United Nations-Ecowas Intervention in Mali- Guinea Bissau: Geo-Economic and Strategic Analysis

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Abstract- Intervention in terms of international law, is the term for the use of force by one country or sovereign state in the internal or external affairs of another. In most cases, intervention is considered to be an unlawful. Oppenheim (1992) defines intervention as a forcible or dictorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other State. The military intervention by ECOWAS has not been totally successful in quelling conflicts, crisis of regime change and political succession and military intervention into politics in the West African sub-region and the Africa generally. Intervention can be done by various means, e.g. military, subversive, economic, or diplomatic. The latest of these conflicts in the sub-region which ECOWAS has intervened are Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012. The objective has been to restore democracy by forcing the military back to the barracks or restricting it to the constitutional role of protecting the territorial integrity from internal insurrection and external aggression. But the root causes of military intervention into politics and crisis of regime change or political succession are yet to be adequately addressed by the ECOWAS, for example, issues of legitimacy crisis, poor governance, bad leadership, political leadership failure, political corruption, electoral crisis and political violence have been largely left unattended or ignored.

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Abstract- Intervention in terms of international law, is the term for the use of force by one country or sovereign state in the internal or external affairs of another. In most cases, intervention is considered to be an unlawful. Oppenheim (1992) defines intervention as a forcible or dictatorial interference by a State in the affairs of another State calculated to impose certain conduct or consequences on that other State. The military intervention by ECOWAS has not been totally successful in quelling conflicts, crisis of regime change and political succession and military intervention into politics in the West African sub-region and the Africa generally. Intervention can be done by various means, e.g. military, subversive, economic, or diplomatic. The latest of these conflicts in the sub-region which ECOWAS has intervened are Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012. The objective has been to restore democracy by forcing the military back to the barracks or restricting it to the constitutional role of protecting the territorial integrity from internal insurrection and external aggression. But the root causes of military intervention into politics and crisis of regime change or political succession are yet to be adequately addressed by the ECOWAS, for example, issues of legitimacy crisis, poor governance, bad leadership, political leadership failure, political corruption, electoral crisis and political violence have been largely left unattended or ignored. The political conditions in most of the countries in the sub-region and indeed Africa as a whole are not democracy friendly or unsuitable for democratization and flourishing of democracy or demilitarization (Aning and Bah, 2010; Sperling, 2011). Most scholars like Nowrot and Schabacker (1998) focus on the legality of ECOWAS intervention while the likes of Olonisakin (2010) concentrates on the effectiveness of the military intervention in quelling conflicts in the West African sub-region. Despite the fact that peacekeeping partnerships are yet to mature, the general consensus is that the world is headed towards greater integration between the UN and ECOWAS, for example, issues of legitimacy crisis, poor governance, bad leadership, political leadership failure, political corruption, electoral crisis and political violence have been largely left unattended or ignored. The political conditions in most of the countries in the sub-region and indeed Africa as a whole are not democracy friendly or unsuitable for democratization and flourishing of democracy or demilitarization (Aning and Bah, 2010; Sperling, 2011). Most scholars like Nowrot and Schabacker (1998) focus on the legality of ECOWAS intervention while the likes of Olonisakin (2010) concentrates on the effectiveness of the military intervention in quelling conflicts in the West African sub-region. Despite the fact that peacekeeping partnerships are yet to mature, the general consensus is that the world is headed towards greater integration between the UN and regional arrangements such as Ecowas. Such institutions play an important role, especially in a world with power imbalances, distrust and unrest. Cooperation among states towards peacekeeping mechanisms gives birth to opportunities for burden sharing, balancing power, pursuing self-interest and generally preventing the collapse of world order as it stands. In light of the changing security dynamics, peace operations have become both the more complex and important. Bringing together regional arrangements allows flexibility for political manoeuvring and unity vis-à-vis mission mandate and implementation. Still in its infancy, peacekeeping alliances should be viewed as a means to an end rather than an end unto itself. It is impossible to obtain a foolproof hybrid operation. But with each step forward, finding common ground for joint preparation mechanisms becomes all the more easier. This paper titled “UN-ECOWAS Intervention in Mali: Geo-Economic and Strategic Analysis”. The study is basically a qualitative research method relying mainly on secondary sources of data from internet source, official documents and country websites as the method of data collection. We made use of qualitative – descriptive analysis as our method of data analysis, that is, documentary studies of official document and other materials in analyzing the secondary data. The major purpose of embarking on this research is to examine the geo-economic and strategic implications of UN-ECOWAS intervention in Mali. Thus, we were able to make the following principal findings that, one, the delayed UN backed ECOWAS humanitarian intervention deepened the crisis in Mali. Two, that the poorly funded UN supported ECOWAS peacekeeping intervention worsened the terrorist attack in Mali. On the basis of this, we recommend, one, that UN and ECOWAS should evolve a rapid and quick deployment of humanitarian intervention forces in order to lesson crisis. Two, that UN and ECOWAS should adequately fund peacekeeping intervention forces in order to reduce terrorist attack.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was established in 1975 primarily to facilitate economic integration and development in West African sub-region. But over the years, the regional economic organization evolved into regional security organization through its military intervention in the conflict situations in the member states and as well created a new organ, ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). The peacekeeping intervention began with Liberian civil in 1989 to Sierra Leone in 1997, Guinea Bissau in 1998, Liberian Second Civil War in 1999, Cote d’Ivoire in 2002, Second Cote d’Ivoire Civil War in 2011, and Mali in 2012 and Second Guinea Bissau crisis in 2012 (Agyapong, 2005; Belmakki, 2005; Levitt, 2008; Francis, 2009; Olonisakin, 2010; Yabi, 2010; Kabia, 2011). The ECOWAS recognizes the fact that no meaningful economic integration and development will be possible under conditions of conflicts as the sub-region was fast assuming the status of conflict region. Prior to the military intervention, ECOWAS had always relied on traditional method of
conflict resolution as a result of widespread conflict and instability in the sub-region in the 1990s and early 2000s, the leaders came to the realization that economic prosperity cannot be achieved in the absence of peace and security. For example before the Liberian conflict in 1989, the ECOWAS relied on traditional conflict resolution mechanisms like mediation in Niger and other cases in the sub-region (Agaypong, 2005; Francis, 2009). ECOWAS is becoming more a regional security organization. But that does not mean total jettisoning of traditional conflict resolution mechanisms as the cases in Togo in 2005 where democracy was restored after military coups, demonstrated. Even in the cases of military intervention, traditional methods of imposing sanctions and encouraging dialogue with the regimes were exhausted (Suifon, 2005; Levitt, 2008).

