



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE

POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

# On Chang Chien's Change from a Constitutional Monarchist to a Republican-Political Thought with Flexibility as the Underlying Reason

By Dr. Sun, Shun-Chih

*Chang -Jung Christian University, Taiwan*

**Abstract** - Chang Chien was born on July 1st in 1853 in Haimen Kiangsu and died on August 24th in 1926 in Nant'ung Kiangsu. In spite of his extraordinary enthusiasm in the promotion of a constitutional monarchy, Chang Chien changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change? This is a significant topic for discussion. So far lots of scholars have done research on this topic; however, the answers to this question have not been completely discovered yet. My finding in this paper contends that though reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government were able to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic to save China. It would be unfair to attribute Chang Chien's change only to his personal ambition to maintain his property, his prestige, or to attain political power. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and his political thought with flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, a republic.

**Keywords** : political thought, political flexibility, constitutional monarchy, republic, north-south negotiation.

**GJHSS-F Classification** : FOR Code: 180108, 160699



ON CHANG CHIENS CHANGE FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHIST TO A REPUBLICAN-POLITICAL THOUGHT WITH FLEXIBILITY AS THE UNDERLYING REASON

*Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:*



# On Chang Chien's Change from a Constitutional Monarchist to a Republican-Political Thought with Flexibility as the Underlying Reason

Dr. Sun, Shun-Chih

**Abstract** - Chang Chien was born on July 1st in 1853 in Haimen Kiangsu and died on August 24th in 1926 in Nant'ung Kiangsu. In spite of his extraordinary enthusiasm in the promotion of a constitutional monarchy, Chang Chien changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change? This is a significant topic for discussion.

So far lots of scholars have done research on this topic; however, the answers to this question have not been completely discovered yet. My finding in this paper contends that though reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government were able to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic to save China. It would be unfair to attribute Chang Chien's change only to his personal ambition to maintain his property, his prestige, or to attain political power. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and his political thought with flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, a republic.

This paper is also to explore, after his change to a republican, Chang Chien's decisive role behind the scene in the North-South negotiation from December 1911 to February 1912 leading to abdication of the Ch'ing government under some concession in exchange for the support of Yuan Shih-k'ai as the president of the republic.

**Keywords** : political thought, political flexibility, constitutional monarchy, republic, north-south negotiation.

## I. INTRODUCTION

**A**lthough for a couple of years Chang Chien had been extraordinarily enthusiastic in the promotion of a constitutional monarchy, he changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change? This is a significant topic for discussion.

So far lots of scholars have done research on this topic; however, the answers to this question have not been completely discovered yet. Chang Hsiao-jo's Biography of Mr. Chang Chien of Nant'ung is a pioneer

work which contains a great many source materials on this topic, however, this book suffers from loose organization and superficial treatment of Chang Chien's political thought(Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930). Sung Hsi-Shang 's The Career of Chang Chien is less a biography than an annotated collection of source materials, drawn largely from Chang Chien's works, supplemented by personal remembrances, but touches little on Chang Chien's change to a republic(Sung Hsi-Shang,1963). Liu Hou-sheng 's Biography of Chang Chien concentrates on the political events of Chang Chien's time including his change to a republican(Liu Hou-sheng, 1958). Samuel C. Chu's Reformer in Modern China: Chang Chien, 1853-1926 emphasizes Chang Chien's role in industry, education, land reclamation, water conservancy and his involvement in national affairs including reasons leading to his change to a republican(Samuel C. Chu,1965). However, Chu concludes that Chang Chien "was of surprisingly little influence on the key events of his time. Compare to such men as Yuan, Shih-k'ai and Sun, Yat-sen, or even to such as Liang, Ch'i-ch'ao and Li, Yuan-hung, he had far less to do with the outcome of what was one of the crucial periods in the history of modern China. His role was a subsidiary one at best" (Samuel C. Chu, 1965:86) and "his career was generally outside the mainstream of contemporary history...In spite of his concern with national affairs, he was always isolated from the larger movements of his time" (Samuel C. Chu, 1965:177). I find this view unreasonable since Chang Chien had played a decisive role in the Constitutional Movement of 1905 -1911, and during the period of North - South Negotiation from 1911 to 1912. Japanese scholar Fujioka Kikuo's Chang Chien and the 1911 Revolution (Kikuo Fujioka, 1985), Chinese scholar Chang K'ai-yuan's The Footprints of A Trailblazer : Draft Biography of Chang Chien(Chang K'ai-yuan,1986), and Biography of Chang chien (Chang K'ai-yuan,2000), and Chang K'ai-yuan & T'ian T'ung 's Chang Chien and Modern Society (Chang K'ai-yuan & T'ian T'ung, 2002), and Chang Chien and Modern Society During the Period of 1911 Revolution (Chang K'ai-yuan & T'ian T'ung, 2011) discuss his career, his political activities and his change



to a republican. Shao, Qin's *Culturing Modernity: The Nantong Model, 1890-1930* argues that the 1911 Revolution was not a breaking point in terms of local self-government. To be sure, the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty demanded the reorientation of local self-government from being a base for a constitutional monarchy to being one for a Republican government" (Shao Qin, 2004:11) and Peter Zarrow points out that the Ch'ing's New Policy reforms encouraged "local self-government", and Chang Chien and his brother were able to build a new power structure in Nantung as they pursued modernization project. They rode out the 1911 Revolution much, perhaps, like other local elites, and seemed happy enough to convert from monarchism to republicanism. What mattered most to them at this particular juncture was Nantung (Peter Zarrow, 2006:189). Other works by Wong King-kong (Wong King-kong, 1957), Jerome Ch'en (Jerome Ch'en, 1983), Chang P'eng-yuan (Chang P'eng-yuan, 1968, 1969), Lu Yao-tung (Lu Yao-tung, 1980), Li Shih-yueh (Li Shih-yueh, 1962), Hsu Lun (Hsu Lun, 1962), T'a Fu-hui, (T'a fu-hui, 1970), Sun Shun-chih, (Sun Shun-chih, 1991:326-332; 1995:41-44; 1997:135-137; 2001:106-110; 2009:71-72) also give explanations to Chang Chien's change from a constitutional monarchist to a republican.

The fourth international symposium on Chang Chien held in Nant'ung on the 25th - 28th of November 2006, 88 articles in relation to Chang Chien and modern Chinese society had been submitted to this symposium (Chang Chien International Symposium Committee, 2007), and the fifth international symposium on Chang Chien held in Haimen on the 17th-19th of April 2009, 120 articles in relation to Chang Chien and Haimen : The Thoughts and Practice in the Early Period of Modernization had been submitted to this symposium (Ts'ui, Chih-ch'ing, 2010), however, the reasons leading to Chang Chien's change from a Constitutional Monarchist to a Republican still have not been completely found out yet.

My finding in this paper contends that though reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and local self-government could be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic. It was also due to his pragmatic attitude and political flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, the same, a republic.

I have adopted the content analysis method in this research and I have collected, arranged, compared, and analysed the related data to help reach a conclusion. This paper depends more on basic source materials rather than second-hand data. Among various source materials, Chang Chien's Diary (Chang Chien, 1986. Hereafter cited as Jih-chi) is the most basic one,

which covers almost 53 years from 24 October, 1873, when he was twenty years three months and twenty three days, to 2 August, 1926, twenty two days before his death. This diary contains approximately 875,000 words by which we are able to understand the life of a typical Chinese intellectual, to check the exact dates of some writings of his, and to correct errors against related sources. The first part of Chang Chien's diary which covers approximately the period from 1873 to 1892 was published in Taipei in 1967; and the second part of Chang Chien's diary which covers approximately the period from 1892 to 1926 was later published in Taipei in 1969. These two parts of Chang Chien's diary were reprinted together in 1986 in Taipei covering the period from 1873 to 1926.

The Nine Records of Chang Chien (Chang Hsiao-jo, 1983. Hereafter cited as Chiu-lu.) is an indispensable source material to Chang Chien's political thought. This collection of his writings is divided topically into: Cheng Wen Lu (On Politics), Shih Yeh Lu (On Industry), Chiao Yu Lu (On Education), Tzu Chih Lu (On Self-government), Tzu Shang Lu (On Philanthropy), Wen Lu (Essays), Shih Lu (Poems), Chuan Lu (Special Section), and Wai Lu (On the Civil Service Examination). Within each topical section the sources are arranged in Chronological order.

