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Great Powers' Conflict Management and Resolution in South-East Asia: An Evaluation of North-Korean Denuclearization Process and Six Party Talks

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Keywords : conflict; management; nuclear; south-east asia; great powers; six party talks.

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Great Powers' Conflict Management and Resolution in South-East Asia: An Evaluation of North-Korean Denuclearization Process and Six Party Talks

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Abstract - With the lessons of 1950's war on the Korean peninsula, drawing from the initial soviet reluctance to back North Korea against the US forces and the subsequent lessons of global realism and constructivism learnt by the north in US perpetual support of the south, the latter resorted to building a nuclear armament for its continuity and survival. This paper is an evaluation of the efficacy of six party talks as adopted in conflict management and resolution in south-east Asia. The paper adopts a descriptive secondary research from existing documented literatures for conclusive analogy. The paper discovers that, the six party talks is a diplomatic way of engaging the provoked north to halt its nuclear ambition, for failure to denuclearize north Korea may serve as a great threat to US ally (south Korea) in the region. The paper concludes that, there is western nuclear strategy to dominate the global military industrial complex and warfare around the world-hence the perpetual subjugation of the global armament and the strategic deterrence of non proliferation. The paper recommends mutual understanding, respect to the sovereignty of states and balance of power among other things.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The six party talks is a movement that was set up to deal with the nuclear issue of North Korea through a peaceful negotiation, paternalism and dialogue. The six parties include states like the United States, Russia, Japan, china, South Korea and North Korea itself. Kissinger (1968) for example has defined negotiation as, "a process of combining conflicting positions into a common position, under a decision rule of unanimity". Elsewhere, theorists have portrayed negotiations as events of diplomatic artistry, mechanical reflections of relative power, and weighted interactions between personality types or rational decision-making processes (Eric, 2003). While formal definitions of negotiation vary; theorists do accept certain basic tenets. Foremost among them are the assumptions that parties who negotiate agree in at least one fundamental respect; they share a belief that their respective

purposes will be better served by entering into negotiation with the other party. Implicitly then, negotiating parties have come to the conclusion, at least for a moment, that they may be able to satisfy their individual goals or concerns more favorably by coming to an agreed upon solution with the other side, than by attempting to meet their goals or concerns unilaterally. It is this mutual perception that leads to the onset of negotiations and betrays the dependence that exists (to whatever degree) between negotiating parties (Eric, 2003).

II. MATERIAL AND METHOD

The material and method used in this research is a descriptive research based on secondary hypothetical order. It investigates using documented library materials and existing published works of scholars in the relevant areas. The paper is also aided by negotiation approaches to establish more theoretical backing on the concept of six party-talks.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

a) *Negotiation Approaches-The Structural Approach*

Structural approaches to negotiations consider negotiated outcomes to be a function of the characteristics or structural features that define each particular negotiation. These characteristics according to Dong (2002) may include features such as the number of parties and issues involved in the negotiation and the composition (whether each side is monolithic or comprises many groups) or relative power of the competing parties. Structural approaches to negotiation find "explanations of outcomes in patterns of relationships between parties or their goals" (Dong, 2002; Tany and Azeta, 2010). They can be deterministic in that they often view outcomes as *a priori* once structural factors are understood. In structural approaches to negotiation theory, analysts tend to define negotiations as conflict scenarios between opponents who maintain incompatible goals. Analysts who adopt a structural approach to the study of negotiations share an emphasis on the *means* parties bring to a negotiation.

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One of the main theoretical contributions derived from the structural approach is the theory that power is the central determining factor in negotiations (Hun and Jeong, 2002). In this view; the relative *power* of each party affects their ability to secure their individual goals through negotiations. Structural theories offer varying definitions of power. For example *power* is sometimes defined as the ability to win, or alternatively, as the possession of 'strength' or 'resources'. The perspective that power serves as a central structural feature of every negotiation has its intellectual roots in traditions of political theory and military strategy including the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli and von Clausewitz (Hun and Jeong, 2002). The central idea in this school is the notion that the strong will prevail.

