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Legislative Turnover in the National Assembly: A Study of the South – East Zone, 1999-2015

Richard Amaechi Onuigbo^α & Eme, Okechukwu Innocent^σ

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I. INTRODUCTION

Nigerians must recall that the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria requires the legislators to gain the requisite experience to effectively discharge their mandate. Consequently, there is decision not to limit the number of times a performing legislator could be re-elected. Despite this, the electorates have the constitutional right to elect or re-elect a legislator. The incessant high turnover of National Assembly members provides a new challenge to democracy. That is, at the inception, one would wonder the level of constructive contributions that would be expected from inexperienced legislators.

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Nevertheless, there are opportunities for learning, provided the legislators sincerely present themselves for such. For instance, Civil Society Legislative Advocacy Centre (CISLAC), National Legislative Institute present themselves to train legislators both at national and state levels, primarily to ensure effectiveness in performance of their mandate.

Re-election of a legislator should under normal circumstance be based on his or her performance and contribution in lawmaking process, representation and oversight functions as well as constituency accountability. However, in several occasions, public deviate in their perception of these constitutional mandates of a legislator, for some selfish and self-serving expectations. With these attitudes, even if a legislator has made meaningful impact in the chamber, he or she may not be re-elected for the failure to play to their tune. Again in some places it is about zoning for “chopping” not working for the people.

Since 1999, the high turnover of lawmakers in the country has been a source of concern to not a few stakeholders. It was therefore not surprising that the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS) in its latest report conducted in 2014 revealed that Nigeria has the lowest retention rate of lawmakers in the national parliament in the world. The report was signed by Director- General of NILS, Dr. Ladi Hamalai. The document titled “Continuity and change in Nigeria’s elections: a collection of essays,” stated that even by African standard, Nigeria has a high turnover rate of 70 per cent as compared to South Africa with 47, Ghana 56, Kenya 64, Uganda 50.5 and 51 per cent for Benin Republic respectively (Odewinge, 2014:5).

The legislative Institute document reported that the United States has the highest retention rate in the world with almost 100 per cent probability that a senator or member of the House of Representatives would be re-nominated by his party to re-contest elections. The report adds that there is a 90 per cent probability that he or she would be re-elected. Re-election rate in US House of Representatives averaged over 90 per cent since 1964 while the retention rate for Senate averaged 85 per cent in the last five decades.

A very close observation of Nigerian politics since 1999 shows that factors such as incumbency advantage, quality of challenges, intra- party procedures and structures as well as god fatherism and elections malpractices are considered as determinants of

reelection rates of legislators accounted for these levels of turnovers. Giving details of the retention rate in the Senate and House of Representatives between 2003 and 2011, the report revealed that both chambers had an average of 25.9 per cent retention rate. While the trend in the Senate showed a decline retention rate in 2003, that of the House of Representatives showed a decline in 2011.

In 2003 elections, only 35 senators were re-elected out of 109, posting an average retention of 32.11 per cent, while 27 and 35 were re-elected in 2003 and 2011 respectively leaving a retention rate of 24.77 and 32.11 per cent. Finally, between 2011-2015, 35 Senators were re-elected (32.1 per cent retention rate). In the House of Representatives, only 108 out of the 360 lawmakers were re-elected in 2003 giving a percentage of 30 while 110 and 103 lawmakers were re-elected in 2007 and 2011 posting a percentage of 30.6 and 28.7 respectively. In elections held from 2003-2007, of 360 seats in the Nigerian House of Representatives, 108 members were re-elected (30 per cent retention rate), 2007-2011, 110 members were re-elected (30.6 retention rate), 2011-2015, 103 members were re-elected (28.7 per cent). From the above thesis, it is axiomatic to posit that Nigeria has the lowest retention rate of lawmakers in the national parliament in the world, the paper seeks to identify the factors responsible for this and their implications using the South-east as a Case between 1999& 2015 respectively.

II. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Lindberg (2004) defines turnover of power in terms of the „electoral turnover of the chief political executive in presidential elections and a changed majority in parliamentary elections. For Lindberg (2004), turnover represents one of the core indicators of electoral competitiveness, the latter being one of the major democratic qualities of elections. Other indicators of competitiveness include winner's share of the vote, winning party's share of legislative seats and second party's share of legislative seats. As articulated by Lindberg, winner's share of the votes is a percentage of the total valid votes cast. Although the exact position of this variable in determining the level of competition has been, and is still being debated, the main argument has been that the closeness of the outcome among competing parties is a reflection of the level of electoral competition. As Lindberg (2004) puts it, being the manifest outcome of institutionalized uncertainty, alternations of power occurring in peaceful manner remains a sign of the distributive authority of the people inherent in the expression "rule by the people". Schedler (2002b; also quoted in Ornnert and Hewitt, 2006:12) has also argued that where alternation has occurred, there is likely to be more democracy and a greater likelihood that new elites are emerging.

Turnover has also been linked with the legitimacy of an election, another key democratic quality of elections. The legitimacy of an election can be determined by the extent at which political stakeholders particularly political parties and candidates accept the outcome of elections in a peaceful and open manner. Rakner and Svasand (2003:4) lend credence to this when they argue that the legitimacy of the electoral process hinges on the electorates' and candidates' perception that the process has been conducted in a way that does not in advance ensure a certain outcome. It is, therefore, expected that to enhance the democratic legitimacy of any elections, there should be certainty about the process, but uncertainty about the results (Przeworski, 1991: 40-41). This, according to Lindberg, is in itself, an intrinsic democratic quality. To measure electoral legitimacy, Lindberg identifies indicators such as loser's acceptance of election results, peacefulness of the elections at all stages –before, during and after- and breakdown. With respect to losers accepting the results, Lindberg warns that there may be situations, especially in transitional settings, where losers may raise alarm just to gain political advantage, for example, from the international community. It may also be a strategy to undermine the political rule of their rivals. By implication, Lindberg submits, that „challenge to the official results cannot be taken at face value as substantiating allegations of irregularities (2004: 64). This rationalisation finds empirical support in the ongoing propaganda in Africa that opposition parties and candidates see elections as legitimate only when they win and vice versa. Despite its sound logic and appeal, the argument nevertheless, fails to tell how to identify genuine rejection of results by oppositions when elections were seriously flawed. In the circumstance, it does seem that the reports of local and international election monitors may provide some leeway about the genuineness or otherwise of opposition's protests and rejection of results (Obi, 2008; Omotola, 2006; Adebayo and Omotola, 2007).

The legitimacy of elections, according to Lindberg (2004a: 64), can also be measured by the peacefulness of the elections, defined in terms of whether violence occurred at any stages of the elections, which according to him, is „a symptom of failed institutionalisation (Lindberg, 2004: 64). There is also the issue of breakdown, which has to do with the abortion of the electoral cycle. This can occur either through military seizure of power or the outright breakout of civil wars. As long as the electoral cycle continues, despite all odds, the elections do have Work in progress, please do not cite. Some form of legitimacy. This, as far as Lindberg is concerned, is the ultimate indicator of legitimacy“ (Lindberg, 2004a: 65). Lindberg went ahead to test the validity of these theoretical propositions, building on the foundational works of Bratton (1998; 1999), Bratton and Van de Walle (1998)

and others and concluded that there were reasons for demo-optimism in Africa on the basis of marked improvement in the democratic qualities of its successive elections.

Turnover can be broadly defined as 'the proportion of membership that changes from one election to the next' (Matland and Studlar 2004: 92). For the exact calculation of turnover rates, however, Manow (2007) offered a more precise definition. Manow (2007:196) propose to define turnover as the share of those who either do not return to the subsequent parliament or are not re-elected. This leads to a broad and a narrow definition of turnover. Legislative turnover is either defined broadly as comprising all who have been members of parliament but are no longer members of parliament (turnover rate $\frac{1}{4}$ return rate), or it is defined more narrowly as comprising all who have been elected to parliament but failed to be re-elected to parliament (turnover rate $\frac{1}{4}$ re-election rate) (Manow,2007:197). Using Germany instances, Manow (2007) posited that whereas the first proposed definition includes all those who were not elected but became members of parliament during the term (in Germany the so-called Nachruicker, i.e. substitutes who replace MPs

who leave parliament during the term for whatever reason), the second definition excludes them. The difference is non-trivial. For instance, during the 12th term of the Bundestag (1990–94) 10 members of parliament died and 27 resigned and these vacancies were filled from party lists. This definition though fits the German environment does not fit ours because of the First Past the Post in operation in Nigeria as opposed to Proportional Representation and First Past the Post combination operating in Germany.

