



GLOBAL JOURNAL OF HUMAN-SOCIAL SCIENCE: F
POLITICAL SCIENCE

Volume 16 Issue 2 Version 1.0 Year 2016

Type: Double Blind Peer Reviewed International Research Journal

Publisher: Global Journals Inc. (USA)

Online ISSN: 2249-460X & Print ISSN: 0975-587X

State Elites' Policies towards-Balochistan (1947-70). Its Dynamics and Impacts

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GJHSS-F Classification : FOR Code: 369999



Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



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I. INTRODUCTION

The rise of ethno-national movements as a global phenomena has been capturing significant attention from social thinkers. Post-1947 Pakistan represents an excellent case study to examine state elites policies, their dynamics and impacts about these movements. This study focuses on what are the causes and its consequences of the centralist state actors' political policies towards Baluchistan imbroglio. (1947-1970). The state elites, since the birth of the country in 1947, have been grappling with the Baloch-ethnic movement. Their "state building policies" turned out to be counter-productive as the Baloch-ethnic movement has led to upsurge and separatist course. The four mini wars were broke out between the insurgents and the state of Pakistan. The impacts of their policies have been contributively to the rise of Baloch-ethnic movement and disruptive of national unity.

II. FIRST BALOCH INSURGENCY

a) *The Accession Arrangement with State elites*

Pakistan took control of the Khanate on 15 April, 1948 in accordance with 3rd June plan after the Khan had inked an agreement of accession with Pakistani authorities (Rana, 2008). Tahir Amin, a well known political analyst and writer is of the opinion that Khan of Kalat entered in the accession arrangement with state elites unwillingly. He was left disappointed to get help from India and Russia. Secondly, he was threatened with the of use of force against his state by the government of Pakistan (Amin, 1998).

b) *Prince Abdul Karim Never Reconciled to the Changed Poition of the Khante*

Prince Abdul Karim, younger brother of the Khan, never reconciled to the changed position of the Khanate after its accession to Pakistan. (Dashti, 2012). He, along with his companions, decided to take up arms against the state of Pakistan (Ahmad, 1988). He entered Afghanistan with a hope of getting assistance for

liberation movement. The Baloch freedom fighters tried to get help and sympathies of the Baloch Sardars for their cause. The Russian and Afghanistan governments were also approached in this regard (Baloch, 1987). They also spared no efforts in creating chaos and unrest like situation in Balochistan (Awan, 1985). Muhammad Hussain. Anka, Malik Saeed Dehwar, Abdul Wahid Kurd, Qadir Bakhsh (Baloch Nationalists) backed the armed resistance movement. (Titus, 1996), However, it was not favoured by Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Gul Khan and Abdul Aziz Kurd because they were not certain about internal and external support (Dehewar, 1994). Afghanistan could not be supportive of the cause of Baloch movement because it was in conflict with its own demand of "Pashtunistan" spreading from Chitral to Balochistan in the Arabian sea. (Baloch, 1987). Afghanistan supported movement for the Pushtunistan both militarily and financially across the Durand Line (Titus, Paul, Swidler, Nina. Feb., 2000)). Thus, due to lack of internal unity and external support it failed (Baloch, 1987). Realising the failure to materialize the liberation struggle, Abdul Karim returned back on 8th July and was arrested. His trial began on 27 November, 1948 by special Jirga in Mach Jail. He was awarded ten years rigorous imprisonment and was fined Rs 5000. His other companions were also sentenced and fined (Nasir, 1982).

c) *Ustamam Gall or the Peoples Party*

Upon his release, Abdul Karim Khan formed a new political party (Ustamam Gall) or the people's party. It focused on the formation of Baloch province. The Wrore Pashtun led by Achakzai was also working on the same lines in Pushtun dominated areas of Balochistan (Awan, 1985). The Khan's dream of making it all embracing Baloch Political Party never materialized because it received cold response from Makran, Kharan and Lasbela (Awan, 1985).