However, the military intervention by ECOWAS has not been totally successful in quelling conflicts, crisis of regime change and political succession and military intervention into politics in the West African sub-region and the Africa generally. The latest of these conflicts in the sub-region which ECOWAS has intervened are Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012. The objective has been to restore democracy by forcing the military back to the barracks or restricting it to the constitutional role of protecting the territorial integrity from internal insurrection and external aggression. But the root causes of military intervention into politics and crisis of regime change or political succession are yet to be adequately addressed by the ECOWAS, for example, issues of legitimacy crisis, poor governance, bad leadership, political leadership failure, political corruption, electoral crisis and political violence have been largely left unattended or ignored. The political conditions in most of the countries in the sub-region and indeed Africa as a whole are not democracy friendly or unsuitable for democratization and flourishing of democracy or demilitarization (Aning and Bah, 2010; Sperling, 2011). Most scholars like Nowrot and Schabacker (1998) focus on the legality of ECOWAS intervention while the likes of Olonisakan (2010) concentrates on the

a) The Role of ECOWAS in Conflict Prevention, Resolution, Management and Military Intervention

At the time of the establishment of ECOWAS in 1975, its main objective was the economic integration of its Member states. To achieve this objective, to a large extent hampered by political crises in the region and rivalries between heads of state for the leadership of the regional organization, there was the need to gradually attach greater importance to peace, defence and security issues. The decade of the 1990s has been particularly decisive for ECOWAS’ evolution into an organization capable of managing conflicts. The 1990 decade saw ECOWAS, spurred by its most powerful member country by far, Nigeria, intervene beyond the conventional diplomatic field by sending thousands of soldiers to try to restore peace in Liberia, then in Sierra Leone and more modestly in Guinea Bissau. The assessment of these military interventions decided by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, the highest decision making body of ECOWAS and implemented by the Executive Secretariat has been the subject of many studies and has generated intense debates twenty year after the establishment of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group, ECOMOG, the peacekeeping force of the organization. What seems undeniable is that ECOWAS indeed faced enormous difficulties in achieving its objectives of restoring peace where it intervened but its military and diplomatic engagement contributed immensely to the international effort which finally helped in ending conflicts that devastated the Mano River Basin region between 1990 and 2003. ECOWAS interventions in the 1990s were, first and foremost, geared towards ending civil wars involving one or several armed rebel groups and the government of legally recognized Member State. The Assembly of Heads of State and Government were going to the rescue of one of its members facing armed rebellion. The aim was indeed to defend the legality embodied by a sitting president and government and not necessarily to defend the political standards adopted by the community like the respect of specific democratic principles or human rights. When Nigeria decided that ECOMOG should intervene in Liberia a few months after Charles Taylor’s rebel movement attacked the government of Samuel Doe, neither the victim of the attack nor the Nigerian government could be described as models of democracy and respect for human rights; intervening diplomatically and militarily in cases of serious threats to the security of a Member State and within the community space in general. ECOWAS consequently played a key role in the arduous resolution of protracted and devastating civil wars in Liberia (1990-1997 and 2003-2007) and Sierra Leone (1991-2002) which sometimes spilled over into Guinea and threatened to cause unrest in the entire West African region.

