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Rethinking Electoral Democracy: A Critical Analysis of Nigeria's 2015 General Election

By Sakue-Collins Yimovie

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Abstract- Today in Africa, besides religion, democracy and its concomitant catchphrases – governance and good governance – dominates political life as the panacea to all social ills. One of such buzz word is election – the bride of honour of liberal democracy. It has assumed the status of a ritual where, every four or five years people run around to participate in an 'event' (or festival) as though they are undergoing a cleansing process that automatically secure their wellbeing for the years ahead. Democracy, political participation, and election have been the subject of rigorous intellectual discourse in recent times. However, whilst providing significant insights on the importance of election to democratic consolidation, missing/absent in the broader literature on democracy is analysis of the complexities making election an invaluable component of the democratic tradition, that is, election as a series of interrelated processes. Combining secondary data obtained 'before', during, and after the 2015 General Election in Nigeria as well as semi-structured interviews, this paper examines the power of institution in the (un)making of electoral democracy, and offer an alternative understanding of election as a process-in-practice as opposed to 'process' in theory. Using systems theory, this paper argues election as a composite whole whose character and outcome cannot be dissociated from the interdependent and interrelated processes that make up the whole.

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Sakue-Collins Yimovie

Abstract- Today in Africa, besides religion, democracy and its concomitant catchphrases – governance and good governance – dominates political life as the panacea to all social ills. One of such buzz word is election – the bride of honour of liberal democracy. It has assumed the status of a ritual where, every four or five years people run around to participate in an 'event' (or festival) as though they are undergoing a cleansing process that automatically secure their wellbeing for the years ahead. Democracy, political participation, and election have been the subject of rigorous intellectual discourse in recent times. However, whilst providing significant insights on the importance of election to democratic consolidation, missing/absent in the broader literature on democracy is analysis of the complexities making election an invaluable component of the democratic tradition, that is, election as a series of interrelated processes. Combining secondary data obtained 'before', during, and after the 2015 General Election in Nigeria as well as semi-structured interviews, this paper examines the power of institution in the (un)making of electoral democracy, and offer an alternative understanding of election as a process-in-practice as opposed to 'process' in theory. Using systems theory, this paper argues election as a composite whole whose character and outcome cannot be dissociated from the interdependent and interrelated processes that make up the whole.

1. INTRODUCTION

General elections in Nigeria have been characteristically marred with massive rigging, ballot snatching, and purloin of outright violence, with that of 2007 adjudged the most violent in recent times, especially given the number of death resulting from post-electoral conflict (Araba and Briamah 2015). However, with the concession of flaws by the victor, in an electoral process that brought him to power, former President Umaru Musa Yar'Adua sets the pedestal that would rekindle the hope of the masses that, indeed, it is possible to exercise one's political right and opinion through the ballot in the near future and have it count. True to expectations, the 2011 general election, albeit its shortcomings, serves as a lunch-pad and adjudged as a significant leap from previous elections, except of course, the exceptionally argued June 12, 1993 annulled polls (Eliagwu 2014; European Union 2015).

The March 28th 2015 General Elections in Nigeria is the fifth election of the Fourth Republic; it is historic and unique for several reasons. For the first time in Nigeria's recent political history an incumbent president was voted out office and the acclaimed

largest political party in Africa – the People's Democratic Party (PDP) – that has hitherto held sway for 16 years was booted out by an alliance of opposition parties under the banner of All Progressive Congress (APC). It is also the first time the defeated candidate in a general election would publicly congratulate the winner as a show of sportsmanship and faith in the polls. However, while so much has been written about the election, with a preponderance of it applauding its successes, only a handful has called for an examination of the role of institutions in the conduct and determination of democratic outcome.

The role of electoral institution in Nigeria has been the subject of contention over time. From the Electoral Commission of Nigeria (ECN) of 1959 to the Federal Electoral Commission (FEC) of 1960; the Federal Electoral Commission (FEDECO) of 1978 to the National Electoral Commission (NEC) of 1987; and, the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) of 1995 to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) of 1998 and still subsisting, the tale is all the same: credible elections with questionable processes and outcomes leading to contestations, allegations and counter-allegations, and sometimes violent conflicts. The frequent change of nomenclature however does not appears to amount to change in attitude, as recent political activities (and processes) has continued to marvel observers (Aribisala 2015; Zaggi 2015).

This paper therefore critically examine the 2015 General Election as a process, not an event, in the democratic life of Nigeria with a view of highlighting the role of institutions in (un)making democratic progress. Specifically, it focuses on the activities of the electoral umpire, INEC, in the course of Continuous Voters' Registration (CVR) exercise, accreditation, and distribution of Permanent Voter's Cards (PVCs) as overture to, and determinant of, the character and outcome of the election. The paper is organised into four sections following this introduction. The first situates the paper within systems theory and highlights the methods of analysis; the second conceptualises election as a process-in-practice as opposed to event; the third examines the electioneering processes of voters' registration, accreditation, and distribution of PVCs, and concludes with a call on the imperative of substantive democracy recognising its goal as well as burden and responsibilities.

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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHOD OF ANALYSIS

This study is anchored within systems theory which draws heavily from the biological understanding of human as a complex unit; made of inter-independent parts, interrelating and cooperating with each other, in order to function as a harmonious whole. Extrapolated to the social sciences, systems analysis postulates that the social world is a system and, as such, is made up of inter-independent parts interacting and interrelating with each other to ensure the effective functioning of society or a sub-system thereof.

The idea of understanding the social world as a social organism of some sorts dates back to classical African antiquity, wherein social harmony is held to be contingent upon the effective functioning of the various units; from the individual, family, through to community, as well as a delicate balance between nature and culture. Thus society is considered a social organism, or organisation, if you will. For instance, the North African scholar and statesman Ibn Khaldūn (1332-1406), in his *magnum opus* titled: *The Muqqadimah* (1377) espoused the concept 'Asabiyyah', to explain the rise and fall of political systems and institutions as the presence or absence of cohesion, as the case may be, in the functioning of the parts that make up society (Martin 2012; Halim *et al.* 2012). This is however appropriated and elaborated in biological sciences to explain the ensemble of cells, grouping of tissues, and cooperation among organs to function as a comprehensive whole, that is, the human being as a system. Nevertheless, in Western social sciences, David Easton (1965) is credited as the first to introduce it to social analysis. For him:

A system is composed of elements or parts (sub-systems), that function as a whole; in other words, there is an organic unity and interdependence between component parts of a system such that any change in one part, causes a change in the other parts and by extension, the entire system (Udu 2015: 100).

It is imperative to emphasise that, as a system, the health and well-being of the whole is contingent on the health and well-being of its independent parts. Thus understood, systems theory is evoked to highlight the importance of the integrity of the various independent but related activities and processes (i.e. voters' registration, accreditation, and distribution of PVCs) in the determination of the independence, impartiality, and credibility of the whole (i.e. the election). In other words, anomaly in any - voters' registration exercise, accreditation, and distribution of PVCs - is tantamount to abnormality in the election as a process.

It is in the context of the foregoing Mahatma Gandhi's admonition; if we take scrupulous care of the

means, the end will take care of itself, becomes instructive. In political theorization, election is seen as a means to enthroning democracy as well as certifying it. This however does not in any way suggests democracy as an end in itself; rather it means to an end - that end being, the improvement of the living condition of the people. It nonetheless suggests that, in the quest for democracy as the immediate or short term goal, election as a means is invaluable as the end it espouses - that is, the long term goal.

a) Methods

The paper adopts content analytical approach to examine data predominantly derived from secondary sources. The paper however combines both primary and secondary data. Primary data derives from semi-structured interviews of INEC's staff, political analysts and scholars. Secondary data derives mainly from INEC's official documents/publications, and other texts such as scholarly writings, media articles, journals, newspapers, magazines as well as reports by election observers and media commentaries. This body of text is then examined and analysed, and forms the basis of this paper.

III. CONCEPTUALISING ELECTION AS A PROCESS-IN-PRACTICE

The general consensus among scholars on election is that it is a process of choosing and selecting leaders through a system assumed to be fair and open to all qualified adult members of society (Huntington 1991; Anifowose 2007; Nwolise 2007). This way Araba and Braimah (2015: 53) opine that "the credibility and legitimacy accorded an election victory is determined by the extent to which the process is free and fair" (cf. Bagura 2008; Bogaards 2007). Election has become an acceptable means of selecting and changing political leaders because it is generally assumed to provide equal opportunities to citizens to vote and be voted for, notwithstanding constitutional restrictions (Udu 2015). What this means is that political leaders are to be chosen by the people, via a system presumably offering both the electorates and contestants unhindered access to choose and be chosen respectively, as well as doing so within the context of a level playing ground for all. Thus ensuring level handedness of the various activities and processes is the burden of the democratic process, and the extent to which, individually and collectively, they are adjudged as balanced is the extent to which the legitimate transfer of political power is said to be democratic (Akindede 2011; Obiyan and Afolabi 2013).

The importance of this *process* as an integral part of liberal democratic tradition, which is *unrestrained participation*, in any form, of all qualified adult members is the definitive character of democratic system. Also, this process imbues the system with the power to confer and transfer legitimacy from the people (the governed)

to their elected representatives (the governors) (Osumah and Aghemelo 2010). The point is that to occasion barrier of any sort to mass participation or to a section of it thereof, is to set the process against itself and this, in itself, is an anathema to democracy or representative government. Araba and Braimah (2015: 50) put this into perspective as follows:

An election itself is a procedure by which the electorate, or part of it, choose the people who hold public office and exercise some degree of control over the elected officials. It is the process by which the people select and control their representatives. The implication of this is that without election, there can be no representative government.

To skew this process invariably means the government emanating from it is automatically illegitimate to the extent that it does not derive its mandate from the consent of the people. Put differently, a process that undermines the right of a people to choose/select their representatives invariably undermine their power to exercise control over those representatives, since they have little or no say on who emerges or how they emerge. Conversely, elected representatives conduct themselves with little or no sense of responsibility to the people once they are convinced their mandate is not derived from the people, but rather obtained from a skewed process. The implication is that every step in the process of selecting representatives' matters in a democratic society, and as Samuel Huntington (1991) asserts that election is of "greater importance in all democratic regimes" to the extent that it, indeed, forms the core of democratic identity so that it is almost impossible to talk about democracy without election. For him,

A political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful decision-makers are selected through fair, honest and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes, and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote (Huntington 1991: 661).

Huntington maintains that this process of selection must be characteristic in showing lack of favouritism and even-handed in the manner by which such selection procedure and its related activities are carried out. Hence it is not sufficient for election to be periodic if its procedures are not devoid of personal, parochial, and institutional bias. More so, the overall character of an election is the cumulative expression of the different interrelated processes leading up to it (Akindele 2011; Obiyan and Afolabi 2013; Ugbudian 2015). It is in this sense Ugbudian (2015) argues election is a systematic way of coordinating the various activities culminating into the selection of political representatives. He describes election as "a systematic way of managing the process [es] of electing the few that will govern in the interest of the larger population"

(2015: 4). It is systematic because it brings together or combines interrelated activities such as registration of political parties, registration and validation of voters/ electorates, delineation and demarcation of electoral constituencies, assigning and allocation of polling units, distribution of electoral materials, and the selection, collation and announcement of voting results.

Therefore, it is the expression of election as a process, not an event, which is of importance here. Consequently, election, properly understood, is the combination of processes leading to the election of political representatives. Beginning from the point of lifting ban on political activities (in societies emerging from monarchical or tyrannical regimes) or the announcement of commencement of political calendar, registration of political parties, delineation of electoral constituencies, registration and validation of voters, as well as the often neglected (seemingly insignificant) incidence/activities underscoring each of these, often overlapping, phase, and culminating into actual voting, collation and announcement of results. Thus beyond the abstract notion of process, election is a series of practical processes which is personified as voting, and culminate with the announcement of results and declaration of winner(s).

A closer look at election as a major plank in democratic process reveals three broad categories of distinct but inextricably linked activities: preparing the grounds and the enabling environment for equitable participation of all, as well as establishing the grand rules of the game; organisation, mobilisation and coordination of the participants; and the adjudication, regulation, legislating, and presiding over these processes. In fact there are three set of interrelated activities making up an election. This is in accord with Akindele's (2011) assertion that elections are not simply the events that occur on Election Day; rather it is the totality of activities and events before, during, and after voting. Obiyan and Afolabi (2013) and Ugbudian (2015) corroborate this by noting that elections are series of activities leading to voting as a selection process. Thus in studying election as a system, one ought to examine how the opportunities provided for at each of these stages are truly competitive. However, to lump these activities together and treating them as a single monolithic process or single event can only be done at the theoretical and practical peril of the society concerned.

Furthermore, while election is almost generally accepted as a legitimate process or means through which citizens of a country elect and select their representatives in government, the institutional making/workings of this *means* is often neglected and the fact that, this means can be usurped institutionally to render the entire process illegitimate is something that has been conspicuously absent in political analysis on democracy (Udu 2015; Zaggi 2015). For instance,

Adejumobi aptly observes that election “is the Kernel of political *accountability* and means of ensuring reciprocity and exchange between the governors and the governed” (1993: 31, emphasis not in original). The point here is to draw attention to the common refrain, that is, to limit political accountability to results emanating from a presumably ‘free, fair and credible, process to a binary relationship between the governed and governors alone. Whereas accountability in political system is *not*, and *cannot*, be limited to outcomes alone but also the processes leading to that outcome. It is a check along the way and not simply at the end of the road: from the provision of conditions for registration of political associations to the registration of parties and voters, as well as distribution of voting and electoral materials, it is important to emphasize equity to ensure no individual, section, or groups of individuals are systematically prevented/excluded from exercising their inalienable right to self-determination.

However, while Nigeria’s 2015 General Election offers so much to unpack and learn of the dynamics of democratization process in sub-Saharan Africa, this paper critically examines the often-neglected fact that election, far from an event, is a process involving and requiring preparations, calculations and permutations. In fact, as a trend it requires checks and accountability all the way through, not only on the conducts of participants but also on the part of the institutions involved. As the cumulative of processes that bespeaks integrity at every point in that process. It is the contention here that the ‘certification’ of an election cannot be adjudged on the basis of the ‘event’ it culminates into without cognizance of the trends and processes that lead to such ‘event’ including, especially, the activities of its manager or umpire.

Thus W. J. M. Mackenzie’s (1954 [1968]) assertion that elections are “rituals of choice” wherein the individual as a chooser, through a social contract, confers political authority on public officers as chosen, to decide and act on her/his behalf on policy matters, espouses certain conditions to ensure that expression of ‘choice’ is not scuttled in practice:

- i. An independent judiciary to interpret electoral law;
- ii. An honest, competent, non-partisan administration to run [manage] elections;
- iii. A developed system of political parties, well organized to put their policies, traditions and teams of candidates before the elections as alternatives between which to choose; and,
- iv. A general acceptance throughout the political community of certain rather than vague rules of the game which limits the struggle for power because of some unspoken sentiments that if the rules are not observed more or less faithfully, the games itself will disappear (Mackenzie 1954 [1986]: 56).

Whereas the second and third conditions apply to the subject matter of this paper, the paper emphasizes the existence of “an honest, competent, non-partisan administration to run elections” as the basic premise of this paper, and the basis on which Nigeria’s 2015 general election is interrogated.

IV. ELECTIONEERING PROCESSES, VOTING AND PATTERNS

In Nigeria, the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is saddled with the responsibility to run and manage elections and in so doing, it is expected to uphold the ideals of accountability, impartiality, transparency and responsiveness at all times and in relations to all parties involved. The 1999 Constitution mandated the INEC to organise, undertake, supervise the processes of electioneering, as well as register and monitor the conduct of political parties to facilitate smooth process of participation and selection of political representatives throughout the Federation.

To this end some have clamoured for the complete insulation of the electoral umpire from partisan politics, especially as it has to do with the appointment of its chair (Udu 2015; Eliagwu 2014). The goal is to render it as independent as possible, as well as ensure its neutrality and impartiality in conduct. Although, this was part of the contentions of the Political Reform Panel of 2010, the extent to which this has been achieved remains a subject for further debate. Larry Udu (2015) however opines the history of electioneering management in Nigeria has been fraught with limitations on all sides. He observes:

In reality, there are empirical evidences over the years, that the INEC has not been fully autonomous and non-partisan; neither does it appear to be sufficiently empowered to carry out its assigned duties and responsibilities impartially. However, in the 2015 General Elections in Nigeria, despite some pockets of irregularities evidenced in late arrival or availability of electoral materials, falsification of election results in some areas, failure of the Card Reader Machines and collusion with politicians and security personnel to subvert the process, the outcome of the 2015 general election has been generally accepted to be transparent and indeed, an improvement on past elections in the country (Udu 2015: 96).

Larry Udu’s suspicion was right as previous electoral rounds have been characterised by anomaly of varying kinds. He however acquiesced to ‘pockets of irregularities’, which nonetheless makes the 2015 general elections a triumph over past ones. Widespread cases of misnomer were reported in relation to delivery and distribution of voter’s card across the country, especially in the south (Zaggi 2015; Aribisala 2015). Lamenting on the lopsidedness resulting from

continuous voters' registration (CVR) and permanent voters' card (PVC) distribution exercises, the Daily Trust Newspaper of January 1st 2015 observes that "looking at the whole two exercises of PVCs distribution and the CVR, analysts say that some state had enjoyed certain advantages over others". The paper further notes that:

For instance, the 10 states in the first phase have had about seven months within which their voters could go to INEC's local government offices to pick up their cards, while those cards disappeared got captured in the new register within same period. But for the states that fell under the second phase, their voters had barely a month to queue up or walk to INEC offices in various local governments to collect their PVCs, after the initial three days for the distribution" (Daily Trust 2015).

Alluding to hitches and constraints, the INEC's chief, Attahiru Jega observes:

I regret to say that there have been delays in the production of the PVCs for many reasons. But we are doing our best. We should have finished the distribution and the CVR by the end of October, but now our hope is that by the middle of December, we should be able to do that (*Ibid*).

Similarly, Kayode Idowu, Chief Press Secretary to Jega, notes that they are having serious challenges with the distribution of PVCs as well as its production, but however reiterates the assurance of sorting it out. Nevertheless, up to the point of voting, several national dailies reported of electorates unable to get their cards

(Vanguard 2015; Daily Trust 2015). Hassan Zaggi (2015: 18) in a media article titled: "Transparency but flawed presidential election", captured the spirit of the election as follows:

Some of the noticeable faults of the presidential elections, as observed on the day of the election at the polling units monitored, include: late arrival of electoral materials; malfunctioning of Card Readers; insufficient and, in some cases, none availability of electoral materials; overcrowding in polling units, and voting throughout the night which exposed the voters to high risks. Those many faults according to findings, have ended up disenfranchising many voters in many parts of the country.

In view of the foregoing, there were disenchantments on the issues of disenfranchisement of the general population and seemingly lopsidedness in the distribution/collection of voters' card that appears more or less tilted in favour of a section of the population – individual, party, and or region. This corroborates Larry Udu's (2015) contention that over the years elections in Nigeria has been fraught with incredible and unsatisfactory performance by the umpires, performing below expectation. He asserts that "[e]vidently, successive electoral commissions in the country have been either pro-ruling party or engaged in the manipulation of election results in favour of the highest bidding contestant" (2015: 101). In the case of 2015 general election, the processes rather than results appears more contentious.

Table 1: Voters' Registration, Accreditation and Vote Cast by Geopolitical Zones

Political Zone	Registered Voters	Accredited Voters	Vote Cast/ Turnout	Valid Votes Cast	Total Invalid Votes
North-Central	9,620,455	4,294,232	3,970,835	3,852,278	118,557
North-East	8,933,630	4,023,354	3,783,920	3,672,348	111,572
North-West	17,570,066	9,499,304	8,747,921	8,505,577	242,344
South-East	7,513,031	3,060,093	2,815,348	2,724,654	90,694
South-South	9,413,630	5,552,925	5,258,597	5,168,330	90,267
South-West	13,484,620	4,972,526	4,539,447	4,362,572	176,875
FCT Abuja	886,573	344,056	316,015	306,805	9,210
Total	67,422,005	31,746,490	29,432,083	28,587,564	844,519

Source: INEC

A careful observation of the table above reveals a very strange trend; more than half the registered voters in almost all the (regions) states, including the FCT, were not accredited. Out of a total of 67, 422, 005 registered voters, only 31, 746, 490 were accredited for

voting.¹ This, no doubt, could put the credibility of a process with over three years of preparation to question. Ordinarily, this is as disturbing as it is worrying for a

¹ See the official data here: <http://www.inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/summary-of-results.pdf>

fledgling democracy struggling to spread its reach as far as possible. However, while this can be given several interpretations, two reasons might suffice: first, it can be interpreted as outright disenfranchisement of the populace; and second, it can be interpreted as a corrective measure to the burgeoning allegations of inflated voter's register with names of non-existing humans or 'fake humans', of which the INEC might have uprooted. The latter has been hailed as the result of innovativeness of the INEC's chairman, Attahiru Jega's introduction of Card Readers and improvement of the voter's register (Udu 2015; Zaggi 2015). However, incredibly, this innovative technology – Card Reader –

failed the incumbent President while standing accreditation in his home town, Otuoke, Bayelsa State. For over thirty minutes the President could not be accredited, and similar fate befell several million Nigerians; in either case, the integrity of such innovativeness becomes questionable (Zaggi 2015; Aribisala 2015; Igbokwe-Ibeto et al. 2016).

