The Novel “Coexistence” by Stephen Gill between the Fiction Prose and the Post Enlightenment Ideology

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Our approach is meant to achieve a few parallels, in the manner of a more extended comment, between the principles mentioned by the heroes of the novel and the way in which the same ideas regarding the peaceful coexistence, the political and economical relations between states, the status of religion in the era of globalization or the issue of peace and war are looked after in the contemporary political philosophy.

These compared approaches, absolutely necessary and welcomed for reflection, even if sometimes contradictory with the ethic precepts assumed in the novel, do not decrease at all the value of Stephen Gill’s book, because the appraisal of a novel is not definitely defined by the scientific quality of the opinions that the literary characters issue at some point but by the possible impact that the respective fictional writing has on the public reader.

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1. Introduction

The Novel The Coexistence by Stephen Gill, written in English and edited in India1, at New Delhi in 2011, was translated in Romanian of Olimpia Iacob2. Stephen Gill is facing an entirely new situation, the cultural shock and the drama of integration in a culture that is different from the Indian one that represents the starting point.

Our Indian arrives to Canada and, as it is natural, he meets white people, Canadians of more generations, aboriginals Eskimos but also Indians who came for studies like him or that emigrated here in order to have a better economic situation, Black people, half-blooded, Native Americans, old British to come to Canada to spend up their pension funds, Americans from USA, most of them with uncertain jobs, unemployed, prostitutes, obscure literary persons, failed actors and so on and so forth, each of them with the story oh his life resumed at extreme, but also each of them with the conceits regarding tolerance, multiculturalism, unity in diversity, peaceful coexistence and so on and so forth, exposed amply in the language of the political discourse. Generally, a language and a mentality specific to late Enlightenment. And the fundamental historic limit of Enlightenment was the illusion according to which culture and the cult of reason will solve everything. For example, Evil exists in world because people are ignorant and they do not know Good rationally. When people will be “illuminated” through culture and reasonable understanding of things, Evil will disappear from the world and we will live in a necessarily better world. As we know, it did not happen.

1. The narrative structure is like a succession of photos or of clichês of cultural memory, like a getting over running of some endless series of facts that begin by random and end without any clear reason, determined by the economy of a subsequent drama. Gill’s character could have been a contemporary Ulysses, similar to that of Joyce but he lacks the imagination fullness proper to the fiction prose, he lacks the organic agglutination of the epic contingencies that vertebrate a character and gives him accuracy, meaning it makes him be alive and to impose himself in our conscience with an apodictic certitude. The difference between a successful literary character, meaning having an evolution that can be called destiny, with the imperfections inherent to life, after the rule of the snow ball of duration at Henri Bergson, on one hand, and a character created ad-hoc on the other hand, with the purpose of sustaining or illustrating an ideological thesis is in fact the difference –for example- between a tree and a bunch. The main character is like a link on which some keys are introduced together out of practical reasons in the novel with thesis, but the different keys, epic situations in the present case, remain in an exquisite mutual exteriority. The Coexistence by Stephen Gill resembles somehow as technique of novel construction Resurrection by Tolstoi, Raghu Nath, like Prince Nehludov, exists not to be a living literary character but to make sermons; they are both made not to merely live, but to preach.

Raghu Nath’s “preach” and in fact Stephen Gill’s main idea, reiterated permanently in the pages of the book, is that of “the coexistence”, taken from an ethic imperative from the Buddhist wisdom, formulated this way: ”live and let others live, too”. This message is the major stake of the novel and, at the same time, the main character’s fundamental naivety. The problem is

that the real historical evolutions were of other nature, not according with this old and respectful in self religious Buddhist precept. Or, if we put the problem of the truth stricto senso and in consequence we want to adjust our discourse to the historical reality, the precept should be reformulated this way: "live and let others live too, but only if these others work for you!"