ECOWAS then intervened on the diplomatic front through its mediation organs comprising Heads of State and Government of a core of Member States, and militarily by sending thousands of soldiers of the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group drawn from the Nigerian Federal Army and other Member States of the organization. It was after several years of ECOMOG’s military presence under extremely difficult material and security conditions and at the instigation of the regional military power, Nigeria that Sierra Leone and Liberia received United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. ECOMOG was indeed accused of behaving as a warring party to the conflict in Liberia and Sierra Leone or as an occupation force. However, its presence at the
height of the fighting and chaos in these two countries, when there was no peace to be maintained, played a major role in the stabilisation of the Mano River Basin region. ECOWAS was led to intervene vigorously in the management of conflict in the 1990s before establishing the institutional and operational basis of a regional mechanism for peace and security supported by the texts of the organization. Although the primary objective for the creation of ECOWAS was the attainment of regional economic development, the challenges of regional security threats have been a constant concern of ECOWAS countries. The domestic and external threats to state security and regime survival led to the signing of the 1978 Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence. Political leaders such as Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal had argued that ‘development cannot be secured in a climate of insecurity’ and that hence there was the imperative that ‘we must among ourselves, establish a genuine West African solidarity pact to guard against external aggression’ (Adebi, 2002:115). It was recognition of the link between regional peace, security and development that led to the establishment of the Francophone mutual defence pact, the Accord de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance en Matières de Défense (ANAD). An additional problem is that security was perceived by ECOWAS leaders in the traditional framework of military, national level-oriented, external security threats. This traditional conception of security perceived in external terms only focused on armed activities and the use, or threat of the use, of military force engineered and actively supported from outside the region, and with the potential to endanger regional peace and security. Domestic security threats from ethno-religious conflicts, bad governance, political repression and insecurity created by the states’ military and security apparatus, were never considered as part of the threats to national and regional security. In effect, both the 1978 and 1981 defence and military protocols were merely ‘regime protection’ strategies to serve the interests of ECOWAS leaders and to ‘insure’ them against both external and internal security threats. These defence protocols, therefore, provided a window of opportunity to clamp down, with military assistance from Community members, on internal opposition and coup attempts and to deal with political instability or support for political dissidents in neighbouring countries. Though the case could be made that the defence protocols created the basis for ECOWAS to take on regional collective security and peacekeeping capability, it was in reality a mechanism for regime security and survival. It is in this context of external aggression and internal instability that ECOWAS leaders moved to adopt measures that will safeguard the sub-region’s security. The organisation’s gradual movement into security started in 1978 when ECOWAS adopted the Non-aggression Treaty which called on member states to “refrain from the threat and use of force or aggression” against each other (ECOWAS, 1978). Critics regard this protocol as merely idealistic as it failed to provide an institutionalised response mechanism in the case of a breach. In recognition of this weakness, West African leaders ratified the Mutual Assistance on Defence (MAD) Protocol at the 1981 Summit in Freetown, Sierra Leone and it came into force in September, 1986. This protocol committed member states to ‘give mutual aid and assistance for defence against any armed threat or aggression’ directed at a member state and considered them to constitute ‘a threat or aggression against the entire community’ (ECOWAS, 1981). The protocol spells out the circumstances requiring action. These include cases of armed conflict between two or more member states after the failure of peaceful means, and in the case of conflict within a state ‘engineered and supported from outside’. It created response mechanisms which include a Defence Council, Defence Committee and a sub-regional intervention force: the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC).

However, this protocol have been criticised for its lack of effective conflict prevention, management and resolution mechanisms. Moreover it focused heavily on external threats and did not envisage a role for the regional body in the coups that destabilised the sub-region in the 1970s and 1980s, and the internal conflicts that swept through West Africa in the 1990s. Critics regard this as regime protection strategies meant to serve the interest of leaders. In addition to these limitations, the institutions provided for in this protocol were never established. A possible reason responsible for the non-implementation of this protocol lies in Francophone suspicions of Nigerian hegemonic ambitions. These suspicions were further deepened by the protocol’s call for the withdrawal of foreign troops from all member states. With strong military ties with France, most of the Francophone West African states depended on their former colonial power for defence and security (Dokken, 2002).

ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) as an intervention force was established in August 1990 as a result of the Liberia conflict. The conflict started with an invasion by rebels in December 1989 and quickly spread through the entire country. By August 1990, the main rebel movement, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) under the leadership of Charles McArthur Ghankay Taylor, was controlling about 90 percent of the country (Scheepers 1999). It was during this time that the Liberian President Samuel K. Doe, who came to power through a military coup in 1980, called on ECOWAS to assist him to restore normalcy to his country. This request initially divided ECOWAS between its Anglophone and Francophone factions (Berman and Sam 2000). Whilst President Doe was a good friend to Nigerian President General Ibrahim Babangida, he was not on good terms with President
Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoire. What compounded the issue further was that Charles Taylor, the leader of the main rebel group (NPFL) was Houphouët-Boigny’s son-in-law and obviously had the support of the Ivorian president. Subsequently, during early August 1990, as mayhem loomed in Liberia, the Anglophone members of ECOWAS, under the auspices of ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee, met in Banjul, the capital of Gambia, and decided to send a military force to intervene in the conflict in Liberia (Berman and Sam 2000, 85).

On August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Commission (“Commission”) agreed to establish an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia to halt the “wanton destruction of human life and property and massive damage being caused by the armed conflict to the stability and survival of the entire Liberian nation.” ECOMOG was mandated to “restore law and order to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections.” On August 24, ECOMOG entered Liberia to forestall the killing, restore law and order, and prevent the state from descending into further anarchy. The NPFL, which by then controlled approximately 90 percent of the country, abducted and attacked ECOMOG forces upon their entry into the country.

ECOWAS Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Management in West Africa Sub-region

It was in 1999 in Lomé that the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS adopted the Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security. According to the Protocol “the Assembly of Heads of States shall be the highest decision making body on issues relating to conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security, humanitarian support, peace building, control of cross-border crime, proliferation of small arms as well as other issues covered by the provisions of the Mechanism”. But the Assembly shall delegate to the Mediation and Security Council the power to take on its behalf decision for the appropriate implementation of the provisions of the Mechanism”. The Mediation and Security Council (MSC) comprises nine member states with seven elected by the Assembly, and the two other members being the current chairperson and the immediate past chairman. Members of the MSC can serve for a two-year renewable term.

The Council of Elders is made up of eminent personalities who can, on behalf of ECOWAS, use their good offices and experience to play the role of mediators, conciliators and facilitators. These personalities “coming from various segments of society, including women, political, traditional and religious leaders” are proposed on a list approved by Mediation and Security Council at the level of Heads of State and Government. These personalities are called upon when the need arises by the Executive Secretary or the MSC to deal with a given conflict situation.