Nevertheless, while this 'halving' of the electorates appears 'universal' and cuts across the federation, it is difficult to admit same on the distribution and collection of PVCs. There were allegations and counter-allegations that certain regions of the country were 'favoured' to the detriment of others.

Table 2: Distribution of PVCs before the Election and Votes Cast by Geopolitical Zones

Political Zone	Registered Voters	Distributed/Collected PVCs	Accredited Voters	Vote Cast/Turnout	% of PVCs	% of Voter's Turnout
North-Central	9,620,455	7,661,576	4,294,232	3,970,835	79.6	92.4
North-East	8,933,630	7,922,444	4,023,354	3,783,920	88.6	94.0
North-West	17,570,066	15,999,398	9,499,304	8,747,921	91.0	92.0
South-East	7,513,031	6,621,541	3,060,093	2,815,348	88.1	92.0
South-South	9,413,630	6,624,301	5,552,925	5,258,597	70.3	94.6
South-West	13,484,620	9,250,041	4,972,526	4,539,447	68.5	91.2
FCT Abuja	886,573	569,109	344,056	316,015	64.1	91.8
Total	67,422,005	56,460,968	31,746,490	29,432,083		92.7 (Av. 92.5)

Source: INEC/Author

The table above shows a highly disproportionate distribution/collection rate, first among the political zones, and then, between the north and south. Specifically, the North (central, east and west) is averaged at 86.4% as against the South's (east, south and west) 75.6%, with the South-West and South-South recording the lowest. Also, notice how two zones in the south fall below 75% distribution rate, with the highest being South-East at 88.1%. Conversely, the lowest distribution rate in the north is North-Central's 79.6% and the highest being North-West with 91.0%.

In addition, whereas the North had over ten million registered voters above the South, the former's distribution rate was way higher or, rather, faster than the latter's. Though, this has been explained to be partially due to 'difficult terrain' in parts of the south-south, especially in the core Niger Delta (Alfred 2015), there is however dearth of plausible explanation of how the North, specifically the war-torn North-East with IDPs was able to achieve such high distribution/collection rate compared to other zones. In an article titled: "How Jega Executed Jonathan's Fall", Femi Aribisala (2015) vehemently asserts the INEC deliberately disenfranchised the Igbos of South-East through manipulation of the voters' register, PVC distribution, and failure of Card Readers. He argued that INEC systematically ensured "far more disproportionately and relative to other geopolitical zones, millions of South-East voters disappeared from the voters' register,

between 2011 and 2015 to pave way for the emergence of a Northern presidential candidate" (Aribisala 2015: 11 quoted in Udu 2015: 101; cf. SDN 2015b: 1).

Moreover, even if it is admitted for the sake of argument that, internal displacement and the presence of IDPs was not an issue and that, the fact of their assemblage of IDPs in one place makes it easier for the distribution/collection of PVCs, the situation still begs for answers. Firstly, the figures still does not seem to add up. The estimated figure of IDPs across Nigeria, at that point, stood at 3.3 million (SDN 2015). Secondly, this estimated figure includes both adults and children, most of who are below the voting age of 18. Thirdly, and more important, there is the difficulty of ascertaining the identities and demographics of IDPs to have been able to facilitate such speedy allocation, collation, assembling, and distribution of PVCs in comparison to the other zones.

Conversely, in the South, with the absence of insecurity threats there was low distribution/collection rate allegedly due to unavailability of cards. On several occasions, people who reported earlier at collection centres were told their cards cannot be located. In fact, the cards were yet to arrive (Aribisala 2015; Zaggi 2015; Udu 2015). This was not peculiar to the South though; it however created serious issues such as congestion and overcrowding at most Collection Centres in the South. This ultimately made collection difficult albeit limited time frame, and electorates resorting to desperate means to


get their cards. In the South-South region field reports were almost unanimous:

[T]ime is not the determining factor for a significant number of those yet to collect their PVCs in the Niger Delta. Registered voters report[ed] that their cards are still not available at their local distribution centres, many are resorting to desperate tactics to secure their democratic right (SDN 2015a).

Despite limited time frame for collection, the PVCs, in most cases, is expressly unavailable. Distribution figure/process from the election umpire continues to baffle observers, as SDN notes, the "validity of statistics on the distribution have been brought into question by numerous reports circulating the country" (SDN 2015b: 1). Similarly, Udu (2015: 104) describes the electoral process as "most outrageous", lamenting a situation whereby "the figures recorded in

the North-West [alone], where 17.6 million registrations took place and 15.1 million PVCs collection was recorded, much more than the entire South-East and South-South combined." For the records: the North-West is the home of the opposition candidate Muhammadu Buhari and APC's stronghold, while the South-South is the home of incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan and, alongside the South-East, PDP's stronghold. This corroborates Aribisala's (2015) assertion that when the INEC failed to teleguide the electioneering process through dubious creation of 29,000 additional polling units; allocating 21,000 and 8,000 of these to the North and South respectively, it resorted to an alternative and rather 'sophisticated' means – the skewed distribution of PVCs in favour of the North.

Graph 1: Electoral Trend across the Geopolitical Zones



Source: Author. The amount of PVCs distributed is computed as hundred percent in each of the geopolitical zones, and the percentages of PVC distributed and voter's turnout is calculated against it.

It is important to note that while the South-South has the highest voter's turnout; it also has one of the least collection rates, second only to the South-West - this explains the unusual pattern in the graph above. This is important for several reasons. First, the South-South in particular, with high voter's turnout but low PVCs collected, is the region of the then incumbent president and doubles as the stronghold of the then ruling party – the PDP, as noted above. Thus the high rate of voter's turnout can be interpreted as efforts to retain political power in the zone. Second, the South-East, another stronghold of the PDP, voted massively for the party even though it was systematically

disenfranchised, and with limited PVCs distributed. Larry Udu, concurring with Aribisala (2015), shows how the voting strength of the South-East was slashed from "5 million in 2011 to only 2.6 million in 2015 presidential election", whereas those of the North and South-West remained relatively stable (Udu 2015: 104). Third, there is an unusual 'coincidence' of the South-West having the lowest PVCs distributed in the South; it is a stronghold of the opposition party – APC – and a 'contested' ground for both the APC and PDP. However, The South-West however voted massively for the APC, with the exception of Ekiti state, which is a PDP-

controlled state and governed by a staunch supporter of Goodluck Jonathan.

Conversely, the North-West, in particular, with the highest rate of PVCs distributed and one of the highest voters' turnouts, is the region of the opposition candidate, Muhammadu Buhari, and doubles as a stronghold and the major source of the party's bulk vote. Thus like in the South-South, the high rate of turnout in the North-West can be interpreted as desire to capture political power from the former. Second, the North-East, another region with both high PVCs distribution rate and second highest voters' turnout, is largely sympathetic to the opposition candidate and his party, the APC. It is however important to point out there were initial insinuations that elections will be boycotted in parts of the North-East, specifically in states affected by the Boko Haram insurgency such as Borno, Yobe and Bauchi, but this was later clarified by the INEC and elections peacefully conducted. Third, the North-Central has the lowest PVCs distribution in the North. This is significant because the North-Central, more or less like the South-West, was more of a 'middle-ground' or a no-man's-land; equally populated by Christians and Muslims; and less predictable even among political analysts (Udu 2015).

Furthermore, what this means is that these zones - North-Central and, South-West to some extent - were highly unpredictable as far as 2015 Presidential election is concern, and as such less susceptible to manoeuvre. What is, however, troubling is what appears like a pattern or coincidence of some sort: the strongholds of the opposition APC with unparallel rate of PVCs distribution while the incumbent PDP's stronghold has the lowest. Also, worthy of note, is how the voter's turnout in the zones with the least PVCs, particularly the South (south and east), appears to compensate for its low PVC's collected, by relatively high turnouts. Moreover the turnout of voters in these zones (South-South and North-West) speaks of the commitments of each to determine the outcome of the election. The implication of all these, like Aribisala (2015) and Udu (2015) aptly assert is that the electoral process was systematically teleguided in favour of the North. The South was largely disenfranchised through voters' registration, restrained from voting through deliberate delayed and skewed distribution of PVC, and severely impaired by the preponderance of Card Reader failures (Zaggi 2015; Aribisala 2015; Udu 2015).

V. CONCLUSION

Though previous elections have been marred by irregularities, they stand a better chance of passing as 'election-in-progress' as opposed to 'electoral reversal'. The former applies to the 2007 and 2011 while the latter is the case of 2015 general elections, because in the former there were clear admission of irregularities

while in the case of the latter, the simulacra of 'credible, free and fair' obscures the whole process and eschews the possibility of improving on it. Though the 2015 general elections has been largely popularised as an improvement on previous ones, such improvement can at best be considered quantitative rather than qualitative of substantive since it falls short of other aspects of the electioneering process that account for the credibility of election. Therefore, while credible, free and fair election is a requisite for the triumph of democracy, an independent and impartial administration legislating and adjudicating over the electioneering processes is a pre-requisite for credible election. The whole cannot be construed and subsumed for the part even as the parts are invaluable; for every step along the path to democratic consolidation matters.

While it is obvious it is not the duty of electoral umpire to compel active participation in the voting process, it is, however, her sole responsibility to ensure that no individual, groups, or region is deprived in the course of exercising this civic and political right, be it for strategic, logistic, and or sentimental reason(s). Also, it is her sole responsibility to assuage the suspicion of – or, indeed, skewing the processes of constituency delineation, voters' registration, accreditation, and distribution of electoral materials. Disenfranchisement of such large proportion of the population, either by error, omission or commission, cannot be excused for experimentation with 'new voting technologies'. The noble path is for the INEC to admit, if indeed they were error or omission, and lay bare its shortcomings for possible corrections to be made in subsequent rounds, regardless of the declaration by outsiders of a 'free, fair and credible' election.

In the end, the point is to highlight that the people's confidence in the system is not misplaced, but more so to build confidence in the people as well as the institutions. However, of more importance is understanding that institutions do not operate themselves; rather they are run by humans. Institutions on their own do not make democracy; it is people that do. There can't be democracy without democrats. Yet, as Plato tried to direct our attention to, in what would appear to be the most incisive critique of, often misinterpreted as apprehension for, democracy: the fear of antidemocratic forces – individuals, policies and institutions, parading as democrats. Political institutions and, indeed, "government is more than a piece of machinery, its essence is ultimately determined by the quality of the men and women who compose it" (Ebenstein 2002: 10). Thus one of the greatest threats to democracy and democratization in the twentieth century will not come from authoritarian rulers or result from authoritarian reversals; rather it would be the failure of democrats to realize that apart from rights and liberties they enjoy, they are equally imbued with duties to translate political practices into economic gains for the

people and responsibilities to be vigilant, at all times, of the workings of such practices and processes (Ake 2012; Kukah 2015).

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Kenya: Explaining State Fragility through the Absence of an Indigenous Imperial State Culture

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Abstract- That the Kenyan state is fragile in political terms is not in doubt. Kenya experiences high levels of political and ethnic rivalry, high possibilities of electoral violence, high levels of fraud, and a general failure to deliver quality services (including security) to the wider society. But, why has Kenya proved to be such a fragile country politically? In other words, what causes Kenya's state fragility? This paper argues that Kenya's fragility is primarily linked to the fact that the dominant group – the Kikuyu (Kenya's economic and political powerhouse) – was historically inward looking, inserted itself as an equal to all other ethnic groups, and was exclusionist in its social culture. It also argues that the state cultures of the other ethnic groups were not any better in terms of aiding state building. This paper on Kenya's political fragility looks at the pre-colonial state cultures of the main ethnic groups, tracing their continuities and discontinuities, and showing how they worked against the building of a coherent and stable state.

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Abstract- That the Kenyan state is fragile in political terms is not in doubt. Kenya experiences high levels of political and ethnic rivalry, high possibilities of electoral violence, high levels of fraud, and a general failure to deliver quality services (including security) to the wider society. But, why has Kenya proved to be such a fragile country politically? In other words, what causes Kenya's state fragility? This paper argues that Kenya's fragility is primarily linked to the fact that the dominant group – the Kikuyu (Kenya's economic and political powerhouse) – was historically inward looking, inserted itself as an equal to all other ethnic groups, and was exclusionist in its social culture. It also argues that the state cultures of the other ethnic groups were not any better in terms of aiding state building. This paper on Kenya's political fragility looks at the pre-colonial state cultures of the main ethnic groups, tracing their continuities and discontinuities, and showing how they worked against the building of a coherent and stable state.

1. INTRODUCTION

Kenya went to the polls on 8th August 2017 to elect leaders at different levels. When the election results were aired, the opposition coalition (NASA) immediately complained of the consistency and the persistent nature in which the numbers of the Jubilee candidate were climbing up. After all the results were announced, the opposition took the matter to the Supreme Court of Kenya which ruled that the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) failed or refused to conduct the elections in accordance with election laws; that there were irregularities and illegalities in the transmission of results; and that the irregularities substantially affected the integrity of the entire presidential vote. The Supreme Court of Kenya also ruled that "we declare that the presidential election held on August 8 is invalid. The third respondent (President Kenyatta) was not duly elected the president of Kenya". While the opposition NASA hails the court decision and questions the integrity of the election body, Jubilee claims that four judges of the Supreme Court have overturned the verdict of 15 million Kenyans. The state for conflict is set, deepening state fragility.

While the evidence that Branch (2011) presents is very convincing, it does not constitute a complete explanation. There is no doubt that from the beginning of the post-colonial Kenyan state, Kenya African National Union (KANU) leaders were pulling in different directions, engaging in endless feuding and exposing

their government to misinformation by British intelligence, to infiltration and to destabilisation. According to Branch (2011), Jomo Kenyatta, the first president, and his vice president, Oginga Odinga, pursued contradictory domestic and foreign policies within KANU and within the government. While Kenyatta aligned himself with the British (who continued to dominate the Kenyan security forces in the early years) and called for a minimal role of the state in the economy and society, Odinga aligned himself with the communist bloc and was the leader of radical Kenyans, creating suspicions of a planned communist takeover (Branch, 2011). The Secretary General of KANU Tom Mboya aligned himself with Kenyatta and with the Americans.

When Jomo Kenyatta came to realise that the Vice President Odinga was creating a second power base within the ruling party and government, he responded by establishing eight vice presidents! To accomplish this, he negotiated and merged KANU with the regional-oriented KADU, which brought in minority leaders. Thus, opposition leaders such as Ngala - the president of KADU, Daniel arap Moi, and Mwai Kibaki who championed regional autonomy (*majimboism*), (which Kenyatta had hitherto opposed so vehemently), were brought in and promoted to become vice presidents. In this way, according to Branch (2011), the Kikuyu-Luo partnership that established KANU was neutralised, and minority leaders came to play vital roles within the ruling party and government.

Political assassinations started early in post-colonial Kenya. According to Branch (2011: 46), Pio Gama Pinto, a rich Asian political and media activist who was regarded as the brains behind Odinga's faction of KANU, was assassinated in 1965. "A few days after the assassination, Kaggia (speaker of the upper parliament) told his fellow MPs that Pinto's killing 'is no ordinary murder. It is a political murder' (Branch, 2011: 46). Kaggia lost his position as speaker! Odinga resigned from KANU and formed Kenya Peoples Union (KPU) which was later banned. Once Odinga was pushed out, Tom Mboya became the primary target and was assassinated for asking the Europeans not to abandon their farms. In his 1970 publication, Tom Mboya as Assistant Minister of Agriculture, observed that the Europeans were abandoning their homes and farms in Kenya, and he felt obliged to persuade them to stay for the sake of the economy. His policy of persuading the European farmers to stay angered the

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Mau Mau veterans and the Nandi remnants that were campaigning for the Europeans to leave, and this collusion triggered moves to assassinate him. Finally, in deadly internal power struggles to replace the ailing Kenyatta who had suffered a serious stroke, Mboya was assassinated, sparking intense ethnic rivalry between the Luo on the one side, and the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu on the other side.

Further evidence of state fragility, is revealed when President Kenyatta allegedly resorted to *oathing*, employing a traditional Kikuyu instrument of declaring allegiance and swearing into secrecy, as a response to intense ethnic rivalry. According to Branch (2011: 85), "Through 1969 and into early 1970, Kikuyu, Embu, Meru and Kamba were taken in their thousands to Kenyatta's home. One recent estimate suggests that over 300,000 people were transported to Gatundu. According to one account, they swore thus: the government of Kenya is under Kikuyu leadership, and this must be maintained. If any tribe tries to set itself up against the Kikuyu, we must fight them in the same way that we died fighting the British settlers. No uncircumcised leaders [that is Luo] will be allowed to compete with the Kikuyu. You shall not vote for any party not led by the Kikuyu". President Kenyatta is quoted as having said: "some want to tell us that Kenya belongs to all the people. Granted, I know that much. But I have a question to ask: when we were shedding blood, some languished in prison and suffering in the forests, fighting for Uhuru, where were the bloody others...If you want honey, bear the sting of the bee..." (Branch, 2011: 102). With ethnicity deliberately promoted by President Jomo Kenyatta as shown above, the Nandi-Kalenjin outside government responded by organising meetings in what became known as the Nandi Hills Declaration, declaring that: "the entire Nandi district belongs under God to the Nandi people; and that every non-Nandi, whether an individual, a firm or a corporation farming in the district or in the Tinderet area is a temporary tenant of the will of the Nandi; that no land transactions in the district involving non-Nandi shall be recognised as having any validity whatsoever; called on every non-Nandi either to surrender his alternative ethnic allegiance or to remove himself and his effects from the district without any delay, lest he incurs the wrath and undying enmity of the Nandi people" (Branch, 2011: 87). This declaration was a direct attack on Kenyatta's resettlement policies that had flooded the Rift Valley with members of the Gikuyu ethnic group.

Change of state leadership did not promote the stability of the Kenyan state. Daniel *arap* Moi, took over the presidency in 1978, and his version of nation-building emphasised continuity with Kenyatta's policies and with selected ancient values. He chose to view the resettlement of the Kikuyu in the Rift Valley as part of positive modernisation which was helping to unite the peoples of Kenya, and was going to sell this to the

whole nation which already felt overwhelmed by Kikuyu dominance. But he also "...organised Kalenjin land-buying companies to compete with the powerful Kikuyu efforts sanctioned by Kenyatta..." (Branch, 2011: 129). Moi's *nyayoism* philosophy emphasised love, peace and unity. So, President Moi was now going to teach other Kenyans to love the Kikuyu who had been implanted in other people's ancestral lands, without anything in return! Alternatively, Moi was going to teach the politically and economically dominant Kikuyu to love and care for people whose ancestral lands they acquired!

Kenya's fragility continued even when multiparty democracy was introduced. Responding to the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD)'s campaigns for multi-party-ism, Moi's supporters (including cabinet ministers from the Rift Valley) started mobilising ethnicity and regional autonomy, calling all Kikuyu, Luo and Luhya communities who had settled in the Rift Valley to leave, and actually mobilising Kalenjin youths to expel them through violence. Branch (2011) quotes Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz who termed it "disorder as political instrument; the deliberate instigation of violence by states for political ends". In addition, "victims were treated a little better by the courts, which commonly released perpetrators on bail and handed out minor sentences to the more than one thousand individuals charged with involvement in the violence. Journalists attempting to investigate the clashes were harassed, and emergency legislation was used to restrict access to sites affected by the violence, and human rights activists were prevented from operating unimpeded in those locations. The regime was fighting for its life" (Branch, 2011: 202). In a sense, statelessness was very visible in Kenya during the period when multiparty democracy was introduced.

Another wave of violence was instituted after the 1992 election and the intention was to effect ethnic cleansing. The Kalenjin youths were organised to target the Kikuyu communities in the Rift Valley. "William Ruto had emerged as a significant figure within Rift Valley politics in the previous decade. He first came to public attention as a leader of the YK'92 group of KANU activists ahead of the first multiparty election. [...] this group was [allegedly] responsible for the harassment of opposition candidates and their supporters, and for the perpetration of ethnic violence." (Branch, 2011: 246-7). Ruto became a senior minister of Home Affairs, controlling the very 'corrupt' force that ignored the ethnic violence in the Rift Valley. According to Katumanga (2010), when Ruto was violently attacked in Kisii in 2007 and the government police refused to protect him, Kalenjin youths responded by seeking to drive the Kisii people out of the Rift Valley.