The practice to dominate them through wars of invasion, through force and cruelty “the others”, to transform them in slaves, in serfs, in paid workers and so on is a constant element of universal history – and not just of the old one. Slavery refined itself in time, today’s slave is not physically enslaved with chains, but through subtler means-financial ones. Slavery began to be formally abolished in the late Antiquity under the ethic empire of Christianity, the serfdom began to formally be abolished in modernism under the ideological empire of Enlightenment but the exploitation of the workforce as “a more gentle form of domination” as Friedrich Nietzsche named it never disappeared but, on the contrary, intensified. The countries that give as hypocritical lessons of moral have a not very distant past in full contradiction with the values that they noisily proclaimed verbally. England detained the biggest colonial empire, over 20% of Earth’s terrestrial surface, France was a colonial power that controlled approximately 9% of the world’s population, and so did Portugal and Spain. In the XIXth century Soviet Russia that arrived later at the share of the colonial pray directly robbed the countries from its sphere of influence under the cover of the "internationalist proletarian. "At the beginning of the XXIst century USA started wars under false pretexts with the real purpose to seize resources of hydrocarbons and to impose its regional domination in the areas in cause. Oil is paid by Americans with blood, and the states rich in oil fields receive “democracy” in exchange. Like the Soviet Union that exported “revolution” in the inter-war period, USA from today exports “democracy”. Other examples regarding the way in which in the historic practice “others are left to live.”

Like slavery and bondage, the colonial empires disappeared formally in the post-war period but the colonial treatment to certain areas of the globe remained and even intensified. We have in view what Jan Tienbergen, Nobel Prize Laureate for Economy, named “the scissors of prices”3. Meaning the tendency of the colonial powers to impose for colonies, on one hand, prices as low as possible at raw materials that they draw from here and to claim prices as high as possible at finite products that they sell on the markets from colonies. The differences of prices represent a huge source of profit that is capitalized in metropolises.

Today, the colonies disappeared formally but there are vast zones of the Earth that are treated in continuation in colonial style, the scissors of prices is practiced and sustained constantly by the combination of the political-financial pressures with threats of military order.

2. Secondly, in Stephen Gill’s novel the characters’ opinions regarding religion retain the attention. From this point of view, India, in even its recent history, traversed a tragic period. On the 15th of August 1947, under the pressure of the movement led by Mahatma Gandhi, Great Britain was forced to grant India the independence, but, immediately, the subcontinent divided in two different countries, India and Pakistan. The result was a series of bloody wars between the Muslim Pakistan and India of predominantly Hindu confession, so a war with a strong religious character.

This makes Raghu Nath, the main character of the book, call the roots of the religious order conflicts “the disease of the theological bacteria5.” The religious confession, assumed as such, generates cultural ghetto, fear and discrimination. The removal of fear and discrimination can also by obtained through the acceptance of multiculturalism and multi-confessions as “fusion of the colors of the rainbow of understanding6”, clear allusion to the cultural and religious syncretism of type New-Age in which the various determined religions are diluted from the identity and national point of view and, through this, profoundly altered. Raghu agrees that there is “an identity crisis that continues to sicken the minds7” but, on the other hand, religion precisely is the irreducible spiritual determination that gives the most profound identity to a nation or a group of nations that are politically aggregated on the confessional criterion, even if apparently the violence determined by the motivations of religious order is of the most cruel and absurd. It is unfortunate that the confessional differences can lead to political differences that have as result wars, but the determined religion is not something accidental but it is an essential, fundamental and ineluctable giving of the great human communities. For example, in India after 1947, during the wars with Pakistan, the religious intolerance reached paroxysmal quotas. “The members of a religion violated and slaughtered women of other religion8”, only because they were of another religion. Still the manifestations determined religiously will not melt down but, on the contrary, according to Samuel P. Huntington9, religion will continue to be a main difference between the different civilizations.