With regard to ECOMOG, it is a structure made up of several multi-purpose units (civilian and military) on stand-by in their country of origin and ready to be deployed in due course. ECOMOG conducts among others observation and peace monitoring missions, peacekeeping and restoration operations, humanitarian action support missions, missions to monitor the enforcement of sanctions, including embargos, preventive deployments, peace building operations, disarmament and demobilization, policing activities to fight fraud and organized crime and any other operations that may ordered by the CMS.

The ECOWAS Mechanism includes finally a sub regional peace and security observation system known as “early warning” or “the system”. This system is made up of an observation and monitoring system based at the headquarters of ECOWAS as well as monitoring and observation zones. Information gathered in each of these zones are transmitted to the observation and monitoring centre in Abuja to enable the Department of Political Affairs Peace and Security to anticipate and react promptly to potential crisis situations.

ECOWAS has shown its determination to increasingly guide its member states through new political and institutional standards aimed at promoting peace, security and stability in the region by formulating the “Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts, Peacekeeping and Security”. Adopted by the Heads of States and Government on 21st December 2001, the Supplementary Protocol is meant to complement that of 20th December 1999 on “internal crisis prevention, democracy, good governance, rule of law and individual rights” and bring the necessary improvements to the Mechanism. This Protocol establishes therefore a clear and direct link between the observance of democratic and good governance standards in member states and peace as well as security prospects, which is undeniably an improvement in the security culture within the West African community space.

The Protocol defines the constitutional principles common to all member states of ECOWAS, including the separation of executive, legislative and judiciary powers; empowerment and strengthening of Parliaments; independence of the judiciary; prohibition of any unconstitutional change as well as any undemocratic mode of acceding to, and maintaining power. The Supplementary Protocol also defines a series of principles concerning elections in member states as well as the observation and support role of ECOWAS during elections.

The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security as defined by the initial Protocol of December
Neo-functionalism is a theory of regional integration in which integration is considered to be inevitable process, rather than a desirable state of affairs that could be introduced by the political or technocratic elites of the involved states.

There are three main principles of neo-functionalism;

1. The principle of positive spillover effects states that integration between states in one sector, that is, economic sector will eventually ramify into integration or co-operation in other sectors such as political, socio-cultural, security, etc.
2. The mechanism of a transfer in domestic allegiance which assumes that as the process of integration gathers momentum in an increasingly pluralistic domestic society of each state; interest groups and other associations will transfer their allegiance or loyalty away from national institutions towards the supranational institution(s) when they begin to realize that their material interests or well being can be better pursued through supranational institution(s) than the pre-existing national institutions; and
3. Principle of technocratic automaticity which states that as integration hastens the supranational institution(s) will take the lead in fostering further integration as they become more powerful and more autonomous of the member states (Echezona, 1998; Haas, 1970).

These three main principles of neo-functionalism embody John Galtung’s Staircase Hypothesis/Strategy which involves the process of beginning with limited domain (or memberships) and limited scope (or sectors or area of cooperation) and gradually deepening the scope before extending the domain. Deepening the scope means moving from the initial areas of cooperation to other areas of cooperation or bringing in new sectors, whereas, extending the domain means admitting new memberships.

a) Background to ECOWAS Intervention in Mali

When a State interferes in the political affairs of another State by invitation, or on request, it cannot be considered as an unlawful act. Interference of a State can never be unlawful if it is for the sake of humanity. It is necessary that the two States agree on the matter of intervention through a treaty. A request for assistance is not an unlawful act. Intervention can be done by various means, e.g. military, subversive, economic, or diplomatically. ECOMOG as an intervention force was established in August 1990 as a fallout of Liberian conflict. It should be noted that ECOWAS in its origin was meant to foster economic integration, and only became involved conflict resolution and peacekeeping interventions by default. Thus, in the last two decades, ECOWAS has played a significant role in resolving...
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which began in 1989 represents a critical stage in (Suifon, 2005; Levitt, 2008). However, the Liberian crisis to intervene only in cases of externally aggression Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence. It has been signed the 1978 Protocol in Non-Aggression and 1981 security and development that some member countries regime survival, and the link between regional peace, security and development that some member countries signed the 1978 Protocol in Non-Aggression and 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence. It has been argued that development cannot be secured (Francis, 2009). Yet these two protocols mainly addressed matters of inter-state conflicts and empower ECOWAS to intervene only in cases of externally aggression (Suifon, 2005; Levitt, 2008). However, the Liberian crisis which began in 1989 represents a critical stage in ECOWAS’ transition into regional security organization. Confronted with unprecedented scale of human suffering and international disengagement from African conflicts in the post-Cold War era, and with no international organization to respond rapidly to the conflict, ECOWAS was forced to device ad hoc security mechanisms. In May 1990, ECOWAS established a Standing Mediation Committee (SMS) charged with the responsibility of peacefully resolving the conflict. The SMS was to later create a body for peacemaking mission into Liberia known as ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), and thus, approved military intervention into Liberian Civil War (Kabia, 2011).