Both definitions have straightforward counting rules: the return rate can be calculated by counting the number of MPs sitting in parliament on the last day of the previous parliament and the first day of the next parliament, with the total number of seats in the previous parliament as the divisor. The re-election rate reports the percentage of incumbents who have been elected at one general election and are re-elected at the next general election, i.e. who were members of parliament on the first day of the previous and on the first day of the next parliament. Oham (2005:8) captured these analysis in Figure 1 below. The election is only part of the total turnover of incumbent Members of Parliament he concluded.




Figure 1 : Breaking down the turnover of incumbent Members of Parliament

The figure shows us that the pre-electoral turnover can be either voluntary or involuntary. Voluntary turnover could be either because the MP decides to devote her or his time to something else, or because she or he chooses to join another party. In established democracies, party shifts among MPs exist, but are rare. Admittedly, retirement is not always voluntary, as it can depend on failing health. As mentioned above, Members of Parliament may also die in office. In single seat electoral systems, deaths in office will normally trigger a by-election, and information about by-elections has been taken into account in this study (to the extent it

has been available), and such cases are then not counted as turnover. Involuntary pre-electoral turnover occurs when an MP is not made the candidate in the next election, even though (s) he wishes to run. It is not possible to separate voluntary from involuntary pre-electoral turnover using election data, and as discussed above it may be difficult even with detailed information, but we will discuss the issue further below. In contrast, the electoral turnover is relatively straightforward. An MP who stands for re-election (for his/her own party, for another party or as an independent) may be accepted or rejected by the electorates.

For our purpose, Legislative turnover refers to the number of lawmakers who failed to win both at the intra and inter party elections irrespective of the fact that they were members of the out going parliament. For example, in Nigeria the Seventh Senate recorded a low turnover of its members as only 33 out of the 109 Senators returned to the Eighth Senate after the general elections. As many as 76 lost their bid to come back. The turnover ultimately affects the quality of performance of the new Assembly. Most of the best legislators who helped conspicuously in giving vibrancy to the 7th Senate lost their return bid for various reasons apart from national interest.

The Leader of the Seventh Senate, Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba, who served for 12 years and played a leading role in stabilising the Senate and democracy lost to intra party politics and the overbearing influence of godfatherism in Nigerian politics. Also, Enang, who could be described as encyclopaedia of legislative rules, proceedings and processes lost as the former Governor of Akwa Ibom State, Godswill Akpabio, insisted that he must not return to the Senate, even when he himself was elected to replace Senator Aloysius Etok.

There are therefore different fates that can befall a Member of Parliament when it is time for a new election. In Nigeria, when all the leadership organs of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) comprising of the Board of Trustees (BOT), Governors' Forum and

National Working Committee (NWC) chose the 66th National Executive Committee (NEC) meeting of the party held last year in Abuja to adopt former President Goodluck Jonathan as its sole candidate for the March 28, 2015 presidential election, little did they know that its state chapters and governors would take a cue from it in no distance time. Without any sense of reference to the party's headquarters, the state chapters witnessed a handful of endorsements for the 2015 election from then PDP-controlled states, especially for governorship ticket. Aiming to nip the catalogue of adoptions in the bud, the NWC voided the endorsements and instructed the governors and chairmen of the affected states to cancel such adoption.

Already, the directive had generated bad blood between the party headquarters and the state chapters led by governors. For once, the interests of governors on the platform of PDP seems threatened and they have started pointing fingers at the Presidency for inflaming the NWC against them to halt their decisions of handpicking their successors and selecting candidates for both the national and state assemblies. These different fates are described in Figure 2. From the different outcomes, we can calculate a series of variables, which are important in our understanding of the various aspects of the turnover of incumbent MPs. These variables are explained by Oham(2005:9) in Table 2 below,




Figure 2 : The possible fates of a Member of Parliament

The factors that account for the above will constitute our units of analysis in section three of the paper.

III. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

The theoretical foundation of this article will rest on elite theory. Parry (1969) defined elites as the small minorities who appear to play an exceptionally influential part in socio-political affairs. They exercise preponderant influence within that collectivistic by virtue of their actual

or supposed talents. In political science, the theory is basically a “class” analysis approach to the understanding of political phenomena. The term has history that dates back to the writings of Vilfredo Pareto (1935 and 1968), Gaetano Mosca (1939 and 1968) and Robert Michels (1968, 2001) observations made by them with regard to (1) the elite as distinguished from the non-elite groups within a social order and (2) the divisions within the elite as between a governing and a non-governing elite. Furthermore, Mosca Gaetano (1939) noted that the distinguishing characteristic of the elite is the “aptitude to command and to exercise

political control". The conceptual schemes postulated by elite theorists comprise the following generalization:

In every society, there is, and must always be, a minority which rules over the rest of society. This notion is quite compatible with Robert Michels's observation in his "political party" who posits that organization says oligarchy". Mosca Pareto also says that in all human societies, be it capitalist or socialist, simple or complex, there is a ruling elite which rules all others member of society. The classical elite theorists posit that elites derive almost invariably the original power from coercive sources through the monopoly of military factor. The minority, either "political class" or governing elite compose of all those that occupy political power or those that influence governmental decisions. This minority undergo changes in its membership and composition. These changes may ordinarily be by recruitment of new members of society. Sometimes the change is by incorporation of new social groups and accordingly a complete replacement of ousted elite by counter elite through revolution. The last form of change comes about when elite refuses to respond to the first two changes. Elite theorists also talked about what they called the "circulation of elites". This can be explained as a situation where by one set of elites (political executives) is replaced by another possessing similar traits. This is what Mosca Pareto was describing when he generalized that "history is a graveyard of aristocracies". This statement shows the inevitability of change when the elite facet. This change can take different forms: (1) between different categories of the governing elites itself (e.g. from the non-governing elite) or between the elite and the rest of the population and while such changes go on, they affect merely the form but not the structure of rule which remains at all times minority dominated (Oligarchy).

Put differently, the theoretical view held by many social scientists which holds that American politics is best understood through the generalization that nearly all political power is held by a relatively small and wealthy group of people sharing similar values and interests and mostly coming from relatively similar privileged backgrounds. Most of the top leaders in all or nearly all key sectors of society are seen as recruited from this same social group, and elite theorists emphasize the degree to which interlocking corporate and foundation directorates, old school ties and frequent social interaction tend to link together and facilitate coordination between the top leaders in business, government, civic organizations, educational and cultural establishments and the mass media. This "power elite" can effectively dictate the main goals (if not always the practical means and details) for all really important government policy making (as well as dominate the activities of the major mass media and educational/cultural organizations in society) by virtue of their control over the economic resources of the major

business and financial organizations in the country. Their power is seen as based most fundamentally on their personal economic resources and especially on their positions within the top management of the big corporations, and does not really depend upon their ability to garner mass support through efforts to "represent" the interests of broader social groups. Elitist theoreticians differ somewhat among themselves on such questions as how open the power elite is to "new blood," the exact degree of agreement or disagreement that usually prevails within its ranks, and the degree of genuine concern (or lack thereof) for the broader public welfare that enters into their choices of public policy goals, but all such theorists broadly share the notion that it is these few thousand "movers and shakers" who really run the country and determine the basic directions of public policy, certainly not the manipulated and powerless masses of ordinary voters choosing among candidates at election time (Burton and John, 1998),).