Extant Writings of Chang Chien (Yang Li-chiang, 1987), is an invaluable source material which includes Chang's unpublished letters and telegraphs to Chao, Feng-ch'ang and Yuan, Shi-k'ai, his personal letters to Chang, Hsiao-jo, Wen, T'ung-ho's letter to Chang Chien, and Ts'ao, Wen-lin's Collation on Nine Records of Chang Chien.

The Complete Work of Chang Chien (Chang Chien Research Center, 1994) includes some new data not found in The Nine Records of Chang Chien, is an invaluable source material to Chang Chien's political thought.

This paper starts with a brief introduction to Chang Chien's careers and political thought in order to trace the clues of Chang's change to a republican. This is followed by describing the fact of Chang's shift so as to help understand why Chang Chien changes. And finally this paper analyses critically and points out the underlining reasons leading to Chang's change from a constitutionalist to a republican based on various source materials and different points of view from scholars.

This paper is also to explore Chang Chien's decisive role in the North-South negotiation from December 1911 to February 1912 leading to the abdication of the Ch'ing government under some concession, in exchange for the support of Yuan, Shih-k'ai as the president of the republic.

The conclusion unveils the most important finding of this paper that the underlying reason leading to Chang Chien's change could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education

and self-government could be accomplished to save China under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and political flexibility which allowed him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, the same, a republic. Of course, his change was apparently due to the trend that he could not reverse, however, his political thought with flexibility should be taken into account as well.

## II. A BRIEF LOOK AT HIS CAREERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

Chang Chien, tzu ( courtesy title ) Chi-chih, hao (alias) Se-an, and Se-Weng, was born the fourth of five sons, on July 1st , 1853 in the village of Ch'ang-lo, Haimen, Kiangsu, and died on August 24th , 1926 in Nant'ung, Kiangsu. Chang Chien began his student days in 1856 at the age of only four. His first teacher was his father Chang, P'eng-nien, who taught him to read Book of A Thousand Characters. The following year, 1857, Chang Chien was sent to a village school. The teacher was Ch'i'u, Ta-chang, under whom Chang Chien in a period of seven years ( 1857-1863 ), had finished the primers such as Trimetrical Classics, and Books of Family Names; the basic poetic readers such as Works of A Thousand Poets , and Poems of A Boy Prodigy; and the Confucian Classics such as The Great Learning, The Doctrine of Golden Means , The Analects of Confucius, Mencius , The Filial Piety Classic , and The Book of Odes . The study of these books served as a basis for examination work, though they were for elementary education only.

In 1864, his father employed Sung, Hsiao-ch'i as family teacher to help Chang Chien and his brothers in the preparation for local examinations. The teacher asked Chang Chien to study again The Great Learning, The Doctrine of Golden Means, The Analects of Confucius, and Mencius, but from better editions. Then he proceeded to teach the boy The Book of History, The Book of Change, The Book of Rites, and T'so's Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals. Under his teacher's effective guidance, Chang Chien learned to write examination poems and examination essays which were required in the examinations. Unfortunately, this enthusiastic teacher died in the Summer of 1866, and Chang Chien was sent to follow Sung Lin, the dead teacher's nephew, in a neighbouring village, Hsi T'ing. Under the new teacher, Chang Chien advanced to study two more Confucian Classics, The Rite of Chou and The Book of Ritual (Chiu-lu, Chuan Lu, chuan 6, 2a-4b).

Chang Chien's examination life was a long and toilsome history. In the first stage, Chang Chien was lucky enough. He spent only five years, 1864-1868, in preparation, successfully passed through the district, prefectural, and Yuan (one conducted by provincial

literary examiners ) examinations, placing twenty-sixth in the latter, and was classified a Fu-sheng (Licentiate) in 1868, at the age of sixteen (Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930: 25-26).

The second stage was very hard for Chang Chien. He spent seventeen more years, 1869-1885, failed five times in the provincial examinations. In 1870 he tried for Chu-jen degree for the first time, and succeeded in placing sixteenth in the k'o examination but failed to pass the provincial examination. He was to repeat this pattern of succeeding in the k'o examinations and failing in the provincial examinations four times in 1873, 1875, 1876, and 1879. The degree of Chiu-jen continued to elude him until 1885, when he competed in the provincial examination and succeeded in placing second highest among who passed.

Chang Chien spent nine more years, 1886-1894, in preparation, failed repeatedly four times in the examinations for Chih-shih degree in Peking in 1886, 1889, 1890, and 1892. In 1894, at the age of 42, Chang Chien, at the insistence of his elder brother, Chang Ch'a, and the encouragement of his aged father, once more took the metropolitan examination. This time, his name was found in the sixtieth position. He improved on this in the re-examination by placing tenth, and when the palace examination was over, he was chosen to be Chuan-yuan, the highest of all. He was duly appointed a Compiler of the First Class in the Hanlin Academy. Unfortunately, only six months after he had won the highest title of Chuan-yuan, he lost his father, who had played the most important role in his examination life. Four years later, in 1898, when he had decided to take no office in the government and when he was busy promoting local development in his home area, Chang Chien did not forget to come back to Peking for his last examination in Hanlin Academy. According to himself, this unnecessary effort was again to fulfil the dream of his deceased father.

Through the traditional training, Chang Chien had accepted the pragmatic and the reciprocal aspects of Confucianism which later functioned as his guiding spirit in promoting industry, education and self-government as the foundation of a constitutional monarchy, and then a republic. Chang Chien believed that the best way is somewhere between the two extremes. As he understood it, there were no basic conflicts between the Chinese tradition and Western civilization. It was possible to find some form of compromise by adhering to the broad principles of Confucianism and adopting Western technology, organization, and even political system of constitutional monarchism and republicanism. Chang Chien thought that "practical use" might be changed but "basic principle" should be permanent and could not be changed. Chang Chien's ideas on industry, education, self-government, constitutional monarchy and republic had changed according to situations, but Chang




Chien's belief on Confucian ideas of serving the people had never changed.

With the pragmatic and reciprocal aspects of Confucian ideas serving the people, adjusting to China's concrete situations, Chang Chien developed his thought firstly, saving China by industry from 1866, the time self-strengthening movement in progress; secondly, saving China by industry and education from 1895 to 1900, the time after Sino-Japanese War; thirdly saving China by industry, education and self-government from 1900 to 1903, the time self-government movement in progress; fourthly saving China by industry, education, self-government under a constitutional monarchy from 1903 to 1911, the time constitutional movement in progress; and lastly, saving China by industry, education, self-government under a republic from one month after 1911

Revolution, the time he changed to a republican, until his death in 1926. Chang Chien indeed had successfully made considerable contributions to China's economic, educational and political modernization. The case of Chang Chien's subtle promotion of China's modernization demonstrated clearly that Confucianism was not necessarily incompatible with modernization (Sun Shun-chih, 1995:98).

The main lines of Chang Chien's political thought may be briefly summarized as follows: industry is the basis of education; education and industry are the foundation of self-government; and self-government is the basis of constitutional monarchy (or later, a republic). The ultimate purpose of his political thought was to make China wealthy and powerful.



Industry is the basis of education since educational expenditures have to be supplied by the income of industry. Industry, according to Chang Chien, incorporated agriculture, labour and commerce and it is roughly equivalent to the term of "economic development" of today. Chang Chien saw industry as a means to supply funds for education and also saw industry as a means to save China. He personally devoted himself to the cause of the development of industry and had made great achievements. The success of his economic endeavours enable him to advance education.

Education and industry are the foundation of self-government since they are the essentials of self-government. Education, according to Chang Chien, was not merely "instruction", but was the means for the

people to obtain wisdom, learning, and knowledge. In order to save China, Chang Chien thought, people should have ordinary knowledge, and ordinary knowledge must be obtained through adequate education. Chang Chien regarded education and industry as the foundation of self-government, and also avenue to a strong nation.