5 Stephen Gill, The Coexistence, page 14
6 Idem, page 84
7 Ibidem, page 152
8 Stephen Gill, The Coexistence, page 100
A rebirth of the religious feeling of the peoples at the end of the XX\textsuperscript{th} century and the beginning of the XXI\textsuperscript{th} century is a reality of the order of evidence. The contestation of the atheist totalitarian system in the ex-Communist states from Central Europe was complementary with strong manifestations of religious order, as the contestation of the Western way of life in the Islamic states is one of proper religious faction today. The fashion of the anti-Communist memorial service with a synod of priests was not invented in Orthodox Romania in 1990 but earlier, in Catholic Poland of the ’80s. The fact may seem a lot more surprising as it comes after a successive diminishing of the role that religion played in the configuration of the European civilization. 3 significant declines occurred in approximately 3 centuries. The XVII\textsuperscript{th} century, called of the Lights, closed with the laic, anticlerical, atheist program of the French Revolution. The XIX\textsuperscript{th} century, especially in its second half, was the century of positivism, of the constitution of experimental sciences, of Darwinist evolutionism in biology and of Marxist atheism in social sciences. Then, the first half of the XX\textsuperscript{th} century was an era of ideologies, not of religion. Ideology, thought as depositary of the absolute truth was put above Revelation and the unique party above Church\textsuperscript{10}. The Russian Bolshevism and the German Nazism meant intrinsic Messianic ideologies, in fact serious parodies after the religious Messianic, the redemption of the entire mankind being operated through the proletarian in case of Leninism, or through the pure race in the case of Hitlerism\textsuperscript{11}. The wars of the XX\textsuperscript{th} century were not carried out for religious or ethnic causes, for saint places or national emancipation, but explicitly for the communization of propriety, for vital space or for the accumulation of the oil resources. It was difficult to foresee a resurrection of the religious feeling and a regain by Church of the lost positions in such a context, in the post-war period.

The religious feeling was reborn, paradoxically, being capitalized in quality of component of the national specific by countries from Central and Eastern Europe in the course of the political changes after 1990, exactly in a historical moment characterized by a dramatic reduction of the weight of the national paradigm in favor of globalization\textsuperscript{12}. In the context of these objective reformation, of profoundness and of duration, some nations desperately look new identity elements, evolving until their transformation in reasons of confrontation and causes of war, the case of the ex Yugoslavia being a relevant one in this sense. At the same time, one can notice a resurrection of the religious spirit at other civilizations too besides the Christian one.

Samuel P. Huntington seems to be the one who put most adequately the problem of the role that religion has today in the ensemble of some constellations of national, civilization values as well as like a factor of inter-civilization confrontation.

Huntington elaborates himself an own vision, obviously under the influence of Spengler and Toynbee. Today’s world does not have as main actors on the international political scene nation-states but a certain smaller number of civilizations coagulated along some nucleus-states. These contemporary civilizations are: the Western Civilization, the Chinese one, the Japanese one, the Islamic one, the Indian one, the Latin-American one and (depending on what the future holds us) the African Civilization\textsuperscript{13}. Of course, the 185 existing national states on Earth still play an important role as subjects of international right, they administer the country in the interior, they handle exterior resources and relations, they perceive threats from the exterior and so on and so forth. The nation states define the external threats depending on the intentions of other states but these intentions are perceived in the basis of some cultural patterns and of some historic memory modeled culturally inside a civilization that often transcends the nation state; these cultural patterns are matters of mentality in the configuration of which religion plays a very important role.

The problems that are put here are: What role does religion play in the definition of a civilization? Which is the essential connection between ethnicity and the religious confession? How does the binomial ethnicity-religion acts in modeling the intra-inter civilization conflicts?

Huntington’s first thesis is enounced unequivocally: “the great civilizations from the history of the world were closely identified with the great religions of the world”\textsuperscript{14}.” More precisely, four out of the five “global religions”, numbered by Max Weber: Christianity, Islamism, Hinduism and Confucianism constituted bases for determined, homonymous civilizations. Buddhism is an exception which is a religion that is proper to more cultures but on which no determined civilization was substantiated. There are no exceptions for the mutual statement, there are no great civilizations that had not been substantiated on great religions. Including the Western European civilization was formed having at its base the Christian religion in its Roman variant and even the self European conscience, the conscience of belonging at this civilization was born during some wars with religious character, respectively the Crusades from the XI\textsuperscript{th}-XIII\textsuperscript{th} centuries. For a very