In contrast, the Kikuyu's response to the election related violence worsened the state's fragility. According to Branch (2011: 236), the Kikuyu youth responded by forming the Mungiki (multitudes in Gikuyu

language), a rural commune for the poor with an initial focus on indigenous religious beliefs, and on unity among the Kikuyu. Mungiki regarded itself as the true successors of the Mau Mau anti-colonialists. It was a militia that practised *oathing*, enforced female circumcision and engaged in criminal extortion. According to Branch, "Mungiki presented itself as an expression of Kikuyu unity in the face of threats from Kalenjin in the Rift Valley. Local pockets of Mungiki activists were involved in the formation of vigilante groups to protect Kikuyu families during the clashes of the 1990s. Its ranks were then swelled by displaced Kikuyu, forced by the violence to take up residence in the eastern Rift Valley, Central Province and Nairobi" (Branch, 2011: 237). Kikuyu elite (including MPs) supported the group. In contrast, the Bagdad Boys, according to Katumanga (2010) and Branch (2011), provided security for Luo political leaders in Kisumu throughout the multiparty era.

With the 2007 election approaching, Uhuru Kenyatta and his KANU broke off from the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) and partnered with Kibaki's PNU. Meanwhile Odinga's ODM partnered with regional leaders across Kenya and was poised to win the elections. With Mudavadi of the Luhya and Ruto of the Kalenjin as vice presidents, ODM stood principally for regional autonomy and Odinga promised that 60 per cent of expenditures would be at regional level. In contrast, President Moi had never supported such politics, even criminalising it and jailing those who championed it. The Kikuyu too did not support ODM primarily because it made the dreaded regional autonomy one of its campaign issues. "The return of *majimboism* (regional autonomy) to public debate alarmed many Kikuyu, as it reminded them of the bloody experience of the 1990s and the threats of violence from the 1960s. Kikuyu church leaders, for instance, denounced the ODM's policy. 'We are the ones who bear the brunt when land clashes break out'. ... 'They described devolution as a monster that the devil would use to cause bloodshed in the nation'. (Branch, 2011: 268). Unknowingly, bloodshed came immediately after the 2007 election and in support of *majimboism*. Kibaki's new regime turned to criminality for survival (Branch, 2011). His government (in which Uhuru Kenyatta was vice president) employed the services of a militia-gang to carryout counter-violence activities against the Kalenjin youth militias. Kibaki's inner circle and Kikuyu businessmen allegedly hired the Mungiki to carryout violent activities against their perceived enemies.

In contrast, Chacha (2010) reports that Kenyan religions had become extremely politicised at the time of the 2007 election. Pentecostal leaders were entering politics, main line churches had taken political sides, Islamic organisations were equally divided and involved, and contradictory prophecies were issued (some saying

the leadership would come from the lake, in reference to the Luo of Lake Victoria. Other prophecies likened Rutoto the military founder of the Nandi people. In short, religious extremism was building up as the country marched towards the 2007 election. Chacha (2010: 124) adds that in some cases, prominent politicians spoke in churches, synagogues and mosques, and allegedly visited even traditional doctors in Tanzania, Nigeria and Zanzibar. Chacha concludes:

Witchcraft and other unflattering spiritual exercises are usually a symptom of two things: desperation to get something at any cost, even at the cost of flirting with evil, and a profound disempowerment in the face of injustice that has infiltrated the psyche and intimate relations (p 126).

Furthermore, Chacha notes that power and elections have been heavily ethnicised in Kenya, favouring certain ethnic groups at the expense of others. The sheer cold-blooded calculations that saw the burning to death of over fifty women and children trapped in the Kenya Assemblies of God Church in Eldoret symbolised the climax of deep-rooted tribal hatred that had been building up towards the 2007 elections. It equally rekindled memories of the genocide that killed an estimated 1 million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda in 1994...during the same period, a Catholic clergy was murdered in Eldama Ravine area (Chacha, 2010: 126-7). More than ten churches countrywide were set ablaze in the volatile hotspots. This sent shock waves to all religious watchers inside and outside the country. Kenya was exploding, and religious groups were active participants in its destruction. Kenya almost degenerated into genocide killing in 2008, and its citizens remained heavily armed in readiness for a possible violence in 2013 and 2017, and the Kenyan state was not ready to disarm anybody!

This paper aims to offer a state-centred account to explain the fragility of Kenyan politics and to show why ethnicity has been so prominent in Kenyan politics. It focuses on the state cultures of four largest ethnic groups – Maasai, Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin – particularly their governance culture and history. The paper's first argument is that pre-colonial Kenyan communities had no centralised political centre that governed all of them as one people; therefore did not see themselves as one people. The second argument is that colonialism did not prepare Kenyans to regard each other as one people. Instead, it sustained the ethnic divisions by favouring some groups and marginalising others, thereby recreating ethnic rivalries. The last argument is that nationalism in the 1940s and 1950s loosely brought together leaders from the largest communities in Kenya (the Kikuyu and Luo). Without a pre-colonial state history and culture of centralised political institutions, and without an inclusive colonial state policy, post-colonial Kenyan politics contained elements of dysfunctionality

that worked against state building and promoted state fragility.

II. GOVERNANCE AMONG THE PRE-COLONIAL PEOPLES OF KENYA

The diverse origins of the peoples of Kenya (as recorded in their traditions and history books), lack a centralised-state culture or a mythological culture that promoted oneness. In short, pre-colonial Kenyan communities did not live in kingdoms or empires; neither did they believe in one religion. According to historians, Kenya was initially populated by the Khoikhoi, who either migrated away to east Africa, or were absorbed by the Cushites who are claimed to have come from the highlands of Ethiopia. It was also populated by the Nilotic (the River-Lake Nilotic, the Plains Nilotic, and the high lands Nilotic groups) who are commonly known as the Luo, Maasai and Kalenjin. Our argument is that none of these groups developed an imperial culture and imperial institutions, and that the absence of these, left the different groups to their own survival skills that tuned them against each other.

a) *State culture of the Nilotic groups – the Maasai, Kalenjin and the Luo*

To begin with, Maasai traditions claim indigeneity to Kenyan territories. Ochieng' (1975: 30) observes that "the mythology of their traditions starts with a lady, remembered as Naiterokop, who is alleged to have come down from heaven and to have born two sons, Maasinda and Olmeek. Maasinda is regarded as the person who formulated the Maasai code of behaviour". Historians and other scholars observe that the Maasai, like the Kalenjin, Jie, Turkana, Kumam, Luo and Karamojong, among others, belong to the Nilotic people, and their original land was situated probably in the vicinity of Lake Turkana in northern Kenya. Ochieng' (1975: 31) notes that "looked at in terms of the broader Nilotic history, the Maasai seem to belong to the Southern Nilotic invaders of Kenya who by the middle of the first millennium A.D had established themselves in the plains around Lake Turkana stretching from Samburu country in the east, to Karamojong Plains in eastern Uganda". Thus, while the Maasai claim indigeneity, historians say that they are part of the Nilotic people who invaded eastern Africa much earlier. "The Plains Nilotic is today represented by the Maasai, the Turkana, the Jie, the Karamojong and Iteso" (Ochieng', 1975:27).

In contrast, the River-Lake Nilotic is represented by the Alur, the Acholi, the Labwor, the Jonam, the Padhola and the Kenyan Luo. In terms of research on state-ness, the obvious thing that emerges is the absence of centralised state power, hence the existence of so many clans, independently living in proximity, and sometimes hostile to each other. Moi (1986: 3) observes: "By the end of the nineteenth century, Kenya

had a varied range of natural environments which were inhabited by 64 tribes varying in size from small to large traditional groupings. There were no hard and fast boundaries between them...". The Luo and the Kalenjin are the focus of this section.

The Highland Nilotic is represented by the Kalenjin. The Nandi and the Kipsigis were highland Nilotic who came to be known as the Kalenjin. They were primarily pastoralists, and their highland habitats and militaries were designed for raiding and for protecting the captured cattle once acquired. In short, the wealth of the community was dependent on the warriors who brought it in, and on the retired warriors to protect it. The warriors underwent an elaborate system of initiating them into formidable fighters and raiders that they were. The trained warriors operated through the age-grade institution, ready to embark on socially organised raiding missions, and to bring wealth home. In deployment terms, "for offensive actions the Kipsigis as a whole do not unite, but are divided into 4 districts: Peelkut, Waldai, Puret and Sot. In each there are four men, of the grade of elders, who have together the supreme command: the poysiek ab puriosiek, i.e., 'the elders of the regiments', who have been company commanders when their age-class formerly occupied the grade of warriors. These four elders do not conduct the raids, but are rather a kind of 'chiefs of staff' (Prins, 1970: 91). Thus, though the Kipsigis were a militarised society, with the warrior age-class as their primary institution for acquiring wealth, they too did not form kingdoms. In short, among the Kalenjin and the Maasai, the military was the institution of choice, for interacting with neighbouring communities. Socially and politically, real men (trained warriors), in Kipsigis culture are called 'arap' (as in Daniel arapMoi). This goes to show real continuities in traditions between the pre-colonial and post-colonial Kenya.

Ehret (1967) notes strong social connections between the Maasai and the Nandi. "The Maasai vocabulary contains extensive word-borrowing from the Nandi (part of the Kalenjin) – related dialect and, alone among the Plains Nilotic, the Maasai in many respects assimilate culturally to the Nandi-related groups of tribes" (Ehret, 1967: 35). Ochieng' (1975: 35) adds that "The Maasai found the Kalenjin families already established in the highlands of the Rift Valley, the best agricultural lands in the whole of Kenya. The Maasai broke through them, interacting with them in various ways. They are said, for example, to have picked up a lot of early Kalenjin culture, adding relatively few distinctive elements of their own". Thus, without establishing an imperial system, the Maasai interacted freely with the Kalenjin, as with the Kikuyu, the Kamba and the Ndorobo as we saw above. Ironically, it was the Nandi, the Kipsigis and the Kikuyu who contributed to the destruction of the Maasai who were also involved in

endless civil wars among themselves as shall be shown below.

b) State culture of the Bantu groups – the Kikuyu

In contrast, historians and linguists classify the Kikuyu among the early Bantu settlers of the Mount Kenya territory. There were several Bantu groups in Kenya, including the Kikuyu, Legooli, Gusii, Tende, Swetam, and Luhya. Most of the Bantu groups claim to have come from Egypt, having passed through Ethiopia, Sudan and Uganda into western Kenya. They count themselves among the immigrants who displaced or absorbed the indigenous peoples of Western Kenya. Ogot (1967) argues that the Bantu groups preceded the others who later settled in Kenya, but not necessarily in the lands that they occupied when colonialism was established later. But the Kikuyu claims to be an indigenous group. Their claims of indigeneity imply that the Kikuyu lived much longer (many generations) in the same area, and had established ancestral roots and prosperity within it. With an environmentally friendly economy based on small livestock (sheep and goats), and occupying an extremely fertile zone of the country, the Kikuyu became a prosperous and peaceful people.

The decentralised nature of the Kikuyu military that was coordinated through a council pursued peaceful co-existence between the clans. Its warrior spirit was aimed at defending their common country against foreign invaders and also protected its economic and social life. The Kikuyu occupied a forested highland environment that provided relative protection from invaders, lessening its reliance on the military and reducing the edge to fight. The Kikuyu military institutions were oriented towards peaceful political governance, ritual eminence and accumulation of wealth. One institution of traditional governance was a 'council of war' that presided over a warrior class divided into regimental groups, according to the system of age grades (*riika*). "Every *riika* had its leader (*mothamaki wa riika*) who was responsible for the activities of his group [...] In time of war, these regiments were united under the leadership of *njamayaita* (council of war) composed of several *athamaki* (leaders) of the various age-grades. At the head of this council was a *mondowaita* (war magician or priest), whose duty was to advise the council as to the best time of waging war (raiding for livestock). He blessed the warriors and gave them war medicine to protect them against the enemy" (Kenyatta, 1938: 197-8). The predominance of magicians and priests of the war council also suggest a political system that was less-war like.

In addition, motives for Kikuyu communities to start war were very limited and never about grabbing land or capturing populations for purposes of increasing the size of the army, but to steal a few cows that had no proper place in their culture. According to their

traditions, land was a commodity to be bought and individually owned (not to be violently grabbed), and to be commonly defended once it had lawfully changed hands as we shall see later. Only cattle could be stolen in an organised fashion involving warriors, but these were irregular and unpopular among the ordinary Kikuyu people. According to Kenyatta (1938: 198-9), "the motive for fighting was merely to capture the livestock of the enemy and to kill those who offered resistance. In other words, it was a form of stealing by force of arms. Women were rarely killed, for it was a disgrace for a warrior to kill a woman unless it was unavoidable[...] the council of war then divided the loot among the regiments[...] then a small number of cattle were set aside for the *mothamaki wa boriri* (the high councillor or the chief of the country)". Moreover, such raids were not very common. According to Kenyatta (1938: 201) "apart from the fighting strength of, say the Kikuyu or the Maasai, there were natural features dividing the two tribes, such as huge forests full of all kinds of dangerous wild animals and snakes, which made the forests a very effective blockade. Sometimes, it is said, a party of warriors entered the forests and never came back[...] In places where there were no such natural barriers, and where the two tribes came into contact frequently, peace treaties were signed and friendly relations established. In this case intermarriages were one form of peace-making". Kenyatta admits that his grandmother was a Maasai through that arrangement of peaceful co-existence. Joint operations were also possible between Kikuyu and Maasai communities. Kenyatta (1938: 202) observes that "[...] in territories where this friendship was established, especially between the Kaptei Maasai and the southern Kikuyu, the warriors of the two tribes joined together to invade another section of Maasai, like Loita, or a section of Kikuyu, like Mbeere of Tharaka". The activities discussed above also show the absence of centralised state institutions.

Part of the reason the Kikuyu generally remained immune from invasion by the Maasai and by others was because they hardly owned cattle, the major prize of raiding. It was not that they owned a powerful state that was feared by others. According to Kenyatta (1938: 63), "In former days cattle had very little economic value to the (Kikuyu) owners, apart from the fact that such owners were looked on as dignified, respected rich men. The milk was not sold, but used by the herdsmen and by visitors, especially warriors who were the protectors of the villages against Maasai or other raiders. The rich men, who naturally had more property to be protected, were responsible for feeding the warriors [with] milk and providing oxen for meat feasts (*irugo*) to keep the warriors in good health". Without large herds of cattle, the Kikuyu were generally safe from Maasai raiders. Ochieng' (1975: 34) notes about the Maasai, "Indeed the Ilmasai (Maasai proper) entertained the belief that God (Ngai), in the olden days,

gave them all the cattle upon the earth; it is therefore unworthy of a Maasai man or woman to dig earth to grow crops". Thus, the Maasai licenced themselves to raid any community that possessed cattle, creating enemies all over. Luckily for the Gikuyu, the Maasai saw them as complementing them rather than competing against them.

Kenyatta notes that the Kikuyu were governed in a loose manner through a council of elders from each settlement, not the kind of institution that could impose an imperial culture and dominance. Allegedly, the council of elders was established after the Kikuyu dethroned their kings and abolished kingship. "Every village appointed a representative to the council, which took the responsibility of drafting the new constitution. The first council meeting was held at a place called *Mokorwe wa Gathanga*, situated in the centre of the Kikuyu country, where the tribe is believed to have originated" (Kenya, 1938: 181). "In order to keep up the spirit of the *itwika* (republican revolution), and to prevent any tendency to return to the system of despotic government, the change of, and the election for, the government offices should be based on a rotation system of generations. The community was divided into two categories: (a) *mwangi*, (b) *maina* or *irungu*. Membership was to be determined by birth, namely, if one generation is *mwangi*, their sons shall be called *maina*, and their grandsons be called *mwangi*, and so on. It was further decided that one generation should hold the office of government for a period of thirty to forty years, at the end of which the ceremony of *itwika* should take place to declare that the old generation had completed its term of governing, and that the young generation was ready to take over the administration of the country" Kenya, 1938: 182).

The Kikuyu economy prioritised small livestock and its warrior army prioritised defence and only engaged in sporadic raids. According to Kenya (1938), "In Kikuyu country, before the introduction of the European monetary system, sheep and goats were regarded as the standard currency of the Kikuyu people. The price of almost everything was determined in terms of sheep and goats (*mboori*). This system still operates among the majority of the Kikuyu people who have not yet grasped the idea of a monetary system and its value [...] Sheep and goats, unlike cattle, are used for various religious sacrifices and purifications. They are the chief means of supplying the people with meat, while the skins are used as articles of clothing. Finally, without them a man cannot get a wife, for it is sheep and goats that are given as *roracio* (marriage insurance)". The conjoining of sheep and goats into a medium of exchange and medium of religious sacrifices and purifications, gives them enormous weight in the culture of the Gikuyu communities. Even land was sold and bought using sheep and goats.

With a small-stock based economy and a culture of buying and selling, the Kikuyu were relatively safe from constant attacks from their neighbours and could strike friendship and trade missions with many of them. However, such institutions could not launch it into political dominance over other groups. According to Kenya (1938: 66), "The articles of special value in trading with the Maasai are spears, swords, tobacco, gourds and red ochre. The Maasai, who are not agriculturalists, and who regard the cultivation of the soil as a crime against their gods, depend almost entirely on the Kikuyu for the supply of the three mentioned articles".

One central institution of traditional governance among the Kikuyu was the religious sacrificial council (*Kaimakia Maturanguru*). According to Kenya, members of this institution "...had practically all their children circumcised (both boys and girls)' and had 'passed through all age-grades'. Members of this council were the most senior elders, and therefore very old, and able to devote their lives to serving God (*Ngai*). Prins (1953: 113) adds "in all matters pertaining to public worship of *Ngai*, the High God, i.e., those acts of worship which fall outside the sphere of kinship: birth, initiation, marriage and death, it is the assembly of ceremonial elders of the grade of *ukuru* which comes into action. If a sacrifice has to be made to *Ngai* they convene the 4th and 5th grades' elders. But only the senior ones (of *ukuru*) are allowed to come near the sacred tree dedicated to the deity". These observations confirm that the Gikuyu society was also oriented towards religion and rituals. Prins (1953: 114) further adds, "a part from the sacrificial duties and prayer with which they are entrusted it is especially in the field of fighting the disastrous results of breaches of taboo that the elders of the ceremonial council (i.e., of both upper grades) are engaged in. The situation of disturbed equilibrium they are to restore is called 'ritual uncleanliness' or *thahu*". It is this religious character of the Gikuyu which was later exploited by the Mau Mau in the 1950s and later by Kenya in the 1960s, to win support for their political purposes. However, such practices and institutions were incapable of founding an imperial state culture.

According to Kenya (1938), on spreading out from their ancestral location, individual Kikuyu families bought land which became private property. First, they met the Gumba (pigmy) people who lived in the forest, who allegedly disappeared and never to be seen again. Second, they met the Ndorobo or Aathi who shared their language, customs and who transacted land for payment. According to Kenya (1938: 26)

"The Ndorobo established friendly relations with the Kikuyu, and, as the people continued to move southwards, land transactions started between the two tribes who lived side by side...As time went on the Kikuyu, who had not enough land to cultivate in the

congested areas started to buy land from the Ndorobo. All the lands which were bought in this way were held under private ownership or as family joint property...The term 'communal or tribal ownership of land' has been misused in describing the land, as though the whole of it was owned collectively by every member of the community".

What Kenyatta demonstrates in the quotation is that the Kikuyu had a practical problem of land shortages which they solved by gaining access to lands held by other communities through monetary transactions, and not through imperial conquest. According to Daniel Branch (2011), land shortages formed the anchor or constant interest defining Kikuyu nationalism that later emerged, making it appear as a greedy community poised to grab land from other groups. The above quotation also shows the character of the neighbouring communities. Ochieng' (1975), notes that the word 'ndorobo' means those without cattle. So this group was no danger to the Kikuyu, and was also safe from the Maasai and from the Kalenjin groups. The Ndorobo were also friendly and traded with the others. So too were the Kamba people who traded primarily with the Gikuyu and Kalenjin communities. Ehret (1967) observes that the Kamba (occupying most of the dry plains between Nairobi and Mombasa) supplied iron ores, salt bearing earth, ebony beeswax, honey, hides, livestock, and goats.

Kikuyu customs made it almost impossible to sell land to members of other communities, effectively making it extremely difficult to develop a state culture that was all-encompassing. This inward looking cultural policy only helped to alienate the Kikuyu. Kenyatta (1938: 36), says that "according to law of land tenure, if one of the brothers wanted to sell out his share, the relatives had the first option so as to avoid a stranger coming in their midst. The descendants of the one whose right was bought out lost all claims to the original ancestral land, and were treated as mere strangers". What emerges from the above is that while the Kikuyu were free to buy land from strangers, they did not sell land to strangers. Such practices were likely to create problems in the colonial era and in the wider nationalism of Kenya where many other groups allowed Kikuyu strangers to buy land from them, and yet that favour was not reciprocated. As a result, the Kikuyu never lost land to any other African group, yet other ethnic groups lost land to the Kikuyu. This culture of never selling land to members of other ethnic groups and the huge hunger for more land would continue into post-colonial Kenya with devastating effect on Kenyan nationalism and on the legitimacy of Kikuyu leadership over Kenya as shall be shown later.