Self-government is the basis of constitutional monarchy (or later, a republic) since constitutional monarchy or a republic cannot really be achieved without self-government. Self-government, according to Chang Chien, meant that everyone should devote himself to the development of industry, education, and other local affairs under the leadership of the intellectuals-the representatives of the people, and thus local councils were essential to self-government. Chang

Chien saw self-government as the basis of a strong nation. Constitutional monarchy, according to Chang Chien, was a separation of the three-power political system under an emperor. Chang Chien thought that self-government and constitutional monarchy were related and mutually influenced, and thus he was inclined to have a parliament to define the shape and size of taxation.

Chang Chien had played a very important role in the Constitutional Movement: in the gestation period of 1904-1906, he acted behind the scene to push the Ch'ing government to adopt constitutionalism; In the developing stage of 1909-1911, he advocated the Petition-for-a-Parliament Movement and as a result the Ch'ing government shortened the preparation period toward constitutional government by three years or more.

Although for a couple of years Chang Chien had been extraordinarily enthusiastic in the promotion of a constitutional monarchy, he changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change?

The reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated. However, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government which were able to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic. The second main reason should be attributed to his pragmatic attitude. He had no choice but to accept the fact that revolution had broken out and that most of the provinces had declared independence, and lots of the constitutionalists had changed their attitude toward republican, and he could not reverse the trend. Even his home county of Nant'ung and home province of Kiangsu were under the threats of troops in Nanking. He was concerned with the safety of his own county and province. He thought that the only way to stabilize the society was to accept the republic in order to avoid chaos so as to achieve his industry, education and local self-government program. The third main reason should be attributed to his despair with the Ch'ing government. His Chuan-yuan background made it impossible for him to lead an uprising, but he could accept the fact of revolution. Although he had no ambition in obtaining political power, he had to get involved in politics. Therefore he found a solution by supporting Yuan Shih-k'ai as president of the republic in exchange for the abdication of Ch'ing court under some concession. Behind the scene during the period of North-South negotiation 1911-1912, Chang Chien had played a very important role.

### III. THE PROCESS OF CHANG'S CHANGE FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHIST TO A REPUBLICAN

In May 1911, true to its promise to the edict of November 4, 1910, the Cabinet Law was enacted and a cabinet was appointed with Prince I-k'ung as Prime Minister. However, of the thirteen posts on the cabinet, eight were held by Manchus, four by Chinese, one by Mongolian, revealing the basic distrust held by the Throne toward the Chinese officials. Five of the Manchus were members of the imperial house, thus providing the basis for the cabinet being nicknamed the "royal cabinet".

For Chang Chien the make-up of the cabinet came as a distinct disappointment. In May 1911 Chang Chien united with his friends T'ang, Shou-ch'ien, Sheng, Tseng-chih and Chao, Feng-ch'ang in writing a letter to Tsai-feng, the Prince Regent, protesting this measure and urging that learned and experienced Chinese higher officials be appointed as ministers. Chang Chien, through Chao, Ch'ing-k'uan, a former follower of prince Ch'un, even warned the Regent against running the risk of losing his throne. Some two months after the establishment of the cabinet no actual progress had been made in political reforms. Chang Chien submitted a petition to the cabinet urging it to take three actions:

1. To formulate and announce an over-all policy in order to communicate between the government and the ordinary people.
2. To establish direct coordination between the cabinet and the various government departments in order to communicate among the government offices; and
3. To make known the program of the cabinet through Tze-cheng Yuan (Political Consultative Council) to the people and call in experts for consultation (Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 28b-30a).

He laid particular stress on the last point as an indispensable step toward securing public support for the cabinet. There appeared to be no response to this petition. Of course, Chang Chien was depressed. But he still supported the Ch'ing government at this moment.

In May of 1911 Chang Chien was selected by the chambers of Commerce of Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton, and Hankou to go to Peking in order to obtain government permission for the founding of a joint Sino-American bank, and a joint shipping line. This scheme came as a result of the visit of an American delegation to the South Sea Industrial Exposition of 1910 in Nanking, in which delegation the American financier Robert Dollar was a prominent member. Through Robert Dollar, Chang Chien had met with the group of American businessmen and worked out the details for a joint Chinese-American bank with a total capital of five million Yuan (about 3.5 million taels), to be established with the American half of the capital. At the same time a

steamship line was also to be set up on a 50-50 basis, starting with a new 18,000-ton ship ordered by Robert Dollar. Chang Chien made ready to travel to Peking by way of Hankou. On his way from Hankou to Peking he paused on June 7 at Chang-the, where his student Yuan, Shih-k'ai had been living in retirement ever since his dismissal in January 1909. The two men had not seen each other for twenty-eight years. On this occasion Chang Chien talked about one of his pet projections, the Huai River Conservancy Scheme.

Chang had been interested in taming Huai River since 1887 but without success nor opportunity. This is why Chang Chien discussed with Yuan the control of Huai River on this occasion. More importantly, in this meeting, these two men discussed future Chinese politics. Yuan, Shih-k'ai expressed his feeling that once he reappeared in the central government, he liked to act according to the opinions of Chang Chien and the public. Chang Chien and Yuan, Shih-k'ai reached an understanding that they would be co-operating in politics in the future. After this pleasantly nostalgic meeting, Chang wrote in his diary:

We talked about the past and the present. I found that, after an interval of 28 years, his powers of judgment and observation had become both mature and incisive. He is head and shoulders above the lot lot (Jih-chih, 2674).

It is exaggerated to say that on this occasion he had already discussed with Yuan Shih-k'ai the future abdication of the Ch'ing court. But it is significant that at that time these two men had reached an understanding on Chinese politics and intended to co-operate in the future. And this sowed the seed for Chang Chien to negotiate between the North and the South later in 1911-1912 in terms of the election of Yuan Shih-k'ai as president and the abdication of Ch'ing court in exchange for some concession from the Republican government.

The next day, June 8th 1911, Chang reached Peking, arriving a day earlier than the original schedule in order to avoid the elaborate welcome which various organizations had planned for him. On June 11th, he received word through Prince Ch'ing that the Regent, Prince Ch'un, the father of the infant Hsuan-t'ung Emperor, wished to see him two days later on June 13th. Chang Chien accordingly first paid a visit to Duke Tsai-tse, the Minister of Finance in order to make clear that he was not seeking an official appointment. The actual audience with the Regent took place on the evening of the thirteenth. The audience lasted more than three quarters of an hour (Jih-chi, 2676-2678).

Within a few days Chang Chien had fulfilled his original mission, obtaining the necessary approval from Duke Tsai-tse for the establishment of the joint bank and joint steamship line. However, the 1911 revolution which broke out later in the year cut short the scheme, and it never materialized.

Chang Chien went to Wu-ch'ang to help draw up the operating regulations of the Ta Wei Cotton Mill scheme some two month after he had returned to Nant'ung from the north. He arrived there on October 4th. On the evening of the ninth two revolutionaries were arrested by the authorities. The city gates were closed immediately while authorities sought to round up other revolutionaries. At ten o'clock on the morning of the tenth the gates were finally opened. Chang Chien promptly went across the river to Hankow. That evening he boarded ship for his return trip to Nant'ung. When he boarded the ship at eight o'clock, he could see across the river burning of an engineering corps camp just outside Wu-ch'ang. The river was too wide at this point for him to hear any district sounds, but seven miles downstream he could still see the horizon bright with the reflected glow of the conflagration.

On the evening of the eleventh the boat arrived at Anking, the capital of Anhwei Province. Next morning Chang Chien went ashore to call on Governor Chu, Chia-pao to discuss the Huai River Conservancy Scheme. It was then that he learned that Wu-ch'ang had fallen to the revolutionaries on the previous evening. Anking was then in a most precarious position, as there was a shortage of ready funds for emergencies, and the new style troop stationed there were rife with revolutionary sentiment and could not be relied upon. Under the circumstances Chang Chien gave up any hope of pursuing the subject of controlling the Huai and left Anking that evening. The following night is boat tired up together with a later arrival, from the passengers of which Chang Chien got details of the events of the ninth and tenth in Wu-ch'ang.

At this moment, Chang Chien still supported the Ch'ing government and undertook the work of saving the Manchu Dynasty from revolution. He reached Nanking on October 14th and went directly to T'ieh-liang, who was the commanding general of the region at the time. He urged the Manchu general to send troops at once to Hupeh and to memorize the government for the immediate establishment of a constitutional government. But T'ieh-liang evaded the issue by asking Chang Chien to refer the matter to Chang Jen-chun, the governor-general of Liang-kiang. This Chang Chien did on the following day. Governor-general Chang, however, not only treated the proposal to urge the establishment of a constitutional government with great contempt, but refused even to entertain the notion of sending troops to the aid of the authorities in Hupeh.

