting Tuaregs en masse. In 1995, the largest Tuareg coalition, the Coordination of Armed Resistance, agreed to a limited autonomy and signed a peace accord with the Nigerien government.

Mali's government is facing its gravest threat yet from these Tuareg rebels. On April 6, 2012, rebels from the northern half of the country, the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), declared the northern half of Mali an independent state under the name Azawad. The new state covers more than half of Mali and includes Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu. According to Burgess (2012), the rebellion which kicked off in January 2011 owes its success in large part to Gaddafi

who recruited Tuareg fighters into his security forces and when his regime fell, they fled back to Mali with large stockpiles of weapons. The estimated two to three thousand experienced, well-armed returning Tuareg fighters were angry not only by the events in Libya but President Amadou Toure's government's lackadaisical attitude addressing the problems their return created. Polgreen (2012) and Cowell(2012) assert this made the Tuareg fighters to reinvigorate the longstanding rebellion they have had with the central government. The Mali army made mainly of sub-Saharan Africans which had previously held the upper hand against the lightly armed Tuaregs was now facing a heavily armed and determined enemy (Brode, 2012). The aftermath of the rebellion was a coup d'état spearheaded by Captain Sonogo that overthrew President Amadou Toure on March 22, 2012. Many members of the Malian army believed the ousted president was not equipping them well enough, not sending reinforcements when needed, and keeping the population in the dark about the deaths of government troops. Ironically, the rebels announced Azawad's independence after the coup.

The Tuareg disenchantment with Mali's central government runs deep and goes back several years. One cause has been their dislike for being dominated, first by French colonialists, which they fiercely resisted, and second, by the Bamako government. As Prasse (1995) notes, the "Tuareg must exist largely at the mercy of hostile ruling powers since the departure of their colonial masters." Lecocq (2005) describes the Tuareg society as being stratified with the upper strata being white, even of European descent. The lower strata, on the other hand, are made up of blacksmiths and blacks. Indeed, the Tuareg kept black slaves, *bellah*, for several years until they were emancipated in the 1940s by French colonial administrators. Since 1970, harsh living conditions resulting from drought have precipitated a southward migration of the population which has brought confusion to social and political structures (Dresch, et al. 1977). The Tuareg rebellion, which began in 1996 and lasted until 1998 was violent and persistent, and spilled from an earlier Tuareg rebellion in Niger against the government. The United States, because of its War onTerror, militarized the governments of the Sahel, bringing further instability to the region. Keenan (2004) shows how Tuaregs attacking humanitarian convoys in Mali in 2004 caused deaths. Besides, a long-standing feud between Kounta and Arab Tribes erupted in a fresh outbreak of fighting.

IV. AFRICA'S SECESSIONS: AN ASSESSEMENT

a) *The contentiousness of sharing wealth*

Economic considerations— precisely, a region or a group assessing if it would get greater economic benefits by breaking away than staying put will always be an important and recurring variable which will weigh

heavily on the decision the region or group makes. Colonialism left a legacy to colonies in how they defined their commodity exports, as farmers were given a wide array of crops and minerals in which to specialize. Regions that are large-scale producers of export commodities like cocoa, coffee, tea or precious minerals such as gold and diamonds are compelled, through monopolistic buying by marketing boards, to contribute money to the common fund. In most African nations, the manner in which government allots money to regions may not be defined by the locus of production or need but by politics. Regions that wield political power or dominate the civil service may reward themselves the most. Based on central governments' tradition of putting taxes from exports into a common fund, regions lacking in high-value minerals and crops have been more accepting of their budgetary allotment from the government. Regions endowed with high-value minerals and crops, on the other hand, expect to be compensated a little bit more.³What stands out about public revenues in most African countries is governments' overreliance on a single crop or mineral for exports. Countries endowed with plentiful natural resources, ironically, have been prone to violence because of disagreements over the manner in which governments and producers share money. While disagreements between government and farmers over commodities pricing, for instance, may be tampered by pragmatism, the same cannot be said for nonorganic minerals such as gold and oil. Agricultural and forest products spread across several regions and make organizing for civil action difficult. Oil, diamonds, and gold and other minerals, on the other hand, are found in specific areas and are nonreplenishable. Extracting those minerals is contentious as local landowners, the government, and private companies haggle over pricing and farmland degradation. Fearon (2005) puts oil at the top of minerals that may spark civil war. Oil, he explains, provides easy source of rebel start-up finance and because oil producers have low state capacities given their low per capita income, also oil makes state or regional control a 'tempting prize.' The volatile politics of Angola's enclave of Cabinda and Nigeria's Delta Region, both major oil producing regions, and of the diamond-producing districts of Kono and Koidu in Sierra Leone supports Fearon's thesis. The thesis shows that other high-value minerals can incite violence, too. Decalo (1985) admits that African politics even during the heyday of independence has always been a privilege reserved for the elite, with social repression as an alternative method for keeping power in the face of declining legitimacy and societal scarcity. Besides, poor training, corruption, and nepotism in public bureaucracies have ensured that only the opinions of the ruling elite stand in policy decisions. Fearon and Laitin (2003) have challenged conventional wisdom about the manner in which civil wars have spread since

the end of the Cold War. They argue that conflicts are not caused by ethnic and religious antagonisms, but poverty and weak bureaucracies have become major sources of insurgencies. Weak bureaucracies translate into weak local policing or inept and corrupt counterinsurgency practices such as an inclination for brutal and indiscriminate retaliation that help to drive noncombatants into rebel forces.

b) Sundry causes for breaking away

Some disaffected groups have used economic sabotage, expressed overtly or covertly by destroying production equipment, to show their displeasure with government policy. Disaffected groups that feel powerless taking on the central government in a secession attempt may find engaging in economic sabotage a viable, cost-effective option. MEND, realizing the enormous military capability of the Nigerian government has opted for a strategy of hurting Nigeria's economy by sabotaging oil equipment and hampering production in the Niger Delta. MEND has not given up on its ultimate goal of seeing the Niger Delta region break away from Nigeria. In 2007, at the height of MEND's campaign, Mouawad (2007) reported there were few safe places left for oil companies in the Niger Delta, the epicenter of Nigeria's petroleum industry. It reported armed rebel gangs blowing up pipelines, disabling pumping stations, and kidnapping over 150 foreign oil workers since 2006. Later that year, Shell shut down about one-half million barrels a day of production from its fields. Jackson (1992, p.2) argues that the weak link between governments and citizens in sub-Saharan Africa has been the cause of states lacking empirical statehood as expressed through authority and power to govern a defined territory and population.

"Citizenship means little, and carries few substantial rights or duties compared with membership in a family, clan, religious sect or ethnic community. Often the government cannot govern itself, and its officials may in fact be freelancers, charging what amounts to a private fee for their services.

When assessing whether a region's threat to break away is real or illusory, it is essential to consider its location relative to other regions of the country. Anecdotal evidence shows regions that have tried to break away have been those situated in the outer fringes. What facilitated Katanga, Biafra, the Niger Delta, Punt land, Somaliland, Southern Sudan, Cabinda, and Azawad breaking away was those regions proximity to other sovereign nations. Secessionist agitations being hatched from regions on the fringes is no accident since a path for escape when the insurgency fails is a consideration not lost on insurgent leaders. Governments threatened by secession task their military to use force to halt that treasonable act. The likelihood of war and even a greater likelihood of losing that war have made groups planning an insurgency to be

circumspect before putting that plan into action. Closeness to other countries also reduces the effectiveness of law enforcement in stopping smuggling, a major revenue source for border residents. Clapham (1998) believes that the resentment that citizens show toward government is due to governments' predictable practice of exacting tribute from its populations in any way it can. "A process that only results in alienation, evasion and the growth of an informal economy whose *raison d'etre* is to evade the demands of the state." At the same time, the penchant African governments have for concentrating power at the center makes the regions placed in the outer fringes poorly served in development projects in schools, hospitals, and road networks.

V. THE POLITICS OF SECESSION

Kamanu (1974) sees African countries' non-support of secession as a foreign policy contradiction for which they have not been able to give a credible answer. Nations supported self-determination under colonialism but have opposed the application of the same principle in a post-colonial setting probably fearing the dreadful consequences of secession. Every African government deems a group or a region's right to leave a union to form a sovereign state non-negotiable. Regionally-based separatist movements are disdained by governments which believe they have an exclusive right to sovereignty. Throughout the world, the supporters of separatist movements are considered criminals (Douglass and Zulaika, 1990). Victory in the resulting war which a government starts to restore national integrity overwhelmingly has been won by the government, bolstered by strong diplomatic support and superiority in troops and armaments. Not ceding to insurgents' demands was the strategy which Colonel Gowon, Nigeria's leader, chose when Biafra announced its sovereignty in 1967. According to Uzokwe (2003), Gowon, refused to accept Biafra's sovereignty and declared the secession illegal. He went on to amass 100,000 troops to crush the rebellion and reintegrate Biafra into Nigeria. This tough stance which governments take against insurgencies is intended as much to preserve a state's integrity, as it is to forewarn other factions from emulating this illegality in the future.

The African Union which has unflinchingly upheld the principle of states' inviolability has used its stature as a supranational organization to leverage leaders inside and outside Africa to hold back diplomatic and military support from regions that break away. This policy which the organization officially adopted in 1964 was meant to tamp down the fervor of self-determination which was running rampant during the first half of Africa's independence decade. The OAU feared that backing the declaration of self-determination from groups in newly independent nations would set the stage for an avalanche of demands, whereby every

group which was disenchanted with its government would seek to withdraw. The OAU's strong stance against secession, however, undermined its disenchantment with Portugal and Spain which had been holdouts for independence. Tanzania, Cote d'Ivoire, Zambia, Gabon, and Haiti recognizing Biafra as an independent state, exposed the OAU's seeming hypocritical philosophy. It was a symbolic statement of support either for Biafrans to keep fighting, or against the Nigerian federal government to stop its assault.

In the 1960s and 70s, the United Nations was conflicted, as the OAU was, about the appropriate response to give to ethnic groups and regions seeking self-determination from the countries of which they were part. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) of 1948 and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) of 1966, respect people's civil and political rights. The UDHR, coming almost a decade before the great decolonization wave began in Africa and Asia, anticipated the self-determination effort which had begun in India and Pakistan and was poised to spread to Africa. In the 1960s, the United Nations supported every colony in Africa decolonizing, including imposing selective sanctions on the racist regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa; yet it never backed Katanga and Biafra breaking away. Apart from the Soviet Union and Cuba supporting Ethiopia in the early stages of Eritrea's insurgency and the United States tepidly supporting Eritrea, Eritrea did not get any official backing from the United Nations or the OAU. The message must be clear, therefore, to a group or region wanting to break away that it might not get much external support even if it presents convincing evidence of atrocities or discrimination.

VI. THE PITFALLS OF LEAVING

The fear new African governments had that well-established kingdoms such as Buganda, Ashanti or Oyo would look inward and withhold support for their new nations was largely unfounded. It was not for lack of grievances from the old kingdoms or regions, however, but rather fear. Regions and their ethnic groups recognized the heavy odds it would face if their ragtag people's militia were to square off against well-stocked national armies. The horrific loss of lives which soldiers and civilians suffered in the Eritrea's war with Ethiopia and in the Nigerian and the Sudanese civil wars, have become ominous reminders of the daunting sacrifices a region or group inevitably will have to make if it tries to break away. Despite the relative calm existing in the relations between African governments and their administrative regions, it would be shortsighted for policy makers to assume that deeply felt grievances emanating from the regions could be treated lightly or ignored. Separatists' agitations are hard to uproot and may smolder for years because the most ardent promoters of separatism often enjoy folk hero status.

The constant clashes in Nigerian states, not just those in the Delta, between residents and immigrants about religion and economic opportunity are reminders of how fractious and intricate intrastate politics in multiethnic nations could be. It may serve African leaders well if they assumed the glue that binds the patchwork of groups inside their boundaries can unravel anytime under the flimsiest of provocations. Disagreements over property rights, border lines, smuggling, and members of one group ill-treating the members of another group have pitted groups against each other. Most disputes do not rise to the point of an aggrieved group wanting to pull out. Other disagreements, however, have, such as Tuareg rebels in northern Mali and Niger and Hutu rebels in eastern DRC wanting autonomy, and prompting armed intervention from government. Inside countries, regional inequalities and other causes such as population size and population concentrations can start a conflict (Raleigh, 2009).

Whenever a region or an ethnic group decides to break away from a sovereign state it has caused war that had been declared unfailingly by the government which believed its sovereignty had been breached. The resultant war had usually exacted a high price both on the region wanting out and the government wanting to keep its sovereignty. Even in Cabinda and the Casamance where rebel groups have not formally broken away by setting up independent sovereign nations, the hot pursuits which the Angolan and Senegalese military had undertaken to hound rebels have laid to waste people, property, and families. The costs associated with secession, not surprisingly therefore, have been those usually borne from war especially in human lives and the destruction done to property and the means of production. Also as occurs in wars, refugees internally or externally displaced become the inexorable collateral damage. The United Nations which since 1960 has continually provided peacekeepers to prevent Africa's internal conflicts from worsening has always borne a substantial part of the cost of those conflicts. The United Nations peacekeeping operations in the Congo—UNOC—the UN's first in Africa's independent decade, caused a financial crisis which plagued UN operations for several years. ONUC's annual cost was \$66million when the UN's overall budget was only \$70million and France and the Soviet Union refused to pay (ONUC, 1964). For its fiscal 2012 budget, the Security Council (2012) estimated a cost of \$7.8 billion for its peacekeeping operations worldwide, with the operations in Africa taking about three-quarters of the total. The greater part of the monetary cost of wars to reclaim territory, however, has been borne by the government which declares war. According to Okpaku (1972), the three-year Nigerian civil war cost the government 1,600 million pounds, or about the entire Nigeria's 1966 GNP. But it

was in the loss of lives where the greatest cost of the Biafran war was felt, especially in Biafra where most of the fighting took place. The war caused 100,000 military casualties and between 500,000 and two million civilians' deaths from hunger, starvation, and disease. Military spending in the Sudan picked up exponentially after 2000 when the government's war with the south intensified. From 2000 to 2006 (when data were available), the country spent three percent of its GDP on the military, amounting to \$13.9 billion (SIPRI). The politics and the war that defined Eritrea breaking away from Ethiopia were exercises in attrition. In early 1990, Human Rights Watch (HRW, 1990) reported Asmara, Eritrea's capital, being cut off from overland supply for more than 200 days as the Ethiopian military starved the city of food and supplies. Resentment between the two countries never subsided pushing the two sides to fight a war from 1998 to 2000. Air raids against civilians and the rounding up and expulsion of long-term Eritrean residents from Ethiopia and of Ethiopian nationals from Eritrea were the war's preferred strategy (HRW, 1998).

