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Struggle for Hegemony and the Economics of Nuclear Proliferation in a Non -Proliferation Regime: The Case of Iran Nuclear Programme

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1. INTRODUCTION

The origin of Nuclear Non-Proliferation [NPT] is traceable to August 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear bombs experiences in Japan, which the United States [US] detonated over those cities during World War II. The bomb's manifest capability to engulfed its targets with unprecedented destructive power conferred on its possessor with military deterrent capability, claim to superiority and enhanced influence in the international system (see Mandelbaum, 1981). Consequently, the US, in the Baruch Plan, proposed the internationalization of the control of nuclear fuel cycle used in manufacturing the bomb in 1946. It is my contention that this proposal was a US strategy to consolidate its military dominance and also to save mankind from this scourge death. Consequently, due to international struggle for hegemony and the economic benefits that are associated with nuclear technology, the then Soviet Union vetoed it out and assiduously pursued its own operational nuclear weaponry that was successfully tested in 1949 [Holloway, 1994]. This was followed by United Kingdom (1952), France (1960) and China (1964).

This development led to the modernization of nuclear warheads and invention of more sophisticated weaponry by the two super powers that represent the rivalry communist and capitalist blocks. However, the superpowers developed common interest preserving only the existing five nuclear states and preventing new ones from emerging [Lavoy, 2004]. Consequently, a joint US-Soviet draft Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] was submitted to the United Nations in 1967, which was adopted as a legal and normative foundation for existing initiatives to promote non-proliferation with minor modifications. Since 1968 when the treaty was opened for signature, over 190 countries gave their assent to NPT while the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) emerged as institutional monitoring agent to safeguard the treaty [Barnaby, 1969:34-36].

Nevertheless, Israel, North Korea, India and Pakistan defied the UNSC and the IAEA, and developed nuclear bombs while countries like South Africa, Japan, Syria, etc have potential nuclear technology. Iran is seriously pursuing its 'civil' nuclear programme. Multiple international pressures and sanctions have been mounted on Iran to abort its nuclear programme but in vain. The US and Israel have equally threatened to carry out pre-emptive strikes on Iranian nuclear sites but to no avail thereby making its nuclear programme a centre of cynosure in Middle East security [Jafarzadeh, 2007]. Iran argues that it has a right under international law to develop civil nuclear programme for peaceful generation of electricity. On the contrary, the United States, Israel, and the European countries view Iran's nuclear capabilities as a threat to world peace and strongly oppose Iran's nuclear-development program [Bahgat, 2006]. They have applied many options such as regime change, isolation, and imposition of international sanctions to deter Iran but to no avail.

It is noted that all the international outcry and sanctions against Iran have been dominated by Western countries' voices and actions and complemented by some Middle East western allies that fear Iran's regional monopoly and dominance. As sanctions and regime change have successfully played an increasing role as foreign policy instruments of the United States and the Western Capitalist block against perceived antagonistic third world regimes, why has Iran successfully defied these instruments? Secondly, did Iran really breach the

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Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT]? This paper seeks to provide answers to these and other ancillary questions. By exploring answers to these questions, this paper provides the framework for UNSC reconsideration of its policy and sanctions against Iran for its nuclear programme, and its approach to NPT. It provides viable alternatives for solving the problems hindering the implementation of NPT with a view to safeguard international security and peace.

Consequently, the paper covers the evolution and dynamics of international Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], the evolution and dynamics of Iran's nuclear programme, international response to the programme and Iranian defence. Specifically, the periodic scope of this research is 1975 – 2013. This research investigates the particular principles of NPT violated by Iran, the connection between Middle East politics and its nuclear programme, Super Powers involvement in the programmes, their reasons thereof and the implications of their actions for the current recorded successes by Iran.

II. MATERIALS AND METHODS

Considering the wealth of literature available as empirical studies, debates and criticism on NPT, Iran nuclear programme, US policy to the Arab World and Middle East, international security and struggle for hegemony, this paper adopts the secondary method of data collection. The method uses archival documents wherein published materials such as books, journals, conference/seminal and workshop papers, magazines and newspapers, government and NGO publications are preserved as sources of data. In addition, such works that are electronically available in the internet are used. The method here is to digest their contents and sift their findings as data.

Consequently, content analysis is adopted as method of analysis wherein sifted data are checked for consistency of the opinions of either the authors and/or the actors; and evaluated with other existing findings on the subject. These data shall equally be examined in the light of other thesis and findings on the subject matter. Through these methods, the paper forms opinions on the data generated during the research and their consequences for resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis and the problems confronting the implementation of NPT.