\textsuperscript{11} Ch. Millon-Deliso, The political ideas of the XIX\textsuperscript{th} century, (2002) Polirom, Iasi, page 52.
\textsuperscript{13} S.P.Huntington, cited work, page 63
\textsuperscript{14} Idem, page 58.
\textsuperscript{15} Andrei Marga, cited work, page 33.
short period of time at the history scale, in the XXth century, the intra- and inter-civilization conflicts were motivated and modeled by ideologies, but towards the end of this century the ideologies entered in decline, and the inter-civilization difference is realized again on the religious component. And it is not about an accidental or regional fact, limited at Europe, but the whole world.

The globalization phenomenon is sustained by objective processes, with universal character, but with the starting point in the Western civilization: the generalized tendency of assimilation of the technical progress, the activity of the transnational corporations, the financial-banking situations and so on and so forth. One can not put the problem of rejecting these globalization influences, of self-isolation, of autarchy, of closing in oneself at the level of nation or of civilization. History demonstrated that the tendencies of rejecting the globalization manifested by some isolated countries (North Korea, Cuba, some Islamic state) represents a wrong solution. The real problem that is put is if the assimilation of these globalization influences, which Huntington defines modernization, can be realized without becoming Western or not. One will be able to estimate if the values of Western civilization, for example democracy, will become effectively universal or not depending on the answer given to this question. The interrogation is complex and asks for nuance through the analysis of some examples.

Turkey made the greatest and most dramatic efforts in this sense form all the non-Western countries, engaged (constrained) in the course of modernization after World War 1. This country sought not only to modernize itself but also become Western. Turkey came out traumatized from World War 1 and from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire. It constituted itself as national state after the Western model and made the most radical and decisive steps in the path of modernization after hundreds of years. European institutions were adopted, a laic state characterized by the separation of religion of state was established, the religious Courts were abolished, the theological schools near the mosques were closed and the Arab alphabet was replaced with the Latin one. The change of alphabet also meant a radical change because in this way the Turkish population of the XXth century was broken-off from the vast historic and theological tradition of its own civilization. Everything was changed by force, from up to down in just a few years, less language and religion. These 2 elements remained the only identity determinations. Turkey modernized itself in force and at the same time it became Western in a significant measure. Still, we can not be certain that it is a real success and irreversible changes. The Islamic political parties not only disappeared but became more powerful day by day and they arrived at power through democratic and especially Westernization would have known spectacular and violent returns, as it happened in neighboring Iran after the pro-Western Shah was chased away from power in 1979, if the Army had not been invested here through Constitution as warrant of the state’s laic character and if in the post-war period the Army had not intervened actively in politics, organizing periodically, about once in 10 years a coup d’etat against the legitimate governments of Islamic orientation.

Another relevant example would be that of Japan, in certain matters asymmetrical in rapport with Turkey. Unlike Turkey, Japan is a certain industrial success and it is at the same time a non-Western country that modernized powerfully, without becoming Western forcibly like Turkey. Japan kept exemplary, even under unfavorable conditions, its national specific. The explanation might reside also in the Shintoist religion, a nationalist religion16 according to some authors that, in the year 1868, on the occasion of the instauration of the Meiji dynasty was proclaimed as official religion of the Japanese state in spite of the minority religions like Buddhism and Confucianism. In Shintoism, patriotism is lifted at the rank of supreme religious virtue together with other moral qualities like loyalty and a vigorous voluntary discipline, religious qualities that are real and that stay undoubtedly at the base of the Japanese worker’s behavior and implicitly of the impressive performances of Japanese economy.

Huntington’s second thesis is enounced in this way: one can notice presently a rebirth of the religious feeling, the religion practically overtakes the tasks of ideology and the religious nationalism tends to replace the laic nationalism17.