A region or an ethnic group that publicly declares its plan to leave a union risks becoming the target of resentment and suspicion by the government and other groups which may see such plan as a threat and a betrayal. The ill will created may last several years, especially when geographic distance becomes an impediment to promoting a uniform national culture. Despite a union consummated more than one-half century ago, some Zanzibar is are still opposed to the island's union with Tanzanians. Similarly, many Cabindans do not consider their enclave to be part of Angola. The Biafran war heralded the long-running insurgency in the Niger Delta. A war or any act of disobedience has usually drawn the fury of ruling governments to employ the strongest means available to end that threat. The strategy has been to employ the police or military to harass groups and individuals. Not surprisingly, wars in Africa concomitantly have also brought human rights abuses. From 2000 to 2007, HRW (2008) criticized the Angola's MPLA government for unprecedented human rights abuses in Cabinda, including the unfair trial of Fernando Lelo and four soldiers. Most of those detained in Cabinda were held in an unofficial military detention center, where they were tortured and held in inhumane conditions for months. In 2012, HRW (2012) also chastised separatist Tuareg rebels of northern Mali for committing many war crimes including rape, using child soldiers, pillaging hospitals, schools, aid agencies and government buildings. An Islamist armed group summarily executed two men, cut off the hand of at least one other, carried out public floggings and threatened women and Christians.

VII. CONCLUSION

The nonchalant manner in which African governments have treated the threat of any region of

their country breaking away epitomizes the mind-set most leaders have for not believing the threat exists, and if it does, having the ability to contain it. The logic behind this philosophy appears simple; leader believe the only answer to end rebellion is to use force, which would also forestall similar rebellious acts spreading to other regions. The inconsistent and vindictive manner in which governments have addressed regional problems, however, has not helped to muzzle regions or groups from expressing their grievances and apprehensions. Governments not showing empathy has indeed hardened the resolve disaffected regions have by engaging in asymmetrical warfare such as kidnappings and sabotaging economic facilities, which they believe would help them to achieve the goal of self-determination they have set. Places like Cabinda in Angola, Zanzibar in Tanzania, and the Casamance in Senegal which have become notorious for political ferment continue to keep their reputation. Like the governments they despise, these regions also believe the cause they are aiming for is just.

Even though Africans seem predisposed to ethnic or regional breakups, the behavior of governments to this threat suggests oblivion, ignorance or supreme confidence to subdue such threats if they should ever arise. The AU's condemnatory stance toward a region breaking away from a sovereign nation as well as the impressive record of success African countries governments have had against renegade regions, and the sporadic nature of such attempts explains governments' complacency to this existential threat. Even when the threat of a region breaking away is obvious, the credential of autocracy to which many African governments had worn prevents them from seeking compromise with groups with whom they disagreed. Even among governments which believe in the rule of law the conviction that the will of the sovereign must always prevail when addressing matters considered to serve parochial interests is strong. Governments believe they would pay an unredeemable price if they were to negotiate with groups that make strong demands for autonomy. The manner in which Nigeria's military government of Sani Abacha handled the Ogoni crisis in the mid-1990s showed prejudice, incompetence and brutality of the highest order against people of the Niger Delta. The military government treated the Ogoni in the manner it did because of an unstated prejudice the people in the Niger Delta were associated with the Biafran secession. Once a region tries to break away, the people living in that region are described as untrustworthy; a label from which the people in the region may find difficult to disentangle themselves. But the Ogoni had pressing issues they wanted the federal government to resolve. They had complained for many years about their deteriorating living conditions, especially the manner in which multinational oil companies were degrading farmlands.

It was in keeping with a string of poor judgments that the government of Sani Abacha arrested, tried, and hung Saro Wiwa, an environmental activist, in 1995. The Ogoni uprisings foreshadowed the unrests in the Niger Delta in the 2000s which has cost the country billions in oil revenues.

Over more than one-half century since Kantanga's secession began, African governments should have learned the lesson that sporadic but ominous regional rumblings will never stop, unless governments diligently address their causes. Communities that make significant contributions to the national economy must be rewarded amply for their good fortune. The stances which most governments have taken when addressing regional issues, on the other hand, have lacked pragmatism as they believe doggedly that ruling governments must have the final say in all matters about sovereignty. It should never be lost on any observer, however, that African governments' preferred nonchalant stance toward the menace of secession and other regional issues in general, may be deliberate because they do not want to spend extra money and personnel to evaluate them to come to solutions which would be long lasting. Grievances may be settled quickly and cheaply through force. Some observers would hope history would teach governments that constituents would be better served if they reflected on the escalating crisis in Mali of Tuaregs of the north breaking away from the south. The Bamako government never envisaged that a dormant grudge would be resuscitated by fighters coming home from Libya who have become emboldened by having access to a bevy of weapons to back up their demand. It seemed farcical that such unlikely events would permutate to create a crisis that may end the Republic of Mali as the world had known it. Sadly, having built a reputation for not planning for contingencies, African

governments are unlikely to draw any hard lessons from the Malian crisis.

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Notes:

¹ In June 2010, Somaliland held presidential elections in which Ahmed Mohamed Silanyo, the opposition candidate defeated outgoing president Dahir Riyale Kahin. International observers said the poll was largely free and fair, despite a few irregularities. "Somalia: New Somaliland President Looking for Recognition and Investment," *AllAfrica.com* July 3, 2010.

² In early 2009, the American military helped plan and pay for an attack on the Lord's Resistance Army, but the offensive went awry, scattering fighters who later carried out a wave of massacres as they fled, killing as many as 900 civilians. Jeffrey Gettleman and Eric Schmitt. U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels. *New York Times* February 9, 2009.

³ To show its sensitivity to the plight of residents of the Niger-Delta Region, the Nigerian Federal Government allocates substantial amounts of money to the nine states in the region. In 2009, out of 180 billion Naira designated as 'statutory transfers', 35.6 billion Naira was allocated to the Niger-Delta region to improve economic and social development. See The Appropriation Bill, 2010. Available at <http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/Bill2010.pdf>

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Rethinking Globalization and Continuing Relevance of the “State” In Comparative Politics

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Abstract - Comparative politics is one of the sub-fields within the academic discipline of political science as well as an approach to the study of politics and development across countries. As a field of study, comparative politics focuses on understanding and explaining political phenomena that take place within a state, society, country, or political system. However, it should be noted that while the field of comparative politics continues to change over time, it is important to note that its definition too changes. This paper, therefore, provides a comprehensive debate on the ontology, epistemology and methodology within the entire field of comparative politics with critical reflections on the continuing relevance of the states in a globalizing world. As a critical reflection, this paper is not wedded to any single world-view or conclusion about globalization. As a whole, this paper is guided by the proposition that, despite the assault on the state from a number of directions, its role will remain central to the study of comparative politics as well as in the contemporary era of globalization.

Keywords : *Comparative politics, Globalization, State, Third World*

“Without comparisons to make, the mind does not know how to proceed” (Alexis de Tocqueville, 1945).

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I. INTRODUCTION

Comparative politics is one of the sub-fields within the academic discipline of political science as well as an approach to the study of politics and development across countries. Comparative politics draws on the comparative research method, what Mill characterized as “the method of agreement” and “the method of difference” or, more commonly, most similar (e.g. Anglo-American democracies) and most different (e.g. democracy versus dictatorships) systems. By drawing on the comparative method, comparative politics attempts to provide a systematic study of the world’s politics, and seeks to explain both similarities and differences among and between political systems. It is a systematic, comparative study of the world’s politics which seek to explain both similarities and differences among these political systems (Wiarda, 2007; Lijphart, 1971; Hopkin in Marsh, D. and G. Stoker, 2002).

Arguably, comparative politics is defined more by its *methodology*, rather than by its substantive or even theoretical areas of focus, which are quite heterogeneous. Comparative politics concentrates on areas such as democratization, state-society relations, identity and ethnic politics, social movements,

institutional analysis, and political economy. It addresses these themes from a number of theoretical perspectives such as rational choice theory, political cultural, political economy, as well as institutionalism. As argued by Kesselman *et al* (2007), comparativists often analyze political institutions or processes by looking at two or more cases that are selected to isolate their common and contrasting features. Studies in comparative politics can be single-country case studies, comparisons of two or more countries, and/or studies of some dimensions of the entire global universe of countries (Wiarda, 2007). In this respect, a comparative study is drawn upon across political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists, among other disciplines.

Comparative politics draws a better understanding of how politics work as well as rules about politics. Mc Cormick refers to CP as a tool to understand ourselves, i.e. gaining knowledge of the self, through knowledge of others. Thus, by studying the ways in which other societies govern themselves, we can better understand the character, origins, strengths and weaknesses of our own system of government (Ibid). Moreover, comparative politics explores how interest groups relate to the state or government, political culture and political values in different countries. Wiarda notes further that comparative politics studies the processes by which countries become developed, modern, and democratic; how civil society emerges in different countries; and the effects of economic growth and social change on the developing nations.

As a field of study, comparative politics focuses on understanding and explaining political phenomena that take place within a state, society, country, or political system (Lim, 2006, 5). It is not necessarily about deciding which political system is best or worst, but learning more about how and why different systems are different or similar. In this respect, comparative politics helps us to understand the effects of both *differences* and *similarities* in different political systems. In fact, the real world of comparative politics can be viewed as a laboratory for political scientists to critically and systematically assess what works and what does not, as well as to demonstrate important theoretical relationships among different political variables. Sartori (1970) makes a similar point arguing that “to compare is ‘to assimilate’ i.e. to discover deeper or fundamental similarities below the surface of secondary diversities”. This is based on the fact that, we can only obtain comparability when two or more items appear ‘similar

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enough'to the extent that they are neither identical nor utterly different (Ibid).

Just like other social science disciplines and fields of study, political science has undergone remarkable changes following the end of World War II (Lim, 2006). In part, this was driven by the importance of knowing about other countries so as the military-strategic interests of the United States (US) could be better protected. As Wiarda (as cited by Lim, 2006: 9) noted, the rise of fascism and military in Germany, Japan and Italy and the rise of communism in Russia and China, had a profound impact on the field of comparative politics and political science as a whole. More recently, the end of the Cold War opened the window of opportunity that has resulted not only in some remarkable political changes, but also in a closer integration of the world's economies than ever before (Green and Luehrmann 2007). Lim tells us that this historical gen of comparative politics informs us clearly that the field is not immune to a host of subjective, mostly hidden social and political forces and that, "what is true of the past is almost assuredly true of the present" (p11). While the field of comparative politics continues to change over time, it is important to note that its definition too changes. comparative politics as defined by many authors focuses on what happens inside countries, while international relations basically focuses more on what happens outside countries or more accurately relations among states. However, it is interesting to note that the renewed interest in the globalization among political scientists during the 1980s occurred almost parallel with changes in the role of the state in society in most Third World countries. Held (2000) alongside many scholars, argues that "we are in a new 'global middle ages', which though the nation states still have vitality, they cannot control their borders and therefore are subject to all sorts of internal and external pressures".

However, this paper does not agree with this fairly miserable image of the state and its centrality in contemporary governance. The paper provides a comprehensive knowledge about the entire field of comparative politics with 'critical reflections' on the continuing relevance of the states (especially in the Third World) in a globalizing world. As a critical reflection, this paper is not wedded to any single world-view or conclusion about globalization. In the same way, Mittelman argues that there is no universal agreement on how the critical conceptions should be understood on what characterizes globalization. Whereas others see globalization from *inside out*, other lens provides peripheral vision which sees globalization from the *outside in*. A critical perspective in this respect, examines how facts about the Third World' states are artificially constructed in the name of 'globalization' and whose interest they serve. The paper discards any sharp distinction between domestic and

international concerns about the state and pays vigilant attention to the environments surrounding states and their influences on variations among states. This paper is guided by the proposition that, despite the assault on the state from a number of directions, its role will remain central to the study of comparative politic as well as in the contemporary era of globalization.

This paper is organized as follows: The first part is an introductory remarks and definition of the subject matter. The second part provides a general knowledge about comparative politics, focusing on the major ontological, epistemological and methodological debates, assumptions and impasses as well as major theoretical approaches in comparative politics. The third part narrows down to discussing comparative politics in the context of the Third World. In this section, the central argument of globalization and state is examined, with the question of 'what is new and what is not new' with globalization. Finally, the paper concludes by looking ahead toward a clear understanding of state and its relevance to economic development in a globalizing world. Since it is not possible to cover everything in this paper, the choice and speciality had to be made.