Elite theory in political sociology was advanced in direct response to Marxism. The early elite theorists were conservatives who were opposed not only to socialism, but also to liberal democracy as expressed by any movement which attempted to give the masses of the population a greater influence on political affairs. They argued that elites were necessary and inevitable and that any revolution which pretended to abolish elites would end up by simply replacing one elite with another. Elite theorists use two basic lines of argument. First, they argue that certain aspects of human nature make elites inevitable. Second, they argue that elites are necessary for any social organization to function effectively. There is also a sociological argument that elites are necessary for a large social organization to function. To a degree this has even been accepted by Marxists. Tucker (1972) accepted the necessity of a "dictatorship of the proletariat" after the Communists had taken power in order to suppress those who would attempt to restore their privileged position in the old society. V. I. Lenin, who led the first communist movement to actually win state power did so on the basis of his theory that only an elitist party of professional revolutionaries, with strict discipline and control by a small central committee, could be efficient enough to win power from the capitalists.

Marx(1982), however, argued that once socialism had been established in conditions of affluence, coercion would no longer be necessary and everyone could share in the administration of common affairs (Tucker, 1972). Exactly how this would be done was never specified, however, and the history of the Soviet Union after the Communist Party took power certainly provided ammunition for the argument that a revolution which intended to abolish elites would simply replace one elite with another. This might be explained as resulting from the avowedly elitist organizational structure which the party needed in order to take power.

Elitist tendencies can also be found, however, even in political parties which are deeply committed to democratic ideals and which operate in a society that allows opposition political parties to function freely. Robert Michels made an extensive study of oligarchical tendencies in political parties, basing most of his analysis on the history of the German Social Democratic party, a working class party strongly committed to democratic ideas. He felt that by showing the prevalence of oligarchical rule in an avowedly democratic organization he was making a critical test of elitist theory. Michels thought that there were three basic causes of oligarchical tendencies--organizational necessities, characteristics of the leaders, and characteristics of the masses. A complex organization requires highly trained and experienced leaders. An organization engaged in conflict with other groups needs to be able to make quick decisions and to command the organization's resources in carrying out those decisions. These organizational demands encourage the development of a professionalized, stable leadership group. These leaders find their job situation quite rewarding, both in salary and in working conditions. This is especially true in labor organizations since the gap in living standards, working conditions, and prestige is great between the leaders and the rank and file. Leaders are likely to perceive an improvement in their own living condition as representative of a general improvement in society, and consequently to become more conservative. In the German socialist party prominent leaders were usually elected members of parliament, where they relied on the support of many voters who were not party members. This enabled them to be relatively independent of the party organization and members; they had more to offer the party than the party had to offer them. The masses tend to be relatively apathetic as long as the organization is producing reasonable benefits for them. Often, they have deferential attitudes toward the leadership; but even if they were unhappy with their leaders, it would be too much trouble to do anything about it.

These processes create what Michels called the "iron law of oligarchy," a tendency for small ruling elites to emerge and persist in complex organizations. This same point was made by Max Weber in his highly influential theory of bureaucratization. Weber felt that bureaucratic administrations could not be abolished by any kind of socialist or anarchist revolution since if they did so the society would cease to operate. He did see possibilities for change, however, largely through the mechanism of a charismatic leader. A charismatic leader emerges during periods of crisis or social breakdown when things aren't working right and people look for a solution which is outside the normal routine of social life. They seek a leader with outstanding personal qualities in whom they can place their trust. While Weber was an intense German nationalist during World War I,

he was also a liberal and did not live long enough to see Adolph Hitler become the terrible incarnation of his concept of the charismatic leader. Robert Michels did live long enough to leave the socialist movement and seek salvation from Benito Mussolini. Pareto, also, was sympathetic to the fascist movement, and his works were used as part of the theoretical underpinnings of fascism.

Elite theory, with its emphasis on strength and leadership, has a natural affinity with fascism just as social class theory has an affinity with socialism and pluralist theory with liberal democracy. Not all elite theorists, however, moved into totalitarianism; one of the most prominent, Gaetano Mosca, was able to reconcile his theory of elites with a belief in a limited form of liberal democracy. The critical differences between political systems, in Mosca's view, depend largely on the organization of two strata within the elite - those at the very top and a larger group of people who are not part of the ruling clique at the moment but nevertheless have considerable power and resources. Less capable families drop out of the top group, and more capable members of the second group rise to the top. This sort of mobility, which Pareto called the "circulation of the elites" is healthy up to a point. If all could compete equally for the position at the top, however, the struggle for power would use too much social energy for too little social benefit. Indeed, it may be necessary for families to be in an elite position for several generations for them to develop the virtues needed for leadership in their children. This line of argument has been applied to more modern events by Karl Mannheim. Mannheim argued that one of the reasons for the growth of fascism in Europe was the weakness of the elites. There was an increase in the number of elite groups due to the increasing complexity of society. This means that the elites became less exclusive and no one was really able to influence events in the societies. The elites were not sufficiently insulated from the masses and were not able to cultivate cultural and intellectual differences. The anti-intellectualism of the masses became popular in elite circles, the quality of intellectual and artistic work declined, while intellectuals became so numerous that their social prestige declined. After fleeing Germany, Mannheim was impressed by the British social system which maintained a stable elite through its aristocratic traditions, while still recruiting an adequate amount of fresh blood.

Too much democracy could lead to dictatorship, and a dictatorship which rules over a relatively literate and sophisticated population must be an authoritarian one since it cannot rely on the passivity and ignorance of the large majority of the population. England was Mosca's ideal also, and it is easy to see how someone who feared the success of a totalitarian movement based on support from frustrated, uneducated masses might feel that a stable, aristocratic

elite on the English model could best provide some stability to society. Elite theory developed in part as a reaction to Marxism. It rejected the Marxian idea that a classless society having an egalitarian structure could be realized after class struggle in every society. It regards Marxism as an ideology rather than an objective analysis of social systems. According to Elite theory man can never be liberated from the subjugation of an elite structure. The term Elite refers to those who excel. The classical elite theorists identify the governing elite in terms of superior personal qualities of those who exercise power.

However, the later versions of elite theory placed less emphasis on the personal qualities of the powerful and more on the institutional framework of the society. They argued that the hierarchical organization of social institutions allows a minority to monopolize power. Another criticism of the elite theories against the Marxian view of distribution of power is that the ruling class too large and amorphous a group to be able to effectively wield power. In their view power is always exercised by a small cohesive group of the elite. Elite theory argues that all societies are divided into two main groups a ruling minority and the ruled. This situation is inevitable. If the proletarian revolution occurs it will merely result in the replacement of one ruling elite by another. Classical elite theory was propounded by Pareto and Mosca. From the above theses elite theory and their circulation has the following features:

- Power is a function of economic status (wealth and related social standing)
 - Few have power, while most do not
 - Few are atypical of society as a result of distinct upper Social Economic Status and interlocking social networks in schools, family, corporate & charitable boards, and party affiliation.
 - Non-elite movement into elite strata is slow and only those who accept elite “consensus” enter into the governing circle.
 - Elites share consensus on basic goals and values such as “managed capitalism”
 - Public policy reflects elite preferences
 - Policy changes are incremental while “big” changes are rare
 - Elites influence mass more than mass direct elite through their control of news media, control of political parties, control of entertainment media and control of political agenda
 - Elites because of their privilege position control the business of democracy.
 - Elite Theory discourages competition among homogenous elite and promotes “top down” democratic values, discourages violent changes.
- How can a republic like Nigeria claim to be a democracy if only a few people actually make political decisions, even if they are elected by the people? Elite theory holds that a representative democracy is not really based on the will of the people, but that there is a relatively small, cohesive elite class that makes almost all the important decisions for the nation. Another version of elite theory argues that voters choose from among competing elites. New members of the elite are recruited through a merit-based education system, so that the best and brightest young people join the ranks of the elite. Elite theorists argue that the founders believed that a privileged majority should rule in the name of the people with a controlled amount of input from citizens. The application of this theory to this article posits that elites consist of those successful persons who rise to the top in every occupation and stratum of society. For example; we can talk of elite of lawyers or Senior Advocates (SAN), elite teachers (Professors), politicians (god fathers, elected and appointed officials) among others.
 - The elite own political structures which return the god sons to office, bribes the judiciary or electoral umpires to decide cases in their favour. They equally provide financial resources to the non-governing elites to oil their political machine. They control the decision making of their parties and their communities respectively. The role of the elites in Nigeria is captured by the role the once powerful kitchen cabinets of political parties, governors and the presidency. The misty situation, orchestrated by the kitchen cabinet fuelled speculations about the status of the current president whose hold on power was threatened by the cabal. To move away from this kind of situation the governors are now making effort to remain relevant in Nigeria political history by moving to the senate in droves. The analysis below will attest to this politics of anxiety.