However, the conclusions reached paper are limited to findings, views and reports that are available in published works used because there is no other source of finding out what happened between 1975 and 2013 between many countries involved in NPT and Iran nuclear programme. It is also limited to the issues raised in the research questions contained in this research. Finally, the discussions and inferences reached in the paper is limited to the researcher's ability to secure and

analyse information, particularly on such public issues like nuclear politics, non-proliferation, Western-Arab states relations and Middle East politics.

III. GAP IN THE LITERATURE

a) Nuclear Proliferation

Discussing proliferation from the point of view of cross boarder transfer of nuclear materials and weapons, available literature reveals five categories of reasons why countries pursue nuclear programme as Security, Prestige, Domestic Politics, Technology, and Economics (Cirincione, 2007:49). See for instance security threats such as the presence (or absence) of a security threat and a security guarantee from a powerful alliance partner (Ruble, 2009; Kapur, 2001; Potter, 1982; Sagan, 2000); levels of economic development (Singh and Way, 2004, Jo and Gartzke, 2007); availability of sensitive nuclear assistance (Kroenig, 2009b; Fuhrmann, 2010); economic development strategies (Solingen, 2007); prevalence of proliferation regime (Montgomery 2005); national pride and "myth makers" (Lavoy, 1993); acquisition of latent capacity capability (Hymans, 2012; Meyer, 1984; Schroeder, 1984); Democracy/liberalizing governments, and status motivations where democratic governments may pursue nuclear programme in other to boost their popularity and retain power like in India and Pakistan (Chafetz, 1993; Perkovich. 1999; Mansfield and Snyder, 1995; Snyder, 2000); and the psychology of individual leaders (Hymans, 2006) among others.

Many other scholars identified factors that discourage countries from pursuing nuclear programme. These include an alliance with a powerful ally (Davis, 1993; Thayer, 1995); bipolarity where states cue up behind two well-structured alliance systems anchored by the two dominant powers (Bennett and Stam, 2000; Gibler and Sarkees, 2002; Frankel, 1993; Betts, 1993); economic integration and interdependence (Paul, 2000). Contrary to the argument of some scholars that alliance deters nuclear proliferation, some other scholars argue that international alliance is needed to solve the problems of scarcity of all sorts of resources [money, political authority and consensus, laboratory quality reagents, access to imports, and so on] needed to establish a successful nuclear programme [Bailey,1991:50-81]. These allies not only add specific capabilities needed to manufacture end-products such as nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles; they also sustain and support the growth of the whole system. By so doing, the technology spreads beyond the acquiring state [Hughes, 1987; Bijker and Law, 1992]. On their part, Lavoy (1993), Elworthy (1986), and Sagan (2000) argue that the degree of autonomy exercised by domestic elite in taking policy decisions is a strong force that determine whether a state pursue nuclear arms or not.

Nevertheless, the literature identified six methods through which the international community has tried to prohibit the spread of nuclear technology. These are; deterrent strategies, which involve the use of sanctions, threats, coercion, etc (Hawkins, 1984; Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom, 1996; Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990); remunerative strategies, which include rewarding actors that are engaged in nuclear proliferation for withdrawing from the act or providing incentives aimed at behavioural changes towards abandoning it (Stranlund, 1995; Ayres and Braithwaite, 1992); preventive strategies, which include the use of "premonitory surveillance" to detect nuclear acts before they occur; generative strategies, which seeks to generate or create new opportunities from the choices available to potential proliferants to avoid proliferation (Connolly and List, 1996); cognitive strategies, which seek to provide potential proliferants with new, more complete, and more accurate information that can solve the proliferant's concerns, and enable a decision on causal relationship between behaviours and consequences; the costs and benefits of different behaviours; and the likely behaviour of other actors [Martin, 1992]; and the normative strategies that seek to change proliferant's behaviour by altering its deep-seated values (Wapner, 1995).

b) UNSC and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

The UNSC on an effort to forestall the spread of nuclear technology and materials drew the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT], which is the most widely signed international treaties in history. The treaty recorded remarkable success. For instance, in 1993 South African deactivated its nuclear program and the six warheads it had produced [GlobalSecurity.org, 2005] due to international pressure and U.N.'s economic sanctions. Thus, sanction was a powerful international instrument that forced South Africa to disarm, while the IAEA was responsible for both the inspections and reporting the openness that the South Africans displayed in dismantling their nuclear program.