On 16th October he went to Soochow, where Ch'en Te-ch'uan, the governor of Kiangsu, backed his proposal and asked him to draft a memorial to be sent to the imperial Court. That evening he and two of his fellow constitutionalists, Lei-feng and Yang, T'ing-tung, worked jointly until midnight before the memorial was done. It was sent to Peking in the name of Governor-general Ch'en, The-ch'un and governor Sun Pao-ch'i of

From his writings as the following you can see, Chang Chien attributes his change from a constitutional monarchist to a republican to world situation, public opinion, peace security, avoidance of chaos, and consideration over territories, nations, people's thinking, and theories of statesmen.

In 1911:

Now the war has happened and the prefects and the counties have collapsed. Considering the world situation and the trend of public opinion, the only way to secure peace for the country and to avoid chaos is to accept republicanism ... we would rather integrate nationalism into republicanism so that people may avoid chaos of war (Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 40b-41a).

and again in 1911 Chang Chien pointed out the fact that he had promoted the constitutional monarchy for ten years, however, he had no choice but to accept republicanism in accordance with time and tide (Chang Chien Research Center, 1994:180). And again in 1911, in a telegraph to the cabinet, he recommended republicanism:

Since inception of the 1911 revolution, I have remarked that without fundamental political reform, chaos of war cannot be eliminated. For the previous month, I have alone considered this issue seriously, I have discussed this issue with the talented, I have consulted public opinions on this issue, I have pondered issues over territories, nations, people's thinking, theories of statesmen from home and abroad, and I have compared monarchical constitutionalism with republicanism of different counties ... Within one month, the republicanism has spread over the country and has been accepted overwhelmingly by the people ... For the benefit of the Manchurian, the Hans, the Mongolian, the Tibetan and the Muslims, I think your majesty had better follow public opinion and give up the throne for the republicanism(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 41b-42a).

"Public Opinion" here is worth mentioning, according to political scientists, "Public opinion is the sum of private opinions of which government officials are aware and take into account in making their decisions"(Austin Ranney, 2001:115); and "Public opinion clearly plays a major role in modern democracy"( Michael G. Roskin et.al , 2008:134). Chang Chien here referred "public opinion" to the opinion of the talented (the elite, the intellectual, the scholar gentry) including the constitutionalists and the revolutionaries.

And on November 27th in 1911, in a letter to his friend Hsu, Ting-lin, a member of Kiangsu Provisional Assembly who had stayed in Peking advocating the convening of parliament, Chang Chien pointed out the fact that there would no peace unless republicanism:

Now the situation is urgent, people are suffering, and a peaceful solution to avoid chaos is

imperative. Republicanism has become a consensus for the southern provinces to achieve peace, and I can not reverse the trend. Please come back to the south and you will understand the situation. The name of the Kiangsu Provisional Assembly has changed into Kiangsu Legislative Assembly and hence there is no need for you to stay in Peking any more (Yang Li-ch'iang, 1987:25-26).

As to the issue concerning the quality of Chinese citizens at that time to meet a republican political system, Chang Chien was optimistic and said in 1911 in his article entitled "The Reasons Why We Should Establish a Republican Political System":

The quality of the citizens in a nation is produced by the political system of that nation. The "quality of citizens" is a product whilst "political system" is a productive machine. Where there is a republican political system, there are qualified republican citizens.... When Chinese citizens have not broken away from a monarchical monarchy, they have no choice but to accept constitutional monarchy. However, once Chinese citizens have broken away from a constitutional monarchy, they are able to accept a republic. This is due to the fact of national situation (Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 43a-43b).

However, later in 1912, he made a complaint about inferior quality of Chinese citizens:

Today the voices of Republicanism have spread all over the country, however, impermissible behaviours occur frequently due to inferior standard of Chinese citizens caused by inadequate education of the Ch'ing government. Now, it is the time for us to change the course of education for better (Chiu-lu, Chiao Yu Lu, chuan 3, 13a).

Finally in 1923, Chang Chien believed that quality of Chinese citizens had failed to meet republicanism:

The foreigners who discuss my country's political system often say that because Chinese education has not yet been universal and hence the ordinary people's knowledge has not matched the requirement of Republicanism. At first, I doubted about this opinion, however, later I believed half of it, then later, I believed it, and finally, now I firmly believe it(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 6, 8a).

At first, Chang Chien thought that once there is a republican form of nation, there will be qualified republican people; later, he doubted it; and finally he realized that without qualified republican citizens, republican political system would be impossible to be operated. He had witnessed political turmoil in the warlords period, and hence he realized that despite the establishment of a republic, Chinese democratic political culture had not been established yet.

And again in 1911, Chang Chien misquoted the theory of Rousseau of France and Lao-tzu of ancient China to support his republican point of view :



I have seriously taken into consideration and have discussed comprehensively with friends the matter on political reform for the past month after the 1911 Revolution ...Rousseau said that it was difficult for the central government to control over a vast nation, and Lao-tzu said that to govern a nation was like to cook a small fish. And these are the evidences to support the view that such a huge nation like China should adopt self-government under a republic. The constitutional monarchy was suitable only to a small country made up of a single race ...such as Japan. Republicanism is the most suitable to a country with vast territory, composed of different races and thus having different customs...such as the United States(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 41b).

And again in his article entitled "Why We Should Establish A Republican Political System", Chang Chien said:

A nation with vast territory is most suitable to adopt self-government under a republic. To prove this in theory, Rousseau's Social Contract says that it is difficult for the central government to control over a vast nation. The European counties as well as the United States of America have all adopted Rousseau's style of Local self-government under the Federal system. To prove this in practice, the United States of America, with more vast territory than China, has initiated and achieved democracy remarkably by adopting self-government under a republic(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 43b).

Chang Chien's knowledge about Rousseau's political theory was vague and superficial. In fact, Rousseau preferred a small nation (not a large nation) under a republic; and Lao-tzu's theory of "governing a nation is like cooking a small fish" is irrelevant to republicanism at all. Nevertheless, Chang Chien indeed tried hard to explain why he had changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican.

Chang Chien's son, Chang Hsiao-jo also explained why his father had changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican:

Taking into consideration of the public opinion, and the situation after the 1911 Revolution, my father had no choice but to accept republicanism, so that chaos might be avoided (Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930: 157, 159).

The following authors also gave interpretations: Chang K'ai-yuan from the people's Republic of China, in 1963, attributed Chang Chien's change to his bourgeois attitude to property (Chang K'ai-yuan, 1963:100) ; But later in 1986 and in 2000, he changed his stand-point and attributed Chang Chien's change to his pragmatic attitude on politics, his wise judgment on the situations and his flexibility in following the tide of history(Chang kai-yuan, 1986: 240-241; 2000:238-239). And in 2002 in their book entitled "Chang Chien and Modern Society", Chang K'ai-yuan and T'ian T'ung attribute Chang Chien's

change to Ch'en, Teh-ch'u'an and T'ang Shou-ch'ian, his friends' influence upon him, the time and tide upon him, and his intention to maintain peace for economic development (Chang K'ai-yuan & T'ian T'ung, 2002:482-486). Hsu Lun, from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang's change to a scheme of stealing the fruit of the revolution from the revolutionaries by penetrating their camp (Hsu Lun, 1962:413). Li Shih-Yueh, from the People's Republic of China, shared the same view above with Hsu Lun (Li Shih-Yueh, 1962: 71, 74). Chen Yu-ch'ing also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang's shift to his disappointment with the Ch'ing government, the influence of his friends such as T'ang, Shou-ch'ien upon him, and his willingness to accept a peaceful settlement (Chen Yu-ch'ing, 1988:76-79). Wu Yi-yeh, also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang's shift to his acceptance of the existing fact caused by the revolution and his dislike to Ch'ing government's insincerity on constitutional reform (Wu Yi-yeh, 1993:44).