In contrast, the Luo settled in Western Kenya, among fragmented communities, some of which were entrenched in armed raids, and others occupying highlands and collaborating with visitors for defensive

purposes. First, the Luo (a Nilotic group as the Maasai and Kalenjin) were a pastoralist, fishing and raiding community. According to Ogot (1967: 38-9), the Luo (like the Maasai) had no strong attachment with land. They were a mobile and ever expanding community, prone to raiding and starting wars that displaced other groups, and they were also less religious. They had no strong attachment to any particular land that they could call ancestral, and they did not respect ancestral claims of other communities either. This also means the Luo felt less inhibited when displacing other communities from their ancestral lands. Thus, the Luo based land settlement on conquest which was elevated to a primary principle, displacing other communities who felt marginalised. From my interviews in Kisumu, the Luo characterise themselves as peaceful people whose nationalism was not driven by any particular immediate hunger. The abundance of fish from Lake Victoria made them a very content people without big stately ambitions. According to a got (1967: 169), neither did the Luo have centralised political institutions nor a centralising political culture.

In summary, pre-colonial Kenya was dominated by Bantu groups among whom the Kikuyu became prominent. It was also dominated by Nilotic groups that included Maasai, Kalenjin and Luo. Both Bantu and Nilotic group slacked a centralising political structure (kingdoms or even empires) from which power radiated from one centre to the different regions of the territory. Numerous ethnic communities based on clan rule, mushroomed and competed for space and for other resources, leading to endless wars, cattle raids and complete displacement of some communities from their ancestral lands. All these set up a stage either for fragmented state systems such as a federation or for a colonializing power to establish a centralised state system and culture. The Maasai raided all communities that kept cattle and created enmity with them, and befriended those that did not keep cattle.

c) *The entry of colonial rule in Kenya- the absence of a centralising state culture*

Fragmented pre-colonial communities in Kenya entered colonialism at different times, some with losses and others with gains, but none with a centralised state/political system. To start with, Ochieng' (1975: 38) notes that the decentralised Maasai communities lost the heaviest and had to be rescued by colonialism.

By A.D. 1800 the Maasai had already seen their greatest days of power. Thereafter their expansion was minimal and, in places such as Western Kenya, the Maasai were definitely on the retreat before the Nandi, Luo and Kipsigis. The apogee of their glory was followed by a precarious balance of power which they had struck with their neighbours. Thus, thwarted, the Maasai turned their aggressiveness inward. The struggle and conflict over grazing and watering rights, and chronic cattle

raiding, now took place among themselves in a protracted series of civil wars.

Ochieng' (1975: 91) observes that "one of the results of Maasai civil wars in the nineteenth century was the removal, in some cases completely and in others partially, of several Maasai sub-groups. Particularly, the second or Losegelai and third wars created a vacuum which several opportunistic groups could take advantage of". Most Maasai land in the Rift valley was taken over by the Nandi and Kipsigis, both Kalenjin groups. A combination of endless wars between the Maasai and their neighbours, civil wars among themselves, render-pest and drought, severely weakened the Maasai communities. By the time of British occupation in 1894, the Maasai were thought to face extinction (having lost a huge population, as well as most of their land and livestock). The British responded by establishing a reserve for the Maasai. However, this also meant the Maasai had ceased to be a political entity that could help resist colonialism, and their collaboration with the British made them enemies of the rising Kenyan nationalism led by the Kikuyu, Luo and Kalenjin communities.

Without developing imperial institutions, other communities had made substantial material gains at the time of colonialism. Towards the end of pre-colonial Kenya, all that the Maasai lost (cattle and land and watering points), the Kalenjin (particularly the Nandi and the Kipsigis) gained. Ochieng' (1975: 92) notes that "the Nandi raids against the Maasai were primarily aimed at dispersing the Maasai, who although weak after the nineteenth century Maasai civil wars, were considered by the Nandi as a threat to their cattle and land. Most of the Nandi-Maasai wars were fought during the time of the Maasai civil war in the Uasin Gishu plateau (the current areas of Eldoret-my emphasis) in the 1860s and these conflicts continued right up to the 1880s". Thus, the Nandi took advantage of the Maasai civil wars to drive them out of the Uasin Gishu. Once lost, and with the Maasai in a defined reserve established by the British, the Uasin Gishu plateau became forever part of the Nandi country who were, according to Ochieng', on friendly terms with their cousins the Kipsigis, the Keiyo, Tugen and the Pokot.

Without imposing imperial rule, the Kipsigis also took a large chunk of Maasai country and cattle. Ochieng' observes that while the Kipsigis raided the Luo (at night for cattle), and fought wars against the Gusiiover boundaries, real war was fought against the Maasai. "War between the Kipsigis and the Maasai on the other hand, was looked on as true war, and was carried out under strict rules, 'as much for glory and the love of fighting as for the acquisition of cattle'" (Ochieng' 1975: 96). It was certain that the group that lost the war would be driven out and impoverished. Coincidentally, the Kipsigis fought wars against the Maasai at a time when the latter fought the Nandi, and were embroiled in

deadly Maasai civil wars. These activities resulted in the expulsion of the Maasai from the Rift Valley.

In contrast, the Kikuyu in central Kenya appear to have never lost land to any African group and pursued a less militarised foreign policy. The only group to whom the Kikuyu lost land was the Europeans. According to Kenyatta, while the Kikuyu initially supplied food to, traded with, and welcomed the Europeans and their Christian religion, they later changed, and started rejecting the religion (opting for a mixture of Christianity and pre-colonial worships), employed peaceful means to try to drive the Europeans out of their land, and started intimidating activities against them. Were (1967: 162) quotes a British officer, Fredrick Jackson, who observed as follows: "Between Kikuyu and Kabaras (Kabaras) going via the Nakuru road there is absolutely no food, and then again via Baringo, and co., there is food, but it cannot be relied upon for a large caravan. To do away with this I strongly recommend that stations should be built at Kikuyu...Ngongo and Bagas at Naivasha and Njemps. When Kabaras (Kabaras in Buluhya) is once reached the food question difficulty is all over". This observation was acknowledged by Kenyatta (1938) who had noted that the Kikuyu withdrew food supplies, with the intention of starving the Europeans as a way of encouraging them to leave.

As a way of addressing the artificial food shortages caused partly by Kikuyu resistance, the Europeans started establishing stations in Kikuyu country, confiscating all land assumed to be unoccupied, establishing the 'white highlands', leading to land dispossession among the Kikuyu at a scale previously unknown in their history. According to Werlin, (1974:39), things worsened when the British settlers and colonial administrators in Kenya developed an ideology of 'white highlands', and 'the Elgin pledge', prohibiting the sale of land in the uplands to Asians. Confrontation was inevitable, but militarisation was not. The withholding of trade to starve the Europeans confirms that the Kikuyu were a less militarised community, and its resistance was civil rather than military. The Europeans responded in a civil manner, too. They were now going to produce food for themselves, and acquiring Kikuyu highlands and labour became their primary concerns. In accordance with the culture and tradition of the love of acquiring land and of paying for it, the Kikuyu demanded exorbitant compensation rather than resort to political violence, another sign of a less militarised community. According to Leakey (1954: 22-23) when the Morris Carter Land Commission was appointed,

The leaders of the Kikuyu Central Association... encouraged those members of their tribe who had genuinely lost land to the white man, to put in such preposterous claims – so exceeding the true facts – that it was inevitable that a clear-headed, judicial-

minded body would reject the claims as too fantastic to be treated seriously. The issue was, in fact, so confused by the untrue evidence that was put forward that, in the end, the extent of the claims which the Commission finally accepted as genuine, fell far short – both in my opinion and in that of many others who knew the position – of reality.

The Kikuyu culture of prioritising material gain (particularly accumulating more land or demanding exorbitant compensation) would haunt the post-colonial Kenyan government as shown in subsequent sections. Kenyatta (1973: 151) criticised this culture of his people in the following words: “We have got to forget the old saying that money is all that matters and start thinking of our country which we love”. But this was against a strong Kikuyu culture which was not going to disappear just because Kenyatta said so. Concerted effort was required to combat it through targeted policies, which never came during the colonial period and in the post-colonial Kenya.

In a related matter and according to Kenyatta (1938), the Kikuyu later rejected Christianity over controversy caused by the rejection by the Church of Scotland Mission Kikuyu of the custom of clitoridectomy, which was widespread among the Kikuyu and among their neighbours. This was a custom involving the initiation of girls characterised by the cutting of the clitoris. Kenyatta (1938) observes that the Kikuyu had so much attachment with the custom to the extent that they disowned their sons who married women from groups that did not practice the custom. So, when the Church of Scotland abolished the practice and expelled all school going children who had passed through the custom, the Kikuyu Christians abandoned the church. Kenyatta notes that in the place of the Church of Scotland, sects such as Watu wa Mungu (people of God) emerged. This particular one emphasised holiness, proclaimed the sacredness of their mission, rejected the holding of property and of money, which they regarded as the source of all evils. However, Kenyatta says the group embraced communion with ancestors and polygamy. “...the new religion sanctioned polygamy on the ground that several leading personages of the Bible, *Ibuku ria Ngai*, often had many wives without being discredited for it; on the contrary, they are praised for their good deeds and wisdom” (Kenyatta, 1938: p 266). In terms of ancestors, Kenyatta says the group argued that “since the Church recognises the sacredness of saints, who are but ancestors of the *mzungu*, and if the deity can be addressed by the saints and can listen to their intercessions, it will be more likely that the spirits of the Kikuyu ancestors will act effectively. The Kikuyu ancestral spirits would have more personal interest in transmitting the prayers and needs of their descendants than mere outsiders who have to deal with requests from different peoples of the world”(Kenyatta, 1938:

266). In this regard, the foundations of Kikuyu nationalism were being laid, but this too was inward looking.

With divide and conquer tactics, the British colonial government primarily recruited for its army, from what was regarded as loyal tribes. According to Ochieng’ (1975) the Kipsigis (a Kalenjin group) initially traded ivory indirectly with the Swahili and Arabs and were indifferent to those passing through their country. Ivory “was exchanged for cattle with the Dorobo, who in turn sold the ivory to the Coastal caravans”. Ochieng’ (1975: 116) says later the Swahili and Arabs set up ivory depots in Kalenjin country. Then the European traders came. According to Katumanga (2010: 538), “The colonial preference of the Kamba and Kalenjin has seen the two communities emerge as the numerically major groups in the armed forces”. (The response of the Kipsigis was surprising, coming from a militarised community that could have easily opted to fight). Ochieng’ says a Kipsigis man stole an iron chain from one Fredrick Jackson who responded by confiscating “one hundred and sixty cattle and one thousand, five hundred goats and sheep”. This kind of British injustice alienated the Kipsigis, who grudgingly managed to contain themselves, and acquired the characterisation of a friendly people. It is said that the Kipsigis were even persuaded by their retired warrior-elders to surrender to British rule. Thus, the Kipsigis strategically avoided armed confrontation with the British, sparing their institutions and economy from disruption, and acquiring new advantages of being enlisted into the colonial army that was used to suppress all armed resistance across Kenya.

In contrast, the equally militarised Nandi (another section of the Kalenjin) was hostile to the Europeans and “would not even let individual Europeans cross their country and, in 1895, they murdered a British trader called Peter West who tried to do so”. Ochieng’ (1975: 119) adds that “Nandi resistance was not broken until October 1905 when Colonel Mienertzhagen surreptitiously murdered the Nandi Orkoiyot (spiritual and military leader), Koitalelrap Samoei. “The original contingent against the Nandi was 1,074 men strong; among these were some six European officers, 500 Sudanese, and 108 Swahili soldiers. By November 27th 1905, about forty-two of them had been killed and forty-six wounded. As against this, about 685 Nandi were killed, 10,308 cattle and 18000 sheep and goats captured, and several men wounded. To prevent further trouble, arrangements were made to move the Nandi into a Reserve, comprising the Aldai and Kabwaren districts ‘and the belt of the country between the Western Escarpment and the line ALAGABIET – KIPSEKAK hill” (Were, 1967: 169). Being a warrior society, the Nandi responded militarily to European encroachments, and therefore suffered casualties, loss of land and livestock. As part of their nationalism, they

never forgave the British, for killing their Orkoiyot, arap Samoei, and for the economic loss they suffered. Naturally, the Nandi expected to return to their ancestral lands after independence and their nationalism sought to expel the white settlers and to return the Nandi to their ancestral homeland. It is not surprising that the Nandi developed a nationalism that was initially anti-British and later anti-Kikuyu who replaced the European occupiers after independence. As we shall see, when independence came, President Jomo Kenyatta from the Kikuyu people insisted that no land would be returned to any community, rather, that land would be sold to any landless people who could afford to buy and to farm it. Such a policy allowed the Kikuyu people to replace the Europeans farmers in Nandi hills, a great source of conflict in post-colonial Kenya.

The white settlers got to dominate the racist politics of colonial Kenya. By nature, racism is not an inclusive system. After the British settlers occupied the 'white highland' around Mt. Kenya and the whole of the Rift Valley, they were able to dominate the constitutional arrangements of Kenya. Werlin (1974: 40-1) notes that "Between the two World Wars the constitutional arrangements was such that the Europeans elected from the rural constituencies in the highlands dominated the proceedings of the Legislative Council. This required the Government to subject all important measures to the criticism of the elected members before submitting them to the Legislative Council for passage. Similarly, the settlers were permitted to be very influential in all stages of administration". Werlin also notes that the white Kenyan civil servants were allowed to own land and this brought them closer to the settlers who influenced government policy to deny Africans the right to grow cash crops, the right to access government education, the right to be appointed into the civil service, the right to political representation and to prosperity, and the right to live in urban Nairobi.

This viewpoint stemmed partly from the British philosophical teachings of Edmund Burke and Herbert Spencer, that traditional culture was an [organic] structure of mutually dependent parts which would be seriously disrupted by the innovations associated with urbanisation. The resulting cultural void would provoke violence and decadence. Those who shared this outlook tended to distrust the westernised and educated African" (Werlin, 1974: 48).

One central way of preventing urbanisation among Africans was racial segregation in the towns, disallowing Africans from owning land and houses in towns and neglecting African townships that were overcrowded, dirty and poor. Colonial segregation offended the materialist culture of the Kikuyu who felt denied of new opportunities to acquire wealth and who were dispossessed of their land and their ancestral

region. This provoked protest nationalism which was predominantly civil and peaceful.

d) *African nationalism in Kenya – the absence of inclusive nationalism*

African nationalism in Kenya was dominated by the Kikuyu who were predominantly in ward looking, peaceful, and who demanded compensation for lost land and equality of opportunity to grow cash crops and a united Kenya led by African majorities. Notwithstanding the violent politics introduced by the Mau Mau (formed by a section of the Kikuyu), Kenya remained predominantly peaceful until Kenyatta was detained, and continued to be so until he was released. The initial Kenyan nationalism was the kind that complained about injustices, denied opportunities, racism, poverty, poor education and so on. The character of Kenyan nationalism and its peacefulness is represented in the writings of Mugo Gathuru (1965). The entry of the armed Mau Mau did not change Kenyan nationalism that much, except creating the impression that the Kikuyu were the only ones fighting for independence. The Mau Mau aimed to 'recover the land stolen by the white man; obtain self-government; destroy Christianity; restore ancient customs; drive out all foreigners; abolish soil conservation; and increase secular education' (Leakey, 1954). The fact that the Mau Mau was restricted to territories occupied by Kikuyu and sought to rely on the support of this traditionally peaceful and monetised community, weakened its national appeal and weakened its capacity to unleash widespread violence. According to Leakey (1954: 3), "a number of brutal attacks were made upon European families, and women and children and elderly people were among those killed, but the total number of incidents involving Europeans was very small, for the directions of the Mau Mau leaders was to concentrate attacks upon loyalist members of the tribe, in order to intimidate them (and any others who thought of helping the Government) into at least a state of passivity. In this they had not, however, succeeded as much as they had hoped". In short, the Mau Mau hardly targeted Europeans even though the latter finally got scared away. In addition, the general Kikuyu population refused to support it, which turned its violence on them, assassinating targets and further alienating the community from its mission. In any case, the Mau Mau had not acquired sophisticated weaponry to face the colonial army primarily consisting of the fierce Kipsigis and the Kamba. Instead, according to Leakey (1954), Mau Mau ran a small mobile gun factory in the Meru forest near Kibiricho. It also relied on stealing weapons from cars, farms and so on, thus introducing a culture of stealing and banditry. The entry of the Mau Mau introduced gangs, stealing, murders and assassinations in Kenyan politics.

In 1955, the British ordered Kenyans to form political parties along district lines, thus adding to the already existing politics of fragmentation. "The result was the formation of numerous district political parties from 1955, such as the Nairobi District African Congress, Taita African Democratic Union, Nakuru African Progressive Party, Baringo District Independence Party, and the Nandi District Independence Party, just to mention a few" (Wanyama, 2010: 66). While Wanyama blames colonialism for fragmenting Kenyan politics, our evidence shows that it merely preserved what was already on the ground. During the time of district-based political parties, the Coast people (headquartered at Mombasa) and the Somalis in Northern Kenya (through the Northern Province People's Progressive Party – NPPPP that even fought against British colonial rule and demanded to be re-integrated into Somalia), were demanding autonomy while Kenyatta insisted on a united Kenyan state. It should be noted that the Coastal region pitted Ronald Ngala's KADU against the Arabs who wanted to secede, and against KANU who favoured a national state. Ngala's KADU had been joined by the Nandi District Independent Party that resolved in 1959 that "the land once occupied by our forefathers and mothers and now in the hands of the foreigners should be handed back to the Nandi people" (Branch, 2011: 13). What this suggests is that there were two kinds of nationalisms in Kenya: one calling for equal opportunities between the whites and the blacks; and another calling for regional autonomy and for the return of the land to the original inhabitants or their children. The dominance of Kenyatta ensured the marginalisation of the latter nationalism, which however, never died away and continued to torment Kenya. On the issue of ethnicity and of lack of national institutions that could bring Kenyans together as one, Kenyatta preached unity characterised by a one-party state. At a rally in Meru (the stronghold of the Mau Mau) in 1961, Kenyatta said:

The need now is for unity, for ending the divisions which are delaying Uhuru. All of us come from one mother. If you want freedom, you must eliminate violence. Now we have the chance to hold meetings during the day. Those who want to hold meetings during the night should stop. We must be peaceful. We must be ambitious. But we should not be vengeful. The time for taking oaths is past. I have heard that some people giving oaths have said they were commanded by Kenyatta. Now I must say that I have never told them to do so. We must not use clubs, pangas or arrows, but one thing: logic (Kenyatta, 1973: 154).

Labelling it disunity, Kenyatta opposed politics of regional autonomy, opposed the expulsion of the whites which he called politics of revenge, opposed violence and secrecy which was championed

particularly by the Mau Mau in Kenya during that time, by KADU in its regions of Rift Valley, and by Coastal, and North Eastern provinces. According to Branch (2011), Kenyatta also feared that the Mau Mau veterans could organise another uprising against his government. "Kenya is a small and not unduly rich country. We simply cannot afford six parliaments and six governments. It is a gross error to believe that the division of the country into [regions] will in some way help to preserve individual liberties. On the contrary, it could easily lead to chaos and disintegration" (Kenyatta, 1973: 169). But Kenyatta offered no solution towards returning back ancestral lands to the original communities that owned them. It can be seen that the politics of regionalism and federalism was meant to protect the land and autonomy of the minority communities.

Led by Jomo Kenyatta as president and by Oginga Odinga as vice president, independent Kenya followed a reconciliatory state policy, trying to let bygones be bygones. "Forgive and Forget and unity" were Kenyatta's purported guiding principles in building state institutions, in building a new national identity, in developing a national economy and in developing a foreign policy. In short, no meaningful land redistribution was contemplated. In practice, however, Kenyatta allegedly divided the government and the ruling party into Kikuyu who supported the president and into Luo who supported Vice President Odinga and who provided opposition from within. According to Branch (2011), Jomo Kenyatta prioritised the interests of his own Kikuyu community: shortage of land for his Kikuyu people was given utmost government priority. The whole process of state building, of forging a new national identity and of building a national economy, sought to address this problem. In short, President Kenyatta behaved more like a Kikuyu warrior, conducting state affairs to satisfy Kikuyu land hunger through political dominance. According to Branch (2011), the main reason Kenyatta rejected regional autonomy and federation was neither about costly governments nor prospects of oil in the northern regions nor a genuine desire for national unity, but was about how his Kikuyu people and himself, could gain access to land and to wealth throughout the whole country (particularly in the fertile and evergreen Rift Valley). Branch (2011) compares a U.S consul who observed that Kenya's nationalist leaders had their own reasons for wanting to hold on to northern parts of the country that sought autonomy, with a British MP who held a contrary view. "While the U.S consul in Nairobi reported in May 1963, that 'oil hopes play a role', a British MP and former governor of northern regions observed that oil was not the main thing. For KANU, refusal to discuss autonomy for the north was consistent with the centralist policies that also dictated its attitude towards devolution. Autonomy for the Rift Valley would have been much



harder to resist had the North Eastern Province been granted some form of self-rule. The Rift Valley and the lands to be vacated by the European settler farmers were the real prize of independence, not the north".