a) *Understanding Legislative Turnover in the South – East of Nigeria: A Thematic Exposition*

In the light of this development, the National assembly election in Nigeria requires more critical scrutiny beyond the initial euphoria generated by the electoral turnover. More specifically, there is need to explore the factors that account for high rate of legislative turnover in the South –east.

b) *Intra-party politics and godfatherism*

Nigeria has the lowest retention rate of lawmakers in the national parliament in the world, the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS) recent study revealed. The report reported that the activities of godfathers and lack of internal party democracy constituted the fundamental reason accounting to

legislators losing their seats in the legislature. For instance, the idea for Jonathan's blanket endorsement was first mooted in 2013 by the chairman of PDP's BoT, Chief Tony Anenih at two separate stakeholders meetings of the party in Asaba, Delta State and in the Presidential Villa, Abuja. Anenih who admitted that party primaries had always been the bane of rancour in the party's rank, said to avert this tradition of internal warfare, the party hierarchy must consider a selection process that would not leave the party bruised and incapacitated before, during and after the election.

Though Anenih's recommendation did not get immediate approval, it was a matter of time before his advocacy became the party's mantra with President Jonathan turning out to be the first beneficiary. With waves of endorsement already pouring in from the party's chapters and zones across the country for the president, the PDP's NEC at its 66th meeting held on September 18 finally stop any of its members itching to contest the March 28, 2015 presidential election. Afterwards, it was rain of endorsement for the president across the PDP structures both within and outside the shores of the country. From Transformation Ambassadors of Nigeria (TAN) rallies held in the six geo-politico zones of the country to PDP sensitisation rallies and the various groups and caucuses in the party, it was Jonathan all the way. Perhaps, the truism – what is the good for the goose is good for the gander played out after Jonathan's endorsement in September 2014. The list of endorsement continued to increase by the day after Jonathan got his clean passage. Some PDP governors anointed their possible successors and even drafted lists of candidates for legislative seats.

In Enugu State, member representing Udenu/Igboeze- North in the House of Representatives, and Chairman, House Committee on Marine Transport, Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi, was endorsed by Governor Sullivan Chime as the PDP candidate and this got the stamp of stakeholders in the state. The story is not different in Ebonyi State where Governor Martin Elechi endorsed the Minister of Health, Prof. Onyebuchi Chukwu as his possible successor. In Delta, Governor Emmanuel Uduaghan is said to be backing behind a former permanent secretary in the state, Anthony Chuks Obuh, while Governor Godswill Akpabio of Akwa Ibom State is said to have picked the Secretary to the State Government (SSG), Udom Emmanuel as the party's flag bearer. Similarly, some second-term seeking governors that have already gotten their state executives endorsement include: Ramalan Yero (Kaduna); the Acting Governor of Taraba State, Garba Umar; Ibrahim Dankwambo (Gombe); Seriake Dickson (Bayelsa).

Also, the bid of some governors seeking to move to the Senate after the expiration of their terms has already been boosted by the senatorial structures of the PDP as they have been declared as the consensus candidates. Those in this bracket include: Akpabio

(Akwa Ibom), Gabriel Suswam (Benue), Uduaghan (Delta), Saidu Dakingari (Kebbi), Theodore Orji (Abia), Chime (Enugu), Ibrahim Shema (Katsina), Aliyu (Niger), and Isa Yuguda (Bauchi). The Senate President, David Mark, who is seeking a fifth term in the Senate was also been anointed for the seat in Benue State. Unlike President Jonathan's endorsement that had a smooth sail, nearly all the endorsements done at the state level went down with fights, evoking measures of imminent division and possible implosion if not looked into. Claims and counter-claims are the order of the day with the different interests itching for each other jugular. Open protests were staged and protests letters were written to condemn the action of the governors to endorse as opposed to party primaries.

For instance, the purported endorsement of Udom by Akpabio met a brickwall with a former governor in the state, Obong Victor Attah taking his defence against the governor to the PDP National Chairman, Alhaji Adamu Mu'azu in Abuja. Same goes for Enugu where Senator Ayogu Eze is shouting daylight robbery over the endorsement of Ugwuanyi. Clearly, the party is sitting on the edge with these protests and with the opposition watching to cash in on the possible implosion, it is only left to be seen what the party leadership could bring to the table. Perceiving that the outcome of the ventures embarked upon by its governors and state chapters may be counter-productive for the party in 2015, the PDP NWC issued a stern warning to the chapters and their chairman against endorsing any aspirant. At the end of its NWC meeting, the leadership of the party said it has voided the endorsement of governorship, senatorial and other candidates by the governors and state chapters, instructing the governors and state chairmen of PDP to cancel such endorsements.

The report singled out lack of internal democracy in parties to be the root cause of electoral problems in Nigeria and perhaps the determinant of re-election rate of legislators. The report indicted state governors of collectively hijacking Nigerian democracy. The governors according to the document became uncomfortable with the presence of high ranking legislators who developed political clout of their own. It is clearly in the interest of the executive arm and especially governors, the National and State Assemblies continuously suffer from the weakness of high turnover. The document further revealed that state chapters of political parties are increasingly controlled by the governors. It noted that state party leaders normally defer to the instructions of the governor in "a patron-clientele interrelationship."

According to the report, governors are de facto party chairmen at the state level. They determine who gets nominated, who is voted out and who is voted in. Candidates were rarely voted out of office, rather, they were replaced mainly through new arrangements or

nomination decided by party leaders. Senator Jubril Aminu for instance, a victim himself accused state governors of hijacking the entire political process to their side; hence, as party leaders at state level, they decide on the fate of aspirants seeking legislative positions across all levels. The Nigerian Governors' Forum is what is used to oppress everybody including the president; and if it is not checked will put the country in serious trouble. According to the report, working in parallel with governors are political godfathers who have the capacity to determine who is elected where and when in a given state. "Apart from being an undemocratic system, godfatherism influence turnover negatively because of intolerance of the godfathers to any show of independence by their protégés in the National Assembly," the report said.

The report deposed that "by 2003/2007 elections, prominent godfathers and governors became extremely powerful to the extent that political parties had little or no powers to curtail the interest of such individuals." Comparing the Nigerian situation with the UK, the report said currently party control is strong in UK just as Nigeria. However, UK differs in that political parties are highly institutionalised and not subjected to personal interests or whims of godfathers within the party as in Nigeria. All the same, British MPs have only limited scope for independent action if they wish to retain favour of their parties.

c) Incumbency factor

Since the return of democratic governance in 1999, former governors have been in the habit of moving from Government House to the Senate after the expiration of their second term in office. While some of them were pressurized by their people to go to the senate based on their performance in office, others pulled their way through without minding whose ox is gored. The trend, which has grown phenomenal in the polity in recent years, is also gradually becoming part of the country's political norms. Even though it is backed by the 1999 constitution, many believe that it is a trend seeming only obtainable in a country like ours where continuous occupation of public offices and posturing for consistent political relevance is placed above merit and performance. When in Enugu State in 1999, the former governor of old Anambra state and then godfather of the state politics, Chief Jim Nwobodo won the Enugu east senatorial seat by proxy, not many knew it was the beginning of a new trend. After the senatorial election, Nwobodo, who was also a presidential aspirant of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), contested the party's Presidential primaries in Jos, and lost. But he immediately took the Enugu East senatorial seat from his political godson, Nnaji and moved to the Senate in 1999. He also defected from the AD of which the senatorial seat was won to PDP. So Nwobodo was among, if not the first former governor, that went to

Senate with the return of democracy in 1999. Since then the influx of former governors into the senate has remained a common practice in every general elections especially since 2007 till date.