Yen Hsueh-hsi also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang Chien's change to his flexibility to follow the time and tide so that division and chaos could be avoided (Yen Hsueh-hsi, 1996:244-245). Hou Yi-chieh, also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang Chien's change mainly to his despair with the Ch'ing government (Hou Yi-chieh, 2000:195-196). Wang Tun-Ch'in attributed Chang Chien's change to his political adjustment to new situation, and had this to say:

Chang Chien's thought has no difference with Sun,Yat-sen's goal for revolution in terms of seeking Democracy in politics, and national industry and commerce development in economics (Wang Tun-Ch'in, 2005:354)

Lu Yao-tung from Taiwan attributed Chang Chien's shift to the impact of the tide of events upon him (Lu Yao-tung, 1980:687). Jerome Ch'en attributed Chang Chien's change to his pragmatic attitude, including the consideration of the security of his property, the maintenance of his prestige and the consistence of his own ideas (Ch'en Jerome, 1983:2298-2303); Kikuo Fujioka attributed Chang Chien's change to his intention to minimize the disaster of the revolution in order to achieve constitutionalism (Fujioka Kikuo, 1985:288); Chuzo Ichiko attributed the shift of the gentry, including Chang Chien, to their intentions to protect themselves by nipping any disaster in the bud and managing to seize real political power(Chuzo Ichiko, 1968:311-312); Samuel C. Chu attributed his change to the fact that "Chang Chien represented the large segment of the people which were neither involved directly in the revolutionary activities nor had vested interest in the continued survival of the Ch'ing Dynasty. He had been a leading advocate of constitutionalism up to 1911. When he supported the revolutionary cause after the initial outbreak, he was

acting the part of a typical number of the local gentry of the country, who switched from constitutionalism to republicanism as a means of saving China", and that "Events in early November 1911, however, apparently convinced him of the hopelessness of efforts to shore up the tottering Manchu regime. He forthwith abandoned the constitutionalists' cause, which he had championed for nearly a decade, and threw his support behind the revolutionary movement"(Chu Samuel C., 1965:69, 75); Wong King-kong attributed Chang Chien's change to the "natural development of his progressivism" and said:

Chang Chien was steadfastly to the constitutional movement in China. His shift from support of limited monarchy to support of republicanism was only the natural development of his progressivism. His fundamental ideal was a democratic China with a constitutional government. During the imperial days Chang Chien, like other constitutional monarchists, was concerned only about the calling of a parliament and the organization of a responsible cabinet. After the establishment of the republic, his attention was transferred to the promotion of party activities and the establishment of a constitution (Wong King-kong, 1957:62);

And Chang P'eng-yuan attributed Chang Chien's change to the fact that there was "no basic difference between the two political groups in their ideal of representative government", "The constitutionalists did not wish to witness a China divided and in chaos", and as "it was apparent that the constitutionalists intended to control the situation themselves" (Chang P'eng-yuan, 1968:181-182); Ta Fu-hui attributed Chang Chien's change to his intention to avoid the chaos of war so as to maintain social order (Ta Fu-hui, 1970:29); Shen Yun-lung said that Chang Chien, former speaker of the Kiangsu provincial assembly and outstanding leader of the constitutionalists in the Chi'ng dynasty, had different views from the revolutionaries, however, he had finally cooperated with the revolutionaries due to the Ch'ing government's reluctance to sincere constitutional reform (Shen, Yun-lung, 1971:275).

From the above mentioned you can see, his disappointment with the Ch'ing government, the influence of his friends upon him, his flexibility to follow the time and tide, his pragmatic attitude, his intention to minimize the disaster of the revolution in order to achieve constitutionalism, no basic difference between the two political groups in their ideal of representative government, the constitutionalists intended to control the situation themselves, and the natural development of his progressivism, are all persuasive factors leading to Chang Chien's change.

However, the underlying reason that Chang Chien's political thought with flexibility was to allow industry, education and self-government to be developed whether under a constitutional monarchy or a

republic should be taken into consideration. Chang Chien advocated the practice of industry, education, and self-government, and hence a suitable funds and a stable society were important for him, his main concern was to obtain a suitable milieu for the development of industry, education, and self-government. Thus the consideration of economic property and social stability, of course, were reasonable. Chang Chien, with a sense of the prestige and responsibility of the traditional scholar-gentry, intended to participate and control the situation in order to avoid possible chaos. The best way to save China in that situation, he thought, was to support the powerful Yuan, Shih-k'ai as president of the Republic of China at the expense of the Manchu empire and Sun, Yat-sen. Hence, his involvement in the ensuing power struggle was inevitable. Besides, he had made the last ditch efforts to urge the Manchu authorities to make necessary reforms, yet they turned a deaf ear to his requests and thus he was totally disappointed with the Manchu regime. In addition, he frequently discussed matters with his talented contemporaries including the constitutionalists and the revolutionaries in Shanghai and thus was influenced by them after the revolution.

Hence it would be unfair to attribute Chang Chien's change only to his personal ambition to maintain his property, his prestige, or to attain political power. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and his political thought with flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, the same, a republic.

In short, we can summarize the reasons attributing to Chang Chien's change as follows:

*a) Chang Chien's Political Thought With Flexibility*

Chang Chien's main concern was industry, education and local self-government, and he wanted to achieve and expand them under a stable government irrespective of a constitutional monarchy or a republic, and this is the most important point. As the above mentioned, with the pragmatic and reciprocal aspects of Confucian ideas serving the people, adjusting to China's concrete situations, Chang Chien developed his political thought firstly, saving China by industry (from 1866); secondly, saving China by industry and education (1895-1900); thirdly saving China by industry, education and self-government (1901-1903); fourthly saving China by industry, education, self-government under a constitutional monarchy (1903-1911); and lastly, saving China by industry, education, self-government under a republic (1911-1926). Hence Chang Chien's political thought with flexibility is the underlying reason leading to his change to a republican.

*b) His Pragmatic Attitude to Face Situation*

He had no choice but to accept the fact that revolution had broken out and that most of the provinces had declared independence, and lots of the

constitutionalists had changed their attitude toward republican, and he could not reverse the trend. Even his home county of Nant'ung and home province of Kiangsu were under the threats of troops in Nanking. He was concerned with the safety of his own county and province. He thought that the only way to stabilize the society was to accept the republic in order to avoid chaos so as to achieve his industry, education and local self-government program.

### c) *His despair with the Ch'ing government*

He was very much disappointed at the Ch'ing government's insincerity toward constitutional reform. His background made it impossible for him to lead an uprising, but he could accept the fact of revolution and independence of provinces. Although he had no ambition in catching political power, he had to get involved in politics. He found a solution by supporting Yuan, Shih-kai as president of the republic in exchange for the abdication of Ch'ing court under some concession (Sun Shun-chih, 1991:330-332). In comparison with other intellectuals during the period from October 10 1911 to February 1912, Chang Chien's reaction to the 1911 revolution stands for the response of some relatively conservative intellectuals to the impact of the tide of events. After the 1911 revolution, most of the provinces declared their independence from Peking by the constitutionalists such as T'ang, Shou-ch'ien in Chekiang and T'an, Yian-k'ai in Hunan. The constitutionalists declared their independence with the purposes of protecting their native homeland and of achieving constitutionalism by way of revolution such as Chang Chien (Chang Peng-yuan, 1983:191). Chang Chien had close contact with the Constitutionalists Ch'en, Teh-ch'uan, T'ang, Shou-ch'en and revolutionaries such as Huang, Hsing, Hu, Han-min, Sung, Chiao-jen, and Wang, Ching-wei in this period and they have been influenced by one another.

## VI. CHANG CHIEN'S DECISIVE ROLE DURING THE NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATION

In his "Revolution by Diplomacy: A Re-examination of the Shanghai Conference of 1911", Australian scholar Louis Sigel has put emphasis on "revolution by diplomacy".

"The Revolution of 1911 was not much of a revolution: There was no fundamental overthrow of the existing social order, nor was there a significant shift in the allocation of political or economic power at the local level. Without the backing of a well-organized movement, the revolutionaries achieved a dominant role in the ending of imperial rule and the establishment of a successful political order in only four provinces-Kwangtung, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Hunan. Thanks to a shortage of defenders of the throne's interest, the Revolution was a relatively bloodless affair. The precipitate cease-fire and general acceptance of a

political rather than military solution reflected widespread acceptance, almost from the start of the eventual solution - a republic under Yuan Shih-k'ai" (Sigel Louis, 1979:111).