Similarly, Libya voluntarily aborted its pursuit of the production of nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as procuring the ballistic launchers from North Korea to deliver them (Salama, 2004). Some scholars argue that Iraq's dependent on external sources for nuclear experts and nuclear materials, international sanctions and aggressions such as the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003; the October 2003 seizure of a German cargo ship loaded with uranium enrichment components by the U.S. Navy in the Mediterranean Sea were responsible for Iraq's unilateral decision to abandon the nuclear programme (Leverett, 2004).

Nevertheless, the UNSC greatest failure has been its inability to prevent North Korea's efforts to produce nuclear arms. Currently, North Korea is

modifying its nuclear bombs with more sophistication and long range reach under the watching eyes of UNSC and its NPT regime [Sanger, 2009]. This is because World Powers i.e. the United States, France, Germany, Britain, Russia, and China who are forced to play the peacekeepers have different interests with regards to the nuclear stand-off (Norris and Kristensen, 2005; Fackler, 2009; International Crisis Group, 2009). On their part, North Korea has repeatedly claimed that it was developing nuclear arms for self defence and to defy U.S. sanctions and nuclear threats, and will also sell its nuclear weapons or nuclear material in exchange for much needed hard currency.

Similar experiences that explicitly revealed the role of hegemonic interest of the Super Powers in the failure of NPT was the nuclearization of India and Pakistan since the late 1974. Neither of the country signed the NPT, since India claimed it was discriminatory and Pakistan would not sign if India did not sign it first (Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007). UNSC sanctions against both sides were light and were even lifted shortly after. India tested its first nuclear explosive in 1974, and detonated five series of nuclear test between May 11th 1998 to May 13th of the same year, while Pakistan began to develop its own nuclear program since the 1970s, had its first nuclear test in 1983 with up to six follow-up tests between May 28th and 30th, 1988 [Lodi, 1999]. Each has continued to modify and increase their nuclear stockpile [Norris and Kristensen, 2009: 82-84]. The US is keeping mute because it's strategic alliance or partnership with Pakistan.

Iran's nuclear programme has a different experience and response from the UNSC. Chubin [1995] correctly argued that Iran nuclear programme is driven by its view of the world, its concept of its role in international politics, Iranian values and interest, and the lessons derived from recent history. Such include Iran's justified fear of specific security threats in the region and from the Western powers (Cordesman and Hashim, 1997). Iran's security threats can be found in its shared 1,448-kilometer border with the Shatt al-Arab, turbulent Iraq, US dominated and belligerent Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, and especially Israel's possession of nuclear weapons (Takeyh, 2006; Ehteshami, 2009). During the Iran's eight-year war with Iraq, Iraq used chemical weapon against Iranian military and civilians without UN condemnations (Cordesman, 1999:269; Chubin and Green, 1998; Chubin, 1994:70). It is therefore erroneous for scholars like Chubin (1995) to have argued that the nuclear programme is motivated more by political reasons.

Yaphe and Schake [2000]; Amirahmadi [ND:12]; Eisenstadt [1999]; and Cohen [2001] among others, correctly noted that the drivers of Iran's nuclear weapons programme self-reliance, quest for greater voice in the international scene; complementing the

deficiencies in conventional weapons; and to strengthen deterrence and or security threats.

Although scholars like Eisenstadt (2009), DeSutter (1997) have suggested ways of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, others are convinced that UNSC and the US cannot stop Iran's nuclear weapon programme (Yaphe and Schake, 2000; Chubin and Green, 1998). Thus, they suggested ways of dealing with a nuclearized Iran. UNSC adopted the options of sanctions, threats and isolation in pursuit of de-nuclearizing Iran. However, the literature reveals contradictions and differences with regards to international response to Iran's nuclear programme. This is because of structure of international politics, emerging powers and prevalent medium power politics in the international arena (Shen, 2006; Kemp, 2006). Consequently, Iran adopted multi-faceted approach to its nuclear crisis that has successfully countered international pressure and actions. Leurs [2008:6] captured it in the following manner;

The third challenge is that Iran has developed several tactics intended to undercut the current US strategy. It has improved relations with Russia, attempted to use its oil exports to win support from an energy-hungry China, and launched a diplomatic offensive aimed at its Persian Gulf neighbours. Iran has also sought to counter US pressure in the UN Security Council by agreeing to negotiate with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

IV. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

The rational action model/theory is adopted as framework of analysing data generated for this research. The framework enhances an understanding and modelling of rational state or individual socio-economic and political behaviour, domestically and internationally [Blume, 2008]. Rationality as used here simply refers to an individual acts, which appears to be balancing costs against benefits to arrive at action that maximizes personal advantage [Friedman, 1953:22]. In rational choice theory, these costs are only external to the state or individual rather than being internal.