b) *The Strategic Approach*

Gittings and Burkeman (2004) see *strategy* as "a plan, method, or series of maneuvers for obtaining a specific goal or result". Strategic approaches to negotiation have roots in mathematics, decision theory and rational choice theory, and also benefit from major contributions from the area of economics, biology, and conflict analysis. Whereas the structural approach focuses on the role of means (such as power) in negotiations, the emphasis in strategic models of negotiation is on the role of *ends* (goals) in determining outcomes (Gittings and Burkeman, 2004). Strategic models are also models of rational choice. Negotiators are viewed as rational decision makers with known alternatives who make choices guided by their calculation of which option will maximize their ends or "gains", frequently described as 'payoffs'. Actors choose from a 'choice set' of possible actions in order to try and achieve desired outcomes. Each actor has a unique 'incentive structure' that is comprised of a set of costs associated with different actions combined with a set of probabilities (Gittings and Burkeman, 2004).

c) *Behavioral Approach*

Behavioral approaches in the view of Young (2003) emphasize the role negotiators' personalities or individual characteristics play in determining the course and outcome of negotiated agreements. Behavioral theories may explain negotiations as interactions between personality 'types' that often take the form of dichotomies, such as shopkeepers and warriors or 'hardliners' and 'soft liners' where negotiators are portrayed either as ruthlessly battling for all or diplomatically conceding to another party's demands for the sake of keeping the peace. The tension that arises between these two approaches for young (2003), forms a paradox that has been termed the "Toughness Dilemma" or the "Negotiator's Dilemma". The dilemma states that though negotiators who are 'tough' during a negotiation are more likely to gain more of their demands in a negotiated solution, the trade off is that in

adopting this stance, they are less likely to conclude an agreement at all.

The behavioral approach derives from psychological and experimental traditions but also from centuries-old diplomatic treaties. These traditions share the perspective that negotiations – whether between nations, employers and unions, or neighbors are ultimately about the individuals involved. Where game theory relies on the assumption that players to a negotiation 'game' are featureless, uniformly rational, pay-off maximizing entities, the behavioral approach highlights human tendencies, emotions and skills. They may emphasize the role played by 'arts' of persuasion, attitudes, trust, perception (or misperception), individual motivation and personality in negotiated outcomes. Other researchers from the behavioral school have emphasized factors such as relationships, culture, norms, skill, attitudes, expectations and trust (Yong and Dong, 2002).

d) *Concession Exchange (Processual) Approach*

Though concession exchange theories share features of both the structural approach (power) and the strategic approach (outcomes), they describe a different kind of mechanism that centers on learning. According to Zartman (1976), this approach (which he calls the processual approach) looks at negotiation "as a learning process in which parties react to each others' concession behavior". From the perspective negotiations consist of a series of concessions (Yoo and Young, 2003). The concessions mark stages in negotiations, which are used by parties to both signal their own intentions and to encourage movement in their opponent's position. Parties use their bids both to respond to the previous counteroffer and to influence the next one; the offers themselves become an exercise in power.

e) *Integrative Approach*

In the analysis given by Eric (2003), integrative approaches, in sharp contrast to distributive approaches, frame negotiations as interactions with *win-win* potential. Whereas a zero-sum view sees the goal of negotiations as an effort to claim one's share over a "fixed amount of pie", integrative theories and strategies look for ways of creating value, or "expanding the pie," so that there is more to share between parties as a result of negotiation. Integrative approaches use objective criteria, look to create conditions of mutual gain, and emphasize the importance of exchanging information between parties and group problem-solving (Eric, 2003). They also emphasize on problem solving, cooperation, joint decision making and mutual gains, integrative strategies call for participants to work jointly to create win-win solutions. They involve uncovering interests, generating options and searching for commonalities between parties. Negotiators may look for ways to create value, and develop shared principles

as a basis for decision-making about how outputs should be claimed (Eric, 2003).

IV. US WARSENERED RELATION WITH KOREA AND THE BEGINNING OF THE SIX PARTY TALKS

It is generally known that since after September 11 attack on the world trade centre, the US foreign policy shifted towards fighting terrorism. George bush has not only tried to have a good relation with north Asian states but considered North Korea as a threat to the region and the United States.

