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VOLUME 13

ISSUE 5

VERSION 10



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE

VOLUME 13 ISSUE 5 (VER. 1.0)

OPEN ASSOCIATION OF RESEARCH SOCIETY

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GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

On Chang Chien's Change from a Constitutional Monarchist to a Republican-Political Thought with Flexibility as the Underlying Reason

By Dr. Sun, Shun-Chih

Chang - Jung Christian University, Taiwan

Abstract - Chang Chien was born on July 1st in 1853 in Haimen Kiangsu and died on August 24th in 1926 in Nant'ung Kiangsu. In spite of his extraordinary enthusiasm in the promotion of a constitutional monarchy, Chang Chien changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change? This is a significant topic for discussion. So far lots of scholars have done research on this topic; however, the answers to this question have not been completely discovered yet. My finding in this paper contends that though reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government were able to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic to save China. It would be unfair to attribute Chang Chien's change only to his personal ambition to maintain his property, his prestige, or to attain political power. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and his political thought with flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, a republic.

Keywords : *political thought, political flexibility, constitutional monarchy, republic, north-south negotiation.*

GJHSS-F Classification : *FOR Code: 180108, 160699*



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On Chang Chien's Change from a Constitutional Monarchist to a Republican-Political Thought with Flexibility as the Underlying Reason

Dr. Sun, Shun-Chih

Abstract - Chang Chien was born on July 1st in 1853 in Haimen Kiangsu and died on August 24th in 1926 in Nant'ung Kiangsu. In spite of his extraordinary enthusiasm in the promotion of a constitutional monarchy, Chang Chien changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change? This is a significant topic for discussion.

So far lots of scholars have done research on this topic; however, the answers to this question have not been completely discovered yet. My finding in this paper contends that though reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government were able to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic to save China. It would be unfair to attribute Chang Chien's change only to his personal ambition to maintain his property, his prestige, or to attain political power. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and his political thought with flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, a republic.

This paper is also to explore, after his change to a republican, Chang Chien's decisive role behind the scene in the North-South negotiation from December 1911 to February 1912 leading to abdication of the Ch'ing government under some concession in exchange for the support of Yuan Shih-k'ai as the president of the republic.

Keywords : *political thought, political flexibility, constitutional monarchy, republic, north-south negotiation.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Although for a couple of years Chang Chien had been extraordinarily enthusiastic in the promotion of a constitutional monarchy, he changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change? This is a significant topic for discussion.

So far lots of scholars have done research on this topic; however, the answers to this question have not been completely discovered yet. Chang Hsiao-jo's Biography of Mr. Chang Chien of Nant'ung is a pioneer

work which contains a great many source materials on this topic, however, this book suffers from loose organization and superficial treatment of Chang Chien's political thought (Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930). Sung Hsi-Shang's 'The Career of Chang Chien' is less a biography than an annotated collection of source materials, drawn largely from Chang Chien's works, supplemented by personal remembrances, but touches little on Chang Chien's change to a republic (Sung Hsi-Shang, 1963). Liu Hou-sheng's 'Biography of Chang Chien' concentrates on the political events of Chang Chien's time including his change to a republican (Liu Hou-sheng, 1958). Samuel C. Chu's 'Reformer in Modern China: Chang Chien, 1853-1926' emphasizes Chang Chien's role in industry, education, land reclamation, water conservancy and his involvement in national affairs including reasons leading to his change to a republican (Samuel C. Chu, 1965). However, Chu concludes that Chang Chien "was of surprisingly little influence on the key events of his time. Compare to such men as Yuan, Shih-k'ai and Sun, Yat-sen, or even to such as Liang, Ch'i-ch'ao and Li, Yuan-hung, he had far less to do with the outcome of what was one of the crucial periods in the history of modern China. His role was a subsidiary one at best" (Samuel C. Chu, 1965:86) and "his career was generally outside the mainstream of contemporary history... In spite of his concern with national affairs, he was always isolated from the larger movements of his time" (Samuel C. Chu, 1965:177). I find this view unreasonable since Chang Chien had played a decisive role in the Constitutional Movement of 1905 -1911, and during the period of North - South Negotiation from 1911 to 1912. Japanese scholar Fujioka Kikuo's 'Chang Chien and the 1911 Revolution' (Kikuo Fujioka, 1985), Chinese scholar Chang K'ai-yuan's 'The Footprints of A Trailblazer : Draft Biography of Chang Chien' (Chang K'ai-yuan, 1986), and 'Biography of Chang Chien' (Chang K'ai-yuan, 2000), and 'Chang K'ai-yuan & T'ian T'ung's 'Chang Chien and Modern Society' (Chang K'ai-yuan & T'ian T'ung, 2002), and 'Chang Chien and Modern Society During the Period of 1911 Revolution' (Chang K'ai-yuan & T'ian T'ung, 2011) discuss his career, his political activities and his change

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to a republican. Shao, Qin's *Culturing Modernity: The Nantong Model, 1890-1930* argues that the 1911 Revolution was not a breaking point in terms of local self-government. To be sure, the collapse of the Ch'ing dynasty demanded the reorientation of local self-government from being a base for a constitutional monarchy to being one for a Republican government" (Shao Qin, 2004:11) and Peter Zarrow points out that the Ch'ing's New Policy reforms encouraged "local self-government", and Chang Chien and his brother were able to build a new power structure in Nantung as they pursued modernization project. They rode out the 1911 Revolution much, perhaps, like other local elites, and seemed happy enough to convert from monarchism to republicanism. What mattered most to them at this particular juncture was Nantung(Peter Zarrow, 2006:189). Other works by Wong King-kong (Wong King-kong, 1957), Jerome Ch'en (Jerome Ch'en,1983), Chang P'eng-yuan (Chang P'eng-yuan,1968,1969), Lu Yao-tung (Lu Yao-tung,1980) , Li Shih-yueh (Li Shih-yueh,1962), Hsu Lun (Hsu Lun,1962), T'a Fu-hui , (T'a fu-hui,1970), Sun Shun-chih, (Sun Shun-chih,1991:326-332; 1995:41-44; 1997:135-137; 2001:106-110; 2009:71-72) also give explanations to Chang Chien's change from a constitutional monarchist to a republican.

The fourth international symposium on Chang Chien held in Nant'ung on the 25th - 28th of November 2006, 88 articles in relation to Chang Chien and modern Chinese society had been submitted to this symposium(Chang Chien International Symposium Committee, 2007), and the fifth international symposium on Chang Chien held in Haimen on the 17th-19th of April 2009, 120 articles in relation to Chang Chien and Haimen : The Thoughts and Practice in the Early Period of Modernization had been submitted to this symposium (Ts'ui, Chih-ch'ing, 2010),however, the reasons leading to Chang Chien's change from a Constitutional Monarchist to a Republican still have not been completely found out yet.

My finding in this paper contends that though reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and local self-government could be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic. It was also due to his pragmatic attitude and political flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, the same, a republic.

I have adopted the content analysis method in this research and I have collected, arranged, compared, and analysed the related data to help reach a conclusion. This paper depends more on basic source materials rather than second-hand data. Among various source materials, Chang Chien's Diary (Chang Chien, 1986. Hereafter cited as Jih-chi) is the most basic one,

which covers almost 53 years from 24 October, 1873, when he was twenty years three months and twenty three days, to 2 August, 1926, twenty two days before his death. This diary contains approximately 875,000 words by which we are able to understand the life of a typical Chinese intellectual, to check the exact dates of some writings of his, and to correct errors against related sources. The first part of Chang Chien's diary which covers approximately the period from 1873 to 1892 was published in Taipei in 1967; and the second part of Chang Chien's diary which covers approximately the period from 1892 to 1926 was later published in Taipei in 1969. These two parts of Chang Chien's diary were reprinted together in 1986 in Taipei covering the period from 1873 to 1926.

The Nine Records of Chang Chien (Chang Hsiao-jo, 1983. Hereafter cited as Chiu-lu.) is an indispensable source material to Chang Chien's political thought. This collection of his writings is divided topically into: Cheng Wen Lu (On Politics), Shih Yeh Lu (On Industry), Chiao Yu Lu (On Education), Tzu Chih Lu (On Self-government), Tz'u Shang Lu (On Philanthropy), Wen Lu (Essays), Shih Lu (Poems), Chuan Lu (Special Section), and Wai Lu (On the Civil Service Examination). Within each topical section the sources are arranged in Chronological order.

Extant Writings of Chang Chien (Yang Li-ch'iang, 1987), is an invaluable source material which includes Chang's unpublished letters and telegraphs to Chao, Feng-ch'ang and Yuan, Shi-k'ai, his personal letters to Chang, Hsiao-jo, Wen, T'ung-ho's letter to Chang Chien, and Ts'ao, Wen-lin's Collation on Nine Records of Chang Chien.

The Complete Work of Chang Chien (Chang Chien Research Center, 1994) includes some new data not found in The Nine Records of Chang Chien, is an invaluable source material to Chang Chien's political thought.

This paper starts with a brief introduction to Chang Chien's careers and political thought in order to trace the clues of Chang's change to a republican. This is followed by describing the fact of Chang's shift so as to help understand why Chang Chien changes. And finally this paper analyses critically and points out the underlining reasons leading to Chang's change from a constitutionalist to a republican based on various source materials and different points of view from scholars.

This paper is also to explore Chang Chien's decisive role in the North-South negotiation from December 1911 to February 1912 leading to the abdication of the Ch'ing government under some concession, in exchange for the support of Yuan, Shih-k'ai as the president of the republic.

The conclusion unveils the most important finding of this paper that the underlying reason leading to Chang Chien's change could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education

and self-government could be accomplished to save China under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and political flexibility which allowed him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, the same, a republic. Of course, his change was apparently due to the trend that he could not reverse, however, his political thought with flexibility should be taken into account as well.

II. A BRIEF LOOK AT HIS CAREERS AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL THOUGHT

Chang Chien, tzu (courtesy title) Chi-chih, hao (alias) Se-an, and Se-Weng, was born the fourth of five sons, on July 1st , 1853 in the village of Ch'ang-lo, Hai-men, Kiangsu, and died on August 24th , 1926 in Nant'ung, Kiangsu. Chang Chien began his student days in 1856 at the age of only four. His first teacher was his father Chang, P'eng-nien, who taught him to read Book of A Thousand Characters. The following year, 1857, Chang Chien was sent to a village school. The teacher was Ch'iu, Ta-chang, under whom Chang Chien in a period of seven years (1857-1863), had finished the primers such as Trimetrical Classics, and Books of Family Names; the basic poetic readers such as Works of A Thousand Poets , and Poems of A Boy Prodigy; and the Confucian Classics such as The Great Learning, The Doctrine of Golden Means , The Analects of Confucius, Mencius , The Filial Piety Classic , and The Book of Odes . The study of these books served as a basis for examination work, though they were for elementary education only.

In 1864, his father employed Sung, Hsiao-ch'i as family teacher to help Chang Chien and his brothers in the preparation for local examinations. The teacher asked Chang Chien to study again The Great Learning, The Doctrine of Golden Means, The Analects of Confucius, and Mencius, but from better editions. Then he proceeded to teach the boy The Book of History, The Book of Change, The Book of Rites, and T'so's Commentary of the Spring and Autumn Annals. Under his teacher's effective guidance, Chang Chien learned to write examination poems and examination essays which were required in the examinations. Unfortunately, this enthusiastic teacher died in the Summer of 1866, and Chang Chien was sent to follow Sung Lin, the dead teacher's nephew, in a neighbouring village, Hsi T'ing. Under the new teacher, Chang Chien advanced to study two more Confucian Classics, The Rite of Chou and The Book of Ritual (Chiu-lu, Chuan Lu, chuan 6, 2a-4b).

Chang Chien's examination life was a long and toilsome history. In the first stage, Chang Chien was lucky enough. He spent only five years, 1864-1868, in preparation, successfully passed through the district, prefectural, and Yuan (one conducted by provincial

literary examiners) examinations, placing twenty-sixth in the latter, and was classified a Fu-sheng (Licentiate) in 1868, at the age of sixteen (Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930: 25-26).

The second stage was very hard for Chang Chien. He spent seventeen more years, 1869-1885, failed five times in the provincial examinations. In 1870 he tried for Chu-jen degree for the first time, and succeeded in placing sixteenth in the k'o examination but failed to pass the provincial examination. He was to repeat this pattern of succeeding in the k'o examinations and failing in the provincial examinations four times in 1873, 1875, 1876, and 1879. The degree of Chiu-jen continued to elude him until 1885, when he competed in the provincial examination and succeeded in placing second highest among who passed.

Chang Chien spent nine more years, 1886-1894, in preparation, failed repeatedly four times in the examinations for Chih-shih degree in Peking in 1886, 1889, 1890, and 1892. In 1894, at the age of 42, Chang Chien, at the insistence of his elder brother, Chang Ch'a, and the encouragement of his aged father, once more took the metropolitan examination. This time, his name was found in the sixtieth position. He improved on this in the re-examination by placing tenth, and when the palace examination was over, he was chosen to be Chuan-yuan, the highest of all. He was duly appointed a Compiler of the First Class in the Hanlin Academy. Unfortunately, only six months after he had won the highest title of Chuan-yuan, he lost his father, who had played the most important role in his examination life. Four years later, in 1898, when he had decided to take no office in the government and when he was busy promoting local development in his home area, Chang Chien did not forget to come back to Peking for his last examination in Hanlin Academy. According to himself, this unnecessary effort was again to fulfil the dream of his deceased father.


Through the traditional training, Chang Chien had accepted the pragmatic and the reciprocal aspects of Confucianism which later functioned as his guiding spirit in promoting industry, education and self-government as the foundation of a constitutional monarchy, and then a republic. Chang Chien believed that the best way is somewhere between the two extremes. As he understood it, there were no basic conflicts between the Chinese tradition and Western civilization. It was possible to find some form of compromise by adhering to the broad principles of Confucianism and adopting Western technology, organization, and even political system of constitutional monarchism and republicanism. Chang Chien thought that "practical use" might be changed but "basic principle" should be permanent and could not be changed. Chang Chien's ideas on industry, education, self-government, constitutional monarchy and republic had changed according to situations, but Chang

Chien's belief on Confucian ideas of serving the people had never changed.

With the pragmatic and reciprocal aspects of Confucian ideas serving the people, adjusting to China's concrete situations, Chang Chien developed his thought firstly, saving China by industry from 1866, the time self-strengthening movement in progress; secondly, saving China by industry and education from 1895 to 1900, the time after Sino-Japanese War; thirdly saving China by industry, education and self-government from 1900 to 1903, the time self-government movement in progress; fourthly saving China by industry, education, self-government under a constitutional monarchy from 1903 to 1911, the time constitutional movement in progress; and lastly, saving China by industry, education, self-government under a republic from one month after 1911

Revolution, the time he changed to a republican, until his death in 1926. Chang Chien indeed had successfully made considerable contributions to China's economic, educational and political modernization. The case of Chang Chien's subtle promotion of China's modernization demonstrated clearly that Confucianism was not necessarily incompatible with modernization (Sun Shun-chih, 1995:98).

The main lines of Chang Chien's political thought may be briefly summarized as follows: industry is the basis of education; education and industry are the foundation of self-government; and self-government is the basis of constitutional monarchy (or later, a republic).The ultimate purpose of his political thought was to make China wealthy and powerful.



Industry is the basis of education since educational expenditures have to be supplied by the income of industry. Industry, according to Chang Chien, incorporated agriculture, labour and commerce and it is roughly equivalent to the term of "economic development" of today. Chang Chien saw industry as a means to supply funds for education and also saw industry as a means to save China. He personally devoted himself to the cause of the development of industry and had made great achievements. The success of his economic endeavours enable him to advance education.

Education and industry are the foundation of self-government since they are the essentials of self-government. Education, according to Chang Chien, was not merely "instruction", but was the means for the

people to obtain wisdom, learning, and knowledge. In order to save China, Chang Chien thought, people should have ordinary knowledge, and ordinary knowledge must be obtained through adequate education. Chang Chien regarded education and industry as the foundation of self-government, and also avenue to a strong nation.

Self-government is the basis of constitutional monarchy (or later, a republic) since constitutional monarchy or a republic cannot really be achieved without self-government. Self-government, according to Chang Chien, meant that everyone should devote himself to the development of industry, education, and other local affairs under the leadership of the intellectuals-the representatives of the people, and thus local councils were essential to self-government. Chang

Chien saw self-government as the basis of a strong nation. Constitutional monarchy, according to Chang Chien, was a separation of the three-power political system under an emperor. Chang Chien thought that self-government and constitutional monarchy were related and mutually influenced, and thus he was inclined to have a parliament to define the shape and size of taxation.

Chang Chien had played a very important role in the Constitutional Movement: in the gestation period of 1904-1906, he acted behind the scene to push the Ch'ing government to adopt constitutionalism; In the developing stage of 1909-1911, he advocated the Petition-for-a-Parliament Movement and as a result the Ch'ing government shortened the preparation period toward constitutional government by three years or more.

Although for a couple of years Chang Chien had been extraordinarily enthusiastic in the promotion of a constitutional monarchy, he changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican within less than one month after the 1911 Revolution. Why did he change?

The reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated. However, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government which were able to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic. The second main reason should be attributed to his pragmatic attitude. He had no choice but to accept the fact that revolution had broken out and that most of the provinces had declared independence, and lots of the constitutionalists had changed their attitude toward republican, and he could not reverse the trend. Even his home county of Nant'ung and home province of Kiangsu were under the threats of troops in Nanking. He was concerned with the safety of his own county and province. He thought that the only way to stabilize the society was to accept the republic in order to avoid chaos so as to achieve his industry, education and local self-government program. The third main reason should be attributed to his despair with the Ch'ing government. His Chuan-yuan background made it impossible for him to lead an uprising, but he could accept the fact of revolution. Although he had no ambition in obtaining political power, he had to get involved in politics. Therefore he found a solution by supporting Yuan Shih-k'ai as president of the republic in exchange for the abdication of Ch'ing court under some concession. Behind the scene during the period of North-South negotiation 1911-1912, Chang Chien had played a very important role.

III. THE PROCESS OF CHANG'S CHANGE FROM A CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHIST TO A REPUBLICAN

In May 1911, true to its promise to the edict of November 4, 1910, the Cabinet Law was enacted and a cabinet was appointed with Prince I-k'ung as Prime Minister. However, of the thirteen posts on the cabinet, eight were held by Manchus, four by Chinese, one by Mongolian, revealing the basic distrust held by the Throne toward the Chinese officials. Five of the Manchus were members of the imperial house, thus providing the basis for the cabinet being nicknamed the "royal cabinet".

For Chang Chien the make-up of the cabinet came as a distinct disappointment. In May 1911 Chang Chien united with his friends T'ang, Shou-ch'ien, Sheng, Tseng-chih and Chao, Feng-ch'ang in writing a letter to Tsai-feng, the Prince Regent, protesting this measure and urging that learned and experienced Chinese higher officials be appointed as ministers. Chang Chien, through Chao, Ch'ing-k'uan, a former follower of prince Ch'un, even warned the Regent against running the risk of losing his throne. Some two months after the establishment of the cabinet no actual progress had been made in political reforms. Chang Chien submitted a petition to the cabinet urging it to take three actions:

1. To formulate and announce an over-all policy in order to communicate between the government and the ordinary people.
2. To establish direct coordination between the cabinet and the various government departments in order to communicate among the government offices; and
3. To make known the program of the cabinet through Tze-cheng Yuan (Political Consultative Council) to the people and call in experts for consultation (Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 28b-30a).

He laid particular stress on the last point as an indispensable step toward securing public support for the cabinet. There appeared to be no response to this petition. Of course, Chang Chien was depressed. But he still supported the Ch'ing government at this moment.

In May of 1911 Chang Chien was selected by the chambers of Commerce of Shanghai, Tientsin, Canton, and Hankou to go to Peking in order to obtain government permission for the founding of a joint Sino-American bank, and a joint shipping line. This scheme came as a result of the visit of an American delegation to the South Sea Industrial Exposition of 1910 in Nanking, in which delegation the American financier Robert Dollar was a prominent member. Through Robert Dollar, Chang Chien had met with the group of American businessmen and worked out the details for a joint Chinese-American bank with a total capital of five million Yuan (about 3.5 million taels), to be established with the American half of the capital. At the same time a

steamship line was also to be set up on a 50-50 basis, starting with a new 18,000-ton ship ordered by Robert Dollar. Chang Chien made ready to travel to Peking by way of Hankou. On his way from Hankou to Peking he paused on June 7 at Chang-the, where his student Yuan, Shih-k'ai had been living in retirement ever since his dismissal in January 1909. The two men had not seen each other for twenty-eight years. On this occasion Chang Chien talked about one of his pet projects, the Huai River Conservancy Scheme.

Chang had been interested in taming Huai River since 1887 but without success nor opportunity. This is why Chang Chien discussed with Yuan the control of Huai River on this occasion. More importantly, in this meeting, these two men discussed future Chinese politics. Yuan, Shih-k'ai expressed his feeling that once he reappeared in the central government, he liked to act according to the opinions of Chang Chien and the public. Chang Chien and Yuan, Shih-k'ai reached an understanding that they would be co-operating in politics in the future. After this pleasantly nostalgic meeting, Chang wrote in his diary:

We talked about the past and the present. I found that, after an interval of 28 years, his powers of judgment and observation had become both mature and incisive. He is head and shoulders above the lot (Jih-chih, 2674).

It is exaggerated to say that on this occasion he had already discussed with Yuan Shih-k'ai the future abdication of the Ch'ing court. But it is significant that at that time these two men had reached an understanding on Chinese politics and intended to co-operate in the future. And this sowed the seed for Chang Chien to negotiate between the North and the South later in 1911-1912 in terms of the election of Yuan Shih-k'ai as president and the abdication of Ch'ing court in exchange for some concession from the Republican government.

The next day, June 8th 1911, Chang reached Peking, arriving a day earlier than the original schedule in order to avoid the elaborate welcome which various organizations had planned for him. On June 11th, he received word through Prince Ch'ing that the Regent, Prince Ch'un, the father of the infant Hsuan-t'ung Emperor, wished to see him two days later on June 13th. Chang Chien accordingly first paid a visit to Duke Tsai-tse, the Minister of Finance in order to make clear that he was not seeking an official appointment. The actual audience with the Regent took place on the evening of the thirteenth. The audience lasted more than three quarters of an hour (Jih-chi, 2676-2678).

Within a few days Chang Chien had fulfilled his original mission, obtaining the necessary approval from Duke Tsai-tse for the establishment of the joint bank and joint steamship line. However, the 1911 revolution which broke out later in the year cut short the scheme, and it never materialized.

Chang Chien went to Wu-ch'ang to help draw up the operating regulations of the Ta Wei Cotton Mill scheme some two months after he had returned to Nant'ung from the north. He arrived there on October 4th. On the evening of the ninth two revolutionaries were arrested by the authorities. The city gates were closed immediately while authorities sought to round up other revolutionaries. At ten o'clock on the morning of the tenth the gates were finally opened. Chang Chien promptly went across the river to Hankow. That evening he boarded ship for his return trip to Nant'ung. When he boarded the ship at eight o'clock, he could see across the river burning of an engineering corps camp just outside Wu-ch'ang. The river was too wide at this point for him to hear any distant sounds, but seven miles downstream he could still see the horizon bright with the reflected glow of the conflagration.

On the evening of the eleventh the boat arrived at Anking, the capital of Anhwei Province. Next morning Chang Chien went ashore to call on Governor Chu, Chia-pao to discuss the Huai River Conservancy Scheme. It was then that he learned that Wu-ch'ang had fallen to the revolutionaries on the previous evening. Anking was then in a most precarious position, as there was a shortage of ready funds for emergencies, and the new style troop stationed there were rife with revolutionary sentiment and could not be relied upon. Under the circumstances Chang Chien gave up any hope of pursuing the subject of controlling the Huai and left Anking that evening. The following night his boat tied up together with a later arrival, from the passengers of which Chang Chien got details of the events of the ninth and tenth in Wu-ch'ang.

At this moment, Chang Chien still supported the Ch'ing government and undertook the work of saving the Manchu Dynasty from revolution. He reached Nanking on October 14th and went directly to T'ieh-liang, who was the commanding general of the region at the time. He urged the Manchu general to send troops at once to Hupeh and to memorize the government for the immediate establishment of a constitutional government. But T'ieh-liang evaded the issue by asking Chang Chien to refer the matter to Chang Jen-chun, the governor-general of Liang-kiang. This Chang Chien did on the following day. Governor-general Chang, however, not only treated the proposal to urge the establishment of a constitutional government with great contempt, but refused even to entertain the notion of sending troops to the aid of the authorities in Hupei.

On 16th October he went to Soochow, where Ch'en Te-ch'uan, the governor of Kiangsu, backed his proposal and asked him to draft a memorial to be sent to the imperial Court. That evening he and two of his fellow constitutionalists, Lei-feng and Yang, T'ing-tung, worked jointly until midnight before the memorial was done. It was sent to Peking in the name of Governor-general Ch'en, The-ch'un and governor Sun Pao-ch'i of

From his writings as the following you can see, Chang Chien attributes his change from a constitutional monarchist to a republican to world situation, public opinion, peace security, avoidance of chaos, and consideration over territories, nations, people's thinking, and theories of statesmen.

In 1911:

Now the war has happened and the prefects and the counties have collapsed. Considering the world situation and the trend of public opinion, the only way to secure peace for the country and to avoid chaos is to accept republicanism ... we would rather integrate nationalism into republicanism so that people may avoid chaos of war (Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 40b-41a).

and again in 1911 Chang Chien pointed out the fact that he had promoted the constitutional monarchy for ten years, however, he had no choice but to accept republicanism in accordance with time and tide (Chang Chien Research Center, 1994:180). And again in 1911, in a telegraph to the cabinet, he recommended republicanism:

Since inception of the 1911 revolution, I have remarked that without fundamental political reform, chaos of war cannot be eliminated. For the previous month, I have alone considered this issue seriously, I have discussed this issue with the talented, I have consulted public opinions on this issue, I have pondered issues over territories, nations, people's thinking, theories of statesmen from home and abroad, and I have compared monarchical constitutionalism with republicanism of different counties ... Within one month, the republicanism has spread over the country and has been accepted overwhelmingly by the people ... For the benefit of the Manchurian, the Hans, the Mongolian, the Tibetan and the Muslims, I think your majesty had better follow public opinion and give up the throne for the republicanism(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 41b-42a).

"Public Opinion" here is worth mentioning, according to political scientists, "Public opinion is the sum of private opinions of which government officials are aware and take into account in making their decisions"(Austin Ranney, 2001:115); and "Public opinion clearly plays a major role in modern democracy"(Michael G. Roskin et.al, 2008:134). Chang Chien here referred "public opinion" to the opinion of the talented (the elite, the intellectual, the scholar gentry) including the constitutionalists and the revolutionaries.

And on November 27th in 1911, in a letter to his friend Hsu, Ting-lin, a member of Kiangsu Provisional Assembly who had stayed in Peking advocating the convening of parliament, Chang Chien pointed out the fact that there would no peace unless republicanism:

Now the situation is urgent, people are suffering, and a peaceful solution to avoid chaos is

imperative. Republicanism has become a consensus for the southern provinces to achieve peace, and I can not reverse the trend. Please come back to the south and you will understand the situation. The name of the Kiangsu Provisional Assembly has changed into Kiangsu Legislative Assembly and hence there is no need for you to stay in Peking any more (Yang Li-ch'iang, 1987:25-26).

As to the issue concerning the quality of Chinese citizens at that time to meet a republican political system, Chang Chien was optimistic and said in 1911 in his article entitled "The Reasons Why We Should Establish a Republican Political System":

The quality of the citizens in a nation is produced by the political system of that nation. The "quality of citizens" is a product whilst "political system" is a productive machine. Where there is a republican political system, there are qualified republican citizens.... When Chinese citizens have not broken away from a monarchical monarchy, they have no choice but to accept constitutional monarchy. However, once Chinese citizens have broken away from a constitutional monarchy, they are able to accept a republic. This is due to the fact of national situation (Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 43a-43b).

However, later in 1912, he made a complaint about inferior quality of Chinese citizens:

Today the voices of Republicanism have spread all over the country, however, impermissible behaviours occur frequently due to inferior standard of Chinese citizens caused by inadequate education of the Ch'ing government. Now, it is the time for us to change the course of education for better (Chiu-lu, Chiao Yu Lu, chuan 3, 13a).

Finally in 1923, Chang Chien believed that quality of Chinese citizens had failed to meet republicanism:

The foreigners who discuss my country's political system often say that because Chinese education has not yet been universal and hence the ordinary people's knowledge has not matched the requirement of Republicanism. At first, I doubted about this opinion, however, later I believed half of it, then later, I believed it, and finally, now I firmly believe it(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 6, 8a).

At first, Chang Chien thought that once there is a republican form of nation, there will be qualified republican people; later, he doubted it; and finally he realized that without qualified republican citizens, republican political system would be impossible to be operated. He had witnessed political turmoil in the warlords period, and hence he realized that despite the establishment of a republic, Chinese democratic political culture had not been established yet.

And again in 1911, Chang Chien misquoted the theory of Rousseau of France and Lao-tzu of ancient China to support his republican point of view :



I have seriously taken into consideration and have discussed comprehensively with friends the matter on political reform for the past month after the 1911 Revolution ...Rousseau said that it was difficult for the central government to control over a vast nation, and Lao-tzu said that to govern a nation was like to cook a small fish. And these are the evidences to support the view that such a huge nation like China should adopt self-government under a republic. The constitutional monarchy was suitable only to a small country made up of a single race ...such as Japan. Republicanism is the most suitable to a country with vast territory, composed of different races and thus having different customs...such as the United States(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 41b).

And again in his article entitled "Why We Should Establish A Republican Political System", Chang Chien said:

A nation with vast territory is most suitable to adopt self-government under a republic. To prove this in theory, Rousseau's Social Contract says that it is difficult for the central government to control over a vast nation. The European counties as well as the United States of America have all adopted Rousseau's style of Local self-government under the Federal system. To prove this in practice, the United States of America, with more vast territory than China, has initiated and achieved democracy remarkably by adopting self-government under a republic(Chiu-lu, Cheng Wen Lu, chuan 3, 43b).

Chang Chien's knowledge about Rousseau's political theory was vague and superficial. In fact, Rousseau preferred a small nation (not a large nation) under a republic; and Lao-tzu's theory of "governing a nation is like cooking a small fish" is irrelevant to republicanism at all. Nevertheless, Chang Chien indeed tried hard to explain why he had changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican.

Chang Chien's son, Chang Hsiao-jo also explained why his father had changed from a constitutional monarchist to a republican:

Taking into consideration of the public opinion, and the situation after the 1911 Revolution, my father had no choice but to accept republicanism, so that chaos might be avoided (Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930: 157, 159).

The following authors also gave interpretations: Chang K'ai-yuan from the people's Republic of China, in 1963, attributed Chang Chien's change to his bourgeois attitude to property (Chang K'ai-yuan, 1963:100) ; But later in 1986 and in 2000, he changed his stand-point and attributed Chang Chien's change to his pragmatic attitude on politics, his wise judgment on the situations and his flexibility in following the tide of history(Chang kai-yuan, 1986: 240-241; 2000:238-239). And in 2002 in their book entitled "Chang Chien and Modern Society", Chang K'ai-yuan and T'ian T'ung attribute Chang Chien's

change to Ch'en, Teh-ch'uan and T'ang Shou-ch'ian, his friends' influence upon him, the time and tide upon him, and his intention to maintain peace for economic development (Chang K'ai-yuan & T'ian T'ung, 2002:482-486). Hsu Lun, from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang's change to a scheme of stealing the fruit of the revolution from the revolutionaries by penetrating their camp (Hsu Lun, 1962:413). Li Shih-Yueh, from the People's Republic of China, shared the same view above with Hsu Lun (Li Shih-Yueh, 1962: 71, 74). Chen Yu-ch'ing also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang's shift to his disappointment with the Ch'ing government, the influence of his friends such as T'ang, Shou-ch'ien upon him, and his willingness to accept a peaceful settlement (Chen Yu-ch'ing, 1988:76-79). Wu Yi-yeh, also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang's shift to his acceptance of the existing fact caused by the revolution and his dislike to Ch'ing government's insincerity on constitutional reform (Wu Yi-yeh, 1993:44).

Yen Hsueh-hsi also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang Chien's change to his flexibility to follow the time and tide so that division and chaos could be avoided (Yen Hsueh-hsi, 1996:244-245). Hou Yi-chieh, also from the People's Republic of China, attributed Chang Chien's change mainly to his despair with the Ch'ing government (Hou Yi-chieh,2000:195-196). Wang Tun-Ch'in attributed Chang Chien's change to his political adjustment to new situation, and had this to say:

Chang Chien's thought has no difference with Sun,Yat-sen's goal for revolution in terms of seeking Democracy in politics, and national industry and commerce development in economics (Wang Tun-Ch'in, 2005:354)

Lu Yao-tung from Taiwan attributed Chang Chien's shift to the impact of the tide of events upon him (Lu Yao-tung, 1980:687). Jerome Ch'en attributed Chang Chien's change to his pragmatic attitude, including the consideration of the security of his property, the maintenance of his prestige and the consistence of his own ideas (Ch'en Jerome, 1983:2298-2303); Kikuo Fujioka attributed Chang Chien's change to his intention to minimize the disaster of the revolution in order to achieve constitutionalism (Fujioka Kikuo,1985:288); Chuzo Ichiko attributed the shift of the gentry, including Chang Chien, to their intentions to protect themselves by nipping any disaster in the bud and managing to seize real political power(Chuzo Ichiko, 1968:311-312); Samuel C. Chu attributed his change to the fact that "Chang Chien represented the large segment of the people which were neither involved directly in the revolutionary activities nor had vested interest in the continued survival of the Ch'ing Dynasty. He had been a leading advocate of constitutionalism up to 1911. When he supported the revolutionary cause after the initial outbreak, he was

acting the part of a typical number of the local gentry of the country, who switched from constitutionalism to republicanism as a means of saving China", and that "Events in early November 1911, however, apparently convinced him of the hopelessness of efforts to shore up the tottering Manchu regime. He forthwith abandoned the constitutionalists' cause, which he had championed for nearly a decade, and threw his support behind the revolutionary movement"(Chu Samuel C., 1965:69, 75); Wong King-kong attributed Chang Chien's change to the "natural development of his progressivism" and said:

Chang Chien was steadfastly to the constitutional movement in China. His shift from support of limited monarchy to support of republicanism was only the natural development of his progressivism. His fundamental ideal was a democratic China with a constitutional government. During the imperial days Chang Chien, like other constitutional monarchists, was concerned only about the calling of a parliament and the organization of a responsible cabinet. After the establishment of the republic, his attention was transferred to the promotion of party activities and the establishment of a constitution (Wong King-kong, 1957:62);

And Chang P'eng-yuan attributed Chang Chien's change to the fact that there was "no basic difference between the two political groups in their ideal of representative government", "The constitutionalists did not wish to witness a China divided and in chaos", and as "it was apparent that the constitutionalists intended to control the situation themselves" (Chang P'eng-yuan, 1968:181-182); Ta Fu-hui attributed Chang Chien's change to his intention to avoid the chaos of war so as to maintenance social order (Ta Fu-hui, 1970:29); Shen Yun-lung said that Chang Chien, former speaker of the Kiangsu provincial assembly and outstanding leader of the constitutionalists in the Ch'ing dynasty, had different views from the revolutionaries, however, he had finally cooperated with the revolutionaries due to the Ch'ing government's reluctance to sincere constitutional reform (Shen, Yun-lung, 1971:275).

From the above mentioned you can see, his disappointment with the Ch'ing government, the influence of his friends upon him, his flexibility to follow the time and tide, his pragmatic attitude, his intention to minimize the disaster of the revolution in order to achieve constitutionalism, no basic difference between the two political groups in their ideal of representative government, the constitutionalists intended to control the situation themselves, and the natural development of his progressivism, are all persuasive factors leading to Chang Chien's change.

However, the underlying reason that Chang Chien's political thought with flexibility was to allow industry, education and self-government to be developed whether under a constitutional monarchy or a

republic should be taken into consideration. Chang Chien advocated the practice of industry, education, and self-government, and hence a suitable funds and a stable society were important for him, his main concern was to obtain a suitable milieu for the development of industry, education, and self-government. Thus the consideration of economic property and social stability, of course, were reasonable. Chang Chien, with a sense of the prestige and responsibility of the traditional scholar-gentry, intended to participate and control the situation in order to avoid possible chaos. The best way to save China in that situation, he thought, was to support the powerful Yuan, Shih-k'ai as president of the Republic of China at the expense of the Manchu empire and Sun, Yat-sen. Hence, his involvement in the ensuing power struggle was inevitable. Besides, he had made the last ditch efforts to urge the Manchu authorities to make necessary reforms, yet they turned a deaf ear to his requests and thus he was totally disappointed with the Manchu regime. In addition, he frequently discussed matters with his talented contemporaries including the constitutionalists and the revolutionaries in Shanghai and thus was influenced by them after the revolution.