The laic nationalism, in its variants from end of century XIX and beginning of the XXth century was rested on a certain philosophy of history, rational in itself. Nation was seen like an organism in development, and the proper and favorable background of development was the national state. Not allowing a nation to develop in its “natural” background as long as the nation was viable and had not yet consumed its creative energies was the greatest crime. The heroes of the day were the fighters for national rights, especially where the nationalities were kept by force in state or multinational empires. Consequently, the tendency was one in the sense of the organization of nations in national states, in which the frontiers were to follow as close as possible the ethnic realities. This was the force-idea that led to the disintegration of the multinational empires at the end of World War 1. The standard bearer was the president of USA Woodrow Wilson himself between 1913-1921, a

17 Samuel P. Huntington, cited work, page 145.
fervent sustainer of the principles of self-determination of nations. The laic nationalism was an illuminated nationalism, adept of the plebiscite consultations.

The laic nationalism was replaced step by step and unnoticeably with a religious, irrational nationalism, adept of resorting to violence towards the end of the XXth century. There are armed conflicts between nations belonging to the same civilization and religion even today but they are not the most important conflicts, they are local conflicts, not conflicts that would tend to become important wars, to become international. But there also are areas of fissure, of cultural faction, areas belonging to the same civilization and religion even though they are far more dangerous and they could get to know an escalade to the dimensions of a war between confessions and civilization. Huntington takes as example the case of ex-Yugoslavia. It began as a local conflict, as interior problem of a state, of the ex-Yugoslavian state, but which could not be governed with local means but it intensified and determined foreign interventions. Russia did not intervene directly in the conflict but it offered diplomatic support for Serbians. Then, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran and Libia procured funds and weapons for the Muslim Bosnians, not in the virtue of some economic interests or ideological motivations but because of the religious affinity. One arrived at a bloody conflict, a conflict that could have been prevented and solved through negotiations, if at the middle had been a laic nationalism and not a religious one. It is very likely that the religious nationalism was the factor that triggered the war. Ex-Czechoslovakia disintegrated peacefully, both resulting countries, the Czech Republic and Slovakia being Christian states, belonging to the same civilization. Ex-Yugoslavia could not disintegrate peacefully because the Orthodox Serbians confronted here with the Muslim Bosnians and Albanian as well as with the Catholic Croatians.

Huntington’s third thesis: the important conflicts of the future will not be conflicts between the national states but between civilizations and they will also have a religious dimension. These conflicts will occur across the lines of cultural faults that separate the civilization from each other, on the geographical meeting place of civilizations. According to Francis Fukuyama and to other authors, the modernization and the globalization are processes that weaken the national state as identity source and so, the religions that transcend the national frontiers overtake this role and become such an identity source. The different regions of the world try to define their cultural identity in rapport with the West appealing to religion because the religious belonging is less changing that the political or economical belonging. The differences of religion create differences of political order, and the geographic proximity gives birth to conflictive territorial claims. There was a moment of euphoria at the end of the Cold War that generated the illusion of an international harmony on long term. This illusion vanished immediately, inter-ethnic conflicts erupted, ethnical purifications were operated and the religious fundamentalism intensified. In the same way, it is a damaging illusion to imagine that a universal civilization based on a unanimous sharing of Western values, a universal civilization of the political democracy, of economic productivity and confessional pluralism could exist in the future. A universal civilization is not possible as long as there is not a universal religion.

There are also, of course, certain universal ethnic-religious values that are share unanimously, that are present practically in all religions of the world, for example the prohibition of homicide as unconditional imperative (“Do not kill!”) or the affirmation of the mutuality principle (“Do as you would be done!”) and so on, but they do not exhaust and neither annul the cultural specific of some determined civilizations, and they do not make out of the Western civilization a universal civilization or at least a dominant civilization. A determined civilization is defined through more features like language (languages), history, religion, customs, spiritual creations and so on and so forth but also through the people’s subjective self-identification through the conscience of their belonging at a certain religion and civilization. Then, modernization does not necessarily mean becoming Western. More than this, a contrary effect can be also noticed: non-Western civilizations modernize themselves and they use the technical potential that the modernization gives to create values and promote non-Western and anti-Western attitudes. It is the case of the Islamic fundamentalists that promote terrorism on Internet and so on and so forth.