The cooperative relationship, according to Eric (2003), between the United States and North Korea, suddenly cooled as President Bush came into office in 2001. The Bush administration set up a new foundation for its relationship with North Korea. The initial step was to recognize North Korea as a grave threat towards peace and security of Northeast Asia. President Bush issued a statement on June 6, 2001, outlining the United State's new policy objectives over North Korea's nuclear and missile program and its conventional forces (Eric, 2003). Bush (2002) made the assertion that if North Korea took positive actions in response to U.S. policy, the United States "will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions and take other political steps." The U.S. administrative officials warned that North Korea's proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) could make such weapons available to Al Qaeda (Byung, 2004). But one major truth that is discernible is that the Bush administration's policy was to eliminate even the minutest elements of North Korean military power and to secure absolute U.S. hegemony in Northeast Asia.

This perspective was clearly enunciated by President Bush's State of the Union speech of January 29, 2002, in which he regarded North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" (JMFA, 2004), a group of states that included Iran and Iraq—all countries which were presumed to be producing and proliferating WMDs. In October 2002, matters took a turn for the worse when North Korea indirectly acknowledged its nuclear weapons development program (Eric, 2003). In response to the acknowledgment, the United States decided to stop supplying heavy oil to North Korea in November (Karin and Julia, 2005).

V. US EFFORTS TO DENUCLEARIZE NORTH KOREA

Between 2002 and 2004, it became very apparent that North Korea was building weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The only effort the United States could venture into, was, however, to begin talks on how to denuclearize the peninsular. The denuclearization process has taken four steps which are (Selig, 2004:4-13):

a) *Step one : Eliminating the Post-1994 North Korean Plutonium Inventory*

North Korea would permit the inspection access necessary for the International Atomic Energy Agency to determine how much plutonium has been reprocessed since the expulsion of the inspectors following the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in December, 2002; the sequestering of this plutonium and any spent fuel under international controls, and the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing plant under international controls (Selig, 2004:4-13).

If North Korea agrees to surrender all of the plutonium found through the inspection process for shipment out of the country, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia would reciprocate with: The resumption of shipments of the 500,000 tons of oil per year delivered under then Agreed Framework, which was cut off in December, 2002.

- a. The exchange of liaison offices with North Korea by the United States and Japan as the first step toward fully normalized relations.
- b. Bilateral and multilateral programs of assistance for the economic and social development of North Korea valued collectively in accordance with an agreed price per kilogram of the plutonium surrendered.
- c. Upon conclusion of the proposed aid agreement, North Korea would initiate steps to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and permit the resumption of the IAEA inspection access cut off in December, 2002

But one thing to note here is that, there were no agreements reached as how much was to be paid on every kilogram forfeited by North Korea as a process leading to the denuclearization. It is on this argument that Selig (2004) wrote:

The Task Force does not specify how much should be offered in payment per kilogram. However, for illustrative purposes, it points out that if the plutonium inventory totals 40 kilograms, and if a price of \$25 million per kilogram were agreed upon, the funds available for these assistance programs would total \$1 billion. The Task Force also notes that South Korea and Japan had agreed to provide \$4 billion and \$1 billion respectively to construct light water reactors under the Agreed Framework, and that the United States spent \$405,106,000 from 1995 through 2003 for oil shipments and for administrative support of the light water reactor project.12

b). *Step Two : Plutonium Cleanout*

- a. North Korea would agree to surrender the remainder of its plutonium inventory, including pre-1994 plutonium reprocessed prior to the Agreed Framework.
- b. The United States would end the remaining U.S. economic sanctions against Pyongyang and would encourage the World Bank and the Asian

Development Bank to move toward North Korean membership in these institutions. This would require the removal of North Korea from the U.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

c). *Step Three : Eliminating the Plutonium Weapons Infrastructure*

- a. North Korea would open previously-barred waste and storage sites and other plutonium- related facilities to a level of inspection acceptable to the IAEA.
- b. The United States would initiate talks with North Korea to set the stage for the elevation of their liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington to the status of embassies.
- c. The United States would declare its readiness to keep open the option of completing one or both of the two light water reactors promised under the Agreed Framework, as South Korea and Japan have urged.

d). *Step Four : Elimination of Weapons-Grade Uranium Enrichment*

If North Korea permits the unimpeded inspection access necessary to determine what, if any, weapons-grade uranium enrichment facilities exist, and takes the comprehensive measures necessary to eliminate any such facilities, the United States would:

- a. Establish full diplomatic relations, upgrading its liaison office in Pyongyang to an Embassy.
- b. Authorize Exxon-Mobil to pursue a natural gas pipeline to South Korea that would cross North Korea.
- c. Open negotiations on a tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War.