Hence it would be unfair to attribute Chang Chien's change only to his personal ambition to maintain his property, his prestige, or to attain political power. Essentially, it was also due to his pragmatic attitude and his political thought with flexibility which allow him to work out industry, education, and self-government for China whether under a constitutional monarchy or, the same, a republic.

In short, we can summarize the reasons attributing to Chang Chien's change as follows:

a) *Chang Chien's Political Thought With Flexibility*

Chang Chien's main concern was industry, education and local self-government, and he wanted to achieve and expand them under a stable government irrespective of a constitutional monarchy or a republic, and this is the most important point. As the above mentioned, with the pragmatic and reciprocal aspects of Confucian ideas serving the people, adjusting to China's concrete situations, Chang Chien developed his political thought firstly, saving China by industry (from 1866); secondly, saving China by industry and education (1895-1900); thirdly saving China by industry, education and self-government (1901-1903); fourthly saving China by industry, education, self-government under a constitutional monarchy (1903-1911); and lastly, saving China by industry, education, self-government under a republic (1911-1926). Hence Chang Chien's political thought with flexibility is the underlying reason leading to his change to a republican.

b) *His Pragmatic Attitude to Face Situation*

He had no choice but to accept the fact that revolution had broken out and that most of the provinces had declared independence, and lots of the

constitutionalists had changed their attitude toward republican, and he could not reverse the trend. Even his home county of Nant'ung and home province of Kiangsu were under the threats of troops in Nanking. He was concerned with the safety of his own county and province. He thought that the only way to stabilize the society was to accept the republic in order to avoid chaos so as to achieve his industry, education and local self-government program.

c) His despair with the Ch'ing government

He was very much disappointed at the Ch'ing government's insincerity toward constitutional reform. His background made it impossible for him to lead an uprising, but he could accept the fact of revolution and independence of provinces. Although he had no ambition in catching political power, he had to get involved in politics. He found a solution by supporting Yuan, Shih-kai as president of the republic in exchange for the abdication of Ch'ing court under some concession (Sun Shun-chih, 1991:330-332). In comparison with other intellectuals during the period from October 10 1911 to February 1912, Chang Chien's reaction to the 1911 revolution stands for the response of some relatively conservative intellectuals to the impact of the tide of events. After the 1911 revolution, most of the provinces declared their independence from Peking by the constitutionalists such as T'ang, Shou-ch'ien in Chekiang and T'an, Yian-k'ai in Hunan. The constitutionalists declared their independence with the purposes of protecting their native homeland and of achieving constitutionalism by way of revolution such as Chang Chien (Chang Peng-yuan, 1983:191). Chang Chien had close contact with the Constitutionalists Ch'en, Teh-ch'uan, T'ang, Shou-ch'ien and revolutionaries such as Huang, Hsing, Hu, Han-min, Sung, Chiao-jen, and Wang, Ching-wei in this period and they have been influenced by one another.

VI. CHANG CHIEN'S DECISIVE ROLE DURING THE NORTH-SOUTH NEGOTIATION

In his "Revolution by Diplomacy: A Re-examination of the Shanghai Conference of 1911", Australian scholar Louis Sigel has put emphasis on "revolution by diplomacy":

"The Revolution of 1911 was not much of a revolution: There was no fundamental overthrow of the existing social order, nor was there a significant shift in the allocation of political or economic power at the local level. Without the backing of a well-organized movement, the revolutionaries achieved a dominant role in the ending of imperial rule and the establishment of a successful political order in only four provinces-Kwangtung, Anhwei, Kiangsi and Hunan. Thanks to a shortage of defenders of the throne's interest, the Revolution was a relatively bloodless affair. The precipitate cease-fire and general acceptance of a

political rather than military solution reflected widespread acceptance, almost from the start of the eventual solution - a republic under Yuan Shih-k'ai" (Sigel Louis, 1979:111).

The nature of 1911 Revolution is debatable, one says that it is a revolution by diplomacy; another says that it is an all-people revolution (Chang Yu-fa, 1988:52,72); the other says that it is a bourgeoisie revolution (Wu Yu-chang, 1961:26); still other says that it is just a dynastic revolution:

"The Revolution of 1911 turns out to be a dynastic revolution. This supposition is supported by two facts. One is that what attracted students, secret societies, and officers and soldiers of the New Army to the Revolution was nothing more than the anti-Manchu racism in Sun Yat-senism. The other is that no great economic and social changes can be detected between the period before and after the Revolution. Of course, there was some progress in industrialization, but this may be explained as natural growth than the result of the Revolution" (Chuzo Ichiko, 1968:313).

and still other says:

Nevertheless it is equally difficult, despite the role played by conservative elements, to regard the 1911 Revolution simply as a traditional rebellion bringing about the fall of one dynasty and the founding of another. This revolution, although it followed the traditional pattern, had a new set of slogans, such as democracy, liberty, and national independence" (Bergere Marie-Claire, 1968:294).

All the above scholars are able to justify their arguments wisely with evidences. However, there is no doubt that the 1911 Revolution was able to be achieved mainly due to the success of the South North Negotiation among all parts struggling for power and interests. Without the success of the South North Negotiation, the 1911 Revolution might have been pacified by Yuan, Shih-k'ai, the prime minister of the Ch'ing Court, and the birth of the Republic of China would not be possible. Of course, Yuan, Shih-k'ai had taken into consideration of his own best interest and accepted the negotiation so as to become the president of the Republic of China. The 1911 Revolution indeed was accomplished by negotiation and it can be said that it was a "revolution by diplomacy".

Once Chang Chien had changed to a republican, he worked wholeheartedly behind the scene to achieve the north-south negotiation. On 11th January 1912, a time of deadlock between the south and the north, Chang Chien wrote two articles entitled "ko-ming Lun (On Revolution)" in which he concluded that there were four kinds of revolution in Chinese history, namely "sheng-hsian (the sages) revolution", "hao-chie (the heroic) revolution", "ch'uan-chian (the power stolen) revolution", and "tao-chei (the villain) revolution", and the cases of the sages revolution and the heroic revolution

were very rare in Chinese history but most of the cases of revolution were the power-stolen revolution and the Villain revolution as a result of the despotic political system of China. He suggested the revolutionaries to follow the cases of the sages and the heroic revolutions, but not the power-stolen and the villain revolution (Chiu-lu, Wen Lu, chuan 3, 5b-7b). In this sense, though his theory on revolution is still within the scope of traditional China for his inclination of "the sages and the heroic revolutions", Chang Chien had already expressed out clearly his hate of "despotic political system of China".

On the surface, the North-South negotiation was conducted by the representatives led by T'ang,Shao-i, chief representative of Yuan,Shih-k'ai, and by the representatives led by Wu,T'ing-fang, the chief representative of Sun Yat-sen. However, in fact, Chang Chien had played a leading role behind the scene during the North-South negotiation in 1911-1912. He connected with Yuan,Shih-k'ai who then controlled the Peking government, and he was also respected by the revolutionaries due to his great prestige and influence in the society and achievement in industry and in education. Before T'ang Shao-i went south for peace conference, Yuan,Shih-k'ai secretly advised T'ang that Chang Chien's opinion should be consulted firstly. On 10, January 1912, Chang Chien sent Yuan a secret telegraph indicating that the South had no choice but to set up a provisional government with the hope of unifying respective provinces and this was merely a temporary solution, and that the provincial president Sun,Yat-sen had already declared that he would resign his provincial presidency immediately after the abdication of the Ch'ing government (Yang Li-ch'ang, 1987:28). And on 14, January 1912 Chang Chien again sent a secret telegraph to Yuan,Shih-k'ai to confirm him that Yuan would be surely elected as the president of the Republic by the republicans in the south immediately after the abdication of the Manchu throne (Chiu-lu, Chen Wen Lu, chuan 4,1a). After several secret telegraphs between Chang Chien and Yuan,Shih-k'ai, on 27, January forty-seven northern military leaders including Tuan,Ch'i-jui declared their inclination of a republic and this was a help in forcing the abdication of the Ch'ing regime (Hsu Lun, 1962:423).

At this time Hu,Han-min, a leading revolutionary, sought out Chang Chien to draft an abdication decree. Chang Chien after consulting with his colleagues about this matter, turned the draft over to Hu, who, after obtaining T'ang,Shao-yi's approval in the matter, sent it to Yuan,Shih-k'ai. Subsequently this draft, after a bit revision, was published as the cabinet's decree, signifying the willingness of the throne to abdicate(Chang Hsiao-jo, 1930:144-145).

During the period of the South-North negotiation, Ti,Pao-hsien's Hsi-lou and Chao,Feng-ch'ang's Hsi-yin-t'ang (both private studies) were two places in Shanghai where the constitutionalists such as

Chang Chien, Ch'en,Teh-ch'uan, T'ang,Shou-ch'en and revolutionaries such as Huang,Hsing, Hu,Han-min, Sung,Chiao-jen, and Wang,Ching-wei met with one another, the private talks were often held there. Chang Chien was a key figure between the North and the South, the peace negotiation envoys often came to ask his opinions, the doomed Manchu authorities received polite compensation (Lu Yao-tung, 1980:694-695). Without Chang Chien's participation, the North-South negotiation might not have been concluded so successfully. The abdication decree read as follows:

We have received from the Empress Dowager Lung-yu an edict as the following:

Because of the uprising by the Army of the People, with the cooperation of the people of the provinces, the one answering the other like an echo, the whole empire is in turmoil and the people have endured much tribulation. I therefore specially appointed Yuan, Shih-k'ai to instruct commissioners to confer with the representatives of the Army of the people about convening a national assembly, at which the future of the government should be decided. For the past two months, there has been a wide divergence of opinion between the north and the south, each strongly maintaining its own view; the general results have been the stagnation of trade and the deployment of troop. As long as the form of government remains undecided, unrest will continue in the country. It is clear that the majority of the people favour the establishment of a republican form of state; the southern and central provinces first held this view, and lately the officers in the north have adopted the same sentiments. This universal desire clearly expresses the will of Heaven, and it is not for us to oppose the desires and incur the disapproval of millions of the people merely for the sake of the privileges and powers of a single house. It is right that the general situation should be considered and due deference given to the opinion of the people. With the Emperor at my side, I hereby hand over the sovereignty to the people as a whole and declare that the constitution shall henceforth be republican, wishing to satisfy the demands of those within the confines of the country, hating disorder and desiring peace, and anxious to follow the teaching of the sages, according to which the country is the possession of the people. Yuan, Shih-k'ai, having been elected Prime Minister some time ago by the Political Consultative Council, is able at this time of change to unite the north and the south. Let him then, with full power to do so, organize a provisional republican government, conferring therein with the representatives of the army of the people, and that peace may be assured to the people, and that the complete integrity of the territories of the five races-Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Muhammandans, and Tibetans- is the same time maintained in a great state under the title of the Republic of China. The Emperor and I, will retire into a life of leisure, free from public

duties, spending our years pleasantly, enjoying the courteous treatment accorded to us by the people, and watching with satisfaction the glorious establishment and consummation of the perfect government (Ch'ai Teh-keng, 1957:183; Liu Hou-sheng, 1963:262-263; Sun Shun-chih, 2010:77-78).

The documents was sealed with the imperial seal and signed by all the members of the cabinets: Prime Minister Yuan, Shih-k'ai, Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs Hu, Wei-the, Minister of the Interior Chao, ping-ch'un, Acting Minister of Finance Shao, ying, Minister of Education T'ang, Ching-ch'ung, Minister of the Army Wang, Shih-chen, Acting Minister of the Navy T'ang, Hsueh-heng, Minister of Justice Shen, Chia-pen, Acting Minister of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce His, yen, Acting Minister of Communication Liang, Shih-l, and Minister of Suzerainty Ta, shou.

There are two issues needed to be mentioned. Firstly, This document was far from an unconditional surrender to Nanking. It did not even recognize the existence of provincial government, instead referring to revolutionaries as the Army of the People. It instructed Yuan, Shih-k'ai to organize a provincial republican government in order to unify the north and the south. Yuan himself inserted the phrase "with full power so to do". So it was Yuan rather than the Nanking government who inherited the Will of Heaven (Chen Jerome, 1972:102). And secondly, indeed, the Ch'ing emperor was forced to give up his throne, not voluntarily, but this decree says that it is the willingness of the emperor to give his power to a more suitable person, and this is compatible to Chinese traditional political culture of "saving face".

The conditions for the abdication were three: (1) Favourable treatment was to be extended to the emperor after abdication in that he would retain his original title of emperor, would be cordially treated by the Republic as the ruler of a foreign country, would be supported in his annual expenses, amounting to four million dollars, by the Republic of China, would continue to live in the palace, be allowed to keep his guards, and be assured of protection for his ancestral temples and the property of the imperial family. (2) Favourable treatment would be extended to the members of the royal family, who could continue to enjoy their hereditary titles, the same privileges as Chinese citizens, protection of their private properties, and exemption from military service. (3) The Manchus, Mongolians, Mohammedans, and the Tibetans were all to have equal rights with the Chinese, to receive protection of their original private property, to enjoy their hereditary titles, and to receive subsidies for the poor. In addition, all of these peoples were to enjoy freedom of worship. All these articles were listed in official documents the contents of which were made known to the foreign ministers in Peking (Teng Ssu-yu and Jeremy Ingalls, 1956:267).

V. CONCLUSION

The reasons leading to Chang Chien's change were complicated. However, the underlying reason could be attributed to his political thought with flexibility that industry, education and self-government which were able to be achieved under whether a constitutional monarchy or a republic.

The second main reason should be attributed to his pragmatic attitude. He had no choice but to accept the fact that revolution had broken out and that most of the provinces had declared independence, and lots of the constitutionalists had changed their attitude toward republican, and he could not reverse the trend. Even his home county of Nant'ung and home province of Kiangsu were under the threats of troops in Nanking. He was concerned with the safety of his own county and province. He thought that the only way to stabilize the society was to accept the republic in order to avoid chaos so as to achieve his industry, education and local self-government program.

The third main reason should be attributed to his despair with the Ch'ing government. His Chuan-yuan (the first place of the traditional Chinese civil service examination) background made it impossible for him to lead an uprising, but he could accept the fact of revolution. Although he had no ambition in obtaining political power, he had to get involved in politics. Therefore he found a solution by supporting Yuan, Shih-k'ai as president of the republic in exchange for the abdication of Ch'ing court under some concession. Behind the scene during the period of North-South negotiation 1911-1912, Chang Chien had played a very important role.

The North - South Negotiation of December 1911 to February 1912 was the key to success of the 1911 Revolution. Without the success of the South North Negotiation, the Chinese Republic might have not been established so successfully, of course, Yuan, Shih-kais had taken his own best interest into consideration, and behind the scene, Chang Chien had played a decisive role in accordance with the trend, in the process of the North - South Negotiation.

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GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Brands of Gender in the Jewish Immigration in Southern Brazil

By Bruna Muhlen

Abstract - The research from this study aimed to open the way to be possible to tell the history of migration and the consequences of oppression and discrimination of the Jews who immigrated to southern Brazil, which in its migration process have a particular ritual acculturation, leading into account its importance in the formation of Brazilian society.

GJHSS-F Classification : FOR Code: 220404, 160699



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



Brands of Gender in the Jewish Immigration in Southern Brazil

Bruna Muhlen

I. INTRODUCTION

This study aims to investigate the identity, culture, and gender in the process of Jewish immigration in southern Brazil, from interviews already conducted with immigrants and descendants of Jewish immigrants, in the light of the geography of gender and feminist geography.

The research from this study aimed to open the way to be possible to tell the history of migration and the consequences of oppression and discrimination of the Jews who immigrated to southern Brazil, which in its migration process have a particular ritual acculturation, leading into account its importance in the formation of Brazilian society.

The social process of Jewish immigration in southern Brazil is a mosaic whose faces are written in each personal account. Such process is collective, though it is a sum of the parts of each immigrant experiences, of the emotions experienced in the departure and in the arrival and life in Brazil.

II. THE JEWISH IMMIGRATION IN SOUTHERN BRAZIL

Jewish immigration started from the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to South America, specifically for the countries of Argentina and Brazil, showing similarities with regard to the occupation of space, since both had roots in colonization agriculture.

Jews have always suffered persecution. In Europe, more specifically in Russia, called pogroms - looting and destruction of houses - are part of the memory of this ethnic group and emerges in situations of instability and violence (Gutfreind, 2010). The consequence of the persecutions was the immigration process (ICJMC, 1991). Thus, in 1891, in order to help Jews facing persecution, was founded the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA - called ICA) by Baron de Hirsch, to establish a methodical and orderly expatriation of Russian Jews.

Brazil was one of the countries chosen by the JCA. The beginning was made in the province of South Brazil, seen as suitable for the establishment of rural settlements, with fertile land for agriculture, which were purchased land for the creation of the Colony of Philippson, close to the city of Santa Maria, and the

colony of Quatro Irmãos, near of the city of Erechin (Cruz, 2009). The beginning of this settlement was in 1904, when the Colony of Philippson received the first immigrants (Gutfreind, 2009). Thus fleeing anti-Semitic persecution in Europe, besides that during the Second World War, Jews were under intense persecution and annihilation (Póvoa, 2005).

The JCA acquired firstly about 5,767 hectares of land, 25 km distant from Santa Maria city. Between the years 1904-1924, the JCA formed a second agricultural colony beyond Phillipson, the Colony of Quatro Irmãos. This colony was more successful, in that area, the settlers have shown a tendency for a better adaptation of Jewish social life. However, due to the philanthropic system of the JCA direction, unsuitable for the development of such company, and lack of stimulation, Quatro Irmãos settlers began to immigrate to the city, before they can form a layer of real farmers (Póvoa, 2005).

Immigrants have become disillusioned by the lack of attention of governments of Brazil, in particular in the South of Brazil, who does not follow the deal done with JCA. The ambition for a more comfortable life and the desire to achieve a better economic situation led the colonists to develop a small agricultural trade in the adjacent villages and abandon the farming, settling in cities like Porto Alegre, Santa Maria, Uruguaiana, Erechim, Pelotas and Passo Fundo (Póvoa, 2005).

In 1937, the Constitution said, about immigration, that the Union had the right to "limit or suspend, for economic or social reasons, the entry of individuals of certain races or origins, hearing the Board of Immigration and Colonization." After the end of the Second World War, the Law 7.967, in September 1945, said in Article 1 that "Every foreigner may enter Brazil provided it meets the conditions of this law" that were under Article 2 "the need to preserve and develop the ethnic composition of the population, the most convenient features of their European ancestry" (Zamberlam, 2004). In times of war, there was an anti-Jewish immigration policy in Brazil, inspired by Fascist Letters from Italy and Poland (Berdichewski, 2001).

In 1938, the decree-law 383 forbade the foreigners any political activity, under penalty of deportation, and in 1939 was required that newspapers and publications in foreign language publish its translation in the vernacular. This requirement was not fulfilled by Jewish newspapers. Already in 1941, was

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completely banned from publication in a foreign language and the two daily Yiddish were closed, never to reopen (Póvoa, 2005).

Discrimination affected all ethnic minorities, but especially hurt the Jewish social life, which was reduced to only activities permitted by law: the religious and charitable. In this period were also prohibited the activities of the Zionist Organization, the most dynamic, ideologically, the most representative of the Jewish community. The Jewish social life was reduced to its simplest expression (Lesser, 1995).

The progress of Jewish life was interrupted and immigrant Jews were spiritually inert until 1945. In 1946 new democratic tendencies manifested themselves in the country and strict laws were relaxed and Jewish life began to beat again in Brazil (Póvoa, 2005).

III. GEOGRAPHY OF GENDER AND FEMINIST GEOGRAPHY

The Geography of Gender treats gender as a dimension of social life that should be incorporated into existing structures, in addition to examining the ways in which political processes, environmental and sociopolitical create, reproduce and transform places we live in and the social relations in which men and women live beyond expressions in space. In Jewish immigration from Europe to Brazil is in the geographic space that happens the social and gender construction, gender roles and gender relations are distinct in different territorial spaces, and differential experiences of space between men and women can be observed from a local scale - everyday space - until a global - international migratory movements (Martinez; Moya et al., 1995).

Already Feminist Geography are feminist research in geography that aim to mitigate inequalities based on gender in the short term and long term eradicate them through social change, seeking a transformation not only in the geography, but also in the way we live and work. Since geography is everywhere, the discussions between gender and spatiality are an interesting way to open our minds to this broad, rich and complex world (Martinez; Moya et al., 1995; Ornat, 2008).

The feminist point of view of the observer transpires in his growing sensitivity to centralize "gender" as a hierarchy category that stratifies all moments of the migration process for all those involved, men and women (Kosminsky, 2007).

When dealing with gender, we must avoid the fallacy that gender relates only to women, since gender is a relational category. So, always take as allusion to the relationship between women and men. Include gender as a mediator category in migration studies allows the researcher information of the causes, processes and consequences of international migration, allowing also an extension of the relationship between

the local and the global. When gender is brought to the front of migration studies, several issues may arise, including, how women and men experience immigration differently and how this fact interferes in their integration and adaptation (Kosminsky, 2004).

Where as the world is structured around two poles, male and female, these gender roles would be reworked daily, demonstrating its instability characteristic, temporality and spatiality (Butler, 2003). These roles are supported by the enforcement to the bodies of the linearity of sex-gender-desire, because it is expected that bodies appointed as male or female play corresponding roles of masculinity and femininity, but sex goes far beyond a fact, is constructed culturally by the societies, and therefore changeable, variable, and open to change. And through cultural relationships and everyday interactions that sex becomes gender, from spatiotemporal specific constructions. Such relationship are explicable when associated to the set of ideas that a specific culture builds about what it is to be man or woman, a set of behaviors that are expected of people, differentiated in space and time (Ornat, 2008).

Conceptualizing "gender" as a process open to change denotes produce a more praxis-oriented perspective, in which gender identities, relations and ideologies are fluid and not fixed. Gender is a key factor that organizes social life, and has worked since the beginning of human existence: a fact that can not be said for most other laminating social forces, such as "class" and "race". However, "gender" can not be seen and analyzed in isolation. More than that, "gender" is dynamic and interacts with other lines of differentiation ("class", "race", "ethnicity", "generation", "sexual orientation"), taking into consideration that all these social differentiation understand power structures. These forces are social constructs and are therefore are not natural or innate characteristics categories. The gender geographical research permits look at gender operating in different aspects of migration (Kosminsky, 2007).

Certain bodies have their identities indicated as different or marginal, and being related to particular spaces, while others are considered normal and often posing as neutral in the dominant discourse (Ornat, 2008). These perspectives extend the possibility of understanding of human migratory movements.

IV. ACCULTURATION

Each migration process implies in an action of acculturation, which can be defined as the process of exchange when groups and individuals from different ethnicities – in this case European Jews of different nationalities and Brazilians - undergo constant contact with each other, and consequently there are cultural changes in individuals (Mühlen; Dewes et al., 2010).

The concepts of gender relations are complementary to acculturation and needed to understand migrations, since being in a new geographical and cultural space causes having to acculturate and thus get rid of gender patterns of the culture of the country of origin. Thus, migration can act as a machine that encourages changes in cultural representations and attitudes relating to gender (Alencar-Rodrigues, Strey et al., 2009).

V. MOBILE IDENTITY

The identity is a multidimensional process, which depends on the time that is conjugated, linking together the past, present and future, while they dissociate spaces, institutions and social category (Bastos, 2007).

Ethnic identity is the source of meaning and experience of a group. Which are differentiated by language and culture that represent them. These distinguishing features represent sources of meanings defined by the people themselves, showing that we are not born with an identity and it is a social construction that depends on the culture in which each person is inserted. Thus, identity is a continuous building process, remaining continuously unfinished (Pedro, 2009).

VI. METHODOLOGY

Because it is a documentary research, the starting point was the contact with the Jewish Cultural Institute Marc Chagall (ICJMC), in the city of Porto Alegre, which has a Department of memory which advocates the preservation of Jewish memory from interviews with immigrants who came from various European countries. Such interviews about immigration are archived in an Oral History Collection, for researchers interested in developing studies on this ethnic group have access to the Collection of ICJMC. Some of the interviews were selected and cataloged in the book of ICMJ "Life Stories - Jewish Immigration in Southern Brazil" Volume I (CHAGALL, 1991). Through the testimonies recorded in that catalogs, this work is based on.

All interviews have a Statement of Consent of Marc Chagall which is signed by each respondent who collaborated or collaborates with his testimony. All measures will be taken, as to care about information that might lead to the identification of respondents, to ensure confidentiality.

VII. TESTIMONIALS

Taking into account the ways in which political processes, environmental and sociopolitical create, reproduce and transform places we live in and the social relations in which men and women live, according to the Geography of Gender, here are some testimonials from immigrants and descendants of immigrants on the difficulties in the immigration process:

- "(...) A few years passed and I along with a group of mates (...) we managed to restore the cemetery Philippson (...). Including my father's grave is there. (...). It was a tribute thus a way for us to thank our parents, our grandparents, what they did for us, the problems they have passed, when they came from Europe to the lands completely unknown." - Son of Russian immigrants.

Being Jewish ethnicities the set of branches of the Jewish community, considering the culture and the countries where they were settled, due to temporal and spatial factors, in addition to mixing and interpreting religious and philosophical, usually every community has different traditions of a group to other. The boundaries of ethnic identities can become more flexible or more rigid in the process of immigration (Poutignat; Streiff-Fenart, 1998), as in the following statement:

- "(...) That situation of being half Jew and half German began to hinder my life here in Brazil ... Led me, arrested me, put me in a field, not concentration, but illegal ..." - German, immigrated to Brazil in 1941.

The Jewish ethnicity discrimination, anti-Semitism, has its origin in the early days of human history, Jews were never considered socially desirable in Brazil during the WWII (Camati, 2009), as noted in the cut below:

- "I talked to a Jew who lives in Brazil. He was in the war in Russia and he managed to get out of Russia ... That was in 1941 ... And just in time to come, he was vetoed, not let him go because he was Jewish. Discrimination was very strong at the time of WWII in Brazil. He has the document that was written that he could not enter because he was Jew." - Son of immigrants.

In Germany discriminatory social representations were produced by Nazi society around the Jewish ethnicity (Tedesco, 2011). And it is in reference to psychological and biological factors that it is the most primitive impulse to reject the other. The politics of intolerance is responsible for anti-Semitism, fascism, communism, Nazism and all other totalitarians of the twentieth century (Camati, 2009), as noted in the speech of Argentine immigrant:

- "The German colony accepted Nazism and the ideas of Nazism. And in Porto Alegre happened a parade of boys with swastika. There were interventions of the German consul and often the Globe Magazine was seized by fascist matters, at the request of the German embassy or Italian." - Argentinean, immigrated in 1921 to Santa Maria.

Jews lived centuries in Europe and did everything to integrate into the local culture, learning the language of the country in which they were installed, leading to rapid social mobility, resulting in significant contributions to the cultural and scientific life to the societies in which they were inserted (Laqueur, 2007). In

Brazil had to go through a new process of acculturation in a different cultural context, as we see in the stories below:

- "In Europe he (father) had nothing, had a dirt floor house and when he came here from Europe, he went to work looking for sowing, because the ICA provided seeds. But he alone could do nothing, he depended on the natives and it was very hard for him, because he did not know the language ... " - A daughter of immigrants.

- "On the ship (...) I learned every day a hundred words, from the Hungarian to Portuguese (...)" - Romanian immigrant arrived in 1942 in Brazil.

The Nazis bet in the people disbelief when people get to know the facts (mass crimes). Were sure that no one would believe that humans would be capable of committing such atrocities, was the "unimaginability" of the Holocaust, its improbability (SANTANA, 2008), as well reports the following interviewee:

- "My father-in-law was in a concentration camp, and my husband went to Rio de Janeiro and asked crying for a visa (...). Then one of those great men said: 'Then give to this Jew, too, the visa' (...) He (the father of the respondent) was a super-German, said had no need to emigrate, that Hitler will take a few months and then disappears and democracy comes back as he was used to (...)" - German Immigrant.

In Europe, even before the Nazis, the Jews have suffered persecution:

- "The Jew, by the history that everyone knows, suffered persecution since the days of Egypt, then the Jews knew that the wealth they could carry was the culture, was a profession ...". - Son of immigrants.

The rise of Nazism provided a model for anti-Semitism - negative stereotypical conceptions about Jews (Lesser, 1995). In 1933, the Nazis, newly elected, organized a one-day boycott to all shops and businesses belonging to Jews in Germany:

- "On the 1st of April was a special day, all Jewish homes, Jewish shops, Jewish offices, etc ... had a man charged with a sign: 'Here do not buy, because the owner is Jew. (...) On July 30, I had lost my job (...). Naturally, it was relatively easy to resolve to leave that country, restricted from activities, always with a certain life-threatening because they were always a bit more aggressive than in the beginning ... ". - German, immigrated to Brazil in 1933.

When they arrived at the camps, Jewish prisoners were divided into groups. The considered too weak to work were immediately killed in the gas chambers (disguised as showers) and their bodies burned, while others were assigned to labor camps where they were used as slaves, then killed by Nazis or by hunger (Finkelstein, 2001), as almost died the Polish immigrant:

- "(...) What fed me is that I was in a wagon with hundreds of prisoners and this wagon was walking as if

we were cattle, and people were dying. They were piling one dead on top of another, and in a corner of the wagon, had a small window and as it was raining, I put my hand and licked my hand, and this was my food. "- Polish who underwent concentration camps.

Being Jewish is not bounded by national origin. Jewish identity is primarily a cultural legacy that, despite saving a certain relationship with the Jewish religion is not bounded by it (Neto, 2008), as is perceived in the the testimony of a Romanian immigrant:

- "The colony was large, the Jews lived very well, on Saturday all closed their houses, went to Shil (Synagogue), like in Europe. (...) "- Romanian, immigrated to Quatro Irmãos with his family.

Immigration can take the challenge of patriarchal culture when we see the issues of gender relations (Kosminsky, 2007). As we note in the reports of the following immigrants:

- "... then we got there (agricultural colonies of ICA), stopped there in that place, had great home, immigrants descended and women in a house, men in another house..." - Russian Immigrant arrived in Brazil in 1913.

The concepts of femininity and masculinity can take on different meanings in different cultures and may be different within the same ethnic group. Immigrant women find themselves further discriminated by a threefold condition of women, immigrants and workers (Martinez; Moya et al., 1995) as in the report below:

- "I was once asked: Your husband is sick? And I said: - No, why? - Because you're working. And I debated: - Need my husband dying for me to work? "

Below can be observed that gender can not be thought of in isolation, because gender interacts with other axes that are also determinants, as the issue of social class:

- "Sometimes we had too much food, sometimes less, but all worked and we were looking to live. Until 1939 that came the Second World War. (...) If I had not survived, the name (family) would have disappeared, because not one of my brothers - (...) - nobody, nobody survived! "- Polish, immigrated to Porto Alegre in 1948.

Migration boost transformations of cultural representations and attitudes relating to gender, as happened with the granddaughter of immigrants, already acculturated (as before were just mothers, today fathers are increasingly present):

- "I worked in Jewish college, was circle of parents and teachers, but at that time was only mothers ..." - Brazilian and granddaughter of settlers Philippon. Usually a migrant leaves his country looking for a better life, as reports a Polish immigrant:

- "(...) The ICA gave everything. What would we lose? Work there and work here, then, as the Bible says, when you change your place will get lucky, who knows? "- Polish Immigrant.

VIII. DISCUSSION

Interesting to note the differences and similarities in the process of immigration since despite being immigrants of the same ethnic group, came from different European countries and at different times. This makes the process of acculturation of each immigrant unique with particular characteristics.

Normally, a migrant leaves his country voluntarily seeking a better life, which has not happened in the case of the immigrants from this study. It was the case of the first Jewish immigrants in southern Brazil, which came with the ICA, at the beginning of the last century. However, those who immigrated because of World War II, because it is people persecuted for reasons of religion that could not go back home, can be configured as refugees.

Interesting to note that regardless of where they came from and when they immigrated, all immigrants went through difficulties. Including children and grandchildren recognize that somehow they are crossed by the experiences of their ancestors.

Also interesting to note that these immigrants and descendants were modified by external causes. In Europe, when they were victims of persecution and had to immigrate; and in Brazil, where they had difficulties to get visa and even run the risk of being placed in camps because they were German Jews and there were policies against the entry of certain races, as provided in the constitution of 1937.

On gender issues, in Brazil in 1913, women went to a house and men to another, to reach the agricultural colony where they would live. Already in Poland before the war in 1939, men and women worked to have food at home. And even recently, Brazilian and granddaughter of settlers experienced situations where Jewish meetings at school, they were for mothers and fathers, but only women participated. In contrast, an immigrant woman to be seen working in Brazil was asked if her husband was ill, implying that for a woman to work (outside the home) only if the man is very ill.

Fortunately, in Brazil, there is growing awareness of gender equality, as realized in the case of meetings of mothers and fathers are actually for men and women, and that work can also be for men and women. That means, independent of issues of space and origin of immigrants, over time, men are gradually assuming roles that were once considered feminine, such as exercise care of a son or a daughter, and women are playing roles that were considered masculine, working outside the home.

IX. FINAL THOUGHTS

Knowing the history of European Jewish immigrants who arrived in South Brazil is necessary, considering that it is one of the ethnic groups that enrich the cultural heritage of Brazilian society.

The value of the Jews to the society who welcomed them is extremely important, because there are few descendants of those immigrants who work in areas of high technology and knowledge in Brazil. As well reported Póvoa (2005) Jews play the role of a Brazilian citizen, but preserve their identity.

As already noted Kominsky (2004), the comparison of immigrants from Europe who settled in particular ways in the same society demonstrated the plasticity of the acculturation process of immigrants in all its richness and variety, and unique aspects of receiving society, in the case of Brazil.

Understanding the path traveled by the civilizations that built our history, that contributed to the ethnic rebuilding of Brazil, from the perspective of gender was and is in this work of fundamental importance, because showed that gender is not only an identity or roles we learned in childhood, but something in continuous movement, influenced by the cultural context.

Finally, professionals - from psychologists to geographers - who are aware of notions of gender and acculturation may be more able to make interventions in the immigrant population.

Researches in gender Geography have sought to understand the methodological issues related to identity, culture, spatiality. And that research on Jewish immigration is a contribution to this still new and new area of geography, but historically old, since gender issues have always existed. Finally, extend the possibilities of realizing the rich diversity of the various ethnic groups that exist in Brazil, and the world, in the light of gender theories.

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GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Politicisation of Education in Nigeria: Implications for National Transformation

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Abstract - Many countries across the world have developed on the wings of their intellectual capacity. For several decades past governments in Nigeria have made futile efforts through several policies and the reshaping of institutional mechanism to revamp the education system. The current deterioration of the Nigerian education sector proves no less good. Several literatures on the education system in Nigeria attributes the deploring condition of the education sector to poor financing, implementation, and monitoring, as well as the copy- syndrome. This paper argues on the contrary that, the problem with the education sector in Nigeria is beyond the identified bottlenecks. The paper contend that politicisation of the education sector based on primordial identities such as ethnicity, religion and godfatherism are rather responsible for the deploring condition of the education system Nigeria, which has multiplier effect on national transformation. The paper concludes that Nigeria"s education will impact positively on the national transformation when the politicisation of the sector along these identities is discouraged and the trend reverted.

GJHSS-F Classification : FOR Code: 940203, 749999p



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



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Politicisation of Education in Nigeria: Implications for National Transformation

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Abstract - Many countries across the world have developed on the wings of their intellectual capacity. For several decades past governments in Nigeria have made futile efforts through several policies and the reshaping of institutional mechanism to revamp the education system. The current deterioration of the Nigerian education sector proves no less good. Several literatures on the education system in Nigeria attributes the deploring condition of the education sector to poor financing, implementation, and monitoring, as well as the copy-syndrome. This paper argues on the contrary that, the problem with the education sector in Nigeria is beyond the identified bottlenecks. The paper contend that politicisation of the education sector based on primordial identities such as ethnicity, religion and *godfatherism* are rather responsible for the deploring condition of the education system Nigeria, which has multiplier effect on national transformation. The paper concludes that Nigeria's education will impact positively on the national transformation when the politicisation of the sector along these identities is discouraged and the trend reverted.