The pioneering protagonists of this theory include a sociologist, George Homans [1961], Blau [1964], Coleman [1973, 1990], and Cook [1977]. Added to these scholars are Elster [1986], Roemer [1988], and Wright [1989], who did not only integrate the theory into the study and explanation of political choices and actions but also argued that it is the basis of a Marxist theory of class and exploitation.

The central principle of this theory is the appreciation of methodological individualism, which believes that complex social phenomena can be explained in terms of the elementary individual actions of which they are composed. This holds that:

The elementary unit of social life is the individual human action. To explain social institutions and social change is to show how they arise as the result of the action and interaction of individuals (Elster 1989: 13).

Individuals are seen as motivated by the wants or goals that express their 'preferences'. They act within specific, given constraints and on the basis of the information that they have about the conditions under which they are acting. At its simplest, the relationship between preferences and constraints can be seen in the purely technical terms of the relationship of a means to an end. As it is not possible for individuals to achieve all of the various things that they want, they must also make choices in relation to both their goals and the means for attaining these goals.

The theory holds that individuals must anticipate the outcomes of alternative courses of action and calculate that which will be best for them. Thus, such actor rationally chooses the alternative that is likely to give them the greatest satisfaction [Heath, 1976: 3; Carling, 1992: 27; Coleman, 1973]. Therefore the basic assumption of the theory is that the patterns of behaviour in the societies [in this case, international arena] reflect the choices made by individuals or states as they try to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs. It entails choosing a "rational" action given one's preferences, the actions one could take, and expectations about the outcomes of those actions.

Furthering analysis on the assumptions or basic principles of the theory, its protagonists raised five subsidiary assumptions about individuals' preferences for actions and these are: a]. All alternative actions are ranked in an order of preference; b]. All the alternative actions must be compared with each other highlighting their requirements, costs and expected results; c]. The independence of irrelevant alternatives. For instance, if A is preferred to B out of the choice set {A,B}, then introducing a third alternative X, thus expanding the choice set to {A,B,X}, must not make B preferable to A. d]. An assumption that an actor has the full knowledge of the consequences of any choice being made; and e]. An individual has the cognitive ability and time to weigh every choice against every other choice.

Although, this theory like most theories in social sciences, humanities and arts suffers some weaknesses, we consider it appropriate for the study. We acknowledge such weaknesses or limitations of the theory like: the theory ignored the role of uncertainty, assumes complete knowledge of contending actors, their capacities and possible actions, which is not true. Actor's knowledge of environmental implications and different limitations affecting its rational capacities (time, assumptions, information, and resources) are limited.

The theory's empirical output has also been limited and that is why countries like Iraq were destroyed for possessing weapons of mass destruction and

nuclear technology when none existed. The US, IAEA, and UNSC were unable to accurately predict and stop North Korea, India, Pakistan and Israel's nuclear weapon programme earlier.

However, the relevance of the theory for this research lies in its ability to highlight the place of interests or factors such as security, power, nationalism and politics, and survival etc as drivers of states choice in their pursuit of nuclear programme. Equally, it enables this research to isolate each actor both local and international that is involved in Iran's nuclear stand-off in order to examine its interests and choices in the pursuit of any policy to that effect. Through its exhibition of rational balancing of costs and effects before choices are made, the theory enables the research to examine the rationale and strength of Iran's successful defiance of international pressure and sanctions to date.

Finally, considering the five basic assumptions of the theory, it enables the study to evaluate UNSC actions, resolutions and in-actions with a view to understand if the international community has a detailed knowledge why its sanctions have failed to deter Iran's pursuit of nuclear programme, and the possible consequences of pre-emptive strike either by UNSC, the US and Israel separately and collectively. There-from, viable recommendations shall be offered on how best to implement the NPT with success. Thus, the theory is applicable for this study.

V. DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

a) *Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [Npt]*

United States test first test of nuclear device at Alamogordo, New Mexico in 1945, its subsequent use over Japan during World War 11 and the manifest destructive impact of the device laid the background for Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The US sponsored the Baruch Plan in 1946 that sought to outlaw nuclear weapons and internationalize the administration and use of nuclear energy. This plan was rebuffed by Soviet Union, who later tested its own nuclear device in 1949 followed by China, France, and the United Kingdom in the 1950s.

In 1961, Ireland sponsored a Resolution that was approved by the United Nations General Assembly that made it mandatory for all countries to enter into an agreement that would ban the further acquisition and transfer of nuclear weapons. In 1965, the United Nations disarmament conference began Geneva and considered a draft nuclear non-proliferation treaty. The conference completed its negotiations in 1968, and on July 1, 1968, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature while its implementation began on March 5, 1970. By the early 1980s, 190 Parties including the five permanent members of the UNSC have signed the Treaty. Only three states, namely; India, Israel, and Pakistan refused

to sign the Treaty, while only one state (North Korea) has announced its withdrawal from the NPT.

NPT fundamentally demands that nuclear states should not transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any recipient or in any way assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weapon state in the manufacture or acquisition of a nuclear weapon. Secondly, non-nuclear-weapon states are prohibited from acquiring or exercising control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or receive assistance in the manufacture of such devices. Thirdly, all Parties to the Treaty have a right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to benefit from international cooperation in this area; in conformity with their non-proliferation obligations (see Article IV). Finally, the Treaty provided that all Parties should undertake to pursue good-faith negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race, to nuclear disarmament, and to general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. However, Article X of the NPT sets forth the right of Parties to withdraw from the Treaty.

These principles are inherently weak, defeatist, and provoke sentimental schisms between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. For instance, the treaty fails to define what a nuclear weapon actually is and the main object of prohibition under the Treaty thereby leading to manifold problems for compliance determination. Secondly, the non-nuclear states conceive the Treaty as a political and legal instrument that symbolizes attempts at perpetual international hegemony by the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council that need to be resisted (see Parsi, 2012:177). Thirdly, the treaty has greatly undermined itself as it seeks to limit the spread of nuclear weapons while facilitating the spread of nuclear power technology, including those dual-use capabilities that possess inherent relevance to the acquisition of nuclear weapons (see Ford, 2010:241–242). The Super Powers ate not committed to the Treaty. For instance, during the ratification process of NPT, Goldblat [2003] noted that the US Congress declared that,

...the US Government made a declaration of interpretation, according to which the Treaty would cease to be valid in time of war. In other words, from the start of hostilities, transfer of nuclear weapons or of control over them, as well as their acquisition by non-nuclear weapon states by other means, would cease to be prohibited.

These generated controversy that made many states to embark on nuclear acquisition programme even before the ratification of NPT. To worsen the situation, the US refused to ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996. Secondly, Russia and the United States also unambiguously declared their intention to retain nuclear weapons for the indefinite future. Moreover, with the exception of the

United Kingdom and more recently France, the all the Nuclear Weapon States have significant modernization programs underway for their nuclear forces; and the US in particular has been attempting to update its nuclear weapon production complex with new nuclear weapon designs [Walsh, 2006]. Scholars like Dokos [2001] have even argued that US and Russia substantial and bilateral reduction of nuclear arsenals did not occur as a result of NPT commitments, but because of changed geopolitical circumstances and the practical need to retire aging parts of the nuclear arsenals.

Finally, the Treaty generated legitimate grievance of those within the treaty as the nuclear states are not disarming [ElBaradei, 2011:236]. This led to the current trends in massive nuclear technology and material proliferation in spite of the various frameworks established to deter their proliferations. Such frameworks include the establishment of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) safeguards system, a network of bilateral and multilateral nuclear cooperation agreements, the system of multilateral export controls, and a series of UN Security Council Resolutions, including Resolution 1887 of 2009. States equally entered into cooperation and alliance system to safeguard the expansion of peaceful civilian nuclear energy.

b) Iran Nuclear Programme In NPT Regime

Scholars have argued differently, as highlighted above, on the actual factor[s] that led to Iran's pursuit of nuclear programme. This section is do not intend to join issues with these scholars but focuses primarily on the sources and development of Iran's nuclear programme, international actions against it, the objectivity or rationality of such actions, and the factors that orchestrated international failure to stop the programme.