Huntington’s bold and repeated conclusion is that presently and in the foreseeable future the civilization identity will be conferred the most strongly by religion more than by anything else: class ideology, cultural ideas and so on and so forth. That, in case of war, the religious identity and self-identification become dominant in rapport with the other identity features, surpassing even the national feeling. That the Western world should give up reforming other civilization and impose its own civilization to other cultural areas. And that the politic leaders can avoid an inter-civilization war through the acceptance of the multi-civilization, multi-religious and multi-way character of the world in which we live.

Thirdly, it is very important how we think the war phenomenon at the history scale: as an unhappy,
unessential accident or as a necessary, essential and inherent reality.

The problem of peace and war is also thought by Stephen Gill’s characters in the style of a late, if not belated Enlightenment. The politicians can not stop the military conflicts themselves because they can be under the financing and/or under the pressure of some groups interested in maintaining these conflicts, some sustainers of the electoral campaigns, the producers of arms interested in their winnings and so on and so forth. “The people is the only source to stop the conflicts. It has to enlighten itself to ask for clarifications from their political representatives on problems linked to their preoccupation.”21 There were even apostles of this idea, a Mahatma Gandhi for example. Gandhi’s genius consisted, in our opinion, in the speculation of a gap of a Mahatma Gandhi for example. Gandhi’s genius consisted, in our opinion, in the speculation of a gap of

But a movement of non-violence is an exception at history scale and not a rule. And who could ensure a certain period of global peace? The eyes of the character Raghu Nath are set towards the United Nations. But the United Nations showed its inability repeatedly. According to Raghu, the United Nations would have been more efficient if it had been foreseen through status with an own Army and, eventually, with an own system to perceive certain taxes. Then, paradoxically, the United Nations would have been called to ensure world peace and to manage the problem of nuclear proliferation with an own Army, meaning still by means specific to war. Then, if we thought, in the perspective of globalization, the United Nations transformation into a strong organization, capable to impose respect, capable to fulfill effectively certain attribution of world government would be a proof of unforgiving credulity if we do not ask ourselves: who will be, more or less occult behind the scenes of this gigantic government. And what wars would set up by the fight for the control of the world government?

And the Enlightenment anti-war plea continues in The Coexistence in the same devout, desiderative language. “What is war? War means killing. Public honors are brought to war killers and they are promoted with distinctions...War is a crime. The killing of citizens, women, old persons, children that have no guilt and that are not interested in war is a crime against humanity.

Including the defense wars are useless because they do not solve anything...Wars aggravate the problems...The soldiers return being drunk with the blood of the innocent people...Great parts of the budgets of the countries are used for Army...Wars slow down the development of any kind...The money of those who die because of the lack of pills, food and clean water and so on and so forth.”22

But, from the politics point of view, things are different. Historically speaking, the periods of war are far more extended than those of peace at the scale of universal history. Practically there is no period of total and complete peace at the level of the whole planet.

At a first approximation, we can define war as being a conflict between political groups (nations, states, civilizations) that is solved through organized violence, a violence effected by that who attacks, rejected with violence also by that who defends himself, a continuation of a disagreement after the diplomatic and political ways are exhausted. Then wars can be classified depending on more criteria, resulting more typologies of war in this way. There are, in a classical classification: (a) external wars that take place between sovereign states and that, in the case of the involvement of a big number of states, as it happened in the 20th century, were called global wars; (b) wars inside a state, so-called civil wars; (c) wars of colonial expansion; (d) wars of national liberation. Generally, war is regarded like a permanent reality, as “a natural function of the peoples”23, a conflicting state that can not be eliminated because it is part of the structure of political relation in general. From this point of view, the war phenomenon is a necessary, unavoidable event that will never be eliminated from the history of mankind. Not even the invention of the atomic bomb, through the nuclear discouragement that it produces through the equilibrium of the mutual terror that it institutes did not lead to the effective elimination of war from history, it not led to the famous “eternal peace” dreamt by Immanuel Kant because, as we know, there were a multitude of local, regional wars carried out with conventional means also in the era of the atomic bomb. On the contrary, in the post-war period, including the war carried out with conventional ways became more complex and violent, at least from the point of view of the social psychology, involving also the civilian population on the side of the armies through propaganda, manipulation, intoxication, threat, electronic war and so on and so forth.