I. Introduction

Education is one of the most crucial sectors in any society, because it is central to the preservation of the society membership.¹ Education as a "process of imparting knowledge, skill and judgement facts, skills and ideas that have been learned, either formally or informally",² forms the basis for human capacity development, both physically and mentally to fit into the society. It is in this context that education is perceived to be the system motivating positive institutional changes and developments³ geared towards creating the required internal solidarity, cohesion and integration of people to achieve the common good for all in the society. Developed countries like United States of America and Britain, and of course, the fast growing countries in Asia, such as China, India, Singapore and Malaysia, and in Africa, for example, Ghana, neighbouring Nigeria, are investing heavily with most sincere commitments to achieve required goals of educational developments. One basic drive for achievements in these countries is the fruitful exchange relations in knowledge production, distribution and commitment of resources to achieving full intellectual employment and development. The case in Nigeria is on the contrary. On the other hand, the government have been

blamed for poor financing of the sector and on the other, educational managers including policy makers, have also been accused of attributing to the deteriorating standard of education in Nigeria basically for lack of effective policy making and management. Beyond these impasses, the sector is suffering from virulent politicisation to untoward tendencies such as ethnicity, religion and *godfatherism* which have become an enduring legacy of colonialism and post-colonial politics in Nigeria.

II. Methodology

The methodology used in this research paper is both observational and historical methods. The choice of these methods is informed by the fact that, observational technique provide not only the ability to perceive events as they occur, but to also provide the opportunity to nose for fine details that may be taken for granted. The decision is also prompted by the attempt to summarise, systematise and simplify the discourse on the subject under consideration.⁴ In addition, the historical technique is also used. The decision is also informed by the need to engage in critical investigation of events, developments and movements, with regard to the thrush of this research across time and space in order to evaluate them given the current situation under investigation.⁵ It is in this context that the observational and historical approaches are considered to be appropriate to appraise politicisation of education system in Nigeria.

III. Theoretical Framework

The neoliberal theory of educational liberalism is used in approaching this paper. The bases for the adoption of the neoliberal theory hinges on the principles of equality and meritocracy. The theory reflects on the multicultural society like Nigeria that is highly diverse in terms of ethnicity, religion and other primordial affiliations. It seeks to promote the ideals of acceptability of such diversities to foster a more democratic educational system and citizenship, where everyone has equal rights and opportunities.

James and Saville-Smith cited in Olszen, Codd and O'Neill, argues that the grounds for educational liberalism is built on "constructing a society in which all are equally eligible to compete for society's position" irrespective of social status or ethnic and religious

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identities of competitors. The theorists aver that primordial identities or status are not decisive in determining the height an individual should attain in the society.⁶ Young concurred that “intelligences and effort” demonstrated in the competitive environment should be the bases, because it produces merit.

He further argue that meritocracy is based on “the believed that intelligence quotient (IQ) plus effort, equals merit”.⁷ The environment that can produce the neo-liberal educational system requires a multi-cultural educational set up – a setting that encourages diversities not only limited to ethnicity and religion as the case is in Nigeria. In such an environment, primordial sentiments are promoted so long it does not compromise the principle of meritocracy as a standard measurement for reward, even when ‘federal character system or quota system’ is used. This applies to recruitment system and admission of students into educational institutions, and other cognate arrangements.

a) Nigerian State Formation and Educational Development

Nigeria is a multicultural state formation. As a modern state formation, as obtained throughout Africa, the current nature of Nigeria is a product of European colonial adventurism and rivalries – a process which was motivated by internal contradictions of capitalist development in the European continent.⁸ To attend to the requirement of capitalist development, the gregarious capitalist nations in the drive to build colonial empires outside their territorial boundaries decided at the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 to partition Africa.⁹ Before their final boundaries were decided, the people who constitute the Nigeria state formation at a point lived in different state formations with different communal characters.¹⁰ They were mutually but also exclusively different in terms of state structures and bio-social relations. The state formations in the era before colonisation in Nigeria coincided with the development of indigenous educational systems which were largely informal in nature. They were, however, organised to meet the needs of the society.¹¹ These state formations espoused a communitarian posture that necessitated indigenous educational development, aimed at inculcating moral norms and values to the younger generation for both self and society development.

The discourse on the pre-colonial state formations, particularly in Nigeria, often excludes the pre-Islamic states, such as the Hausa states and Borno Empire located in Northern Nigeria,¹² which later formed the Sokoto Caliphate in the 18th century. The Fulani, who constituted a minority, achieved this by fostering a religious war and annexing these states under their imperial control. They transformed the existing educational system of these the annexed ethnic

communities to reflect the typical practice on the Arabian Peninsula by adopting Arabic as a major medium of communication and knowledge delivery. Before British colonial domination, extant literature on Nigeria have pointed that the Islamic expansionism to the south intuitively meant some sort of Nigeria state formation was going to emerge in comparative terms with states in Western Europe. They posit that western colonization halted the development. Suffice to note that Islamic expansion transformed the process of indigenous educational development to meet new requirement of the Fulani imperial rule in the century before it was brought under British colonial rule.¹³

In the pre-colonial times, educational development was closely linked with the social development and was in conformity with the successive stages of physical and mental upbringing of the child. It was difficult to distinguish between education and productive activities, or create a division between manual and mental education because they concurrently went together. Before the establishment of Islam and its attendant institutions, particularly the education sector in the North, indigenous educational development went on unabated. In the same way, indigenous education system was construed in the south to enhance the already existing ethno-religious system.¹⁴ Religion provided for the indigenous population the definition, principle of judgement and criteria of perception. It offered them the reading of their world, history, society, time, space, authority, justice and ultimate truth. It was also functional to legitimising new forms of aspirations, new forms of organisation, new forms of relations and new forms of social order.¹⁵ Religion was located in everything and everything was clothed in religion.

The ethno-cultural traditions of the people in this epoch, directed the process of formal education such as the passing of an individual from one age-grade to another. Such was also instrumental for the development and specialisation of individuals into various professions such as haunting, priesthood, blacksmithing, farming and practical medicine among others.¹⁶ This implies that Nigerian ethnic groups as were beyond Africa demonstrated through informal and formal education the tradition of general knowledge and communal participation through enculturation.¹⁷ Such knowhow was demonstrated by occupational specialisation and division of labour in craftsmanship which distinguished the master/experts from the generality of practitioners. The cavers also were differentiated from the dancers, musicians, the sculptors and so on. These big leaps were informed by the stylistic tendencies, cultural norms, ideational formulation as well as social and aesthetic tenets which guided the society.¹⁸ This attest to the development and domestication of the various indigenously generated

professions throughout the country today. For example, the perfection in sculptures such as the famous Nok terracotta in the central Nigeria and the bronzes sculptures in Ife in south-western Nigeria dates before colonial domination of ethnic natives by the Fulani and Britain at different historical epochs. The same applies to other areas such as agriculture and technology development.

b) *British Colonisation and Politicisation of Education System in Nigeria*

Colonisation in Nigeria as an historical epoch deliberately brought together different ethnic groups to signal that Nigeria was going to emerge as a multicultural state formation.¹⁹ In the process, they liquidated the internal harmony and fragmented them by generating primordial loyalties which became manifested in the post-colonial era. The people crystallised and exploited to attend to British colonial requirements and development generated by industrial revolution. Since the British colonialists could not do as their presupposition would have permitted them, they fall back on the indigenous traditional rulers to foster colonisation, while limiting their boundaries of operations.²⁰ This was classically 'indirect rule system' but largely referred as 'divide and rule system' by Afro-centric scholars. Colonialism destroyed ethnocentric values of the Nigeria ethnic groups and stirred up rivalries that have become an enduring character of Nigeria in the 21st century. Falola (2004) avers in this context that colonial manipulations laid the foundation of the current problems in Nigeria, which post-colonial elites fed on.²¹

Ethnicity and religion were very important materials factors for achieving colonial ambition in Nigeria. Under the name of tribalism, colonial anthropologists constructed tribal stratifications and christened some ethnic groups as higher races and majorities - Hausa-Fulani, Igbo and Yoruba respectively. They debased other ethnic groups and sub-grouped them regionally for these 'big-three' to lord over them.²² They were instrument used to stimulate internal tribal jealousies in the post-colonial era. How was the foundation laid? The colonialists fostered unabatedly the Christianisation of Southern Nigeria and the minority areas of the North and allowed Islam to flourish unabatedly in Hausa-Fulani dominated areas. The forerunners of British colonialism – the Christian Missionaries were not allowed to penetrate the core North with their gospel. The colonialists ensured that two dominant religions emerged with dominance in each of the poles. The Central Belt of Nigeria became the battle ground for the two religions in search for converts in the post-colonial era. This era marked the beginning of normlessness among the Igbo-speaking people as described by the Chinua Achebe in his most

revered literary book the *Things Fall Apart*. Cultural values of these people were destroyed and the Islamic culture in the North was allowed to consolidate.²³ Even though the introduction of Western education in the south gave them an edge over the North, the purpose renegotiated to meet new ends.

Rodney contended that the educational system adopted for the colonised was underdeveloped and under-developing, meant to attend to the task of colonisation. The success was informed through the use of laws, taxable system and other processes that were considered favourable for capitalist profits.²⁴ Sargent concurred thus:

Even more dangerous was education...although Christian missionaries provided schools and, in fact, education of many leaders of the later independence movements. The fact that most education was provided by Christian missionaries illustrates another fact about the colonial experience – the attack on indigenous culture. This process of deculturation proved traumatic for many people.... On hand the imposition of an alien culture stripped many people of their sense of self, their religions were suppressed; their language were replaced; their customs were replaced by western styles. Everything indigenous was treated as inferior, and this attitude was taught in schools.²⁵

Kazah-Toure argues connectively that:

Construct such as 'Muslims', 'non-Muslims' and 'pagans' became categories that were applied for the status and to some extent class position of individuals and groups in the colonial system. Regardless of such categories many groupings were presented as primitives, savages, fanatics, and full of "pagan superstitions" (Administrative Policy, 1935). Urban settlement, labour camps, schools and other institutions were segregated along ethnic and religious lines on the basis of "non-Muslims", "native Africans", "non-native Africans", and all sorts of "tribal" and primordial categories.²⁶

Remarkable to note is, although the Fulani imperial domination, who in the name of religious reforms conquered and brought many under control in Northern Nigeria, and turned many of these communities into vassals under the Sokoto Caliphate, the situation later became compounded under colonial rule. The colonialists carefully studied and understood that religion was the cement of relationships in various societies, and continue to act as a dominant element of the super-structure; they relied on the religious arms to penetrate the pre-colonial societies. In the North, the presence of Islam was important for mystifying the people to accept colonialism; as such it was promoted and adopted as part of education curriculum. In the south, the traditional practices of the people were considered barbaric and as such it was considered not

in tandem with universal practice. A new religion was introduced into the social system to dispel the old ones as life guiding principles and of course, educational system. The process, however, was not conclusive because in the post-colonial era ethnic groups in this region of Nigeria retreated to cultural institutions for direction of society.

Scholars such as Adebisi; Osaghae and Okwori, in different contexts argued that the religious arms of colonialism imposed a dominant pattern which denied the people cultural equality. They destroyed indigenous institutions and values by perpetuating cultural violence mostly in southern Nigeria and pagan areas of Northern Nigeria while allowing intact the religious systems of the Muslim North. They adopted a colonial policy that kept the North from the spell of western education with informed concern not to affect them with virulent nationalistic tendencies of the southerners fostered by western education.²⁷ The later decision to introduce western education by establishing the famous Katsina College to open-up officially in 1922 was restricted only to the sons of the Emirates Aristocrats to the exclusion of the commoners. The purpose was to create Hausa-Fulani Muslim intelligentsia that will work in the interest of British colonial government.²⁸

The colonial politicisation of educational system later manifested virulently in the politics of independent struggle. Within this period, Nigerian elites crystallised and transformed into ethnicity and religious bigots within respective regional enclaves. The Northern Nigeria in terms of western education and skills refused to accept the 1959 proposal for national independence.²⁹ According to Odofin,

Before the national independence, several problems afflicted Nigeria federation, out of which two were fundamental (a) the structural imbalance in the federal system and (b) the difference spread in the pattern of western education. These two problems were the original sources of fears of domination arising out of population and size and employment opportunities within the federation. These constituted a conflict of reward power versus the expert power.³⁰

c) *Post-Colonial Development and Politicisation of Education in Nigeria*

In the 1950s, particularly at the height of nationalist struggles for independence,³¹ colonialists in Nigeria manipulated identities as political factors of determining who should get what in the political process of post-colonial Nigeria. One of such processes manipulated by the elites, according to Soyinka was census and the other was the electoral process, skewed in favour of the Northern aristocrats by the colonialists, which he identified as their surrogates.³² This explains non-cohesion among post-colonial Nigerian elites

toward developing all inclusive system of education that became manifested in the immediate post-independence Nigeria. In fact, emerging from colonial rule Nigeria engaged in an overshadowed rationalistic character and was left in a doldrums. Elites could not come to terms to develop an acceptable system of education that will strengthen and unite the country and transforming the Nigerian society towards inclusive citizenship. They devised separatist systems of education across the three regions. Olaniyi pointed that:

...the government of the Western Region adopted a 6-3-3-2-3 system: 6 years primary education, 3 years Modern school, 3 years secondary school, 2 year Higher School Certificate, and 3 years university education; both Eastern and Northern Regions settled for 7-5-2-3 system: 7 years primary education, 5 years Secondary/Teacher education, 2 year Higher School Certificate, and 3 years university education.³³

The inconsistencies were informed by the adoption of the Federal Constitution in the country in 1954 which granted internal self-government to the three regions. The division did not only affect the political sphere, but also regionalised the education system. This continued until 1973, following the report of Simeon Adebode committee of National Policy on Education.³⁴ The educational policy stipulated the following objectives: a) the inculcation of national consciousness and unity; b) the inculcation of right type of values and attitudes for the individual and the Nigerian society; c) the training of the mind in the understanding of the world around, and d) the acquisition of appropriate skills, abilities and competencies both mental and physical and equipping the individual to live and contribute to the development of the society.³⁵ These laudable objectives have not fully been implemented in the education system because primordial and patrimonial politics have taken the centre stage of the sector. The post-colonial politics in Nigeria also enthroned ethno-regional confined educational policies, which elites exploited to pursue ethnic and religious group interests and recruitment was determined by primordial identities in all sectors of the federation, including education sector. The concept of indigene/non-indigene and Christian/Muslim identities and Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba, Igbo, gender and class categorisation were exploited in the education sector with minorities from each region at disadvantage. This practice is still very much visible in contemporary Nigeria and it is indeed responsible for identity contestations in recent times.

As an attempt to create an egalitarian posture in the education sector, the federal government adopted the 'quota system', 'federal character' and 'catchments area' principles to dispel the ethno-religious divides and imbalance in the sector. On the final analysis, they

further compounded the problem of identity consciousness. The system have bequeathed the problem of integration and enhanced regionalism. This was not different under the military even though they tinkered with the federation and emasculated group identities; they consistently stifled the sector's quest for autonomy and under funded it. This further enhanced divisive tendencies and made education institutions, especially universities and tertiary institutions fallow grounds for ethnic and religious mobilisation in Nigeria. The military nurtured a cabalistic class structure of intelligentsias from various academic institutions to promote their in-genuine philosophy and continues stay in power.

The military government particularly that of the General Ibrahim Babangida, changed the curriculum of education to reflect their own interest. It was within this period that History received shape decline of patronage in favour of government as a course of study the Nigeria secondary schools and the universities. The hatred developed for history was fashioned on the conception that historians have caused serious problems for the country. This was indeed erroneous because history is the bedrock if any society must develop. The regime introduced the 6-3-3-4 system where a student have to spend 6 years in primary school, 3 years in junior secondary school, 3 years in senior secondary school, and minimum of 4 years in the university. Toward the end of the regime, Nigeria education sector has become ethnically and religiously driven. Meritocracy was abused, compromised and jettisoned.

d) Military Exit and Politicization of Education in Nigeria

Military exit ushered in a new age of politicising the education sector. The former military leader, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, who emerged victoriously from the democratic transition of General Abdulsalam Abubakar, introduced changes in the sector based on the philosophy of National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategies (NEEDS).³⁶ The government was committed toward gearing a private sector driven economy which education was enlisted as one of the major sectors to be privatised to attract investors and to assist buster education in Nigeria. There was also the assumption that with private sector engagement, employment opportunities would be generated which consequentially will reduce the rate of unemployment in the country.

The government also change the curriculum by introducing the 9-3-4 system; this system of education provided for 9 years primary education, 3 years secondary education and minimum of 4 years University education.³⁷ To achieve this end at the primary school level, the federal government contracted teaching staff and engaged them for the period of two years. It is expected that the teaching staff employed on the

platform of Universal Basic Education (UBE) should be incorporated into the regular teaching staff of the various states in the federation. In most parts of the North, only few states were able to incorporate them as state government teaching staff. This was a remedial solution but did not in any way solve the problem of unemployment. Besides, religion and ethnicity were determining factors in the recruitment exercise. The transitory changes in Nigeria education curriculum as observed reflected on the politicisation of the sector at the policy levels in search for effective system of education. As beautiful as the policy is, it has remained unrealistic and unattainable due to the deep seated systemic corruption in Nigeria.

Nigerian politicians, both governing and non-governing elites, and school managers and proprietors have not come to terms to depoliticise education in Nigeria. Although, at the national level, Nigeria have had several people in the academia manning the prestigious ministerial position as education Ministers, they have achieved less at ensuring that the sector receive best attention it requires to meet the standard of international practices. It is a known fact that structural facilities and human and material resources are inadequate in most educational institutions in Nigeria. In the past, Nigeria had an outstanding record of having the best of primary and tertiary institutions, especially Universities, in Africa and was competitively measured along with universities of international repute. Students and lecturers from all over the world were coming to Nigeria. The impetus for this was the material conditions that were readily welcoming at that time. Foreign investors were willing to invest in the Nigerian education sector without being beckoned to come.

The baton has changed; Nigerians go looking for investors to come to come and invest not only in the education sector but also other sectors. Today, even the oil-rich Niger Delta region has lost much patronage due to the rising tides of ethno-religious identities which has destabilised the country. To be specific, the education sector has received the highest level of threats in recent times, not only from 'cultists' which we use to know about, but also from ethno-religious radical groups. In Kano State, for example, over 15 Lecturers and Students casualties were recorded at the Bayero University and the Vice Chancellor's office of the Gombe State University was brought under attack by unknown gunmen in the year 2012. Nevertheless, several lecturers at the University of Maiduguri in Borno State were also attacked and assassinated. Today, the situation is frightening as serial killings of people in the academia occur almost on the daily bases.

The impact of this is enormous and is causing a lot of damages to the education sector in Nigeria. The effect is that usual cross-fertilization of Scholars and students in the various universities and tertiary

institutions across the country has drastically reduced due to the increasing level of restiveness, especially in Northern Nigeria. The situation has a multiplier effect on the development of the country, because the idea of evolving a more democratic country, where multiculturalism is respected and upheld is threatened every day. Because of these circumstances, most universities and tertiary institutions have lost the patronage they use to get from students and Scholars that are not 'indigenous' to the sited areas. What is obtainable now is the increasing clusters of ethnic and religious groups 'indigenous' in those universities, and indeed, is not healthy for integrated development of the country.

Scholars of Marxist orientation such as Harvie, Hill, McLaren, Cole, and Rikowski³⁸ have in different context and collectively, argued that the situation which ethnically and religiously is manifesting virulently in the national politics and indeed, in various institutions of learning as it is currently in Nigeria, reflect 'politics of human resistance' against the neo-liberal system. More specifically in their co-authored book: *Postmodernism in educational theory: Education and the politics of human resistance* published in 1999, Harvie, Hill, McLaren, Cole, and Rikowski, contended that education under normal circumstance supposed to produce the society required social change to uncover how apparently positive, for example, the social inclusion, lifelong learning, higher education 'standard' and creativity in education is important for the development of individuals, community and the country at large. On the contrary, according to them, the system has failed when measured in the context of capital's social universe.³⁹ In a nutshell, positive aim of education in the neoliberal system has dissolved into negativity. This failure is caused by the inability to determine what system of education the country operates? What education policy framework the country seeks to adopt and be committed to it? And what does the education system seeks to produce? Often, such system produces inequality rather than egalitarian society as it professes.⁴⁰

Contrary to the foregoing assertions, the problem in Nigeria is not a problem of liberal education as it is assumed in most countries of Arab extraction, relating it to the fundamental factors that led to Arab spring in 2011. The problem is about individual group quest for ethnic and religious hegemony in a multicultural diverse country like Nigeria. The quest of multiculturalism is to build a society where within the philosophy of meritocracy individuals are given what they deserve. What is obtainable in Nigeria is not democracy in the real sense of the word. It is a quasi-practice of democracy that has succeeded in enthroning identity and personalised interests; while exploiting these identities, they have assumed new logics of modern colonisation in Nigeria.⁴¹

The manner in which ethnicity and religion are expressed in the various sub-sector of the education sector in Nigeria is very glaring and destructive today. The desire to build an inclusive and integrated Nigeria so blessed with natural providence of ethnic and religious diversity is more threatened now under the frame of identity politics, which started earlier in Nigeria's history. The various institutions of education which were to promote national cohesion and solidarity were established and associated with the names of some ethnic chauvinists and religious bigots, who masqueraded themselves as national heroes. This was notable in the immediate post-independence Nigeria's universities and other tertiary institutions. It was known that initially the naming of universities and tertiary institutions in Nigeria were associated to areas where they were established, the process changed gradually to assume ethnic and religious dimension, which has become more pronounced today in Nigeria.

Several universities such as the University of Ife was renamed Obafemi Awolowo University, to glorify the ethnic heroic tendencies of the late sage, Dr. Obafemi Awolowo. In the Northern Nigeria, a university was established in Zaria, and was named after Sir, Ahmadu Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto and premier of Northern Nigeria. In Bauchi, a University of Technology was established but was named in honour of Abubakar Tafawa Balewa. The Usman Danfodio University established in Sokoto took after the name of the Islamic sage and jihadist. Notwithstanding, in the South-East Nigeria, Nnamdi Azikiwe University was established in Akwa in honour of the late Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who was from Anambra. To promote inclusive citizenship, these universities would have taken cross-ethnic or national identities in the various regions they were established, for example, Nnamdi Azikiwe University would have rather been named Ahmadu Bello University, where as the Obafemi Awolowo University would have been named Nnamdi Azikiwe University and Ahmadu Bello University would have been named Obafemi Awolowo University. This would have reflected the spirit of oneness and national integration, but the manner in which the universities were regionally confined to particular ethnic, religious and regional settings purportedly proved that there were no national heroes but ethno-regional heroes instead.

In most parts of the country, particularly as from the post-Civil War era onward, more ethnically and religiously driven identity education institutions emerged. Recent examples around the country are revealing. The Federal University of Technology, Yola, is now Modibbo Adama University of Technology (MAUTECH); University of Lagos is now Moshood Abiola University, Lagos and the Federal University of Agriculture, Umudike in Abia state is now Michael Okpara University of Agriculture. The names of these universities were changed, following President












Goodluck Jonathan's assiduous to the National Assembly to obtain endorsement to immortalise some acclaimed national heroes. This glaringly reflected the politicisation of education sector in Nigeria which started earlier in the country that have unconsciously or consciously generated waves of ethnic and religious identities movements and violence in contemporary Nigeria. As this dilemma is lamentable, the perceived excluded minorities in various states have also engaged in such pursuit. The community university in Wukari that was formerly Jubilee University was renamed to Kwara University, purportedly to immortalise 'mythically' the Jukun heroic confederacy. In the same manner state universities and tertiary institutions have been emerging across the country. As they are emerging, whether directly or indirectly, the leadership of these states and institutions ensures their candidates given consideration before any other people. The criteria used are essentially primordial rather than merits. It is this factor that has succeeded in enthroning ethnicity and religious identities as yardsticks for recruitments of workforce and admission of students in

various Nigerian schools – the universities and tertiary institutions alike. This is at the heart of the falling standard of education in Nigeria that is much to be desired.

e) Politicisation of Education in Nigeria: What Implications?

As from 1999, Nigeria has witnessed an unequivocal increase in the numbers of educational institutions, following the private sector driven economy in Nigeria. For example, the number of private universities in Nigeria now stands at over fifty. This is accompanied by quite a number of ever increasing states and federal universities and tertiary institutions in the country. In spite of the increase, the standard of education has been deteriorating, as the objectives for which they are established are much to be desired.⁴² This problem is more worrisome now given the positions of Nigerian universities, including the tertiary institutions as presented by the Webometrics 2012 ranking of universities in Africa and the World below.

Table 1 : Webometrics Ranking of World's Universities, January 2012

Position	Continent Rank	University	Country	World Rank	Position			
					Size	Visibility	Rich Files	Scholars
22		University of Benin		1,639	5,768	1,802	7,522	1,697
35		University of Agriculture Abeokuta		2,266	2,916	9,426	5,248	1,271
38		University of Ibadan		2,515	7,146	4,645	6,696	1,866
47		University of Nigeria		3,228	4,072	9,375	8,440	1,752
49		Obafemi Awolowo University		3,263	8,626	8,408	8,414	1,741
52		University of Lagos		3,486	2,688	9,521	9,241	1,841
55		Ahmadu Bello University		3,512	4,058	10,399	8,159	1,756
63		University of Ilorin		4,302	7,386	9,139	1,985	2,261
88		University of Jos		5,681	5,022	10,220	4,760	2,900
95		Auchi Polytechnic		6,254	2,101	2,331	18,742	9,576
100		National Open University of Nigeria		6,576	12,658	9,157	4,064	3,528

Source : http://www.webometrics.info/about_rank.html (retrieved 23 July 2012).

From the foregoing, could this problem be linked to the poor policy making process, poor financing, poor implementation of policies and programmes, and poor monitoring process of the programmes? Although, these could partly attribute to, and explain the reasons for the deteriorating standard of education in Nigeria, the problems in recent times could be highly associated with the ethnicity, religion and *godfatherism* factors in Nigeria, because in Nigeria where ethnicity is less pronounced, religion assumes dominance. This also applies to where religion is less dominant, ethnicity takes proceedings. In some other areas where ethnicity and religion assume moderate status, godfathering becomes operational. Within this setting, godfatherism applies to determine 'who gets what, when and how'. The propelling factors for the manifestation of these identities in Nigeria education sector could be clannish or sectarian conception of social life in Nigeria societies which most people associate it to political elitism and manipulation of the *mass mind*.

In Nigeria today, evidence abound that Vice Chancellors, Provosts and Rectors as well as other education managers such as Principals and Headmasters are motivated by primordial factors. This situation reveals itself to the extent that today certain positions must be kept for the 'indigenous people' of the institution's host communities. If the positions are occupied by 'non-indigenes', the process of institutional governance/administration becomes frustrated. In some circumstances, they go to the length of watering down the criteria for recruitment in order to accommodate their primordial interests. Such system is never healthy for the development of education in Nigeria because it excludes those who merited the positions.

Another factor that indicts such practices is that when primordial identities become prominent, established rules seize to function. The system of rewards and punishment are determined by primordial considerations or informal conventions. In such institutions, multiple layers of red tapes are created and the consequences of being caught and punished for corrupt practices are low relatively to the benefits.

The managers shy away from asserting their proper disciplinary authority because of such affiliations. Those who would want to execute their primary responsibilities find themselves isolated and endangered. If care is not taken, they are dramatically eliminated or made to suffer sabotage for wanting to be just.⁴³ Because of primordial dominance, systemic operation becomes subservient to poor policy design and implementation processes, poor financing and monitoring processes. Even while finance is available, they are not often used for the purpose assigned to them rather mismanaged or siphoned and channelled into private uses, and punishment for such offence(s) committed becomes difficult to enforce.

Cumulatively, since the people recruited to pilot the affairs of the sector is carried out on basis of primordial considerations of ethnicity, religion and political balancing the system tends to produce poor leadership and followership in the society. The system ends up as a mere jamboree where grading of students is determined by such institutional misnomer and as such also tends to produce graduates that are unproductive to themselves, their immediate social milieu and the larger society. Many of such graduates because of clandestine connections are given consideration when it comes to employment far above those, although are intelligent and can fit adequately into the given job, but because they are poor and lack connection suffer delay. It is in this context that Timawus (2010) submits that "a political system that rewards school dropouts with more honours and income than a university professor in a whole lifetime is fit to breed *Boko Haram*".⁴⁴

The politicisation of education in Nigeria has also led to the loss of intercontinental cross fertilization of scholarship in Nigerian universities. This is because of the unfriendly nature of the Nigerian societies to foreign Scholars. Within Nigeria, the usual mixture of Scholars from various ethnic, religious and philosophical backgrounds in most Nigerian universities are fast disappearing. The reason is because these institutions have been overtaken by ethnicity, religious bigotry and clandestine relationships. The implication is more visible now that ethnic and religious restiveness has reached the moon in Nigeria. Because of this situation, many Scholars are relocating to their 'indigenous homelands' or areas considered being relatively peaceful. The politicisation of education therefore has open the space for the rediscovery of old boundaries of ethno-cultural identity such as described by Professor Eskor Toyo "Ethnic chauvinism, born-to-ruleism, Ilorin memories, Oduduwaism, Arewaism, Ohaneizism, etc."⁴⁵ Despite over fifty years of Nigeria's independence, the situation is ever alarming. The derogatory space for this development is has expanded, for example, the renaming the University of Lagos to Moshood Abiola University by the federal government of Nigeria led to violent demonstration among students in Lagos, majority of them were Yoruba. Tracing the problem, it will be revealing that it is associated with the memories of the 12 June 1993 Babangida's annulled election. Although, there were no demonstrations in Yola but the expression of the people showed that the renaming of the Federal University of Technology to Modibbo Adama University of Technology has succeeded in consolidating the domination of the Hausa-Fulani over the various ethnic groups in Adamwa State.

IV. Conclusion: Depoliticising Education System: Imperative for Future Generation

Education is imperative for any meaningful development of any country. The politicisation of the sector is the major factor truncating Nigeria's match to socio-economic, political, scientific and technological development. There is no gain saying that extant literatures on the education in Nigeria have blamed poor policy making and implementation processes and indeed, poor financing as central to the deteriorating condition of the sector in Nigeria. However, these literatures underscored the role of primordial identities in contributing to the fallen standard of education. The former are repercussive effects of the latter which are both historical and contemporary. The reflection of the poor condition of the education system in Nigeria is historical, because the origin of the problem generates from the contact with colonialism, first of the Arab-type and later, the Western-type. The problem is also contemporary because after fifty years of independence, the effort to build integrated and the all inclusive system of education has received utmost commitment.

It suffices to note that the main objective of education worldwide is to assist in constructing socially established normative cultures that will provide security and build the capacities for strengthening, uniting and pursuing the common good for all. This is attainable only in a democratic system, if democracy is given the utmost visibility. Democracy, which is embedded with liberal ideals, allows all sundry to have a stake in the governing process no matter the class or status of individuals in the society. The reason is that democratic culture is constructed on the basis of liberal culture and multiculturalism, which allows for competition within the same social arrangement. Therefore, it is adequate to state that the liberal-type or multicultural type of education system is a one that encourages meritocracy or excellence, because it is constructed on the belief that intelligence quotient (IQ) plus effort equals merit.⁴⁶ Banks and Banks

Multicultural education is a field of study and an emerging discipline whose major aim is to create equal educational opportunities for students from diverse racial, ethnic, social-class, and cultural groups. One of its important goals is to help all students acquire the knowledge, attitudes, and skills needed to function effectively in a pluralistic democratic society and to interact, negotiate, and communicate with people from diverse groups to create a civic and moral community that works for the common good.⁴⁷

To achieve the merit of building an egalitarian society where merit count, stakeholders must

appreciate and given in their commitment that educational institutions are major avenues through which equality of opportunities can be achieved. Merit can be celebrated only when all are equally eligible to compete for society's rewards irrespective of their birth, social positions, or primordial affiliation.

This can practically be obtained in the academic institutions where staffing and the admission of students when excellence is allowed to precede ethnicity, religious consideration and *godfatherism* in Nigeria. One thing is at stake for the survival of democracy in Nigeria, which is, Nigerians must appreciate and articulate the "conception of education which recognises that without a democratic development of society, a more democratic system of education cannot be promoted, and without a more democratic system of education the development of society is unlikely to occur".⁴⁸ With this principle, politicisation of education Nigeria would give way for meritocracy that can instil discipline and hard work among citizens of this country. This way, the standard of education in Nigeria can be revamped.

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GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Religious Political Groups and Democracy in Tajikistan

By Adil Khan

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Abstract - This paper is an attempt to develop understanding of the interplay of different actors in Tajikistan after its independence from Soviet rule. Its main focus is to explore the revival, role and ideals of religious groups in Tajikistan as well the status and future prospects for democracy in the republic.

Keywords : *tajikistan, religious groups, democracy.*

GJHSS-F Classification : *FOR Code: 750499p, 160699*



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I. INTRODUCTION

Like other Central Asian Republics, Tajikistan also carries with it the legacy of pre-independence Soviet period. One of the most dominant features of this legacy is authoritarianism. Although the rhetoric to democratize the state, dominantly because of international pressures, remained a significant discourse while interacting with international community yet no substantial effort has been made in this regard. The democratic institutions like legislature are used as a rubberstamp by the President and his inner circle of non elected affiliates. Over the years regime had shown zero tolerance for opposition political parties and independent media groups and individuals. Judiciary also looks for the executive's advice for its rulings (www.bti-project.org). This authoritarian nature of the state, with a superficial commitment to democratic values, has deep implications for the Tajik society in its various social and political manifestations. This paper is primarily focused upon the analysis of state of human rights, with special reference to religious and political rights, as well as state of democracy in Tajikistan. It is divided into three parts. The first part addresses the state policy towards independence of religion and religious practices, the society's and religious' classes response to the policy and the resulting implications for the state and society. The second part probes into various political groups and their interaction with the ruling regime, especially the religious political parties and groups. The third part comprehensively discusses the difference between rhetoric and reality about democratization in Tajikistan. A synthesis of the whole debate concludes this article.

II. RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: STATE VERSES SOCIETY

Tajikistan has a predominant Muslim Majority. Although majority of Tajikistanis belong to Sunni Hanafi

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sect yet there are good number of people belonging to other sects and religions. Among Muslims four percent are Ismai'li Shias, majority of whom, live in Badkhashan, Khatlon and the capital Dushanbe. Apart from Muslims there are Christians of Russian origin, Jews and Bahais as well. Almost every religion and sect has its own religious sanctuary for worship. There is no official state religion. Legally it is obligatory to register religious groups as well as their place of worship.

As for as the constitution of Tajikistan is concerned, it ensures freedom of religion to all segments of society, but like many other third world societies there is hell of difference between constitutional arrangements and their practical implementation. The government's policy is to discourage religious freedom. A number of religious groups were banned during the past decade either on their failure to complete registration requirements or by declaring them as extremists. There are also restriction on number of mosques where a formula is devised for mosque-population ratio; for example a five times mosque can be establish in an area where total number of Muslim residents is from 1000 to 5000, while a Friday mosque can function in an area with 30000 to 50000 of population. Another instance of state's control over religious affairs is that Imams of these mosques are selected by the state machinery working under the supervision of Ministry of Religious Affairs. Similarly ban on wearing Hijab for female students in schools and keeping beard prior to reaching age of 50 years are considered to be interference in the religious freedom of the people. There are regulations for the publication, import and distribution of religious literature. All religious literature, whether produced at home or imported from abroad, is strictly censored (<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/appendices/index.html>).

Some of religious groups were banned after declaring them as extremist. The leading examples were Jama't e Tabligh, Salafia sect and a Christian organization Jehovah's Witnesses. In 2006 some 59 members of Jama't e Tabligh were sentenced for 3 to 8 years. According to a report the females wearing hijab find it difficult to have a job as state policy discourages this act. (<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2010/appendices/index.html>).

As it is evident from human history, that the task to suppress a value, so near to the sentiments of the people, is not easier one rather most of the time it had

reverse implications. People, when they feel deprived of what they wish to practice from the core of their heart, look for opportunities to practice what they believe in with liberty. A similar situation has emerged in Tajikistan. Due to over-regulation of religious affairs there has emerged a deep rooted discontent among the people, on one hand, while, on the other religious classes have started to struggle for freedom from state control. One manifestation of this struggle is in the form of religious political groups.