VI. THE US PROPOSAL

In a formal proposal presented to North Korea on June 24, 2004, in Beijing, the United States outlined a six-stage denuclearization process. North Korea would be required at the outset to acknowledge that a weapons-grade uranium enrichment program exists and to make specific commitments providing for its elimination in a denuclearization agreement. The six principles contained in the proposal are (Selig, 2004: 4-13):

1. The DPRK would make a unilateral declaration pledging to "dismantle all of its nuclear programs"
2. "Upon acceptance of the DPRK declaration, the parties would:
 - a. provide provisional multilateral security assurances, which would become more enduring as the process proceeded.
 - b. begin a study to determine the energy requirements of the DPRK and how to meet them by non-nuclear energy programs.
 - c. begin a discussion of steps necessary to lift remaining economic sanctions on the DPRK, and

on the steps necessary for the removal of the DPRK from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism."

3. Based on the DPRK declaration, "the parties would then conclude a detailed implementation agreement providing for the supervised disabling, dismantling, and elimination" of all DPRK nuclear programs, the removal of all nuclear weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods; and a long-term monitoring program. "To be credible, and for the programs to get underway," the declaration and the agreement would have to include "the uranium enrichment program, and existing weapons, as well as the plutonium program" (Selig, 2004:4-13).
4. Upon conclusion of this agreement, "non-U.S. parties would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK."
5. Implementation of the agreement would begin with a three-month preparatory period in which the DPRK would:
 - d. provide a complete listing of all nuclear activities.
 - e. cease operations of these activities.
 - f. "permit the securing of all fissile material and the monitoring of fuel rods."
 - g. "Permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons/weapons components and key centrifuge parts". These steps would be subject to "international verification."
6. After the dismantlement is completed, "lasting benefits to the DPRK" would result from the energy survey and the discussions on ending sanctions and the removal of the DPRK from the terrorist list (Selig, 2004:4-13).

In retaliation, North Korea refused to admit the KEDO delegation from entering the country to inspect the use of heavy oil (Soo-Min, 2006) and also, proclaimed the resumption of the construction and operation of all its nuclear facilities. In fact, North Korea made preparations for reoperating the nuclear reactors between the 22nd and 25th of December, and purged the IAEA inspectors on December 27, 2002 (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). This uncompromising trend of the United States reached its peak with its "tailored containment" policy against North Korea at the end of 2002 (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981).

Having recognized that this hostile policy of the United States was a grave threat to its 'supreme national interests' and sovereignty, on January 10, 2003, North Korea declared their withdrawal from the NPT (Lewicki, Barry, Sounders and John, 2005). It accelerated the tension between the North Korea and the IAEA that in turn escalated into the second nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. The disagreements between the two sides was hardly alleviated by the mediation proposal of the IAEA and the following the war in Iraq (CMFA, 2003).

Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March/April 2003, nuclear strains on the Korean peninsula have not heightened. Moreover, with North Korea's acceptance of

multilateral dialogues on April 14, 2003, two nuclear talks were held in Beijing Iraq (CMFA, 2003), among them, the six-party talks in August were notable. With the newly reinforced peaceful mood, the nuclear standoff is

expected to be resolved gradually. The chronology of the development of nuclear tension between the United States and North Korea from October 2002 to August 2003 is illustrated below:

A Pedigree To The Six Party Talks

Date	Nuclear stand off
October 4, 2002	North Korea reportedly acknowledged its nuclear weapons development program when James Kelly visited Pyongyang.
October 25, 2002	North Korea proposed a non-aggression pact with the United States.
November 14, 2002	KEDO announced the discontinuance of heavy oil supply to North Korea.
December 12, 2002	The United States declared the nullification of the Geneva Agreed Framework with North Korea.
December 27, 2002	North Korea purged the IAEA inspectors from its territory.
December 29, 2002	The United States adopted a 'tailored containment' policy against North Korea.
January 10, 2003	North Korea withdrew from NPT.
March 17	The U.S. Ambassador to South Korea clarified that U.S. policy toward Korea would be different from the case of Iraq.
April 14, 2003	North Korea announced its acceptance of new multilateral talks for resolution of nuclear problem.
April 23, 2003	Trilateral Talks (DPRK, USA and China) in Beijing, China
July 12, 2003	Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo visited North Korea
July 17, 2003	Dai Bingguo visited Washington
August 1, 2003	North Korea agreed to participate in six-party talks
August 27-9, 2003	First Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China
February, 25-8, 2004	First Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China