Subsequently, ECOMOG was instrumental in implementing ECOWAS military intervention in the 1990s; and 2000s, over two decades in keeping peacekeeping and military intervention in the West African sub-region (Agypong, 2005). Going by the treaty which establishment ECOWAS in 1975, the main aim was to spur economic integration and development in West Africa. Regional security was an important but not as vital or primary concern. Neither the treaty nor the protocols empowered it to launch peacekeeping missions or intervene militarily in internal affairs or conflicts of member countries. But owing to international inaction, ECOWAS intervened unilaterally without UNSC’s authorization in Liberian Civil War to halt the conflict (Levitt, 2008). ECOWAS which was founded in 1975 as an economic umbrella organization for economic development and integration, had to grapple with the plethora of conflicts in the sub-region in the 1990s and 2000s, which have sapped its energy and resources meant for economic integration and development. On May 9, 1990, ECOWAS went ahead to set up a Five-Member Consultative Group on Liberia, appointed as Standing Mediation Committee (SMS) made up of four Anglophone countries, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Gambia and one Francophone country, Guinea, and Chaired by Gambia. The Consultative Group was further charged with the task of maintaining peace and security in the sub-region a mandate that transcended the Liberian conflict. The SMC held their first meeting with the Liberian warring factions in Freetown in July 1990. Due to collapse peace talks, the final communiqué of the Summit of Heads of State and Government resulted in the creation of ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in August 1990 (Suifon, 2005). On March 21, 2012, the Malian coup d’etat began when mutinying Malian soldiers displeased with the management of the Tuareg rebellion attacked several locations in Bamako including the presidential palace, state television, and military barracks. The soldiers who claimed they had turned the National Committee for the Restoration of Democracy and State, declared the following day that they had overthrown the government of Amadou Toumain Toure forcing him into hiding. The coup was followed by spectre of international condemnation, harsh sanctions by Mali’s neighbours and the swift loss of Northern Mali to Tuareg forces. On April 6, 2012, the junta agreed with ECOWAS negotiators that they would step down from power in return for the end of sanctions, to give power to transitional government led by parliament Speaker Dioncounda Traore. In the following days, both Toure and coup leader Amadou Sanago formally resigned, however, as of May 16, 2012, the junta was still widely believed to maintain overall control. On March 23, 2012, the African Union (AU) suspended Mali, which would remain until “effective restoration of constitutional order is achieved without delay”. On this day, a joint African Union and ECOWAS diplomatic mission met representatives of the junta for talks and negotiations. On March 26, 2012, the President of United States, Barrack Obama, formally suspended aid the Mali, stating that it would only resume when democracy was restored. The next day, March 27, 2012, the Ivorian President Allassane Quattara called on an ECOWAS meeting in Abidjan to send a “strong signal” to the mutinous soldiers that democracy must be restored, and return to democracy as non-negotiable. Even Kadre Desire Quedraogo, the head of the ECOWAS Commission, described the coup as a “threat to entire region”. Following the meeting, ECOWAS placed peacekeeping troops on standby, hinting a possible military intervention. On March 29, 2012, ECOWAS announced that the junta had 72 hours to return power
to constitutional authorities, or Mali would face the closure of its land borders and freezing of its assets in ECOWAS member countries. On March 30, 2012, Sanogo reiterated his promise to hold elections in response to ECOWAS position but refuses to release a timetable. On April 1, 2012, Sanogo in trying to meet one of the ECOWAS demands, announced that the CNRDR would reinstate Mali’s previous constitution and begin to organize free, open and democratic elections which the junta will not participate in. On April 2, 2012 after the junta failed to meet the ECOWAS deadline for relinquishing power, severe sanctions against Mali began. For example, the Mali’s accounts in the Central Banks of West African states were frozen and Mali’s land borders were closed. On April 3, 2012, the UN Security Council began work on a resolution backing the ECOWAS sanctions against the junta. The US and the African Union joined ECOWAS in announcing travel ban on the coupists. Sanago stated that a “national meeting” would be held on April 5 to decide “what will be the best for the country in a consensual democratic fashion” On April 4, 2012, the UNSC made strong condemnation of the forcible seizure of power from the democratically elected government and again called for the immediate restoration of constitutional democracy and for the preservation of the electoral process. The ECOWAS began planning of a military intervention against junta and the Tuareq rebels the following day, April 5, 2012. France declared its support for military intervention by ECOWAS pledging to help on logistics. On April 6, 2012, the MNLA or the Tuareg rebels “irrevocably” the independence of Azaward from Mali. The African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) condemned the declaration, the former declaring it “null and of no value whatsoever”. Later in the day, ECOWAS and the coup leaders reached an agreement on a transition of power and lifting of sanction, under which National Assembly of Mali Speaker Dioncounda Traore would become interim president and oversee new elections. Under the terms of the agreement, the mutinying soldiers will be given amnesty for their participation in the coup. On April 8, 2012, Amadou Toumani submitted his formal resignation from the presidency to ECOWAS mediators and Amadou Sanogo resigned shortly after. On April 9, 2012, Mali’s constitutional court met to determine the interim president, announcing that Dioncounda Traore can assume the presidency for up to 40 days in order to organize elections. On April 12, 2012, the coup leaders formally handed power to Traore, and the imprisoned ministers and aides from Toure’s Administration were released. On his inauguration, Traore pledged to “wage a total and relentless war” against the Tuareq rebels unless they surrendered their control of Northern Malian cities. On April 17, 2012 it was announced that Cheick Modibo Diarra has been appointed interim prime minister to help restore civilian rule. The new civilian government comprising 24 ministers was announced on April 25, 2012, three of which defence, interior and internal security are form military and considered to be close to the coup leaders. Sanago stated that the junta would continue to play a supervisory role in the transition. On April 29, 2012 ECOWAS announced a deadline of a 12 month transition until presidential and legislative elections, and that ECOMOG troops would be deployed to Mali to ensure a peaceful transition. Sanago stated that his government would reject both decisions. On April 30, 2012, following the report that the leaders of the presidential guard would be arrested by the junta, they assaulted OTRM offices and other locations in Mali in an apparent attempt at counter coup, exchanging fire with junta soldiers. The junta seized control of the primary base of anti-junta soldiers, effectively ending the counter coup. On May 15, 2012, ECOWAS released a statement accusing the junta of blocking the return to civilian rule and threatening to re-impose sanctions. On May 21, 2012, soldiers allowed a group of pro-coup demonstrators into Traore’s office in Bamako who attacked and knocked him unconscious (Akuetteh, 2012; Charbonneau, 2012; Control Risks, 2012; UN Integrated Regional Information Networks, 2012; Sanders, 2012; Sneider, 2012).