It should also be noted that there was rebellion within Kenyatta's KANU party. First, the youth of KANU led the internal rebellion, invading and trespassing on white-owned farms in pursuit of Mau Mau-inspired politics of opening more space for the Kikuyu, and of Kalenjin politics dominated by calls for the expulsion of the Europeans. "Disturbed by reports from sundry areas of trespass and intimidation, and even *oathing* by some younger members of the party, he issued – on January 19, 1962 – a stern statement..." It is clear that Kenyatta's leadership based on forgiving the whites, forgetting all wrongs of the past and uniting all communities and races, was not resonating even with the youth of his own party, prompting him to threaten them with expulsion! His version of land re-distribution was based on giving loans to 'peasant farmers' to buy 'unused land in the hands of the whites', whose loss would be compensated by the British Government! "In the allocation of land to the new peasant farmers we shall bear in mind that our first duty will be to help those landless people who today have no means of livelihood. I did not say – at a recent KANU rally – that such peasant farmers will get land free. I went to great pains to explain that the way the government would help such peasant farmers would be by giving them loans on easy terms, to be repaid by the farmer in instalments over a period of time".

Thus, Kenyatta had no intention of directly addressing wrongs of the past in a comprehensive way. Rather, his government was going to help landless farmers (mostly Kikuyu as it later turned out) with loans to buy land! From interviews in Nairobi, Kisumu, Mombasa, Nakuru and Northern regions, these loans attracted very low interest rates in Kikuyu-dominated territories, and very high interest rates in non-Kikuyu areas. In addition, the loans were administered through banks, either owned or run by the Kikuyu. The end result was that only the Kikuyu accessed the loans, and in a sense, got the plots for free as they were given interest-free loans. In any case, the Mau Mau had had a policy of mobilising the Kikuyu to be land hungry, and after independence, to always flock in large numbers to resettlement areas, necessarily constituting a majority of squatters who were to be given priority in resettlement programmes. It is therefore not surprising that Kenyatta's commercialised re-settlement policies shattered the Kikuyu-Luo partnership that had built KANU and energised calls for regional autonomy, plunging Kenyan politics into chaos forever.

III. CONCLUSION

Kenya remains a fragile country, and the disputed 2017 election results that were followed by

sporadic post elections protests and a court case challenging presidential election results, are clear evidence of that fragility. This paper has shown that state fragility in Kenya is imbedded in the pre-colonial systems that were allowed to continue during the colonial and postcolonial periods. Pre-colonial Kenya neither had centralised political institutions nor a state culture and universal religion that could be relied upon to unite the different ethnic groups and clans into one nation-state. Through the culture of buying and acquiring property in areas occupied by other ethnic groups, the Kikuyu managed to spread their wings and occupy faraway territories in the Coastal areas, in Western and Northern Kenya and in the Rift Valley. But without imperial institutions and an imperial culture of dominance and without hierarchy and subordination, the Kikuyu exposed their defences and remained vulnerable.

The paper has also shown that colonialism, nationalism and post-independence politics, equally failed to create a centralising state culture that could have united Kenyans under Kikuyu dominance. Colonialism dispossessed the Kikuyu and the Nandi, displacing them from ancestral lands, racially discriminating and preventing them from accumulating property in the country and in the urban areas, driving them into slums and reserves, and radicalising them into freedom fighters. In contrast, colonialism benefited the Maasai who it saved from extinction, and it benefited the Kipsigis who escaped military defeat and instinctively acquired the label of 'friendly people' and got absorbed into the colonial military and into the police that were inherited by post-colonial Kenya. To the Kikuyu nationalists, the Kipsigis and the Maasai acquired the label of collaborationists as the institutions they were hired into had been used to protect colonialism and to brutalise the local peoples.

Kenyan nationalism had three strands: (i) national unity, equal opportunities and opening up the whole country to Kikuyu investment that championed by KANU that became the ruling party; (ii) regional autonomy and separate development championed by KADU and representing the Nandi, Coastal peoples and other groups; and (iii) secession, championed by the Arabs and the Somalis who wanted to break away from Kenya. Strong variations imbedded into the lived social experiences of different groups in Kenyan society, promoted differences rather than unity and oneness. Amidst this, Mau Mau radicalism introduced secret gangs and the political assassinations of opponents among and outside the Kikuyu communities, bequeathing a violent culture and clandestine groups that took to *oathing*. Kenyan politics is partly characterised by armed gangs to whom violence is a normal political tool, for hire to elites from the same ethnic background. This politics of gangs for hire excludes principles of fairness and of the rule of law.

Instead of relying on the state security that is controlled by former collaborationists, Kenyan communities resort to criminal gangs for protection! Rooted in an undying warrior culture, many Kenyan communities encourage armed youth gangs that freely rob and are easy to hire by rival politicians and businessmen. Kikuyu political and business elites who oppose the politics of regionalism and whose property and lives are vulnerable all over Kenya, protect themselves through armed gangs and through rigging elections to prevent from attaining political power, any political party that campaigns for regionalism.

To expect Kenyan politics miraculously (without systematic effort and international assistance) to re-structure itself into hierarchical and coherent parties with loyal branches all over the country, into inclusive state institutions that are nationally focused and that protect all Kenyans, and into equitable social and economic distribution systems that create even development, is to expect what is not within her reach. Kenya remains a fragile society. Its militias are deadly armed, and their enemy is Kenya itself. No Kenyan leader has been ready to disarm the militias and the criminal gangs, and the country faces real risks of implosion. The security forces are immobile and offer no security to the Kenyan people. The religious institutions are divided.

But Kenyan political violence is not spontaneous, it is either hired out or mobilised for targeted political and economic ends. Kenya remains fragile as it is founded on unfairness, insecurity, intolerance and survives on ethnic mobilisation. But without addressing past injustices suffered by the Nandi and the Kikuyu, and without assuring the Kikuyu of safety in the wider country where they have bought enormous properties, preventing the opposition from winning political power and from implementing regionalism, is the single most important political goal. Political assassinations, election rigging and buying of voters, have all been used at one time or another in pursuit of that goal – preventing parties that threaten to use state power to implement regionalism. The country needs the involvement of the international community to negotiate a peaceful existence and to build an equitable economic and social system. Observing elections alone will not help the international community to help Kenya reform itself.

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Ethnicity, Religion and Voter's Behaviour: The Experience of the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria

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Abstract- The need for political stability and virile democratic culture in Nigeria is a great concern to all Nigerians and the international community. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, several elections have been conducted, but the 2015 election is very significant to us because it exposed the unflinching role of ethnicity and religion in the voting behaviour of different segments of our society. We adopted Rational Choice Theory as our conceptual framework. This paper interrogates the influence of ethnicity and religion in the voting behaviour of the Nigerian electorates and recommends that voting behaviour should be based on party ideology and competence and reputation of the candidates and not ethnicity and religion.

Keywords: ethnicity, religion, voters, election, behavior.

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Abstract- The need for political stability and virile democratic culture in Nigeria is a great concern to all Nigerians and the international community. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, several elections have been conducted, but the 2015 election is very significant to us because it exposed the unflinching role of ethnicity and religion in the voting behaviour of different segments of our society. We adopted Rational Choice Theory as our conceptual framework. This paper interrogates the influence of ethnicity and religion in the voting behaviour of the Nigerian electorates and recommends that voting behaviour should be based on party ideology and competence and reputation of the candidates and not ethnicity and religion.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The need for political stability and virile democratic culture in Nigeria is a great concern to all Nigerians and the international community. Since the advent of the Fourth Republic in 1999, several elections have been conducted in the country, but the 2015 election is very significant to this study.

The 2015 presidential election in Nigeria had come and gone but the indelible footprint it left in our memories will linger for some time to come. Apart from the fact that the election resulted in the defeat of the incumbent president, Goodluck Ebele Jonathan and the ruling party, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), it also exposed the unflinching role of ethnicity and religion in the voting behaviour of different segments of the our society (Mudasiru, 2015).

One may argue that ethnicity and religion have always been a factor in Nigeria's politics; the 2015 presidential election was different in some forms. The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) had dominated the political scene of Nigeria since 1999 and had never lost certain states to the opposition but instead gained some. But in the 2015 presidential election, the PDP lost some of its strongholds such as Plateau, Niger, Benue, Kwara and Adamawa States to mention but a few to the main opposition party, the All Progressives Congress (APC).

The outcome of the election also saw the first successful merger of opposition parties in Nigeria and the first time an incumbent president has lost election in Nigeria (Wikipedia, 21/9/2017).

Therefore, it is pertinent to understand what caused the infiltration in the rank and file of the ruling party in Nigeria. What is the implication of this for the party and democracy in Nigeria? What does this portend for the future of elections in Nigeria? Should this be encouraged or discouraged? These and many other questions are what this paper intends to interrogate.

a) Conceptual Clarification

The key concepts in this paper are ethnicity, religion and voters behaviour. In order to refresh the thoughts of readers, we shall explain these concepts.

b) Ethnicity

Okwudiba Nnoli is perhaps the best known authority on ethnicity in Africa. He opined that 'ethnicity is a social phenomenon associated with interaction among members of different ethnic groups. Ethnic groups are social formations distinguished by the communal character of their boundaries. The relevant communal factors may be language, culture or both (Nnoli, 1980:5).' Mudasiru (2015) has also argued that ethnicity constitutes the foundations of the African society, for it shapes communities, cultures, economic and the political structure of the peoples. More importantly, it shapes the perceptions of the African, defines his universe and provides him with meaning, understanding and the power to interpret the world around him. It is therefore an integral part of every African, despite the deepening influences of westernization and increasing cultural adulteration, since colonial times. Mudasiru highlights the importance of ethnicity to African in the following ways :-

Firstly, it provides security both to the group as a whole, as well as to the individuals constituting the group. The sense of belonging to an ethnic group means the members are safe together as one people, and ready to defend themselves against any external attacks on their existence and sovereignty. This notion of security also provides the groups with a sense of direction in their lives.

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Secondly, ethnicity provides each group with a common ancestry and history, which is an important aspect of the African peoples.

Thirdly, ethnicity also identifies each group by providing its members with a common language.

Finally, ethnicity serves as an organizing force, which assists in bringing the people together to fight or seek a communalism, family, and togetherness, which also deepens the sense of belonging (Mudasiru, 2015).

It is important to stress that ethnicity affects the voting pattern of a group. Ethnicity is an important factor of mobilization during election. The building of strong affiliation to a group helps in this direction. Therefore, it is important to understand the approaches to voting pattern of people and situate the role ethnicity could play in this direction.

c) Religion

A major interest in Nigerian polity is the relationship between religion and politics, in other words, between religion and voting pattern. The Nigerian society is religiously pluralized and this significantly influences political behaviour and decisions of the nation (Oguntala-Lagunda, 2008).

The task of giving a definition to religion has been Herculean. However, for operational reasons, it is imperative that we attempt a definition here. A renowned sociologist, Emile Durkheim as cited in (Aderibigbe and Aiyegboyin, 1997:7) defined religion as 'a unified system of beliefs and practices which unite into moral community called a church all those who adhere to them.' The above definition is very restrictive as it sees religion in terms of Christianity. What about the African traditional religion, Islam and others. Any acceptable definition of religion should accommodate all.

Igwe (2005:379) defines religion as 'belief in the supernatural and practices sustaining that belief, the ultimate superstition and thus, a level of consciousness mostly centering on God and Satan, gods, spirit or deities.'

Like ethnicity, religion constitutes the foundation of the African society. It shapes the perception of its followers, defines their universe and provides them with meaning, understanding and the power to interpret the world around them and the spiritual world. It provides its members security and a sense of belonging and encourages them to defend themselves against external attack on their physical and spiritual existence.

In Nigeria, there are three dominant religions, these are: African Traditional Religion (ATR), Islam and Christianity. All these religious ideology allow interaction between religion and politics. Therefore religious beliefs also influence voters' behaviour.

These three predominant religions operate across the country, but while Islam is predominant in the northern part of the country, Christianity holds sway in

the southern part and a few numbers of people across the country practice the African Traditional Religion.

d) Voting Behaviour

Mudasiru (2015) observed that one most striking issue about the voting behaviour literature is that it groups neatly according to three paradigms: the sociological approach, party identification models and rational choice theory. Although there have been some attempts to integrate party identification within a rational choice framework. Most researches have tried to explain voting behaviour using only one of the approaches and have decidedly ignored the others. We suggest that all of the approaches have merit and limitations, and that they should be seen as complementary rather than opposing. We argue that each approach is applicable under different conditions of political context. The best way to understand general patterns of voting is to integrate these approaches, and apply them in comparative analysis, paying careful attention to varying political contexts.

The sociological approach to voting behaviour emphasizes the impact of social structure suggesting that social groups' memberships influence voting choices (Lazarus feldetal; 1944; Alford, 1967; Rose and Urwin 1969; 1970 Lijphart 1979, 1980). Voters are considered to be instrumental, for instance, they vote for parties or individuals that best reflect the interests of their groups.

Another influential work fitting under the sociological paradigm is that of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), who argue that not only do group identities influence voting behaviour, but that cleavage structures determine the number of political parties in a given polity. In order words, political parties evolve in response to the interests of social cleavages. The sociological approach, then, holds that group identities affect attitudes and interest. These attitudes in turn affect how people vote.

Unlike the sociological model, the party identification model assumes voters to be expensive rather than instrumental, and attitude and issue preferences are considered to be endogenous to vote. The approach holds that voters have long-standing psychological ties to specific political parties, and seldom waver from voting for them. These party attachments are largely due to early socialization reflection, mostly family influences. Simply put, people are influenced by partisanship of their parents. The party identification model can be seen as similar to the sociological approach, people "come to see themselves as members of social group for instance, Democrats and Republicans in much the same way that certain people incorporate religion, regional, or ethnic groups into their self-conceptions" (Gerbar and Green, 1998: 794). On the other hand, unlike the sociological model, party identification model further holds that causations

runs in both direction between attitudes and vote. Although instrumental like the sociological model, the rational choice approach is much more individualistic, suggesting that voting decisions are based on cost-benefit analyses where voters match their individual issue preferences with party platforms.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

In our abstract, we noted that we are adopting the Rational Choice Theory (RCT) also known as Choice Theory or Rational Action Theory as our conceptual framework. This theory to us, is the most potent paradigm for the direction of this research.

The sociologist, George Homas in 1961 laid the basic framework for exchange theory, which he beached in assumptions drawn from behavioral psychology. This could be attributed to the foundation of the RCT. However, between 1960 and 1970, other theorists like Blau, Coleman, and Cook extended and enlarged his thoughts and helped to develop a more formal model of rational choice. Over the years, rational choice theorists have become increasingly mathematical, reviewing their thought to Marxian ideas. Becker (1976) opines that "the RTC was early popularized by a 1992 Nobel Memorial Prize Laureate in Economics Science, Gary Becker, who was one of the first to apply rational actor models more widely".

RCT is a theory for understanding social and economic as well as individual behaviour. It is the main paradigm professed by the microeconomics school of thought and is significantly adopted by analyst in the field of political science and other disciplines like sociology, anthropology and philosophy.

Wikipedia (retrieved 8/24/17) states:

The concept of rationality used in rational choice theory is different from the colloquial and most philosophical use of the word. Colloquially, "rational" behaviour typically means "sensible", "predictable", or "in a thoughtful, clear-headed manner." Rational choice theory uses a narrower definition of rationality. At its most basic level, behavior is rational if it is goal-oriented, reflective (evaluative), and consistent (across time and different choice situations).

Wkipidia as (retrieved 9/24/17) goes further to argue that 'rationality is widely used as an assumption of the behavior of individuals in microeconomic models and analyses and appears in almost all economics textbook treatments of human decision-making. It is also used in political science, sociology and philosophy. Understanding voters' behavior according to the theory of Rational Choice means learning about the motivating factors why the individuals choose to vote based on ethnic sentimentalism and religious biases.'

The RTC champions the view that because individuals and people have preferences among variable choice alternatives that allow them to adopt

which option is best preferable to them, they therefore behave as they do. That is, people make rational choices based on their goals, and those choices direct their behavior. The rational agents is assumed to take account of available information, probabilities of events, and potential costs and benefits in determining preferences, and to act consistently in choosing the self-determined best choice of action.

Economics factor is a major determinant that shape human behavior. This underscores why people are often motivated by materialism which is exemplified in unbridled desire for money and profit making and it defines why they calculate the likely costs and benefits of any action before deciding what to do. This thinking model is called rational choice theory.

The rational actor is one who chooses to vote base on his inclination to religion and or ethnic background of the candidates. This theory asserts that each individual begins life with a clean slate and makes his or her own choices as to how to behave. The predestined actor is an individual who is unable to control his or her urges and may actually be encouraged by his or her environment to vote based on both religious and ethnic inclinations. Such people may be obsessed by internal or external influences (or both) to react in ways that is different from their original values.

RCT best explains the age long voting behavioural patterns in Nigeria. Just like during the independence era, ethno-religious affiliations continue to reflect in voting behaviour of Nigerians because most of the electorate see the acquisition of state power not only as a means to an end, but an end itself. The dominance of power in their ethnic nationality and even religious cycle is seen as a route to wealth, therefore must be achieved. This played out prominently in the 2015 Presidential election as reflected in the election results. While President Buhari, a Moslem from the North won in almost all the Northern States, the then incumbent President his closest rival won majorly in South – South and South – East States which are his ethnic stock and dominated by Christians. The voting pattern in the South West and North Central and parts of the country was drummed around ethnic sentiments and religious cleavages.

It is significant to note therefore that the patterns of selecting political actors in the political system in Nigeria in form of political recruitment, the nature of political socialization, as well as the free flow of communication that exist between political office holders and other state actors in the political system are currently determined by interest, motivated by materialism. Politics which albinio is expected to be service driven is determined by economic interest which eventually shapes voting behavior as reflected in 2015 Presidential elections in Nigeria.

a) *An Overview of Voting Pattern in Nigeria, Since Independence*

Nigeria as a nation is an aggregation of several nationalities. In real terms, it is a pluralistic and multi-faceted society both in terms of region, culture and composition. It has about 450 different ethnic groupings. The 2006 officially certified census by the National Population Commission (NPC) put the population of Nigeria as 140 million with a growth rate of 6.3% per annum (Mudasiru, 2011).

Despite the fact that Nigeria is composed of over 450 ethnic groupings, there are three dominant ethnic groups, these are the Hausa/Fulani, Ibo and Yoruba with the Hausa Fulani dominating the Northern part of the country; the Ibo in the Eastern part and the Yoruba in the Western part of the country. The 1996 state creation and reorganization of the state structure in Nigeria saw these ethnic groupings being reorganized into six geo-political zones with the Hausa-Fulani comprising majorly the North-East, North-West and North-Central; the Ibo in the South-East; the Yoruba in the South-West; while the Niger Delta people comprise the South-South (Musasiru, 2015).

Members of the different ethnic groups have continued to vie for political offices in order to enrich both individual and group interest. Political party formation is not left out in this ethnic chauvinism and configuration, hence party campaign also follow ethnic sentiments. This was the trend in the first and second republics and has continued till date. From the First Republic down to the Fourth, ethnicity, religion and party popularity have been the main drivers of voting pattern in Nigeria. However, other minor factors which slightly determine voters' behaviour are individual competence and reputation.

In the First Republic, three political parties dominated the political scene, namely the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroons (NCNC), Northern People's Congress (NPC) and the Action Group (AG). These parties reflected the three dominant ethnic groups in the Country – the Ibo, the Hausa/Fulani and the Yoruba respectively. In the same manner, in 1959 and 1964 federal elections the voting pattern followed the ethnic line. The Hausa/Fulani voted for the NPC overwhelmingly, while a comfortable majority of the people of the Eastern region voted for the NCNC and majority of the people in the Western region voted for the AG. The voting pattern clearly followed ethnic lines which did not encourage national integration and subsequently led to the collapse of the first republic (Ikelegbe, 1995:200 – 2003)

Voting pattern in the Second republic (1979-1983) was not different from the first republic. In the 1979 general elections, the Hausa/Fulani voted massively for the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) which had its base in the North; while the Ibo ethnic group voted massively for the Nigerian Peoples Party (NPP)

with its base in the East; and the Yorubas voted massively for the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) which was ubiquitous in Yoruba land.