The nature of 1911 Revolution is debatable, one says that it is a revolution by diplomacy; another says that it is an all-people revolution (Chang Yu-fa, 1988:52,72); the other says that it is a bourgeoisie revolution (Wu Yu-chang, 1961:26); still other says that it is just a dynastic revolution:

"The Revolution of 1911 turns out to be a dynastic revolution. This supposition is supported by two facts. One is that what attracted students, secret societies, and officers and soldiers of the New Army to the Revolution was nothing more than the anti-Manchu racism in Sun Yat-senism. The other is that no great economic and social changes can be detected between the period before and after the Revolution. Of course, there was some progress in industrialization, but this may be explained as natural growth than the result of the Revolution" (Chuzo Ichiko, 1968:313).

and still other says:

Nevertheless it is equally difficult, despite the role played by conservative elements, to regard the 1911 Revolution simply as a traditional rebellion bringing about the fall of one dynasty and the founding of another. This revolution, although it followed the traditional pattern, had a new set of slogans, such as democracy, liberty, and national independence" (Bergere Marie-Claire, 1968:294).

All the above scholars are able to justify their arguments wisely with evidences. However, there is no doubt that the 1911 Revolution was able to be achieved mainly due to the success of the South North Negotiation among all parts struggling for power and interests. Without the success of the South North Negotiation, the 1911 Revolution might have been pacified by Yuan, Shih-k'ai, the prime minister of the Ch'ing Court, and the birth of the Republic of China would not be possible. Of course, Yuan, Shih-k'ai had taken into consideration of his own best interest and accepted the negotiation so as to become the president of the Republic of China. The 1911 Revolution indeed was accomplished by negotiation and it can be said that it was a "revolution by diplomacy".

Once Chang Chien had changed to a republican, he worked wholeheartedly behind the scene to achieve the north-south negotiation. On 11th January 1912, a time of deadlock between the south and the north, Chang Chien wrote two articles entitled "ko-ming Lun (On Revolution)" in which he concluded that there were four kinds of revolution in Chinese history, namely "sheng-hsian (the sages) revolution", "hao-chie (the heroic) revolution", "ch'u'an-chian (the power stolen) revolution", and "tao-chei (the villain) revolution", and the cases of the sages revolution and the heroic revolution

were very rare in Chinese history but most of the cases of revolution were the power-stolen revolution and the Villain revolution as a result of the despotic political system of China. He suggested the revolutionaries to follow the cases of the sages and the heroic revolutions, but not the power-stolen and the villain revolution ( Chiu-lu, Wen Lu, chuan 3, 5b-7b). In this sense, though his theory on revolution is still within the scope of traditional China for his inclination of "the sages and the heroic revolutions", Chang Chien had already expressed out clearly his hate of "despotic political system of China".

On the surface, the North-South negotiation was conducted by the representatives led by T'ang,Shao-i, chief representative of Yuan,Shih-k'ai, and by the representatives led by Wu,T'ing-fang, the chief representative of Sun Yat-sen. However, in fact, Chang Chien had played a leading role behind the scene during the North-South negotiation in 1911-1912. He connected with Yuan,Shih-k'ai who then controlled the Peking government, and he was also respected by the revolutionaries due to his great prestige and influence in the society and achievement in industry and in education. Before T'ang Shao-i went south for peace conference, Yuan,Shih-k'ai secretly advised T'ang that Chang Chien's opinion should be consulted firstly. On 10, January 1912, Chang Chien sent Yuan a secret telegraph indicating that the South had no choice but to set up a provisional government with the hope of unifying respective provinces and this was merely a temporary solution, and that the provincial president Sun,Yat-sen had already declared that he would resign his provincial presidency immediately after the abdication of the Ch'ing government (Yang Li-ch'ang, 1987:28 ). And on 14, January 1912 Chang Chien again sent a secret telegraph to Yuan,Shih-k'ai to confirm him that Yuan would be surely elected as the president of the Republic by the republicans in the south immediately after the abdication of the Manchu throne (Chiu-lu, Chen Wen Lu, chuan 4,1a ). After several secret telegraphs between Chang Chien and Yuan,Shih-k'ai, on 27, January forty-seven northern military leaders including Tuan,Ch'i-jui declared their inclination of a republic and this was a help in forcing the abdication of the Ch'ing regime (Hsu Lun, 1962:423 ).

At this time Hu,Han-min, a leading revolutionary, sought out Chang Chien to draft an abdication decree. Chang Chien after consulting with his colleagues about this matter, turned the draft over to Hu, who, after obtaining T'ang,Shao-yi's approval in the matter, sent it to Yuan,Shih-k'ai. Subsequently this draft, after a bit revision, was published as the cabinet's decree, signifying the willingness of the throne to abdicate(Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930:144-145 ).

During the period of the South-North negotiation, Ti,Pao-hsien's Hsi-lou and Chao,Feng-ch'ang's Hsi-yin-tang ( both private studies) were two places in Shanghai where the constitutionalists such as

Chang Chien, Ch'en,Teh-ch'u'an, T'ang,Shou-ch'en and revolutionaries such as Huang,Hsing, Hu,Han-min, Sung,Chiao-jen, and Wang,Ching-wei met with one another, the private talks were often held there. Chang Chien was a key figure between the North and the South, the peace negotiation envoys often came to ask his opinions, the doomed Manchu authorities received polite compensation (Lu Yao-tung, 1980:694-695). Without Chang Chien's participation, the North-South negotiation might not have been concluded so successfully. The abdication decree read as follows:

We have received from the Empress Dowager Lung-yu an edict as the following:

Because of the uprising by the Army of the People, with the cooperation of the people of the provinces, the one answering the other like an echo, the whole empire is in turmoil and the people have endured much tribulation. I therefore specially appointed Yuan, Shih-k'ai to instruct commissioners to confer with the representatives of the Army of the people about convening a national assembly, at which the future of the government should be decided. For the past two months, there has been a wide divergence of opinion between the north and the south, each strongly maintaining its own view; the general results have been the stagnation of trade and the deployment of troop. As long as the form of government remains undecided, unrest will continue in the country. It is clear that the majority of the people favour the establishment of a republican form of state; the southern and central provinces first held this view, and lately the officers in the north have adopted the same sentiments. This universal desire clearly expresses the will of Heaven, and it is not for us to oppose the desires and incur the disapproval of millions of the people merely for the sake of the privileges and powers of a single house. It is right that the general situation should be considered and due deference given to the opinion of the people. With the Emperor at my side, I hereby hand over the sovereignty to the people as a whole and declare that the constitution shall henceforth be republican, wishing to satisfy the demands of those within the confines of the country, hating disorder and desiring peace, and anxious to follow the teaching of the sages, according to which the country is the possession of the people. Yuan, Shih-k'ai, having been elected Prime Minister some time ago by the Political Consultative Council, is able at this time of change to unite the north and the south. Let him then, with full power to do so, organize a provisional republican government, conferring therein with the representatives of the army of the people, and that peace may be assured to the people, and that the complete integrity of the territories of the five races-Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Muhammandans, and Tibetans- is the same time maintained in a great state under the title of the Republic of China. The Emperor and I, will retire into a life of leisure, free from public

duties, spending our years pleasantly, enjoying the courteous treatment accorded to us by the people, and watching with satisfaction the glorious establishment and consummation of the perfect government (Ch'ai Teh-keng, 1957:183; Liu Hou-sheng, 1963:262-263; Sun Shun-chih, 2010:77-78).

The documents was sealed with the imperial seal and signed by all the members of the cabinets: Prime Minister Yuan, Shih-k'ai, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu, Wei-the, Minister of the Interior Chao, ping-ch'un, Acting Minister of Finance Shao, ying, Minister of Education T'ang, Ching-ch'ung, Minister of the Army Wang, Shih-chen, Acting Minister of the Navy T'ang, Hsueh-heng, Minister of Justice Shen, Chia-pen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce His, yen, Acting Minister of Communication Liang, Shih-l, and Minister of Suzerainty Ta, shou.