b) Background to ECOWAS Intervention in Guinea Bissau

The 2012 ECOWAS intervention into the conflict in Guinea Bissau is not the first time ECOWAS is intervening in Guinea Bissau. In 1998, ECOWAS or rather ECOMOG intervened in Guinea Bissau to quell the rebellion and restore power to the President Bernardo Vieira (Agyapong, 2005). It is important to state the intervention was at the request of the president (Levitt, 2008; Francis, 2009; Olunisakin, 2010; Yabi, 2010).

However, following the military unrest in 2010 and a failed coup attempt in 2011 due to infighting in the military between the Navy and the Army, the country was once again plunged into political instability. After the death of Malam Bacai Sanha on January 9, 2012, a new presidential election was scheduled to be held within 90 days in line with the constitution. Despite a peaceful campaign there were fears of possible violence or a coup d’etat if the army did not approve of the winner. On April 12, 2012 following the first round of a presidential election, elements of the armed forces staged a coup d’état in Guinea Bissau, just over two weeks before the second round between Carlos Gomes Junior and Mohamed Ilaa Embalo.

On April 15, 2012, an agreement was reached to set up an interim National Transitional Council with a majority of opposition parties and the military. On April 12, 2012, gunfire was initially reported in the night as mutinous troops attempted to overthrow the government by seizing control of the entire capital, and heavy automatic gunfire and mortar explosions. The former
prime minister and presidential candidate Carlos Gomes Junior and interim President Raimundo Pereira were feared or reported missing. The mutineers or coupists seized control of the offices of the incumbent PAIGC and radio stations as well as fighting police officers loyal to the government who were forced to retreat. The soldiers also blocked the roads into and out of the capital city and the national radio and television was taken off air by the night of the same day.

The main target was reportedly Gomes Junior’s residence which was surrounded by troops. Gomes house was attacked by grenades with gunfire reportedly occurring nearby. The soldiers also looted the house of the head of the national election commission, Desejado Lima da Costa. The soldiers sealed off the embassies to prevent government officials from fleeing and hiding with foreign diplomats, and several politicians were arrested. At dawn, people began to venture out of their home and there appeared to be little or no presence of soldiers on the streets. Still an “unusual” quiet was reported in the capital city, either the government or the coup leaders.

Soldiers were however, reported to be standing guard outside radio and television stations in the Bissau including the state-run television office and the presidential offices. An overnight curfew was imposed the following day with orders for the members of the civilian government to turn themselves over to the army. Private radio stations or media houses had also been shut down.

The coupists formed the “Military Command” under the leadership of the army’s vice chief of staff, General Mamadu Toure Kuruma and put forth conditions for a national unity government after announcing the ouster of Gomes Junior along with the interim president Raimundo Pereira and the army’s chief-of-staff, General Antonio Indjai. Senior officers of the army subsequently met the leaders of the political parties and called on them to form the transitional government, but added that the army would control the defence and interior ministries. The meeting was attended by Antonio Indjai, Ture Kuruma, the heads of the army, air force and navy, the army’s spokesman, lieutenant Colonel Daha Bana na Walna and four colonels, but no one from the incumbent PAIGC attended. The army’s chief-of-staff, General Antonio Indjai was later arrested after attending the meeting.

The five leading opposition candidates including Lala Embalo, announced at a joint news conference that the boycott of the second round of the election was in the name “justice”. Agnela Regalla Regala of Union for Change, one of the attendees said that “the military chiefs suggested the idea of new presidential and legislative elections”. The spokesman for the coalition of opposition parties, Fernando Vaz, said that discussion continued for a third day and the PAIGC has been invited to participate. After the meeting the coalition had said it agreed upon a set of proposals to put forward to the Military Command for a transitional unity government.

The PAIGC reportedly rejected the transitional unity government and any anti-constitutional or anti-democratic proposal of a solution to the crisis, while also calling for the release of the detainees. On April 15, 2012, a demonstration of about 30 people at the National Assembly, where talks on a transitional government were ongoing, was dispersed by soldiers. The National Union of Workers of Guinea Bissau, which has a membership of about 8,000 mostly civil servants, called a general strike the next day.

On April 16, 2012, an agreement, which deliberately excluded PAIGC, was reached with 22 of the 35 opposition parties to set up a National Transition Council. The composition and mandate period was to be determined the next day in concert with the Military Command. The existing institutions were also to be dissolved, and in their place two committees would run the country, one would manage foreign affairs and the other would handle social affairs. Thereafter, it was agreed that the transitional civilian government will rule for about two years before new elections will be held. The National Assembly Speaker, Manuel Serfo Nhamadjo, who had previously rejected the office of president in April 2012, was again selected as an interim president on May 11, 2012, only for one year.