III. INITIAL INSIATIVES BY THE SATE ELITES TOARDS BALUCHISTAN

a) *Formation of Advisory Council*

Jinnah had a desire to change the statuesquo in Balochistan. To fulfil his pledge he established Governor General's Advisory Council in Balochistan (Khan, 2009). It was made to sure public's participation in the governance of their province (Axmann, 2008) It was nominated body of the areas of British Balochistan. The announcement was a big step forward for the province. According to Axmann, it was established on 11 June, 1949 (Axmann, 2008). However, it did not come up to the expectations of the people because it was only a recommending body. It consisted of two members with nominal powers. It was devoid of composite representative enlarged body of all areas forming British Balochistan. All hopes were dashed to pieces regarding people's representatives' participation

in the governance of the province. The real powers were with the AGG to whom the Advisory Council merely referred any matter in the form of proposal for consideration. Eventually, it met its death on 1st September, 1951. The council was formed as a body so that it may have check on the decision and administrative planning of the AGG but its original position and capacity was not as it envisioned. (Ahmad, 1992).

b) *Report of the Reform Committee*

Another step taken by the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan to bring constitutional and administrative change in Balochistan was the appointment of a Reform Committee on 4 October, 1950. It was composed of five members. It visited each and every corner of the British Balochistan. Its report was a remarkable step in the constitutional and political history of British Balochistan. The report of the committee proposed provincial autonomy and raising it to the status of Governor's province. It also stressed upon the introduction of adult franchise and enlarged powers to the provinces. The creation of local bodies institutions were also regarded as inevitable (Axmann, 2008). The topmost central administration opposed the report of the committee and was not given practical shape in the post-colonial Balochistan. The arguments given in this regard were far from convincing like weak financial position and under population of the post-colonial Balochistan. Jinnah had earlier set aside the arguments by saying that centre would share the financial difficulties of the province for the sake of progress and welfare of people (Axmann, 2008).

c) *Balochistan States Union (BSU)*

The state authorities decided to integrate four states of Kalat, Mekran, Kharan and Lasbela into 'Balochistan States Union' (BSU). All four states agreed to the idea in March 1952. (Awan, 1985). It had common executive, legislature and its administration was to be headed by the Prime Minister. The permission of the government of Pakistan was needed in the removal or nomination of the Prime Minister. However, Council of Rulers had the powers to appoint or remove him. The Council of Rulers, comprising four rulers of the states, headed by a President was to be selected among the rulers in rotation. Accordingly, the Khan of Kalat, Mir Ahmad Yar Khan, was chosen as the President of the council. BSU had its own cabinet to be chosen from the Assemblies. They could not be appointed or dismissed without the prior approval of the government. The agreement provided for a legislative council of 28 elected and 12 nominated members. Aga Abdul Hamid, a civil servant, was appointed as the Prime Minister of the Union (Awan, 1985). Awan also maintained that Ahmad Yar Khan took it as a chance to emerge as the future leader of the post-colonial Balochistan. He also urged the Marri and Bugti tribes to demand for their

joining in BSU. He further writes that BSU was a 'a trap' to lure Khan before demolishing him (Awan, 1985). Where as, Dehwar views that topmost central authorities did not like the institution of BSU and they had some other foolish and dubious designs like one unit at the back of their mind (Dehewar, 1994). The later events also witnessed that the idea of BSU was originated with the aim of merging it with the province of Balochistan. The government finally gave this region a special status (Ahmad, 1992). Special areas were to be part of the province. These areas would not have any representation in the provincial legislature. Provincial Executive, Chief Commissioner or Governor, would control these areas.

d) *Dissolution of First Constituent Assembly*

In the meantime, the dispute between the Constituent Assembly and the then Governor General, Ghulam Muhammad was moving towards its climax. The Constituent Assembly's two hasty enactments led to its dissolution by Governor General on 24 October, 1954. Governor General was annoyed with the Constituent Assembly when it asserted its powers. Firstly, it repealed 'PRODA' (Public and Representative Offices Disqualification Act, 1949). (Rizvi,1886). It was made during Liaquat's period to check the mal-administration, mismanagement, and corruption in the society. The prestige of the Constituent Assembly was greatly lowered due to this step (Khan, 2006). Secondly; it amended the Government of India Act, 1947 by divesting the powers of Governor General to remove the ministries. It was, indeed, a step forward in the growth of parliamentary democracy in Pakistan (Sayeed, 1965). The Constituent Assembly kept the Governor General uniformed on this account. He reacted sharply and dissolved the Constituent Assembly (Ziring, 2006). The Governor General's action could not be justified because it was about to complete its work in regard to the framing of the constitution. If the Governor General had dissolved it when it lost its credibility after the election of 1954 in East Pakistan, his action would have been defended. He did it only to protect his vested interests rather than to protect democratic principle (Khan, 2006).