III. RELIGIOUS POLITICAL GROUPS: ORGANIZATION, OBJECTIVES, AND SOCIAL ACCEPTANCE

Religion and politics had a centuries old relation. Religion had been used for centuries to legitimize monarchies. Divine origin theories and Divine Right theories emerged in the same background. With the passage of time religious classes have changed their role according to the changing circumstances but their influence in the political affairs remained a social and political reality, especially in the third world societies. With the emergence of democratic setups and secularization of religion and politics in the Western world religious clergy had to face new challenges where they needed to transform their role according to the challenges posed to their survival. To a greater extent in West the role of religion was minimized in the course of 18th, 19th and 20th centuries but it had reemerged in the recent years with the revived role of church in Europe and Noe-Cons in United States of America. In other third world democratizing societies, religious clergy had found new ways and means to safeguard their interests and protect them from the secularization drive. They formed political parties to operate in a democratizing setup. Tajikistan is also a democratizing society, though the pace of democratization is very slow. Like other third world societies the religious clergy in Tajikistan had also opted for new roles to keep their significance intact. For this purpose Islamic Renaissance Party was established that represents religious class interests in the state.

Although religious classes faced severe persecutions during soviet period and religious activities were either banned or discouraged, yet in some peripheral parts of the state, religious sentiments and values were able to survive. With the independence from Soviet clutches these fragmented religious enclaves started reorganizing themselves. The political manifestation of this reorganization was IRP.

Islamic Renaissance Party was established in 1990. Its main objective is to enforce Sharia law and distribute the state resources according to Islamic principles. This movement has many influences on it, the most dominant of which is that of Basmachi movement. The significant aims and objectives of the

party are as under: (www.asc-centralasia.edu.pk/Issues_67/06_adam_saud.html)

1. Struggle to ensure sovereignty of the state in the political and economic affairs.
2. An unending effort for the promulgation of Islamic law and providing citizens with the rights as enunciated by Sharia.
3. Establishment of youth organizations.
4. To reawaken the spirit of Islam among Tajikistani population by participating in religious-cultural, economic and political activities.
5. To systematically preach Islam to other communities of the republic.
6. To struggle for the democratization of the state where rule of law prevail.

Right after the establishment of IRP, it started its political activities. Despite of hurdles created in its ways it had carried on presenting its demands before the government. Its main demands included a ban on sale of pork and alcohol, renaming of streets in Tajikistan according to Islamic names, opening up of new mosques and ban on un-Islamic way of slaughtering cattle. Despite of these demands the government had paid no heed rather tried to outlaw the activities and organization of IRP. It was accused as a main responsible actor in the civil war from 1994 to 1997. It was subsequently banned. In 1999 ban was lifted from its activities and IRP started its struggle again. The agreement between the government and IRP weakened its support base as some circles of the IRP saw this agreement with suspicion. Despite of all these problems IRP is now running as a legal entity. (www.asc-centralasia.edu.pk/Issues_67/06_adam_saud.html).

As Tajikistan is an authoritarian state, therefore, access to information about the changing trends in mass population and their socio-political orientations is a difficult task. Regime's commitments to repressive policy for those who try to report independently make the task of analyzing social acceptability, of the religious as well as other political organizations, a much harder project to undertake. The only insight that can be borrowed for this purpose is from the resources available outside Tajikistan. Different reports published by international NGO's and United Nations to some extent reflect the social mood. The severity of civil war during 1990's is an evidence of widespread discontent in the different pockets of the country. Although IRP had chosen peaceful path for its future yet it is unable to attract voters in that majority to bring about systemic changes in the country. There are multiple reasons for it. In the following discussion these reasons are discussed with special reference to future of democracy and political parties in Tajikistan.

IV. STATE OF DEMOCRACY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS

According to constitutional provisions Tajikistan is a democracy. It has democratic structures and a so called electoral process as well. It provides for multi-party polity where a total of eight registered parties enter into electoral process. Five out of these eight have representation in the parliament in the current term. These parties include:

1. The Agrarian Party (APT)
2. The Communist Party (CPT)
3. Islamic Renaissance Party (IRPT)
4. Peoples Democratic Party (PDPT)
5. Party of Economic Reforms (PERT)

Among these five parties PDPT is the ruling party. It uses state machinery to consolidate its position and maneuver electoral results in its favor. Other political parties are weak and decaying. IRPT is the strongest opposition party. The regimes policies are discouraging to the entry of new political parties in the political arena. For example in 2012 the Justice Ministry refused the registration of National Movement of Tajikistan. The NMT pledged to reduce presidential powers as well as his term of office. It stood for increasing powers of the legislature. (www.crs.gov)

A part from these political parties there are interest groups in Tajikistan but these groups are least coordinated and weak. Over all political culture is very low and very restricted political discourse is allowed. Ruling party's monopoly over the media and state apparatus made the chances of dissent very dim. There are various tactics used to control media; for example financial pressures, increase in defamation suits and arbitrary arrests.

Voters' interest and understanding of the electoral process as well as its utility is very low. In a society where people have a widespread belief that they cannot bring change through their vote and electoral process only facilitates survival of status-quo, a parochial political culture is a natural outcome. Over the years, the dominance of one party and maneuvering of election results have strongly entrenched this belief in the majority of Tajikistan's mass population. Despite of these problems the Regime is able to facilitate some sort of democratic process in the form of presidential election and election for the legislative bodies.

In 2006 presidential elections were held in which five candidates ran for the presidential slot. The election campaign was dominated by the incumbent Rahmon. The other four candidates did not dare to criticize the policies of the Rahmon. The election debates remained limited and immature. According to independent observers the process and debates were little improved than 1999 presidential elections but it was not up to the standards as were expected in the modern democratic

societies (www.crs.gov). It was an easy win for the incumbent Rahmon. The next election is scheduled to be in 2013.

Similarly the latest elections for the legislative body were held in 2010. Turn out on the Election Day was quite encouraging according to official sources. Approximately 87% of the registered voters came to polling stations to cast their votes. Peoples Democratic Party won 54 seats, while IRP, Communist Party, Agrarian Party, and Economic Reform Party won two seats each. One seat was won by an independent candidate. Independent observers reported that the election process lacked transparency. Ruling party did not provide a level playing field to all actors. Government officials influenced the campaign to the disadvantage of opposition parties, while election results were also maneuvered. There were irregularities observed at the polling stations also.

The score of the regime on human rights violation is very high. According to the State Department's Report (2012), harassment of journalists, repression of religious minorities, arbitrary arrests and lack of free trial in courts featured the year 2011 in Tajikistan. There are severe restrictions on freedom of speech. A criticism or defamation of president may result in a punishment of five year imprisonment.

There are number of NGO's operating in Tajikistan but only one to five percent of them take up the issues of human rights. These NGO's are mostly providers of services while very few focus on the mobilization sector. (www.bti-project.org).

V. CONCLUSION

Like other Central Asian Republics, Tajikistan also reflects a hybrid culture leading to a constant struggle among different actors to define the nature of political arrangement in the country. Under international obligations it is compelled to move towards democratization but dominance of pre-independence political elites had crippled the process to a greater extent. The only challenging force that emerged in the course of time is that of IRP, another political party more reactionary in nature than a democratic force. Thus, it can be concluded that future of democratization will heavily depend on the future developments in the whole Central Asian region as well as its interaction and nature of its relations with the western democratic world.



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GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Correlates of Residents' Response to Crime in Nigerian Cities

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Abstract - The paper examines the socio economic attributes of residents (SEC); building and environmental features (BEF), residential crime magnitude, fear of crime events, fear of neighbourhood and households' safety measures in Ibadan, Zaria and Owerri with a view to establish a relationship between them. Four indices were developed. These are 'Residential Crime Magnitude' (RCM), 'Fear of Crime Events Index' (FCEI), 'Fear of Neighbourhood' (FNI) and 'Household Safety Measures Index' (HSMI). The study observed a significant relationship between low attributes of BEF, low attributes of SEC, low attributes of RCM and low attributes of HSMI, low attributes of FNI and low attributes of FCEI. Among SEC, BEF and RCM, BEF was identified as the strongest dependent variable informing residents' response to crime. Thus any meaningful intervention at crime control must first begin with decision on building and environmental features that discourages crime incidence and reduces fear of crime.

Keywords : residential area, residents, response, crime, socio-economic, building, environmental features, fear, safety measures.

GJHSS-F Classification : FOR Code: 160504



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Correlates of Residents' Response to Crime in Nigerian Cities

Adigun, Folasade Oyenike ^α & Prof Adedibu A. Afolabi ^σ

Abstract - The paper examines the socio economic attributes of residents (SEC); building and environmental features (BEF), residential crime magnitude, fear of crime events, fear of neighbourhood and households' safety measures in Ibadan, Zaria and Owerri with a view to establish a relationship between them. Four indices were developed. These are 'Residential Crime Magnitude' (RCM), 'Fear of Crime Events Index' (FCEI), 'Fear of Neighbourhood' (FNI) and 'Household Safety Measures Index' (HSMI). The study observed a significant relationship between low attributes of BEF, low attributes of SEC, low attributes of RCM and low attributes of HSMI, low attributes of FNI and low attributes of FCEI. Among SEC, BEF and RCM, BEF was identified as the strongest dependent variable informing residents' response to crime. Thus any meaningful intervention at crime control must first begin with decision on building and environmental features that discourages crime incidence and reduces fear of crime.

Keywords : residential area, residents, response, crime, socio-economic, building, environmental features, fear, safety measures.

I. INTRODUCTION

Human beings are created to respond to stimuli. The response could be internal or external. In the same vein residents respond to crime emotionally and physically. In this study fear is considered as the emotional response to crime while the use of household safety measures is taken as the physical response. Fear is the foremost response to experience or knowledge of crime incidence (Afon 2001), which under normal condition dictates the type as well as extent of household safety measures to be employed. It could also influence the preparation and the ardence of criminals thereafter. On the other hand the availability of targets in absence of capable guardian is a motivating factor for incidence of crime. Thus, crime incidence, fear of crime and physical response to crime together with other factors such as socio-economic and environmental features could constitute a cycle. Residents may build confidence on the strength of safety measures taken at household and neighbourhood levels; thus affecting their level of fear.

Four notable categories of response to crime were identified in the literature: control through the convectional justice system (Walklate, 1996; Shaftoe, 2002), social crime prevention (Aguda, 1994; Shaftoe, 2002), African Traditional Protective Devices, ATPDs

(Agbola, 1997) and Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED). Criminal Justice System is the most commonly used crime control measures. Yongcho (1974) described this approach as one, which involves the entire array of government institution that functions as the instrument of a society in enforcing the standard of conduct needed for the protection, safety and freedom of individual citizens, and for the maintenance of order. The task involves detecting, apprehending, prosecuting, treating and sanctioning the deviants. This method has been referred to as offender-centered strategy (Walklate, 1996).

The second measure is the social crime prevention which in the words of Shaftoe (2002) consist of "an interlocking series of interventions that enable people to lead a life where they do not have the inclination, motivation or need to offend against others, whether for expressive or acquisitive reasons". The next strategy is Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED) which is an environment-centered strategy. It includes the specific targeting associated with situational crime prevention and the more general approach of designing out crime. The pioneers of this approach are Jacobs (1995) and Jeffery (1977) but its famous exponent is Newman (1995) though Coleman (1985) also worked extensively on it.

The manifestation of some these strategies in Nigeria are at different levels. Communities and individuals react to crime in Nigeria mostly from the ineffectiveness (or otherwise) of the criminal justice system in combating crime and insecurity in their areas (Agbola, 2002). Several studies have shown that residents' responses to crime in Nigeria are of various forms including crime reporting to police (though decreasing in use), individual preventive measure and collective activities against criminal occurrences (Agbola 1997; Afon, 2001, Agbola 2002; Abodunrin 2004; Oredein, 2006). Included among individuals' attempt at controlling crime are: construction of high walls around residences; construction of high fencing walls, massive gates and strong locks; use of Close Circuit Television CCTV; installation of lighting facilities at every corner of the residential environment; use of African power called "juju" or charm and total reliance on God Almighty for protection. Others include the use of dogs, guns, insurance schemes, special security door, burglar alarms, police patrol, window and door grills. On the community or collective level, night watchmen are

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employed to keep watch on neighbourhoods, gates are installed on streets, bumps or speed breakers are put on streets. Others include the use of warning signs to restrict movement and the use of community security check points. Vigilante groups (a variant of night watchmen) are used in some communities. These responses however vary among the three residential areas based on the diversity in social and economic characteristics of the residents as well as level of crime incidences. It has been argued that there are intricate connections and complex interrelationships between the environment in which urban dwellers live, incidence of crime and, by logical extension, their response to crime (Abodunrin 2004; Adeboyejo and Abodunrin 2005). Crimes occur not only within but are also influenced and may indeed be compounded by a wide ranging socio-economic and environmental context, summarized in urban residential patterns of various cultural settings.

Therefore any study aiming at providing sufficient information to enable a solid conclusion useful for decision making must take cognisance of the complexities between residents' socio-economic attributes, building and environmental features typical of each residential area, crime incidence and residents' responses. Isolating a single variable for any substantive explanation may be a minor task out of the whole gamut because of the complexity of the relationship between these variables. Against this background this study examines the socio economic attributes of residents; building and environmental features, residential crime magnitude, fear of crime events, fear of neighbourhood and households' safety measures in Ibadan, Zaria and Owerri with a view to establish the relationship between them. This is done with the aid of canonical correlation statistic- a statistical tool which allows multiple dependent and independent variables in a single analysis. The three selected cities are traditional urban centres with phenomena growth in population and area extent, increasing level of urbanization and industrialization, as well as political and socio-economic prestige in the area. Zaria, Ibadan and Owerri (see Fig 1) are respectively one of the major Hausa-Fulani, Yoruba and Igbo cities and as such, they are capable of reflecting the socio-economic and cultural attributes of the three regions selected.

II. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The study utilized primary data obtained through questionnaire administered to residents. Information obtained includes residents' socioeconomic characteristics (SEC); building and environmental features (BEF); residential area crime experienced within six months (RCM); level of fear of crime events; level of fear of neighbourhood and level of usage of household safety measures (or residents' physical response to crime). Five, two and three local

government areas in Ibadan, Zaria and Owerri respectively formed the sampling frame (see appendix 1). Localities within the three distinct residential areas were identified. All the low density residential areas surveyed in Owerri were selected from Owerri Municipal because areas that could be identified as low density areas fall under the jurisdiction of Owerri Municipal Local Government area.

Previous research efforts identified three major categories of residential areas which are distinct in social as well as physical attributes (Onokerhoraye & Omuta, 1986; Afon 2004). These are: low quality residential area usually (high density residential zone); medium quality residential area (medium density residential zone) and high quality residential area (low density residential zone). In modern urban centres residential density is described in terms of floor area ratio and population. In traditional urban centre traditional/core, transitional and suburban residential areas represent the three residential areas highlighted above (Onibokun 1972). According to Okewole (1977) historically, the traditional core area is a pre-colonial development occupied by indigenous population and or the early settlers. This area is often found in the heart of the city (Onokerhoraye & Omuta, 1985). The transitional residential area developed during the colonial era forms the next layer of development. The sub-urban/low density residential area could be pre and post independence developments. In cities of this nature socio-economic characteristics (such as level of education, occupation and income) and environmental quality are considered to vary inversely with density. These features were used in identifying the three residential areas.

The study employed a multi stage sampling technique. The random and systematic sampling techniques were used within the context of already stratified local government areas and the three residential zones. The first level of stratification was done on the basis of the delineated local government areas. The second level of stratification was based on identified residential areas. Localities with the features of the three residential areas were identified in each local government area and purposively selected for the study.

The first building in each randomly selected street was chosen at the discretion of the researcher. Subsequent selection was done at an interval of ten buildings. To cater for residents in landlocked portions of the core area where buildings are not accessible by roads, buildings were selected at uniform interval of every five building off the roads. The target population are the residents. A household was selected from each chosen building from where a resident not less than 18 years either male or female was sampled. The selected residents were investigated using a structured questionnaire. The structured questionnaire was distributed using a ratio of 3:2:1 in the high, medium

and low density residential zones in each selected city (see table 1). This is in line with the generally believed pattern of population distribution among residential areas (Adeboyejo and Onyeonoru, 2003). A total of 1164 copies of the questionnaire out of the 1220 scheduled for distribution were considered useful for the analysis. This represent 95.4 percent questionnaire recovery rate

Table 1 : Summary of Questionnaire Distribution

Cities	Residential Areas for analysis			Total	Retrieved
	Low	Medium	High		
Ibadan	111	224	336	669	654
Zaria	58	116	174	348	319
Owerri	33	67	101	201	191
Total	202	407	611	1220	1164

Source : Author's 2010.

Data analysis was both descriptive and inferential. Four indices were developed in this study. These are 'Residential Crime Magnitude' (RCM), 'Fear of Crime Events Index' (FCEI), 'Fear of Neighbourhood' (FNI) and 'Household Safety Measures Index' (HSMI). The first is the aggregate of crime experienced by households while the second was used in measuring what residents fear most in criminal attack and public disorder. The third: FNI was used in measuring fear of likelihood of crime incidences at certain period of time within the residential neighbourhood. The fourth index was developed to assess residents' level of usage of household safety measures HSMI (or residents' physical response to crime). Variables indicating FCEI and FNI were measured in the ranking scale of Likert as "very high" (5), "high" (4), "moderate" (3), "low" (2) and "very low" (1). The FCEI and FNI were obtained by dividing the summation of weighted value (SWV) by the total number of responses. The SWV of each variable is the addition of the product of the proportion of responses to it and the weighted value attached to each rating. This is done for each residential area. The mathematical expression is as follows:

$$FCEI = SWV/Ni \dots\dots\dots 1$$

$$FNI = SWV/Ni \dots\dots\dots 2$$

$$SWV = NiVi \dots\dots\dots 3$$

Where: FCEI = 'Fear of Crime Events Index'

FNI = 'Fear of Neighbourhood Index'

SWV = Summation of weight value

Ni = Number of Respondents rating variable i; and

Vi = weight assigned to variable i

Some variables indicating HSMI were obtained in ranking scale of Likert as "very often", "quite often", "often", "seldom" and "not at all". These include use of special door locks, alarm system, burglar proofs on doors and windows, use of security dogs, sword/axe/club/stick, juju, gun and security guard(s).

HSMI was obtained by dividing the summation of weighted value (SWV) by the total number of responses. The SWV of each variable is the addition of the product of the proportion of responses to it and the weighted value attached to each rating. This is done for each residential area. The mathematical expression is as follows:

$$HSMI = SWV/Ni \dots\dots\dots 4$$

$$SWV = NiVi$$

Where: HSMI = 'Household Safety Measure Index'

SWV = Summation of weight value

Ni = Number of Respondents rating variable i; and

Vi = weight assigned to variable i

Other safety measures assessed as nominal data include material used for door, window, fence and tip of fence; and body responsible for neighbourhood security surveillance.

The variables in each of the groups highlighted above were summarized using factor analysis and their linear composites were extracted. Nineteen factors emerged from the analysis out of which six were selected and others regarded as residual because of their loading values and the fact that they are repetition of the selected ones (see appendix 2). The loadings of the variables under each group are listed in the descending order of loadings attached to them.

There after the relationship between all the groups was verified using canonical correlation analysis.

1. Residential Crime Incidence (RCM): This factor extracts 73.529% of the total variance of the data set. The crime categories (with their loadings) included here are: assaults .978; white collar .978; stealth/pretence .973; against morality .961; against property .944; against public law .929; aggression .927; public disorderliness .652; acquisition .629; unnatural crime .367.
2. Fear of Crime events Index (FCEI): This component accounts for 62.457% of the total variance. The variables measuring fear of crime events loaded thus: female member of household raped .926; female household member tortured or beaten .909; destruction of car .894; self tortured or beaten .872; kidnapping .871; self raped .862; burning of cars .839; loss of one's life .833; burning of houses and properties .799; contacting HIV AID or venereal disease .754; killing of household member .698; money stolen .653; destruction of window/door locks/ burglary proof .647; shock or psycho imbalance .616; property carted away .554.
3. Fear of Neighbourhood Index (FNI): This component extracts 51.889% of the total variance of the data set. The loadings of the variables used to measure feelings of fear in the residential neighbourhood are as follows: worried going out in the dark .935; risk for women going alone in the dark .930; raping of women/girls in the dark .814;

- one who goes out before dawn likely to be attacked .803; risk of attack when out in the area in dark .779; afraid being alone anytime at home .721; afraid being alone in the night .717; afraid being alone in the morning .493; afraid being alone in the afternoon .423; afraid being alone in the evenings .279.
4. Building and Environmental Features (BEF): This factor extracts 43.377% of the total variance of the data set. The variables concerned and their loadings is as follows: percentage residential use .835; percentage street lights .829; percentage flats .657; percentage duplex/bungalow .619; percentage access road .541; percentage security checking points .330; percentage first-floor .079; percentage restriction signs -.103; percentage ground-floor -.110; percentage street-bumps -.703; percentage residential/commercial uses -.889; percentage accessed by footpath -.902; percentage traditional/roomy building -.954.
 5. Household Safety Measures Index (HSMI): This factor extracts 42.741% of the total variance of the data set. The loading of the variables under this component is thus: percentage barb wire 0.082; percentage burglar proof on doors 0.080; alarm system 0.079; iron/steel window 0.076; percentage iron/steel door 0.071; security dogs 0.063; security guard 0.061; barbwire fence 0.056; percentage burglar present 0.055; door locks 0.052; vigilante responsible for neighbourhood 0.051; percentage hedges as fence 0.048; percentage police responsible for neighbourhood security 0.033; sword/axe/club/stick 0.032; percentage glass panes/flush doors 0.022; burglar proof on windows 0.022; percentage concrete fence 0.020; percentage broken bottles on fence -0.084; percentage wooden window -0.78; percentage wooden doors -0.075; percentage hired security guard responsible for neighbourhood security -0.074; gun -0.064; percentage no fence -0.061; juju -0.052; percentage no burglar -0.012; percentage louver blades glass -0.007.
 6. Socio-economic Characteristics (SEC): This component extracts 37.550% of the total variance of the data set. The loading of the variables under it is as follows: percentage monthly income between #25,000:00 – #70,000:00 .929; percentage 1 – 4 persons .916; percentage monthly income greater than #70,000:00 .856; percentage public service .837; percentage having 1 – 2 vehicles .829; percentage married .655; percentage 31 – 55 years old .638; percentage having more than 2 vehicles .628; percentage of non-indigene .621; percentage male .606; percentage post-graduate .601; percentage greater than 10 years .229; percentage more than 55 years .197; percentage tenant .136; percentage NCE/OND holder .114; percentage

organized private sector .101; percentage landlord -.097; percentage less than 10 years -.230; percentage unemployed -.461; percentage with no formal education -.473; percentage single -.491; percentage 18 – 30 years -.598; percentage female -.606; percentage indigene -.616; percentage less than #6,000:00 -.763; percentage no vehicle -.794; percentage greater than 10 persons/building -.882;.

Using Statistical Package for Social Scientist the study employs canonical correlation analysis to explain the relationship between the linear composites of socio-economic characteristics (SEC), building and environmental features (BEF), residential crime magnitude (RCM), indices of fear of crime events (FCEI), fear of neighbourhood (FNI) and households' safety measures (HSMI).

The linearity of the relationship between

The general canonical model is given as:

$$R = R_{1_{yy}} R_{yx} R_{-1_{xx}} R_{xy} \dots \dots \dots 5$$

where:

- R = Canonical correlation
- $R_{-1_{yy}}$ = Inverse of correlation among composites of fear of crime events (FCEI), fear of neighbourhood (FNI) and households' safety measures (HSMI) (Dependent Variables DVs)
- $R_{yx} R_{xy}$ = Correlation among independent and dependent variables
- $R_{-1_{xx}}$ = Inverse of correlation among composites of residential crime incidence (RCM), residents' socio economic characteristics (SEC) and building and environmental features (BEF) (Independent Variables IVs)

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The result of the correlation analysis is documented appendix 3. The correlation of set 1 (R_{yy}) comprises the correlations between variables of fear of criminals events (FCEI), fear of Neighbourhood (FNI) and households' safety measures (HSMI). These variables have positive correlation coefficients. This indicates that the correlation is uni-directional. The higher the attributes of the composites the higher the scores they obtain. In this context the higher the positive value of variables of fear of crime events index (FCEI), fear of neighbourhood index (FNI) and households' safety measures index (HSMI), the higher their attributes in the model. Considering the loadings in set 1, the absolute values of fear of neighbourhood FNI (.5804, .5737) is greater than fear of crime events FCEI (.5804, .3330). The index with the least absolute values is household safety measures HSMI (.3330, .5737). In order of importance the implication of this is that fear of neighbourhood is more crucial in the canonical correlation analysis performed than fear of crime events and household safety measures. The relationship between incidence of crime, socio-economic

characteristics and, building and environmental features on one side, and residents' response to crime (fear of neighbourhood, fear of crime events and households' safety measures) on the other side places fear of neighbourhood as the prime response to residential area crime incidence. In other words, residents' response to crime is first and majorly emotional in respect of fear of the likelihood of crime occurring at certain period of time within the residential neighbourhood (measured as FNI). The fear of crime events i. e. fear of what one could suffer during crime incidences is the second foremost emotional response to crime. Finally these emotional responses manifested in physical household safety measures employed.

The correlation for set 2 comprises of the correlation between the factors of residential area crime incidence (RCM), building and environmental features (BEF) and residents' socio-economic characteristics (SEC). The correlation coefficients of these are both positive and negative that is bidirectional. This implies that the higher the attributes of the factors the higher the scores they obtain. In this regard the higher the positive value of the composites of fear of crime events (FCEI), fear of neighbourhood (FNI) and households' safety measures (HSMI), the higher their attributes in the model. Among the loadings of factors in set 2, the absolute value of building and environmental features BEF (-.6842, .5500) is greater than that of residential crime magnitude RCM (-.3593, -.6842) while the least is socio-economic characteristics SEC (-.3593, .5500). This implies that residents' response to crime is first influenced by building and environmental features then residential crime magnitude and socio-economic characteristics.

The analysis produced three canonical variates. The correlation of the first pair of canonical variate (Root 1) is .995 (see Fig 2). The eigen value for the correlation is therefore .990. Eigen value is the square of correlation $r^2 = \lambda$. The first pair of canonical variate have .995 correlation and overlap with .990 or 99.0% variance. The correlation of the second pair of canonical variate (Root 2) is .695 (see Fig 3). Similar to the procedure used for Root 1, the eigen value for Root 2 is .482. This connotes that the second pair of canonical variate have .695 correlation and overlaps with .482 or 48.2% variance.

Table 2 : Bartlett's Test of Significance

Root	X2	P value	R
Root 1	70.455	0.000	.995
Root 2	9.346	0.053	.695
Root 3	0.448	0.503	.181

Source : Author's, 2010

In order to know whether the remaining correlations are truly zero the Bartlett's test of significance was computed and documented in table 2. For Root 1, X2 is 70.455 with P value of 0.000 at 99.99 % confidence limit. There is a significant overlap in the

variability between variables concerned. This indicates that there is a significant relationship between variables of residential crime magnitude RCM, socio-economic characteristics SEC and building and environmental features BEF; and fear of crime events FCEI, fear of neighbourhood FNI and households' safety measures HSMI. The X2 for Root 2 is 9.346 with P value of 0.053 at 99.99 % confidence limit. The P value for Root 2 is significantly different from zero. This implies that there is significant overlap in the variability between the second pair of the canonical variates (Root 2). The X2 for Root 3 is 0.448 with P value of 0.503 at 99.99% confidence limit. This indicates that there is no significant overlap in the variability of the variables concerned. In canonical analysis the first pair of canonical variate is the first canonical extract and the strongest to be considered in the interpretation of the model (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2001) moreover the third pair of canonical variate had no significant overlap in the variability between the variables concerned. Thus the first and second will be interpreted in this study.

Table 3 : Loading Matrix for Canonical Correlation

Sets	Variable set	Canonical Variate Pairs		
		First	Second	Third
Set 1	FCEI	-.225	-.021	.974
	FNI	-.722	-.552	.417
	HSMI	-.946	.296	.130
Set 2	RCM	-.046	-.984	.174
	SEC	-.386	.518	.763
	BEF	-.697	.708	-.112

Source : Author's, 2010

Documented in table 3 is the loading matrix of canonical correlation. For the first pair of canonical variate, fear of crime events (FCEI) correlates -.225; fear of neighbourhood (FNI) correlates -.722; households' safety measures (HSMI) correlates -.946 while residential crime magnitude (RCM) correlates -.046; socio-economic characteristics (SEC) correlates -.386; building and environmental features (BEF) -.697. The correlation of the first pair of canonical variate is unidirectional because the coefficients carry negative signs. This indicates that a low attributes of household safety measures (HSMI), a low attributes of fear of neighbourhood (FNI) and low attributes of fear of crime events (FCEI) is associated with a low attributes of building and environmental features (BEF), low attributes of socio-economic variables (SEC) and a very low attributes of residential crime magnitude (RCM). In other words variable of building and environmental features is stronger among the independent variable sets followed by socio-economic variables then residential crime magnitude. In this order they influence first level of installation and usage of household safety

measures, residents' level of fear or dread of likelihood of crime incidence in their neighbourhood and lastly fear of events associated with magnitude of crime within residential areas.

With the second pair of canonical variate fear of crime events (FCEI) correlates -.021; fear of neighbourhood (FNI) correlates -.552; households' safety measures (HSMI) correlates -.296 while residential crime magnitude (RCM) correlates -.984; socio-economic characteristics (SEC) correlates .518; building and environmental features (BEF) .708. The correlation of the second pair of canonical variate is bidirectional because the coefficients carry either positive or negative signs. This indicates that a low attributes of fear of neighbourhood (FNI), high attributes of household safety measures (HSMI), and a very low or insignificant attributes of fear of crime events (FCEI) is associated with a very low attributes of residential crime magnitude (RCM), high attributes of building and environmental features (BEF) and, a high attributes of socio-economic characteristics (SEC). Variables of building and environmental features are stronger among the independent variable sets followed by variables of socio-economic variables then residential crime magnitude. In this order they influence first households' safety measures then fear of crime events and lastly fear of neighbourhood. This implies that households in the high socio-economic class with high building and environmental features employed a high usage of households' safety measures, inhibiting crime incidence (low residential crime magnitude) thus resulting in low fear of crime events and fear of likelihood of occurrence of crime in the neighbourhood. This implies that residents with high socioeconomic profile with high building and environmental features could afford the installation of more household safety measures. This acts as deterrence to crime thus inputting confidence in households evidenced in low fear of neighbourhood and crime events.

The implication of the results of the first variate pair is that households with low building and environmental features, low socio-economic attributes, had low experience of crime as a result of high usage of household safety measures dictating a low usage of household safety measures then low level of fear of likelihood of crime incidences in the neighbourhood and low fear of what to suffer if crime occurs. Further implication is that residents with low feelings of fear of crime in their neighbourhood had lower fear of crime events because they experience low crime incidences and are in the low socio-economic rung with low building and environmental features thus utilizes household safety measures minimally. Practically, when building and environmental features are poor and the residents are poor while crime magnitude in the area is relatively low, it follows that: household safety measures

would be close to nil, fear of neighbourhood will be very low and the fear of crime events will be very low too.

It is important to interpret this correlation with the communalities which loads highly in each of these composite. A residential environment with low proportion of buildings used solely for residential purpose and low street lights with low proportion of residents with monthly income of #25,000: 00 - #70,000: 00; 1-4 persons per building, monthly income greater than #70,000:00, public service and vehicle ownership of 1-2 vehicles had low experience of crime of assaults, white collar crime and stealth/pretext. This scenario necessitated low use of barb wire on the fence, burglar proof on doors, alarm system etc. Then there is low worry of going out in the dark, risk of women going out in the dark and fear of women getting raped in the dark. Principal example of this scenario is the situation of the high density residential areas sampled in this study.

Since the strongest of the independent composite in this relationship is building and environmental features, thus policies or programmes targeted at addressing criminality in areas of low socio-economic attributes with low residential crime incidences must pay careful attention to variables of building and environmental features. Such variables include use of buildings, use of street light in neighbourhoods, building type, access type, use of restriction signs within neighbourhood etc. Summarily a significant relationship has been established between socio economic attributes of residents; building and environmental features, residential crime magnitude, fear of crime events, fear of neighbourhood and households' safety measures. Thus, the third hypothesis set initially in this study is rejected.

a) Redundancy Analysis

The redundancy analysis reveals how much variance is extracted by each canonical variate from its own side and the other side of the equation.

Table 4 : Proportion of Variance Extracted

Canonic Variate Pairs	Proportion of Variate extracted from Independent side (%)	Proportion of Variate extracted from dependent side (%)
Dependent Side	1 (48.9)	.484 (48.4)
	2 (13.1)	.063 (6.3)
	3 (38.0)	.131 (1.2)
Independent side	1 (21.0)	.489 (21.2)
	2 (28.0)	.131 (57.9)
	3 (0.7)	.380 (20.9)

Source : Author's, 2010

The three canonical variates pairs were considered here in order to ascertain the extent of the variance extracted from both the dependent and independent sides of the equation. This is done in order to account for total (100%) variance. The proportion of variance extracted by variables used is documented in table 4. The first, second and third canonical variates pair from the dependent composites extracted 48.4%, 6.3% and 1.2% respectively of the independent composites. Thus the dependent composites extracted a total of 55.9% variance of the independent composites. Likewise from its own side i.e dependent composites the first, second and third canonical variates pairs extracted 48.9%, 13.1% and 38% variance respectively. This produced a total of 100% variance. From the independent composites, first, second and third canonical variates pairs extracted 21.2%, 57.9% and 20.9% (totalling 100%) of the variance in favour of the independent side. On the other hand the first, second and third canonical variates pair extracted 21.0%, 28.0% and 0.7% respectively from the dependent composites. The independent composite thus extracted 49.7% variance from the dependent composites. This implies that 49.7 percent of the variation observed in residents response to crime i.e. fear of crime events, fear of neighbourhood and households' safety measures is extracted by variables of residential crime magnitude, building and environmental features and socio-economic characteristics.

IV. CONCLUSION

The study employed the use of a robust statistical technique: canonical correlation analysis in determining the relationship between attributes of building and environmental features (BEF), socio-economic characteristics (SEC), residential crime magnitude (RCM) and household safety measures (HSMI), fear of neighbourhood (FNI) and fear of crime events (FCEI). The relationship between incidence of crime, socio-economic characteristics and, building and environmental features on one side, and residents' response to crime (fear of neighbourhood, fear of crime events and households' safety measures) on the other side places fear of neighbourhood as the prime response to residential area crime incidence. In other words, residents' response to crime is first and majorly emotional in respect of fear of the likelihood of crime occurring at certain period of time within the residential neighbourhood (measured as FNI). The fear of crime events i. e. fear of what one could suffer during crime incidences is the second foremost emotional response to crime. Finally these emotional responses manifested in physical household safety measures employed.

This study therefore posits that there is significant relationship between low attributes of BEF, low attributes of SEC, low attributes of RCM and low attributes of HSMI, low attributes of FNI and low

attributes of FCEI. The confirmation of a significant relationship between these six indices is an indication that crime control cannot be properly handled until all these aspects are taken care of. However BEF was identified as the strongest dependent variable informing residents' response to crime thus any meaningful intervention at crime control must first begin with decision on building and environmental features that discourages crime incidence and reduces fear of crime. This is not to undermine other factors which show a relationship with response to crime. According to the result of this analysis when this is taken care of the feedback will be observed first on residents' perception of their vulnerability within their neighbourhood (FNI).

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APPENDICE

Appendix 1 : Selected Localities in Ibadan, Zaria and Owerri

S/N	Local Government Area	No of Questionnaire Scheduled	Residential Zones	Localities
1	Ibadan North	77	High	Yemetu, Oke Aremo, Oje, Itu Taba
		52	Medium	Mokola and Total Garden,
		25	Low	New Bodija
2	Ibadan North east	71	High	Ode Aje, Beyerunka and Ita Bale Labo
		47	Medium	Iwo Road and Orita Basorun
		24	Low	Agodi
3	Ibadan South east	83	High	Elekuro, Odinjo and Idi Arere
		55	Medium	Orita-Challenge and part of Yejide
		27	Low	Part of Felele
4	Ibadan South west	67	High	Foko, Gege, Bode and Popoyemoja
		44	Medium	Odo-Ona and Oke-Bola.
		22	Low	Oluyole Estate
5	Ibadan North west	38	High	Agbeni/Agbaje, Idikan and Abebi
		26	Medium	Eleyele

		13	Low	Omireke GRA
	Total	671		
6	Zaria	72	High	Zaria City,
		48	Medium	Wusasa and Gaskia.
		24	Low	GRA
7	Sabon Gari	102	High	Sabon Gari and Samaru,
		68	Medium	Railway Authority Staff Quarters and Centre for Energy Development Staff Quarters,
		34	Low	School of Aviation Senior Staff Quarter, Ahmadu Bello University Staff Quarter and Nigeria Institute of Transport Technology
	Total	348		
8	Owerri Municipal	32	High	Douglas
		21	Medium	Ikenegbu and Works layout.
		11	Low	Prefab/Aladima and World Bank Estate
9	Owerri North	44	High	Orji and Amakoya
		30	Medium	Emekuku
		14	Low	
10	Owerri West	25	High	Nekede
		16	Medium	Ihagwa
		8	Low	
	Total	201		

Source : Author's, 2010.