US pursuit of hegemonic control of the Persian Gulf led to its Israel, Britain and other European states allied sponsorship of "Operation Ajax" that restored the Shah to power in Iran prior to the 1979 revolution. Thereafter, the US initiated a new era of cooperation with Iran, which involved technical and economic development, military cooperation and support, as well as the development of nuclear technologies for peaceful energy use, which actually began in 1957. The US wanted Iran to become the "Defender of the Gulf" in order to free up American power elsewhere [Cordesman, 1999: 358–365]. The Cooperation, which was initiated by President Eisenhower of America provided for the installation of U.S. equipment in Iran, the supply of technical training to Iranian scientists, and provisions for a supply of fuel to power a series of nuclear reactors. The deal offered Iran the opportunity to acquire a reprocessing facility, thereby providing the Shah with the ability to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle and a means to produce fuel for nuclear weapons. This encouraged Iran to sign the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty in 1968.

Iran acquired its first nuclear reactor in 1967 from the United States, which was later transformed to the Amirabad Nuclear Research Centre in Tehran (now called the Amirabad Technical College) (Jablonski, 1984:56). In 1975, further acquisition of an additional eight nuclear reactors was made. European countries such as Germany and France joined the US and received billions of dollars from Iran for the sale of reactors, fuel, and the training of scientists. In addition, Iran purchased a 10 percent share of a uranium enrichment plant that was built in France as part of a joint French, Belgian, Spanish and Italian consortium [Cordesman, 2000:5].

Politically, this served the interests of the Shah because it enabled the regime to suppress and dominate the citizenry - a scenario that led to the 1979 revolution. Nationalism and a change in leadership edged the US out in the struggle with other world powers for the control of Iran's influence, politics, technology and economy in their pursuit of regional control of Middle East. Consequently, countries like Germany and the United States, whom had once promised to sell more nuclear reactors and establish power plants in Iran, cancelled their business contracts after the downfall of the Shah. On its own part, the new Iranian regime arrested many Iranian nuclear scientists; others were forced into exiled, or killed, leaving the program in shambles. However, the Iran-Iraq War prompted Ayatollah Khomeini to re-activate Iran's nuclear programme.

On its part the US exhibited great effort to slow-down and or completely prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to Iran, which it started (Cordesman, 1999:239). For instance, the US frustrated Iran's efforts in 1991 to purchase a 10-megawatt research reactor from India, to purchase enriched fissile material from Kazakhstan in 1992, to purchase two 300-megawatt reactors from China between 1992 and 1994; to purchase a \$45 million nuclear power plant from Ukraine in 1998, and to purchase a uranium hexafluoride conversion plant from China (Cordesman, 1999:241-243; Eisenstadt, 1999:141). The US government has also continued to block Iran's requests for loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank [Yaphe and Schake, 2000:108; Sick, 1998:6]; it has also opposed consistently Iranian candidates for posts in international organizations (Chubin and Green, 1998:160). In addition, America incessantly has mobilized international organizations against Iran in different occasions. In this instance, several international sanctions like that of UNSC, NATO, and EU have being imposed on Iran, yet the results of these actions fall short of expectations. The UNSC passed three sanction resolutions on March 2006 that are pro-US interest in the crisis and three others to re-enforce them, yet Iran developed its uranium enrichment

capability by increasing its centrifuges from 164 to 3000. Walsh [2008:6] tacitly summarised it thus;

...in the race between centrifuges and sanctions the centrifuges are winning. The historical record here is sufficiently clear that scenario American and European officials have conceded the point.

Iran remains undaunted and has continued its nuclear programme with success.

Nevertheless, Iran intensified its diplomatic efforts at reaching bilateral agreements leading to external assistance in acquiring nuclear equipments and technical skill. This influenced Iran under President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani to approach China, France, Germany, Pakistan, Argentina, Spain, Czechoslovakia, and Russia etc for assistance [Giles, 2000:80] in the quest to nuclearize Iran. By 1984, Ayatollah Khomeini obtained assistance from France and Pakistan to establish a new nuclear research centre in Esfahan (Cordesman, 2000:7-8). The same year, Iranian requested that Germans should return to complete the Bushehr nuclear power plants that they had started building under the Shah but the Germans refused (Eisenstadt, 1999:141). Similarly, in 1987, Argentina agreed to train Iranian scientists in their Jose Balaseiro Nuclear Institute as well as sell Iran \$5.5 million worth of uranium (Cordesman, 2000: 7- 8) but later declined due to American pressure [Eisenstadt, 1999:141].