After dissolving the first Constituent Assembly, civil and military bureaucracy fully asserted and made solo flight in deciding the future of the constitution making history of Pakistan. The formal agreement regarding the integration of the BSU in to Balochistan was signed between the Khan and the Government of Pakistan on 1st January, 1955. Ahmad Yar and other rulers consented to dissolve the BSU and thereby sanctioned the abolition of the states. By raising their annual allowances the government of Pakistan easily succeeded in doing away with Kalat, Karan, Lasbela and Mekran as independent princely states (Axmann, 2008).

IV. POLITICS OF ONE UNIT IN WEST PAKISTAN

a) *The Formation of One Unit Plan*

The most controversial step taken by the second Constituent Assembly was the formation of One Unit Plan (1955) (Rizvi,1896) It was basically the brain child of central state actors, who regarded welding all areas and provinces in to one unit as pre-condition to bring 'the linguistic and cultural homogeneity'. They viewed it that it would eliminate the feelings of provincialism and prejudice. It would also be necessary for viable political and economic system. Defence requirements could also be met. Ayub Khan backed one unit scheme in these words.

Strategically and economically, West Pakistan was destined to stand or fall as a whole lying as it does in the basin of the Indus River and its tributaries, its future economic development must be considered as a whole to achieve the maximum result. West Pakistan, in order to develop properly and prove a bulwark of defence from north and south must be welded in to one unit and all provincial artificial boundaries removed regardless of any prejudices to the contrary, which are more the creation of politicians than real. (Khan, 1967).

Balochistan, instead of achieving a full fledged provincial status, was included in West Pakistan it was actually planned by the central state elites to counter the numerical majority of East Pakistan (Samad,1995) and to foil the political alliances and cooperation between Bengal and smaller provinces (Axmann, 2008). The politics of one unit in west wing further made the smaller provinces and nationalists forces more organized and sensitive about the cultural peculiarities and identities (Harison,1981).

b) *Political Manoeuvring to get One Unit Plan Implemented*

No doubt, the central state actors used all kinds of political manoeuvrings to get One Unit Plan implemented. They succeeded in obtaining Provincial Assemblies' approval for their one unit scheme. Sindh Assembly did not toe the line of civil-military elites and had to pay the price. Pirzada's ministry was dislodged because of its disapproval of one unit. "The major political parties of West Pakistan, Muslim League and the Republican Party were ambiguous, non-committal and opportunistic in their attitude towards one unit." (Afzal, 1976). One unit scheme which was incorporated in the Constitution of 1956 led to the death of federal principle in west Pakistan (Yusuf, 1998), Provincialism could only be lowered by a big change in outlook and policies of the civil-military establishment.

c) *Opposition by Regionalists*

The regionalists in Balochistan were against the One Unit Plan as envisaged by the centralist state actors. They wanted independent status or at least

complete political and economic autonomy for their province. The ethnic actors were sceptical and developed a lot of apprehensions against central state actors' policies. They considered their policies as an invasion on their regional cultures.

d) *Idea of Baloch Homogeneity*

Baloch nationalists even laid stress on homogeneity within Baluchistan rather than language differences between Baloch and Brahavi. They believed Baloch and Brahavi belong to the same origin (Baloch, 1975). They are the branches of the earlier Baloch. (Marri, 1985). A reputed researcher, Tariq Rehman opines that the Khans of Kalat, who were Brahavi rulers, promoted the idea of common origin between Brahavi and Baloch to get help to consolidate their rule (Rehman, 1997).