II. THE SUBSTANCE OF COMPARATIVE POLITICS

a) *Ontological, Epistemological and Methodological Debates*

Questions and issues relating to *what to compare, why compares, and how to compare* are the major concern of any comparativist. Comparative politics and comparative methodologies are, thus, well suited for addressing such questions. Addressing these questions does not only provide extensions of knowledge, but also a strategy for acquiring and validating new knowledge (Sartori, 1970). Making comparisons is a natural human activity. Comparing the past and present of nation *X*, and comparing its experience with that of other nations, deepens the knowledge and understanding of both nations, their policies, histories and experiences that are being compared (Almand and Powell, 1996). Comparative politics, *inter alia*, aimsto describe the political phenomena and events of a particular country, or group of countries (Landman, 2003). Comparative methods is a powerful and adaptable tool which enhances our ability to describe and understand political processes and political change in any country by offering concepts and references points from a broader perspective. Thus, this exposesthe comparative politicsfield into diverse intellectual enterprises. While Peters (1998) regards this heterogeneity as both a strength and weakness of comparative politics, Verba (as quoted by Peters, 1998:9) argues that this heterogeneity of the field will prolong its vitality, and it is a source of strength rather than of weakness. According to Verba, the openness of

the field to various theories and methodologies helps to maintain its vitality and its capacity to cope with realities in a rapidly changing political world. So, the practical analyst of comparative politics needs to know not only *what* political reality (ontology) is, but also how to begin to *know* and explain it, (epistemology), before even addressing the particular problem under investigation (methodology). Landman (2003:16) discusses ontology, epistemology and methodology as terms that occur in the discussion of the philosophy of science and distinctions between them often become indistinct in the comparative literature. Thus, these three concepts provide a 'directional dependence' among each other. Whereas ontology establishes *what is knowable*, epistemology discusses *how it is knowable* and methodology *how it is acquired systematically*. In a sense, different broad ontological and epistemological positions inform different methodological orientations or preferences (Marsh and Stoker, 1995:14). Drawing a link between methodology and ontology, Hall (2003) argues that, 'if methodology consists of techniques for making observations about causal relations, an ontology consists of premises about the deep causal structures of the world from which analysis begins and without which theories about the social world would not make sense.' This author argues further that, ontology is ultimately important to methodology because the suitability of a particular set of methods for a given problem turns on assumptions about the nature of the causal relations they are meant to discover.

'Ontology' in comparative politics refers to theory of being, or a metaphysical concern. It relates to what can be studied, what can be compared, and what constitutes CP. Hall (2003) defines ontology as the fundamental assumptions scholars make about the nature of the social and political world and especially about the nature of causal relationships within that world. It is the character of the real world as it actually is (Ibid). In comparative politics, ontology is relevant to our study of the 'what' of - countries, events, actors, institutions, and processes that is observable and in need of description or analysis. While we may have a lot to analyze in comparative politics, Peters discusses at least five types of studies that are classified as being components of comparative politics. The first unit of analysis according to Peters is a *single country'* descriptions of politics in *X*, whatever *X* may be. While this is a most common form of analysis in the discipline, it has the least assert to advancing the scientific status of comparative politics. The obvious weakness of this approach is that it is not really comparative but rather an explication of politics 'someplace else' (Ibid).

A second unit of analysis in comparative politics is *processes and institutions*. This can be a selection of a small number of instances that appear similar or comparable in some significant ways; those

instances are then used to clarify the nature of either the process or the institutions itself, or the politics of the country within which it occurs. This method does not describe and implicitly compare whole systems, but rather to develop lower-level comparisons of a particular institution or political process. Example of this can be a comparative analysis of public policy formulation and implementation. A third way of approaching comparative politics is *typology formation*, where political comparativists develop classification schemes of countries or different components of the political party systems. This form of analysis was used to analyze politics in various countries by comparing their actual performance with the conceptual model. A fourth variety of CP analysis is *regional statistic analysis*. The purpose of this approach is to test some proposition about politics within the specific region. The initial goal of this approach is to make generalization only about that region, and if successful, then the ultimate goal is to extend that analysis to be a proposition about politics more generally. Example of this can be studies of the welfare state in Western Europe and North America. The final option discussed by Peters is *global statistical studies*. This does for the entire world what the regional studies do for a subset. Example of this can be the World Development Reports or Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index.

Epistemology in social sciences expresses a view about how we know, what we know and in particular about what constitutes an adequate explanation of a political event or process. *Positivism* and *historicism*¹ are among the two significant modes of thought that have greatly influenced contemporary social science (Chilcote, 2000:32). Positivism (and its empiricist epistemology), in particular, has indeed dominated the discipline of comparative politics and social science at large for a number of decades. Positivism has a very long history in social science (Smith *et al*, 1996) with the early theorists, such as Auguste Comte, David Hume, and Herbert Spencer. Comte in particular, is the one who coined the word 'positivism' and 'sociology' in early 19th century (Chilcote, 2000; Smith *et al*, 1996; Neufeld, 1995). His major aim was to develop a science of society based on the methods of natural sciences. According to Comte, the positivist approach would give in a methodologically unified conception of science which would give true, objective knowledge, in the form of causal laws of phenomena, derived from observation (Neufeld,

¹ According to Chilcote, Historicism grew out of a German academic debate in the 19th century. This model deals with history and influenced people like Hegel, Marx and other thinkers. Historians try to describe and explain events shaping the world (See Lewy, 1968). Positivists have criticized historicists for theorizing about broadly conceived questions, for utilizing data to illustrate rather than to rest their theories, and for failing to tie theory to data (See Chilcote, 2000, p.33).

1995). Comte's view was very significant in the development of the social sciences during the 19th century, fundamentally influencing writers such as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and Émile Durkheim (Smith *et al*, 1996; Neufeld, 1995). Nonetheless, Comte's view suffered from a number of ambiguities and even internal challenges which gave way to *logical positivism* which arose in the 1920s in Austria (The Vienna Circle), Germany (The Berlin School) and Poland. This approach claimed radically that science was the only true form of knowledge. Hence, it became very dominant and perhaps the most influential variant in social science, dating from the first half of the 20th century (Neufeld, 1995). The logical positivists located many of the problems and uncertainties of science in general and social sciences in particular with the unclear use of language. The proponents of this variant argue that, in order to avoid production of meaningless statements, scientific language must be governed by strict rules of meaning. They appeal to the certainty of empirical sense-perception in an effort to stabilize scientific and social scientific categories (Hall *et al*, 1995). However, logical positivism was discredited as a philosophy of science especially after World War II. Its epistemology and ontology became increasingly challenged throughout the social and behavioural science in the 1950s and 1960s, thus giving rise to *post-positivism* (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998).

Post-positivism, on the other hand, was a response to the widely discredited maxims of positivism, whereas many of its doctrines were in direct opposition to those of its fore-runner. Post-positivism believes that a research is influenced by the values of investigators as well as the theory or hypotheses that are used by the investigator. Moreover, it believes that the nature of reality is based on the fact that our understanding of reality is constructed (Ibid). The post-positivist objective is not to reject the scientific project altogether, but to identify the need to understand properly what they are doing when engaged in any form of research (Fischer, 1998). Post-positivism can thus be explained as an attempt to understand and reconstruct that which already is being done when engaged in scientific inquiry. For post-positivists, the central debates in politics are not often over data as such, but rather over the underlying assumptions that organize them (Ibid). Tashakkori and Teddlie noted that, since these tenets reflect common understandings regarding both the 'nature of reality' and the conduct of social and behavioural research, they are widely shared by both qualitatively and quantitatively oriented researchers.

Moreover, women as a category, gender as a topic and the impact of feminism as an ideology are three powerful sources of ideas which contribute to *feminist epistemology* in political science (Grant and Newland, 1991). According to Randall (in Marsh and Stoker 2002), feminism has gone through three

epistemological phases in political science: rationalist (positivist), anti-rationalist and post-rationalist (interpretive). According to her, both liberal feminism and early radical feminism were implicitly rationalist, but without reflecting upon their own epistemological basis. The anti-rationalist approach represents the world in terms of a series of dualistic oppositions, e.g. between culture and nature, or mind and body, identified with men and women respectively (Ibid). Randall explains this approach as inevitably limited for feminists working in the social sciences. One of the attempts to escape from the anti-rationalist approach is *feminist standpoint*.

Nancy Hartsock (1983) suggests that standpoint feminism is intellectually indebted to Marxist theory. According to Hartsock (1997) feminist standpoint builds on Marx's understanding of experience and is used to criticize patriarchal theories which rely primarily or exclusively on male experience in political science. Hartsock's ideas draw on the theorizing of Marx, whose theory is centered less on the material aspects of life than on the more broadly defined social ones. Feminist standpoint inherited the more realist notion of historically constrained awareness. That is, it "depends on the assumption that epistemology grows in a complex and contradictory way from the material life" (Ibid). However, standpoint theory has been criticized by other feminists on a variety of reasons. One of the criticisms has come from postmodernist feminists. This paradigm shift to postmodernist feminisms which occurred by the middle of the eighties was highly influenced by French thinkers like Michel Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Jean-Francois Lyotard, to mention but few (Benhabib, 1994). As the impact of their theories, no matter how diverse and sometimes contradictory was felt upon the core of study of social science especially in the US, feminist theorists also discovered an attractive ally in postmodernism for their concerns. As a criticism to standpoint theory, postmodernist feminists such as Judith Butler² argues that there is no concrete "women's experience" from which the knowledge can really be constructed. From Butler's viewpoint, there is no single cause for women's subordination, and no single approach towards dealing with the issue. Thus, standpoint theory has failed to take into account the substantial differences between women's lives (Randall, 2002:115). In other words, the lives of women across space and time are so diverse, hence, impossible to generalize about their experiences (Benhabib, 1994).

Given the feminist diversity in politics, there is not one single shared feminist epistemological position so far (Randall, 2002). Feminist epistemology is a loosely organized approach to epistemology, rather than a particular school or theory. Its diversity reflects the

² See Butler, J (1990)

diversity of epistemology in general, as well as the diversity of theoretical positions that constitute the position of women in the fields of political science. What is common, however to all feminist epistemologies is an emphasis on the epistemic salience of gender and the use of gender as an analytic category in discussions, criticisms, and reconstructions of epistemic practices, norms, and ideals. Since gender is intrinsic to the politics, political and transformative value of feminist epistemology on the study of politics is crucial to overcome gender silence on this matter (Hudson, 2005).

As it has been noted earlier in this paper, comparative politics is much more than simply a subject of study -- it is also a *means of study*. Methodology in comparative politics consists of methods, procedures, working concepts, and rules used to test theory, guiding inquiry, and searching for solutions to problems of the real world (Chilcote, 2000). It is a particular way of viewing, organizing, and giving shape to inquiry. Green and Luehrmann (2007) argue that, through the use of the comparative method we seek to describe, identify, and explain trends – in some cases, even predict human behaviour. The most important of these are inferences about causal relationships, where the object of a methodology is to increase confidence in claims that one variable or event (x) exerts a causal effect on another (y) (Ibid). Since comparative politics is a branch of social science, many political scientists emphasize attention to explicit assumptions and to systematic and quantitative investigation. This implies a systematic procedure for comparative political science investigation, akin to that of natural science. In comparing different cases, comparative politics uses various models or hypotheses as a way of simplifying and explaining various political realities more easily. Models bring disparate parts together and demonstrate relationship (Ibid). An effective model simplifies reality by dividing it into clear and manageable components (Wiarda, 2007:36). Models help a researcher to organize, highlight and give coherence to various events, processes, and institutions. They simplify complex events and give a researcher an understanding of them more clearly. However, the overall usefulness as well as limits of models should be recognized by the researcher, especially when they have outlasted their utility.

The systematic study of political science involves the variety of methods that are adopted within the discipline. Hence, the distinction between different comparative methods or approaches is a function of the kind of research, time and resources available, as well as his/her epistemological position. Landman, (2003) emphasizes that the central distinction between different methods in comparative politics depends on the key trade-off between 'the level of abstraction' and 'the scope of countries or cases under study or

investigation'. If the level of conceptual abstraction is higher (e.g. focus on many countries), the researcher is more likely to include a large number of countries or cases in his or her study. Conversely, the lower the level of abstraction (e.g. focus on one case or few cases), the researcher is less likely to use abstract concepts that are more grounded in the specific context of investigation.

Case study approach is the popular form of research design which is widely used throughout the social sciences research (Burnham *et al*, 2004). It was a dominant mode of inquiry in American government and politics since the 1950s (Eulau, 1962). However, Hall (2003) argues that the role of the case study has been concealed for years for enveloping confusion about what constitutes a case and what constitute an observation relevant to the testing of theory. Burnham *et al* give us a simple definition of cases, i.e. 'how many' and 'which'. Yin (2003) suggests that case study should be defined as a research strategy, an empirical inquiry that investigates a phenomenon within its real-life context. Case studies enable comparative researchers to focus on a single individual, group, community, event, policy area or institution, and study it in depth (Ibid). Though this approach can be used in collection of both quantitative and qualitative data, it has more of the qualitative to it as it generates a wealth of data relating to one specific case. Doing a case study in a comparative perspective implies that, a researcher must not only conduct intensive (highly focused) research on the primary case, but must also carry out extensive (broad-based) research on a range of other relevant cases (Lim, 2006, 50). However, the disadvantages of case studies in social sciences is that, a single case study can provide little basis for creating new generalizations or grounds for invalidating existing generalizations (Axline, 1994). It is often noted that, the group studied may be unique, and the observer may be biased in his or her perceptions. Similarly, hypotheses can rarely be put to an objective test, and in some cases the analysis may not rise above mere description.

While case study approach has a considerable influence in comparative politics and social sciences at large, *case selection* merits some special attention as well. This is because; the quality of any comparative research depends much on what cases are included in that study. This is imperative given that most comparative work does involve purposeful, rather than random selection of cases (Peters, 1998). However, the number of cases to be included in a comparative research design depends essentially on how many suitable cases are available for such a research work. Comparative case selection should take place on the basis of three selection principles: cases should be able to maximize experimental variance, minimize error

variance, and control extraneous variance³ (Peters, 1998, 31; Burnham, 2004, 62). Two main comparative approaches for choosing cases are: *most similar system (MSS)* and *most different systems (MDS)* (Przeworski and Teune, 1970). While, both system designs are used in comparative politics, mostly by those who compare few countries or cases, they do vary to a greater extent. MSS design is the usual method which most of political comparativists undertake. It includes a range of countries or cases that appear to be similar in as many ways as possible in order to control for concomitant variation (Peters, 1998, 37). MSS design is particularly well suited for those engaged in area studies (Przeworski and Teune, 1970; Landman, 2003). It deals more directly with countries as a unit of analysis and attempts to control for extraneous sources of variance by selecting cases which are likely to avoid this problem. By and large, MSS looks for differences between cases that appear to have a great deal in common, e.g. United States and Canada. On the other hand, the MDS design is not particularly interested in countries, rather a more variable based research. It is mainly interested in finding the relationships among variables that can survive being transported across a range of very different countries (Peters, 1998). While cases in MSS should have the different independent variables, the independent variable in the MDS should be the same across all cases (Burnham *et al*, 2004). Thus, this kind of research compares two or more cases that are as different as possible except on the independent variables (Ibid). MDS looks for commonalities between cases that appear absolutely opposed in experience.

b) *Theoretical approaches in comparative politics*

Theoretical framework serves as a logical prerequisite of comparative analysis because it alone can provide that *tertium comparationis*⁴ without which comparison is impossible (Eula, 1962). Among the commonly known approaches to the study of comparative politics are behavioural; political culture; rational choice; and political development approaches. However, the distinctions among these approaches

³ Guy Peters defines Experimental variance as the observed differences or changes in the dependent variable that are a function of the independent variables identified as central to the analysis. 'Error variance' on the other hand are that portion of the variance observed in the dependent variable that is not a function of random occurrence and errors in measurement, while 'Extraneous variance' refers to the situation where there are one or more variables that have a systematic relationship with the dependent variable, and perhaps also with the independent variables in an analysis. Extraneous variances are more likely to creep into the analysis.