In 1995 Russia signed an \$800 million agreement with Iran to complete one of the two reactors in Bushehr and to provide technical training and low-enriched uranium fuel for a period of 10 years beginning in 2001 (Yaphe and Schake, 2000:40). In 1997, Iran equally "...obtained new nuclear technology from Russia" [Cordesman, 1999:241-242] and purchased four tactical nuclear weapons from Russian smugglers for \$25 million while Argentinean scientists helped to activate these weapons [Cordesman, 1999:244].

It is pertinent and objectively arguable at this point that the international outcry, pressure and sanctions against Iran are misplaced and unjustifiable. The nuclear states that are under international prohibition by the NPT from transfer nuclear technology were the both the initiators, developers and sponsors of Iran's nuclear programme – its purpose not considered. They were blinded by the quest to secure and or maintain hegemonic control of the Persian Gulf on one hand, and improve/secure increased income from foreign trade. That is, the same powers that prohibited nuclear proliferation defied it because of their pursuit of hegemony and national income. In addition, these powers have equally defied the principle of nuclear disarmament, which is one of the major provisions of NPT; rather they have pursued the modernization of their nuclear weaponry. Why has the nuclear watch dog displayed serious indifference to these violations under the NPT regime and why must it be Iran that will pay for

the crimes committed by all?

In all, Iran has insisted that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes and represents its exercise of nuclear rights conferred by Article IV of the NPT. The Iranian leadership has long claimed that since they are signatory in good standing with the NPT, the sole reason for their pursuit of nuclear power is related to civil purposes [Eisenstadt, 1999:130]. The US and its European and Middle East allies disagree with this position, proceeded to sponsor and or impose international sanctions against Iran. In addition to IAEA argument that Iran has not provided a satisfactory explanation of either its past nuclear behaviour or the inconclusive but worrying pattern of its evidences (Hersh, 2001; Miller, 2007:551 – 559), the U.S. Energy Information Administration reports that Iran has over 93 billion barrels of proven oil reserves in addition to the suspected 191 billion barrels of proven and possible oil reserves located in the Caspian Sea, and an estimated 812 trillion cubic feet in proven natural gas reserves [Zunes, 1999:1; Cordesman, 1998: 4, 22]. These are evidences adduced by the US and IAEA to prove that Iran is pursuing nuclear weapon production.

The porous nature of these evidences is buttressed by the fact that Iran tactically and successfully classification of its nuclear programme and made it impossible for antagonists of its nuclear programme to tender objective evidence with which full international mobilization could be possible (Leurs, 2008; Ehteshami, 2009:32). When did the stockpiling of oil reserve become an international/objective yardstick for determining a country that is pursuing the production of nuclear weapon? It must be admitted that this paper is not concurring to Iranian or US position but fundamentally argues that the US and other nuclear states armed Iran but became enemies when their interests in Iran was defeated. They have equally circumvented NPT principles, and by virtue of their international behaviour particularly against emerging powers, pose nuclear threats to countries like Iran. This provoked the need for mutual nuclear deterrence and the contemporary pervasive proliferation of nuclear technology and materials.

Mutual alliance system evolved among emerging powers suffering from US antagonism and internationally led castigation and sanctions that are determined to assert their independence, sovereignty or autonomy in the pursuit of their national interests. The strategic economic and security potentials of such countries safeguarded their cooperation with other world powers likes Russia, China, and North Korea, who are US rivalries in the international scene. For instance, the stability of the Middle East as a major source of energy, which is needed for industrial development by some world power like China, and as a potential market for nuclear technology proliferation-prone zone have tend to



neutralize the effects of international sanctions against Iran. The bilateral energy ties between Iran and many regional or international powers have played serious neutralizing role against international sanctions and isolation. Similarly, Iran's global trade ties with many countries particularly in the energy industry made it difficult for the United States and its partners to isolate Iran from the international community (Government Accountability Office (GAO) 2008: 35). Oil and gas deposits are too significant in the world's international energy supplies and therefore cannot be sidelined without debilitating consequences for the economies of the leading industrial nations [Zunes, 1999:1].

Equally, Iran's funding of development and liberation struggles in many Less Developing Countries particularly in the Arab World renders international isolation of Iran weak and ineffective. For instance, Iran's Arab allies particularly the Hezbollah and Hamas appreciate the fact that the prospect of US-Iranian accommodation could end their primary source of funding and jeopardise their struggle or nationalism [Sadjadpour, 2009]. Therefore, such countries defy international sanctions against Iran.