Since the advent of the fourth republic in 1999, there have been four presidential elections with the 2015 election as the fifth. Though the multi-party system was adopted, three major political parties contested the election. These were the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), the All Nigerian Peoples Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). Apart from the AD that had its base in the South - West, the PDP and the APP were actually national parties. In the 1999 presidential election, the APP and the AD formed alliance but at the end, the candidate of the PDP, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo won the election. Interestingly the presidential candidates of the parties that contested the election were from the South West. Chief Olusegun Obasanjo was the flag bearer of the PDP, while Chief OluFalae was the flag bearer of the APP/AD alliance. The result of the election revealed that all segments of the country voted in accordance with the interest of their ethnic group. It was the voting pattern or behaviour of the South - West that could be classified as absolutely ethnic. This is because they voted massively for the AD. One fundamental reason that influenced their voting behaviour was the feeling that the other ethnic groups wanted to impose Chief Obasanjo on them, having annulled the June, 12 election widely believed to have been won by their illustrious son, late Chief M.K.O. Abiola.

b) *Ethnicity, Religion and Voters' Behaviour in the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria*

The Nigerian general election of 2015 was the 5th quadrennial election to be held since the end of military rule in 1999. Voters elected the president and members to the House of Representatives and the Senate. The incumbent president, Goodluck Jonathan sought his second and final term (Wikipedia, retrieved 9/27/2017).

The elections were first scheduled to hold on 14th February, 2015, however, the Electoral Commission, Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) postponed it by six weeks to 28th March, 2015 mainly due to the poor distribution of permanent voters cards and to curb ongoing Boko Haram insurgency in North-Eastern states of Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states.

On 28th March, 2015 the presidential election held, fourteen candidates and political parties contested the election. However, the three frontline parties were the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) which was also the ruling party, the All Progressives Congress (APC) the main opposition, and African People's Alliance (APA). At the end of the election, the candidate of the APC, Muhammadu Buhari was declared the winner of the election with 15,424,921 votes which represented 53.95% of the votes cast, while President Goodluck

Ebele Jonathan, the candidate of PDP and the incumbent president had 12,853,162 votes, representing 44.96% of the votes cast while Adebaye Ayeni, the candidate of APA had only 53,537 votes (Wikipedia, as retrieved 29/9/2017).

A synopsis of the election result as copied from the website of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) is as presented on the table below:

Table 1: Showing the Summary Voters Turn – Out in the Presidential Election

1	Total No of Registered Voters	67,442,995
2	Total No of Accredited Voters	33,746,490
3	Total No of Valid Votes	28,587,564
4	Total No of Rejected Votes	844,519
	Total Votes Cast	29,432,083

Source: INEC Website




Figure retrieved from Google image 12/9/17




Fig. 1: Map of Nigeria Showing the States Won by the Two Contending Presidential Candidates in the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria

Figure I above shows that the APC candidate, President MohammaduBuhari won in twenty States while the PDP candidate, then incumbent President Goodluck Jonathan won in Sixteen States and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. An analysis of the map

Muhammsdu Buhari of APC won in 20 States and Abuja, while Good luck Jonathan of PDP won in sixteen States. The States won by each of the two major candidates and parties are as reflected in the map of Nigeria, highlighted as figure 1 below:

shows that most of the States won by the APC are in North – West, North – East, major parts of North–Central (Middle Belt) and South - West Regions, while the PDP won in all the South – South and South - East States. All but one South – West States fell to the APC

because the Region had a Vice Presidential Candidate which is a bargaining tool for their future.

Table 2 highlights the detailed result of the 28th March, 2015 Presidential election in Nigeria which is attached as an annexure 1. While table 3 presents the approximate percentage of voter's turns – out in the 36 States and the FCT, Abuja which is attached as annexure II. From the annexures 1 and II, it was obvious that the contest was between the PDP and the APC. The other parties made no significant impact in the election. The election marks the first time an incumbent president lost re-election in Nigeria (Wikipedia, as retrieved 29/9/2017). Furthermore, the result showed that many factors influenced voters' behaviour. Also, annexure 2 shows the approximate percentage of Voters turn – out. From that table, it is flawless to state that we had more Voters turn out from the South – South, the Region from where the then President Goodluck Jonathan hails from. Rivers State recorded up to 71% of voters, the highest in the Federation, followed by Delta 66% and Akwalbom, Bayelsa and 64% respectively. Jigawa equals Akwalbom and Bayelsa States. Further to the fore going is the issue of religion; the PDP's Goodluck Jonathan won in all the core Christian States, even in North - East Taraba as well as North – Central Plateau and Nassarawa, while there were stiff competition in Lagos, Benue, Kogi and all the other South West States. This revealed the commitment of the South – South as well as South - East people to supporting one of their own, just was the massive support for MuhammaduBuhari in North – West and North - East. The above confirms the assertion that the main reasons that shaped voters' behaviours in that election were ethnicity and religion which is better analyzed by the rational choice theory.

Suffice it to say that since the advent of democracy in 1999, the PDP dominated the political landscape of the nation and has continued to have the trapping of a national party. The PDP has formidable members from the 36 states of the federation and the 776 Local Governments Areas in Nigeria. After the 1999 general election, no party was able to successfully challenge the hegemony of PDP. That is to say that the party had tentacles all over the country. However, as a result of the desire for change in Nigeria, in 2013, the All Progressives Congress (APC) was formed through an alliance of four opposition parties, namely; the Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN), the Congress for Progressive Change (CPC), the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) and a faction of the All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA). This new party was accepted by many Nigerians and has a national outlook. With the registration of the party, a strong and formidable opposition emerged in Nigeria's political landscape. Later, a factional group from the PDP known as the 'New Peoples Democratic Party (New PDP)' joined the

party. This further consolidated the strength of the party, as this group had prominent and influential Governors, Members of the National Assembly and top politician with large followership. The party indeed became a good competitor to the PDP. The springiness of the party, with national appeal, led to its victory in the election in the 2015 general elections. The result of the election showed that what actually influenced voters behaviour was ethnicity and religion, especially at the Presidential level. At this junction, let us review independently how both ethnicity and religion influenced Voters behaviour in the 2015 Presidential election in Nigeria.

c) *Ethnicity and Voters behavior in the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria*

Ethnic sentimentalism dominates socio-economic activities in Nigeria. This tendency dates back to the colonial era. For power sharing, this phenomenon has been a defining factor of political activism and economic adventualism as well as social emancipation of the people. Political powers are acquired through massive supports from the ethnic or religious groups of the candidates.

Ethnicity played a critical role in determining the victor in the 2015 Presidential election in Nigeria. The result of the presidential election reveals that the PDP candidate President Goodluck Jonathan who hails from Bayelsa State in the southern part of Nigeria, and indeed, the South-South Geo-political zone won in all the South-South and South-East States. The results of the election in each of the zones are as presented in the tables below:

Table 3: Result of the 2015 Presidential Election for the Two Key Contestants in South - South Region

Sn	Name of State	Apc - Buhari	Pdp-Jonathan
1	Akwa Ibom	58,411	953,304
2	Bayelsa	5,194	361,209
3	Cross Rivers	28,368	414,863
4	Delta	48,910	1,211,408
5	Edo	208,469	286,869
6	Rivers	69,238	1,487,075
	Total	423,784	4,714,728

It is important to note that the total valid vote cast in the Region for the two frontline candidates was 5,138,512, out of 28,587,564 for the Federation. This represents about 18 % of the total no of valid votes. PDP's Goodluck Jonathan from the Region scored 4,714,728 representing 91% while APC's Muhammadu Buhari scored 423,784, representing 9 % of the votes. From this result, it is obvious that Jonathan won overwhelmingly in his Region because of the ethnic inclination of the voters. This table is further presented in the pie chart below:




Fig. 2: Pie Chart Showing % of Votes in the 2015 Presidential Election in South – South Region for the Two Frontline Candidates

Pie – Chart constructed by the authors.

Similarly, there was no sharp departure in the South – East from the South – South Region. The South – East people also overwhelmingly voted for the PDP's Goodluck Jonathan as is reflected in the table below:

Table 5: Result of the 2015 Presidential Election for the Two Key Contestants in South - East Region

Sn	Name of State	Apc – Buhari	Pdp – Jonathan
1	Abia	13,394	368,303
2	Anambra	17,926	660,762
3	Ebonyi	19,518	326,653
4	Enugu	14,157	553,003
5	Imo	133,253	559,185
	Total	198,248	2,467,906

From the table above, the APC scored 198,248 representing 7%, while the PDP scored 2,467,906 representing 93% of the total votes cast for the two candidates. The total valid vote scored by the two front line candidates at the election was 2, 666,154 representing about 93%. The victory of the PDP here was earned because they believe that Jonathan is also from South – East. His name (EbeleAzikiwe) has history with the Region. More so, South –South States were under the Eastern Region before the creation of twelve states in Nigeria by the administration of General Yakubu Gowon. One could conclude that the voting behavior in this Region was the same with the South – South State. This underscores the power of ethnicity in the shaping of the voters behaviour in the Presidential election.

The situation was different in the South - West, there was indeed a paradigm shift from the achieved results in the South – South and South – East Regions. APC captured all the States in that Region with the exception of Ekiti State where the Governor is a Christian and a vocal member of the PDP. The table below explains further:

Table 6: Result of the 2015 Presidential Election for the Two Key Contestants in South - West Region

Sn	Name of State	Apc - Buhari	Pdp – Jonathan
1	Ekiti	120,331	176, 466
2	Lagos	792,460	632, 327
3	Ogun	308,290	207,950
4	Ondo	299,889	251,368
5	Osun	383,603	249,929
6	Oyo	528,620	303,376
	Total	2,433,193	1,821,416

Voting in this region was competitive. The total vote for the two main Candidates was 4,254,609, representing about 15% of the total valid votes. The APC won in the Region with 2,433,193 which represents 57% against the PDP's 1,821,416, representing 43 % of the valid votes. It is important to state that there was no marginal victory. There was a twin play of ethnicity and religion in the voters' behaviour here. While the PDP had no serious candidate in the Presidential ticket from this Region, the APC had its Presidential candidate from this Region. This underscores the slight victory of the party in this Region as reflected in our table above.

The result in the North Central was also very competitive and more reflective of the voters' wish. While there were elements of ethnic chauvinism, religious bigotry was more noticeable. The table below explains better:

Table 7: Result of the 2015 Presidential Election for the Two Key Contestants in North – Central Region

Sn	Name of State	Apc - Buhari	Pdp – Jonathan
1	Benue	373,961	303,737
2	Fct	146,399	154,195
3	Kogi	264,851	149,987
4	Kwara	302,146	132,602
5	Nasarawa	236,838	273,460
6	Niger	657,678	149,222
7	Plateau	429,140	549,615
	Total	2,411,013	1,712,818

The total vote for the key candidates, Buhari and Jonathan was 4,123,831, which is 14.4% of the total valid votes cast. APC's Buhari scored 2,411,013, about 58%, while the PDP's Jonathan scored 1,712,818, about 42% of the total vote cast. Jonathan lost here because he is a Southerner and the Northerners wanted a return of power to the North. There was a similarity in voters' behaviour in this Region like the South – West.

Voters behaviour in the North – East Region was unique. The table below illustrates further.

Table 8: Result of the 2015 Presidential Election for the Two Key Contestants in North - East Region

Sn	Name of State	Apc - Buhari	Pdp – Jonathan
1	Adamawa	374,701	251,664
2	Bauchi	931,598	86,085
3	Borno	473,543	25,640
4	Gombe	361,243	96,664
5	Taraba	261,326	310,800
6	Yobe	446,265	25,526
	Total	2,848,676	796,379

The two front line candidates and parties scored 3,645,055 votes. The result from the Region indicates that the APC won in five states, pooling 2,848,676 votes

which represent 78% of the total valid votes, while the PDP won one State from this Region – Taraba, pooling 796,379, about 22%. There was show of ethnic bias in the choice and acceptance of the candidates.

The situation in the North - West was similar to what played –out in the South – South, because the APC candidate is from that Region. Also important to note is the fact that the PDP Vice Presidential candidate is also from this Region. The table below illustrates further.

Table 9: Result of the 2015 Presidential Election for the Two Key Contestants in North - West Region

Sn	State	Apc - Buhari	Pdp – Jonathan
1	Jigawa	885,988	142,904
2	Kaduna	1,127,760	484,085
3	Kano	1,903,999	215,779
4	Katsina	1,345,441	98,937
5	Kebbi	567,883	100,972
6	Sokoto	691,926	152,199
7	Zamfara	612,202	144,833
	Total	7,135,199	1,339,709

The total valid vote cast in this Region was 8,474,908 which represent about 30% of the final result. The APC scored 7,135,199, about 84%, while the PDP scored 1,339,709, which is 16% of the valid votes. Just like the South – South, the victory for the APC candidate, Buhari was prodigious. There was a high sentimental attachment to the APC candidate who hails from the Region. In this Region, none of the States was won by the PDP, even Kaduna where Namadi Sambo, the PDPs' Vice Presidential candidate hails from. The result in Kaduna State explains the skewed interest of the people to clinch the No 1 and not No 2 position in Nigeria and their rejection of Sambo in preference for Buhari. The reason for this is not far- fetched, the people wanted power back and believed that the most potent person to achieve this was a candidate from their ethnic stock. The result from this table is further reflected in the pie – chart below:




Fig. 3: Pie Chart Showing % of Votes in the 2015 Presidential Election in South – South Region for the Two Frontline Candidates

Pie – chart constructed by the authors

It is significant to note that the APC won in four Regions, while the PDP's victory was in two Regions. The reason for the victory of the APC is not far from ethnicity, which is visibly observed in the voters' behaviour in all the Regions. Like pre – independence, the First, Second and Third Republics of Nigeria, ethnicity has remained a dominant feature of our social-economic evolution and has been a prominent feature in our democratic journey.

d) *Religion and Voters behavior in the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria*

So many scholars have argued that religion is a key feature in the democratization process in Nigeria; this has become a key feature in shaping voters behaviour. There is an incontrovertible connection between religion and politics because religion has long been adapted as part of the daily life of Nigerians, and affects varied aspects of people's life including socio - economic affairs. While religion has remained a strong influencing factor on the country's political process, it seemingly is not the same in most developed

democracies like the United State and most Western States. Religion has been a defining factor in the choice of candidates to occupy key political offices in Nigeria, and this has underpinned the voting pattern and behaviour of the electorates.

It should be recalled that Goodluck Jonathan is a Christian, while MohammaduBuhari is a Moslem, so Christianity and Islamism influenced the electioneering process and the voters' behaviour in itself. This is as reflected in the election results from each of the geopolitical zones. Goodluck Jonathan pooled 91% and 93% respectively in the core Christian dominated South – East and South – South, while President Buhari won convincingly in both the North - West and North –East, pooling a majoritarian vote of 84% and 78% respectively which critically is a Moslem domain. There was stiff competition in South – West and North – Central over the two contending parties because of sturdy influence of religion. The percentage votes for each of these two candies based on religious bias is as presented below:

Table 10: Summary Analysis of the Result of the 2015 Presidential Election for the Two Key Contestants in the Six Regions

Party	Region	Valid Vote Cast	Percentage	Winner
APC	South – South	423,784	9%	
PDP	South – South	4,714,728	91%	PDP
APC	South – East	198,248	7%	
PDP	South – East	2,467,906	93%	PDP
APC	South – West	2,433,193	57%	APC
PDP	South – West	1,821,416	43%	
APC	North – West	7,135,199	84%	APC
PDP	North – West	1,339,709	16%	
APC	North – East	2,848,676	78%	APC
PDP	North – East	796,379	22%	
APC	North – Cent.	2,411,013	58%	APC
PDP	North – Cent.	1,712,818	42%	

A review of the table above shows voters' apathy and tenacious sentimentalism to religion. While the PDP's Jonathan won convincingly in the South – South and South - East dominated Christian block, it was difficult for him to exercise superiority in the North – West and North – East Regions peopled majorly by the Moslems, thus, these two Regions fell to the APC's Mohammadu Buhari. There was stiff battle in both South – West and North – Central Regions, the reason for this is not far-fetched, the Regions do not have marginal domination by any of the Religious blocks.

One may also ask why and how the PDP candidate won in the Northern states of Plateau, Nassarawa and Taraba as well as the Federal Capital Territory FCT, Abuja. These states are dominated by Christians, though they have a nearly equal Moslem population that challenges their hegemony. It is important to state that right from the creation of Taraba and Plateau states, a non Christian had never been elected as the Governor. It is quite clear that voters'

behaviour was influenced by a combination of the party profile and the ethnic and religion background of the contestants. So, the PDP candidate, President Jonathan won those states in the north out of religious sympathy. Majority of the voters in those jurisdictions feel that they would be better protected by a Christian president than a Muslim. The battle in Kogi and Benue shows no significant victory by the APC because of the Christians population in those states.

On the other hand, the APC candidate, General Muhammadu Buhari who also is a Moslem from Katsina state in the North-West Geo-political zone won a comfortable majority in fifteen northern states except the three mentioned earlier. It is also clear from the result that apart from Ekiti State, General Buhari won all the five Yoruba states of the South-West Geo-political zone of Nigeria. One may ask why and how he won them. The answer lies in the fact that the Yorubas who inhabit the South-west geo-political zone are politically sophisticated. They are different from other geo-political

zones in Nigeria. In the 1999 presidential election which was contested by two of their sons, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo, the PDP candidate and Chief Olu Falae, the APP candidate, all the Yoruba states voted for Chief Olu Falae, the All Peoples Party's (PDP) candidate who also is a Yoruba man? They felt that the interest of the Yorubas would be best protected under Chief Olu Falae. At the end of the day, Chief Obasanjo won was duly returned elected. However, what really happened in the case of the 2015 presidential election was that majority of the Yorubas were in ANC which was one of the parties that formed APC. Again the running mate of the APC presidential flag bearer, Professor Yemi Osinbajo is a Yoruba man, a Christian and a man that is highly respected and admired for his humility and scholarship coupled with the fact that he was nominated for that position by Chief Bola Tinubu, the strongman of Yoruba politics in this dispensation.

It is also pertinent to state here that in the politics of the South-West Nigeria, religion does not take the drivers' seat. What drives the Yoruba politics is ethnic interest. The Yoruba felt they were better protected in APC because they have No. 2 key position, hence they mobilized and voted more for the APC and Buhari.

It may also be queried why the PDP did not make a significant impact in the Northern part of Nigeria even when the running mate to president Jonathan, Alhaji Namadi Sambo is from the Kaduna State, North-West Geo-political zone. The simple reason is that, the Hausa/Fulani ethnic nationality felt that power had shifted from the north to the south for so too long and wanted their own to be president at all cost to protect their ethnic interest. This action was based on cost-benefit analysis which is a product of the rational choice theory.

Apart from ethnic and religious reasons, other factors could be adduced as to why majority of Nigerian voters rejected the PDP. The reasons are the high level of corruption, insecurity and the desire for change in the Nigerian polity. With respect to corruption Alapiki (2015:37) observed as follows:

There are numerous accounts and examples of high profile corruption in Nigeria... suffice it to mention the celebrated cases... the pension scam where civil servants are robbed of billions of Naira by government officials, the fuel subsidy scam in which NNPC, fuel marketers and importers colluded to defraud this country, and many more cases that investigation and prosecutions have been stalled, like the Aviation scam.

Corruption does not end with the stealing of public resources; it undermines justice, economic development and destroys public trust in government and political leaders. It also negates the principle of Public Financial Management. The PDP and President

Goodluck Jonathan's administration did not have the will power to fight this pandemic, rather, they stocked billions of funds in Naira, USD and other foreign currencies in personal or hired houses, empty septic and water tanks to name but a few. Besides corruption, the waning popularity of parties and candidates, the precarious economic and security situation in the country coupled with the desire for change also influenced voters' behaviour. This to the electorates was an anathema and they saw the Presidential election as a venue to remove the PDP and indeed Jonathan from power and reposition the country for greatness.

III. CONCLUSION

This paper attempts to examine how ethnicity and religion influenced Voters behavior in the 2015 presidential election in Nigeria which was won by Mohammadu Buhari. We adopted the qualitative research method as our methodology. We also adopted the sociological approach to voting behavior and the rational choice theory as our theoretical framework. We concluded that from the result of the election, it is obvious that the two major factors that influenced the pattern of voting were ethnicity and religion. We also asserted that beyond that, other factors such as corruption popularity of parties and candidates, the precarious economic and security situation in the country coupled with the desire for change also influenced voters' behaviour.