The Khanate parliament declared on 14 December, 1947 that Baloch would be its national and official language. In practice, however most of the work of Kalat was carried out in Urdu, while correspondence with outsiders was in English. Notwithstanding administrative necessities, it was significant that Balochi nationalism was expressed through Balochi during 227 days of the independence of the Kalat State. (Rehman, 1997).

e) *Concept of Unity through Conformity by the State Elites*

Whereas the Pakistan State elites believed in one nation, one language and one culture (Amin, 1998). They wanted to make Urdu the only national language country. They emphasized a strong centre and used Islam to gain legitimacy. Ethnic identities and cultural diversities were considered as dangerous ideas to the concept of one nation. Ethnic elites were dubbed as "anti-state and anti-Islam". The state elites showed zero tolerance towards regional languages. They believed in unity through conformity (Amin, 1998).

f) *Pakistan-Natioanl Patry (PNP)*

A significant development occurred on 30 November, 1956 when like minded political parties in West-Pakistan formed the political organization by the name of Pakistan-National Party (PNP). The like-minded political groups were Azad Pakistan Party headed by Mian Iftikharuddin, G.M Syed's Awami Party, Wror Pashtun of Abdus Samad Achakzai, Khodai Khidmatgar of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Ustamam Gall (Peoples Party) from Balochistan and Sindh Hari Committee of Hyder Bakhsh Khan Jatoi. All these political forces looked upon the unification plan as usurpation of regional, constitutional, economic and political rights of the small provinces.

g) *Policies of the Ethnic Elites*

The regionalists and separatists forces vehemently opposed the welding of the West-Pakistan in to one unit and demanded its demolition with greater

provincial autonomy to the smaller provinces. Maulana Abdul Hameed Khan Bhashani joined it in 1957. It was renamed National Awami Party (NAP). Abdul Ghaffar Khan was elected its first President. (Awan, 1985). The party manifesto included the following main points. It vowed to defend the territorial integrity of the state. It laid stress upon the independent and non-aligned foreign policy. It demanded the creation of provinces on linguistic lines. Adult franchise should be introduced. It demanded the ending of usurpation and exploitation of the people belonging to different regions. The NAP started to act as opposition front. It also provided a platform to the leftist groups to express their viewpoint on the country politics (Baloch, 2004).

h) *Khan Joined Hands with Nap*

After return from abroad, The Khan found his state of Kalat being a part of one unit, West-Pakistan. He took anti one unit stand and joined hands with NAP in its opposition and abolishing one unit. He again tried to restore his state and creation of an independent homeland for the Baloch. He sought the help of the former Sardars in this regard. He vigorously demonstrated against unification plan. (Awan, 1985).

i) *The Historic Meeting of Baloch Sardars*

The Khan chaired the historic meeting of Baloch Sardars held at the Palace Hotel in Karachi in 1957. It was attended by Nawab Khair Bakhsh Marri, Nawab Ghous Bakhsh Raisani, Mir Jamal Khan Jamali and Nawab Akbar Bugti. The historic demand of the meeting was the dismantling of one-unit and creation of Balochistan province on the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and historical basis (Mazari.1999). When Khan's real determination of the creation of the Khanate of Kalat was exposed to the participants of the meeting most of them opposed it and walked out in protest. (Mazari.1999), Having lost trust of the Sardars, Khan's political future was in jeopardy.

V. SEVERE POLITICAL CRISIS IN PAKISTAN

Meanwhile, Pakistan was confronting severe political crises. It was mostly created due to weak federal parliamentary system. The political parties were not well-organized and well-established. (Choudhury, 2011). They lacked political tradition and norms. The political culture of West-Pakistan was dominated by powerful land and tribal elites. The Muslim League had very short history of organized political struggle. The early death of Jinnah created vacuum. Moreover, the political and constitutional problems were further compounded by federal character of Pakistani society. The West-Wing had dominance in military and bureaucracy. It was also politically dominant. It created a sense of deprivation and alienation among the people of East-Pakistan. (Choudhury, 2011). In the western wing, small provinces were raising head against Punjabi

dominance in the polity. The one unit scheme further promoted apprehensions and reservation of the small provinces, Inter-wings and intra-west-wing conflicts caused a great delay in the constitution making process.

The ambitious civil-military bureaucracy manipulated the circumstances taking advantage of the institution imbalance. It took its benefits and asserted its role in polity. After the dismissal of Nazimuddin's ministry in 1953 and dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly in 1954, the civil-military bureaucracy increased its role in politics and emerged as a key factor in determining the state's policies. President Sikandar Mirza proclaimed Martial Law in the early hours of October 8, 1958. The constitution was abrogated and central and provincial assemblies were dismissed. Political parties were banned and general elections were postponed for an indefinite period. Ayub Khan was appointed as a Supreme-Commander of the Armed Forces of Pakistan.