ECOWAS formally condemned the coup in Guinea Bissau and described the coup as unaccepted. According to statement issued by the President of ECOWAS Commission, Kadre Desire Ouedraogo read: “The Commission firmly denounces this latest incursion by the military into politics and unreservedly condemns the irresponsible act, which has once more demonstrated their penchant to maintain Guinea Bissau as a failed state”. ECOWAS later decided to send a military contingent to provide security for the run-off election or second round of the election which it insisted must go ahead.

The ECOWAS has imposed diplomatic, economic and financial sanctions on Guinea Bissau after talks in Banjul between foreign ministers of the regional Contact Group and Guinea Bissau’s political stakeholders failed to reach an arrangement to return the country to the path of constitutional and democratic rule within a year. The sanctions which became effective also target member of the junta that seized power on April 12, 2012 and their associates or cronies. The coup disrupted the political process to elect a replacement for the late president, Bacai Sanha who died in January 2012.

The Seven-Nation Contact Group of Benin, Cape Verde, Gambia, Guinea, Senegal and Togo chaired by Nigeria was set up by the extraordinary summit of regional leaders on April 26, 2012 in Abidjan, Cote d’Ivoire to follow up the decisions of the summit in resolving the current political impasse in Guinea Bissau.
The Abidjan extraordinary summit denounced the coup attempt by the Military Command to foist a political arrangement on the country through the formation of a National Transition Council which the regional leaders condemned as unconstitutional and vowed not to recognize it in line with the region’s zero tolerance for unconstitutional accession to power.

The Summit also authorized the deployment of a contingent of regional Standby Force to replace Angolan troops in Guinea Bissau. The Summit thereafter issued a 72-hour ultimatum to the junta to submit a mediation process for a consensual transition arrangement that will result in restoration of constitutional order. The Contact Group concludes that “it was fruitless to continue as it become obvious that the head of the military junta was not willing to negotiate and clearly prefers to face the consequences”.

c) Legitimacy Crises and ECOWAS Intervention in Mali and Guinea Bissau

The ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government in its Extraordinary Session held in Dakar, Senegal on May 3, 2012 under the Chairmanship of Alassane Quattara, President of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire and Chairman of the Authority strongly condemns the clashes that began on April 30, 2012 in Bamako, and deprecates their adverse impact on life and security of the Malian population. In the communiqué, the Summit requests the transitional authority to expedite action on the development of the roadmap for the transition, with set timelines for activities such as adoption of legislative organizational and operational measures. All these leading to the holding of presidential elections and full restoration of constitutional order including the establishment of a consultative framework on critical issues relating to the implementation of the transition with the facilitation of the mediator. The Authority renews its call on the Malian Armed forces to dedicate themselves to the republican responsibility of protecting the territorial integrity of the country and the population. It reminds all the parties that any attempt from any quarters to destabilize the transition process shall be liable to targeted sanctions as set out in the Summit Decisions of March 29, 2012. The Authority instructs the ECOWAS Commission to transmit this Decision to the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, the UN Security Council, and other partners to seek their support on the matter. The Authority, in the Summit, instructs the Commission to hold the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in readiness for immediate deployment as soon as the Malian authorities make the relevant request. In line with this, Authority instructs the Commission to define the modalities for military cooperation between the Malian Army and ESF in view of the deployment. Authority as well instructs the Commission to establish contact with all development partners to ensure their participation in the effective and rapid financing of the intervention. In the case of Guinea Bissau, the Authority commends the release of the Prime Minister, Carlos Gomes Junior and the Interim President Raimundo Pereira on April 27, 2012, and demands that the Military Command release all other personalities still detained illegally. The Authority reiterates its firm condemnation of the coup d'état on April 12, 2012 and recalls its principle of “zero tolerance” for power obtained or maintained by unconstitutional means. Thus, the Summit reiterates its demand for an immediate return to constitutional order. The Authority confirms its previous decision to establish a twelve-month transition during which the following measures shall be taken with the assistance of ECOWAS. A review of legal texts such as constitution, electoral act, etc, to achieve greater efficiency; the reform of the defence and security sector and other reforms with a view to preparing the ground for the holding of fresh elections to choose a substantive president by the end of the transition. The Authority recommends that to conduct the transition within the framework of the constitution, the National Assembly renews its leadership through vote, whereby the new Speaker of the National Assembly thus elected shall assume the responsibility of Interim President. The new Deputy Speaker thus elected shall become the Speaker of the National Assembly. A consensual Prime Minister with full powers shall be designated to lead a broad-based government that shall lead the transition to its conclusion. The Interim President and the transitional Prime Minister shall not be eligible to contest in the envisaged presidential election. The tenure of the members of the National Assembly shall be extended through the appropriate mechanisms to cover the transitional period. Authority decides that the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) in line with the new approved mandate shall be deployed to secure the withdrawal of the Angolan Technical Assistance Mission (MISSANG); to ensure the security of the transition, and help in the implementation of the Defence and Security Reform programme. The Authority directs the ECOWAS Commission to seek the assistance of the African Union (AU) and the international community for the implementation of the measures to be taken in Guinea Bissau. The Summit also decides to maintain the sanctions imposed until such time that all the protagonists or dramatic personae accept the modalities for a return to constitutional order. The Authority, thus, mandates the regional Contact Group to take on its behalf, all urgent necessary measures for the application of its decision (ECOWAS, 2012). Yet despite these interventions from ECOWAS in Mali and Guinea Bissau, the crises are not resolved. These have been evidence of supports from the people or pro-junta demonstrations. The military intervenes mainly because of the mis-governance of the civilian democratic government. The result of these bad leaderships or poor
governance or political leadership failure is crises of legitimacy.