Finally, we recommend that voting behaviour should be based on party ideology and competence and reputation of the candidates and not ethnicity and religion. If Nigeria must move forward, the electorates must reject ethnicity and religion as the bases of political choice. This is because, it enthrones mediocrity and encourages ethnocentrism and corruption in all sphere of our national life. As a country, if we do not get our politics right, we will not get our economy right. The much needed imperative of national integration can only be achieved if we toe the part of national interest even in our voting behavior.

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Annexure 1: Result of the 2015 Presidential Election in Nigeria

S/N	State	Buhari	Jonathan	Ayeni
1	Abia	13,394	368,303	2,766
2	Adamawa	374,701	251,664	1,549
3	Akwabom	58,411	953,304	384
4	Anambra	17,926	660,762	2,303
5	Bauchi	931,598	86,085	964
6	Bayelsa	5,194	361,209	70
7	Benue	373,961	303,737	945
8	Borno	473,543	25,640	878
9	Cross River	28,368	414,863	532
10	Delta	48,910	1,211,405	478
11	Ebonyi	19,518	323,653	2,452
12	Edo	208,469	286,869	709
13	Ekiti	120,331	176,466	482
14	Enugu	14,157	553,003	715
15	Gombe	361,245	96,873	773
16	Imo	133,253	559,185	2,236
17	Jigawa	885,988	142,904	2,527
18	Kaduna	1,127,760	484,085	1,611
19	Kano	1,903,999	215,779	2,770
20	Katsina	1,345,441	98,937	1,671
21	Kebbi	567,883	100,972	2,685
22	Kogi	264,851	149,987	1,001
23	Kwara	302,146	132,602	1,165
24	Lagos	792,460	632,327	2,177
25	Nassarawa	236,838	273,460	310
26	Niger	657,678	149,222	2,006
27	Ogun	308,290	207,950	1,930
28	Ondo	299,889	251,368	1,139
29	Osun	383,603	249,929	1,306
30	Oyo	528,620	303,376	4,468
31	Plateau	429,140	549,615	618

32	Rivers	69,238	1,487,075	513
33	Sokoto	691,926	152,199	3,482
34	Taraba	261,326	310,800	1,306
35	Yobe	446,265	25,526	632
36	Zamfara	612,202	144,833	1,310
37	FCT	146,399	157,195	674
	Total	15,424,921	12,853,162	53,537

Buhari - 53, 96%

Jonathan - 44.96%

Margin - 2,571,759

Source: Nigerian general election 2015 – Wikipedia, 21/9/2017 (<https://en.m.wikipedia>).

Table 2: Showing approximated voter turnout by % in the 36 states and the FCT

SN	State	Party	%
1	Lagos	APC	29
2	Gombe	APC	46
3	Borno	APC	30
4	Adamawa	APC	47
5	Ogun	APC	35
6	Niger	APC	47
7	Oyo	APC	46
8	Kogi	APC	35
9	Yobe	APC	48
10	Bauchi	APC	53
11	Kebbi	APC	54
12	Benue	APC	40
13	Ondo	APC	41
14	Katsina	APC	56
15	Kwara	APC	41
16	Zamfara	APC	50
17	Kaduna	APC	52
18	Sokoto	APC	59
19	Kano	APC	44
20	Jigawa	APC	64
21	Abuja FCT	PDP	39
22	Taraba	PDP	46
23	Abia	PDP	33
24	Osun	PDP	50
25	Anambra	PDP	39
26	Edo	PDP	36
27	Ebonyi	PDP	40
28	Plateau	PDP	54
29	Cross River	PDP	44
30	Enugu	PDP	45
31	Bayelsa	PDP	64
32	Ekiti	PDP	45
33	Akwabom	PDP	64
34	Delta	PDP	66
35	Imo	PDP	46
36	Nasarawa	PDP	46
37	Rivers	PDP	71



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Post-Colonialism and Political Modernity in the Middle East

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Introduction- For a long time, the dominant approach within the study of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline has been to regard the Middle East as a separate geopolitical entity -- which is assumed to portray crucial aspects of a distinct regional political system: with its major and minor powers; core and peripheral states or regions. Although rarely manifested and mostly unacknowledged, this implied an engagement with some rather complex epistemological and ontological claims, which hold a major stake within the philosophy of social sciences, in general, and the study of politics, in particular.

The rise of regional conceptions of inter-state, inter-national relations in the post WWII academic pursuit of IR has undeniably been a development that precipitated some consensus or a middle ground upon which an engagement with a supposedly mechanical anarchical state-system has become possible, with the appropriation of an attitude that calls itself realism which has successfully monopolized over linguistic and normative vocabularies in an uncompromising attempt to construct and authorize a specific empirical position as a reification of "the real." Thus, what is primarily at stake in the study of regional systems -- whether as a function of policy-formulation, specialized investigation or an academic pursuit -- is this almost absolute conception of the reality of regional systems that seems to prevail overwhelmingly within much of the literature.

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Post-Colonialism and Political Modernity in the Middle East

Joseph Alagha

To the Realists: You sober people who feel well armed against passion and fantasies and would like to turn your emptiness into a matter of pride and an ornament: you call yourself realists and hint that the world really is the way it appears to you. As if reality stood unveiled before you only, and you yourselves were perhaps the best part of it—O you beloved images of Sais! But in your unveiled state are not even you still very passionate and dark creatures compared to fish, and still far too similar to an artist in love? And what is “reality” for an artist in love? You are still burdened with those estimates of things that have their origin in the passions and loves of former centuries. Your sobriety still contains a secret and an indistinguishable darkness. Your love of “reality,” for example—oh, that is a primeval “love.” Every feeling and sensation contains a piece of this old love; and some fantasy, some prejudice, some unreason, some ignorance, some fear, and ever so much else has contributed to it and worked on it. That mountain there! That cloud there! What is “real” in that? Subtract the phantasm and every human *contribution* from it, my sober friends! If you *can*! If you can forget your descent, your past, your training—all of your humanity and animality. There is no “reality” for us—not for you either, my sober friends. We are not nearly as different as you think, and perhaps our good will to transcend intoxication is as respectable as your faith that you are altogether incapable of intoxication.

The Joyful Science, Friedrich Nietzsche

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.

What is Enlightenment? Michel Foucault

I. INTRODUCTION

For a long time, the dominant approach within the study of International Relations (IR) as an academic discipline has been to regard the Middle East as a separate geopolitical entity -- which is assumed to portray crucial aspects of a distinct regional political system: with its major and minor powers; core and peripheral states or regions. Although rarely manifested and mostly unacknowledged, this implied an engagement with some rather complex epistemological and ontological claims, which hold a major stake within

the philosophy of social sciences, in general, and the study of politics, in particular.

The rise of regional conceptions of inter-state, inter-national relations in the post WWII academic pursuit of IR has undeniably been a development that precipitated some consensus or a middle ground upon which an engagement with a supposedly mechanical anarchical state-system has become possible, with the appropriation of an attitude that calls itself realism which has successfully monopolized over linguistic and normative vocabularies in an uncompromising attempt to construct and authorize a specific empirical position as a reification of “the real.” Thus, what is primarily at stake in the study of regional systems -- whether as a function of policy-formulation, specialized investigation or an academic pursuit -- is this almost absolute conception of the reality of regional systems that seems to prevail overwhelmingly within much of the literature.

To be sure, however, the institution of this regional conceptualization of inter-national, inter-state relations has been undoubtedly a development which has only come about after some rather intense and controversial debate that have mainly revolved around the possibility of a scientific study of politics as a behavioral science. The counter claim of maintaining a classical conception of politics within a philosophical tradition -- which in the post WWII has mainly manifested itself around normative philosophical debates -- has been a contention that has had much stake in shaping the dominant realist position, especially within the Anglo-Saxon tradition of the disciplinary practices of IR.¹

The debate between traditionalists and behavioralists in the 1970s has precipitated as a synthesis of a traditional conception of politics with an appropriate coating of the necessity of situating political science within the wider vicinity of social and behavioral sciences. As a result of this the neo-realist, neo-liberal

¹ This debate between behavioralism and various forms of classicism have mainly taken place in the US. Nevertheless, the root of this dichotomization of the two approaches took place within more broad themes in 20th century European thought revolving around the crisis of historicism and the dubious status of positivist epistemologies within the social sciences. Noteworthy, the literature on this subject is rather broad and arcane. My reading has been mainly influenced by an engagement within structural linguistics and anthropology. An interesting attempt to chart the roots of the problem -- as it has manifested itself within political realism in the 20th century theories of international relations -- is that of Brian Schmitt in his book entitled, *The Political Discourse of Anarchy* (2000).

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nexus, with the origins of the former generally attributed to the seminal work of Kenneth Waltz *Theory of International Relations* and the subsequent development of his work by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane is a position that is deeply rooted within the American and British universities.

Much of the new regional conceptualization of the world has mostly been formulated in the shadows of this neorealist, neoliberal nexus. This in turn, has some crucial implications for the various possibilities of formulating theoretical positions that make it possible to speak about geographical designations as sub-systems, which, for various reasons, exhibit special characteristics and require distinct approaches. Nevertheless, what remains striking in these accounts is the overwhelming ahistoricism and structuralism² that imposes a rather rigid, and arguably, simplistic on contextual reading on such a culturally and ethnically diverse region, such as the Middle East. Thus, what might appear as a natural extension of a classical realist position -- with its emphasis on the sharp distinction between the domestic and the international into some version of a more sophisticated comprehension of the world, or regions of it, as interdependent and complex entities -- has been more than merely logical or natural. The development has been characterized by an almost disregarding anything that falls outside the bubble of billiard ball models, in which states are viewed as black boxed entities struggling for the maximization of their autonomy and security, in a milieu that is structurally anarchic. Indeed, this approach refuses to think outside the box of Miles Copeland's classical realist book of *the Game of Nations*.

It seems the problem turns out to be two-folded. On the one hand, such a rigid structuralism applied to a domain, which is susceptible to incessant flux resulting from a variety of factors, seems constricting even within the "Core Capitalist" region of the world, where principles and institutions of the state system have been formalized and consolidated since two centuries ago.

On the other hand, it is the problem of applying such a rigid structuralism into a regional environment, where states are still on the way to consolidation and where territorial disputes and conceptions of security centered around the sovereignty of states and their territorial integrity are characteristic of the political struggles of another era-- such as was the case in 18

and 19 century continental Europe. Thus, it is inaccurate to assume that what has transpired in the Capitalist Core throughout the 19th and 20th century, with the resulting pacification of "zones of liberal peace" will necessarily be the case in a region where state building -- although has largely obeyed the logic of its colonial powers process-wise -- differs largely content-wise. It is precisely in this respect that problems of cultural ambiguities, economic disparities, and political instabilities, generate a field of paradoxes and contradictions that gain special significance, once one is willing and able to engage them.

Surveying the history of the last half century of the region compels one to succumb to the realist claim: that politics is uniform in space and time; conflict is inherently immutable (whether attributed to human nature, the nature of the state, or the inter-state system); and the world of guns and bombs and violence is all that matters, and is what should constitute the proper site of the study of politics between nations or states; or indeed nation-states. Looking at the modern postcolonial history of the region one finds ample evidence of the abovementioned logic: major wars during the Cold War era between Israel and its neighbors (1948, 1967, 1973, 1978, 1982); a Civil War in Lebanon (1975-1990); the war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988); and enough intra-state violence. The bewilderment this generates as to the causes and consequences is not to be taken lightly given the enormous loss and suffering incurred on the inhabitants of the regions.

II. THE REALIST THEORY AND SOVEREIGNTY FROM THE OUTSIDE

The "modified form of realist theory" that Hinniesbusch and Ehteshami (H&E) develop in the introductory chapter of the book, is the reference point of this section. The claims of realism that the author assumes are set as follows. The state is the main actor in foreign policy and thus the elites of state have an "... interest in maximizing the autonomy and security of the state."³ Secondly, it accepts that anarchy is an inherent feature of the international system which generates "... profound insecurity and pervasive struggle for power," even more so in the Middle East.⁴ Finally, the assumption that states seek to counter these menaces "... through "reason of state," notably power accumulation and balancing, and that the latter is a key to the regional order."⁵ These appear to be the main assumptions of the authors, which incidentally are the central tenets and axioms of political realism both within

² Noteworthy, the term "structuralism" is used in its original context, as the word has been known with the development of structural linguistics and anthropology in Continental Europe. The reader is aware that within the discipline of international relations some authors use the word to designate versions of Marxism and accounts of Capitalist Imperialism as approaches to the study of International Relations. Notwithstanding that such a use is a slippage and distortion of the original use, it might be also considered that Marxism as it proliferated within the confines of a distinctly critical project in the Post-Cold War discipline of International Relations is a relatively recent development that has been usually referred to as "Marxian Inspired Critical Theory."

³ Hinniesbusch, R. "Introduction: The Analytical Framework" in Hinniesbusch, R. & Ehteshami, A. *The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States*, Lynne Rienner Publishers: Colorado, 2002: 1.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid.

and outside the discipline of IR. This much is at once clear and ambiguous. It seems that the clarity in the “unshakable” tenets of realism clash with the ambiguities of the Constructivists, Pluralist and Marxist-Structuralist contentions over what constitutes the proper emphasis of the International.

H&E suggest resolving this by reference to the three domestic, regional, and international levels of environments⁶ that affect and shape foreign policy. Nevertheless, there remains an ambiguity on the status to be ascribed to the state-building process and how that might have enhanced or constrained the autonomy and independence of states.⁷ H & E's emphasis moves to pin down the character of the three levels or environments and the way they might constitute determinants of foreign policy.

III. STRUCTURAL-MARXISM AND THE LOGIC OF IMPERIALISM

Using the Marxist-Structuralist theory of Imperialism and by making ample references to diverse scholars that have used this theory to understand the “dependent” or “penetrated” nature of the Middle Eastern region, H&E offer the processes of “band-wagoning” of local client states with major powers; the incorporation of the regional economy into the world capitalist system; and the economic dependency such an incorporation has generated to point to the hierarchical relationship between Middle Eastern States and major Capitalist powers.⁸ Examples are ripe with references to the Gulf Oil Monarchies and their interest in the global core; the application of economic sanction on states whose interests clash with those of the core, like Iraq and Libya. However, this hierarchical and rigid dependency model is rejected by H&E -- who by reference to more realist-centered views -- emphasize the degree of autonomy that has been obtained by states in the conduct of foreign policy through fostering horizontal ties. Ties, which in many respects, have bypassed the hierarchical control of the global hegemonic power, especially during the Cold War (1945-1990) when the split of the global core into a bipolar system gave a chance for states in the region to enhance and consolidate their autonomy.⁹ Notwithstanding the ambiguities and controversies, H&E site three consequences of the impact of the regions

position within the international system. First, the overlap of local states with those of global patrons; second, the nationalist resistance that such a penetration might generate; and third the prevailing environment in the international system -- whether bi-polar, uni-polar or multi-polar -- and the effect this has on the possibilities that might emerge in the region.¹⁰

Explaining western penetration into the region in economic terms seems the best way to evade the more profound question of cultural, social, and political penetration. However, such an evasion neither erases those questions nor makes them non-existent. One might assume that those in power -- who constitute the elite in realist terms -- are rarely effected by such a phenomena, but what cannot completely be ignored is the effect such penetrations might have on the very process of molding the discursive horizons of regional political discourses and political ethics. What might not prevent the emergence of anti-imperialist and nationalist political discourse, might however, and quite subtly, chart the direction of such discourse in ways that might evade the eye of the negligent spectator. It is in this context that questions of political identity and state sovereignty become crucial and interesting.

IV. POLITICAL IDENTITY AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY

Concerning the juncture of identity and sovereignty that has become one of the chief tenets to challenge the superiority of realism in explaining international relations, H&E display an admirable self-indulgence. He is open to discuss themes that a well-respected realist is to leave well behind as questions more properly concerning the analysts of political life inside the state. He writes,

The unique feature of the Middle East state-system, specifically the uneasy relation of identity and state sovereignty, immensely complicate foreign policymaking in the Middle East. The realist model, in which elites represent loyal populations insulated from external influence in the conduct of foreign policy, must be substantially modified in analysis of the region.¹¹

Nevertheless, the substantial modification in H&E view is the lack of “impermeability and secure national identity—that realism assumes.”¹² Thus, trenchant anomalies of irredentist tendencies, which the author sees them as “built-in”, are characteristic of the region reflected in the expression of the practices and worldviews of various ethnic and religious milieus, and how these challenge the immutability of territorial borders and thus simulate territorial conflict between

⁶ The three levels of analysis -- which became influential after the publication of Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State and War* -- have been a major issue of theoretical contention within IR. However, the substitution of the state level with the regional level by Hennesbusch is interesting in this respect, as it reveals the closure of the site of politics within the state, which, as will be argued later, has a profound impact on the devising and formulating of long term policies of states within the region.

⁷ Ibid., p.2.

⁸ Ibid., p.3-4.

⁹ Ibid., pp. 4-5.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 6.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 7.

¹² Ibid.

states. An incisive example in this respect is the Kurdish problem the horizons of which stretch from the North of Iraq to the Turkish heartland passing through Syria, and which incidentally was of a 1998 Turkish-Syrian confrontation. Beside these, the problem of Palestinian and Syrian refugees, Shi'ite tendencies to export the Islamic Revolution out of Iran, and the sectarian struggle in Lebanon, which resulted in a long and destructive civil war more than telling in this respect.¹³ Added to this is the immense, but somehow ambiguous and complicated power that Islam possess as a trans-national, supra-state identity. This power, in many ways, and more than H&E are willing to concede, structures and commands the lives and worldviews of the people in the region, makes the resort to the juncture of political identity and state sovereignty legitimate and wanting. Thus, the generated *duality* that the ruling elite have to grapple with between asserting *raison de la nation* (pan-Arabism or pan-Islamism) and *raison d'état* (state sovereignty) is what has compelled H&E to treat the region as an arena of trans-state political competition, while authorizing political discourse, such as is the case with the Palestinian problem¹⁴ (and, recently, by extension the Syrian problem). Such a reading, which incidentally is a modified form of political realism, is what makes the authors' approach at once interesting and ambiguous.

The ambiguity arises as soon as one advances to survey the authors' treatment of state formation and the foreign policy making process. The authors discuss at length the various manifestation of Pan-Arabism (note that there is little mention of Pan-Islamism and its manifestation, which have been no less significant in this respect), especially as they came to influence the period of Nasser's rule (1952-1970). H&E mention how from a constructivist point of view identity as such, is never monolithic and given, but is something that is shaped and molded by the historical experience and interaction of leaders and nations. Extending this logic the author points to the fact that local communities have amply taken advantage of this and manipulated leaders who advocate such supra-state tendencies to their own interests. Nevertheless, H & E are prompt to retract from this position and claim that,

The interaction of leaders also "deconstructed" Pan-Arabism, so to speak: interstate disagreement over its meaning and the failures of Arab unity projects and of Arab collective institutions disillusioned and demobilized Arab publics, reducing Pan-Arab constraints on state leaders.¹⁵

Although the logic is clear, the conclusion could be contested, just as H&E view that identities in the region are contested and complex. One has only to

mention the extraordinarily limited room left for leaders while dealing with the Palestinian problem in order to see how those identities as contested and complex as they are, constitute the conditions of political possibility and discourse. The public statements of Arab leaders, although not the site reliable reflection because of their contradictory nature, seem to reveal how the pure logic of power rarely manifests itself which is devoid of any appeal to those complex and contested identities in the name of which those leaders speak, act and devise policies. The views might differ, but as H&E use the word "deconstruction" in his text, it is presumed that he might be willing to allow some room for the reader to "deconstruct" his text in an attempt to reveal ambiguities in the discourse that he is willing to offer.

V. THE DECLINE OF PAN-ARABISM AND THE NEW INTERNATIONAL

H&E give two main reasons why these identities have declined. Firstly, he points to the neglect of power by constructivists who fail to see that it is military power and not public opinion that was responsible to lead state to put self-help over identity. Secondly, the residual Pan-Arabism still continues to have an impact on foreign policymaking since the state identities are no good substitute for that matter. Thus, the problem of legitimacy is partially resolved by recourse to Pan-Arabism or Pan-Islamism as a contingency measure to disguise, justify and sometimes modify the reason of state.¹⁶ Although the Arab world constitutes in the words of Hedley Bull an "international society" bound by rules and norms, it is constantly drifting towards a "system of state" defined in terms of pure power and interest.¹⁷ Bull being a founding member of the English School in the discipline of IR has a somewhat different, more historically orientated conceptualization of "systems of states" and "international society". His approach, which is central to such an argument, retains only one brief mention. Bull, who worked alongside Martin Wight, was weary of this argument in its various extensions, while being cautious about the way this logic jumps straight to a position that depicts the world as a billiard table with the balls standing for the states in constant collision. Thus, while Arab leaders are cautious not to be affected by sub or supra-state identities (such as the so-called Arab Spring, for instance), they are also aware that what constitutes *raison d'état* is an inseparable from the global web of political concepts and realities that challenge it. As Martin Wight would have put it,

The feeling of unease about the system of sovereign states is a deep-rooted one in Western thinking about international relations. It exists not only among those who explicitly espouse the

¹³ Ibid. p.7-8

¹⁴ Ibid. p. 8-9.