Appendix 2 : Factor Analysis

Component Matrix^a

	Component	
	1	2
RCM_acquisition	.629	.680
RCM_stealth/pretence	.973	-.064
RCM_aggression	.927	-.333
RCM_assaults	.978	-.058
RCM_against morality	.961	-.108
RCM_against property	.944	.001
RCM_public disorder	.652	.623
RCM white collar	.978	.094
RCM_against public law	.929	-.162
RCM_unnatural crime	.367	-.665

Extraction Method : Principal Component Analysis.

a. 2 components extracted.

Component Matrix^a

	Component		
	1	2	3
FCEI_loss of one's life	.833	.368	.063
FCEI_killing of hsd memb	.698	.516	-.484
FCEI_female memb of hsd raped	.926	-.124	-.222
FCEI_self raped	.862	-.015	-.459
FCEI_kidnappg	.871	-.324	.082
FCEI_self tortured or beaten	.872	.145	.204
FCEI_female hsd memb tortured or beaten	.909	-.027	.132
FCEI_contactg HIV AD or venerable disease	.754	-.443	.152
FCEI_shock or pscycy imbalance	.616	.668	-.197
FCEI_ppty carted away	.554	.363	.683
FCEI_money stolen	.653	.022	.687
FCEI_destr of windoor locksburglar proof	.647	.519	-.044
FCEI_destr of car	.894	-.355	.153
FCEI_burng of houses & ppties	.799	-.403	-.392
FCEI_burng of cars	.839	-.416	-.117

Component Matrix^a

	Component	
	1	2
RCM_acquisition	.629	.680
RCM_stealth/pretence	.973	-.064
RCM_aggression	.927	-.333
RCM_assaults	.978	-.058
RCM_against morality	.961	-.108
RCM_against property	.944	.001
RCM_public disorder	.652	.623
RCM_white collar	.978	.094
RCM_against public law	.929	-.162
RCM_unnatural crime	.367	-.665

Extraction Method : Principal Component Analysis.

Component Matrix^a

	Component				
	1	2	3	4	5
RR_sp door locks	.573	-.156	.400	-.188	.655
RR_burglar windows	.249	-.916	.150	-.138	.192
RR_burglar on doors	.884	-.354	-.187	.103	-.142
RR_security dogs	.699	.558	.180	.106	.120
RR_gun	-.711	.314	.331	.453	.090
RR_swordaxeclubs tick	.355	.803	-.218	.086	.187
RR_alarm syst	.874	.170	-.262	-.147	.148
RR_security guard	.681	-.105	.601	.173	.162
RR_juju	-.580	.322	.583	-.233	.183
PER_WOODENDOORS	-.838	-.388	-.291	-.086	.236
PER_IRONSTELLDOR	.786	.384	-.382	.145	-.109
PER_GLASSPANSFLUSHDOORS	.249	-.061	-.508	.578	.024
PER_WOODENWINDOW	-.864	.188	-.385	-.093	-.094
PER_IRONSTEELWINDOW	.843	.228	-.422	.067	-.013
PER_LOUVREBLADESGLASSPANES	-.081	-.813	.127	.190	.157
PER_NOFENCE	-.679	.586	.051	-.413	-.107
PER_CONCRETEFENCE	.219	-.870	-.232	.335	.117
PER_BARBWIRE_FENCE	.622	.617	.258	-.086	.255
PER_HEDGESFENCE	.535	.157	.526	-.006	-.439
PER_BROKENBOTTLES_ONFENCE	-.936	-.097	.030	.254	.187
PER_SPIRALBARWIRE	.912	.149	.115	-.271	-.241
PER_BURGLAR_PRESENT	.610	-.589	.424	.154	-.158
PER_NO_BURGLAR	-.132	.715	-.574	.143	.302
PER_VIGILANTEE_RESPON	.567	-.631	-.460	-.238	.019
PER_HIREDSECURITYGUARD_RESPON	-.821	-.096	.219	.359	-.239
PER_POLICE_RESPON	.371	.564	.358	.632	.015

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. 5 components extracted.

Component Matrix^a

	Component					
	1	2	3	4	5	6
PER_N_FEDU	-.473	.682	-.455	.176	-.261	.062
PER_NCE_OND	.114	.277	.716	-.079	-.036	.525
PER_PGRAD	.601	-.203	.156	.644	.194	-.162
PER_ORG_PRVSECT	.101	.171	.120	-.326	.792	.274
PER_PUBL	.837	-.336	-.225	-.119	-.259	-.209
PER_UNEMPL	-.461	.309	-.106	.685	.248	-.360
PER_GRT#70000	.856	-.220	-.290	.092	-.012	.160
PER_#25G_70G	.929	-.010	.218	-.147	-.161	-.128
PER_LESS#6G	-.763	-.490	.001	-.051	-.109	.347
PER_MORE2VEH	.628	-.241	.639	.186	-.059	.097
PER1_2VEHS	.829	-.367	.380	-.017	.026	-.116
PER_NOVEH	-.794	.337	-.497	-.059	.005	.042
PER_LANDL	-.097	.607	.305	.599	.079	.402
PER_TENA	.136	-.760	-.505	-.288	.058	.112
PER_18_30YRS	-.598	-.648	-.025	.431	.010	.063
PER_31_55YRS	.638	.251	-.170	-.652	-.193	.119
PER_MORETHAN_55YRS	.197	.833	.282	.133	.252	-.281
PER_MALE	.606	-.420	-.448	.431	.054	.227
PER_FEM	-.606	.420	.448	-.431	-.054	-.227
PER_SNG	-.491	-.833	.015	.136	.194	.072
PER_MAR	.655	.664	-.088	-.122	-.271	-.030
PER_1_4PERSONS	.916	.018	-.198	.214	-.171	.207
PER_GREATR_10PERSONS	-.882	.128	-.038	-.336	.287	.057
PER_LESS10YRS	-.230	-.895	.293	-.144	.073	-.175
PER_GREATR10YRS	.229	.893	-.301	.159	-.071	.157
PER_INDIGENE	-.616	-.140	.248	.129	-.679	.024
PER_NON_INDIGENE	.621	.134	-.238	-.145	.680	-.029

Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.

a. 6 components extracted.

Appendix 3 : Canonical Correlation Model

Run MATRIX procedure:

Correlations for Set-1

	FCI	FNI	HSI
FCI	1.0000	.5804	.3330
FNI	.5804	1.0000	.5737
HSI	.3330	.5737	1.0000

Correlations for Set-2

	RCM	SEC	BEF
RCM	1.0000	-.3593	-.6842
SEC	-.3593	1.0000	.5500
BEF	-.6842	.5500	1.0000

Correlations Between Set-1 and Set-2

	RCM	SEC	BEF
FCI	.0550	.2132	.1260
FNI	.4236	.1357	.2199
HSI	-.1547	.4875	.7988

Canonical Correlations

1	.995
2	.695
3	.181

Test that remaining correlations are zero:

	Wilk's	Chi-SQ	DF	Sig.
1	.005	70.455	9.000	.000
2	.500	9.346	4.000	.053
3	.967	.448	1.000	.503

Standardized Canonical Coefficients for Set-1

	1	2	3
FCI	.292	.452	1.104
FNI	-.436	-1.338	-.129
HSI	-.794	.913	-.164

Raw Canonical Coefficients for Set-1

	1	2	3
FCI	.292	.452	1.104
FNI	-.436	-1.338	-.129
HSI	-.794	.913	-.164

Standardized Canonical Coefficients for Set-2

	1	2	3
RCM	-.984	-.945	.144
SEC	.020	.207	1.180
BEF	-1.381	-.052	-.663

Raw Canonical Coefficients for Set-2

	1	2	3
RCM	-.984	-.945	.144
SEC	.020	.207	1.180
BEF	-1.381	-.052	-.663

Canonical Loadings for Set-1

	1	2	3
FCI	-.225	-.021	.974
FNI	-.722	-.552	.417
HSI	-.946	.296	.130

Cross Loadings for Set-1

	1	2	3
FCI	-.224	-.014	.176
FNI	-.718	-.384	.075
HSI	-.941	.206	.023

Canonical Loadings for Set-2

	1	2	3
RCM	-.046	-.984	.174
SEC	-.386	.518	.763
BEF	-.697	.708	-.112

Cross Loadings for Set-2

	1	2	3
RCM	-.046	-.683	.031
SEC	-.384	.360	.138
BEF	-.693	.492	-.020

Redundancy Analysis:

Proportion of Variance of Set-1 Explained by Its Own Can. Var.

	Prop Var
CV1-1	.489
CV1-2	.131
CV1-3	.380

Proportion of Variance of Set-1 Explained by Opposite Can.Var.

	Prop Var
CV2-1	.484
CV2-2	.063
CV2-3	.012

Proportion of Variance of Set-2 Explained by Its Own Can. Var.

	Prop Var
CV2-1	.212
CV2-2	.579
CV2-3	.209

Proportion of Variance of Set-2 Explained by Opposite Can. Var.

	Prop Var
CV1-1	.210
CV1-2	.280
CV1-3	.007



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Socioeconomic and Political Development: Their Measurement and Connections

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Abstract - The scope of the paper is to investigate the basic factors of development worldwide. By following factor analysis, six variables that we consider of high importance for the overall development of nations, namely the level of income per capita, the degree of human development, the extent of government effectiveness, the level of perceived corruption, the range of political rights and the extent of civil liberties are found to be integrated into two basic factors of development: the socioeconomic factor and the political factor. The socioeconomic factor comprises the level of income per capita, the degree of human development, the extent of government effectiveness and the level of perceived corruption, while the political factor comprises the range of political rights and the extent of civil liberties. Our analysis unveils that both these factors are of crucial importance for the overall development of countries. Based on these two factors or criteria of development, our empirical work in the form of cluster analysis distinguishes four groups of countries that we describe and discuss in length. The basic conclusion that emerges from our cluster analysis is that although an effective strategy towards overall development demands integrated policies that incorporate both the socioeconomic and the political dimensions of development, most countries worldwide have not achieved both of them.

Keywords : *socioeconomic development, political development, corruption, human development, government effectiveness, political system, factor analysis, cluster analysis.*

GJHSS-F Classification : FOR Code: 160699



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Socioeconomic and Political Development: Their Measurement and Connections

Kostas Rontos ^α & Ioannis Vavouras ^σ

Abstract - The scope of the paper is to investigate the basic factors of development worldwide. By following factor analysis, six variables that we consider of high importance for the overall development of nations, namely the level of income per capita, the degree of human development, the extent of government effectiveness, the level of perceived corruption, the range of political rights and the extent of civil liberties are found to be integrated into two basic factors of development: the socioeconomic factor and the political factor. The socioeconomic factor comprises the level of income per capita, the degree of human development, the extent of government effectiveness and the level of perceived corruption, while the political factor comprises the range of political rights and the extent of civil liberties. Our analysis unveils that both these factors are of crucial importance for the overall development of countries. Based on these two factors or criteria of development, our empirical work in the form of cluster analysis distinguishes four groups of countries that we describe and discuss in length. The basic conclusion that emerges from our cluster analysis is that although an effective strategy towards overall development demands integrated policies that incorporate both the socioeconomic and the political dimensions of development, most countries worldwide have not achieved both of them.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Empirical analysis approaches, measures and evaluates development mainly from its economic point of view. Social and political factors although considered by theory as playing an important role towards the advancement of the overall development of nations are mostly underestimated in empirical work. This is the outcome of several reasons. The most significant one is that the sociopolitical dimensions of development cannot be easily defined and measured in contrast to its economic dimension. Actually, economic development as a quantitative variable is identified with economic growth and is measured by international organizations and national statistical services for all countries of the world with relatively simple and widely acceptable indexes, such as real income per capita, while social and political aspects of human action can

only be successfully expressed by more complicated procedures on which generally there is no wider agreement.

However, it has been established long ago that economic growth although a necessary is not a sufficient condition for the development of nations. Development is a much wider concept than growth that incorporates as well the social and the political transformation of countries. The identification and more importantly the analysis of these sociopolitical transformations is associated with major difficulties. It must be realized, however, that this problem should not be the reason for policymakers and academic researchers to reduce their concern for the social and political dimensions of overall development. Actually, in modern societies there exist additional needs for the reduction of wealth inequalities and for the more fair distribution of the economic result of human activities, for the effective reduction of corruption, for a better social security system and what is called “social state”, for health and education systems of high quality, for increased government effectiveness in order the state to satisfy social needs more efficiently and for high standards of political rights and democracy, so that citizens to live in a comfortable, fair, secure and pleasant sociopolitical environment.

The recent worldwide economic crisis has unveiled that whenever an economic crisis is associated with a social and political crisis, that might be hidden or unobservable to some extent, then the economic crisis is deeper and more long lasting. In this way, symmetric economic disturbances or shocks, that is disturbances of economic activity that have simultaneous impacts on all countries, might have country specific or asymmetric consequences, that is they might have differential effects on various countries by affecting some economies more deeply than others, and therefore they might require a different macroeconomic policy mix. Therefore, although economic shocks might be symmetrical in their origins they might have asymmetrical effects on various countries due to their differentiated sociopolitical environment. In other words, economic development is not guaranteed in the long-run unless it is associated with high levels of social and political development. The countries more deeply affected by the recent economic crisis and sovereign debt crisis seem to be those where the levels of social and political development are not considered as very

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high. This is not astonishing since social cohesion and democratic institutions are effective guides to the formulation and implementation of the appropriate policies to overcome economic problems.

Fortunately, widely recognized international agencies and organizations have relatively recently developed methodologies to measure variables that express social and political dimensions or aspects of development, as it will be presented in the next section of the paper, that allow empirical research to incorporate them in studies on the overall development. It must be stressed however from the outset that overall development is a multidimensional phenomenon associated with a variety of social, economic and political factors or variables, such as high per capita income, high human development, high government effectiveness, significant reduction of income and wealth inequalities, large social transformations, reduced corruption and adoption of democratic political mechanisms and procedures. In the following paragraphs we discuss in some detail the variables that have been used in our factor analysis as the main characteristics of the level of overall development of nations.

The variable very widely used in empirical research as the best measure or the best available indicator of the level of economic development is real income per capita. International organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank and the OECD classify countries as developed or developing according to their prevailing or average income per capita levels. Although income per capita is criticized as an inadequate indicator of economic development, mainly because it is an inefficient measure of the average living standards and quality of life prevailing in a country, it is still recognized as the best available measure of the average level of economic development.

We argue moreover that overall development is also associated with the degree of human development that is by the level of health, the degree of access to knowledge and the level of well-being prevailing in a given country, as a wider notion than economic development. Human development refers to the expansion of people's freedoms and capabilities to live their lives as they choose (UNDP, 2009). Human development is both a process and an outcome. It is not only concerned with the process through which human choices are enlarged, but it also focuses on the outcomes of the enlarged choices (UNDP, 2002).

Moreover, we accept that overall development is also associated with the degree of government effectiveness. An effective public sector promotes all the three dimensions of development, i.e. economic, social and political. Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi define governance as "the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes the processes by which governments are selected,

monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them" (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2009).

Another variable that we consider to be associated with all the three aspects or dimensions of the overall level of development is the level of perceived public sector corruption prevailing in a country¹. Public sector corruption is usually defined as the abuse of public power for private benefit (Tanzi, 1998) or the abuse of public office for private gain (Martinez-Vazquez, Arze del Granado and Boex, 2007). The World Bank defines public sector corruption as the abuse of public authority for private interest (World Bank, 1997). OECD defines public sector corruption as the misuse of public office, roles or resources for private benefit, material or otherwise (OECD, 1996). A definition provided by the nongovernmental organization Transparency International that covers corruption in both the public and the private sectors of the economy is the misuse of trusted power for own profit (Transparency International, 2011).

Corruption is a complex and a multidimensional phenomenon having several causes and effects. The factors that are associated to corruption are numerous. The most important ones are the level of economic development, the type of political authority, the quality of governance, the quality of the institutional framework, the effectiveness of the justice system, the degree of globalization, the level of competition, the structure and the size of public sector, as well as the cultural qualities, the geographic location and history². In summary, widespread corruption largely unveils the existence of institutional and political weaknesses as well as economic and social underdevelopment. It is recognized that corruption may be the single most significant barrier to both democratization and economic development (Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The general attitude towards corruption is also determined by the level of individual morality that is by the system of individual behavioral and moral attributes (Rontos, Salvati and Vavouras, 2013a). Basically, corruption is detrimental to economic growth and development by adversely affecting investment³. The extent, however, of the consequences corruption has on economic

¹It has been acknowledged from the first stages of human civilization that whoever is in a position to exercise power may also be in the position to use his public office for individual benefit. For an analysis of the concept and the various definitions of corruption, see Johnston (2001).

²For an analysis of the determinant factors of corruption see among others Lamsdorf (2006) and Treisman (2000).

³It must be stressed however that some early works on the subject argued that corruption improves economic efficiency and therefore promotes economic growth operating as the necessary "grease" to lubricate the wheels of state bureaucracy. See for example Leff (1964) and Huntington (1968).

development is largely determined by the existing institutional framework (de Vaal and Ebben, 2011). On another account, corruption is a “disease” which is caused by poverty, that is controlled only when economies develop (Treisman, 2000; Paldam, 2002)⁴.

It is also acknowledged that there exists a strong connection between the level of overall development and the quality of the political system. Underdevelopment is widely considered to be both a symptom and a cause for the malfunctioning of democratic institutions (Warren, 2004). Moreover, democracy and the consequent public accountability reduce the costs of development. In a sense, the political system or the “political macrostructure” is responsible for determining the political motivation of all players in a state system and it is the very reaction of these factors that determines the behavior of state bureaucracy (Lederman, Loayza and Soares, 2005). As a result, a highly developed and well-functioning democracy serves as a tool for increasing the level of overall development (Zhang, Cao and Vaughn, 2009).

In this paper our first objective is to examine all the above factors, that is income per capita, human development, government effectiveness, public sector corruption, and political freedom in the forms of political rights and civil liberties, as the main indicators of the overall development and the ways that their combination in several levels classifies countries and determines the patterns of development. Our analysis reveals that all the above factors are correlated and in general are of crucial importance in determining the extent of overall development worldwide⁵. It is assumed that political rights and civil liberties represent or measure the level of political development of countries while the rest variables in the model represent the socioeconomic one. In any case the methodology used will confirm or not the above assumption on its specific worldwide application.

II. DATA

Our analysis is based on six variables that have been derived for 176 countries (see list of countries in Table 6 and full values of variables in Appendix 1). It is the total number of countries for which data for all these variables existed in the year 2010. It could therefore be considered as a worldwide analysis. The variables have been derived from official statistics and other reliable and well-known international data sources as it is explained below.

⁴Moreover, we must point out that corruption is extensive in low income countries, not because their inhabitants present a natural proclivity towards the said phenomenon, but because the conditions of life make them prone to that (Lalountas, Manolas and Vavouras, 2011).

⁵This outcome is compatible with our argument on the importance of these variables as determinants of the overall level of development presented in a relevant work. See Rontos, Salvati and Vavouras (2013b).

1. To approximate the level of economic development in each country the variable Gross National Income per capita in purchasing power parities or current international dollars was used (GNI.PC.PPP). GNI.PC.PPP is gross national income (GNI) converted to international dollars using purchasing power parity rates. An international dollar has the same purchasing power over GNI as a U.S. dollar has in the United States⁶. GNIPC.PPP is very useful in economic analysis when the objective is to compare broad differences between countries in living standards since, as we have stated, purchasing power parities take into account the relative cost of living in various countries, while nominal GNI (or GDP) does not incorporate any such considerations. GNI.PC.PPP is an indicator widely used in international comparisons of economic development. The data used refer to the year 2010 and are provided by the World Bank (2010a) and for that year cover 215 economies.
2. The human development index (HDI) has been used as a summary measure of the level of human development. It is estimated by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and it measures the average achievements in a given country in three dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, access to knowledge and a decent standard of living. It is a composite index with life expectancy in birth, mean years of schooling, expected years of schooling and gross national income (GNI) per capita as its main components. Despite its inherent limitations the index is a useful comparative measure of the level of human development. According to this index countries are classified in three categories: High human development, if the value of the index is higher than 0.800, medium human development, if the value of the index is between 0.500 and 0.799 and low human development, if the value of the index is lower than 0.500. The data used refer to the year 2010. They are provided by the UNDP (2010) and for that year cover 169 countries and 25 territories. Since the HDI includes as one of its main components GNI per capita that has already been used as the basic variable of economic development, we used the variable HDI.NONINCOME, that is the HDI excluding its income dimension or component.
3. To express government effectiveness the relevant World Bank government effectiveness indicator (GE) has been used. This indicator is very useful because it aims at capturing the quality of public services provided, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation,

⁶See <http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD>.

and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi, 2010). The aim of the indicator is therefore to capture the capacity of the public sector to implement sound policies. GE is one of the six composite indicators of broad dimensions of governance, the so called worldwide governance indicators (WGI) covering over 200 countries since 1996 and produced by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (World Bank, 2010b). The values of GE lie between -2.5 and 2.5. Actually, the variable has been transformed to a standard normal one (with mean 0 and standard deviation 1), so that cross-country and over time differences in the measurement scale are avoided. Higher values correspond to better governance. Although this indicator measures subjective perceptions regarding government effectiveness and it is not the outcome of a quantitative objective measurement, it is of a great importance since it reveals how government effectiveness is being perceived.

4. To express corruption the corruption perceptions index (CPI) has been used. The CPI is an international index provided annually by the nongovernmental organization Transparency International. It should be acknowledged that CPI is the most extensively used index for relevant empirical studies. It is a composite indicator, based on a variety of data derived from 13 different surveys carried out by 10 independent and reputable organizations. It measures corruption in a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 represents the highest possible corruption level, while as the scale increases there is the perception that corruption does not exist in a given country. Despite the fact that the index is not the outcome of an objective quantitative measurement of corruption, it is of great importance since it reveals how this phenomenon is being perceived. The major strength of the CPI lies in the combination of multiple data sources in a single index, a fact that increases the reliability of each country's score (Lambsdorff, 2006)⁷. The data used for the CPI refer to the year 2010 and as it has already been stated are provided by Transparency International (2010) and for that year cover 178 countries or territories.
5. To approximate the quality of democracy in each country the "political rights" index (PR) has been used. The index is based on the evaluation of three sub-indexes, namely electoral process, political pluralism and participation and functioning of government. The index is estimated by the Freedom House organization (2013). The PR index measures from 1, which ranks a country as very free, up to 7,

which ranks a country as not free. According to the PR index countries are characterized as free countries (F) if they score 1.0-2.5 in the 1-7 scale, partly free countries (PF) if they score 3.0-5.0 in the 1-7 scale and not free countries (NF) if they score 5.5-7.0 in the 1-7 scale. The data used for the PR index refer to the year 2010 and are provided by the organization Freedom House (2010) and for that year cover 194 countries and 14 territories.

6. To approximate the extent of civil liberties in each country the "civil liberties" index (CL) has been used. The index is based on the evaluation of four sub-indexes, namely freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights. The index is estimated by the Freedom House organization (2013)⁸. The CL index measures from 1, which ranks a country as very free, up to 7, which ranks a country as not free. According to the CL index countries are characterized as free countries (F) if they score 1.0-2.5 in the 1-7 scale, partly free countries (PF) if they score 3.0-5.0 in the 1-7 scale and not free countries (NF) if they score 5.5-7.0 in the 1-7 scale. The data used for the CL index refer to the year 2010 and are provided by the organization Freedom House (2010) and for that year cover 194 countries and 14 territories.

It must be stressed that the average of the PR and CL ratings is known as the "freedom rating" index (FR) and determines the overall status of a country as a free, partly free and not free. However, since the two indexes focus on different aspects of democracy and freedom and since there are some deviations between the PR and CL ratings for several countries, we decided to use the two separate ratings instead of the average FR index.

III. METHODOLOGY

A two-step multivariate strategy has been developed in order to characterize the socioeconomic and the political system of each country according to the selected economic and non-economic features describing the level of economic, social and political development in each country. Analysis steps include: (i) a factor analysis and (ii) a non-hierarchical cluster analysis.

Factor analysis was used to detect the internal relations and structures among the variables GNI.PC.PPP, HDI.NONINCOME, GE, CPI, CL and PR by grouping and reducing their number.

The statistical measure Kaiser-Mayer Olkin (K.M.O.) of sampling adequacy and Bartlett's Test of

⁷ For an extended analysis and assessment of the various indicators of corruption, see mainly UNDP (2008).

⁸ For more details see Methodological Summary, Freedom House (2013).

Sphericity were calculated. Principal components analysis was employed to extract the number of factors, with Eigenvalues > 1 taken as a criterion, which was verified by Scree Plot. Conducting factors rotation the maximum likelihood method was used as extraction method and Varimax with Kaiser Normalization as rotation method.

Then, a non-hierarchical k-means cluster analysis (CA) was carried out with the aim at separating countries in a few groups exhibiting homogeneous socioeconomic and political patterns. The scores of the factors extracted from the above analysis were used as clustering criteria. The aforementioned scores were calculated according to the Bartlett method. The best partition (i.e. the optimal number of clusters in terms of group separation) was chosen according to the Cubic

Clustering Criterion (CCC) that works through the maximization of the ratio of the intra-group variance to the inter-group variances. Variance Ratio Criterion (VRC), that also was applied, suggested the same number of clusters. An ANOVA table, that was also constructed, indicates which variables contribute mostly to the differentiation of the clusters. Moreover, the analysis has been extended to the indication of the greatest similarities and dissimilarities between the clusters formed

IV. RESULTS

First of all descriptive statistics of the six variables inserted in the model are presented in Table 1. We can also see that 176 countries were inserted in the analysis for all the variables (N = 176).

Table 1: Descriptive statistics

	Mean	Std. Deviation	Analysis N
CPI.2010	4.011	2.0933	176
GE.2010	-.0593	.97877	176
CL.2010	3.3580	1.80230	176
HDI.NONINCOME.2010	.63461	.207620	176
PR2010	3.5227	2.14331	176
GNI.PC.PPP.2010	13,323.01	15,136.160	176

Factor analysis suggests the existence of two factors according to the Eigenvalues criterion (Table 2) and the Scree Plot (Figure 1). As a result, factor analysis

confirms our hypothesis of the existence of two distinct factors of development, the socioeconomic and the political one.

Table 2 : Total variance explained

Component	Initial Eigenvalues			Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	4.178	69.633	69.633	4.178	69.633	69.633
2	1.011	16.857	86.490	1.011	16.857	86.490
3	.419	6.985	93.475			
4	.202	3.360	96.834			
5	.100	1.674	98.508			
6	.090	1.492	100.000			

Extraction Method : Principal Component Analysis.

Note that initially 86.49 % of the variation is explained by the model.

Scree Plot




Figure 1

In order to ensure the endogenous correlations, the statistical measure Kaiser-Mayer Olkin (K.M.O.) was used, which indicates the data suitability, the existence of adequate endogenous correlations and the adequacy of the sample, ranging in 0.784. At the same time, Bartlett's Test Sphericity = 988, 15, df = 105, $p = 0.00$ verifying the possibility of variable correlation, by using factor analysis.

Table 3 : Total variance explained

Factor	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
1	2.775	46.248	46.248
2	2.055	34.256	80.504

Extraction Method : Maximum Likelihood

It is important to note, that the two factors retained, show that the total variance explained by the model is 80.54 % and that we have only 19.46 % loss (Table 3). The contribution of each factor to the variance explanation is also presented in the Table 3.

Table 4 : Rotated factor matrix

	Factor	
	1	2
GNI.PC.PPP.2010	.879	-.143
CPI.2010	.852	-.398
GE.2010	.805	-.438
HDI.NONINCOME.2010	.666	-.266
CL.2010	-.346	.922
PR2010	-.254	.873

The results from the use of the Varimax Rotation with Kaiser Normalization method, in which the basic hypothesis is that the factors that occur are independent with each other, are analyzed below. In fact, the resulted factors could be labeled as follows:

- Factor 1 : Socioeconomic aspects of development with variance explained = 46,248%. Four variables are loaded on this factor: GNI.PC.PPP, CPI, GE, and HDI.NONINCOME, that represent actual socioeconomic aspects of development and count factor loadings which range from 0.879 to 0.666. All variables have very high loads, which fluctuate more than 0.6. The perceptual variables and their factor loadings are presented in the Table 4.

- Factor 2 : Political aspects of development with variance explained = 34,256%. Two variables are loaded on this factor: CL and PR, which represent actual political aspects of development and have very high loads (0.922 and 0.873 respectively- Table 4).

In Figure 2 it is shown how the six variables are located in a rotated factor space.




Figure 2

Cluster analysis identified four groups of homogeneous countries according to our socioeconomic and political criteria as they are determined by the scores of the two aforementioned factors (Table 5). As it has already been stated, the full list of countries according to the cluster membership is shown in Table 6.

Table 5 : Results of cluster analysis: average value by factors' score and cluster

Factors	Clusters			
	1	2	3	4
Factor 1: Socioeconomic development	-0.30821	1.46801	2.18501	-0.59533
Factor 2: Political development*	1.10621	-0.78835	1.59198	-0.62630
Number of countries (N = 176)	55	31	9	81

According to the scale of PR and CL positive average score here means low political development and vice-versa.

According to the above cluster analysis we can observe the following:

Cluster 1 includes a considerable number of countries (55) characterised as mainly socially and economically-disadvantaged and very politically-disadvantaged in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Most of them are considered as third world countries. Afghanistan, Armenia, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Cuba, Egypt, Ethiopia, Georgia, Iran, Iraq, Vietnam are examples of them. However, two countries included in this group are not considered as third world countries, namely China and Russia.

Cluster 2 includes a total of 31 countries that can be classified as developed and consolidated democracies placed mainly in the European Union and in the Northern America with high economic and social development and considerable high political development (the lowest score of factor 2 on average among clusters). Examples of countries belonging to this cluster are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Finland, France, Israel, Japan,

Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, South Korea, United Kingdom and the United States.

Cluster 3 includes a limited number of 9 countries that can be classified as those showing a considerably higher socio-economic development (the highest score of factor 1 on average among clusters) but already unstable political systems (the highest score of factor 2 on average among clusters). To this cluster belong some very rich oil exporting countries of the Middle East (Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates). However three non oil exporting high income countries are also included in this cluster, namely Hong Kong, Singapore and Brunei.

Finally, in the most populated cluster 4 have been classified 81 countries showing very low levels of socio-economic development (the lowest score of factor 1 on average among clusters) but showing also fairly good levels of political development.

Table 6 : Cluster membership by country

Cluster 1	Cluster 2	Cluster 3	Cluster 4
Macau	Australia	Bahrain	Countries with high GNI (Higher than the median GNI.PC.PPP = 4,625 \$)
Timor – Leste	Austria	Brunei	
Afghanistan	Barbados	Hong Kong	
Algeria	Belgium	Kuwait	
Angola	Canada	Oman	
Armenia	Chile	Qatar	
Azerbaijan	Cyprus	Saudi Arabia	
Belarus	Denmark	Singapore	
Bhutan	Estonia	United Arab Emirates	
Burundi	Finland		
Cambodia	France		
Cameroon	Germany		
Central African Republic	Iceland		
Chad	Ireland		
China	Israel		
Colombia	Japan		
Congo – Brazzaville	Korea (South)		
Cote d'Ivoire	Luxembourg		
Cuba	Malta		
Democratic Rep, of Congo	Netherlands		
Djibouti	New Zealand		
Egypt	Norway		
Equatorial Guinea	Portugal		
Eritrea	Seychelles		
Ethiopia	Slovenia		
Gabon	Spain		
Gambia	Sweden		
Georgia	Switzerland		
Guinea	United Kingdom		
Haiti	United States		
Iran	Uruguay		
Iraq			
Jordan			
			Albania
			Argentina
			Bosnia and Herzegovina
			Botswana
			Brazil
			Bulgaria
			Costa Rica
			Croatia
			Czech Republic
			Dominica
			Dominican Republic
			Ecuador
			El Salvador
			FYR Macedonia
			Greece
			Guatemala
			Hungary
			Italy
			Jamaica
			Latvia
			Lebanon
			Lithuania
			Maldives
			Mauritius

Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan Laos Libya Malaysia Mauritania Morocco Myanmar Pakistan Russia Rwanda Somalia Sri Lanka Sudan Swaziland Syria Tajikistan Thailand Tunisia Turkmenistan Uzbekistan Vietnam Yemen Zimbabwe			Mexico Montenegro Namibia Panama Paraguay Peru Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia South Africa Trinidad and Tobago Turkey Ukraine Venezuela Countries with low GNI (Lower than the median GNI.PC.PPP = 4,625 \$) Bangladesh Benin Bolivia Burkina Faso Cape Verde Comoros Ghana Guinea – Bissau Guyana Honduras India Indonesia Kenya Kiribati Lesotho Liberia Madagascar Malawi Mali Moldova Mongolia Mozambique Nepal Nicaragua Niger Nigeria
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			Papua New Guinea Philippines Samoa Sao Tome and Principe Senegal Sierra Leone Solomon Islands Tanzania Togo Tonga Uganda Vanuatu Zambia
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However, this fourth most populated cluster presents an extended variation in strictly economic terms as they are represented by GNI.PC.PPP. Actually the range of GNI.PC.PPP among the 78 countries of the cluster (3 of the 81 with missing income were omitted) is 31,300 \$, while the interquartile range is 10,970 \$. With a median value of 4,625 \$, countries as Slovakia, Czech Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Greece and Italy have extremely high GNI values (21,870-31,740 \$), while some others as Mozambique, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Niger and Liberia have extremely low GNI values (900-440 \$). The fact that the score of the socioeconomic factor, which was used for countries' clustering (together with political factor), came from the combination of GNI and three more variables (CPI, GE, HDI) may explain this variation of the strict economic variable (GNI) of the model. Due to this heterogeneity, we could classify the countries in cluster four in two sub-groups (Table 6), according to the median GNI.PC.PPP.

Table 7: Distances between final cluster centers

Cluster	1	2	3	4
1		2.597	2.540	1.756
2	2.597		2.486	2.070
3	2.540	2.486		3.557
4	1.756	2.070	3.557	

According to Table 7, the greatest dissimilarities exist between the countries of the third and fourth clusters, as they present opposite developmental characteristics in their socioeconomic and political systems. Additionally, the lowest distance exists between the countries of first and the fourth cluster mainly due to the low levels of socioeconomic development that both of them present.

Table 8: Anova Analysis

	Cluster		Error		F	Sig.
	Mean Square	df	Mean Square	df		
Factor 1: Socioeconomic development	47.903	3	.281	172	170.298	.000
Factor 2: Political development	47.050	3	.251	172	187.713	.000

The ANOVA analysis presented in Table 8 indicates, that overall, each of the factor's score used in the present clustering, i.e. the socioeconomic and political one differs significantly across the clusters (p-value = 0.00 for both factor scores). However, according to F values, the variable contributing slightly more to cluster's differentiation is the political development.

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Factor analysis indicated that the six variables considered as the main determinants of development, namely the level of income per capita, the degree of human development, the level of perceived corruption, the extent of government effectiveness, the extent of

political rights and the extent of civil liberties are integrated into two basic factors of development: the socioeconomic factor and the political factor, confirming therefore our initial hypothesis. The socioeconomic factor comprises the level of income per capita, the degree of human development, the level of perceived corruption and the extent of government effectiveness, while the political factor comprises the extent of political rights and the extent of civil liberties.

Following this distinction of the two factors of development, countries can be classified as we have already stated into four main distinct groups: The first group comprises those countries associated with low values of the socioeconomic factor and low values of the political factor. Countries included in this group should pay balanced efforts on their socioeconomic and political transformation in order to develop. The second group comprises those countries associated with high values of the socioeconomic factor and high values of the political factor. Countries included in this group seem to fulfill the conditions that guarantee their long-run development. These two groups of countries (i.e. the first and the second) seem to confirm the prevailing hypothesis that the socioeconomic and the political development are positively correlated (Needler, 1968). In fact until the mid 1970s only highly developed economies enjoyed political democracy⁹. That is, it was accepted that economic development (to restrict only to that) generates political development and vice versa. Later, however, it was realized that growth might have and negative effects on democracy (destabilizing growth hypothesis)¹⁰.