In addition, Iran is physically sandwiched between both the oil rich areas of the Caspian Sea and Persian Gulf, while at the same time being located at the international crossroads of Central Asia and the Middle East. Iran's geographic location is therefore too strategic to be ignored by any country that participates in international production and distribution of goods and services. European Union, for instance, finds it difficult breaking off diplomatic ties with Iran for a long time because of this, while Belgium is the only Western European state that has severed diplomatic relations with Iran [Yaphe and Schake, 2000:109].

Russia and China view Iran's nuclear question as an opportunity to contest US hegemonic control of the Middle East - a geopolitical region with vast natural and economic resources. That is why Russia remains the main Iran's military supplier and its main nuclear partner followed by China [Ehteshami, 2009: 32]. Since the 1980s China has been responsible for helping the Islamic Republic build fuel fabrication, uranium purification, and zirconium tube production facilities, and even provided it with the equipment used in electromagnetic isotope separation enrichments of weapons grade uranium [Cordesman and Al-Rodhan, 2006]. For these reasons, the two countries have continued to oppose any form of military action by the United Nations against Iran. Iran's ability to continue with its nuclear programme can therefore be seen as a by-product of an interactive game between the world powers struggling for hegemony (Kemp, 2006: 2), the economics of the sale of nuclear material and technology, and the place of energy in modern development. The failed experience of US-led sanctions can therefore be interpreted on the basis of the above

factors and the strategy deployed by Iran in the face of world powers balancing strategy in the Middle East.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty [NPT] regime emerged out of the need to avert a similar occurrence of the nuclear holocaust in Japan during World War 11. The major problems hindering this objective were the inevitable need and use of nuclear energy for power and industrial development, and the dual applicability of these materials for peaceful and military purposes. This led to the establishment of international management system in the movement and use of nuclear materials needed for peaceful purposes. In addition, acquiring nuclear capability/weapon raised military deterrence to the highest level thereby making it a national security priority for states seeking international recognition and role.

The paper observes that the skewed provisions over possession and transfer of nuclear technology and materials in the principles of the NPT provoked agitations among non-nuclear states that it is intended by nuclear states to dominate them. Furthering this, the nuclear states instead of disarming themselves are modernizing their nuclear weapons while they impose restrictions on others from acquiring same. As rewards, they have equally being transferring nuclear technology and materials to their regional allies in the Less developing Countries as a strategy of safeguarding their hegemony. Through this programme, the US initiated and began the process of nuclearizing Iran when they restored the Shah to power. Driving by nationalism against US overwhelming dominance and exploitation of Iranian economy and politics, Iran went through revolution in 1979 that edged the US out of Iran.

Subsequently, the US and its allies turned against Iran and its nuclear programme. However, Supper Power rivalry, the need for pivotal need for Iranian energy, interstate trading and consequent alliances among anti-US forces orchestrated a strong cooperation between Iran and other major world powers. These powers have continued to sponsor and support/assistance Iran's nuclear programmes to the detriment of international sanctions and isolations. These powers have equally blocked previous attempts to secure international military strikes against Iran nuclear sites and territory. Therefore, the struggle for hegemony among world powers, the irreplaceable need for oil and gas as sources of inevitable energy in the current development process, and the needed increase in national economy derived from the sale of nuclear materials have propagated nuclear proliferation and sustained Iran's nuclear technology in the midst of NPT regime.

This paper therefore recommends that:

1. All nuclear power states must unilaterally dismantle their nuclear weapons plant and disable their

nuclear weapons under the unrestricted supervision of all the members of UNSC. Successful implementation of NPT statutes depends on this otherwise emerging powers who feel threatened or who need nuclear deterrence for their emergence have no other option than to pursue it.

2. The nuclear facilities and weapons of Israel, Pakistan, and India must be disabled under the unrestricted supervision of the five permanent members of UNSC to enable Iran abort its nuclear programme. This is because the security threat posed by these nuclear states is one of the major factors that led to Iranian programme.
3. Justice should be applied in UNSC actions against violators of NPT statute. If NPT prohibited the procurement, purchase and sale or transfer of nuclear facilities or materials being used for manufacturing nuclear weapons, all nations that were involved in the development of Iran's nuclear programme such as the US, China, Russia, France, Belgium, Spain, Germany, the US and Italy should be sanctioned. This should be a confidence building mechanism that will discourage others from participating in such international business and defiance of international obligations. Iran should not be a 'scape goat'.
4. The Principles of NPT should be reviewed and fundamentally restructured.

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