There are two issues needed to be mentioned. Firstly, This document was far from an unconditional surrender to Nanking. It did not even recognize the existence of provincial government, instead referring to revolutionaries as the Army of the People. It instructed Yuan, Shih-k'ai to organize a provincial republican government in order to unify the north and the south. Yuan himself inserted the phrase "with full power so to do". So it was Yuan rather than the Nanking government who inherited the Will of Heaven (Chen Jerome, 1972:102). And secondly, indeed, the Ch'ing emperor was forced to give up his throne, not voluntarily, but this decree says that it is the willingness of the emperor to give his power to a more suitable person, and this is compatible to Chinese traditional political culture of "saving face".

The conditions for the abdication were three: (1) Favourable treatment was to be extended to the emperor after abdication in that he would retain his original title of emperor, would be cordially treated by the Republic as the ruler of a foreign country, would be supported in his annual expenses, amounting to four million dollars, by the Republic of China, would continue to live in the palace, be allowed to keep his guards, and be assured of protection for his ancestral temples and the property of the imperial family. (2) Favourable treatment would be extended to the members of the royal family, who could continue to enjoy their hereditary titles, the same privileges as Chinese citizens, protection of their private properties, and exemption from military service. (3) The Manchus, Mongolians, Mohammedans, and the Tibetans were all to have equal rights with the Chinese, to receive protection of their original private property, to enjoy their hereditary titles, and to receive subsidies for the poor. In addition, all of these peoples were to enjoy freedom of worship. All these articles were listed in official documents the contents of which were made known to the foreign ministers in Peking (Teng Ssu-yu and Jeremy Ingalls, 1956:267).

## V. CONCLUSION

The reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated. However, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government which were able to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic.

The second main reason should be attributed to his pragmatic attitude. He had no choice but to accept the fact that revolution had broken out and that most of the provinces had declared independence, and lots of the constitutionalists had changed their attitude toward republican, and he could not reverse the trend. Even his home county of Nant'ung and home province of Kiangsu were under the threats of troops in Nanking. He was concerned with the safety of his own county and province. He thought that the only way to stabilize the society was to accept the republic in order to avoid chaos so as to achieve his industry, education and local self-government program.

The third main reason should be attributed to his despair with the Ch'ing government. His Chuan-yuan (the first place of the traditional Chinese civil service examination) background made it impossible for him to lead an uprising, but he could accept the fact of revolution. Although he had no ambition in obtaining political power, he had to get involved in politics. Therefore he found a solution by supporting Yuan, Shih-k'ai as president of the republic in exchange for the abdication of Ch'ing court under some concession. Behind the scene during the period of North-South negotiation 1911-1912, Chang Chien had played a very important role.

The North - South Negotiation of December 1911 to February 1912 was the key to success of the 1911 Revolution. Without the success of the South North Negotiation, the Chinese Republic might have not been established so successfully, of course, Yuan, Shih-kais had taken his own best interest into consideration, and behind the scene, Chang Chien had played a decisive role in accordance with the trend, in the process of the North - South Negotiation.

## REFERENCES RÉFÉRENCES REFERENCIAS

### Chinese and Japanese References

1. Chang, Chien (1986). *Liu-his-ts'ao-t'ang Hih-chi* (Chang Chien's Diary). Taipei: Wen Hai Press.
2. Chang, Chien International Symposium Committee (2007) edited, Chang Chien yu Chin-tai Chung-kuo She-hui-Ti ssu-chieh Chang Chien Kuo-chi Hsueh-shu Yen-t'ao-hui Lun-wen-chi (Chang Chien and Chinese Society -- the Fourth International Symposium on Chang Chien), Nanking : Nanking University Press.
3. Chang, Chien Research Center (1994) edited, Chang Chien Ch'u'an-chi (The Complete Work of

Chang Chien). Kiangsu: Kiangsu Classic Books Press.

4. Chang, Hsiao-jo (1930), Nant'ung Chang Chi-chih Hsien-sheng Chuan-chi (Biography of Mr. Chang Chien of Nant'ung). Shanghai: Chung Hua Bookstore.
5. Chang, Hsiao-jo (1983) edited, Chang-chi-tzu Chiu-lu (The Nine Records of Chang Chien). Taipei: Wen Hai Press.
6. Chang, Hsu-wu (2004) et al. edited, Chang Chien. Peking: China Industry and Commerce Associated Press.
7. Chang, K'ai-yuan (1963), "Lun Chang Chien te Mao-tun Hsing-ko" "Discussion on Chang Chien's Contradictory Character", Li-shi Yen-chiu (Research on History), 3 : 87-104.
8. Chang, K'ai-yuan (1986), K'ai-to-che te tsu-chi : Chang Chien Chuan-kao (The Footprints of A Trailblazer: A Draft Biography of Chang Chien). Peking: Chung Hua Bookstore.
9. Chang, K'ai-yuan(2000), Chang Chien Chuan (The Biography of Chang Chien). Peking: China Industry and Commerce Associated Press.
10. Chang, K'ai-yuan & T'ung T'ian (2002) Chang Chien yu Chin-tai She-hui (Chang Chien and Modern Society). Peking: China Industry and Commerce Associated Press.
11. Chang, K'ai-yuan & T'ung T'ian (2011), Hsin-hai Ke-ming Shih-ch'í te Chang Chien yu Chin-tai She-hui (Chang Chien and Modern Society During the Period of 1911 Revolution). Wuch'ang: Huachung Normal University Press.
12. Chang, P'eng-yuan (1969) Li-hsien Pai yu Hsin-hai Ke-ming (The Constitutionalists and the 1911 Revolution). Taipei: Chinese Academic Writings Commission.
13. Chang, P'eng-yuan (1983) "Tsai-lun Li-hsien Pai yu Hsin-hai Ke-ming" (Again on the Constitutionalists and the 1911 Revolution), in Hsin-hai Ke-ming Yen-t'ao-hui Lun-wen-chi (A Symposium on the 1911 Revolution). Taipei: Institute of Modern Chinese History, Academia Sinica, pp.187-200.
14. Chang, Yu-fa (1988) Chung-kuo Hsien-tai-shih (The Contemporary History of China), Taipei: Tung Hua Bookstore.
15. Ch'ai, Teh-keng (1957) et al. edited, Hsin-hai Ke-ming (The 1911 Revolution), Vol. 8, Shanghai.
16. Ch'en, Yu-Ch'ing (1988), Chang Chien, Kiangsu: Kiangsu Classics Books Press.
17. Chin, Ch'eng(2003), Chang Chien Yen-chiu Lun-kao (Draft of Discussion on Chang Chien). Shang Hai: Hua-tung University of Science and Engineering Press.
18. Chou, Hsin-kuo (2004), Chung-kuo Chin-tai-hua Hsien-ch'u:Chuang-yuan Shi-yeh-chia Chang Chien (A Pioneer for China's Modernization :Chang Chien, the Top Scholar-Industrialist). Peking: Social Science Documents Press.
19. Hou, Yi-chieh (2001) "Chang Chien yu Hsin-hai Ke-ming—Chien Po Chung-chung O-ch'uan, Huan li-shih I Chen-shih" (Chang Chien and 1911 Revolution--Critics on Wrong Interpretations, Back to the Fact of History), in Chung-kuo Tsao-ch'i Hsien-tai-hua te Ch'ien-ch'u—Ti-san-chieh Chang Chien Kuo-chi Yen-t'ao-hui Lun-wen-chi (China's Early Modernization: Third International Symposium on Chang Chien), Peking: China Industry and Commerce Associated Press, pp.192-217.
20. Hsu, Lun (1962) "Chang Chien tsai Hsin-hai Ke-ming chung te Cheng-chih Huo-tung" (The Political Activities of Chang Chien during the 1911 Revolution), in Hsin-hai Ke-ming Wu-shi Chou-nien Chi-nien Lun-wen-chi (A Symposium in Commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of the 1911 Revolution), Peking: Chung Hua Bookstorepp.408-425.
21. Jerome Ch'en (1983), "Chang Chien tsai hsin-hai ch'i'en-hsi Cheng-chih Ssi-hsiang te Chuan-pien" (The Change of Chang Chien's Political Thought in the Eve of the 1911 Revolution), in Chi-nien Hsin-hai Ke-ming Ch'i-shi Chou-nien Hsueh-shu T'ao-lun-hui Lun-wen-chi (A Symposium in Commemoration of the 70th Anniversary of the 1911 Revolution), Peking: Chung Hua Bookstore, pp. 2285-2307.
22. Li, Shih-yueh (1962), Chang Chien yu Li-hsien-p'a (Chang Chien and the Constitutionalists). Peking: Chung Hua Bookstore.
23. Liu, Hou-sheng (1958) Chang Chien Chuan-chi (Biography of Chang Chien). Shanghai Lung Men joint Bookstore.
24. Liu, Hou-sheng (1963) "Chang Chien yu Hsin-hai Ke-ming" (Chang Chien and the 1911 Revolution), in Hsin-hai Ke-ming Hui-i-lu (Memoirs of the 1911 Revolution), 6:261-265. Peking: Literature and History Data Press.
25. Lu, Yao-tung (1980) "Hsin-hai Ke-ming ch'i'en-hou Chang Chien te Chuan-pien" (Chang Chien's Change before and after the 1911 Revolution), in Chin-tai Chung-kuo Ssu-hsiang Jen-wu Lun—Wan-ch'ing Ssu-hsiang ( A Discussion on Thoughts and Figures in the Modern China--Thoughts in the Late Ch'ing Period), Taipei Shih-pao Cultural Company, pp.687-700.
26. Sheng, Yun-lung (1971) "Chang Chien and Ch'en Teh-ch'uan tui Hsin-hai K'ai-kuo Ch'en-hou chih Ying-hsiang" (Chang Chien and Ch'en Teh-ch'uan's Impact on China around 1911 Revolution), Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, 2 : 271-295.
27. Sun, Shun-chih (1997), "Chang Chien te Cheng-chih Ssu-hsiang" (The Political Thought of Chang Chien) Jen-wen chi She-hui K'o-hsueh Ch'i-k'an (Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy),9,3: 115-144.