The model of the state of nature, of permanent war of each against everybody is extended by Hobbes in the international relations as well: “The kings and the

22 Stephen Gill, the cited work, pages 162-165.
sovereign powers, due to their independence are always in continuous hatred [...] with the armies pointed and the eyes aimed at ones against others. The kingdoms have fortresses, garrisons and guns at the frontiers and they send spies permanently at their neighbors. In time of war, the two cardinal virtues of people are not Justice and Goodness but Strength and Wisdom, there is no propriety, nor sovereignty, nor separation between what is mine and what is yours but what can be taken by force and as long as it can be kept by force belongs to each. There is the tendency that these things be practiced also by individuals in the rapports between them, in the states, only that here the individuals come to be afraid of what Hobbes calls “a common power” after getting out of the state of nature and entering through social contract in the state of right, something that was later called “the monopoly of legitimate violence” that state has in rapport with the individuals.

An interesting question is put in this point. Why does a certain state and not other has to be legitimated as carrying out the function of “global power” or of “legitimate violence” at global scale, a state that would play a major role in the regulation of some interior or international conflicts? Why does a certain ideology and not the other have to impose itself in such situations? Why do we have to prefer certain solutions and not the others; why do we have to share certain values and not other? In other words, which is the difference between a USAa coalition of states lead by USA intervention in force in a particular country – and the intervention in force of a particular totalitarian state?

The answer has its roots in the period of the Cold War. 2 types of state authorities were delineated ever since the period of the ideological confrontation between USA and the Soviet Union. (a) A traditional, democratic authority, a state that detains the monopoly of using “the legitimate violence” that is necessary in Weber sense; and (b) a totalitarian authority, lacking democracy and/or democratic traditions in which the state’s legitimate violence is transformed into terror and the state becomes holder of the monopoly of terror. If we introduce this criterion of delineation we obtain a relative interventionism legitimacy in favor of USA, this state having an authority detained through democratic mechanisms and exercising a legal violence, its interventions can be appreciated generally as “legitimate and necessary.”

In essence, the discourse of war and the belligerent rhetoric make their effect also depending on the individuals’ precursory perception regarding war, on the education of whole generations regarding the effects of war, on the horizon of waiting of some population in rapport with a certain hotbed of conflict and on the collective mentalities through the prism of which the idea of war is regarded. We have to remark here that war is perceived not only negatively but also positively, in ethic sense. War can be regarded as degenerative power of the states but also as regenerative power. First of all, we will notice that through accumulation in time the periods of war from mankind’s history are more extended than those of peace. The total number of wars from history, of approximately 14.500 is considerable. If we also retain here Thomas Hobbes’ idea that war not only consists in effective battles or fights but also in the intention and desire to make war, then the belligerent state from the history of mankind is practically permanent.

Then, from the interior, wars will be regarded completely differently by the belligerent parts. The part that is in defense, that defends its territory, country, will regard war as an ethic and justice excuse, and the belligerent part that attacks, occupies and invades with the purpose of robbery will look at war at the cynic and amoral way or will produce false justifications with the purpose of manipulating the masses. The antiterrorist war is considered as a war “of defense” and those who try to defend their country are called “rebels” by the aggressors but the wars that are carried out for the occupation of some territories that are rich in natural resources will not be able to have the same ethic and justice excuse.