We thus, conclude that the legitimacy crises suffered by the ousted democratic governments hinders ECOWAS intervention for democratization in Mali and Guinea Bissau.

d) Militarization, Poor Governance and ECOWAS Intervention in Mali and Guinea Bissau

The militarization in Africa, West Africa and Mali and Guinea Bissau to be specific is as a result of many years of failure of political leadership and misgovernance by the political class. Right from the independence, politics in most African states including Mali and Guinea Bissau have been characterized by poor governance, bad leadership, political succession crisis, legitimacy crisis, electoral and political violence. The result of these is the militarization of the society through military foray or incursion into politics and consequently political crisis and instability.

Expectedly too, these African states inducing Mali and Guinea Bissau have not fared well in economy either. Poor or weak economy plundered by many years of political corruption, embezzlement, mismanagement and misappropriation of public fund or commonwealth has resulted to poor human development indexes, low life expectancy, low literacy, high mortality rate, poor standard of living, low per capita income, mass unemployment, abject poverty, low GDP, etc.

Due to crisis of legitimacy, there had been little or no resistance from the populace in the military incursion into politics. Some saw it as relief while others saw it as better alternative. The people have not enjoyed any viable or meaningful democracy dividend from civilian government and have been disenfranchised through electoral rigging and malpractices. In most cases like in the cases of Mali and Guinea Bissau, the military intervene whenever there is unresolved electoral contest or election leading to electoral and political violence in form of pre-election, election and post-election violence.

It is this excessive militarization coupled with legitimacy crisis or lack of confidence on the democratic process that frustrates ECOWAS efforts to demilitarize and democratize Mali and Guinea Bissau. People have lost faith in their political leaders and the political elites. The military has ended up being worse than the civilians they ousted from power. The people do not know whom to trust anymore. In fact they do not know the difference between the two. The common thing between the two is bad leadership or poor governance. The political leadership has failed to unite the people but rather exploit and emphasize their divisions leading to ethnic and religious conflicts.

The military intervention by ECOWAS has not been totally successful in quelling conflicts, crisis of regime change and political succession and military intervention into politics in the West African sub-region and the Africa generally. The latest of these conflicts in the sub-region which ECOWAS has intervened are Mali and Guinea Bissau in 2012. The objective has been to restore democracy by forcing the military back to the barracks or restricting it to the constitutional role of protecting the territorial integrity from internal insurrection and external aggression.

But the root causes of military intervention into politics and crisis of regime change or political succession are yet to be adequately addressed by the ECOWAS, for example, issues of legitimacy crisis, poor governance, bad leadership, political leadership failure, political corruption, electoral crisis and political violence have been largely left unattended or ignored. The political conditions in most of the countries in the sub-region and indeed Africa as a whole are not democracy friendly or unsuitable for democratization and flourishing of democracy or demilitarization (Aning and Bah, 2010; Sperling, 2011).

e) ECOWAS Intervention and Demilitarization in Mali and Guinea Bissau

ECOWAS promptly intervened in the conflicts in Mali and Guinea Bissau with little or no success. The fact remains that the political elites in those two countries have long alienated their people. They have not only alienated their people, but have also used ethnic and religious sentiments to make themselves relevant in politics and in some cases perpetrate themselves in political offices. The incursion or meddling of military into politics has not helped matters, but rather militarized the society the more. Guinea Bissau particularly had endured many years of political instability owning to excessive militarization.

The point is that poor governance or bad political leadership by the ousted democratic regimes in Mali and Guinea Bissau resulted to excessive militarization when the military decided to intervene into politics. ECOWAS intervened to restore democracy by demanding the military to withdraw to the barracks for a transition programme into democracy. The processes of democratization and demilitarization are not, totally or completely successful. Thus, militarization resulting from poor governance of the ousted democratic governments impeded or constrained ECOWAS intervention for demilitarization of Mali and Guinea Bissau.

III. Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations

a) The Summary

We started by dwelling on all the technically in the chapter one, where we posed four research questions, stated four specific objectives, and four research hypotheses. We, also, demonstrated the theoretical and empirical relevance or justifications of this study. The issues, time frame and subjects covered
by the study were also highlighted. The main concepts or terms used in this study were operationalized or defined as they are applied or used in this study.

In the chapter two, we reviewed the related extent and relevant literature concerning the role of ECOWAS in conflict prevention, resolution, management and military intervention; and ECOWAS mechanisms for conflict prevention, resolution and management in West Africa sub-region. We also predicated the study on neo-functionalism. In Chapter Three, we looked into background to legitimacy crisis and ECOWAS intervention in Mali and Guinea Bissau like background to ECOWAS intervention in Mali; background to ECOWAS intervention in Guinea Bissau; and legitimacy crises and ECOWAS intervention in Mali and Guinea Bissau. Lastly, in Chapter Five, we summarized the entire work and drew some conclusions on the basis of which we made some recommendations.

b) Conclusions
   In the course of this study, we reach the following conclusions:
   1. That the legitimacy crisis suffered by the ousted democratic regimes hinders ECOWAS intervention for democratization in Mali and Guinea Bissau.
   2. That the militarization resulting from poor governance of ousted democratic governments impedes ECOWAS intervention for demilitarization of Mali and Guinea Bissau.

c) Recommendations
   In the course of this study therefore, we recommend the following:
   1. That there is need for confidence building measures to enhance ECOWAS intervention for democratization in Mali and Guinea Bissau
   2. That there is need for public enlightenment to achieve successful demilitarization of Mali and Guinea Bissau by ECOWAS.

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a) Books

b) Journals
c) Conference and Seminar Papers


d) Internet Sources