This is despite the clamour for a paradigm shift in the country's political leadership that has been predominantly dominated by the same set of people and their cronies since independence. It would be recalled that with the expiration in 2007 the second term in office of all the state governors elected in 1999, some of them quickly found their way to the senate the same year without delay. Among those that were elected into the Senate in 2007 were Alhaji Bukar Abba Ibrahim (Yobe State), Senator Saminu Turaki (Jigawa State), Senator Chimaroke Nnamani (Enugu), and Senator Abdullahi Adamu (Nasarawa) Adamu Aliero (Kebbi) George Akume (Benue). In 2011 the number rose with the election of Dr. Bukola Saraki (Kwara) Alhaji Danjuma Goje (Gombe) Dr. Chris Ngige (Anambra) and Joshua Dariye (Plateau). Senator Chimaroke Nnamani (Enugu), Alhaji Saminu Turaki (Jigawa) and senator Adamu Aliero (Kebbi) who were in the senate in 2007 failed to win their re-election in 2011 due to some political differences with their successors and other factors. The likes of Orji Uzor Kalu (Abia) Attahiru Bafarawa (Sokoto) Boni Haruna (Adamawa), Rev. Jolly Nyame (Taraba) Gbenga Daniel (Ogun) and others who could not find their way to the senate immediately after their second term as governors expired have not been finding it easy politically.

The attempts to move to Senate in the last general elections failed them as they lost out in the election. But it seems they are not relenting yet as many of them contested for the senatorial seats in 2015 general elections. The development pitched some of the governors against incumbent senators of their zones. A development *Eme & Okeke (2015)* posited caused ripples and rivalry in some political parties already. A serving senator had disclosed at peak of the defection and counter-defection in the National Assembly that their party leadership promised them automatic tickets for 2015 election. According to the senator: We were promised automatic return ticket for 2015, but some of were skeptical about it, considering that most second term governors of their party platform want to go to the senate in 2015. It was obvious they just used it as a political gimmick to discourage them from defecting to another party.

Supporting this thesis, the NILS report noted that one of the most worrisome cause of high turnover, the report stated, is the "ruling party" incumbency dominance syndrome. According to the findings, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) which ascended to dominance in 1999, surpassed that of any previous government in Nigeria. In 1999, the PDP won commanding majority of 68 per cent of seats in the National Assembly, with nearly identical margin in both houses. "This increased to 69 per cent in Senate after

the 2003 elections, and 80.7 per cent in 2007. PDP, for the first time in 2011 lost its poise in National Assembly as its presence in Senate fell from 80 percent to 66 per cent due to the rise of parties such as Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) and Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) thus breaking the continuity pattern after 2015 elections.

d) *Quality of challengers*

What then is the place of opposition merger/coalition in the promotion of electoral turnover? In order to engage this question, it is apposite to begin with the rise of effective opposition to counter the PDP. It would be recalled that the APC was a product of the merger of the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigerian People's Party (ANPP), and a breakaway faction of the All Progressive's Grand Alliance (APGA) led by Rochas Okorocha, the Governor of Imo State. Aimed essentially at supplanting the PDP, the emergence of APC as a mega party made the contest for 2015 more intense. The APC gained more strength when a breakaway faction of the PDP, initially christened the new PDP and led by five incumbent PDP governors, a former National Chairman of the Party, leading members of the National Assembly in both chambers and their teaming supporters, defected *en masse* to the APC due to irreconcilable differences within the PDP. The NILS report noted that while it is argued that in the US, the high retention rate of legislators is partly explained by the well-established stature of incumbents compared to the lower quality challengers in emerging democracies such as Nigeria and South Africa. It continued that due to the established and dominant role of previous dictatorial governments, the new political class lacks confidence and remained cowed.

For example, in 1999 only 15 of the 360 members of the House of Representatives listed their prior occupation as politicians with the majority citing backgrounds in business, professional businesses such as accounting or law firms, education, and agriculture. That is why the 4th National Assembly has the highest number (78 per cent) of members who had educational qualifications of first degree and above. The percentage dropped to 66 per cent in 2011. The reason for the decline in academic quality of legislators is not unconnected with the developing confidence of the political class in the new democracy. The list obtained from the Independent National Electoral Commission, INEC, indicates that Abia and Gombe state are the highest contributors of female members to the House of Reps. Both states produced two female winners each. Yobe, the hotbed of Boko Haram insurgency, also produced one female Rep. member.

e) *Politics of zoning and power sharing*

Zoning is also seen to be responsible for the low retention rate amongst Nigerian lawmakers.

Provisions on federal character and zoning in section 14 of the 1999 Constitution (as amended) has been adopted by political parties at national and state levels in power sharing.

Section 14 (3) and (4) of the 1979 Constitution" Section 14 (3) clearly spelt out the *modus operandi* of the Federal Character principles as follows:

The composition of the government of the Federation or any of its agencies be carried out in such manner as to reflect the Federal Character of Nigeria and the need to promote national unity and also to command loyalty thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or any of its agencies (The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979).

Although in practice, existing legislators can be re-nominated for re-election irrespective of zoning considerations depending on the interest of the party leadership, governors, godfathers and political clout of individual legislators, the research observed that the party leadership can also use the zoning principle as an excuse to reject an incumbent. In some cases, the local governments could fiercely insist on taking their turn and cause the party to de-nominate an incumbent. For instance, Senator Theodore Orji of Abia joined the league of second term governors in the Senate. Stakeholders from the governor's Abia Central Senatorial Constituency at the end of a meeting last year, said the resolution was upon what they described as the governor's good work in office. One time national chairman of the Peoples Democratic Party, PDP, Prince Vincent Ogbulafor was among the several stakeholders from the party who were at the meeting that was organized by eight members of the House of Assembly from the area. The adoption of the governor as the zone's sole candidate for the Senate seat was irrespective of the intentions of the present occupant of that seat, Senator Nkechi Nwaogu. Senator Nwaogu, a veteran political fighter who fought her way to relevance in the House of Representatives and in 2007, triumphed over two senators to take the Abia Central seat in the Senate. A couple of senators are, however, not as lucky as Nwaogu.

However, the most contentious battle was the tit for tat war fought between the Deputy President of the Senate, Senator Ike Ekweremadu and Governor Sullivan Chime of Enugu State for the Enugu West Senatorial District. It was not news that Ekweremadu and Chime were at each other's juggler. There are no pretenses that Chime wanted to come to the Senate at the expiration of his tenure in 2015. The battle was so fierce that the governor some time last year embargoed another term for all the Enugu team in the National Assembly. But Chime did not have a smooth sail. He was promptly challenged by some other members not only

Ekweremadu. They pointedly told him that he lacks the constitutional powers to deny any member the right to contest if the person so wish. Just like the normal sibling rivalry, the Ekweremadu and Chime contest, was a rivalry that emanated from their days under Governor Chimaroke Nnamani. Ekweremadu became Chief of Staff when Chime as Special Adviser reported to him. When Ekweremadu became Secretary to the State Government, Chime became a commissioner reporting to the SSG. When Ekweremadu became Deputy President of the Senate, Chime in turn became governor and thence some claim, commenced a battle by the governor to express himself outside Ekweremadu's shadow. The shadow boxing between both men which occurred for most of the first term turned full blown recently at a meeting between the governor and members of the National Assembly from Enugu State during which the governor decreed that members who had served for two or more terms would not be returning to the National Assembly. That meeting was almost a reminder of that night in 2007 when then Governor Chimaroke Nnamani had lined up Enugu members of the National Assembly and his associates at home and dictated what and what offices they would vie for in the 2007 election.

Ekweremadu, however, stood up to Chime and told him that he had no capacity to dictate for them and moved that the meeting be closed if the governor had no other agenda. Ekweremadu's stern stance reportedly emboldened another member of the National Assembly who seconded his motion for the adjournment of the meeting. Since that controversial meeting, Ekweremadu and the governor have not sat together but aides and associates have increasingly exchanged barbs. Ekweremadu who it was believed was about relinquishing his seat in 2015, it was learnt, has based on the challenge from the governor now set himself for a possible challenge with the governor who had set his sights on Ekweremadu's seats. Ekweremadu who has through his influence drawn several Federal Government projects to his Enugu West constituency had through an aide accused the governor's camp of trying to destroy constituency projects facilitated to the constituency.

f) *Election malpractices*

The prevalence of election malpractice has been identified as another factor causing the high turnover of legislators in Nigeria. Governors, godfathers and well-resourced aspirants are culpable of perpetuating electoral fraud and manipulating the election processes. In Nigeria, the history of elections has shown that the populace cannot look toward to them as a significant force in charging their material conditions of existence. Apart from crumbs when politicians and political parties throw out as inducements to the electors at election time, the masses of the people have gone through one election after

another since 1923 without noticing any significant change for the better in their material conditions. Whatever change may have taken place cannot be traced to the electoral process.