28. Sun, Shun-chih (2001), "Chang Chien tsai Hsin-hai-ko-ming hou yu Chun-hsien chuan wei Kung-ho-chih Yen-chiu" (Chang Chien's Conversion from A Constitutional Monarchist to A Republican after the 1911 Revolution), *Ch'ang Jung Hsueh-pao* (Journal of Ch'ang Jung Christian University), 5, 1: 99-115.
29. Sung, Hsi-Shang (1963), *Chang Chien te Sheng-p'ing* (The Career of Chang Chien). Taipei: Chinese Books Compilation Commission.
30. Ta, Fu-hui (1970), "Chang Chien Tasi Ch'ing-mo Li-hsien Yun-tung Chung te Ti-wei" (Chang Chien's Position in the Constitutional Movement of the Late Ching Period), *A History of Journal* 1: 27-42.
31. Ts'ui, Chih-ch'ing (2010) et al edited, *Chang Chien yu Haimen : Tsao-ch'i Hsien-tai-hua Ssu-hsiang yu Shih-Chien* (Chang Chien and Haimen : The Thoughts and Practice in the Early Period of Modernization), Nanking, Nanking University Press.
32. Wang Tun-Ch'in (2005) *Ch'u'an-t'ung yu Ch'ien-ch'an: Chang Chien Ching-chi Ssu-hsiang Yen-chiu* (Tradition and Prospect: A Research on Chang Chien's Economic Thought). Peking: People's Press.
33. Wang Wei (2004), *Mo-tai Chuang-yuan Chang Chien* (The Last Imperial Civil Service Examination Champion, Chang Chien). Wu Han: Yangtze River Literature.
34. Wu Yi-yeh (1993), "Chang Chien yu Nant'ung Chin-tai-hua Mo-shih" (Chang Chien and Nant'ung's Model of Modernization), in *Lun Chang Chien: Chang Chien Kuo-chi-hsueh-shu Yen-t'ao-hui Lun-wen-chi* (International Symposium on Chang Chien), Kiangsu, Kiangsu Classic Books Press pp.37-57.
35. Wu, Yu-chang (1961), *Hsin-hai ko-ming* (The 1911 Revolution). Peking: People's Press.
36. Yang, Li-ch'iang et al. (1987), eds. *Chang Chien Ts'un-kao* (Extant Writings of Chang Chien). Shanghai: People's Press.
37. Yen, Chih-chun (2006) *Wei-ta te Shi-pai Ying-hsiung: Chang Chien yu Nant'ung Ch'u-yu tsao-ch'i Hsien-tai-hua Yen-chiu* (A Great and Failed Hero: Chang Chien and Nant'ung's Early Modernization). Peking: Social Science Documents Press 2006.
38. Yen, Hsueh-his (1996) "Chang Chien yu Hsin-hai Ke-ming : yu Li-hsien chuan hsiang Kung-ho te Ssu-hsiang Chi-ch'u" (Chang Chien and the 1911 Revolution—A Discussion on His Conversion of Thought from Constitutional Monarchism to Republicanism), in *Chin-tai Kai-ke-chia Chang Chien: Ti-erh-chieh Chang Chien Kuo-chi Hsueh-shu Yen-t'ao-hui Lun-wen-chi* (Reformer in Modern China: Second International Symposium on Chang Chien), Nanking: Classics Press of Kiangsu, pp.233-250.
39. Yu, Ho-p'ing et al. (2004) edited, *Chang Chien: Chung-kuo tsao-ch'i Hsien-tai-hua te Ch'ian-ch'u* (Chang Chien: A Pioneer for China's Early Modernization) *Ch'ang Ch'un: Chi Lin Literature and History Press*.
40. Fujioka, Kikuo (1985), *Chio Kien to Shingai Kakumei* (Chang Chien and the 1911 Revolution). Sapporo: Hokkaido University Press.

*English References*

1. Austin Ranney (2001), *Governing: An Introduction to Political Science*, Prentice Hall, Inc., New Jersey.
2. Chang, P'eng-yuan (1968) "The Constitutionalists", in Mary C. Wright (ed.), *China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1913*, New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, pp.143-183.
3. Chuzo, Ichiko(1968) "The Chinese Gentry, An Hypothesis", in Mary C. Wright (ed.) , *China in Revolution: The First Phase 1900-1913*, New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 297-313.
4. Elisabeth Koll (2003), *From Cotton Mill to Business Empire: The Emergence of Regional Enterprises in Modern China*, Harvard University Asia Centre, Cambridge, MA.
5. Jerome Ch'en (1972), *Yuan Shih-k'ai*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
6. Louis Sigel (1979), "Revolution by Diplomacy: A Re-examination of the Shanghai Peace Conference of 1911," *Australian National University, Papers on Far Eastern History*, 19:111-143.
7. Marie-Claire Bergere (1968), "The Role of the Bourgeoisie", in Mary C. Wright ed., *China in Revolution: The first Phase 1900-1913*, New Heaven and London: Yale University Press, pp. 229-295.
8. Michael G. Roskin et.al (2008), *Political Science*, an Introduction, Pearson Education, Inc., New Jersey.
9. Peter Zarrow (2006), "Qin Shao, Culturing Modernity: The Nantong Model, 1890-1930", *Bulletin of the Institute of Modern History, Academia Sinica*, 51:187-196.
10. Shao, Qin (2004), *Culturing Modernity: The Nantong Model, 1890-1930*, Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
11. Samuel C. Chu (1965), *Reformer in Modern China: Chang Chien, 1853-1926*. New York and London: Columbia University Press.
12. Sun, Shun-chih (1991), *Chang Chien (1853-1926): Political Thought and Action*, Sydney: Ph.D. Thesis, University of New South Wales.
13. Sun,Shun-chih (1995), "The Political Thought of Chang Chien 1853-1926", *The Journal of Ming Chuan College*, 7:85-148.
14. Sun, Shun-chih (2009), "Chang Chien's Ideas and Activities on Constitutional Monarchy", *Asian Social Science*, 5-3:57-72.

15. Sun, Shun-chih (2010), "Chang Chien's Role in the North-South Negotiation 1911-1912", *Ch'ang Jung Hsueh-pao*, (Journal of Chang Jung Christian University), 14-1: 67-88.
16. Teng, Ssu-yu and Jeremy Ingalls (1956), translated and edited, *The Political History of China 1840-1928*, Toronto, D.Van Nostrand Company.
17. Wong, King-kong (1957), *Chang Chien: A Case Study of Attempts at China's Modernization by the Traditional Gentry*. Unpublished Master Thesis, University of Washington.





This page is intentionally left blank