The rest two groups of countries (i.e. the third and the fourth) seem to contradict the above common assumption. As we have shown, the third group comprises 9 countries associated with high values of the socioeconomic factor and low values of the political factor. For these countries, the high levels of socioeconomic development are not compatible with high political development. A "deficit" of political development seems to exist. As a result it could be argued that the high levels of socioeconomic development of these countries are not long run guaranteed or sustainable. The "deficit" of political development inhibits their development prospects. A primary objective of the countries included in this group is the adoption of policies that promote their political development. The fourth group is a very large group comprising 81 countries. This is a very heterogeneous

group, mainly as far as its socioeconomic determinants, characterized by low values of the socioeconomic factor and relatively high values of the political factor. As we have already pointed out, in this group of countries the low level of socioeconomic development seems to be the basic factor inhibiting their long-run development.

The primary objective of the countries included in this group is the adoption of policies that promote their socioeconomic development, not ignoring of course that the political development of these countries might also require to be increased.

Considering that the first two groups of countries (including in total 86 countries) seem to confirm the prevailing hypothesis that socioeconomic and political development are positively associated while the last two groups of countries (including in total 90 countries) seem to contradict this hypothesis, we investigate the relationship between the two factors of development taking all countries together. As it was expected, the correlation between each one of the variables comprising the level of political development and each one of the variables comprising the level of socioeconomic development is found to be moderate ($r < 0.7$)¹¹. As a result, the prevailing hypothesis of the positive correlation between the two factors cannot be empirically confirmed, at least completely and at least in the specific form of model specification.

Moreover, our cluster analysis has revealed that the largest dissimilarities or divergences exist between the third and the fourth group of countries, while the smallest ones between the first and the fourth group. Moreover, the analysis has shown that the score of each basic factor of development (i.e. the socioeconomic and the political one), differs significantly across the clusters. However, it has been established that the variable contributing more to the differentiation of clusters seems to be the political development.

In summary, the above empirical work has highlighted that the level of socioeconomic development and the level of political development are the most important dimensions that determine the overall long-run developmental patterns worldwide. The basic outcome of our empirical analysis is that in order to increase the level of overall development, not only economic but also social and political efforts should be undertaken. In some countries, emphasis should be given to their socioeconomic development (countries belonging to group 4), in some to their political development (countries belonging to group 3), and in some countries to both dimensions of development, socioeconomic and political (countries belonging to group 1).

The main conclusion of the above analysis is therefore that not all countries should follow identical strategies in order to increase their overall long-run development levels. As we have already stated, in some

⁹For a review of the theory explaining this relationship between development and democracy, see Romer (1994).

¹⁰The destabilizing growth hypothesis was proposed by Paldam (1998). And in fact, some relevant empirical work indicates that democracies do not appear to show different growth performance than non-democracies (Alesina, Özler, Roubini and Swayel, 1992). However, most empirical work on this subject investigates the relationship between political instability and economic growth.

¹¹ See Rontos, Salvati and Vavouras (2013b).

countries emphasis should be given to their socioeconomic development, in some to their political development and in some others to both of them. In line of the above analysis we argue that a high overall level of development is achieved and maintained in the long-run only when the socioeconomic development is

associated with the consolidation of democracy. Rising incomes is therefore a necessary but not a sufficient condition to increase overall development, unless it is associated with the improvement of the other socioeconomic determinants of development as well as with the consolidation of democracy.

Appendix 1 : List of countries considered in the analysis with the selected variables

Country	CPI	PR	GNI	HDI	GE	CL	Country	CPI	PR	GNI	HDI	GE	CL
Afghanistan	1.4	6	910	0.39	-1.47	6	Laos	2.1	7	2400	0.52	-0.94	6
Albania	3.3	3	8570	0.74	-0.27	3	Latvia	4.3	2	16630	0.80	0.69	1
Algeria	2.9	6	8060	0.70	-0.56	5	Lebanon	2.5	5	13820	0.74	-0.34	3
Angola	1.9	6	5170	0.48	-1.12	5	Lesotho	3.5	3	1980	0.45	-0.36	3
Argentina	2.9	2	15500	0.79	-0.21	2	Liberia	3.3	3	440	0.33	-1.24	4
Armenia	2.6	6	5640	0.71	-0.15	4	Libya	2.2	7	16750	0.77	-1.21	7
Australia	8.7	1	36910	0.93	1.81	1	Lithuania	5	1	18010	0.81	0.72	1
Austria	7.9	1	39800	0.88	1.88	1	Luxembourg	8.5	1	61250	0.87	1.7	1
Azerbaijan	2.4	6	9240	0.70	-0.83	5	Madagascar	2.6	6	950	0.48	-0.82	4
Bahrain	4.9	6	21240	0.81	0.59	5	Malawi	3.4	3	860	0.40	-0.39	4
Bangladesh	2.4	3	1810	0.50	-0.84	4	Malaysia	4.4	4	14160	0.76	1.09	4
Barbados	7.8	1	18850	0.79	1.4	1	Maldives	2.3	3	7840	0.66	-0.21	4
Belarus	2.5	7	13590	0.75	-1.13	6	Mali	2.7	2	1030	0.36	-0.88	3
Belgium	7.1	1	38330	0.89	1.59	1	Malta	5.6	1	24170	0.83	1.15	1
Benin	2.8	2	1580	0.43	-0.53	2	Mauritania	2.3	6	2400	0.45	-0.93	5
Bhutan	5.7	4	4970	0.52	0.57	5	Mauritius	5.4	1	13800	0.73	0.76	2
Bolivia	2.8	3	4620	0.66	-0.45	3	Mexico	3.1	2	14400	0.77	0.16	3
Bosnia and Herzegovina	3.2	4	8870	0.73	-0.73	3	Moldova	2.9	3	3370	0.64	-0.62	4
Botswana	5.8	3	13640	0.63	0.5	2	Mongolia	2.7	2	3660	0.65	-0.61	2
Brazil	3.7	2	11000	0.72	0.07	2	Montenegro	3.7	3	12790	0.77	0.07	2
Brunei	5.5	6	49790	0.84	0.88	5	Morocco	3.4	5	4580	0.58	-0.17	4
Bulgaria	3.6	2	13510	0.77	0	2	Mozambique	2.7	4	900	0.32	-0.46	3
Burkina Faso	3.1	5	1260	0.33	-0.58	3	Namibia	4.4	2	6270	0.62	0.1	2
Burundi	1.8	4	580	0.31	-1.09	5	Nepal	2.2	4	1210	0.46	-0.76	4
Cambodia	2.1	6	2070	0.52	-0.82	5	Netherlands	8.8	1	41810	0.91	1.73	1
Cameroon	2.2	6	2260	0.48	-0.88	6	New Zealand	9.3	1	29140	0.91	1.86	1
Canada	8.9	1	38370	0.91	1.86	1	Nicaragua	2.5	4	2660	0.59	-0.96	4
Cape Verde	5.1	1	3690	0.57	-0.05	1	Niger	2.6	5	720	0.29	-	4
Central African Republic	2.1	5	780	0.34	-1.4	5	Nigeria	2.4	5	2140	0.45	-1.19	4
Chad	1.7	7	1360	0.33	-1.5	6	Norway	8.6	1	57910	0.94	1.79	1
Chile	7.2	1	14950	0.80	1.17	1	Oman	5.3	6	25770	0.70	0.58	5
China	3.5	7	7600	0.68	0.12	6	Pakistan	2.3	4	2780	0.50	-0.76	5
Colombia	3.5	3	9020	0.71	0.14	4	Panama	3.6	1	13050	0.77	0.13	2
Comoros	2.1	3	1090	0.43	-1.73	4	Papua New Guinea	2.1	4	2400	0.46	-0.75	3
Congo – Brazzaville	2.1	6	3180	0.28	-1.23	5	Paraguay	2.2	3	5050	0.66	-0.92	3
Costa Rica	5.3	1	11290	0.74	0.31	1	Peru	3.5	2	9320	0.72	-	3
Cote d'Ivoire	2.2	6	1800	0.40	-1.32	5	Philippines	2.4	4	3960	0.64	-	3

Croatia	4.1	1	18680	0.79	0.61	2	Poland	5.3	1	19180	0.81	0.7	1
Cyprus	6.3	1	30910	0.84	1.49	1	Portugal	6	1	24600	0.81	1.03	1
Czech Republic	4.6	1	23540	0.86	1	1	Qatar	7.7	6	76470	0.83	0.93	5
Denmark	9.3	1	41100	0.89	1.72	1	Romania	3.7	2	14300	0.78	-0.14	2
Djibouti	3.2	5	2450	0.43	-0.99	5	Russia	2.1	6	19210	0.75	-0.39	5
Dominica	5.2	1	11960	0.72	0.65	1	Rwanda	4	6	1150	0.43	-	5
Dominican Republic	3	2	8990	0.69	-0.62	2	Samoa	4.1	2	4250	0.69	0.056	2
Ecuador	2.5	3	7850	0.72	-0.67	3	Sao Tome Principe	3	2	1970	0.51	-0.68	2
Egypt	3.1	6	6030	0.64	-0.43	5	Saudi Arabia	4.7	7	23150	0.77	-0.08	6
El Salvador	3.6	2	6460	0.67	0	3	Senegal	2.9	3	1910	0.46	-	3
Equatorial Guinea	1.9	7	21980	0.53	-1.68	7	Serbia	3.5	2	11090	0.76	-0.11	2
Eritrea	2.6	7	540	0.35	-1.37	7	Seychelles	4.8	3	22660	0.77	0.17	3
Estonia	6.5	1	19370	0.83	1.22	1	Sierra Leone	2.4	3	820	0.33	-1.19	3
Ethiopia	2.7	5	1030	0.36	-0.34	5	Singapore	9.3	5	56890	0.86	2.24	4
Finland	9.2	1	37080	0.88	2.24	1	Slovakia	4.3	1	21870	0.83	0.85	1
France	6.8	1	34760	0.88	1.44	1	Slovenia	6.4	1	26530	0.88	1.03	1
Gabon	2.8	6	13070	0.67	-0.85	5	Solomon Islands	2.8	4	2200	0.51	-0.94	3
Gambia	3.2	5	1960	0.42	-0.67	5	South Africa	4.5	2	10330	0.62	0.33	2
Georgia	3.8	4	4950	0.73	0.29	4	Spain	6.1	1	31420	0.88	0.98	1
Germany	7.9	1	38100	0.90	1.55	1	Sri Lanka	3.2	4	5040	0.69	-0.16	4
Ghana	4.1	1	1610	0.53	-	2	Sudan	1.6	7	2020	0.41	-1.36	7
Greece	3.5	1	27640	0.86	0.52	2	Swaziland	3.2	7	5570	0.52	-0.52	5
Guatemala	3.2	4	4630	0.57	-0.7	4	Sweden	9.2	1	40120	0.90	2.01	1
Guinea	2	7	990	0.34	-1.14	6	Switzerland	8.7	1	49960	0.90	1.91	1
Guinea – Bissau	2.1	4	1180	0.35	-1.04	4	Syria	2.5	7	5090	0.63	-0.55	6
Guyana	2.7	2	3460	0.63	-0.13	3	Tajikistan	2.1	6	2120	0.60	-	5
Haiti	2.2	4	1120	0.45	-1.61	5	Tanzania	2.7	4	1430	0.46	-	3
Honduras	2.4	4	3750	0.62	-0.66	4	Thailand	3.5	5	8150	0.68	0.085	4
Hong Kong	8.4	5	47270	0.89	1.73	2	Togo	2.4	5	990	0.43	-1.38	4
Hungary	4.7	1	19550	0.81	0.69	1	Tonga	3	5	4560	0.70	-0.33	3
Iceland	8.5	1	29350	0.90	1.57	1	Trinidad and	3.6	2	24400	0.76	0.25	2
India	3.3	2	3340	0.54	-	3	Tunisia	4.3	7	8960	0.70	0.19	5
Indonesia	2.8	2	4190	0.61	-0.19	3	Turkey	4.4	3	15460	0.70	0.35	3
Iran	2.2	6	11400	0.71	-0.51	6	Turkmenistan	1.6	7	7460	0.68	-	7
Iraq	1.5	5	3460	0.57	-1.22	6	Uganda	2.5	5	1250	0.44	-0.55	4
Ireland	8	1	33550	0.91	1.31	1	Ukraine	2.4	3	6590	0.73	-0.77	2
Israel	6.1	1	25760	0.89	1.24	2	United Arab	6.3	6	46990	0.85	0.78	5
Italy	3.9	1	31740	0.87	0.51	2	United Kingdom	7.6	1	35840	0.86	1.56	1
Jamaica	3.3	2	7470	0.73	0.18	3	United States	7.1	1	47310	0.91	1.44	1
Japan	7.8	1	34780	0.90	1.39	2	Uruguay	6.9	1	13560	0.78	0.65	1
Jordan	4.7	6	5810	0.70	0.07	5	Uzbekistan	1.6	7	3150	0.64	-0.79	7
Kazakhstan	2.9	6	10620	0.74	-0.27	5	Vanuatu	3.6	2	4300	0.62	-	2
Kenya	2.1	4	1640	0.51	-0.53	4	Venezuela	2	5	12040	0.73	-	4

Kiribati	3.2	1	3520	0.62	-0.85	1	Vietnam	2.7	7	3060	0.59	0.309	5
Korea (South)	5.4	1	28830	0.89	1.18	2	Yemen	2.2	6	2470	0.46	-	5
Kuwait	4.5	4	53340	0.76	0.1	4	Zambia	3	3	1370	0.43	0.801	4
Kyrgyzstan	2	6	2070	0.61	-0.63	5							

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GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Oil Pipeline Vandalism and Nigeria's National Security

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GJHSS-F Classification : FOR Code: 810107, 810107p



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



Oil Pipeline Vandalism and Nigeria's National Security

Okoli, Al Chukwuma ^α & Orinya, Sunday ^σ

Abstract - This paper examines the nexus between oil pipeline vandalism and national security in Nigeria. Comprehending national security in terms of sustainability development and livelihood, the paper seeks to establish the implications of oil pipeline vandalism for Nigeria's national security. By way of descriptive analysis, predicated on empirical evidence, the paper posits that oil pipeline vandalism is a threat to Nigeria's national security. In view of its adverse impacts as exemplified in loss of life, economic losses, environmental degradation, and pipeline explosions, the paper submits that oil pipeline vandalism portends serious danger for national sustainability of Nigeria.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Nigerian petroleum industry has been confronted by two sapping challenges over the years. The challenges relates to the prevalence of militancy and oil pipeline vandalism in the Niger Delta. While the former has significantly attenuated in the aftermath of the Amnesty deal in 2009 (Okoli, 2013), the latter appears to have escalated both in incidence and impact. According to Ogbeni:

A total of 16,083 pipeline breaks were recorded within the last 10 years adding that while 398 pipeline breaks representing 2.4 percent were due to ruptures, the activities of unpatriotic vandals accounted for 15, 685 breaks which translated to about 97.5 percent of the total number of cases (Ogbeni, 2012, para 8).

Indeed, the incidence of oil pipeline vandalism has been on the rise in Nigeria. According to the 2013 annual report of the Nigerian Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (NEITI), Nigeria lost a total of 10.9 billion US Dollars to oil theft between 2009 and 2011 (NEITI, 2013; Onoja, 2013). This loss adumbrates the significance of vandalism as a veritable problem in the Nigerian oil industry. The implication of oil pipeline vandalism vis-a-vis Nigeria's security has been vividly demonstrated by its nexus with economic, environmental, and humanitarian losses and consequences (Onuoha, 2009). In effect, oil pipeline vandalism has been associated with consequences which hold negative implications for national issue of

oil pipeline vandalism, in spite of its topical relevance, has not received adequate emphasis in the existing literature. Again, the bulk of the extant works in the area of inquiry has tended to be merely journalistic, bereft of analytical rigours and systematization. This has necessitated a systematic investigation into the problematique. This paper, therefore, an attempt is made to establish the relationship between oil pipeline vandalism and national security in Nigeria. The paper posits that oil pipeline vandalism results in untoward outcomes which threaten Nigeria's national security.

II. METHODOLOGY

The paper is qualitative and exploratory in approach. In keeping with the logic of deductive reasoning of systematic inquiry, the paper qualitatively explores its subject matter by way of a descriptive-analysis, predicated on scholarly exegesis and empirical evidence. The thrust of analysis was systematically prosecuted under select themes and sub-themes carefully designed to address the salient aspects of the paper's objective.

III. FRAME OF REFERENCE

Two basic concepts form the thrust of the subject matter of this paper. These are oil pipeline vandalism and national security. Following hereunder is an attempt to clarify these concepts vis-à-vis their contextual meanings in this writing.

a) Oil Pipeline Vandalism

Vandalism is an action involving deliberate destruction of public or private property. Within the civic domain, vandalism denotes willful destruction of public or government property in keeping with criminal or political intent. Oil pipeline vandalism therefore implies deliberate breaking of oil pipelines with the intent to steal petroleum products or to sabotage the government (Vidal, 2011).

In Nigeria, oil pipeline vandalism has been perpetrated principally by criminal syndicates who are motivated by the desire to loot oil products for material aggrandizement. This organized crime is often aided and ablated by the state agents, which gives it a semblance of a franchise. Oil pipeline vandalism is also known in Nigeria as oil bunkering, which is the act of drilling into the pipelines with the intent to steal products.

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b) *National Security*

The conception of national security in this paper identifies with the revisionist thinking on the subject matter (Gambo, 2008; Onuoha, 2007), which sees national security from the point of view of human security. According to Onuoha (2007, p.4), human security entails:

Freedom from actual and potential threats to human life, safety and survival which may arise as a result of human actions or inactions, or from natural disaster such as flood, earthquake, famine, drought, disease and other non-man-made calamitous events resulting in death, human suffering and material damage.

National security is therefore understood in the context of this writing to mean the ability of the state to protect its citizenry from hunger, poverty, ignorance, disease, and all forms of defenselessness (Okoli, 2012). This entails protecting the citizenry from all forms of social, political, ecological, territorial, as well as cosmic vulnerabilities. This conception of national security marks a radical departure from the orthodox perspective which conceives of national security merely from defense/military-centric point of view (Alkali, 2003).

IV. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: THE QUEER LADDER THEORY (QLT)

A number of theories have been developed by scholars in an attempt to come to terms with the phenomenon of organized crime. These theories include the ethnic succession theory, social control theory, alien conspiracy theory, and queer ladder theory (Lyman, 2007; Mallory, 2007). For the purpose of this paper, the Queer Ladder Theory (QLT) has been adopted.

The principal assumptions of QLT can be summarized thus:

- i. Organized crime is an instrumental behavior/practice; it is a means to an end.
- ii. It is an instrument of social climbing and socio-economic advancement.
- iii. It is a means to accumulate wealth and build power (Mallory, 2007).

Often alluded to this theory is the assumption that organized crime thrives in contexts where the government's capacity to dictate and sanction crime is poor; where public corruption is endemic; and where legitimate livelihood opportunities are slim (Nwoye, 2000; Lyman, 2007). Under these circumstances, the incentive to indulge in life of crime is high, while deterrence from criminal living is low. This creates room for criminal impunity and franchise.

Applied to this study, QLT enables us to situate the prevalence of organized crime and other acts of criminality in Nigeria. In this regard, it is to be noted that the incidence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria has been driven by 'rat-race' for material aggrandizement.

This has been made worse by the prevailing socio-economic malaise and concomitant livelihood crisis in the country. The inability or failure of the country relevant government agencies in ensuring efficient enforcement of appropriate sanctions against crime in Nigeria has all the more complicated and accentuated the problem.

The notion of 'ladder' in QLT symbolizes social climbing or mobility. Hence, those who take to organized crime as a means of social climbing (mobility) are thought to be toeing the awkward, unconventional (queer) path. The adoption of the theory for the purpose of this discourse is informed by its analytical utility in providing insights into the sociological foundations of organized crime in developing nations.

The queer ladder theory was influenced by an American sociologist, Daniel Bell (1919-2011), who coined the idea of 'queer ladder' in an attempt to explain the functional significance of organized crime as a desperate tactic for socioeconomic empowerment and social climbing. This analytical construct has since fertilized into a popular theoretical framework widely used in contemporary crime studies.

V. THE STRUCTURE OF NIGERIA'S OIL PIPELINE SYSTEM

The discovery of crude oil in commercial quantity in Oloibiri in 1956 marked the birth of the petroleum industry in Niger. Since then, the Nigeria economy has been more or less dependent on petroleum. To facilitate the distribution of crude oil product from the oil rich Nigeria Delta to other parts of the country, a network of oil pipelines was constructed to inter-link some states at strategic locations (Onuorah, 2007).

Nigeria has a total pipeline grid of 5001 kilometers. This consists of 4315 kilometers of multi-product pipelines and 666 kilometers of crude oil pipelines. These pipelines transverse the country, forming a network that inter-connects the 22 petroleum storage depots, the four refineries at Port-Harcourt (I and II), Kaduna and Warri, the off-shore terminals at Bonny and, Escravos, and the jetties at Alas Cove, Calabar, Okirika and Warri (Onuoha, 2007, p.6). This system of oil pipelines are used to transport crude oil to the refineries in Port-Harcourt (I and II), Warri and Kaduna, covering a total distance of 719 kilometres. The multi-product pipelines are used to transport products from the refineries/import receiving jetties to the 22 petroleum storage depots at various places in the country. The storage infrastructure consisting of 22 loading depots linked by pipeline of various diameters has aggregate installed capacities of 1,266890 (PMS), 676 400 (DPK), 1007 900 (AGO), and 74 000 (ATK) m3tonnes (Special Committee on the Review of Petroleum Products Supply Distribution- SCRPPSD, 2000, p.10).The entire pipeline grid and oil products

distribution network is made up of organic systems as illustrated in the table below.

Table 1 : Nigerian Pipeline Grid and Distribution Network

1. System 2A	Warri-Benin-Ore-Mosimi
2. System 2AX	Auchi – Benin
3. System 2B	(a) Atlas Cove – Mosimi – Ibadan – Ilorin (b) Mosimi – Statellite (Ejigbo in Lagos) (c) Mosimi – Ikeja
4. System 2C	Escravos – Warri – Kaduna (Crude lines)
5. System 2D	(a) Kaduna – Zaria – Kano – Zaria – Gusau (b) Kaduna – Jos – Gombe – Maiduguri
6. System 2E	PH – Aba – Enugu – Makurdi
7. System 2EX	PH – Aba – Enugu – Makurdi – Yola
8. System 2CX	(a) Enugu – Auchi (interconnection). (b) Auchi – Suleja – Kaduna. (c) Suleja – Minna
9. System 2DX	Jos – Gombe

Source : Onuoha (2007, p. 6-7).

VI. INCIDENCE AND PREVALENCE OF OIL PIPELINE VANDALISM IN NIGERIA

The Nigerian oil Pipeline infrastructure has been subjected to incessant attacks by vandals over the years. The frequency of such attacks has been rather disturbing in the recent times. For instance, in 1999 alone, there were a total of 477 recorded cases of pipeline vandalization in Nigeria (see Tables 2 below).

The incessant occurrence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria has raised the question as to whether the pipeline networks were laid in such a manner that forecloses easy vandalization. This is in addition to the question as to whether the pipelines are

policed and protected at all. Indeed, some safety valves were considered while laying the pipelines. For instance, the government acquired 3.5 metres wide right of way (ROW) on each side of the pipelines; also the pipes were buried a meter deep to avoid accidental contacts, or vandalization. Despite these safety valves, recent experience in Nigeria has shown that the integrity and safety of these pipelines have been incessantly compromised because of the activities of vandals and saboteurs. The vandals fracture the oil pipelines with the criminal intent of obtaining and appropriating petroleum products for commercial purposes or personal use. The table below (Table 2) highlights the incidence of oil pipeline vandalization in Nigeria in 1990s.

Table 2 : Incidence of Pipeline Vandalization in 1990s

Year	Number of Incidents	Remarks
1995	7 cases	Reported cases only
1996	33 cases	Reported cases only
1997	34 cases	Reported cases only
1998	57 cases	Reported cases only
1999	497 cases	Reported cases only

Source : NNPC's Special Committee on the Review of Petroleum Product Supply and Distribution-SCRPPSD (2000, p.4).

If the figures on table 2 are anything to go by, the implication is that the incidence of pipeline vandalization has been on geometrical increase. This trend has got even worse since 2000. Available statistics show that Port Harcourt, which recorded about 600 pipeline breaks in 2003, had about 1,650 breaks from January to September, 2006. Similarly Warri axis moved

from only 100 pipeline breaks to 600 during the same period (Amanze-Nwachukwu and Ogbu, 2007, p.14). Cases of pipeline breaks have also been recorded in the northern parts of Nigeria, particularly in Kaduna and Gombe State (Onuoha, 2007).

In effect available records clearly indicate that incidence of oil pipeline vandalism has been on the

spiral increase in Nigeria. The vandals appear to have acquired more criminal discipline, sophistication and efficiency in perpetrating oil pipeline vandalism with apparent ease and impunity. So, the incidence has been escalating. A media report by Ogbeni (2012, para 5) succinctly situates the rising incidence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria in recent times thus:

Between 2010 and 2012, total of 2,787 lines breaks were reported on pipelines belonging to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), resulting in a loss of 157.81mt of petroleum products worth about ₦12.53billion. Pipeline along the Gombe axis recorded 850 cases and Kaduna system recorded 571 cases of pipeline vandalism. The pipeline along Warri axis recorded 548 cases vandalism while Mosimi system pipelines in Lagos recorded 463 cases and Port Harcourt recorded lesser cases of vandalism while mosimi system pipelines in Lagos recorded 463 cases and porthacort recorded lesser cases with 336 point vandalized.

It is evident from the above citation that oil pipeline vandalism is a burgeoning organized crime in Nigeria. This illegality has been so systematized in such a manner that it goes with a semblance of a franchise, wherein even public officials have been implicated. In this regards, Vidal (2011, para 5) poignantly observes:

Table 3 : Flashpoints of Oil Pipeline Vandalization in Nigeria (2002 and 2012)

PELINESYSTEM	PIPELINE ROUTE	NO OF BREAKS (%)
System 2E/2EX	Port-Harcourt – Aba - Enugu – Makurdi + Yola	8, 105 (50.3%)
System 2A	Warri – Benin – Suleja/Ore	3, 295 (20.2%)
System 2B	Atlas Cove – Mosimi – Satellite – Ibadan – Ilorin	2,440 (% not indicated)
System 2C-1	Warri – Escravos	74 (% not indicated)
Gas System	Trans – Forcados	55 (% not indicated)

Source : Adapted from Ogbeni (2012); <http://ehatafrik.com/articles/econimy/item/1284-fue-pipe-vandalism-in-nigeria.html>

In all, a total of 15, 685 cases of pipeline vandalism were recorded in Nigeria between 2002 and 2012. (Ogbeni, 2012, para 8). The bulk of these incidents occurred in the Southern half of the country where the difficult terrain of the Creeks and Coastlines apparently makes such activities easy.

VII. CAUSES OF OIL PIPELINE VANDALISM IN NIGERIA

It has been indicated in the preceding sections that oil pipeline vandalism is principally motivated by the criminal intent of the vandals who break into pipelines to drill products for pecuniary gains. The criminal intent notwithstanding, there are other factors which tend to predispose people to indulge in oil pipeline vandalism.

Prominent among these factors are scarcity of petroleum products, widespread poverty and ignorance (illiteracy) among Nigerians, poor protection of the pipelines as well as shallow lying of the pipelines. Some

But organized crime has moved into oil theft, and is now thought to be paying groups to break in to oil industry equipment and steal many thousands of gallons at a time. Tankers or barges are then filled and oil is exported –often with the help of corrupt bureaucrats and police forces.

The prevalence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria has been principally driven by the culture of inordinate ambition to amass fortunes for accelerated socio-economic mobility and empowerment. This is a pattern of 'primitive accumulation' that is prevalent in Nigeria's public and private domains. It is to be noted, however, that pipeline vandalism has also been occasioned by political sabotage. This was the case in the hey-days of the Niger Delta crisis when militants used to indulge in sporadic assaults of the pipeline systems in an attempt to sabotage the activities of the oil companies as well as elicit government and international attention (Ilagaha, 2007).The point to be underscored in the foregoing is that the prevalence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria has left the oil pipeline systems vulnerable to incessant breaks with untoward consequences for the political economy of Nigeria. Below is a table showing the scale of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria between 2002 and 2012.

of these factors have been alluded to in the following citation:

The vandalism mostly take place in poor courtiers because international oil and gas companies often fail to buy or protect their pipelines as they would have to do by law in rich countries. The easily accessible pipes, which often run through slums and informal settlements in burgeoning cities, are tempting to desperately poor communities, who often have no electricity and must rely on oil lamps for lightening and power (Vidal, 2011, para 2).

In tandem with the above, the following can be identified as causative and predisposing factors of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria.

- i. Inordinate ambition to a mass wealth.
- ii. Culture of criminal impunity and corruption in Nigeria.
- iii. Poor policing /protection of oil pipelines.
- iv. Political sabotage as in the case of the Niger Delta militancy.

- v. Widespread poverty of the rural and urban-slum dwellers.
- vi. Scarcity of petroleum products.
- vii. Flourishing of the oil black market in Nigeria and the likes.

VIII. EFFECTS OF OIL PIPELINE VANDALISM IN NIGERIA

Pipeline Vandalism has resulted in untoward consequences which threaten economic public safety and national sustainability in Nigerian. Hereunder is a discussion on the major effects of this phenomenon.

a) *Economic Losses*

The economic losses associated with oil pipeline vandalism are arrived at by qualifying the monetary with (value) of lost products and the cost of pipeline repairs. This has amounted to billions of Nigeria over the years. For instance, the Managing Director of Pipelines and Products Marketing Company (PPMC), Prince Haruna Momoh recently revealed that "between 2009 and December 2012, the NNPC alone lost about ₦165 Billion to products theft and repairs of vandalized pipelines" (Ugwuanyi, 2013, para 6). More recent figures suggest that Nigeria has lost as much as ₦1.011 trillion to oil theft (See for instance an entry at www.legal-com/news.asp%3fmonth%...). A report issued by NEITI in July 2013 (already cited elsewhere in the paper) indicates that Nigeria lost a whopping sum of 10.9 billion US Dollars to oil theft and vandalism in the period of 2009 to 2011 alone. These translate to huge economic

loss with far reaching implications for Nigeria's economic growth and development, and by extension national security.

b) *Environmental Degradation*

Pipeline vandalism has led high incidence of oil spillage in Nigeria over the years. The 2011 Draft Annual Statistical Bulletin of the NNPC shows that oil spills are significantly on the rise in Nigeria. The figure below (Appendix 1) illustrates this fact. Associated with the incidence of oil spills is the attendant environmental degradation which jeopardizes the land, vegetation and habitation of the affected area. This has been exemplified in desolation of farmlands, loss of aquatic and wild lives, as well as water and air pollution. These conditions have implications for public health and safety of the people.

c) *Fire Disasters/Pipeline Explosions*

This has been the worst manifestation of the impact of oil pipeline vandalism on human security in Nigeria According to Ugwuanyi:

Over 2,500 lives have been lost to explosion from vandalized pipelines in last 15 years. Sometimes, the exact figures of casualties were not got in the event of fire outbreaks while some incidents were not reported (2013, para 8).

To better appreciate the spate of pipeline explosion disasters in Nigeria in the recent years, a graphic highlight of such occurrences is instructive. See table 4, 5, and 6 below details.

Table 4 : Incident of Oil Pipeline Explosion Disasters in Nigeria (1998 – 2008)

S/N	Date	Location	State	Death Toll	Observed Consequences
1.	17 October 1998	Jesse	Delta	At least 1000	Damage to farm-lands, environmental pollution, dozens of people injured.
2.	22 April 1999	Bayatta, Ijaw Community	Delta	At least 10	Damage to farmlands, pollution (air and water).
3.	8 June 1999	Akute Odo	Ogun	At least 15	Damage to farm-lands (land and air pollution)
4.	13 October 1999	Ekakpamre Ughelli	Delta	Undetermined	Damage to farm-lands, destruction of flora and fauna, environmental pollution.
5.	14 January 2000	Gatta Community	Delta	At least 12	Damage to farm-lands and environment.
6.	7 February 2000	Ogwe Community	Abia	At least 15	Damage to farm-lands and the environment.
7.	20 February 2000	Lagos	Lagos	At least 3	Damage to farm-lands, destruction of a canoe, environmental pollution.
8.	14 March 2000	Umugbede Community	Abia	At least 50	Environmental pollution, damage to farmlands.
9.	22 April 2000	Uzo-Uwani	Enugu	At least 6	Damage to farm-lands, environmental pollution.

10.	3 June 2000	Adeje	Delta	Undetermined	Damage to forest, destruction of a high-tension power cable of two electricity plants, youths police clash.
11	20 June 2000	Okuedjeba	Delta	Undetermined	Damage to farm-lands, environmental pollution.
12	10 July 2000	Adeje/ Egborode, Okpe	Delta	At least 150	Damage to farm-lands, environmental pollution.
13	16 July 2000	Oviri Court	Delta	At least 300	Damage to farm-lands, environmental pollution, dozens of people injured.
14	5 November 2001	Umudike	Imo	At least 3	Several burnt bicycles, more than 17 people injured.
15	19 June 2003	Onitcha Amiyi-Uhu (Ovim)	Abia	At least 125	Dozens of people injured, damage to farmlands.
16	6 January 2004	Elikpolewedu	Rivers	Undetermined	About 200 hectares of farmland and properties worth millions of Naira destroyed.
17	30 July 2004	Agbani	Enugu	At least 7	Several people injured, environmental pollution
18	16 Sept. 2004	Ijegun	Lagos	At least 60	Air and water pollution
19	December 2004	Imore village	Lagos	At least 500	Environmental pollution
20	30 May 2005	Akinfo	Oyo	At least 1	34 persons were injured, 15 died after eleven days.
21	13 January 2006	Iyeke	Edo	At least 7	Six persons injured, damage to farmlands environmental pollution.
22	12 May, 2006	Ilado village	Lagos	At least 150	Pollution of water, incineration of every-thing within a 20 metre radius, dozens of people injured.
23	2 December 2006	Ijeododo	Lagos	At least 1	Environmental pollution, damage to farmlands.
24	26 Dec. 2006	Abule Egba	Lagos	At least 500	Incineration of 40 vehicles, a dozen homes, including a mosque and two Churches, and innumerable business ventures comprising auto mechanic workshops, a saw mill and network of timber shops.
25	25 Dec. 2007	Ikate Near Atlas Cove, Jetty-Lagos	Lagos	About 50	Many people, most youths were injured.
26	16 May 2008	Ijegun	Lagos	Undetermined	Many people were injured; a primary school and shops were burnt.

Sources : Onuoha, F (2007:12); *The Punch*, Thursday, January 3, 2008, p.14 (editorial); <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/listofpipeline-accidents> (assessed october 10, 2008).

The above table shows that Nigeria has witnessed cases of oil pipeline explosions as much as twenty-six (26) times since the foremost incident at Jesse, near Warri in 1998. About 3,000 people are estimated to have died in these incidents (see for instance Table 5.3 above). The incidents of pipeline

disasters have been most pervasive and frequent in the coastal states of Nigeria, of which Lagos and Delta have ostensibly taken the lead. Table 5 below compares these two states (Lagos and Delta) in terms of the incidence and frequency of oil pipe disasters.

Table 5 : Incidents of Pipeline Disasters in Lagos and Delta States Compared

Delta	Lagos
Jesse incident, 1998	Lagos incident, 2000
Bayatta incident, 1999	Ijegan incident, 2004
Ekakpamre incident, 1999	Imore incident, 2004
Gatta incident, 2000	Ilado incident, 2006
Adaje incident, 2000	Ijeododo incident, 2006
Okuedjeba incident, 2000	Abule Agba incident, 2006
Adeje/Egborede, Okpe incident 2000	Ikate incident, 2007
Oviri Court incident, 2000	Ijegan incident, 2008
Total no. of cases = 8	Total no. of cases = 8

Source : Adapted from Table 4.