Apart from the above, elections in Nigeria have also brought untold hardship to the people. The violence and thuggery which are always associated with electoral have caused havoc to the life and property of the palace. The general electoral atmosphere of intimidation; victimization, abuse, hostility, denial of the right of opponents to free speech and assembly, and the blatant disregard of cherished rules, norms and regulations by political actors increases the insecurity of the population.

These changes have generated major problems for the electoral process of Nigeria. Among these problems are:

- Electoral malpractices: these have illegal possession and printing of ballot papers, stuffing of ballot boxes with ballot papers, manipulation of electoral laws, beating-up opponents imprisonment and killing of real and alleged political opponents, denial of electoral rights to citizens, padding of falsehood by the mass media, character assassination, non-enforcement of electoral laws. The offenders have been government officials, law enforcement, electoral officers, security agents, politicians and supporters and other Nigerians.
- Electoral violence
- Inadequate security for the electorates, electoral officials together with inefficient, law enforcement.
- Ignorance, indiscipline and gullibility of the electorate.
- Inefficiency of the electoral referee,
- Inefficiency of the mass media is carrying out electoral tasks;
- Inadequate funding and disbursement of funds by the electoral commission and
- Improper spending of funds by politician and their agents (Nnoli, 1987:45).

Electoral governance is a crucial variable in securing the credibility of elections in emerging democracies, but remains largely ignored in the comparative study of democratization. Universally, election is regarded as the heart beat of representative democracy. A credible election not only confers legitimacy on political leadership, it is also crucial to the sustenance of democratic order. Election provides citizens with the freedom to choose their rulers and to decide on public policy. Under any democratic system, citizens who are legally qualified to exercise franchise are provided with opportunity to choose political alternatives and to make decisions that express their preferences. In a multi-party dispensation, this choice is

made out of the several parties and candidates competing in the electoral market.

Party primaries are rarely conducted with any sincerity or hope that the ultimate nominee will be the candidate with the most votes. Rather, primaries turn out to be shams and serve to confirm the candidates picked by the party hierarchy. For example, in Rivers State, the ruling party substituted for the name of the candidate who won the governorship primaries the name of a party member favoured by the party hierarchy who did not participate in the governorship primaries.

The NILS report disclosed that in 2007, the election into the National Assembly suffered credibility problems just as previous elections “as the presidency, and the ruling party (PDP) elite seemed determined to secure the outcome. It is a well-known fact that the 2007 elections were judged to be the worst in Nigeria’s history. The ruling party (PDP) won nearly three quarter of the seats in the National Assembly. More than 10 gubernatorial elections were overturned, and dozens of National Assembly seats were transferred or substituted for new voting.” The researchers observed that there seems to be a wind of change in the country’s electoral process. It appraised the 2011 Electoral Act and the administration of the 2011 elections, which it said the international community also acknowledged as one of the best in the nation’s history.

According to the report, while we expect more transparency and credible elections in the future, intra-party primaries remains a source of serious concern as the primaries are predetermined by governors and godfathers. It is thus expected that despite improvement in electoral transparency, high turnover of legislators will continue as many will continue to fail to be nominated or voted out at intra-party primary elections level not due to poor performance but the whims of party leaders.

IV. IMPLICATIONS

The legislature is the least developed of the three arms of government, which is a factor of the reality of our political evolution, where the military had been in power for almost three-quarter of our post-independence period. Each time the military came, the legislature was under lock and key. It was not allowed to grow along with the other arms of government. So the growth has been stunted and that stunted growth has also affected the capacity. We still have serious issues with capacity in the legislature. And we have not also helped the situation because of the rapid turnover. For example, from the 2011 senate, out of 109 senators only 23 returned. That is a serious issue. The truth is each time that you have a new person coming to the scene, he or she has to learn the ropes. There is no magic about it. Irrespective of what you read, it is not the same thing as when you are faced with the reality of the situation. This is because the re-election rates in Nigeria

are too low to allow for capacity retention and growth in the institutional confidence of the legislature to enable effective performance. Speaking at the beginning of a five -day induction course for newly elected members of the National Assembly organized by the National Institute for Legislative Studies (NILS), Senator Mark regretted that only a few lawmakers would be returning, which, according to him, would impact negatively on the legislature.

During the March 28 presidential and National Assembly polls, over 70 senators and more than 250 members of the House of Representatives failed in their attempts to retain their seats. This, according to the former Senate President, was not good for Nigeria’s democracy, positing that when people are new to a system, it takes time for them to adjust and learn the procedures. It is going to take time for them to even find their ways even round the National Assembly building itself. So, it will be a very slow start obviously. If the members returning are more, things will start a lot quicker.

The legislators are not the only one that lack capacity in this regard, also legislative support staff do not have the capacity to provide the needed legislative support. The capacity lapses in Nigerian legislature manifests mainly in the areas of law making and legislative process, financial and technicalities, oversight function etc. At both state and federal levels, Legislatures surrender to the wishes of the executive rather than being in the obligation to perform the functions given to them by the 1999 Constitution. The PDP last year endorsed David Mark without undergoing primaries. This was, however, predicated on the thinking that Mark’s endorsement was consistent with the position of the party apparatchik that there may not be need for changing a good hand much less a winning team.

Since his ascendancy to the Sixth Senate, Mark’s leadership is believed to have brought about the stability of the upper chamber of the National Assembly. This is particularly instructive when compared to the frequency at which the leadership changed in the fourth and fifth senate. There is no gainsaying therefore that the stability in the present legislature under Mark is responsible for the stability in the nation’s body polity. Mark’s leadership, without much ado, has had to intervene each time the country was at crossroads. Amongst such interventions are the Doctrine of Necessity in 2010, the resolution of the January 2012 fuel subsidy strike, the Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) strike and most recently, the strike by the Nigeria Medical Association (NMA).

Whilst such interventions are seen to speak more to Mark’s impressive leadership, it is nonetheless a success story made possible with the assistance of his deputy, Senator Ike Ekweremadu, and the Senate Leader, Senator Victor Ndoma-Egba. The home front

secured, the leadership has helped re-position the National Institute of Legislative Studies (NILS) to build capacity and advocacy for Nigerian parliamentarians even as Ekweremadu has transformed the Parliament of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as its Speaker.

Indeed, Ndoma-Egba is largely touted as having lived up to his billings, but has also been able to forge a close-knit relationship with his colleagues. An example was his role in the period that some members of his PDP defected to the All Progressives Congress (APC).

In fact, when their defection letter became a big issue and threatened to undermine their unity both as members of the senate and PDP, it was Ndoma-Egba who was handed the assignment to save the day. As the only Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) in the Nigerian legislature, Ndoma-Egba guided the senate, particularly in the area of law. His experience and knowledge of the Constitution is believed to have helped guided the running of the senate. Consistent with Mark's policy which thrives on delegating authority, Ndoma-Egba hosted the first ever African Legislative Summit in Abuja on November 2013, where he assembled parliamentarians from all over Africa. He still coordinates the summit as its president.

Former President Goodluck Jonathan had also sent him across Africa as his special envoy to lobby other African parliaments, the result of which was the emergence of Hon. Bethel Amadi (from the House of Representatives) as President of the Pan-African Parliament. It was the first time that a Nigerian parliamentarian would hold such a high position on the continent. It is against this backdrop that scholars believe that such opportunities would be lost on the country should Mark, Ekweremadu and Ndoma-Egba fail to return to the chamber in 2015. This perception is predicated on the fact that changing the leadership of the National Assembly at this time has not only local but also international implications for Nigeria. This is because parliaments all over the world are now involved in diplomacy, both within and outside the shores of their respective countries.