⁴ *Tertium comparationis* Latin word literally means, *a third for comparison*. It is a basis for comparison where the quality that two things which are being compared have in common. It is the point of comparison which prompted the author of the comparison in question to liken someone or something to someone or something else in the first place

reveal the various tendencies employed in the study of comparative politics.

Behavioural approach to political analysis was one of the dominant paradigms especially in the 1950s and 1960s in American political science (Burnham *et al*, 2004). Sanders (2002:63) explains behavioural approach as "a single, deceptively simple, question: why do individuals, institutional actors and nation states behave the way they do?" One of the distinctive features of behavioural approach is that, *observable* behaviour (both individual and social aggregate) should be the focus of analysis (Ibid). Sanders further explains that any description of that behaviour should be inclined to scientific empirical testing. This approach readdressed the field to study and examine political activities such as mass political participation especially in voting; leadership behaviours; actions of interest groups; as well as political parties both at the local and international level. The advocates of this paradigm saw themselves as spokesmen for a very broad and deep conviction that political science should abandon certain traditional kind of research and execute a more modern sort of analysis (Burnham *et al*, 2004). However, this approach faced criticisms from three broad directions. It was in the first place criticized for its failure to fulfil its own goals i.e. to offer an adequate account of some of the most important dimensions of politics, even in an area such as voting behaviour (Gibbons, 2006; Burnham *et al*, 2004). Secondly, behaviouralists were also criticized for inserting an 'undue emphasis' on process at the expense of the content and substance of political events and systems. Sanders argues that in between early 1950s and the mid-1970s, many scholars working within the behavioural approach were more concerned with an inductivist approach to research which accentuate what can easily be measured rather than what might be theoretically important. Moreover, behavioural approach was attacked by the American Political Science Association (APSA) in 1967 as of 'no relevance' due to its tendency to concentrate on readily observable phenomena -such as voting- rather than more subtle and deeper analysis (Burnham *et al* 2004; Sanders 2002). Notwithstanding all these criticisms, the legacy of behaviouralism and its counterpart post-behaviouralism remains enormous in the twenty-first century in a sense that, its ideas lay across nearly all empirical social researchers (Sanders, 2002). As Macridis (1968) argues, behaviouralism opened up the study of contextual factors within which political structures and forms develop and political roles flourish.

Political culture approach to politics is another eminent approach marked the field especially in the 1960s. Almond (2000) explains the notion of political culture as one of the most powerful themes of classical literatures since the ancient Greek and Roman Empire. According to him, the Greeks had a cyclical theory of political change which explained the rise and fall of

political constitutions in social psychological terms. On the other hand, Jacobsen and Losada (2005) explained the evolution of the concept of 'political culture' from its root in Plato and Aristotle, through 1960s' political science, to the more recent 'cultural turn' where culture is seen as universally constitutive of social relations and identities. They define political culture as a "perspective on processes of change and continuity in any human polity or its component parts which privileges symbols, discourses, rituals, customs, norms, values and attitudes of individuals or groups for understanding the construction, consolidation and dismantling of power constellations and institutions" (Ibid:58). Similarly, Wiarda (2007:66) defines political culture as "the basic values, beliefs, ideas, attitudes and orientations that citizens of different countries have about their political system". According to him, political culture of nation *X* means the cognitions, feelings, and orientations of people toward politics of that nation. It comprises of the core values, not temporary ones with regards to whether people accept the basic premises of their political system such as democratic system, rule of law, separation of powers, civil liberties etc., and not whether or not one approves or disapproves on a daily basis of how well the president and his cabinet are doing their job (Ibid). Since political culture varies greatly from one country to another, it is the similarities as well as differences in political beliefs and attitudes between countries and regions that stimulate comparisons and thus make 'political culture' a subject of major interest to comparative politics (Ibid). Political culture helps us understand different factors driving politics or political change. At its macro level, political culture serves to characterize nations or national political systems (Chilcote, 2000:104). However, Chilcote argues that the macro political culture revolves around reductionism, bias and explanatory value. This author argues further that "most social science is culture-bound and that most generalizations are valid only within particular cultural situation" (Ibid, 105). Almond (2000:7) points out eminent political theorists such as Machiavelli, Montesquieu and Rousseau who contributed a lot to the political culture tradition. According to Almond, both Machiavelli and Montesquieu draw lessons from Roman history on the significance of moral and religious values and upbringing for the formation of Roman character which eventually explained the steadfast course and remarkable performance in war and peace of the Republic. However, both Machiavelli and Montesquieu emphasized on political culture and socialization in a subjective and descriptive way, rather than analytically (Ibid). On the contrary, Rousseau used to identify political culture in terms of morality, custom and opinion, where he treats these as a kind of law more significant than law properly speaking i.e. a kind of law that is imprinted on the hearts of the citizens.

Rational choice theory (RCT) is another paradigm that shaped the post-war political science especially in the US but also with an impact elsewhere (Burnham *et al*, 2004). This paradigm aimed at understanding and often modelling social and economic behaviour. RCT reveals how intentional and rational actors generate collective outcomes and aggregate behaviour (Levi, 1997). While models of rational choice may be widely diverse, they all share one thing in common, i.e. assume that individuals choose the best action according to stable preference functions and constraints facing them. The strength of this approach is seen in its capacity to generate testable theory with clear scope condition as well as its ability to make sense of a correlation or a set of events by providing a reasonable and compelling story that identifies the causal mechanisms which link together the independent and dependent variables (Ibid). Another strength discussed by Levi is, the universalism that rational choice theory reveals generalizable implications applicable to cases beyond those under immediate investigation. RCT embarks on from the viewpoint of the individual, rather than from several individuals interacting together, social situations, or groups. The emphasis on the individual and his or her interests is always an initial point for any theory of rational choice. One of the major aspects of RCT is that it is sociologically minimalist in a sense that, different theorists of rational choice may make somewhat different simple assumptions about the individual and proceed in different ways from the individual to explain the complexities of larger social groups and/or systems. Thus, though the approach is methodologically individualist, yet its focus is not on individual choice but on the aggregation of individual choices. However, Levi argues that comparative rationalists face a very important challenge on "how to offer explanations that compel both logically and empirically" (p20). Similarly, Green and Shapiro (as quoted by Levi) doubts whether rational choice has yet to produce significant empirical contributions in politics. Generally, RCT has been criticized for being too individualistic, too minimalist, and too focussed on rational choices in social action. According to Wiarda (2007), most scholars of comparative politics have so far been sceptical of this approach. Nevertheless, this paper agrees with Wiarda that, politics is too complex and multifaceted to be agreeable to any single causal explanation.

In the late 1950s to early 1960s, *political development (PD)* approach emerged out of North America as the dominant approach in comparative politics. Viewed as a dependent variable, PD brings into bear a number of different approaches such as culturalism, structuralism, rationalism, political economy, historical institutionalism and regime analysis (Hagopian, 2000). However, PD scholars assert to work in these areas in a manner that is distinct from those

specialize in any one of these. Pye, 1965 (as quoted by Hagopian) defines PD as the "extent to which patterns of behaviour identified as 'modern' tend to prevail over those considered to be 'traditional' and as taking place when achievement considerations replace ascriptive standards, when functional specificity replaces functional differences in social relations, and when universalistic norms supersede particularistic ones". In general, PD can be viewed as the growth in the capacity of societies to organize for political action and for states to govern (Ibid). Given the sudden emergence in the late 1950s and the early 1960s of the newly independent nations of the Global South, PD scholars found particularly appropriate to study the politics of these new or emerging countries. The 1960s witnessed not only a propagation of development studies on a range of subject areas, but also the emergence of the study of development and modernization as the leading paradigm in the comparative field (Wiarda, 1999). *Modernization theory* elaborates differences between societies in terms of their positions on various indices of modernity or development that measured their similarity to the modern industrial society (Peet and Hartwick, 1999). During the 1950s and 1960s modernisation was taken to mean the process of change socially, economically and politically similar to what happened in North America and West Europe from 17th century to 19th century and later spread to other parts of the world. These processes of change included the advancement from simple techniques towards scientific knowledge-based techniques; evolution from subsistence to commercial agriculture; transition from the use of human and animal power towards power driven machines and the movement from farm and village to urban centres. As a whole, this paradigm was more concern on the conditions and mechanisms necessary for social transformation from traditional to modern. However, PD approach faced a number of criticisms. Among other things, this approach was criticized as biased, ethnocentric and based entirely on the U.S. and European experiences of development. Furthermore, timing, sequences and stages of development⁵ proposed in this approach are based on the Western experiences and may not be replicated in today's developing nations. Lastly, Wiarda(1989) noted that, PD was just part of a larger Cold War strategy fomented by the U.S. to keep the Third World depressed and 'in chain'. Consequently, *dependency theory* (DT) grew out of dissatisfaction with the PD approach and it main paradigm of modernization. DT emerged in the late 1960s and early 1970s both as a guide in its own right to thought and praxis on Latin America (Wiarda,

1999). The main argument raised by DT was that, rather than U.S. and Latin America's development proceeding complementarily and in harmony, the development of industrialized countries had occurred at the expense, and often on the backs of, the developing nations (Rodney, 1974; Wiarda, 1989; Wiarda, 1999). Thus, underdevelopment is seen as the flip-side of the coin of development, with the development of industrialized countries a product of the underdevelopment of the Third World countries (Ibid; Wilber, 1979). According to Stavrianos(1981), the central theme of this school of thought is that the 'underdevelopment' of the Third World is the result of the economic exploitation of the 'periphery' by the 'centre' rather than of any internal impediments to modernization and development. This was due to global expansion of European capitalism which emphasised trade based on the unequal terms and power structure. DT is girded in Marxist perspectives (class analysis) which became increasingly relevant for understanding the situation of underdeveloped countries. DT is hence more critical to the U.S. and often uses the terms 'colonialism' and 'imperialism' to describe the relationship between developed and developing nations. While PD saw the main causes of underdevelopment as domestic and internal to the developing nations themselves (such as lack of political parties, interest groups, effective government etc.), DT charges U.S. and Europe as a source of the backwardness of the Third World. Despite strong criticisms of PD in the 1970s and its disappearance in the 1980s, it was revived in a form of "Washington Consensus"⁶ in the 1990s whereas; those who most strongly supported this idea were often the same individuals who had been the architects of the PD thirty years earlier (Wiarda, 1999). Proponents of Washington Consensus insisted that the internal political and economic arrangements in Africa and other developing countries created the disabling environment and slowed the rate of development (Owusu in Smith, 2006). Hence, the Washington Consensus brought with it a "new political economy" that requires elimination of barriers to cross-national interaction and exchange that were earlier created by protectionist states (Haques, 2002). Under this architecture, the state has not only adopted market-driven policies such as privatization, deregulation, and liberalization, but also transformed the remaining public sectors into business-like entities in

⁵ Walt W. Rostow developed a model in later 1950s – 1960 to elucidate five stages of economic of growth: Traditional society; Pre-conditions for take-off; Take-off; The drive to maturity and; High mass consumption. According to Rostow, all societies are identified, in their economic dimensions, as lying within one of these five categories.

⁶The Washington Consensus is a phrase initially coined in 1990 by John Williamson to describe a relatively specific set of ten economic policy prescriptions that he considered to constitute a "standard" reform package promoted for the developing countries by Washington, D.C.-based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the U.S. Treasury Department. Since then, the phrase "Washington Consensus" has become a lightning rod for dissatisfaction amongst anti-globalization protestors, developing country politicians and officials, trade negotiators, and numerous others. It is often used interchangeably with the phrase "neoliberal policies".

terms of role, structure, orientation and organizational culture (Ibid). While this mode of governance can easily function in developed countries, it has had many adverse outcomes to the Third World countries both internally and externally. As Haques argues, internal effects include worsening conditions of poverty and inequality, as well as weakening status of citizens' social and political rights. Externally, the main concern is diminishing state sovereignty, worsening external dependence and expanding international inequality.

III. COMPARATIVE POLITICS OF THE THIRD WORLD

a) *Third World: A Genealogy and Theoretical Perspective*

The origin of 'Third World' can be traced back in the 1950s. As pointed out by Ma (2005), the term originated in France from system of three estates: lords spiritual, lords temporal and the 'third estate' comprising the ordinary people. Consequently, in 1952 the French demographer Alfred Sauvy invented the term 'Third World' to refer to the 'third estate' before the French Revolution. In its initial meaning, Third World is termed as economically *poor*, politically *powerless*, and socially *marginalized*. The term was in fact grounded in the post-1945 conjure of decolonization, national liberation and the Cold War (Berger, 2004). Even though the original notion of the Third World was "not based upon the prior existence of the First and Second World" (Ma, 1988:344), this clear division gave rise to the notion of the First World, referring to the advanced capitalist countries led by the USA, in contrast with the Second World consisting of the Soviet bloc countries. In such an antagonistic geopolitical context, Third World inevitably became *political*, expressing the attractions of keeping a neutral position, or finding a third way between the capitalist and communist camp – Non Aligned Movement (NAM) (Payne, 2001). Despite the NAM attempts, most nationalist movements and Third World regimes had diplomatic, economic and military relations with one or both of the superpower, e.g. Ghana and Tanzania – Eastern bloc whereas Kenya and Nigeria – Western bloc.