Source : Eric yong-joong lee: *The six-party talks and the north korean nuclear dispute Resolution under the IAEA safeguards regime. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal; Vol.5 (2004).*

It was however, on August 27, 2003, six nations- China, the United States, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas - gathered at a hexagonal table in Beijing for a three-day meeting to discuss how to resolve the pressing issue of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program (JMFA, 2004), the meeting served as a forum for clarifying the positions between North Korea and the United States. However, their mutually irreconcilable positions were reconfirmed. North Korea's objective was to construct a new level of relations leading to the normalization of ties with the United States, and to obtain economic rewards for giving up its nuclear program. North Korea's position may be divided into the following: (1) it wanted to confirm that the United States would shift away from its hostile policy; (2) it wanted to secure a non-aggression treaty that would strictly and legally guarantee that neither of the two sides would resort to attacking one another; and (3) it would not submit to inspections until the United States would agree to abandon its antagonistic position toward North Korea (Karin and Julia, 2007). The United States, however, was deliberately vague on what rewards it

might bestow upon North Korea if it agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner (Karin and Julia, 2007).

The purposes of the other nations that were present at the talks may be summarized as follows: China tried to play the role of an active mediator, by hosting the second nuclear talks after the trilateral meeting in April 2003. China also attempted to increase its influence over the Northeast Asian region (Byung, 2004). Russia, by offering a joint assurance (along with China) to the Kim Jong-Il regime in North Korea, wanted to intervene as a main actor in resolving the nuclear crisis (Yoo-sung, 2005). Japan's primary concern in the talks was to solve the kidnapping of the Japanese by North Korea as well as to maintain its security from the suspected nuclear weapons and missiles. Finally, South Korea, by reconfirming its position as the most important counterpart of North Korea, hoped to enforce a non-nuclear Korean peninsula plan. South Korea had hoped that the success of the multilateral talks would translate into a more permanent peace regime between the two Koreas (Karin and Julia, 2007).

VII. US SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

The United States maintains sanctions against North Korea under five primary rationales: first, the state is considered a national security threat; second, it is on the State Department's list of state sponsors or supporters of terrorism; third, the DPRK is a Marxist-Leninist state; fourth, the country has been implicated in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and fifth, the country is a non-nuclear weapons state that has denoted a nuclear device. In addition to diplomatic sanctions (Eric, 2003), the U.S. government maintains various economic sanctions on trade, aid, arms sales and transfers, and access to assets under U.S. jurisdiction based on these four principles. Sanctions under the first rationale are specific to North Korea while the latter three apply to various country groupings of which North Korea is a part. Individual sanctions cannot necessarily be categorized neatly under one rationale or another but have sometimes been imposed under several different laws or regulations. Some of these (few) sanctions imposed according to Dong (2005) are:

1. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the United States instituted a total embargo on exports to the DPRK.
2. Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR), issued by the Department of Treasury in December 1950, also forbade "any financial transactions involving, or on behalf of, North Korea, including "transactions related to travel."
3. The Department of Commerce revised its Export Administration Regulations (EARs) in 1965, grouping countries by level of restriction, and North Korea remained on the most restricted list.
4. The State Department placed North Korea on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1988 after the 1987 bombing of Korean Air Lines flight 858 which was reportedly carried out by two North Korean agents. This reinforced Washington's rationale for restricting trade and financial transactions with the DPRK.
5. Under the Export Administration Act of 1979, governments of countries found to be sponsors and supporters of international terrorism can face a wide array of sanctions, including the forfeit of most trade and foreign aid, access to sales of items on the U.S. Munitions List, Export-Import bank assistance, and support through international financial institutions. Other restrictions can include the denial of beneficial trade statuses, higher tax hurdles for potential investors, and additional regulations that make trade in food and medicines more difficult.
6. In September 2005, the United States sanctioned two North Korean companies accused of assisting proliferation activities in Iran. The new sanctions prohibit U.S. government agencies from buying or selling military equipment, services or technology from or to the companies or their subsidiaries.
7. In March 2006 the Treasury Department announced a prohibition on transactions between any U.S. person and a Swiss company, Kohas AG, and its owner, Jakob Steiger, for allegedly doing business with Korea Ryonbong General Corporation; another blacklisted company. The Treasury Department action also froze any of their assets under U.S. jurisdiction.
8. Then in April 2006 a new OFAC regulation prohibited as of May 8 "US persons from owning, leasing, operating or insuring any Vessel flagged by North Korea."
9. Regulation prohibited as of May 8 "US persons from owning, leasing, operating or insuring any vessel flagged by North Korea." More significantly, as noted above, beginning in 2005 the Treasury Department used the powers authorized by the U.S. Patriot Act to address counterfeiting concerns. In September 2005, under Article 311 of the Patriot Act, the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in Macau at which North Korean entities maintained accounts, as a "primary money laundering concern" and proposed rules restricting U.S. financial institutions from engaging in financial transactions with it. Some U.S. officials believe a number of the accounts belong to members of North Korea's ruling elite. The Treasury Department's designation resulted in a run on BDA by account holders; consequently, the Macau Monetary Authority assumed control of BDA and impounded the North Korean accounts.

Timeline : U.S. Sanctions and other Treasury Departments Actions against the DPRK

1950	Korean War breaks out. United States institutes total embargo on exports to North Korea. President Truman declares a state of national emergency in U.S. because of Korean War. Department of Treasury issues Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR), forbidding financial transactions by, or on behalf of, North Korea, including transactions for travel. These regulations also froze North Korean assets held under U.S. jurisdiction
1953	Armistice halts Korean War.
1955	U.S. issues first International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) which includes North Korea on list of countries that should be denied, "licenses, other approvals, Exports and imports of defense articles and defense services."
1965	When Export Administration Regulations (EARs) are revised categorizing countries according to level of restriction, North Korea continues to be on the list of most restricted countries—Country Group Z.
1975	Korea- related Foreign Asset Control Regulations (FACRs) revised to prohibit transactions related to agricultural products that contained raw goods originating in the DPRK
1985	DPRK joins NPT
1987	KAL flight 858 is bombed, reportedly by North Korean agents
1988	North Korea is added to U.S. Department of State's list of state sponsors or supporters of international terrorism.
1989	EARs revised to allow export of "commercially-supplied goods intended to meet basic human needs" to DPRK with licenses granted on a case-by-case basis. Revisions ease regulations concerning travel to DPRK for special activities. Revisions to the IEEPA to reflect advances in media (such as CDs, etc.) allow for ease in flow of information materials between U.S. and certain countries, including DPRK
1991	North and South Korea join the UN.
1992	FACR revised to allow telecommunication between U.S. and DPRK.
1992-2002	U.S. sanctions various North Korean entities for violation of U.S. missile nonproliferation laws found in sections of the Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act, and Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Sanctions passed on North Korean entities in 1992, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2006 often alongside sanctions on Iranian, Syrian or Pakistani entities.

1994	U.S. and DPRK Sign the Agreed Framework.
1995	A range of economic sanctions eased. New FACR revisions allow unlimited travel-related transactions, establishment of news organization offices and transactions related to provision of LWR. The revisions also allow for the importation of North Korean magnesite and magnesia.
1996	FACR revision allows for humanitarian donations in response to DPRK floods and famine
1997	FACR revision authorizes payments for services rendered by North Korea to U.S aircraft in connection with overflight of, or emergency landing, in the DPRK.
1998	The DPRK test fires a missile over Japan.
1999	The DPRK announces a self-imposed moratorium on missile testing. President Clinton announces the most significant easing of trade and travel restrictions since their imposition in 1950.
2000	EARs and FACRs revised to allow for easing of these trade and travel sanctions. Regulations on financial transactions are also loosened so that most transactions are permitted.
2002	The Agreed Framework begins to erode when North Korea reportedly admits to having a uranium enrichment program, reactivates its reactor at Yongbyon and expels IAEA inspectors and the United States stops oil shipments to DPRK
2003	DPRK withdraws from NPT
2005	March 2: North Korea announces an end to its missile-testing moratorium. May 1: North Korea tests a short-range missile. June 28: The US imposes financial sanctions on three North Korean entities it accuses of involvement in WMD proliferation September 12: The U.S. Department of Treasury designates Banco Delta Asia in Macau an institution of "money laundering concern;" Macanese authorities respond by freezing North Korean accounts. September 19: The Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks produces the "September Joint Statement," in which parties agree to the goal of ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The U.S. sanctions two North Korean companies. October 21: The U.S. Department of Treasury Freezes Assets of eight North Korean entities for involvement in WMD proliferation