As earlier discussed, the feeling of neglect and deprivation were compounded in Baluchistan over the issue of one unit. The NAP and the Khan opposed and demanded its dismantling. The ruling elites were anxiously waiting to take the Khan's designs as a pretext to arrest him on the charges of high treason. He was allegedly blamed for conspiracy to merge Kalat with Iran ((Axmann, 2008). He was also accused of reeling Afghanistan's support for proposed Baluchistan rebellion. (Harison, 1981). The Khan, while addressing the workers of the Baluch Academy at Quetta on 26th August, asked for the breaking up of one unit and creation of new province on linguistic basis. (Awan, 1985).

VI. BALUCH ARMED INSURRECTION OF 1958

a) *The Arrest of the Khan*

On the Khan's refusal to meet the President and the Prime Minister to explain his alleged involvement in anti-state activities, the government of Pakistan finally decided to arrest him at the end of September, 1958. (Awan, 1985). Martin Axmann opined that the allegations against the Khan were levelled to pave the way for imposing Martial Law in the country. Awan and Iqbal Ahmed differ with the Axmann's views. They did not see any link between the two-events. The Khan was detained in Kalat allegedly on the blame for starting full-scale Baluch insurgency with the help of 80,000 tribesmen. Pakistani armed forces entered on October, 6 in Kalat finding no such reported numbers of insurgents. As a result of the clashes, a number of tribesmen were killed (Axmann, 2008). The Khan was deprived of all distinctions and privileges by the order of President, Sikandar Mirza. Agha Daud Jan was appointed as his successor. (Axmann, 2008).

Most Baluch considered army's attack on Khanate in 1958 as unprovoked and aggressive. There

was also strong resentment among tribesmen against authorities' demand of turning in their weapons at local police station. (Axmann, 2008). The arrest of the Khan also caused a wave of anger to sweep throughout Baluchistan.

b) *Sardar Nauroz Khan Challenged the Authority of the State*

Sardar Nauroz Khan Zarakazai, an old man of ninety, decided to challenge the authority of the state of Pakistan. He led the major Baluch armed insurrection in support of the Khan. Nauroz Khan was perceived as a notorious fire brand during British times. (Harison, 1981). The chief demand of Nauroz Khan was release of the Khan and breaking up of one unit. He also urged upon the protection of Baluch customs and traditions (Awan, 1985). He, along with his gathered guerrilla force of 1000 men, went to the Mulla Pass. The army launched bombing on the guerrilla hideouts in mountains.

c) *An Agreement Reached between State Elites and Nauroz Khan*

Baluch nationalists opine that an agreement was reached as result of discussion between Pakistani authorities and Nauroz Khan. According to it, tribesman gave up their armed resistance movement in response to general amnesty and safe conduct. Abolishment of one unit was also promised. Sardar Doda Khan Zehri took an oath on the Koran, the Muslims' holy book, assuring the insurgents that authorities had met all their demands. (Axmann, 2008).

According to nationalists' accounts, the authorities dishonoured the pledge by arresting Nauroz Khan and his sons. However, the military government officials declined to accept the authenticity of such agreement. (Axmann, 2008). Nauroz Khan and seven of his followers, including Batay Khan and his sons, were given capital punishment by a special military court held at Mach Jail. Nauroz Khan's death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment due to this old age and his six supporters were executed, (Titus, Paul, Swidler, Nina. Feb., 2000)).

The early two military actions were taken in post-colonial Baluchistan against the Khan. First, to compel him to accede to Pakistan in 1948 and second, on the pretext of his 'anti-state activities' in 1958. That ended and rebels were forced to give in (Cohen, 2009). The next conflict erupted in 1962 after the military operation and the military court' punishment to the leader of second armed rebellion, Nauroz Khan and his followers. Besides repeated military actions in post-colonial Baluchistan and persisted incarceration of Baluch leaders. (Chandio, 2013). The other factors which caused alienation and disillusionment among the people of Baluchistan were the formation of one unit in 1955 and Ayub Khan's Martial Law in 1958.