However, from a modernization perspective especially in 1960s, the emphasis was more on *economics*. The world was therefore divided between 'Developing Countries' (viewed optimistically) or 'Less Developed Countries' (viewed only a little less optimistically), on the one hand and 'Developed Countries' on the other (Ibid). Under a dependency school of thoughts, especially in 1970s, the world system approach used different vocabulary, i.e. the 'core' (developed countries) and the 'periphery' (less developed countries), and somewhat 'semi-periphery' for those countries which play an intermediate role in the system. As Payne noted, the overall approach was still

based on a bipolar analysis. In the 1980s, the world setting was characterized by the notion of a North-South divide. This was mostly a divide between the northern and southern hemispheres, separating North America and South America, Europe from Africa, and North Asia from South Asia, deviating only to draw Australia and New Zealand into the economic and political north (Payne, 2001). Today, most textbooks in comparative politics have traditionally been organized according to two main categories based on the dependency i.e. centre (Global North) and periphery (Global South).

Nevertheless, since early 1990s, following the collapse of the Soviet bloc, the end of Cold War and the intensification of globalization, the notion of the Third World has been challenged by many scholars. Ma (1998), have raised doubts on the validity of the three-world taxonomy (i.e. 1st World, 2nd World and 3rd World), since the so called 'Second World' has disappeared and many former Soviet states fall under developing world. On the other hand, there are countries formerly classified as less developed, but which are becoming rapidly industrialized. The first wave of countries to be identified as 'Newly Industrializing Countries' (NICs) included Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. These countries underwent rapid industrial growth in the 1970s and 1980s, attracting significant financial investment, and are now associated with high-technology industries. More recently, Thailand, China, and Malaysia have been classified as newly industrializing countries.

However, Cho (2005) argues that there is still the 'Third World' in reality and the validity of it as an analytical category. He argues that the transition from authoritarian to democratic regime in Third World should bring with it a revival of the original spirit of Bandung⁷. In view of the spirit of Bandung, Cho argues that the only challenge facing the Third World it is to look at how it related to the current globalization context. Cho proposes that Third World states have to put an emphasis on strengthening national sovereignty, in the way of recovering the manoeuvring power of the nation-state and emphasizing that nation-state-centred strategy is still basic and important. Vicky Randall (in Berger,

⁷Bandung is a city located in the middle of the West Java province, around 180 km south-east of Jakarta, Indonesia. It is a place where the idea for the Non-Aligned Movement was originated during the Asian-African Conference in 1955. This conference played a constructive role in mobilizing the counter-hegemonic forces of what was to become known as the Third World against the bi-hegemony that emerged in the post-World War II period (Mushakoji, 2005). Cho (2005) defined the Bandung spirit as "a non-aligned self-helped organization against the predominance of the powerful, especially the Western advanced countries and analyze in what kind of domestic conditions this spirit was born, how these initial conditions changed in the process of authoritarianization of the Third World, how should the Third World revive its original spirit in democratization of the authoritarian Third World, and consider what tasks are ahead in order to revive the Bandung spirit"

2004) argues that Third World still retains its strategic relevance in some geopolitical circumstances. The 1996 summit of the NAM (of which majority of them are Third World countries) in Havana, Cuba showed that the Third World countries are asking for a bigger say in world affairs. Profound and fruitful debates were held, in an atmosphere of true understanding, unity and cohesion, which allowed for the adoption of documents of crucial importance to the future of the Non-Aligned Movement. From my perspective, the term 'Third World' is not useful due to its negative connotation right from its onset⁸. The authors of this paper would prefer other terms such as - developing countries or emerging nations simply because of their optimistic view on the Third World. East Asian 'miracle'⁹ provides a particularly good example of the way in which Third World countries can be viewed optimistically.

b) Debating Globalization and Continuing Relevance of the Third World' States

Globalization has become a key concept in the social sciences (Kiely, 2005) and a new regime of truth from the 1990s (Blackmore, 2000). While the concept of globalization is not new, it is only since the end of the Cold War that the term has been under the analytical spotlight (Haynes, 2003). Globalization is typically described as increased economic, cultural, environmental and social interdependencies and new transnational financial and political formations arising out of the mobility of capital, labour and information, with both homogenizing and differentiating tendencies. Giddens (1990:64) defines globalization as "the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa". Globalization has transformed the relationship between political process and territorial, sovereign states, thus political responsibilities and practices commonly attributed to states have shifted to an international level (Ougaard, 2004). This has resulted into an emergence of increasingly influential non-state actors (e.g. terrorist groups, civil society) as well as international organizations and institutions. Thus, political decisions are increasingly made at the international level rather than local level. With the current global system, the ability to generate policy for multiple nations is vested to international institutions, since it is not within the boundaries of individual states any more. As Ougaard argues, this ability has become increasingly important in dealing with the most pressing global issues facing states such as climatic change, pandemic diseases, increased migration, proliferation of poverty, economic recession, the spread of weapons, terrorism, and resource scarcity.

⁸ Refer to its invention by the French demographer Alfred Sauvy in 1952.

⁹ Refer to NIC

However, globalization as described by Mittelman is a highly contested domain thus no absolute lines for demarcating it. In fact, there are diverse interpretations with regard to the meaning, intensity, dimension, extent, cause, and consequence of globalization in existing literature (Haque, 2002). Whilst economists have defined globalization as 'an open economy', sociologists might define the same as 'an open society' (Van Der Bly, 2005), and so do developed states *versus* developing states. Thus as explained by Kumar (2003), "...the nature of globalization is contingent upon one's theoretical perspective..." Likewise, Bartelson argues that the concept of globalization stands in a double and paradoxical relationship to the world of international relations. According to this author, the concept of globalization seems to presuppose a stratification and compartmentalization on one hand, and transgress this stratification and compartmentalization on another hand. Bartelson writes: "Indeed, the logic of the concept of globalization seems to undermine not only those distinctions that have conditioned the intelligibility and autonomy of international relations, but also to an extent the very practice of making such ontological distinctions". (Bartelson, 2000:183)

Conversely, social theorists refer globalization as a part of interlocking and long-term social processes beginning in early modernity. As Bohman (2004) noted, the social fact of globalization proves exemplary since it can be experienced from different perspectives and as such can best be understood in a *multiperspectival* practical inquiry into the framework of decision-making and problem solving. Van Der Bly makes the same claim that, the current sociological concept of globalization is open to various interpretations which offer both advantages and disadvantages. The advantage according to her is the "freedom to highlight the concept in a broad way and from various perspectives". The disadvantage on the other side arises on the confusion resulting from this broad and yet undefined and implicit points of reference. Thus, Van Der Bly argues that "If something is everything, eventually it becomes nothing"; hence, "The Globalization of Nothing" (Ritzer, 2004) in this aspect has become a tautology.

Moreover, neo-Marxism and postmodernism have explored their own unique definitions of globalization which denotes globalization as a "phase" or a "stage" that the world has come into. Kumar explores a neo-Marxist AnkiHoogvelt's idea that globalization is not a euphemism for either 'internationalization' or 'transnationalization' nor... the expanding phase of capitalism, but the "deepening phase of capitalism". Kumar also discusses the postmodernist theorist Douglas Kellner who describes

this "phase" as a move away from modernity. Thus, globalization is a state of *betweenness* from modernity to postmodernity which according to him is not yet complete. Munck (2002) explores another view which sees globalization as a new imperialism. This author argues that globalization has led not to a levelling of social and economic conditions worldwide but to a dramatic increase in social exclusion within and between nation-states. Vilas (2000) argues on the same trail that, from historical perspective, globalization is the present stage of economic imperialism. According to this author, globalization transforms the market place into the universal mechanism for economic regulation and accentuates and complicates international and internal inequalities. Consequently, Chilcote argues that globalization can only be as a manifestation of imperialism and devastating capitalist order. Although globalization is new phenomenon, I agree with many scholars that its intensification especially after the Cold War, has transformed the economic, social, political and cultural aspects in the contemporary world. However, there is a need for comparativists to clearly delineate 'what is new', and 'what is not new' with the contemporary globalization particularly in relation to the traditional roles of the state.

In modern political science, state theory and analysis is mainly dominated by two traditions: one derived from Marx (and Engel) and the second one from Max Weber. Derived from the "Communist Manifesto", Marx sees the state and its institutions as agents of the dominant class in capitalist society to further bourgeois' interest at the expense of other classes (proletarian). In contrast, Weber's account of state is less political and more precise than that of Marx. He was more concerned with 'how' the state operated rather than the character of its rule or nature of its output. For Weber, the modern state is a compulsory association with a territorial base; legitimate by its members and run by an impersonal bureaucratic staff; in the context of legal administrative order; regulated and limited by legislation and representative government (Leftwich, 1994). The fundamental assumption of the modern state proposes that public offices should not be used for private gain and that occupancy should entail no powers of private patronage in support of any particular private client base. By and large, Weberian conception of the modern state and bureaucracy has been central debates in empirical democratic theory and public administration and policy. Nevertheless, as Leftwich argues, these characteristics of the modern state are just ideal-typical but no state in the modern world is 'perfectly' embracing them.

The Third World' experience reveals that, the making of modern state in colonial and post-colonial milieu was not geared at promoting economic development growth or transformative development. Consequently, these states lack most of the conditions

and capabilities associated with the state's emergence in developed world. However, this was, to a great extent, caused by colonial rulers. With exception of Japanese rule in Korea, the rest of colonial rulers in developing countries were not developmental in a sense, but intended for extraction of riches and raw materials as their focal goal. In his book, *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, Walter Rodney argues that, "Africa helped to develop Western Europe in the same proportion as Western Europe helped to under-develop Africa" (1972:75). Accordingly, after independence, many states in developing world have had great trouble in establishing their supremacy and maintaining sovereignty within their borders and in relation to regional and international political forces. Most of them aspired to combine the best in their own traditions of governance to oversee social, political and economic development. Thus, the wide variation among states in the developing world is based on: the nature of the pre-colonial politics; the economic purpose of colonial rule; the characteristics of the colonial state institutions; socio-political groups which dominates these institutions and; the manner of incorporation of pre-colonial political processes and institutions in the systems of colonial and post-colonial rule (Leftwich, 1994).

The theory and practice of state in developing countries vary from country to country and time to time. Hence, different countries will inevitably confront very different historical circumstances and developmental challenges, something that makes generalisation more difficult. Over the past two decades, *developmental states* have begun to shed their reputations as 'welfare laggards' especially in East Asia. The idea of the developmental state is most closely associated with Chalmers Johnson and his influential analysis of Japan's very rapid and successful post-war reconstruction and reindustrialisation. Johnson's central argument was that Japan's pretty remarkable and historically unparalleled industrial revival was neither a fluke nor inevitable, but a consequence of the efforts of a 'plan rational' states. According to him, a *plan rational* or *developmental state* was one that was dogged to influence the direction and pace of economic development by directly intervening in the development process, rather than relying on the uncoordinated influence of market forces to allocate economic resources. This form of state is well known for its capacity to define, pursue and implement developmental strategies which can and do overrule class, regional or sectoral interests in the reputed national interests. It involves a much closer symbiosis between state and private sectors, but with autonomy, effectiveness and legitimacy. Historically, this form of state can be traced back to Bismarckian Germany and Meiji Japan. However, in contemporary Third World, it has been replicated widely in South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, China, Indonesia, Mauritius and Botswana.

Generally, this form of states maintain a control of public good, an arena of public space in which citizens can debate common problems and attempt to achieve a common goal.

Moving to globalization and state, Hirst and Thompson (1996), akin to other scholars, propose that the contemporary globalization suggests that certain (if not all) traditional powers of the state are declining. These authors argue that, the power of nation states as administrative and policy making agencies has declined while the state's role as an economic engineer is lessening. Held also argues that with the intensification of globalization has diminished the powers of states, thus "national states have largely become decision takers". In a similar vein, Habermas (1999) explores the idea of weakening of the nation-state. He suggests that state can no longer count on its own forces to provide its citizens with adequate protection from the external effects of decisions taken by other actors. Kahler (in Katznelson & Milner) argues that, globalization has brought about the increased influence of nongovernmental organizations that have international allies. According to him, this shift in bargaining power between states and non-state actors leads those pessimistic about the effects of globalization on the state to accentuate declining state capabilities, whatever the national policies pursued. The critical question for discussion in this paper is; *which state is losing power?* Can we compare a state like US or UK and Zambia and argue 'equally' that state is losing power in capitulate to globalization? It might be true that a state like Zambia is losing power, but is US or UK losing power in capitulate to globalization or rather gaining more power? To me, this sounds like a cover for an *imperialistic strategy*, where America and many of states of the Global North are chief beneficiaries of globalization at the expense of the Global South. Lentner (2004) claims that with the idea of globalization, liberal states maintain dominant positions in the international system, managing international political economy through coordinated and largely institutionalized action, where the US remains central and hegemonic within this arrangement (p.44). Moreover, it appears that the events of 11 September 2001 and the so called 'war on terror' have brought into sharp focus the classic role of the state. These events have also highlighted the importance of the role of global cooperation for global safety and security. This shows that after 9/11, despite of the globalization forces, states have reaffirmed power, but back to our question is; *which state has reaffirmed power?* For instance, while a US citizen does not need a visa to go to Zambia, a Zambian immigrant and visitor to the US continues to face both old and new procedures and restrictions, as well as greater scrutiny and suspicion. Moreover, since 9/11, there have been many security enhancements to the visa process which have added to its cost. As Chowdhury (2006) claims,

globalization is sometimes used as a cover for endless warfare, where US as a chief beneficiary of globalization, extends its political authorities to undermine the global system.

Although globalization is not a new phenomenon, this paper agrees with many scholars who argued that its intensification has mounted especially after the Cold War. However, the whole debate about "Globalization and State" sounds to me that the state is not losing power, but changing or revising its roles. It should be also noted that, a revised role for the state does not necessarily imply a 'greater' role, but a more 'effective' role of the state to meet challenges of globalization. Weiss argues that the state is not so much devolving power, rather seeking power sharing arrangements which give it scope for remaining an active actor, for a 'catalytic' state.