It seems obvious that the current negative attitude towards war is determined by the common representation that war is a horrible thing, resulting in huge losses of human lives, with the death of many innocent people, with huge material losses caused directly by the destruction of the production capacities and indirectly through requisitions and the subordination of economy towards the war necessities and so on and so forth. The fiction prose that has as object the evocation of some scenes of war also regularly cultivates a frightening imaginary of human suffering, meant to give birth a strong aversion towards war.

But, on the other hand, one can notice that war in general is not negative univocally regarding the historical events with detachment and from high altitude. There are populations that in short accesses of violence, in revolutions full of political excesses, made greater progresses than in long periods of tranquil evolution. The Napoleonic Wars, for example, undoubtedly meant an important progress for Europe’s political evolution. Hegel, contemporary with Napoleon and the Emperor’s

26 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1951) The State Publishing House, Bucharest, page 113
28 Andre Glucksmann, Ouest contre Ouest (2003), Paris, Plon, page 81
admire is the thinker that puts again in these terms the problem of war.

According to Hegel “war has an ethic moment that does not have to be regarded as an absolute evil but as a purely exterior accident which would have an accidental reason itself, passions of rulers, injustices and so on and so forth, generally something that does not have to be.” 32 It is necessary that what is finite, man’s propriety and life be put as something accidental because it stays in the concept of finite. This necessity also has the form of a force of nature, in the sense in which everything that is finite is ephemeral and mortal. Ethically, though, this natural feature, the characteristic to be mortal is taken away from nature and transformed in man’s work of will and liberty, the natural passing becomes desired passing, one does not wait the natural death as end of a life maybe lacking merits but the glorious death in war is sought. According to Hegel through war “the ethic health of the populations is conserved, their indifference to the torpidity in the fixity of finite determinations as the movements of winds guards the sea of the putrefaction at which it could be exposed by a long tranquility.” 33 So would also happen with the populations that would have a long, maybe eternal peace. Sometimes, wars that appear at the right moment prevented interior troubles and led to the consolidation of the state’s power in the interior. “Populations become stronger after wars” 34 says Hegel even if some individuals lose their propriety or life. That is why people deplore war for the losses and sufferings that it brings. They listen peacefully, with devotion and with approval to the pulpit in which they are told about the uselessness of having material goods and about our ephemeral life, but when the problem is put really that they themselves lose their goods and life as a result of war, they launch curses against the conquerors.

II. Conclusion

I have approached in the above lines a number of 3 aspects presented in summary: (a) the nature of the economic rapports at global scale with their moral implications, condensed in the Buddhist dictum “live and let others live too”; (b) the resurrection of the religious feeling, defining for the different civilizations and the role that religion should play in the eventuality of “a clash of civilizations”; (c) the problem of peace and war, also seen as essential determination of universal history – problems amply debated both in the novel and in the scientific literature of specialty.

We could notice a marking difference between the imaginary assertions, specific to novel as prose of fiction and the concepts of the scientific discourse, equivalent in fact with two different ways of understanding the truth. First of all, we have the truth adequantio rei et intellectus, characteristic to the scientific knowledge, then we have the truth in quality of consensus, shared by a large public, proper to the discourses of ideological and persuasive type, including the belletristic discourses. It is not about two distinct truths, nor about a double truth, but just about two distinct aspects of the same unique truth.

Then we have to remark that the opinion expressed by characters in the novel do not resist, under the rapport of the value of truth in confrontation with the theories elaborated scientifically. But it is not about disintegrating the novel through the scientific contradiction of the characters’ opinions, in this way we could disintegrate principally any novel, first of all the novels written by a great novelist like F. M. Dostoevsky. It is about 2 different moments of truth, of science on one hand and the fiction prose on the other hand. The fiction prose also has the advantage that it can be shared by a broader public than the one that frequents the scientific literature and it can also play the role of outlet in view of liberating the pressure accumulated by the popular dissatisfactions.

And this is precisely the point where resides the disadvantage of art, because from this point of view, it can be politically manipulated and the readers that assimilate the fictional allegations may acquire the illusion which typically pertains to the Enlightenment, that they are in the possession of an encompassing and ultimate truth.

33 Idem
34 Idem