It is clear from the above table that the incidence of oil pipeline disasters has been alarming in Lagos and Delta states. In the year 2000 alone, Delta State recorded five (5) cases of such occurrence while in 2004, Lagos attained similar record by witnessing three (3) cases of pipeline disasters. Other states that have recorded such occurrences include Ogun, Imo,

Edo, Oyo, Rivers, Enugu, and Abia. Abia state stands out as a state with the worst incidence of such disaster in the South East of Nigeria within the period under review. More recent occurrences of pipeline explosion disasters have further confirmed the scenario on table 4 and 5 above. See table 6 below for insights.

Table 6 : List of Recent Pipeline Explosions in Nigeria (2009 to 2013)

DATE/YEAR	PLACE	STATE	EFFECTS
December 2009	Arepo	Ogun	Loss of lives and environmental pollution
May, 2010	Amukpe, Near Sapale	Delta	Destruction of public property (NNPC facilities)
December, 2010	Idu, near Ijegan	Lagos	Loss of lives and environmental degradation.
May, 2011	Oko Owore-Amukpe	Delta	Loss of lives and environmental and damage
2011	Okoroma Clan Nembe LGA	Bayelsa	Population displacement and family dislocation.
October 1, 2012	Umueke-Umueze in Osisioma LGA	Abia	Loss of lives and destruction of farmlands.
Januarys 2013	Arepo	Ogun	Loss of line and environmental degradation

Source : Author

Apart from human casualties, oil pipeline disasters have resulted in loss of livelihood sources, population displacement, and destruction of family assets, and environmental degradation (Onuoha, 2009; Okoli, 2012). This implies that oil pipeline vandalism is a veritable impediment to human security in Nigeria. Hence, oil pipeline explosions have been associated with dire ecological and humanitarian conditions (UNEP, 1085; Nrnberger, 1999), whereby populations are displaced as a result of actual or impending disaster.

d) Killing of Public Officials

Oil pipeline vandalism has also resulted in wanton killing of government officials and public security agents. In effect, oil vandals have acquired immense sophistication in arms bearing and violence. This enables them to contend with and ward off threats during their criminal operations. In this context, they have often killed both policemen and civilians in an attempt to ensure 'hitch free' operations. A case in point is the killing of five members of staff of PPMC at Arepo in January, 2013 when they came to fix a vandalized pipeline (Ugwuanyi, 2013, para 9).

IX. GENERAL STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF OIL PIPELINE VANDALISM

In addition to its impacts, the prevalence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria holds some strategic implications for the country. First, it is an affront to the Nigerian Justice system. In spite of its criminalization in the Nigeria criminal law, the phenomenon has prevailed with apparent impunity. It is indeed worrisome that an act that amounts to a blatant violation of the Constitution has subsisted in defiance of criminal justice and rule of law.

Secondly, the prevalence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria portends danger for the fight against corruption in Nigeria. It has been established that government agents have often aided and abetted this criminal practice, thus given it some semblance of a franchise. It has also been established that in some cases, criminal elements in Nigeria oil industry have collaborated with organized syndicates in perpetrating pipeline vandalism. This tells volume of the systemic corruption in Nigeria, which has been quite endemic and intractable within the sphere of public domain.

Thirdly, the prevalence of oil pipeline vandalism implies negatively for Nigeria's aspiration towards sustainable economic growth and development. The extent of infrastructural damage, as well as economic loss and sabotage associated with oil pipeline vandalism points to the fact that it is a veritable impediment to Nigeria's economic development. This is more so in view of the strategic position of the petroleum sector in Nigeria's political economy.

Overall, oil pipeline vandalism constitutes a veritable threat to Nigeria's national security. As it has been observed in the preceding sections of this writing, the impact and implications of pipeline vandalism have been critically detrimental to the concerns of public safety and development in Nigeria. To say the least, therefore, the prevalence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria over the years has presented the country with crucial national security challenge.

X. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In this paper, an attempt has been made to examine the phenomenon of oil pipeline explosion disaster in Nigeria with a view to situating its impacts and implications vis-a-vis Nigeria's national security. The paper took off on the premise of the assumption that oil pipeline vandalism is a veritable threat to Nigeria's national security. To buttress this point, the paper explored the trend of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria and posited that the act amounts to criminality, economic and ecological sabotage. Regarding its impacts, the paper observed that oil pipeline vandalism has resulted in immense economic losses, environmental degradation, and pipeline explosions wherein scores of people have been killed. In the light of these findings, the paper submits that oil pipeline vandalizing has posed a serious threat to national sustainability of Nigeria. This affirms the assumption of the pipeline of the paper to the affect that oil pipeline vandalism is a veritable threat to Nigeria's national security.


The paper also observed that the prevalence of oil pipeline vandalism in Nigeria portends negatively for Nigeria's aspirations to rule of law, anti-corruption, and sustainable economic development. To checkmate the criminality, the paper recommends stringent penalties for perpetrators of oil pipeline vandalism in an attempt to ensure deterrence. The NNPC and oil multinationals should work with local communities towards ensuring that pipelines are adequately protected in the hinterlands. There is a need for the law enforcement agents to be up and doing and proactive in ensuring a grass-roots surveillance of pipelines in order to defer prospective vandals.

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APPENDIX 1



Source : Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 2011 Draft Statistical Bulletin (n.p)<http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=NI> (Accessed April 7, 2013).



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GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Great Powers' Conflict Management and Resolution in South-East Asia: An Evaluation of North-Korean Denuclearization Process and Six Party Talks

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Keywords : conflict; management; nuclear; south-east asia; great powers; six party talks.

GJHSS-F Classification : FOR Code: 349901p, 160699



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I. INTRODUCTION

The six party talks is a movement that was set up to deal with the nuclear issue of North Korea through a peaceful negotiation, paternalism and dialogue. The six parties include states like the United States, Russia, Japan, china, South Korea and North Korea itself. Kissinger (1968) for example has defined negotiation as, "a process of combining conflicting positions into a common position, under a decision rule of unanimity". Elsewhere, theorists have portrayed negotiations as events of diplomatic artistry, mechanical reflections of relative power, and weighted interactions between personality types or rational decision-making processes (Eric, 2003). While formal definitions of negotiation vary; theorists do accept certain basic tenets. Foremost among them are the assumptions that parties who negotiate agree in at least one fundamental respect; they share a belief that their respective

purposes will be better served by entering into negotiation with the other party. Implicitly then, negotiating parties have come to the conclusion, at least for a moment, that they may be able to satisfy their individual goals or concerns more favorably by coming to an agreed upon solution with the other side, than by attempting to meet their goals or concerns unilaterally. It is this mutual perception that leads to the onset of negotiations and betrays the dependence that exists (to whatever degree) between negotiating parties (Eric, 2003).

II. MATERIAL AND METHOD

The material and method used in this research is a descriptive research based on secondary hypothetical order. It investigates using documented library materials and existing published works of scholars in the relevant areas. The paper is also aided by negotiation approaches to establish more theoretical backing on the concept of six party-talks.

III. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

a) *Negotiation Approaches-The Structural Approach*

Structural approaches to negotiations consider negotiated outcomes to be a function of the characteristics or structural features that define each particular negotiation. These characteristics according to Dong (2002) may include features such as the number of parties and issues involved in the negotiation and the composition (whether each side is monolithic or comprises many groups) or relative power of the competing parties. Structural approaches to negotiation find "explanations of outcomes in patterns of relationships between parties or their goals" (Dong, 2002; Tany and Azeta, 2010). They can be deterministic in that they often view outcomes as *a priori* once structural factors are understood. In structural approaches to negotiation theory, analysts tend to define negotiations as conflict scenarios between opponents who maintain incompatible goals. Analysts who adopt a structural approach to the study of negotiations share an emphasis on the *means* parties bring to a negotiation.

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One of the main theoretical contributions derived from the structural approach is the theory that power is the central determining factor in negotiations (Hun and Jeong, 2002). In this view; the relative *power* of each party affects their ability to secure their individual goals through negotiations. Structural theories offer varying definitions of power. For example *power* is sometimes defined as the ability to win, or alternatively, as the possession of 'strength' or 'resources'. The perspective that power serves as a central structural feature of every negotiation has its intellectual roots in traditions of political theory and military strategy including the writings of Thucydides, Machiavelli and von Clausewitz (Hun and Jeong, 2002). The central idea in this school is the notion that the strong will prevail.

b) *The Strategic Approach*

Gittings and Burkeman (2004) see *strategy* as "a plan, method, or series of maneuvers for obtaining a specific goal or result". Strategic approaches to negotiation have roots in mathematics, decision theory and rational choice theory, and also benefit from major contributions from the area of economics, biology, and conflict analysis. Whereas the structural approach focuses on the role of means (such as power) in negotiations, the emphasis in strategic models of negotiation is on the role of *ends* (goals) in determining outcomes (Gittings and Burkeman, 2004). Strategic models are also models of rational choice. Negotiators are viewed as rational decision makers with known alternatives who make choices guided by their calculation of which option will maximize their ends or "gains", frequently described as 'payoffs'. Actors choose from a 'choice set' of possible actions in order to try and achieve desired outcomes. Each actor has a unique 'incentive structure' that is comprised of a set of costs associated with different actions combined with a set of probabilities (Gittings and Burkeman, 2004).

c) *Behavioral Approach*

Behavioral approaches in the view of Young (2003) emphasize the role negotiators' personalities or individual characteristics play in determining the course and outcome of negotiated agreements. Behavioral theories may explain negotiations as interactions between personality 'types' that often take the form of dichotomies, such as shopkeepers and warriors or 'hardliners' and 'soft liners' where negotiators are portrayed either as ruthlessly battling for all or diplomatically conceding to another party's demands for the sake of keeping the peace. The tension that arises between these two approaches for young (2003), forms a paradox that has been termed the "Toughness Dilemma" or the "Negotiator's Dilemma". The dilemma states that though negotiators who are 'tough' during a negotiation are more likely to gain more of their demands in a negotiated solution, the trade off is that in

adopting this stance, they are less likely to conclude an agreement at all.

The behavioral approach derives from psychological and experimental traditions but also from centuries-old diplomatic treaties. These traditions share the perspective that negotiations – whether between nations, employers and unions, or neighbors are ultimately about the individuals involved. Where game theory relies on the assumption that players to a negotiation 'game' are featureless, uniformly rational, pay-off maximizing entities, the behavioral approach highlights human tendencies, emotions and skills. They may emphasize the role played by 'arts' of persuasion, attitudes, trust, perception (or misperception), individual motivation and personality in negotiated outcomes. Other researchers from the behavioral school have emphasized factors such as relationships, culture, norms, skill, attitudes, expectations and trust (Yong and Dong, 2002).

d) *Concession Exchange (Processual) Approach*

Though concession exchange theories share features of both the structural approach (power) and the strategic approach (outcomes), they describe a different kind of mechanism that centers on learning. According to Zartman (1976), this approach (which he calls the processual approach) looks at negotiation "as a learning process in which parties react to each others' concession behavior". From the perspective negotiations consist of a series of concessions (Yoo and Young, 2003). The concessions mark stages in negotiations, which are used by parties to both signal their own intentions and to encourage movement in their opponent's position. Parties use their bids both to respond to the previous counteroffer and to influence the next one; the offers themselves become an exercise in power.

e) *Integrative Approach*

In the analysis given by Eric (2003), integrative approaches, in sharp contrast to distributive approaches, frame negotiations as interactions with *win-win* potential. Whereas a zero-sum view sees the goal of negotiations as an effort to claim one's share over a "fixed amount of pie", integrative theories and strategies look for ways of creating value, or "expanding the pie," so that there is more to share between parties as a result of negotiation. Integrative approaches use objective criteria, look to create conditions of mutual gain, and emphasize the importance of exchanging information between parties and group problem-solving (Eric, 2003). They also emphasize on problem solving, cooperation, joint decision making and mutual gains, integrative strategies call for participants to work jointly to create win-win solutions. They involve uncovering interests, generating options and searching for commonalities between parties. Negotiators may look for ways to create value, and develop shared principles

as a basis for decision-making about how outputs should be claimed (Eric, 2003).

IV. US WARSENERD RELATION WITH KOREA AND THE BEGINNING OF THE SIX PARTY TALKS

It is generally known that since after September 11 attack on the world trade centre, the US foreign policy shifted towards fighting terrorism. George bush has not only tried to have a good relation with north Asian states but considered North Korea as a threat to the region and the United States.

The cooperative relationship, according to Eric (2003), between the United States and North Korea, suddenly cooled as President Bush came into office in 2001. The Bush administration set up a new foundation for its relationship with North Korea. The initial step was to recognize North Korea as a grave threat towards peace and security of Northeast Asia. President Bush issued a statement on June 6, 2001, outlining the United State's new policy objectives over North Korea's nuclear and missile program and its conventional forces (Eric, 2003). Bush (2002) made the assertion that if North Korea took positive actions in response to U.S. policy, the United States "will expand our efforts to help the North Korean people, ease sanctions and take other political steps." The U.S. administrative officials warned that North Korea's proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) could make such weapons available to Al Qaeda (Byung, 2004). But one major truth that is discernible is that the Bush administration's policy was to eliminate even the minutest elements of North Korean military power and to secure absolute U.S. hegemony in Northeast Asia.

This perspective was clearly enunciated by President Bush's State of the Union speech of January 29, 2002, in which he regarded North Korea as part of an "axis of evil" (JMFA, 2004), a group of states that included Iran and Iraq—all countries which were presumed to be producing and proliferating WMDs. In October 2002, matters took a turn for the worse when North Korea indirectly acknowledged its nuclear weapons development program (Eric, 2003). In response to the acknowledgment, the United States decided to stop supplying heavy oil to North Korea in November (Karin and Julia, 2005).

V. US EFFORTS TO DENUCLEARIZE NORTH KOREA

Between 2002 and 2004, it became very apparent that North Korea was building weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The only effort the United States could venture into, was, however, to begin talks on how to denuclearize the peninsular. The denuclearization process has taken four steps which are (Selig, 2004:4-13):

a) *Step one : Eliminating the Post-1994 North Korean Plutonium Inventory*

North Korea would permit the inspection access necessary for the International Atomic Energy Agency to determine how much plutonium has been reprocessed since the expulsion of the inspectors following the breakdown of the Agreed Framework in December, 2002; the sequestering of this plutonium and any spent fuel under international controls, and the shutdown of the Yongbyon reactor and reprocessing plant under international controls (Selig, 2004:4-13).

If North Korea agrees to surrender all of the plutonium found through the inspection process for shipment out of the country, the United States, South Korea, China, Japan and Russia would reciprocate with: The resumption of shipments of the 500,000 tons of oil per year delivered under then Agreed Framework, which was cut off in December, 2002.

- a. The exchange of liaison offices with North Korea by the United States and Japan as the first step toward fully normalized relations.
- b. Bilateral and multilateral programs of assistance for the economic and social development of North Korea valued collectively in accordance with an agreed price per kilogram of the plutonium surrendered.
- c. Upon conclusion of the proposed aid agreement, North Korea would initiate steps to rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and permit the resumption of the IAEA inspection access cut off in December, 2002

But one thing to note here is that, there were no agreements reached as how much was to be paid on every kilogram forfeited by North Korea as a process leading to the denuclearization. It is on this argument that Selig (2004) wrote:

*The Task Force does not specify how much should be offered in payment per kilogram. However, for illustrative purposes, it points out that if the plutonium inventory totals 40 kilograms, and if a price of \$25 million per kilogram were agreed upon, the funds available for these assistance programs would total \$1 billion. The Task Force also notes that South Korea and Japan had agreed to provide \$4 billion and \$1 billion respectively to construct light water reactors under the Agreed Framework, and that the United States spent \$405,106,000 from 1995 through 2003 for oil shipments and for administrative support of the light water reactor project.*¹²

b). *Step Two : Plutonium Cleanout*

- a. North Korea would agree to surrender the remainder of its plutonium inventory, including pre-1994 plutonium reprocessed prior to the Agreed Framework.
- b. The United States would end the remaining U.S. economic sanctions against Pyongyang and would encourage the World Bank and the Asian

Development Bank to move toward North Korean membership in these institutions. This would require the removal of North Korea from the U.S. List of State Sponsors of Terrorism.

c). *Step Three : Eliminating the Plutonium Weapons Infrastructure*

- a. North Korea would open previously-barred waste and storage sites and other plutonium- related facilities to a level of inspection acceptable to the IAEA.
- b. The United States would initiate talks with North Korea to set the stage for the elevation of their liaison offices in Pyongyang and Washington to the status of embassies.
- c. The United States would declare its readiness to keep open the option of completing one or both of the two light water reactors promised under the Agreed Framework, as South Korea and Japan have urged.

d). *Step Four : Elimination of Weapons-Grade Uranium Enrichment*

If North Korea permits the unimpeded inspection access necessary to determine what, if any, weapons-grade uranium enrichment facilities exist, and takes the comprehensive measures necessary to eliminate any such facilities, the United States would:

- a. Establish full diplomatic relations, upgrading its liaison office in Pyongyang to an Embassy.
- b. Authorize Exxon-Mobil to pursue a natural gas pipeline to South Korea that would cross North Korea.
- c. Open negotiations on a tripartite peace treaty ending the Korean War.

VI. THE US PROPOSAL

In a formal proposal presented to North Korea on June 24, 2004, in Beijing, the United States outlined a six-stage denuclearization process. North Korea would be required at the outset to acknowledge that a weapons-grade uranium enrichment program exists and to make specific commitments providing for its elimination in a denuclearization agreement. The six principles contained in the proposal are (Selig, 2004: 4-13):

1. The DPRK would make a unilateral declaration pledging to "dismantle all of its nuclear programs"
2. "Upon acceptance of the DPRK declaration, the parties would:
 - a. provide provisional multilateral security assurances, which would become more enduring as the process proceeded.
 - b. begin a study to determine the energy requirements of the DPRK and how to meet them by non-nuclear energy programs.
 - c. begin a discussion of steps necessary to lift remaining economic sanctions on the DPRK, and

on the steps necessary for the removal of the DPRK from the List of State Sponsors of Terrorism."

3. Based on the DPRK declaration, "the parties would then conclude a detailed implementation agreement providing for the supervised disabling, dismantling, and elimination" of all DPRK nuclear programs, the removal of all nuclear weapons and weapons components, centrifuge and other nuclear parts, fissile material and fuel rods; and a long-term monitoring program. "To be credible, and for the programs to get underway," the declaration and the agreement would have to include "the uranium enrichment program, and existing weapons, as well as the plutonium program" (Selig, 2004:4-13).
4. Upon conclusion of this agreement, "non-U.S. parties would provide heavy fuel oil to the DPRK."
5. Implementation of the agreement would begin with a three-month preparatory period in which the DPRK would:
 - d. provide a complete listing of all nuclear activities.
 - e. cease operations of these activities.
 - f. "permit the securing of all fissile material and the monitoring of fuel rods."
 - g. "Permit the publicly disclosed and observable disablement of all nuclear weapons/weapons components and key centrifuge parts". These steps would be subject to "international verification."
6. After the dismantlement is completed, "lasting benefits to the DPRK" would result from the energy survey and the discussions on ending sanctions and the removal of the DPRK from the terrorist list (Selig, 2004:4-13).

In retaliation, North Korea refused to admit the KEDO delegation from entering the country to inspect the use of heavy oil (Soo-Min, 2006) and also, proclaimed the resumption of the construction and operation of all its nuclear facilities. In fact, North Korea made preparations for reoperating the nuclear reactors between the 22nd and 25th of December, and purged the IAEA inspectors on December 27, 2002 (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). This uncompromising trend of the United States reached its peak with its "tailored containment" policy against North Korea at the end of 2002 (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981).

Having recognized that this hostile policy of the United States was a grave threat to its 'supreme national interests' and sovereignty, on January 10, 2003, North Korea declared their withdrawal from the NPT (Lewicki, Barry, Sounders and John, 2005). It accelerated the tension between the North Korea and the IAEA that in turn escalated into the second nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. The disagreements between the two sides was hardly alleviated by the mediation proposal of the IAEA and the following the war in Iraq (CMFA, 2003).

Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March/April 2003, nuclear strains on the Korean peninsula have not heightened. Moreover, with North Korea's acceptance of

multilateral dialogues on April 14, 2003, two nuclear talks were held in Beijing Iraq (CMFA, 2003), among them, the six-party talks in August were notable. With the newly reinforced peaceful mood, the nuclear standoff is

expected to be resolved gradually. The chronology of the development of nuclear tension between the United States and North Korea from October 2002 to August 2003 is illustrated below:

A Pedigree To The Six Party Talks

Date	Nuclear stand off
October 4, 2002	North Korea reportedly acknowledged its nuclear weapons development program when James Kelly visited Pyongyang.
October 25, 2002	North Korea proposed a non-aggression pact with the United States.
November 14, 2002	KEDO announced the discontinuance of heavy oil supply to North Korea.
December 12, 2002	The United States declared the nullification of the Geneva Agreed Framework with North Korea.
December 27, 2002	North Korea purged the IAEA inspectors from its territory.
December 29, 2002	The United States adopted a 'tailored containment' policy against North Korea.
January 10, 2003	North Korea withdrew from NPT.
March 17	The U.S. Ambassador to South Korea clarified that U.S. policy toward Korea would be different from the case of Iraq.
April 14, 2003	North Korea announced its acceptance of new multilateral talks for resolution of nuclear problem.
April 23, 2003	Trilateral Talks (DPRK, USA and China) in Beijing, China
July 12, 2003	Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Dai Bingguo visited North Korea
July 17, 2003	Dai Bingguo visited Washington
August 1, 2003	North Korea agreed to participate in six-party talks
August 27-9, 2003	First Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China
February, 25-8, 2004	First Round of Six-Party Talks in Beijing, China

Source : Eric yong-joong lee: *The six-party talks and the north korean nuclear dispute Resolution under the IAEA safeguards regime. Asian-Pacific Law & Policy Journal; Vol.5 (2004).*

It was however, on August 27, 2003, six nations- China, the United States, Russia, Japan and the two Koreas - gathered at a hexagonal table in Beijing for a three-day meeting to discuss how to resolve the pressing issue of North Korea's suspected nuclear weapons program (JMFA, 2004), the meeting served as a forum for clarifying the positions between North Korea and the United States. However, their mutually irreconcilable positions were reconfirmed. North Korea's objective was to construct a new level of relations leading to the normalization of ties with the United States, and to obtain economic rewards for giving up its nuclear program. North Korea's position may be divided into the following: (1) it wanted to confirm that the United States would shift away from its hostile policy; (2) it wanted to secure a non-aggression treaty that would strictly and legally guarantee that neither of the two sides would resort to attacking one another; and (3) it would not submit to inspections until the United States would agree to abandon its antagonistic position toward North Korea (Karin and Julia, 2007). The United States, however, was deliberately vague on what rewards it

might bestow upon North Korea if it agreed to dismantle its nuclear weapons program in a verifiable and irreversible manner (Karin and Julia, 2007).

The purposes of the other nations that were present at the talks may be summarized as follows: China tried to play the role of an active mediator, by hosting the second nuclear talks after the trilateral meeting in April 2003. China also attempted to increase its influence over the Northeast Asian region (Byung, 2004). Russia, by offering a joint assurance (along with China) to the Kim Jong-Il regime in North Korea, wanted to intervene as a main actor in resolving the nuclear crisis (Yoo-sung, 2005). Japan's primary concern in the talks was to solve the kidnapping of the Japanese by North Korea as well as to maintain its security from the suspected nuclear weapons and missiles. Finally, South Korea, by reconfirming its position as the most important counterpart of North Korea, hoped to enforce a non-nuclear Korean peninsula plan. South Korea had hoped that the success of the multilateral talks would translate into a more permanent peace regime between the two Koreas (Karin and Julia, 2007).

VII. US SANCTIONS ON NORTH KOREA

The United States maintains sanctions against North Korea under five primary rationales: first, the state is considered a national security threat; second, it is on the State Department's list of state sponsors or supporters of terrorism; third, the DPRK is a Marxist-Leninist state; fourth, the country has been implicated in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and fifth, the country is a non-nuclear weapons state that has denoted a nuclear device. In addition to diplomatic sanctions (Eric, 2003), the U.S. government maintains various economic sanctions on trade, aid, arms sales and transfers, and access to assets under U.S. jurisdiction based on these four principles. Sanctions under the first rationale are specific to North Korea while the latter three apply to various country groupings of which North Korea is a part. Individual sanctions cannot necessarily be categorized neatly under one rationale or another but have sometimes been imposed under several different laws or regulations. Some of these (few) sanctions imposed according to Dong (2005) are:

1. Following the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, the United States instituted a total embargo on exports to the DPRK.
2. Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR), issued by the Department of Treasury in December 1950, also forbade "any financial transactions involving, or on behalf of, North Korea, including "transactions related to travel."
3. The Department of Commerce revised its Export Administration Regulations (EARs) in 1965, grouping countries by level of restriction, and North Korea remained on the most restricted list.
4. The State Department placed North Korea on the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism in 1988 after the 1987 bombing of Korean Air Lines flight 858 which was reportedly carried out by two North Korean agents. This reinforced Washington's rationale for restricting trade and financial transactions with the DPRK.
5. Under the Export Administration Act of 1979, governments of countries found to be sponsors and supporters of international terrorism can face a wide array of sanctions, including the forfeit of most trade and foreign aid, access to sales of items on the U.S. Munitions List, Export-Import bank assistance, and support through international financial institutions. Other restrictions can include the denial of beneficial trade statuses, higher tax hurdles for potential investors, and additional regulations that make trade in food and medicines more difficult.
6. In September 2005, the United States sanctioned two North Korean companies accused of assisting proliferation activities in Iran. The new sanctions prohibit U.S. government agencies from buying or selling military equipment, services or technology from or to the companies or their subsidiaries.
7. In March 2006 the Treasury Department announced a prohibition on transactions between any U.S. person and a Swiss company, Kohas AG, and its owner, Jakob Steiger, for allegedly doing business with Korea Ryonbong General Corporation; another blacklisted company. The Treasury Department action also froze any of their assets under U.S. jurisdiction.
8. Then in April 2006 a new OFAC regulation prohibited as of May 8 "US persons from owning, leasing, operating or insuring any Vessel flagged by North Korea."
9. Regulation prohibited as of May 8 "US persons from owning, leasing, operating or insuring any vessel flagged by North Korea." More significantly, as noted above, beginning in 2005 the Treasury Department used the powers authorized by the U.S. Patriot Act to address counterfeiting concerns. In September 2005, under Article 311 of the Patriot Act, the U.S. Department of Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia (BDA), a bank in Macau at which North Korean entities maintained accounts, as a "primary money laundering concern" and proposed rules restricting U.S. financial institutions from engaging in financial transactions with it. Some U.S. officials believe a number of the accounts belong to members of North Korea's ruling elite. The Treasury Department's designation resulted in a run on BDA by account holders; consequently, the Macau Monetary Authority assumed control of BDA and impounded the North Korean accounts.

Timeline : U.S. Sanctions and other Treasury Departments Actions against the DPRK

1950	Korean War breaks out. United States institutes total embargo on exports to North Korea. President Truman declares a state of national emergency in U.S. because of Korean War. Department of Treasury issues Foreign Assets Control Regulations (FACR), forbidding financial transactions by, or on behalf of, North Korea, including transactions for travel. These regulations also froze North Korean assets held under U.S. jurisdiction
1953	Armistice halts Korean War.
1955	U.S. issues first International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) which includes North Korea on list of countries that should be denied, "licenses, other approvals, Exports and imports of defense articles and defense services."
1965	When Export Administration Regulations (EARs) are revised categorizing countries according to level of restriction, North Korea continues to be on the list of most restricted countries—Country Group Z.
1975	Korea- related Foreign Asset Control Regulations (FACRs) revised to prohibit transactions related to agricultural products that contained raw goods originating in the DPRK
1985	DPRK joins NPT
1987	KAL flight 858 is bombed, reportedly by North Korean agents
1988	North Korea is added to U.S. Department of State's list of state sponsors or supporters of international terrorism.
1989	EARs revised to allow export of "commercially-supplied goods intended to meet basic human needs" to DPRK with licenses granted on a case-by-case basis. Revisions ease regulations concerning travel to DPRK for special activities. Revisions to the IEEPA to reflect advances in media (such as CDs, etc.) allow for ease in flow of information materials between U.S. and certain countries, including DPRK
1991	North and South Korea join the UN.
1992	FACR revised to allow telecommunication between U.S. and DPRK.
1992-2002	U.S. sanctions various North Korean entities for violation of U.S. missile nonproliferation laws found in sections of the Arms Export Control Act, Export Administration Act, and Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. Sanctions passed on North Korean entities in 1992, 1996, 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2006 often alongside sanctions on Iranian, Syrian or Pakistani entities.

1994	U.S. and DPRK Sign the Agreed Framework.
1995	A range of economic sanctions eased. New FACR revisions allow unlimited travel-related transactions, establishment of news organization offices and transactions related to provision of LWR. The revisions also allow for the importation of North Korean magnesite and magnesia.
1996	FACR revision allows for humanitarian donations in response to DPRK floods and famine
1997	FACR revision authorizes payments for services rendered by North Korea to U.S aircraft in connection with overflight of, or emergency landing, in the DPRK.
1998	The DPRK test fires a missile over Japan.
1999	The DPRK announces a self-imposed moratorium on missile testing. President Clinton announces the most significant easing of trade and travel restrictions since their imposition in 1950.
2000	EARs and FACRs revised to allow for easing of these trade and travel sanctions. Regulations on financial transactions are also loosened so that most transactions are permitted.
2002	The Agreed Framework begins to erode when North Korea reportedly admits to having a uranium enrichment program, reactivates its reactor at Yongbyon and expels IAEA inspectors and the United States stops oil shipments to DPRK
2003	DPRK withdraws from NPT
2005	March 2: North Korea announces an end to its missile-testing moratorium. May 1: North Korea tests a short-range missile. June 28: The US imposes financial sanctions on three North Korean entities it accuses of involvement in WMD proliferation September 12: The U.S. Department of Treasury designates Banco Delta Asia in Macau an institution of "money laundering concern;" Macanese authorities respond by freezing North Korean accounts. September 19: The Fourth Round of Six-Party Talks produces the "September Joint Statement," in which parties agree to the goal of ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program. The U.S. sanctions two North Korean companies. October 21: The U.S. Department of Treasury Freezes Assets of eight North Korean entities for involvement in WMD proliferation

	December 13: The U.S. Department of Treasury issues an advisory warning U.S. and international financial institutions to "guard against the abuse of their financial services by North Korea."
2006	<p>March: A North Korean Delegation visits the U.S. to discuss the BDA designation; the meeting is inconclusive. The following day, North Korea tests a short-range missile.</p> <p>March 30: The U.S. freezes the US-controlled assets of a Swiss firm and a Swiss individual that allegedly have business dealings with a North Korean entity named by the U.S. government as a WMD proliferator.</p> <p>April: New OFAC regulations, effective in May, make it illegal for U.S. persons to own, lease, operate or insure any vessel flagged by North Korea.</p> <p>July 5: The DPRK test fires seven missiles, including a Taepo-Dong long-range missile.</p> <p>July 15: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1695.</p> <p>October 3: North Korea announces unspecified plans to test a nuclear device.</p> <p>October 6: The UNSC Issues SC 8859 warning North Korea not to test a nuclear device.</p> <p>October 9: North Korea announces that it has exploded a nuclear device.</p> <p>October 13: New Japanese sanctions, announced October 11, go into effect.</p> <p>October 14: The UN Security Council unanimously adopts Resolution 1718.</p> <p>November 13: The US submits a report to the UN describing implementation of 1718 under existing law and providing a provisional list of luxury goods prohibited for export.</p> <p>December 7: President announces imposition of "Glenn Amendment" and new Atomic Energy Act sanctions, mandated by law to be applied to non-nuclear-weapons states that detonate nuclear devices.</p>
2007	<p>January 26: The U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) amends the EAR to impose license requirements for the export and re-export of "virtually all items subject to the EAR" except food and medicines not listed on the Commerce Control List and releases a list of luxury items prohibited for export and re-export to the DPRK.</p> <p>February 13: Agreement signed in which the U.S. agrees to "begin the process of removing the designation of the DPRK as a state-sponsor of terrorism and advance the process of terminating the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act with respect to the DPRK."</p>

Source : Karin Lee and Julia Choi: *north korea: economic sanctions and u.s. department of treasury actions 1955-september2007. national committee on north korea, 2007. pp. 51-53*

VIII. CONCLUSION

It is rather apparent that international relations and politics are best represented or explained by realist analogy of the systemic nature, which is anarchy and lack of general security. The North had since discovered this, hence tried to develop its own military capability. But what is obtainable on the ground is the sheer attempt by the United States and the west to dominate global production and possession of military industrial complex with the purpose to dominate the global armament by discouraging arms race among major and emerging powers and states.

IX. RECOMMENDATION

The continuity of international peace and mutual cooperation among nation-states is based on the following peaceful recommendations:

The major powers of the global system must respect the territorial sovereignty of other miniature states for them to have political confidence, trust and respect on the great powers and for peace to reign at different levels of the global system.

There should not be any form of deliberate provocative political or military alliance against any nation. This will do away with other forces such as those that engendered the Second World War from the

lessons learnt from Hitler's Germany of building and establishing some security and military alliances and pacts with the Soviet Union, Italy, and Japan.

More balances of power are indispensable. This will go by the tenets of balance of terror. If countries have equal capability of military destruction and might, there is the likelihood for such states not to fight each other, due to the destructive nature of each and the calculated collateral damage.

It is also recommendable that the United States withdraws its troops from South Korea and ceases all forms of joint military drills with the south to ensure more peaceful coexistence and stability between the Koreans.

The major powers in the six party talks must also be sincere and honest and stand firm to ensure meaningful perpetual negotiations with the north, for more mutual understanding and respect be achieved among all parties involved.

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Global Journal of HUMAN SOCIAL SCIENCE
Political Science
Volume 13 Issue 5 Version 1.0 Year 2013
Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal
Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)
Online ISSN: 2249-460x & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

Boko Haram Insurgency: A Northern Agenda for Regime Change and Islamization in Nigeria, 2007 - 2013

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Abstract - Nigeria witnessed the emergence of Boko Haram - an Islamic sect - in 2002 and its active insurgency since 2009. This paper studies the Boko Haram and its operations with a view to determine its relationship with Northern struggle for political hegemony. With the aid of secondary method of data collection and Islamic fundamentalist theory as framework of analysis, the paper observed that the primary goals of the sect are the overthrow of none Muslim and moderate Muslim government and the Islamization of Nigeria. It observed also that the sect receives financial, administrative and security support from many top Northern Islamic politicians, serving political office holders and Northern members of the armed forces. Finally, government anti-terrorism campaign has drastically reduced the spread, success and regularity of Boko Haram insurgency. The paper therefore recommends punitive anti-terrorism laws, and the adoption of state of emergency as a regular approach to fighting terrorism among others in Nigeria.

GJHSS-F Classification : FOR Code: 360199p, 390301



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Boko Haram Insurgency: A Northern Agenda for Regime Change and Islamization in Nigeria, 2007 - 2013

Chukwuemeka Eze Malachy

Abstract - Nigeria witnessed the emergence of Boko Haram - an Islamic sect - in 2002 and its active insurgency since 2009. This paper studies the Boko Haram and its operations with a view to determine its relationship with Northern struggle for political hegemony. With the aid of secondary method of data collection and Islamic fundamentalist theory as framework of analysis, the paper observed that the primary goals of the sect are the overthrow of none Muslim and moderate Muslim government and the Islamization of Nigeria. It observed also that the sect receives financial, administrative and security support from many top Northern Islamic politicians, serving political office holders and Northern members of the armed forces. Finally, government anti-terrorism campaign has drastically reduced the spread, success and regularity of Boko Haram insurgency. The paper therefore recommends punitive anti-terrorism laws, and the adoption of state of emergency as a regular approach to fighting terrorism among others in Nigeria.

I. INTRODUCTION

Nigeria has continued to face political instability and crisis since the census crisis of 1962 orchestrated by Northern quest to dominate the South, and the transition crisis of 1964 that culminated in the 1967-1970 Nigerian civil war. The instability manifested as coups and counter coups, religious and ethnic conflicts, failed transition programmes, politically motivated high level murders, electoral violence, arson and electoral litigations that overturned many declared victories. Since 1983 when Nigeria recorded a failed attempt at civilian transition of power due to Northern dominated National Party of Nigeria's manipulation of electoral process and results, Nigeria has witnessed an unprecedented level of violence that ranges from inter/intra-communal and ethnic clashes, ethno-religious violence, demonstrations or civil strife, arson, armed robbery, political assassination, murder, gender-based violence, election violence, and bomb explosion [Ogunyemi and Align, 2011].