Hirst and Thompson (1996) discussed three interrelated key functions of states as a crucial element of the international system: i.e. the state must construct a *distributional coalition* to win the acceptance of key economic actors and the organized social interests representing these actors; the state must *orchestrate social consensus* among the actors for the common national economic goals and; the state must also achieve an adequate balance between different *levels of government* in the distribution of its fiscal resources and regulatory activities. Weiss notes that "...nation state will matter more rather than less and...this will advance rather than retard development of the world economy."

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

Generally, the historical analysis of comparative politics has manifested to a large extent "expansion of politics" beyond the local boundary. Needless to say, the bright line separating domestic and international politics has been rubbed out by the complex set of cross-border economic, cultural, technological, and relations that constitute the contemporary global order. Hynes (2003) notes that, as a consequence of globalization, states are now subject to a multiplicity of external influences and must make policy in a world characterized by both vague and shifting power structure. As pointed out by Sartori, politics results *objectively* bigger on account of the fact that the world is becoming more politicized and globalized. In contrast, politics is *subjectively* bigger in a sense that political focus and/or attention has paradigmatically shifted from local to global. Consequently, the 21st century is racked by turmoil caused by globalizing capitalism, new wars, renewed search for meaning in life and the discovery of newly critical knowledge. As Kesselman laid it, there is a danger of entrapping ourselves in worlds of our own making. Such an outlook has inevitably acknowledged the essentiality of states for the continued promotion of social, political and economic development.

Nevertheless, instead of fading away, a state in the so called 'the era of globalization' remain indispensable to upholding a stable international system and a thriving political economy both in developed and developing nations. The basic argument that has been entertaining in this paper is that, "an effective and autonomous state enables a society to participate and benefit fully in the international political economy and to resist pressures emanating from it". Munck explores a conception that, "...the global is dynamic and fluid while the local is embedded, static, and tradition-bound". That said, without a strong state, a country will not be able to compete in a globalizing world. Whilst *capital* is global, exists in the space of flows and lives the instantaneous time of computerized networks, *labour* lives in the local, exists in a 'space of places' and lives by the clock time of everyday life. As Munck suggests, we might now consider reversing the 1970s slogan of "Think Globally, Act locally" to "Think Locally, Act Globally". However, from the analysis made earlier in the paper, it is difficult to escape the feeling that in order for the state to function properly in the contemporary era of globalization, it is subjected to *redefinition of its roles*, to take into account the emerging global political, economic, social, environmental and cultural challenges.

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Motives of Internal Revolutions Phenomenon on Arab Political Regimes

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Abstract - Internal Revolutions Phenomenon on the Arab Political Regimes is considered a compound phenomenon; that was aroused from a combined number of elements and their combination in a way that we can not assume that the cause of this phenomenon returns to one reason or an element without the other reasons or elements. We can not understand this phenomenon unless within the factors network and reasons that led to its appearance. In order to achieve the purpose of this study, a random sample of (280) individuals was selected, who represent different segments from the intellectuals and politicians, those who are active in economic, media, religious and social, in addition to the other interested people in the issue of internal revolutions from various Arab nationalities. Where as a questionnaire which consisted of (55) questions has been distributed on five main themes equally, it was discovered that the underlying political, economic, media, religious and social reasons were the most important reasons that led to the internal revolutions, where all the reasons got a positive arithmetic means. It turns out that the economic factor was one of the strongest reasons that led to the emergence of revolutions in the Arab Countries. The study also revealed that there are differences due to the impact of gender in the study sample individuals. In addition, no differences were found due to the impact of marital status on the opinions of the study sample individuals. As for the correlation among all the reasons leading to the internal revolutions, it has been shown that there is no correlation between the political reasons and religious reasons of the internal revolutions.

Keywords : *Internal Revolutions, Arab, Political Regimes.*

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Motives of Internal Revolutions Phenomenon on Arab Political Regimes

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Abstract - Internal Revolutions Phenomenon on the Arab Political Regimes is considered a compound phenomenon; that was aroused from a combined number of elements and their combination in a way that we can not assume that the cause of this phenomenon returns to one reason or an element without the other reasons or elements. We can not understand this phenomenon unless within the factors network and reasons that led to its appearance. In order to achieve the purpose of this study, a random sample of (280) individuals was selected, who represent different segments from the intellectuals and politicians, those who are active in economic, media, religious and social, in addition to the other interested people in the issue of internal revolutions from various Arab nationalities. Where as a questionnaire which consisted of (55) questions has been distributed on five main themes equally, it was discovered that the underlying political, economic, media, religious and social reasons were the most important reasons that led to the internal revolutions, where all the reasons got a positive arithmetic means. It turns out that the economic factor was one of the strongest reasons that led to the emergence of revolutions in the Arab Countries. The study also revealed that there are differences due to the impact of gender in the study sample individuals. In addition, no differences were found due to the impact of marital status on the opinions of the study sample individuals. As for the correlation among all the reasons leading to the internal revolutions, it has been shown that there is no correlation between the political reasons and religious reasons of the internal revolutions.

Keywords : *Internal Revolutions, Arab, Political Regimes.*

I. STUDY INTRODUCTION AND ITS BACKGROUND

The world traces the revolutions' events that are now threatening all the existing Arab political regimes. Where the revolutions have been able to change the path of government of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya; furthermore they continue to threaten some of the political regimes in both Yemen and Syria. Where as, the revolution holds a new meaning which aims at changing the authoritarian regimes and broad sectors of the people participating in this revolution which aims are centered on three categories; combine bread, freedom and dignity.

Arab political regimes exercised few years ago a political culture which was directed to meet the aims

of the regime and its own interests, which worked on controlling this culture and covering up their flaws, that were based on of traditional governance rules and regime's authoritarian practices against peoples (Belkeziz,1996:81).

The concept of (Revolution) is one of the old terms that have accompanied the emergence of the state and political life since the beginning of history, however, the concept of revolution that has prevailed over other concepts, is considered the people's revolution against colonialism or authoritarian regimes, but revolution in its meaning in the language is not limited to this aspect but includes any act that leads to change the situations radically, whether they are political, economic or social.

Political liberalism has achieved great success in western countries after the circulation of the word "democracy" since the seventeenth century, especially after the success of the American Revolution in 1776, the French Revolution in 1789 and the establishment of many of democratic regimes in Europe.

However, the political regimes in various Arab countries has succeeded to a large extent in the domestication and taming many of the (educated, economic, religious, military, political parties, governmental organizations) elites, sometimes by threats and intimidation, in other times by temptation and arousal of interest, especially that the large class of these regimes rely in its authoritarian strategy on political elite as well as its counterpart the military. Additionally, some of these elites have their own interests, and their involvement in financial, administrative and political corruption, which have contributed significantly in creating of a gap between the ruling political power on the one hand and community members on the other hand , in addition to imposing the continuation of the political situations to be the same. Which caused for these elites to loose the confidence of the masses and create a sense of frustration among all the Arab peoples (Lkrini,2008).

Moreover, some Arab countries gaining the satisfaction of foreign countries in order to maintain its survival, where they resorted to the practice of seclusion and concealment within their societies, which led to the increased dependence on the outside, in addition to reducing its sovereignty and meeting the demands of the Protecting countries and the implementation of its

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policies without taking the local public opinion to ensure its legitimacy (Qaleyon,1990:27-28).

Furthermore, (Modernization Theory) confirmed the need of specific conditions and requirements for the establishment and continuity of democratic political regimes, the existence of developed social and economic building was included in these conditions and characterized by the presence of a certain degree of richness and wealth, economic growth, low illiteracy rate, the emergence of strong middle class and influential, urbanization, social mobility as well as a media capable of delivering the word (Lipset,1959:69-105).

The political culture prevailing in the societies of the Third World, consists of a set of customs, traditions and values, which established even in the authoritarian in social relations prevailing in the society and led to the delay of democracy and prosperity in the authoritarian dictatorship rule of the societies Third World Countries(Abusada:3-5).

The dictatorships prevailing within a ruling political party, such as what was found in most of the third world countries, lack of the parliament role and the power of people, which led to the emergence of some educators and reformers who exclaim for the need of freedom from authoritarian regimes.

The dictatorial regimes characterizes in addition to its dependence on a small group in the ruling through ruling party, by depending on the suppression of political opposition and not to allowing it to express its opinions. In many cases, the dictatorship governments declare that the opposition parties are considered illegal parties and since the opposition is illegal, which leaves room for dictatorship governments to rely on the army and secret police in suppressing all forms of opposition.

There is a tendency that determines the legitimacy of political violence and its legitimacy which was based on the nature of political regimes. In the countries of political pluralism, violence practiced by citizens or certain categories is considered an illegal use of force, for it represents a breach of the law, surpassing the intermediary institutions that organize the relationship between the ruler and the ruled. While legal violence is only practiced by the State and it must be within the law. In authoritarian and coercive regimes, the practice of violence by citizens is considered lawful and legitimate due to the lack of effective legal channels for participation in power or changing it (Miller,1984:. 401-419).

II. STUDY QUESTIONS

1. What are the main reasons leading to the internal revolutions on Arab political regimes?
2. What are the strongest reasons that led to the emergence of internal revolutions on the Arab political regimes?

3. Are there statistical significances due to the impact of sex and marital status on the opinions of the study sample individuals about the reasons leading to the internal revolutions?
4. Is there a correlation between all the reasons leading to the internal revolutions?

III. STUDY HYPOTHESES

1. The most important reasons of internal revolutions are: "economic reasons" (3.90), "political reasons" (3.75)," media reasons" (3.67), "religious reasons" (3.67), "social reasons" (3.52) and all of these got positive arithmetic means ranged between (3.52-3.90), the total mean of the internal revolutions' reasons is (3.72).
2. The economic factor turns to be one of the strongest reasons that led to the emergence of revolutions in the Arab countries, arithmetic means ranged between (3.21-4.40), where the item "the prevalence of unemployment and the lack of employment opportunities" received the top, and the item "the emergence of globalization phenomenon and economic opening-up policies", got the lowest, the total mean is (3.90), which is a positive arithmetic mean.
3. There are differences due to the impact of sex on the opinions of study sample individuals about the economic and social reasons, and the reasons as a whole leading to the internal revolutions, where the females' views are greater. Regarding marital status, the study showed that there are no differences in the views of study sample individuals.
4. There is no relationship between political and religious reasons of internal revolutions.

IV. METHOD AND PROCEDURES:

The method and procedures of study included a description of statistical processing that will be used in the analysis of data and extracting the results. The researcher used the descriptive analytical method (SPSS) to achieve the objectives of the study and to answer the first and second questions. The researcher used tests for independent samples (Independent Sample T-test) to answer the third question. To answer the fourth question Pearson correlation test was used (Pearson Correlation).

Questionnaire's items are (55) items distributed on five main axes equally and by (11) items for each axis and study tools are built like Likert Five Point Scale and they are the following: very large degree, large degree, medium degree, low degree, very low degree, They are represented in numbers by the following scores, respectively: (5.4, 3, 2.1).

The researcher showed the study tools that have been built to arbitrators from faculty members who specialize in measurement and evaluation; to detect the

validity of the questionnaire's items, their relevance in terms of language, clarity of the items and the extent to which the item is related to its domain. After retrieving the questionnaires from the arbitration committee, the researcher wrote down of arbitrators' views about every item and adopting each item got 75% or more of the arbitrators' consensus on its suitability, modifying or re-formulating it, so these tools became in their final form.

V. STUDY INDIVIDUALS

Questionnaire items distributed on intellectuals and activists in the political, economic, media, religious and social domains from different Arab nationalities, representing a category follows-up and is interested in the issue of internal revolutions in the Arab world. The study chose a group of people numbered (280) individuals, were randomly selected (see Table 1).

Table 1 : Distribution of study sample individuals according to personality variables.

Variable	Category	Frequency	Percent
Gender	Male	153	54.6
	Female	127	45.4
Marital Status	Single	174	62.1
	Married	106	37.9
Scientific Qualification	Intermediate Diploma	30	10.7
	BA	172	61.4
	Master	36	12.9
	Ph.D.	42	15
Residence Area	City	123	43.9
	Village	68	24.3
	Desert	46	16.4
	Camp	43	15.4
Age	20-29	111	39.6
	30-39	106	37.9
	40-49	46	16.4
	50 and over	17	6.1
Total		280	100

VI. STUDY IMPORTANCE

The importance of this study is related to its subject novelty and development dramatically among the Arab Peoples and what it includes of quick reactions that have a profound impact and strong in the diversion of the Arab regimes towards overall reform process after the broken down of some of the political regimes in some Arab countries. This study addresses the most important reasons that led to the internal revolutions to be an example and role model for all political decision-makers, as well as taking the preventive role in a civilized and democratic manner to deal with these crises in the future.

VII. STUDY OBJECTIVES

1. Introducing a recent study in the development and escalation of the phenomenon of internal revolutions in light of the failure of some Arab countries leaders.
2. Knowing the reasons behind the outbreak of internal revolutions against Arab political regimes.
3. Providing successful and alternative means about using political violence against the peoples.

4. Realizing the real democracy value and exercising it correctly.
5. Realizing the meaning of public freedoms and its role in changing the course of the regime rule in the Arab world.
6. Focusing on the need to respect Arab human rights, protecting his dignity and providing decent life for the peoples.

VIII. PREVIOUS STUDIES (LITERATURE)

The emergence of the political thought helped John Locke, Montesquieu and Jan Jacques Rousseau on the development of the democracy concept through John Locke's invitation to limit the powers of the monarchy and his interest of public freedoms. As well as Montesquieu has been first to call for the separation of powers, by making each body of the three governmental bodies to comply with specific function and without interfering with other bodies' affairs, which leads to ensure the rights of citizens and respect their freedoms. While Jan Jacques Rousseau considered that the general will is the source of sovereignty in the state, not the ruler or the king power.

Max Feber thinks that the possession of any political regime of power and ability, not enough to stabilize it for a long time because the relationship between the ruler and ruled concerned, unstable and the source of the weakness of the existing regime and when the people convinced of the efficiency of the existing power and its eligibility in government it will reach the essence of legitimacy, this (Legitimacy) is the basis of the continuation of the regime. The relationship between Arab political regimes and their peoples appeared to be based on suspicion and fear. Arab regimes surrounded themselves by security forces, armies and special guard forces spending on them more than spending on development projects and modernization for their peoples (Bassiouni, 1996:54).