Sadly, the parliament is one institution where there's no hand-over note. Once a lawmaker is kicked out, whatever experience he or she may have garnered goes with him; time and money are wasted. Against this backdrop, if turnover bug is allowed to continue in post-2015, the nation would have lost huge resources, not only in monetary terms but also in terms of manpower, clout and experience. The tables below capture the empirical analysis of causal variables underscoring high legislative turnover in Nigeria in general and the South-east in particular:

Table 1 : Legislative Turnover in Abia State between 1999-2015

S/N	State	Constituency	Name of Candidate	Year	Sex	Party	Constituency	Year	Name of Candidate	Sex	Party
1	Abia	Isialangwa North/South	1. Nwakanwa Chimaobi 2. Anayo Damian Ozurumba 3. Chineye Fredinard Ike 4. Darlinton Nwokocho	1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2015 2015-2019	M	PDP	Abia North	1999-2003	Ike Nwachukwu	M	PDP
2	Abia	Ikwaano Umuahia	1. Iheanacho Obioma 2. Atuma Emeka 3. Stanley U. Ohajuruka 4. Udo Ibeji 5. Samuel Ifeanyi Onuigbo	1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2011 2011-2015 2015-2019	M	PDP	Abia Central		Bob Nwannunu	M	ANPP
3	Abia	Bende	1. Njoku Nnamdi 2. Mba Ajah 3. Nnenna Ijeome Ukeje 4. Elendu-Ukeje Nnenna L. I.	1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2015 2015-2019	F	PDP	Abia South		Adolphus Wabara	M	PDP
4	Abia	Aba North/South	1. Anthony Eze Enwereuzor 2. Nnanna Uzor Kalu 3. Uzo Azubuike 4. Ossy Prestige Chinedu Ehiriodo O Ossy	1999-2003 2003-2011 2011-2015 2015-2019	M	APGA	Abia North	2003-2007	Uche Chukwumerije	M	PDP
5	Abia	Arochukwu Ohafia	1. Mao Arukwe Ohuabunwa 2. Uduma Kalu 3. Arua Arunsi 4. Nkole Uko Ndukwe	1999-2007 2007-2011 2011-2015 2015-2019	M	PDP	Abia Central		Chris Adighije	M	PDP
6	Abia	Obingwa/Ugwunagbo/Osisioma	1. Clifford Oniagu 2. Nkechi Justina Nwaogu 3. Eziuchi Chimwe Ubani 4. Solomon Adaelu Ezinwa O.	1999-2003 2003-2007 2007-2015 2015-2019	M	PDP	Abia South		Adolphus Wabara	M	PDP
7	Abia	Isuikwuato/Umunneochi	1. Uchechukwu N. Maduako 2. Nkiru Onyejocha 3. Onyejeocha Nkeruka Chiduben	1999-2007 2007-2015 2015-2019	F	PDP	Abia North	2007-2015	Enyinnaya Abaribe Harcourt	M	PDP
8	Abia	Ukwa East/West	1. Macebuh Chinonyerem 2. Uzoma Nkem Abonta 3. Abonta Uzoma Nkem	1999-2007 2007-2015 2015-2019	M	PDP	Abia Central		Nkechi Justina Nwaogu	F	PDP
							Abia South		Uche Chukwumerije	M	PPA
							Abia North	2015-2019	Mao Ohuabunwa	M	PDP
							Abia Central		Theodore Orji	M	PDP
							Abia South		Enyinnaya Abaribe Harcourt	M	PDP

Table 2 : Legislative Turnover in Anambra State between 1999-2015

S/N	State	Constituency	Name of Candidate	Year	Sex	Party	Constituency	Year	Name of Candidate	Sex	Party
1	Anambra	Aguata	1. Duru Chidi Okechukwu 2. Eucharita Azodo Okwunna	1999-2007 2015-2019	F	PDP	Anambra Central	1999-2003	Chuba Okadigbo	M	PDP
2	Anambra	Nnewi North South/Ekwusigo	1. Efobi Bertrand Maduka 2. Chris Emeka Azubogu	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Anambra South		Mike Ajeogo	M	PDP
3	Anambra	Ihiala	1. Okeke Frederick A. U. 2. Anohu Chukwuemeka Reginald	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Anambra North		Nnamdi Eriobuna	M	PDP
4	Anambra	Anaocha/Njikoka/ Dunukofia	1. Chukwuemeka Chikelu 2. Okechukwu Nnamdi Eze	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Anambra North	2003-2007	Ugochukwu Uba	M	PDP
5	Anambra	Anambra East/West	1. Anosike Emma 2. Madubueze Peter Obiano	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	APGA	Anambra Central		Emmanuel Anosike	M	PDP
6	Anambra	Orumba North/South	Okechukwu Udeh	1999-2007			Anambra South		Ikechukwu Abana	M	PDP
7	Anambra	Idemili North/South	1. Ugokwe Jerry Sonny 2. Obinna-Chidoka	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Anambra Central	2007-2011 2011-2015	Annie Okonkwo Chris Ngige	M M	PDP APC
8	Anambra	Awka North/South	1. Offodile Chudi 2. Anayo Nnebe	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Anambra South		Ikechukwu Obiorah	M	PDP
9	Anambra	Ogbaru	1. Uzoka Okwudili 2. Chukwuka Onyema Wilfred	1999-2007 2015-2019	M	PDP	Anambra North	2011-2015	Joy Emodi (PDP) (annulled) Alphonsus Obi Igbeke Magi Okadigbo	F M F	ANPP ANPP PDP
10	Anambra	Onitsha North/South	1. Ikpeazu Lynda Chuba 2. Idu Emeka Godwin Obiajulu	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Anambra Central	2015-2019	Uche Ekwunife	F	PDP
11	Anambra	Oyi/Ayamelum	1. Ughanze Celestine Nnaemeka 2. Onyenwufe Gabriel	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	APGA	Anambra South	2011-2019	Andy Uba	M	PDP
							Anambra North	2015-2019	Stella Oduah	F	PDP

Table 3 : Legislative Turnover in Ebonyi State between 1999-2015

S/N	State	Constituency	Name of Candidate	Year	Sex	Party	Constituency	Year	Name of Candidate	Sex	Party
1	Ebonyi	Ebonyi/Chaukwu	1. Elizabeth Ogbaga 2. Peter Oge Ali 3. Nwazunku Chukwuma	2007-2011 2011-2015 2015-2019	M	PDP	Ebonyi Central	1999-2003	Sylvanus Ngele	M	PDP
2	Ebonyi	Ohazara Onicha-Ivo	1. Okereke D. Onuabunchi 2. Okorie Linus 3. Okorie Linus Abaa	2007-2011 2011-2015 2015-2019	M	PDP	Ebonyi North		Vincent Obasi Usulor	M	PDP
3	Ebonyi	Etza North Isihielu	1. Paulinus Igwe Nwagu 2. Peter Edeh Onyemaechi 3. Anayo Edwin	2007-2011 2011-2015 2015-2019	M	PDP	Ebonyi South		Anyim Pius Anyim	M	PDP
4	Ebonyi	Izzi/Abakaliki	1. Sylvester Ogbaga	2007-2019	M	PDP	Ebonyi North	2003-2007	Christopher Nshi	M	PDP
5	Ebonyi	Afikpo North/South	1. Omo Christopher Isu 2. Igaritwey Iduma Enwo	2007-2015 2015-2019	M	PDP	Ebonyi Central		Julius Ucha	M	PDP
6	Ebonyi	Etza South/Ikwo	1. Chima Innocent Ugo 2. Okwuru Chukwuemeka Tobias 3. Ogbee Lazarus N.	2007-2011 2011-2015 2015-2019	M	APGA	Ebonyi South		Emmanuel A. Azu	M	PDP
							Ebonyi North	2007-2011	Anthony Agbo	M	PDP
							Ebonyi South		Anyimchukwu Ude	M	PDP
							Ebonyi Central		Chris Nwankwo	M	PDP
							Ebonyi North	2011-2015	Anthony Agbo	M	PDP
							Ebonyi South		Anyimchukwu Ude	M	PDP
							Ebonyi Central		Chris Nwankwo	M	PDP
							Ebonyi Central	2015-2019	Ogba Joseph	M	PDP
							Ebonyi North		Samuel Egwu	M	PDP
							Ebonyi South		Sunday Oji	M	PDP