VII. DISCUSSION

The adopted policies of Ayub's regime, in political, cultural and economic spheres were totally unitary in characteristics. He sustained One Unit Plan and introduced. "Controlled democracy" based on "Basic democracy" (Rizvi, 2003). The civil military elites during Ayub's period believed in using force to suppress the opposition. The government intensified the military operation in Balochistan to crush the insurgency sparked off after the life imprisonment of Nauroz Khan and his companions' execution. In July, 1960 Army's action caused a wave of indignation among the political activists. Ayub Khan paid visit to Quetta in August 1962. Baloch leaders organized a political meeting on his arrival. They condemned military operation as solution of the Balochistan problem. (Harison, 1981).

The dictator was angry with their warning and threatened them with "extinction" if they persisted with their resistance (Amin, 1998). The regionalists in Balochistan strongly opposed the state elites' policies. The Bugties, the Marris and the Mengal tribes continued their resistance under the leadership of respective tribal chiefs like Khair Bakhsh Marri, Akbar Bugti and Atta Ullah Mengal (Foreign policy Centre, 2006).

It must be noted that the Baloch were greatly under represented in state power structure during Ayub' period. The next wave of uprising was launched by the Mengals and it spread to the Marri-Bugti areas. It carried on till the declaration of amnesty in 1967. The Mengals were annoyed with government's demand of surrendering of weapons. Tribesmen were greatly perturbed over the government's decision to replace the traditional Sardar's with that of the government's nominees.

The guerrilla warfare continued in Jhalawan and Marri areas during Ayub's regime. Skirmishes between the hostiles and the government forces took place during 1956-66. The government in order to control the rebellious activities decided to replace hostile Sardars like Attaullah Mengal, Nawab Akbar Bugti and Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri with that of government supporters. The government's initiative in this regard was totally failed. All of the government's nominees were killed by their tribesmen.

Ali Muhammad Mengal started armed resistance after the arrest of Atta Ullah Mengal and made the following demands: First, to release Atta Ullah Mengal, second, to stop the campaign to collect weapons, third, closure of police stations. The clashes broke out between tribesmen and security forces that lasted till the end of 1966. (Foreign policy Centre, 2006) The government arrested Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, Mir Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo, Sardar Atta Ullah Mengal and Khair Bakhsh Mari on charges of supporting armed uprising. They were time and again detained and set free on different charges.⁶⁵ They were blamed for

backing and extending assistance to the Baloch resistance against the government of Pakistan. Sher Muhammad Marri stood distinguished in raising the flag of guerrilla rebellion.⁶⁷ He was also famous as General Sherof. He had joined politics in 1945 and established "Mazlum Party" in the tribal areas of the Sulaiman Mountains. He also founded the Parari movement. (Suddiqi, 2012) Both commands were under his control. He himself led the northern command of the Marri-Bugti area.⁶⁹ The southern command of Jhalawan district was under the supervision of Ali Muhammad Mengal. It was believed that Sher Muhammad had organized 22 base campus in Marri-Bugti and Mengal areas by July 1963. The army headed by Major General Tikka Khan took on the "Pararis". They put up stiff resistance (Suddiqi, 2012). The government authority was greatly undermined by the killing of all the new Sardars replacing the traditional ones. The Baloch became more united and die-hard due to the military operation. Amazingly, even the British avoided to replace the Sardars in such a manner as Pakistan government did under Ayub. Sher Muhammad expressed the objectives of this rebellious struggle with the News International. According to him, the key goal of the armed struggle was to break up the one unit. The rebels had close political affiliation with the NAP, which was struggling for provincial autonomy. The government failed to control the situation and it deteriorated with the passage of time. The government felt the failure and futility of its strategies towards the Balochistan crisis. There was a shift in government's attitude towards the problem after the appointment of General Muhammad Musa Khan as a Governor. Amnesty was announced and the Baloch leaders were released as a gesture of goodwill. The authorities also reinstated the deposed tribal chiefs. They were further assured that their political demands would also be met. The area returned to normalcy after calling the rebellion off in 1967.⁷⁶ After brief interval, the situation again became tense due to lack of trust between the central state actors and ethnic lords. Muhammad Akbar Khan Bugti, Gul Khan Naseer, Ghaus Bakhsh Bizenjo and Abdus Samad Khan Achakzai were re-arrested. Trouble again sparked off in Easter Balochistan and Pat-Feeder area. Meanwhile, the political condition of the country worsened. There was wide spread agitation against the government.