Louis Althusser, assure that peoples rise up in search of full sovereignty against fatherhood and authoritarian regimes and sacrifice the safety, tranquility and life and exposing themselves to the need, death and the decline in order to get rid of slavery, insult, tyranny and injustice and what they earn from behind this is prevalence, glory and freedom, in order to make regimes run in a democratic manner and through the election and selection (Althusser, 2006).

Al-Hamalawy says if there is no plan to manage the crisis and end it in the way you want, so the crisis will end itself in the way it wants and not in the way that we want. 9 political writer, Choral Bill says that when we try to study crisis manage it, we find only two ways not three, either to go back to an experience has had on the ground and we still have experience its results or to fabricate fictional assumptions that do not have reality in fact did not tested yet and when choosing, the first option is unquestionably the right (Al-Hamalawy, 1997:16).

Tanter and Ullman say that the concept of crisis returns back to the history of Greek medicine and it means (turning point) in the course of the disease after that the patient's health may improve, and end up to recovery or end in death, like heart attack (Tanter & Ullman, 1972:126). Al-Khudairi points that the crisis is a critical decisive moment, regarding the source of the management entity, which suffered of it. It forms a hard difficulty to deal with for the decision makers and make them very confused in decision-making in light of lack of knowledge, uncertainty and reasons and results mixing (Khudairi, 2012: 76).

Joseph Lapalmbara says that the problem of distributive justice refers to a defect in the estimated distribution of the political regime. This defect takes the form of a widening gap between the distributive demands on the one hand and the regime's ability to respond to them on the other hand. This defect stems from two sources: First: Lack of wealth sources, commodities and material services i.e. the values disputed among members of society and hence the importance of economic development appears. The

second is: Lack of justice in wealth distribution and valuable things among different social classes and its groups, due to inefficiency of distributive policies and their bias in favor of groups without others, and hence comes the importance of changing the foundations of the distribution process (Lapalmbara, 1971:233-281).

Beitz states that political regimes differ in their policies towards distribution crisis, in any solution to the distribution crisis comes only through the regime pursuit to increase production through the completion of positive changes in production methods, structures and relations. In addition, to ensure a minimum level of equitable distribution of it among the various groups and society sectors at the same time, so as to satisfy the basic needs of citizens, especially those with low-income (Beitz, 1981:321-345).

Both Morrison and Stevenson confirm the positive relationship between the spread of education and increasing acts of violence, through their study that they conducted on a number of African countries and Latin American countries in order to determine the social and political requirements for political stability in these countries (Morrison & Stevenson, 1974:252-263).

Hoseltiz confirmed that the spread of education and what resulted from it of the emergence of new patterns of political awareness and social movement, leading to increased likelihood of political violence, especially when the regime do not have the capacity and flexibility to create new job opportunities for graduates and to respond and adapt to new demands arising from the educational process (Hoseltiz, 1965:61).

Medela Reski concluded from his study about the relationship between scarcity and inequality on the one hand and the popular revolutions on the other hand. While, the probabilities of revolutionary violence have increased in countries that suffer from a scarcity in agricultural land and inequality in distributing; with the observation that the problem of inequality is exacerbating with the increasing number of population (Midlarsky, 1982).

Abdulfattah presented a study showing the changing roles of the armies at the stage of Arab revolutions, which answers questions about the possibility of changing this interfering role of these armies during the next phase and turning them to guarding armies of the political process without interference in directing their tracks, particularly since these revolutions have raised the slogan of democracy and civil state (Abdulfattah, 2011:7-10).

IX. RESULTS ANALYSIS

a) *First Question:*

What are the main reasons leading to the internal revolutions on Arab political regimes?

i. *First Axis (Domain):*

Political reasons of internal revolutions:

Table 2 : Arithmetic means, standard deviations and percentages of study items representing the first axis.

Political Reasons	Mean	Std. Deviation	%
Removing competencies from political action and the monopoly of top jobs	4.08	0.815	81.60
tyranny and oppression Policy against the peoples	4.06	0.914	81.20
Common policy of inheriting power to the sons and relatives	4.05	1.120	81.00
Failure to combat corruption and the loss of the government to regulatory role	4.05	1.036	81.00
The absence of national dialogue and communication between the ruler and the ruled	3.90	0.908	78.00
Businessmen Control of power	3.68	0.921	73.60
Suppression of peoples through security institutions	3.68	1.039	73.60
Fraud in parliamentary elections	3.62	1.016	72.40
Lack of people's participation in political decision-making	3.60	0.997	72.00
Establishing a constitution that does not serve the interests of the people	3.31	1.142	66.20
The absence of parties' role of and the opposition in the political reform process	3.22	1.094	64.40
Average	3.75	0.475	75.00

From the previous table we note that the items that represent political reasons of internal revolutions got positive arithmetic means ranged (3.22-4.08), where the item "Removing competencies from political action and

ii. *The Second Axis:*

Economic reasons of internal revolutions:

the monopoly of top jobs" received the top one and the item "The absence of parties' role of and the opposition in the political reform process" got the lowest, the total average is (3.75), which is a positive arithmetic mean.

Table 3 : Arithmetic means, standard deviations and percentages of study items representing the second axis.

Economic Reasons	Mean	Std. Deviation	%
Prevalence of unemployment and the failure to provide job opportunities	4.40	0.760	88.00
Emergence of financial and administrative corruption	4.30	0.799	86.00
Rising of commodity prices and products	4.20	0.853	84.00
Falling of workers' salaries and wages	4.07	0.907	81.40
Increasing fees and taxes on the citizens	4.04	0.909	80.80
Widespread of poverty and emergence of famine	4.03	0.976	80.60
Exploitation of state's sources and its monopoly in favor of the powerful	4.02	0.759	80.40
Lack of transparency to maintain public money	3.65	0.915	73.00
Weakness of development process and economic reform	3.55	1.042	71.00
Import and export monopoly in favor the benefit of the powerful	3.47	0.942	69.40
Emergence of globalization phenomenon and economic openness policies	3.21	1.194	64.20
Average	3.90	0.537	78.00

From the previous table we note that the items that represent economical reasons of internal revolutions got positive arithmetic means ranged (3.21-4.40), where the item " Prevalence of unemployment and the failure to provide job opportunities " received the top one and the item " Emergence of globalization phenomenon and economic openness policies " got the lowest one, the total average is (3.90), which is a positive arithmetic mean.



iii. *The Third Axis :*
Media reasons of internal revolutions

Table 4 : Arithmetic means, standard deviations and percentages of study items representing the third axis.

Media Reasons	Mean	Std. Deviation	%
Spread of satellite media	3.95	1.085	79.00
Governments follow policies of repression and media blackout	3.89	0.944	77.80
Lack of transparency and credibility of the local media	3.87	0.972	77.40
Lack of control over the electronic media	3.85	1.177	77.00
Not exercising freedom of opinion and imposing restrictive laws	3.71	1.012	74.20
Government control over local media	3.63	1.123	72.60
Knowledge and knowing of electronic communication means	3.59	1.063	71.80
Ease of information access and its spread	3.56	1.214	71.20
Spread of community awareness in the search for information	3.54	1.158	70.80
Inefficiency of local media	3.43	1.111	68.60
Sincerity and diversity of information through satellite media	3.30	1.229	66.00
Average	3.67	1.099	73.40

From the previous table we note that the items that represent political reasons of internal revolutions got positive arithmetic means ranged (3.22-4.08), where the item "Removing competencies from political action and

the monopoly of top jobs" received the top one and the item "The absence of parties' role of and the opposition in the political reform process" got the lowest, the total average is (3.75), which is a positive arithmetic mean.

iv. *The Fourth Axis:*

Religious reasons of internal revolutions:

Table 5 : Arithmetic means, standard deviations and percentages of study items representing the fourth axis.

Religious Reasons	Mean	Std. Deviation	%
Lack of Arab regimes commitment of Islamic Sharia	3.89	1.191	77.80
Dissatisfaction of religious parties on government performance	3.82	0.994	76.40
Clergy's desire to participate in political decision-making	3.57	1.114	71.40
Incompatibility of clergy with legal legislations	3.51	0.894	70.20
Emergence of influential religious blocs on the public opinion	3.50	1.117	70.00
Clergy's rejection of the State's liberal regimes	3.48	1.047	69.60
Clergy's Invitation to change and reform	3.46	1.138	69.20
Clergy's refusal to followers of profitability capitalist systems or regimes	3.45	1.080	69.00
Unwillingness of political parties and religious blocs about entrance of Arab regimes in alliances and treaties with western countries	3.44	1.217	68.80
Clergy's disharmony with cultural openness policy	3.41	1.185	68.20
Clergy's desire to dominate regime	3.19	1.305	63.80
Average	3.67	0.538	73.40

From the previous table we note that the items that represent religious reasons of internal revolutions got positive arithmetic means ranged(3.19-3.89), where the item " Lack of Arab regimes commitment of Islamic

Sharia" got the top one and the item " Clergy's desire to dominate regime " got the lowest, the total average is (3.67) which is a positive arithmetic mean.

v. *The Fifth Axis:*

Social reasons of internal revolutions:

Table 6 : Arithmetic means, standard deviations and percentages of study items representing the fifth axis.

Social Reasons	Mean	Std. Deviation	%
Spread of nepotism and favoritism in Arab societies	4.56	0.868	91.20
Absence of justice and social equality	4.10	0.958	82.00
Existence of differences among society classes and hegemony of the rich to the poor	4.07	0.951	81.40
Poor service delivery and its organization (infrastructure)	3.84	0.919	76.80
Lack of representation of social groups in power	3.67	1.101	73.40
Absence of educational sector development	3.62	1.087	72.40
Poor health services	3.62	1.078	72.40
Lack of interest in local community institutions	3.54	0.983	70.80
Spreading social discrimination culture	3.51	1.274	70.20
Absence of solidarity and social solidarity	3.47	0.998	69.40
State's adopting of racial discrimination / sectarian	3.35	1.227	67.00
Average	3.52	0.585	70.40

From the previous table we note that the items that represent social reasons of internal revolutions got positive arithmetic means ranged (3.35-4.56), where the item "Spread of nepotism and favoritism in Arab societies" got the top one and item "State's adopting of average is (3.52), which is a positive arithmetic mean.

b) *Second Question:*

What are the strongest reasons that led to the emergence of internal revolutions on the Arab political regimes?

To answer the second question Arithmetic means, standard deviations and percentages of study axes are calculated and the following table shows that:

Table 7 : Arithmetic means, standard deviations and percentages of study item's axes.

Axis	Mean	Std. Deviation	%
Economic reasons	3.90	0.537	78.00
Political reasons	3.75	0.475	75.00
Media reasons	3.67	1.099	73.40
Religious reasons	3.67	0.585	73.40
Social reasons	3.52	0.585	74.40
Reasons as a whole	3.72	0.364	74.40

From the previous table we note that the reasons presented as a reason of internal revolutions all of them got positive arithmetic means ranged (3.52-3.90) and reasons ranked as the following "economic reasons" (3.90), "political reasons" (3.75)," media reasons "(3.67), "religious reasons" (3.67) and "social reasons" (3.52), the total mean of internal revolutions is (3.72).

c) *Third Question:*

Are there statistical significances due to the impact of sex and marital status at significance level less than (0.05) on the opinions of the study sample individuals about the reasons leading to the internal revolutions?

Table 8 : T -results of independent samples of effect of sex test on the answer, where we note that sex has the effect on economic and social reasons as well as for reasons combined as a, where the results were greater for females.

	T	df	Sig.(2- tailed)	Sex	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Political reasons of internal revolutions	-1.247 -	278	0.213	Male	153	3.72	0.518
				Female	127	3.79	0.416
Economic reasons of internal revolutions	-2.333 -	278	0.02 *	Male	153	3.83	0.576
				Female	127	3.98	0.475
Media reasons of internal revolutions	-1.223 -	278	0.222	Male	153	3.63	0.585
				Female	127	3.71	0.473
Religious reasons of internal revolutions	- .354 -	278	0.724	Male	153	3.51	0.643
				Female	127	3.53	0.509
Social reasons of internal revolutions	-2.771 -	276	0.006*	Male	151	3.67	0.635
				Female	127	3.86	0.451
Ft	-2.363-	278	0.019 *	Male	153	3.67	0.399
				Female	127	3.78	0.309

A - To answer the study question on the impact of sex, T- test for independent samples is used (Independent Sample T-test), where T values are not statistically significant at a level less than (0.05) for the political, media and religious reasons of the revolutions and they are statistically significant at a lower level of (0.05) for the economic and social reasons as well as for

reasons combined as a whole, which indicates that there are differences due to the impact of sex at the significance level less than (0.05) on the opinions of the study sample individuals on the reasons leading to the internal revolutions in the Arab world, where the views are greater for females individuals on the reasons leading to the internal revolutions in the Arab world.

Table 9 : T -results of independent samples of effect of marital status test on the answer, where we note that there is no influence of the marital status.

	T	df	Sig.(2- tailed)	Sex	N	Mean	Std. Deviation
Political reasons of internal revolutions	0.468	278	0.64	Male	174	3.76	0.498
				Female	106	3.73	0.435
Economic reasons of internal revolutions	0.086	278	0.932	Male	174	3.90	0.529
				Female	106	3.90	0.552
Media reasons of internal revolutions	0.692	278	0.49	Male	174	3.68	0.493
				Female	106	3.64	0.605
Religious reasons of internal revolutions	1.708	278	0.089	Male	174	3.57	0.566
				Female	106	3.44	0.611
Social reasons of internal revolutions	0.922	276	0.357	Male	173	3.78	0.569
				Female	105	3.72	0.560
Ft	1.191	278	0.235	Male	174	3.74	0.340
				Female	106	3.69	0.398

B - To answer the study question on the impact of marital status, T- test for independent samples is used (Independent Sample T-test), where T values are not statistically significant at a level less than (0.05) for the political, media, religious economic and social reasons of the revolutions, which indicates that there are differences due to the impact of marital status at a significance level less than (0.05) on the opinions of the study sample.

d) *Fourth Question:*

Is there a correlation between all the reasons leading to the internal revolutions?