This high level of insecurity has been exacerbated by catastrophic terrorism that have taken terrible humanitarian toll and threatened Nigeria's cooperate existence as witnessed in the Niger Delta region and many Northern States. Kaplan [1994:3] summarized the scenario thus:

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The country is becoming increasingly ungovernable.... Ethnic and regional splits are deepening, a situation made worse by an increase in the number of states from 19 to 30 and a doubling in the number of local governing authorities. Religious cleavages are more serious; Muslim fundamentalism and evangelical Christian militancy are on the rise; and northern Muslim anxiety over southern [Christian] control of the economy is intense . . . the will to keep Nigeria together is now very weak.

Consequent upon this, many insurgent and ethnically based organizations such as the Oduduwa Peoples' Congress (OPC), the Egbesu boys, the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB), Arewa Peoples' Congress (APC), the Bakassi Boys, Igbo Peoples' Congress (IPC), Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVF), Niger Delta Resistant Movement (NDRM), Movement for the Survival of the Izo Nationality of the Niger Delta (MOSIEND), the Yobe Taliban, Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Jama'at Ahlus al-Sunnah Liddawati Wal-Jihad or better known as Boko Haram, and a host of many other violence wielding groups emerged. Of these groups, this paper studies Boko Haram because its activities, destructions and killings are the most contemporary with sophisticated connections to many past and serving political office holders and military personnel.

According to Connell (2012), Boko Haram was founded in 1995 by Abubakah Lawan under the original name Ahlulsunna wal'jama'ah hijra with its headquarters in Maiduguri, Nigeria. Its original goal of improving the economic hardship and poor living standards in the country through struggle attracted followers in their hundreds (Farouk, 2012:2). However, when Lawan left for studies at the University of Medina in Saudi Arabia, a radicalized Muslim cleric named Muhammad Yusuf assumed leadership position of the group and renamed the group Boko Haram (Connell, 2012:88), which simply means western education is forbidden. Yusuf equally changed the primary goals of the sect towards the overthrow of the secular Nigerian Government and the enforcement of an anti-Western Sharia law based government. Consequently, the sect attacks churches and government buildings, personnel and institutions. They have carried out several attacks against security

agencies, government properties, churches and markets together with United Nations headquarters in Abuja [Brock, 2011].

However, the increasing spread and successful operations of the Boko Haram sect against the people and government of the Federal republic of Nigeria, the level of destruction of lives and property in the face of multiple armed security forces is a puzzle that needs to be resolved. This dangerous trend has been complicated by the allegation of complicity among former heads of state, high-ranking political office holders and security personnel. The disappearance of Kabiru Sokoto – a terrorist suspect from the police cell, the arrests of some security personnel who were smuggling illegal arms into the country by Customs officials, and the arrests of some security personnel safeguarding or transporting illegal arms into Abuja, etc are equally matters of serious concern. Unfortunately, none of those arrested suspects and collaborators has been prosecuted. This paper therefore studies the insurgency with a view to examine the factors that have encouraged the growth and expansion of Boko Haram operations, its relationship with Northern political agenda and achievements so far.

II. MATERIALS AND METHODS

This study is predominantly based on information derived from secondary sources such as relevant texts, journals, magazines, newspapers, official publications, historical documents and the Internet, which served as tangible sources of insight into terrorism, politics and conflicts. The time-span of the study is primarily but not exclusively between 2007 when Boko Haram began its public campaign against constituted governments and 2013 being the current time Nigerians witnessed its terrors across the Northern Nigeria. The choice of 2007 as starting point of this inquiry was informed by the fact that it marked the year the Islamic sect recorded its first public and successful attack. That was even the year the group revealed for the first time the reasons for its campaign against the government and Nigerians.

However, the inquiry is strictly limited to recorded information about Boko Haram and its insurgent activities that can be found on the internet and libraries. The paper is interest in such information as the rise and activities of Boko Haram, its operations across Nigeria, government responses to their claims and actions, and the impact such actions.

Consequently, the paper adopts content analysis as its method of analysis. The method here is to sift the findings in the works available for this research, check the consistency of the opinions of either the authors and/or the actors; evaluate such findings or opinions with other existing findings on the subject. The data shall equally be examined in the light of other

thesis and findings on the subject matter. Through these methods, the paper draws inferences on the data generated during the research and their consequences for party dominance in Nigeria's democratic process.

III. GAP IN THE EXTANT LITERATURE

This section reviews available literature on regime change, terrorism, terrorism in Nigeria, and the emergence of Boko-Haram as a terrorist group in Nigeria.

a) *Regime Change*

The concept of regime change has being variously defined by scholars. According to Booth (1998:5) it is the act of changing "both the fundamental rules of politics and the makeup of its coalition (a regime shift)". Other authors such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) perceive it as the possible outcome of the strategic interaction of domestic political groups. These authors ignored the role or influence of external or foreign players in such an interaction (Bonfatti, 2011:5). They equally ignored the role or influence of non-state actors, who are not members of any political party nor act in the name of any of such parties such insurgent or rebel groups. Nevertheless, the concept of regime change is associated with the substitution of one type of regime with another i.e. civilian regime with military regime, or substitution of the executive arm of government with another through elections, coup d'état, litigations/legal process, revolution, and or the death of the incumbent chief executive (Baird, 2001; Caldeira and Gibson, 1992). In essence, it is the constitutional or unconstitutional removal or replacement of the chief executive of a state whether military or civilian regime or a change from one regime type to another, which in effect leads to the substitution of all political appointees with other set of people. From the perspective prism of changes in structures, mechanisms of operation and procedure, Albrecht and Schlumberger [2004] classified regime change into five as follows: change in the Structures of legitimacy and strategies of legitimization; elite change; change in institution building/arrangement of power; co-optation i.e. restricting populism and widening the regime's power base; and external influences/intervention.

The nature and dynamics of regime change depends on the socio-political and economic forces that are responsible for change. Such forces can be indigenous or exogenous. In most cases regime change is associated with perceived inability of the existing political system or administrators of such system to translate popular in-put demands on a policy issue into political action (Tyler and Mitchell, 1994; Easton, 1965b). This leads to decline in legitimacy, the emergence of civil rights movements and activism. In this case, people's dissatisfaction with dividends of bad governance propels pressure that results in coup d'état,

assassination of the incumbent, or demand for early elections. Such a regime is voted out of power by the people. Generally, social tension, mass unemployment among young people, religious fundamentalism, poverty, undemocratic culture, ideology, despotism or autocratic governance, democracy, security and economic expansion or advantage has been noted by scholars as the major reasons causing nationally or internationally sponsored regime change.

Booth [1998:9 emphasis mine] in the study of regime change in South American countries from traditional political stability, guerrilla insurgency, military reformism, personalistic authoritarianism, socialist revolution, to civilian-led liberal democracy between 1970 and the late 1990s argued that,

Regime coalition members benefit from inclusion in the regime. [Consequently,] Social and economic change can generate and mobilize new political actors who may seek inclusion into the ruling coalition and its benefits, and who may or may not be admitted by those within the regime. Socio-economic change can dramatically affect the resources available to the regime.

This inclusion tendency in South American politics that normally alters both the character and rules of the regime i.e. regime shift is necessitated by corporatist tendencies and the willingness of new actors to fight the status quo till they are included in the regime. It therefore suffices to say that South American political actors do not work for regime change but shift or transformation.

Thus, intra and inter class struggle due to social exclusion from the structure of distribution lead to rebellion, revolution and political violence that inevitably cause changes in regime [Gurr, 1970; Walton, 1984:13]. Many scholars such as Walton [1984]; Skocpol [1979]; Paige [1975]; Olson [1979]; Wickham-Crowley [1992]; Booth [1996], Williams [1986]; Gasiorowski [1995] and Brockett [1988] generally agree that rapid economic change and evolving class relations are powerful factors that cause mass mobilization needed for a violent challenge to any regime. Such group of people when mobilized focuses their energy on changing the status quo. Aya [1979] and Tilly [1978] note that the ruling coalition is always the target of such a change, while the coalition itself enhances the rebellion through repression thereby promoting the expected change. It is more profitable however for the ruling group to share power with broader sets of citizens to avoid total regime change. Thus, redistribution of resources leads to mobilization and democratization [Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006].

The literature also noted the role of external interests that were not accommodated by regimes as forces that influence or cause the movement for changing regimes. Seligson and Booth [1993]; Huntington [1993]; Easterly et Al. [2008]; Dube et Al.

(2011); Whitehead (1991); Carothers (1991) among others stressed the role of external intervention to change an existing regime and or imposition of preferred regime type because their interests, which is predominantly economic (Bonfatti, 2011), are not safeguarded in such regimes. Such external forces may be strengthening a prevailing regime by supporting it or weakening it through or withheld support, supply of resources to domestic actors, altering their relative strength and capacity to act (Muller and Seligson, 1994). They may also use international institutions to pressurize regimes to adopt certain policies or regime types through such instruments like foreign loans, aid, arms, trade, cooperation at the international level, military assistance etc (Booth, 1998).

b) *Terrorism*

There is no commonly accepted conceptualisation of terrorism. From the perception of imperial and autocratic regimes, certain group actions that are against their interests are branded terrorist actions, while for the perpetrators, such actions are nationalistic and emancipatory [Gunaratna, 2002]. The debate over what constitute terrorism has been summed up in the following expression, 'one man's freedom fighter is another man's terrorist.' The crux of the arguments is that actions considered by the state as terrorism take the form of asymmetric warfare between groups, movements and organisations often against the state. These include ethnic identity conflicts, which is characterised by irredentist and secessionist movements and multi-party civil war. Such actions are guided by religious or ethno-nationalist ideas and characterised by hatred, fear and genocide and have no declarations of war, few battles and are typified by attrition, terror and violence against civilians [Kaldor, 1999; Laquer, 2001; Gilbert, 2003; Holsti, 1996]. In some cases like the Rwanda and Burundi genocides, dominant ethnic groups employ the instrumentalities of the state to perpetuate the same act against other groups that are not in power. Still such state sponsored or perpetuated terror is not termed terrorism.

To some other scholars, terrorism is a violent reaction against an established social order wherein terrorists are seen as social actors seeking for change in society and use violence as instruments to destroy the existing framework of society or merely change it. Such violence can be for reform or revolution. This is due to the existence of a set of existential and development human needs that require satisfaction on a hierarchical basis. Indifference to such needs on the part of government normally leads actors into violence against the state [Burton, 1979; Gurr, 1970 and 1988]. This implies that if the basic human needs of individual non-state actors are unsatisfied they can generate grievance terrorism, revolutionary terrorism or reactionary terrorism, which has an agenda for either destroying or reforming the existing social system.

Although consensus will continue to elude the conceptualisation of terrorism for a long time [Laqueur, 1987:72], the concept is relative to the legitimacy of state governance, or as specific methods of political violence, such as hijack or bombing or as acts of violence against a specific target group, particularly civilians [Wilkinson, 2000]. In line with this, the United States Department of Defence in Laqueur [2001] conceptualized of terrorism as; "Unlawful use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce and intimidate governments to accept political, religious or ideological objectives." Hoffman [1999:32] noted that terrorism can even be located in the "threats to the stability of nation states by non-state actors and nongovernmental processes and organisations." The predominance of state power over private forces made the relative legitimacy explanation of terrorism the widely accepted understanding of the concept. Resultantly, the concept represents a challenge and threat to state authority by an illegitimate body. However, Schmid and Jongman [2004:2] offered more neutral conceptualization terrorism as;

A method of combat in which random or symbolic victims serve as instrumental targets of violence. These instrumental victims share group or class characteristics, which form the basis for the victimisation. Other members of that group or class are put in a chronic state of fear (terror)... the purpose of which is to change attitudes or behaviour favouring the interests of the user of method of combat.

Available literature such as Bowyer [1978]; Laqueur [2001] and Richmond [2006] revealed four primary reasons for terrorist actions as follow:

1. Functional reason [i.e. Terrorism is intended to provoke a response to further the cause by strategic manipulation]. This suggests that terrorism can be perpetuated to force a reaction from an established political power centre, governing authority or state against the instigators, their supporters and even the population in general in a manner that may lead to intense and indiscriminate state repression in order to deprive the government of legitimacy and radicalise the masses [Rubenstein, 1987; O'Sullivan and Herman, 1991].
2. Symbolic reason [i.e. Terrorism purposely carried out as a symbol to terrorise, intimidate and strike fear into the lives of those against whom the violence is directed, even if they are not the actual physical recipients of the violence]. In this case both those that are targeted and those who witnessed it are affected by such actions [Tzu, 1963; Wilkinson, 2000].
3. Tactical reasons [i.e. Terrorist acts are tactically committed as instrument of negotiation to achieve short term gains like the exchange of hijack

hostages for prisoners, or a bank robbery to fund arms procurement, or even to attract economic empowerment].

4. Political reason [i.e. Incumbent political elites or regime do declare political opponents, who have 'illegitimate designs' on state power, as terrorists. This enables the state to employ a 'free hand' and legitimately pursue an agenda to eradicate its opposition, regardless of whether they are actually linked to terrorists' activities or not (Wilkinson, 2000). State monopoly of legitimised violence allows it to embark on terrorist acts in the guise of anti-terrorist policies against opponents both nationally and internationally.

The varied nature of the reasons for terrorism leads to various forms of terrorist actions and respective state sponsored counter terrorist activities. These anti- or counter- terrorism activities as noted by the United States Congressional Budget Office [2002 & 2005]; Guinnessy and Dawson [2002]; Macilwain [2002]; Silke [2004], etc include airport screening, anti-terrorism products for personal use, arrest, assassinations, blast resistant luggage, building security, detection devises for biological or chemical weapons, diplomatic efforts, educational support, emergency response preparedness, fortification of embassies, gas masks, hostage negotiation, laws against terrorism, medical antidotes for anthrax, medical antidotes for nerve gas, medical antidotes for other chemical or biological weapons, metal detectors, prosecution strategies, psychological counselling, punishment and sentencing, religious interventions, social and economic responses, UN Conventions and multilateral interventions, use of force by one country to another, use of media, etc.

Silke (2005), Cauley and Im [1988] and McCord [2003] observed that these anti-terrorism measures are often ineffective and increase the temerity with which terror is being perpetuated. Enders, Sandler and Cauley [1990]; Enders and Sandler [1993] evaluation of multiple counter terrorism programmes and outcomes between 1968 and 1993 consolidated this argument. Equally, Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare [1994] evaluation of the effectiveness of six Israeli military-led retaliation attacks on reducing terrorism from the PLO and Lebanon that took place between 1972 and 1988 when Israeli athletes were killed at the Munich Olympic Games of 1972 and observed the ineffectiveness of the counter terrorism strikes. However, some scholars like MacKenzie [2000]; Sherman et al. [2002]; Weisburd et al., [2003]; Enders and Sandler [2000] observed dual effect on the effectiveness of counter terrorism activities. Many effects are close to a zero effect while others provide no statistical evidence that the counter-terrorism strategy was harmful. Other studies shows that such programmes produce negative effects leading to increased likelihood of new terrorist activities [Prunckun

and Mohr, 1997; Silke, 2005]. For instance, generally statistics show that the United States' 1986 attack on Libya after Libya's involvement in the bombing of the LaBelle Discotheque in West Berlin significantly increased the number of terrorist attacks, at least in the short run.

These outcomes made some scholars like Enders and Sandler, [2002]; Abadie and Gardeazabal [2001]; Barros [2003] to embark on an exploration of alternative methods of waging counter terror wars. They noted such alternative like assassinations and kidnappings of terrorist group leaders such as the ones conducted by ETA between 1968 and 2000; the application of different political ideologies by those in power; increases in police and military fiscal allocations as well as increases in foreign investment in the home country or base where the terrorist groups are based. The United States for instance raised its "Appropriations for Combating Terrorism and Protecting Critical Infrastructure" by over 650% from \$13.6 billion dollars in 2002 to \$88.1 billion in 2004 [Congressional Budget Office, 2005]. This excludes the billions of dollars spent since September 11th on counter terrorism around the world.

c) *Boko-Haram and Terrorism in Nigeria*

The emergence of Boko Haram, which can be traced to the Islamic Movement of Nigeria, a Shiite movement led by Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky that was funded by Iran, laid the background for the contemporary terrorist activities in Nigeria since 2007. Since then, the sect has vigorously pursued the propagation of an extreme Islamic doctrine, which sees Western education and the leadership of non-hard-line Muslims and or Christians as evil and immoral. The sect forbids everything Western i.e. Western education and modern science and technology are sinful, sacrilegious or ungodly and should therefore be forbidden (Danjibo, 2009; Adesoji, 2010). The sect seeks to create an Islamic state governed by Sharia law in Nigeria by any means at its disposal and at whatever human cost it deems necessary [Bumah, 2009]. For this, the sect has carried out numerous deadly attacks against Nigerian governments, their institutions and structures, and Nigerians in general. On its part, the state has reacted to these brutal attacks by legislating against it, waging anti-terrorist wars and declaring state of emergency in three states where the sect is based and operates mostly. This paper pursues an analysis of the aim of book-haram insurgency in Nigeria, the nuances of its operations, and an evaluation of state sponsored anti-terror programmes. Suffice to say, the paper will test the applicability of the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of anti-terrorism wars within the Nigerian context.

IV. THEORETICAL NEXUS

With the consideration of the primary reasons that led to emergence of Boko Haram sect, this paper adopts the Islamic fundamentalist theory as its framework of analysis. According to Hodgkin [1975:247], the fundamental principle of the theory, which guided Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio, was "to make upon the heathen king who...make no profession of Islam, is obligatory by assent". Therefore, the goal of Islamising Nigeria under the sharia law dates back to the Jihad of Usman Dan Fodio in 1804 [Adetoro, 1982]. Since then, the goal has always being the motive behind various ethno-religious riots in Northern Nigeria.

Recently, Farouk (2012) observed that the Boko Haram sect and insurgency is an expression of the Quranic verse which states that "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors" (Quran 649). Usigbe (2012) noted that President GoodLuck Jonathan was recently directed by the Boko Haram sect to embrace Islam or resign. Furthering the argument, Suleiman (2011) reporting the public statement issued by Boko Haram group in Maiduguri on April 24, 2011, noted that their objectives were to abolish democracy and institute Sharia law as instrument of justice and islamization. The sect preached first total islamization of Nigeria until 2009 when it took arms against the state because of the Maiduguri crisis of July, 2009 that led to the death of Mohammed Yusuf and some of their members. For this reason, one of the sect's spokesmen declared;

we would continue to fight until Islam is well established and the Muslims regain their freedom all over Nigeria. We would never be ready to compromise and we don't need amnesty. The only solution to what is happening is for the government to repent, jettison democracy, drop the constitution and adopt the laws in the Holy Qur'an (Suleiman, 2011:50).

First, the sect called on government to prosecute the police officers involved in the extra – judicial killing of their leader Mohammed Yusuf and some members. They equally called for the arrest and trial of some former Northern Nigeria Governors for what they described as acts of "betrayal" because the former governors used them as thugs.

The relevance of this theory to our study relates to the fact that over 60% of Nigerians are not Moslems. They are either Christians, Traditional religionists, atheists, members of the church of Satan and other religious affiliations. The real threat posed by the emergence and activities of Boko Haram stems from the fact that these none Muslims are prepared for a showdown with the Islamic sect. The theory enables us therefore to understand the attacks and counter attacks in the Northern Nigeria, relocation of non-indigenes out of many states in the North and its economic, social and political consequences. The theory enables us also to

study the reasons for and impact of government's counter terror operations in the Northern part of Nigeria, the overall impact of the terror and counter terror activities on tourism, foreign investments, economic activities, fiscal appropriation for security/armed forces, and growth. The theory is therefore relevant for the study.

V. FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

a) *Book-Haram Insurgency*

Boko Haram is one of the Islamic fundamentalist sects in Nigeria that adopted violence as a weapon of attracting national and international responses to their demands or interests. "Boko-Haram" is a name that was derived from Hausa and Arabic words. "Boko" in Hausa means "western education" and "Haram" an Arabic word means "sin" [Obinna, 2011]. It therefore suffices to say that the name Boko-Haram literally means western education is a sin. This symbolises the original name of this sect, Jama'atu AhlisSunna Lidda'awatiwal-Jihad, which stands for "The Group of Al-Sunna for Preaching and Jihad". It is innocuous therefore to argue from the onset that Boko-Haram is an Islamic sect established for the purposes of stamping out western civilization and for prosecuting jihad.

Consequently, the sect is against Christians, moderate Muslims and the government of Nigeria, and began by stockpiling arms and ammunitions between 2002 and 2008 [Soyombo, 2012]. Security reports and government's investigation of their activities led to the 2009 massive five days Boko Haram riots across Bauchi that later spread to Yobe, Maiduguri, Kano and Borno. During the riot, over 800 people including the leader of the sect – Mohammed Yusuf – were killed. This marked the beginning of their violent campaign in Nigeria. The

sect embarked on regular and more violent attacks against churches, security establishments and media organizations with heavy human casualty. The increasing spread and dimension of the insurgency promoted the Sultan of Sokoto, the Governor of Niger State, Dr Mu'azu Babangida Aliyu, the Coalition of Muslim Clerics in Nigeria (CMCN), the Islamic Circle of North America, the Islamic Supreme Council of Canada, the Muslim Council of Britain, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and the Council on American Islamic Relations to observe that the sect's activities have exceeded religious goal- islamization (Oladeji and Agba, 2011).

The sect is now pursuing political agenda also. This paper argues that this is not a change of goal as overthrowing non-Islamic regimes is one of their primary goals that manifested itself during the 2011 general elections.

In order to secure electoral victory at all cost during the 2011 election, desperate northern politicians recruited members of the sect to rig the 2011 elections in their favour at the state and federal levels, those who won the elections dumped them while those who failed particularly to win the presidential elections further funded and used them to cause havoc [Dibia, 2012]. Consequently, they enjoy the full support of major Northern political elites and members of the armed forces who want the North to dominantly occupy the seat of the presidency. The failure of the Northern political elites to win the presidential ticket during the 2011 elections led to intensified Boko Haram attacks against government, Christian and Southern targets in the North. The list of Boko Haram attacks seems endless as they continued into 2013. A brief summary of these attacks are graphically presented in a table below as follows:

Some of the Boko Haram Attacks between 2007 and 2013

s/n	Date	Location	Nature of Attacks	Remarks
1	July 26, 2009	Bauchi	5 days uprising and attack on a police station that spread to Maiduguri, Borno, Yobe, and Kano	Over 800 people killed
2	July 27, 2009	Yobe	Attack on Potiskum, Yobe State Divisional Police Headquarters	3 Police men and 1 fire service officer died.
3	March 13, 2010	Plateau state	Churches and markets	300 people killed
4	September 7, 2010	Bauchi	Attacked Prisons	killed 5 guards and freed over 700 inmates, including former sect members.
5	October 1, 2010	Abuja	Explosions near the Eagle Square	12 people killed & many injured.
6	October 11, 2010	Maiduguri	Bombing/gun attack on a police station	destroys the station and injures three
7	December 24 2010	Barkin Ladi, Jos	Bomb attack	Eight people killed
8	December 28, 2010	Jos	Christmas eve bomb attack on church	38 people killed
9	December 31,	Abuja	The group attack a Mammy market at	11 people killed

	2010		Army Mogadishu Barracks	
10	7 January 21, 2011	Maiduguri	Attack on politicians	8 persons killed including ANPP governorship candidate
11	March 2 2011	Kaduna State	The residence of the Divisional police Officer, Mustapha Sandamu	2 police men killed
12	March 30, 2011	Damaturu, Yobe State	Bomb attack	injured a police officer
13	April 8, 2011	Niger State	Bombing of INEC office in Suleja	Killed 8 Corps members
14	April 9 2011	Unguwar Doki Maiduguri	Bomb explosion occurred at a polling unit	Killed 17 people and many injured
15	April 29 2011	Bauchi state	Army Barracks in Bauchi bombed	No death
16	May 29, 2011	Bauchi State	Explosion at mammy market of Shandawanka barracks	claimed 18 lives and left many injured
17	May 30 2011	Maiduguri	Bombs exploded early morning on Baga road in	13 persons died and 40 injured
18	June 7, 2011	Maiduguri	Series of bomb blasts	claimed five lives and injured many others
19	June 16, 2011	Abuja	Bombing of Nigerian Police Headquarters	three killed and many vehicles damaged
20	June 16, 2011	Maiduguri	bomb blast at Damboa town	Four children killed
21	June 20, 2011	Katsina State	Boko Haram stormed Kankara Police station	9 police men killed
22	July 9, 2011	Maiduguri	A clash between Boko Haram and the military	31 persons killed
23	July 11 2011	Kaduna State	Tragic explosion at a relaxation joint in Fokados street	Many people killed
24	July 12, 2011	Borno State	Boko Haram threw an explosive device on a moving military patrol vehicle	5 persons killed
25	July 15, 2011	Borno State	Explosion in Maiduguri	Injured five people
26	July 23, 2011	Borno State	An explosion close to the palace of the Shehu of Borno, Abubakar Garbai Elkanem	Injured three soldiers
27	July 25, 2011	Maiduguri	Bomb explosion near the palace of traditional ruler	Eight persons died
28	August 25, 2011	Maiduguri	Bank robbery	killed 4 policemen, 1 soldier and 7 civilians and removed undisclosed sum of money
29	August 26, 2011	Abuja	A Suicide Bomber Drove Into The United Nations building	25 persons killed and 60 injured
30	September 12, 2011	Bauchi State	Bomb attack on a police station in Misau	Seven people, including four policemen
31	September 13, 2011	Maiduguri	Armed attack on military vehicle	injured four soldiers
32	October 3, 2011	Maiduguri	Attack on Baga Market	3 people killed
33	November 4, 2011	Yobe state	Attacks of Damaturu villages	150 people killed
34	December 24, 2011	Jos	Bomb attacks in churches and markets	80 people killed
35	December 25, 2011	Niger State	Christmas Day bombing in Madalla	50 people died
36	December 30, 2011	Maiduguri	Bomb attacks	Seven people killed
37	January 5, 2012	Gombe state	Bomb attack in a church	Six people died
38	January 6, 2012	Yola	Bomb attack in a Christ Apostolic Church	17 people died while 20 Igbo people were also killed in Mubi
39	January 20, 2012	Kano State	Bomb attacks	250 people killed in multiple attacks
40	January 22, 2012	Bauchi State	Attacks in churches and the headquarters of Tafawa Balewa Local Government Area in	Two churches destroyed, two military personnel, a DPO and eight civilian killed

			the state.	
41	February 10, 2012	Kano	Attacked a Police Station in Shagari Quarters	Many injured
42	February 15, 2012	Kogi State	Caused Jail Break in Koton Karji Prisons	A warder killed And 199 prisoners released
43	April 26 2012	Abuja	Bombing of three media houses	killed 8 people & injured 13 people
44	April,29,2012	Kano	Attack on Bayero University, Kano	killed 13 Christian Worshipers, a senior non-academic staff & two Professors
45	April 30, 2012	Jalingo	Bomb explosion	11 persons killed & several others wounded

Sources : *Punch* 17, June, 2011, *Punch* 27, February, 2012, *Punch* 23, February, 2012, *Guardian* 20, February, 2012, *Guardian* 12, March, 2012, *Nigerian Tribune* 30, January, 2012 etc.

Analyzing the above table, it is evident that their attacks are coordinated and aimed at three primary targets, which are government institutions, Christians and educational institutions. This satisfies the demand of the primary goals of the sect, which is islamization, elimination of western education and the over throw of the government of none or moderate Muslim leaders for effective islamisation project.

b) *Government Responses to Boko-Haram Insurgency*

The government of the Federal republic of Nigeria evolved programmes and strategies to neutralize and checkmate the activities of terrorist organizations in Nigeria. In summary, these programmes and strategies includes negotiation with various groups towards peace and greater security, establishment of resettlement centres and empowerment of the almageris, establishment of Joint military Task Force and subsequent strikes against members of Boko Haram and their camps, changes in immigration procedures, increased surveillance, and increased the severity of penalties associated with Boko Haram terrorist attacks [Donahue, 2001].

First, the National Assembly (NASS) initiated a legislative process aimed at criminalising terrorism via the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act in 2002. The ineffectiveness of this process led to the presentation of Terrorism Prevention Bill to the Senate in 2006 that was subsequently defeated. Its re-introduction in 2008 has passed the second reading but has being hindered by the debate over the appropriateness or otherwise of some provisions, which sought to include the struggle for resources control in the Niger Delta as terrorist act. This shows that government's efforts between 2002 and 2008 to enactment an anti-terrorism legislation is aimed specifically at the Niger Delta region [Sankore, 2008] and not the Northern Boko-Haram.

It is pertinent to note that the sect was considered to be an evil with strong capability and evil intention that need to be checked through the

application of sufficient strength to deter or defeat the sect. Consequently, government arrested several members of the group largely in Bauchi during its massive five days uprising. The arrest exacerbated the uprising, orchestrated further wide spread attacks, which led to violent confrontation between government forces and the sect that led to the deaths of about 700 people [Nossiter, 2009]. This led to a more organised and sophisticated military campaign against the sect that calumniated in the declaration of state of emergency in three states where they are primarily based and majority of their attacks were launched.

This forced many members of the sect into exile in neighbouring countries like Chad, Niger etc. The operations of the joint task force set up to ensure peace and security in the state of emergency zones have not succeeded to wipe out Boko Haram attacks completely but they have reduced their attacks drastically and to an infinitesimal level compared to earlier operations. The joint task force has equally being intercepting and confiscating illegally imported arms and ammunitions, discovering and destroying Boko Haram weapon production centres/laboratories, discovering and seizing stock piles of arms and ammunitions, and destroying the sect's training camps and hideouts scattered all over the Northern region. At the height of these military operations, circumstances revealed the obscure fact that some top government functionaries and members of the armed forces, traditional rulers, business magnets and frustrated politicians from the Northern Nigeria were the major sponsors of the sect.

In addition to the above, the federal government has proposed amnesty for all Boko Haram members that reject violence. In pursuance of this, the government has set up amnesty and reconciliation committee [Brock, 2012:2; Johnson, 2012:14]. Therefore, one can innocuously conclude that government response to Boko Haram activities or operations in Nigeria has achieved a reasonable degree of success.

c) Summary

Nigeria is a multi-ethnic country with over 350 ethnic nationalities that has been divided into two parallel groups following the Othman Dan Fodio jihad, and whose drive or struggle to control the political system is principally or fundamentally structured by religion since 1914. The predominance of Muslims in the North and Christians in the South orchestrated the unending North-South struggle that has come to define public policies, development programmes, the rules of political process and regime change in Nigeria. The hegemonic drive of the core Northern Muslims to control the political system, which is the instrument of capital accumulation and class formation in Nigeria – a drive perpetuated for about four decades out of five decades of Nigeria's independence through military dictatorship, has been the cause of political instability in Nigeria. The entrance of civil rule from 1999 and power shift to the South led to the emergence of Boko-Haram as an insurgent sect.

This paper observed that the primary objectives of Boko Haram as an Islamic sect are jihad and overthrow of the non-Islamic government headed by southerners since 1999. The sect silently stockpiled weapons /ammunitions between 2002 and 2007 when transition or regime change was expected to favour the North and in preparation for jihad and overthrow of the incumbent government if it does not. The security forces were unable to detect this secret military preparation because the sect was sponsored by many Northern retired and serving military personnel and politicians. These facts explains the reasons why the entire Boko Haram insurgent actions were targeted against government institutions, Christian churches, Southerners, their business concerns, and habitations. These attacks are broad, scientific and mostly successful until government initiated anti-terrorist actions against the sect in 2013. This paper equally observes that there is no functional anti-terrorism law in Nigeria. Thus, the government of federal republic of Nigeria adopted a multiple approach to countering Boko Haram insurgency. Security Agents detect, seize and/or destroy various forms of ammunitions that were either imported or stockpiled by the Boko Haram sect. Security Agents equally uncovered and destroy many Boko Haram training camps and hide-outs.

Supplementing these efforts, government embarked on amnesty and human empowerment programmes particularly for the almageris. A high powered amnesty committee was set by the federal government, which has being visiting, discussing and negotiation with key stakeholders in the North and assumed members of the Boko-Haram sect. The inability of these to influence the sect to stop its attacks led to the declaration of state of emergency in three core Northern states where they operate. This neutralized and reduced both the temerity and regularity of the sect's

attacks and brought back relative peace in Northern Nigeria.

The scenario is not without disastrous consequences for the socio-economic, political, and international personality of Nigeria. The insurgency has led to forced and unprepared external and internal migration of people out of many major Northern cities/states; increased unemployment, poverty, and anti-social behaviours particularly among migrants; heavy lose of government revenue, private and public property, and thousands of human lives; hindered foreign investments and tourism in Nigeria; exacerbated the pre-existing ethno-cultural and religious schisms and phobism in Nigeria; and created high level of insecurity of lives and property in Nigeria.

Consequently, the following recommendations are offered as a means of countering terrorist activities in Nigeria:

1. Government should enact punitive anti-terrorism laws that meets the international template and devoid of ethnic sentiments.
2. Security officials aiding and abating Boko Haram insurgency in terms of arms acquisition, transportation or movement, operations should be charged with treason.
3. The current state of emergency policy and its associated operations should be sustained as anti-terrorism strategy in Nigeria.

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Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear

- Adhere to recommended page limits

Mistakes to evade

- Insertion a title at the foot of a page with the subsequent text on the next page
- Separating a table/chart or figure - impound each figure/table to a single page
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence

In every sections of your document

- Use standard writing style including articles ("a", "the," etc.)
- Keep on paying attention on the research topic of the paper
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding for the abstract)
- Align the primary line of each section
- Present your points in sound order
- Use present tense to report well accepted
- Use past tense to describe specific results
- Shun familiar wording, don't address the reviewer directly, and don't use slang, slang language, or superlatives
- Shun use of extra pictures - include only those figures essential to presenting results

Title Page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short. It should not have non-standard acronyms or abbreviations. It should not exceed two printed lines. It should include the name(s) and address (es) of all authors.



Abstract:

The summary should be two hundred words or less. It should briefly and clearly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript-- must have precise statistics. It should not have abnormal acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Shun citing references at this point.

An abstract is a brief distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approach to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Yet, use comprehensive sentences and do not let go readability for briefness. You can maintain it succinct by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study, with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to maintain the initial two items to no more than one ruling each.

- Reason of the study - theory, overall issue, purpose
- Fundamental goal
- To the point depiction of the research
- Consequences, including definite statistics - if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account quantitative data; results of any numerical analysis should be reported
- Significant conclusions or questions that track from the research(es)

Approach:

- Single section, and succinct
- As a outline of job done, it is always written in past tense
- A conceptual should situate on its own, and not submit to any other part of the paper such as a form or table
- Center on shortening results - bound background information to a verdict or two, if completely necessary
- What you account in an conceptual must be regular with what you reported in the manuscript
- Exact spelling, clearness of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else

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The **Introduction** should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable to comprehend and calculate the purpose of your study without having to submit to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give most important references but shun difficult to make a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. In the introduction, describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will have no attention in your result. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here. Following approach can create a valuable beginning:

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- Present a justification. Status your particular theory (es) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
- Very for a short time explain the tentative propose and how it skilled the declared objectives.

Approach:

- Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done.
- Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point with every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need a least of four paragraphs.



- Present surroundings information only as desirable in order hold up a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read the whole thing you know about a topic.
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- Explain materials individually only if the study is so complex that it saves liberty this way.
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- If use of a definite type of tools.
- Materials may be reported in a part section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

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- Report the method (not particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology)
- Describe the method entirely
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- Simplify - details how procedures were completed not how they were exclusively performed on a particular day.
- If well known procedures were used, account the procedure by name, possibly with reference, and that's all.

Approach:

- It is embarrassed or not possible to use vigorous voice when documenting methods with no using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result when script up the methods most authors use third person passive voice.
- Use standard style in this and in every other part of the paper - avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
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- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.

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The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part a entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Carry on to be to the point, by means of statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently. You must obviously differentiate material that would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matter should not be submitted at all except requested by the instructor.



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- Sum up your conclusion in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
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- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and comprise remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or in manuscript form.

What to stay away from

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surroundings information, or try to explain anything.
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- Do not present the similar data more than once.
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- Never confuse figures with tables - there is a difference.

Approach

- As forever, use past tense when you submit to your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.
- Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report
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Figures and tables

- If you put figures and tables at the end of the details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attach appendix materials, such as raw facts
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- Give details all of your remarks as much as possible, focus on mechanisms.
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- Try to present substitute explanations if sensible alternatives be present.
- One research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind, where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

- When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from available information
- Submit to work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.
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