	December 13: The U.S. Department of Treasury issues an advisory warning U.S. and international financial institutions to "guard against the abuse of their financial services by North Korea."
2006	<p>March: A North Korean Delegation visits the U.S. to discuss the BDA designation; the meeting is inconclusive. The following day, North Korea tests a short-range missile.</p> <p>March 30: The U.S. freezes the US-controlled assets of a Swiss firm and a Swiss individual that allegedly have business dealings with a North Korean entity named by the U.S. government as a WMD proliferator.</p> <p>April: New OFAC regulations, effective in May, make it illegal for U.S. persons to own, lease, operate or insure any vessel flagged by North Korea.</p> <p>July 5: The DPRK test fires seven missiles, including a Taepo-Dong long-range missile.</p> <p>July 15: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1695.</p> <p>October 3: North Korea announces unspecified plans to test a nuclear device.</p> <p>October 6: The UNSC Issues SC 8859 warning North Korea not to test a nuclear device.</p> <p>October 9: North Korea announces that it has exploded a nuclear device.</p> <p>October 13: New Japanese sanctions, announced October 11, go into effect.</p> <p>October 14: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1718.</p> <p>November 13: The US submits a report to the UN describing implementation of 1718 under existing law and providing a provisional list of luxury goods prohibited for export.</p> <p>December 7: President announces imposition of "Glenn Amendment" and new Atomic Energy Act sanctions, mandated by law to be applied to non-nuclear-weapons states that detonate nuclear devices.</p>
2007	<p>January 26: The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the EAR to impose license requirements for the export and re-export of "virtually all items subject to the EAR" except food and medicines not listed on the Commerce Control List and releases a list of luxury items prohibited for export and re-export to the DPRK.</p> <p>February 13: Agreement signed in which the U.S. agrees to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK."</p>

Source : Karin Lee and Julia Choi: north korea: economic sanctions and u.s. department of treasury actions 1955-september2007. national committee on north korea, 2007. pp. 51-53

VIII. CONCLUSION

It is rather apparent that international relations and politics are best represented or explained by realist analogy of the systemic nature, which is anarchy and lack of general security. The North had since discovered this, hence tried to develop its own military capability. But what is obtainable on the ground is the sheer attempt by the United States and the west to dominate global production and possession of military industrial complex with the purpose to dominate the global armament by discouraging arms race among major and emerging powers and states.

IX. RECOMMENDATION

The continuity of international peace and mutual cooperation among nation-states is based on the following peaceful recommendations:

The major powers of the global system must respect the territorial sovereignty of other miniature states for them to have political confidence, trust and respect on the great powers and for peace to reign at different levels of the global system.

There should not be any form of deliberate provocative political or military alliance against any nation. This will do away with other forces such as those that engendered the Second World War from the

lessons learnt from Hitler's Germany of building and establishing some security and military alliances and pacts with the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan.

More balances of power are indispensable. This will go by the tenets of balance of terror. If countries have equal capability of military destruction and might, there is the likelihood for such states not to fight each other, due to the destructive nature of each and the calculated collateral damage.

It is also recommendable that the United States withdraws its troops from South Korea and ceases all forms of joint military drills with the south to ensure more peaceful coexistence and stability between the Koreans.

The major powers in the six party talks must also be sincere and honest and stand firm to ensure meaningful perpetual negotiations with the north, for more mutual understanding and respect be achieved among all parties involved.

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