To answer the study question Pearson Correlation Test (Pearson Correlation) is used, it is found that there is no relationship between the political and religious reasons of the internal revolutions.

Table 10 : Pearson Correlation Test (Pearson Correlation).

		Political reasons of internal revolutions	Economic reasons of internal revolutions	Media reasons of internal revolutions	Religious reasons of internal revolutions	Social reasons of internal revolutions	ft
Political reasons of internal revolutions	Pearson Correlation	1	.323**	.458**	0.043	.502**	.661**
Economic reasons of internal revolutions	Pearson Correlation	.323**	1	.369**	.205**	.504**	.710**
Media reasons of internal revolutions	Pearson Correlation	.458**	.369**	1	.221**	.364**	.708**
Religious reasons of internal revolutions	Pearson Correlation	0.043	.205**	.221**	1	.224**	.529**
Social reasons of internal revolutions	Pearson Correlation	.502**	.504**	.364**	.224**	1	.769**
ft	Pearson Correlation	.661**	.710**	.708**	.529**	.769**	1
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).							

X. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study presents the reality of the Arab regimes ruling for their people, which describes the most important reasons behind the collapse of the regimes in some Arab countries which continued to rule for many years. The study revealed the structural errors of the regimes and their methods of exercising their policies against their peoples, prompting the Arab people to get out of the ordinary and remove from power their countries' rulers, in light of Arab regimes' failure in building political and economic balance with their peoples and the absence of democracy manifestations. This study also focused on the concept of revolutions, their development stages, the emergence of political, economic, social, religious and media elites which calls for reforms and change in the regimes,

which was succeeded recently in the collapse of some Arab regimes, known as (the Arab Spring) under the spread of means of communication and speed of information access.

Through the study of the internal revolutions phenomenon on the Arab political regimes, we find that they came as a result of the regimes' failure in achieving the objectives of the Arab nation and its aspirations towards freedom, independence and dignity. Thus these Arab regimes have failed politically, economically, security and socially; because of wrongful conduct in the usurpation of power by the people and systematic corruption and adherence to self-interests in order to achieve special objectives of the owners of power and money and the monopoly of power, public office and positions in the Arab world at the expense of their peoples. Arab political regimes must recognize the need to accelerate the comprehensive reforms in all areas.

This study recommends the following :

1. Preparation for amending the regimes procedures on the basis of free, fair, competitive and periodic elections on all government executive and legislative positions as well as strengthening the judicial system and its independence of any intervention.
2. Fighting all types of financial and administrative corruption and the necessity for multiple centers of decision-making, including means of parliamentary accountability and administrative transparency.
3. Respecting citizens' rights, freedoms and their dignity, in addition to reject all kinds of violations against humanity.
4. Removing all restrictions on media and interest in freedom of individual, collective and media expression in the diffusion of events and facts about national issues.
5. Establishing the concept of democracy, respect and acceptance from all segments of the political forces in Arab countries. Moreover, promoting comprehensive development, social justice, equality, principle of equal opportunity and respecting religious and ethnic minorities.
6. Focusing that the nation is the source of authority and rejecting the domination and oppression policy against peoples by using armies and security institutions.
7. Providing the principle of distributive justice for all categories of society and non-bias to certain elites.
8. Supporting the concept of citizenship and strengthening the relationship between the ruler and the ruled.

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Survey of Socio-Economic Status of Rural Women: Analysis of “Swayam Siddha”

By Dr. Sachin Sharma & Prof. Vishwas Vyas

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Women have an important role in building up the contemporary Society .but the socio-economic status of women is very poor rated so Government is trying to change this scenario by implementation of several schemes like Swashakti, Swadhar & Swayam siddha .

Swayamsiddha is the scheme of socio-economic upliftment of rural women. It has been started by department of Women & Child Development in year 2001.

Swayamsiddha worked in the rural routs by the help of Self Help Group (SHG)model of microfinance.

Swayamsiddha has been covered 650 Blocks of all states of the country. The first phase of scheme is completed recently. This study has given a clear Picture of Socioeconomic status of Women members of SHG. Women are associated with this scheme & get benefited in terms of money as well as social status.

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Abstract - Women make up 52% of our country's population. Women have an important role in building up the contemporary Society .but the socio-economic status of women is very poor rated so Government is trying to change this scenario by implementation of several schemes like Swashakti, Swadhar & Swayam siddha .

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I. THE OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY

The main objective of this study was to make an appraisal of the socio-economic conditions of Women beneficiaries of Swayamsahayata samuh (i.e. Self Help Group SHG) formed under “Swayamsiddha” Scheme of Government of India, to understand the actual effect of scheme on employment conditions, education status , earnings-expenditure-saving ratio & awareness.

Performance study/evaluation of the scheme “Swayamsiddha” was also implied objective of this paper.

II. METHODOLOGY

The study was carried out in the Mhow & Depalpur subdivision of district Indore, which is situated in western part of State Madhya Pradesh, India . Since this scheme has concentration towards Women Self help Group & covered the area of above subdivisions only, it was specifically chosen for the study.

The total Number of Women Self Help Group beneficiaries covered under this scheme is approximate 1000 in the area . A sample of 200 women beneficiaries representing 20% of the total beneficiaries was selected. The respondents were interviewed through a detailed questionnaire. The data collected has been tabulated

and wherever possible appropriate statistical tools like mean and correlation have been used.

Some relevant secondary data was also used as require.

III. SWAYAMSIDDHA SCHEME AND SELF HELP GROUPS

This Scheme was launched by central government of India in 2001 . It is a Self Help Groups based Programme with emphasis on convergence activities. The objective is to ensure that Self Help Groups members avail the benefit of all schemes and services in an integrated and holistic manner. It was introduced during 2001-02 replacing the erstwhile Indira Mahila Yojna .

The long term objective of the programme is the all round empowerment of women by ensuring their direct access to, and control over, resources through a sustained process of mobilization and convergence of all the ongoing sectoral programmes. The scheme was designed as women empowerment program through Self Help Group . The implementing body or Nodal Agency of the Scheme was Department of Women & Child Development.

The self-help group has been defined by NABARD as a group of about 20 people from a homogeneous class who come together for addressing their common problems. They are encouraged to make voluntary thrift on a regular basis. They use their pooled resource to make small interest bearing loans to their members. The process helps them imbibe the prioritisation of needs, setting terms and conditions and accounts keeping. This gradually builds financial discipline in all of them. They also learn to handle resources of a size that is much beyond individual capacities of any of them. The SHG in certain multiples of the accumulate savings of the SHG. The bank loans are given without any collateral and at market interest rates. The groups continue to decide the terms of loans to their own members. Since the groups own accumulated savings are part and parcel of the aggregate loans made by the groups to their members, peer pressure ensures timely repayments.(as stated in Final Report on Functioning & Performance of Swashakti & Swayamsidhdha Projects :- Planning commission of India)

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This is broadly, Integrated program for women development in terms of socioeconomic progress. The objectives of Swayamsiddha Programme are given below:

1. To establish women SHGs.
2. To make awareness about Health, Education, Authority & Rights, Socio-economic development for the purpose of women empowerment of SHGs.
3. To provide source of income for women selfemployment.
4. To make the federation of SHGs at village level.

IV. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. It was found that more than 54% of respondents were aware about Government Schemes before joining Self Help Group whereas the remaining 46% were not aware about Government Schemes of women welfare. Maximum number of respondents were know about welfare schemes but they did not know "how to get benefited". After joining Self Help group more than 65% of respondents were aware about Government Schemes (Table :1)

2. The Study Reveals a high degree of illiteracy prevalent among the sample respondents.59% of the respondents are illiterate. 27% of the respondent are literate with primary education & only 14% of the respondent are literate with high school education or higher education. Table

The low literacy rate of women is result of the negative attitude of the rural society towards women-education.but after the joining the group they were realized the importance of education & try to get educated.

3. The income of respondents was extremely low . most of them were used to engaged in hereditary occupation i.e. agriculture labour. maximum 49% of the respondents stands in the family income block of Rs 2000 to Rs 3000 whereas 16% of the respondents has earn only Rs 1000-2000 per month as family income . Table 3

Because of the above fact most of the respondents have lots of economic problems in daily life. 63.5% of of the respondents were found in economic problems. Out of the total respondents 33.5% have problems regarding food, 31% of the respondents feels problems regarding clothing and rest were not have proper place of residence. Table 4

After joining SHG, Income of women respondent increases slightly more than 86% of the respondents acknowledged that they were received Rs 1000 per month as additional income from SHG activities. Table 9

4. As for as saving in concern, women get benefited from the scheme. 97% of the respondents starts

saving in terms of money . Although Rate of average saving were very low but they invest amount of saving in SHG activities also. Table 6

More than 70% of the respondents reveal the fact that they save money, 18% were store values in materials. Table 7

5. There are so many unorganized channel of lending in Indian market which deals with high rate of interest and targeted poor section of society. Women are "safe target" for them. Table 11

But in this study we found that maximum respondents 86.5% not require money on Interest after joining SHG. As we Know Income of 91% of the respondents increased after joining SHG so they fulfill daily needs as well as save some amount. Table 12

6. Most of respondents were take part in decision making process of SHG. They used to participate in meetings.90% of the respondents actively participated in decision making process of the group. Table 2

7. As Indian society is male dominating in nature, women have lots of obstacles to worked with Group.44.5% of the respondents were not supported by family. 24% of the respondents were facing problems from society and rest of the respondents having problems with members of group. Table 5.

8. 50.5% of the respondents get economic benefits from the group, 14.5% of the respondents feels benefited at family status and 35% of the respondents except increasing trend in social status. Table 8

9. 9..Regarding social awareness about Health and religious issues, rituals etc , respondents revealed the fact of totally unawareness about Health but high degree of attention towards rituals.

V. FINDINGS ABOUT SWAYAMSIDHA SCHEME IMPLEMENTATION

1. There is no any specific department to look after the scheme. Department of Women & child welfare was nodal implementing agency but they take this work in addition.

2. Scheme was not properly propagate in the public so real objective of the scheme was not achieved.The Ministry of Rural Development (Department of Rural Development) have stated that they agree with the view of the Loksabha Committee that in order to popularise the concept of Self Help Groups in the States which are lagging behind in the Self Help Groups movement (Report on women empowerment- Loksabha)

3. Lack of proper policy about women SHG was create problems of execution.

4. Because of "redtapism", only few states utilized the fund allotted under the scheme most of states laps funds of the scheme.
5. Basic framework of the scheme is complicated for the rural area. All the emphasis of scheme implementing bodies moving around Paper work only Instead of effective working .

"Banks were less bothered about financing to women SHGs. Loksabha Committee reveal the fact that 5% of the reserved funds for the women laps due to non cooperation of banks The Committee, therefore, recommended that the Department of Economic Affairs (Banking Division)/Reserve Bank of India should impress upon the Banks which are lagging behind to take suitable remedial steps to enhance Net Bank Credit for lending to women. "

6. Budget of the scheme was inadequate for the country like India.
7. There is no any system to ensure proper utilization of funds.

VI. SUGGESTIONS

Government should take following action for the success of the women SHG:

- A. Appropriate policy should be made.
- B. Specific Department Should be establish for the same

- C. Increase in budgeted –fund allotment is required
- D. Awareness programmes for women SHG should be designed and followed
- E. Schemes Like Swayamsiddha must be advertised properly thus maximum persons may get benefit of Programe.

These and other adequate measures shuld be undertaken to secured the objective of the scheme and women welfare.

VII. CONCLUSION

This study has given a clear Picture of Socioeconomic status of Women members of SHG. Women are associated with this scheme & get benefited in terms of money as well as social status.

Swayamsiddha SHGs is positively change the socioeconomic profile of rural women. but scheme was implemented halfheartedly by the government. As the matter of fact

lack of Budget, Policy & advertisement are major problems of the scheme. Scheme was closed after operation of five year & phase2 is launching very soon.

Government should take proper action before planning the new phase of it. After all we can say that women becomes Swayamsidhha after joining the SHGs.

Table 1 : Awareness about women welfare schemes(before joining SHG).

Sn	Awareness status	No of respondents	Percentage
1.	Yes	109	54.5%
2.	No	91	45.5%
	Total	200	100%

Table 2 : Family Income of Respondents.

Sn	Monthly Income Amt in Rs	No of Respondents	Percentage
1.	1000&2000	32	16%
2.	2000&3000	98	49%
3.	3000&4000	36	18%
4.	4000	44	22%
	Total	200	100%

Table 3 : Problems in Daily life needs (Before joining SHG).

Sn	Status	No of Respodents	Percentage
1.	Yes	137	63-5%
2.	NO	63	31-5%
	Total	200	100%

Table 4 : Saving Status after membership.

Sn	Status	No of Respodents	Percentage
1.	Yes	194	97%
2.	NO	6	3%
	Total	200	100%

Table 5 : Types of Saving.

Sn.	Type of Benefit	No of respondent	percentage
1.	Economic	101	50-5%
2.	Social	70	35%
3.	Family	29	14-5%
	Total	200	100%

Table 6 : Types of Benefits (after joining SHG).

Sn.	Type of Benefit	No of respondent	percentage
1.	Economic	101	50-5%
2.	Social	70	35%
3.	Family	29	14-5%
	Total	200	100%

Table 7 : Monthly Income From SHG.

Sn.	Monthly Income Amt in Rs	No of Respondents	Percentage
1.	Up to 1000	173	86-5%
2.	Up to 2000	18	09%
3.	More than 3000	09	4-5%
	Total	200	100%

Table 8 : Types of Economic Problems.

Sn.	Problems	No of Respondents	Percentage
1.	Food problems	67	33-5%
2.	Clothing	62	31%
3.	Residence	26	13%
4.	Others	45	22-5%
	Total	200	100%



Table 9 : Increase in Income after joining SHG.

Sn.	Status	No of Respondents	Percentage
1.	Yes	182	91%
2.	No	18	9%
	Total	200	100%

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The **Introduction** should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable to comprehend and calculate the purpose of your study without having to submit to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give most important references but shun difficult to make a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. In the introduction, describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will have no attention in your result. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here. Following approach can create a valuable beginning:

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Approach:

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- If use of a definite type of tools.
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Approach:

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Approach

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