Ayub Khan's experiment of "Controlled Democracy" based on Basic Democracy ended on a note of disillusionment and failure (Ziring, 2006). Basic democratic institutions increased the influence of bureaucratic elites and marginalised the politically informed section of the society (Jalal, 1991) Highly authoritarian and centralized political system promised little to the Baloch grievances. They were excluded from a share in the political authority within Western-Pakistan. It contributed to the rise of the movement for regional autonomy and Baloch nationalism.

Ayub Khan's rule stopped the growth of democracy in Pakistan. There was no space for the growth of genuine political system. The whole system was circling around Ayub Khan's authoritative personality and his created political party (Rizvi, 2003) It crumbled to dust after his departure from Presidency. Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rehman, passionate supporter of provincial autonomy, and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, advocate of populist program, moved in to the political vacuum.⁷⁹ Baloch nationalists stopped their hostilities against the regime because their major demands were fulfilled. However, they sustained their "Command Headquarter" and guerrilla formation.

The Constitution of 1962 was more centralized and the central grip over the units increased manifold. (Ali, 1966). Ayub Khan considered a strong centre inevitable for achieving unity and economic progress of the country. (Rizvi, 2003). He ruled like an autocrat and concentrated all powers in his own office. The institutions of Basic democrats were established to enhance the influence of the bureaucratic elites. The regionalists were totally opposed to his views. Regionalism reached its peak during Ayub Khan's rule because of the extensive powers of the President, centralized so called federal structure and the subdued position of the indirectly elected National Assembly. (Talbot, 1990). The centralist elites regarded the ethnic actors as Indian agent working against the integrity of Pakistan. (Haqqani, 2005).

The situation had gone beyond his control and he realized his grip losing over the country's affairs. Ayub Khan resigned his office on 25th March, 1969 and handed over the reins of the government to General Yahya Khan, Commander in chief of the army. Yahya Khan imposed Martial Law and abrogated the Constitution of 1962. The political parties were banned. Yahya Khan introduced two-major changes in the future political structure. One unit was dissolved and the former provinces were restored.

Second, Balochistan was made a full-fledged Governor's province. Yahya's regime also released Baloch nationalists. It was the undemocratic rule of the Ayub's regime which deprived Balochistan of an effective voice in the nation and state-building task.

The movement of maximum provincial autonomy gained currency in the Eastern-wing. The situation also worsened in Western-wing. The ethnic elites in Balochistan resented the one unit. Instead of following the strategies of pacification, the ruling elites tried to suppress the Baloch regionalists. Troops were deployed in the province to put down the insurgencies. A number of Baloch regional leaders were arrested. The strategy of suppression further inflamed the centrifugal forces in the provinces. The Ayub government underestimated the forces working for restoration of democracy and provincial autonomy. Eventually, the

regionalists and supporters of democracy started movement against the authoritarian regime, which brought about the downfall of his rule in March 1969.¹¹

VIII. CONCLUSION

The early two military actions were taken in post-colonial Baluchistan by the state authorities against the Khan. First, to compel him to accede to Pakistan and second, on the pretext of his 'anti-state activities' The next conflict erupted after the military operation and the military court' punishment to the leader of second armed rebellion, Nauroz Khan and his followers. Besides repeated military actions in post-colonial Balochistan and persisted incarceration of Baloch leaders. The other factors which caused alienation and disillusionment among the people of Balochistan were the formation of one unit in 1955 and Ayub Khan's Martial Law in 1958. The centralizers' attitude had always been that they knew the best what is good for an area and its people and what they do, had to be accepted without any questioning. The Baloch were not prepared to accept their perception, with the result that military operation were launched and their top leadership remained imprisoned for long periods. Top most military-civilian elites' policies towards Balochistan created feelings of mistrust and deprivation among the people of Balochistan. Since Khan's arrest, the wave of violence and counter violence erupted and continued even to the present time. Decentralization along with democratization should have been the response to the fissiparous tendencies instead of a greatly centralized governmental set-up.

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