Table 4 : Legislative Turnover in Enugu State between 1999-2015

S/N	State	Constituency	Name of Candidate	Year	Sex	Party	Constituency	Year	Name of Candidate	Sex	Party
1	Enugu	Enugu North/South	1. Ofor Gregory Chukwuogbo 2. Chime Oji Agu	2007-2011 2015-2019	M	PDP	Enugu East	1999-2003	Jim Nwobodo W Hyde Onuaguluchi	M	AD
2	Enugu	Nkanu East/West	1. Peace Uzoamaka Nnaji 2. Chukwuemeka Ujam	2007-2011 2015-2019	M	PDP	Enugu West		(Nullified) Ben-Collins Ndu	M	ANPP
3	Enugu	Udenu Igboeze North	1. Ugwuanyi Ifeanyi 2. Agbo Dennis Nnamdi	2007-2011 2015-2019	M	PDP	Enugu North		Fidelis Okoro	M	PDP
4	Enugu	Nsukka/Igboeze South	1. Ikechukwu Ugwuogede	2015-2019	M	PDP	Enugu East	2003-2007	Ken Nnamani	M	PDP
5	Enugu	Uzo-Uwani/ Igbo Etiti	1. Paul Okwudili Eze 2. Stella Uchena Obiageli Ngwu	2007-2011 2015-2019	F	PDP	Enugu West		Ike Ekweremadu	M	PD
6	Enugu	Oji River/Aninri, Awgu	1. Oguakwa K. G. B 2. Toby Okechukwu	2007-2011 2015-2019	M	PDP	Enugu North		Fidelis Okoro	M	PDP
7	Enugu	Udi/Ezeagu	1. Ogbuefi Ozombachi 2. Amadi Oguerirwa Denis	2007-2011 2015-2019	M	PDP	Enugu East	2007-2011	Chimaroke Nnamani	M	PDP
8	Enugu	Enugu East/Isi – Uzo	1. Gilbert Nnaji 2. Kingsley Sunny Ebanyi	2007-2011 2015-2019	M	PDP	Enugu West		Ike Ekweremadu	M	PDP
							Enugu North	2011-2015	Ayogu Eze	M	PDP
							Enugu East	2015-2019	Gilbert Nnaji	M	PDP
							Enugu West		Ike Ekweremadu	M	PDP
							Enugu North		Utazi Chukwuka	M	PDP

Table 5 : Legislative Turnover in Imo State between 1999-2015

S/N	State	Constituency	Name of Candidate	Year	Sex	Party	Constituency	Year	Name of Candidate	Sex	Party
1	Imo	Isialambano/Okigwe/ Onuimo	1. Ibekwe MauriceObasi 2. Onwubuarika Kinsley Obinna	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Imo East	1999-2003	Owerri Ifeanyi Ararume	M	PDP
2	Imo	Ehime-Mbarano/ Ihitte Uboma/Obowo	1. Nwajiuba Chukwuemeka U. 2. Chike John Okafor	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	APC	Imo West	1999-2003	Okigwe Evan Enwerem	F	PDP
3	Imo	Ahiazu/Mbaise/Ezinhitte	1. Anyanwu Tony 2. Raphael Uzochi Igbokwe	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Imo North	1999-2003	Orlu Arthur Nzeribe	M	ANPP
4	Imo	Owerri Municipal/Owerri N/Owerri West	1. Oguike Levi 2. Ezenwa Onyewuchi Dike Cajethan O.	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Imo East	2003-2007	Owerri Amah Iwuagwu	M	PDP
5	Imo	Orlu/Oru East/Orsu		1999-2003 2015-2019			Imo West		Okigwe Ifeanyi Godwin Araraume	M	PDP
6	Imo	Nkwerre/ Isu/Njaba, Nwangele	1. Osuala Christopher Chukwuemeka 2. Chukwudi Victor Jones Onyereri	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Imo North	1999-2003	Orlu Arthur Nzeribe	M	PDP
7	Imo	Ohaji/Egbema Oru, West Oguta	1. Eze Okere Tony 2. Goodluck Opia Nanah	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Imo East	2007-2011	Chris Anyanwu	F	PDP
8	Imo	Mbaitoli Ikeduru	1. Nwole Uchenna 2. Nwawuba Henry Ugochukwu	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Imo West		Hope Uzodinma	M	PDP
9	Imo	Ideato/North/ Ideato/South	1. Ezeani Nnamdi 2. Chukwukere Austine Ikechukwu O.	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	APC	Imo North		Achonu Nneji	M	ACN
10	Imo	Aboh Mbaise/Ngor Okpala	1. Egu Greg C. 2. Bede Eke Uchenna	1999-2003 2015-2019	M	PDP	Imo East	2011-2015	Chris Anyanwu	F	APGA
							Imo West		Hope Uzodinma	M	PDP
							Imo North		Achonu Nneji	M	PDP
							Imo East	2015-2019	Samuel Anyanwu	M	PDP
							Imo West		Uzodinma Goodhope	M	PDP
							Imo North		Achonu Nneji	M	PDP

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Much as the buck of the work lies with the political parties, it is expedient to note that only lawmakers adjudged to have raised the bar in their legislative mandate be allowed to return to the Senate and the House of Representatives. That way, Nigeria may have begun a reality check for an institutional legislature. It therefore recommended that measures be taken with an expected outcome of increase re-election rates of legislators to at least 50 per cent in order to retain institutional memory and capacity in Nigerian democracy, particularly the legislature.

Accordingly, a transparent, free and real competitive elections in the polity will help reduce the high turnover regime. The quality of representation and legislative performance generally will improve if elections are based on transparent objective standards and if nomination of candidates are based on good performance and accountability. Again, having foreseen the challenges incessant high turnover will present to the legislative processes, it is suggested that organizing training and retraining programmes for the legislators at national and state levels to ensure constructive representation, lawmaking and oversight will be helpful. It is hopeful that the legislators will present themselves for proper learning.

VI. CONCLUSION

The pre- and post-electoral turnover of Members of Parliament proved to be consistently high in the Nigerian political parties and parliaments (elected through majoritarian electoral systems) included in this study, often very high. The position of MPs is much less secure than that of their colleagues in other countries. On average around half the MPs did not stand again for their own party. Some of these cases will naturally be voluntary retirements, but there are few reports of MPs having grown tired of sitting in parliaments, most of which have only existed for some 8 to 16 years. Some parliamentarians leave to stand for other parties, but their normally spectacular failure to succeed when doing so indicates that they are either very poor political strategists, or mainly switch when forced in one way or another to do so. On the whole, the available information indicates that the high rate of pre-electoral turnover is largely due to forced de-selection. The indications here is therefore that in comparison to established democracies, Nigerian MPs have significantly less influence over their continued position as the parliamentary representative of the party.

Furthermore, it seems that although falling out with the party leaders can certainly end the career of a parliamentarian, the turnover is not only due to the opinions of the leadership. The information suggests that local party activists can have influence through

protests and threats of withdrawing support. In one way, this could be seen as functioning as a way of exercising accountability, especially when the electoral turnover is very low. This is however open to debate. Money is often of the essence in the process, and the foremost way to win local popularity is through providing benefits, rather than offering policy alternatives. No clear evidence has been found indicating whether or not we should expect the turnout to fall as the African political parties and parliaments grow older and possibly more institutionalised. Members of Parliament in the young Nigerian democracies may face an uncertain future also in the years to come.

Thereafter, the level of electoral turnover in emerging democracies outside of Nigeria was analysed in passing. On average, the turnover was lower in the countries for which data has been found, and closer to what we expect to find in established democracies. This implies that MPs in Nigerian political parties are less likely to return as candidates than their colleagues in other countries that have recently introduced a democratic political system. However, the lack of available data precludes us from drawing any definitive conclusions. Perhaps the most important finding of this paper is the need for continued research on electoral turnover also in non-established democracies, in order to better understand the dynamics of the political parties that inhabit them.

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