¹⁵ Ibid. p. 9.

¹⁶ Ibid., pp. 9-10.

¹⁷ Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, London: Macmillan, 1977.

elimination of this system, but also where we might least expect them to find it, in the pronouncements of the servants of sovereign states themselves, by whose daily acts the system is preserved. These pronouncements often betray a sense of the inadequacy of the anarchical system, a lack of confidence in its institutions, a tendency guiltily to disguise their operation of the system or to apologize for doing so. The League of Nations and the United Nations we are invited to see not as diplomatic machinery in the tradition of the Concert of Europe, but as first steps towards a world state. Military alliances, in this manner of speaking, become regional security systems; exclusive political groupings, like Little Europe or the British Commonwealth, experiments in world order; war, police action. Men of affairs, even while in their actions they are seeking them, in their words are sometimes suggesting that solutions cannot in the long run be found within the framework of the existing system. Whether by a social contract among the nations or by conquest, whether gradually or at once, whether by a frontal assault on national sovereignty or a silent undermining of its foundations, the problem of international relations, if it is soluble at all, is taken to be in the last analysis the problem of bringing international relations to an end.¹⁸

In the same token, Arab political consciousness is gradually coming closer to the realization that solution to its own particular political struggles and the contradiction that emerges from them are not to be pursued with a blind belief in the state-system. Increasingly, political elites, statesmen, and analysts are turning their attention into a more positive appropriation of their political power and position, which unlike in the past, is beginning to leave an enduring mark on the Arab body politic. While the last 50 years have been turbulent and violent, to paraphrase Marx, they have been conditions evading the will and choice of the political communities subjected to them. Thus, most what has transpired during this half a century has left Arab politics (both internal and external), compelled to act contingently but not under conditions of its own choosing. It is at least open to contestation that such a course of action is susceptible to change as the World together with the Arabs walks through the doorsteps into the uncertain 21st century.

VI. CONCLUSION: BETWEEN POLITICAL REALISM AND POLITICAL MODERNITY

In an influential essay concerning the epistemological problem characteristic of modern social sciences on how an autonomous knower is able to make knowledge claims about a world external to it, the renowned anthropologist Levi-Strauss had this to say,

In the first place, he (Wiener) maintains that the nature of the social sciences is such that it is inevitable that their very development have repercussions on the object of their investigation. The coupling of the observer with the observed phenomenon is well known to contemporary scientific thought, and, in a sense, it illustrates a universal situation. But it is negligible in fields which are ripe for that most advanced mathematical investigation; as, for example, in astrophysics, where the object has such vast dimensions that the influence of the observer need not be taken into account, or in atomic physics, where the object is so small that we are interested only in average mass effects in which the effect of bias on the part of the observer plays no role. In the field of social sciences, on the contrary, the object of study is necessarily affected by the intervention of the observer, and the resulting modifications are *on the same scale* as the phenomenon that are studied.

In the second place, Wiener observes that the phenomena subjected to sociological or anthropological inquiry are defined within our own space of interests; they concern questions of the life, education, career, and death of individuals. Therefore the statistical runs available for the study of a given phenomenon are always far too short to lay the foundation of a valid induction. Mathematical analysis in the field of social science, he concludes, can bring results which should be of as little interest to the social scientist as those of the statistical study of a gas would be to an individual about the size of a molecule.¹⁹

As mentioned earlier, the discipline of IR has been a solitary field of knowledge that has remained largely intact from the developments in social and political theory in the 20th century and the various themes revolving around the philosophies of social sciences and their relationship to modern subjects. Thus, themes that derive their cannon from a more prolific reading of the twentieth century as the culmination of the modern epoch have been set aside in favor of an ahistorical structuralism that has elevated the concept of pure power into the superior analytical tool of the observer. Even when dealing with questions

¹⁸ Butterfield, Herbert and Wight, Martin (eds.) (1966) *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

¹⁹ Levi-Strauss, C. *Structural Anthropology*, (trans. Claire Jacobson & Brooke Grundfest Schoepf) New York: Basic Books, 1963:55-6.

concerning the origins and ontological status of power have been set aside, and superseded by more quantitative and descriptive survey of geographies, resources and strategic geo-political aspects. While these are undeniably inseparable from what politics has come to be within the confines of the mass-industrialized modern world, they do not outrightly assume an unchallenged status of superiority over such questions are becoming more and more appropriate and helping with the down of a global era.

The construction and the proliferation of the concept of the international that is not able to deal with the increasingly complex world emerging out of a curious relationship between Global Capitalism and the conflation of fractured, but nonetheless sovereign states is to be held under more intense critical attitude than has been the case thus far. A theory that claims to authorize reality out of a crude treatment of conceptions of power and security that reflect the horizons of the increasingly archaic 18th and 19th century social and political thought is to be, not only modified but seriously revised and reshuffled. However, when the theory at hand is as pervasive as political realism has been, then one is at least to be prudent on the assessment of its value as an edifice of conceptual tools and analytical strategies. Not to succumb to the charm of political realism is what has been the central aim of this paper. More significantly, not to dismiss it out of hand, which requires a critical engagement with its central tenets has been the general attitude towards the paper. The contention of this paper is that political realism as an edifice of concepts and tools is a much more serious intellectual project, than has been forwarded by the H&E in their textbook on International Relations of the Middle East. In a similar manner, state sovereignty as a political principle, political concept and a political practice that authorizes, shapes, and molds both individual and state behavior is a much more complex and fertile site to be engaged with than this author seems to offer. The construction of the "International" from the concept of the "political"; the constitution of modern politics on the pillars of the state as the only form of political community emerging from the modern epoch; and the closure of political discourse by the imposition of a hegemonic discursive logic (as has been the case with the crude expression of realism within IR) are themes, with their complexity and puzzling nature, are outside the parameters of this paper.

To paraphrase Weber "The iron cage of modernity" seems to have a solid hold on the political consciousness and possibilities. By the extension of the internal constitution of politics to the external realm and the imposition of highly subtle forms of practices of legitimization, the modern state has been able to forge a body politic that seems to be entrapped forever in the "iron cage of modernity" in its own particular and idiosyncratic manner. Understanding the banality,

ethical, and critical modes of attitudes towards political ideals and aspiration of the present, the populace also grasps some of the inherent paradoxes and contradictions of this discursive space. A discursive practice, to be sure, so strong that repeatedly succeeds to transform one into a novice, if one makes an attempt to handle and reorganize the material that forms it. The logic of the modern nation-state in the 21st century Middle East -- fused with the degenerate remaining of the web of traditional and parochial ontology of its classical era -- has transformed the political field of the region, and consequently the entire body politic, into a seemingly irresolvable ontological dilemma (here understood in the sense of the duality of identity and the violation of the particularistic character of the local culture by competing versions of universalism) persistently subjected to possible epistemological solutions. Such epistemological logics of inescapable dualism, or more often, achieved monistic notions of virility are responsible for what might be termed as the structural and ideational predicament in modern Middle Eastern politics.

As a final word, the discourse on the International Relations of the Middle East is moving turbulently towards the identification of the character and nature of the changes that are radically transforming modern Arabic societies and nations. The intensification of communication of practices, the gradual infusion of the conception of a community along dialogic lines; all taking place within the (secular) modern city, are all factors that will leave their mark on the future. While the future is still ahead of us and open for negotiation and contestation; rather than being the property of the transcendental manifesto, one has to be clear about the conditions that might ameliorate (or not) such a negotiation of "the yet to come." What remains essential in this respect is the development and proliferation of a critical attitude that frees itself from the imposition of a global/imperial/neo-colonial will while remaining critical of what is local. What might be understood as a process of "Enlightenment" or "Renaissance" that is still underway in the Middle East has to be conceived as an investment that will shape the character and course of the possibility of becoming otherwise than we are now. To conclude in Foucault's words,

The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine, nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them.²⁰

²⁰ Michel Foucault, *What is Enlightenment?* 1978.

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Public Perception of Electronic Dividend on the Nigerian Capital Market Development

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A.C Ekwueme ^α & J. O Omenka ^σ

Abstract- This study surveys the public perceptions of e-dividend and payment system in the Nigerian capital market. After offering a brief overview of the topic and statement of the problem, the study presents a theoretical discussion which was anchored on the 'diffusion of innovation developed by (Everett Rogers, 1962) and the 'technological determinism theories (Marshal McLuhan 1962). The study explains why the two theories are suitable frameworks for effective implementation of the electronic dividend in the Nigerian capital market. The sampling size for the study was purposively chosen from 100 investors from where the primary data were elicited towards unearthing public opinion on e-dividend payment system in the Nigerian capital market. Data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. The major data collection instrument is the questionnaire and interviews. The data were presented in tables as frequency distribution. In the analysis, the techniques of percentage and frequency were used. On presentation and analysis of data, the study found among other things that awareness of e-dividend payment system in the Nigerian capital market among the stakeholders was sufficient. This was evidence in the perception of investors in the Nigerian capital market where 60% of respondents affirmed that there is sufficient dissemination of information on the e-dividend policy. From the findings of the study, the researcher draws its conclusions and make recommendations.

I. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY

In an increasingly competitive global financial system in which countries try to out-compete one another for investment inflows, governments across the world are launching reforms to strengthen their regulatory regimes. Because investors consider the strength and independence of the regulator, amongst other factors before making an investment decision, thus emerging markets are empowering their financial system regulatory agencies to give investors adequate protection, ensure fair, efficient markets, and reduce systemic risk.

In pursuance of the aforementioned objectives, the Nigerian capital market regulator, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC), In November 2015, launched the E-Dividend Mandate Management System (E-DMMS) in collaboration with the Central Bank of Nigeria, Nigerian Interbank Settlement System (NIBSS) and other stakeholders.

Mounir Gwarzo (2016), the migration from manual warrant dividend to e-dividend system was aimed at addressing the alarming accumulation of unclaimed dividend in the capital market and to help reduce the amount which stood at N117 billion as at December 31, 2016. Out of this figure, N86 billion was in the custody of the paying companies while N13.7 billion was in the custody of the registrars. From November 2015 when the SEC flagged-off the campaign on e-dividends to February 2017, about N42.2 billion has been paid to investors from the backlog of unclaimed dividends Mounir Gwarzo (2016). About 2.2 million investors have so far mandated their bank accounts for direct payment of dividends through the e-dividend platform with about Nine million investors yet to join electronic-dividend system where dividends will be paid directly by corporate registrars to the bank accounts of investors SEC (2017),

There are more than 12 million investors in the stock market. Of this number, Minority retail investors account for more than 80 per cent of the domestic investors' base, although they account for lower turnover. Institutional investors, including pension fund administrators (PFAs), insurance companies, investment banking firms, stockbrokers, dealers and high net worth individual investors among others, account for the larger percentage of transactions Taofik Salako (2017).

This study therefore focuses on the public perceptions of the e-dividend in the Nigerian capital market development. By surveying public perceptions, this research aims to determine and reveal the level of awareness of e-dividend platform and payment system among the investing public and how they perceive the policy.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

There are growing concerns by investor over the increasing amount of unclaimed dividend in the Nigerian capital market and the challenges involved in collecting dividend. This concern arises from draw back in the old dividend payment such as poor logistic management, inadequate update of shareholders personal data, inability of investors to maintain regular signature to collect dividends and multiple applications during public offering.

This has resulted to large amount of unclaimed dividend which is a bad omen to both local and foreign investors, since one of the factors to be considered by

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investors before deciding on whether or not to invest in a country is the ability to recover return on investment.

All of that will be addressed with the electronic dividend and payment system where dividends are paid directly into the investor's bank account.

III. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY

This research work is generally aimed at ascertaining public perception of the electronic dividend and payment in the Nigerian capital market. Other objectives are:

- a. To determine the level of awareness of the e-dividend platform in the Nigerian capital market among the investing public.
- b. To establish public opinion on the e-dividend payment platform in the Nigerian capital market.
- c. To find out factors responsible for growing unclaimed dividend in the Nigerian capital market.
- d. To ascertain the place of e-dividend payment in the development of the Nigerian capital market.
- e. To suggest possible ways of enhancing investor's protection in the Nigerian capital market.

IV. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

In the light of the above, the following research questions have been specified to guide the direction of the study. They are as follows;

- 1) Are you aware of the of e- dividend payment system in the Nigerian capital market?
- 2) Do you think electronic dividend payment system will reduce the unclaimed dividend in the Nigerian capital market?
- 3) Are there any problems associated with the old warrant dividend payment?
- 4) Are you satisfied with the present capital market regulations.

a) Scope of the Study

This study focused on the public perceptions of e- dividend payment system in the Nigerian capital market; it is also within the scope of the study to determine the roles of the SEC in the development of Nigerian capital market vis-a vis the e-dividend policy.

b) Significance of the Study

This study will be of immense benefits to investors and intending investors as it will serve as guide for investing decision in the Nigerian capital market. The findings of this study will also be useful to Nigerian capital market regulators as it will serve as a reference point for policy decisions. It will also serve as a source especially to researchers and students who may wish to undergo further research on the topic. Through this study, the future researcher would be able to arrive at dependable conclusion and make recommendation of meaningful contribution towards the development of Nigerian capital market.

c) Conceptual Clarifications

Dividend: Dividend is that portion of a company's net earnings which the directors recommend to be paid to the shareholders in proportion to their shareholdings in the company. It is usually expressed as a percentage of nominal value of the company's ordinary share capital or as a fixed amount per share. According to William and Scott (2006), dividend is referred to as a periodic cash payment that firms make to investors who holds the firms' preferred or common stock. It is the distribution of profits to a company's shareholders. The primary purpose of any business is to create profit for its owners and the dividend is the most important way the business fulfils this mission. When a company earns a profit some of this money is typically reinvested in the business and called retained earnings, and some of it can be paid to its shareholders as a dividend, paying dividend reduces the amount of cash available to the business, but the distribution of profit to the owners is after all, the purpose of the business Pandey (2011).

The amount of the dividend is determined every year at the company's annual general meeting where profit and loss are declared as either a cash amount or a percentage of the company's profit. The dividend is the same for all share of a given class that is preferred shares or common stock shares, once declared a dividend becomes a liability of the firm.

Unclaimed Dividend: This is a return on investment that has been declared and has not been claimed by the investor

E-dividend: This is online payment of dividends due to investors through a direct credit into a nominated bank account rather than issuance of cheque or dividend warrant Mounir Gwarzo (2016).

Capital market: Country's capital markets are the markets in which companies, governments and their institutions raise capital publicly and 'where securities representing claims to capital are traded Ahmed, Bello (2015). The market provides facilities for mobilising and dealings in medium and long term funds. The players on the capital market are the operators who act as intermediaries between the providers of the funds and the fund users. They include, Securities Exchanges, Brokers/Dealers, Issuing Houses, Registrars and Investment Advisors.

Stock Exchange): This is the Nigerian trading floor for stock.

Security and Exchange Commission (SEC): This is the corporate body that regulates the activities of the Nigerian capital market and ensuring fair dealing in securities and protection of investors.

V. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

This study is anchored on the 'diffusion of innovation (DOI) developed by (Everett Rogers, 1962)

and the technological determinism theories (Marshall McLuhan 1962).

Diffusion is defined as the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system (Everett Roger, 1962); a social system is "a set of interrelated units engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal. The theory explains how, over time, an idea or product gains momentum and diffuses (or spreads) through a specific population or social system. The end result of this diffusion is that people, as part of a social system, adopt a new idea or behaviour. Adoption means that a person does something differently than what they had previously used to. The key to adoption is that the person must perceive the idea or product as new or innovative. It is through this that diffusion is possible.

Technological determinism theory on the other hand holds that technology more than any other factor influences social behaviour to change. It was propounded by Canadian Marshall McLuhan (1962). Neil Postman, a prominent technological determinist (Neil Postman, 1995), suggests we ask the following questions when adopting any new technology:

What is the benefit of the technology?

Whom does it benefit?

What are we giving up in order to gain this new benefit?

The two theories are relevant to this study because diffusion of innovation is relating to dissemination of information about a new ideal which is the e-dividend policy while, technological determinism entails change in technology which in this case is change from warrant dividend to electronic dividend.

a) *Review of Related Literature*

It is only wise to build upon the works of other scholars for better understanding of the topic under investigation. Though research conducted on the broad field of public perceptions, particularly in relation to electronic dividend is relatively few as it is an emerging development in the Nigerian capital market. Most of the literature relevant to this topic is in form of scholarly studies; include both quantitative and qualitative data. Other relevant literature includes, company annual reports, journals of Capital market, newspapers, capital market regulatory sources etc. The literature review will be built around the following sub-titles. They are: Objectives of Capital market Regulation in Nigeria, Nigerian Capital market development, Problem of unclaimed dividends in the Nigerian Capital Market, Statutory and regulatory approaches to unclaimed dividends problems, Electronic Dividend Option.

b) *Objectives of Capital market Regulation in Nigeria*

The prime objective of capital market regulation is investor protection. Creative accounting, insider dealings and misuse of client money are some of the

vices that investors need to be protected from. Capital market regulation has as its core objectives the following:

- Protection of investors.
- Ensuring that the markets are fair, efficient and transparent.
- The reduction of systemic risk. In sum, regulation of the capital market is meant to protect public interest which operates on the need to promote economic development and confidence which in turn should bolster inward investment (Adewale 2011).

Under Section 313(1) of the Investments and Securities Act 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is empowered to make Rules and Regulations for effective regulation of the Nigerian Capital market.

c) *Problem of Unclaimed Dividends in the Nigerian Capital Market*

Mounir Gwarzo (2016), the migration policy from manual warrant dividend to e-dividend system was also aimed at addressing the alarming accumulation of unclaimed dividend in the capital market and to help reduce the amount which stood at N117 billion as at December 31, 2016 Mounir Gwarzo (2016). Out of this figure, N86 billion was in the custody of the paying companies while N13.7 billion was in the custody of the registrars. From November 2015 when the SEC flagged-off the campaign on e-dividends to February 2017, about N42.2 billion has been paid to investors from the backlog of unclaimed dividends.

About 2.2 million investors have so far mandated their bank accounts for direct payment of dividends through the e-dividend platform with about Nine million investors yet to join electronic-dividend system where dividends will be paid directly by corporate registrars to the bank accounts of investors (SEC 2017).

There are more than 12 million investors in the stock market. Of this number, Minority retail investors account for more than 80 per cent of the domestic investors' base, although they account for lower turnover. Institutional investors, including pension fund administrators (PFAs), insurance companies, investment banking firms, stockbrokers, dealers and high net worth individual investors among others, account for the larger percentage of transactions Taofik Salako (2017).

Transactional report by the Nigeria Stock Exchange (May 2017) indicated that retail domestic investors account for 38.5 per cent of total transaction value by domestic investors. Many sources in the know said the large number of unregistered investors for the e-dividend might have been responsible for the extension of the June 30, 2017 deadline for the cessation of dividend warrants and adoption of the full e-dividend option by SEC.

SEC had announced the extension of the deadline from June 30, 2017 to December 31, 2017, citing numerous requests received from the investing public. In a circular seen by the researcher, SEC asserted that the deadline of December 31, 2017 "will mark the end of conventional issue of physical dividend warrants to shareholders of public companies in the Nigerian capital market. With a view to ensuring that all investors benefit from the free e-dividend programme, it had committed to pay the cost of enrolment had resulted in getting about 48 per cent of investors to enrol for the e-dividend payments.

According to Gwarzo the free registration for e-dividend underscored its strong focus on market development and enhancement of investor confidence. These are part of commitment to ensure that the era of stale dividends and huge unclaimed dividends in the market become a thing of the past Mounir Gwarzo (2016). "In this country, we have never had this kind of initiative that has reduced unclaimed dividends like we had today. Apart from the investor getting his dividends where ever he is, that investor will be able to get dividends that in the last five years he has not been able to get. The e-dividend is for the interest of retail investors,"

Gwarzo (2016). listed the benefit of electronic dividend to include:

- It is convenient, secure, online means of paying dividends directly to the investor
- Shareholders will receive their dividends promptly, without the hassles of lodging or cashing their cheques or warrants in banks.
- Increase transparency and efficiency in the administration of dividend payment.
- Investors will be able to monitor and tract dividend payments more effectively.
- Faster and more secured dividend payments- shareholders will get credit for dividend declared within 24 hours of payment.
- More investors will be attracted into the capital market.
- More satisfied investors as dividends are received promptly.
- It implies same day clearance for dividend payment, following which a confirmation letter of the dividend payment is then sent to the shareholder through the Registrars.
- No more waiting for the dividend warrant in the mail or queuing to pay in the bank.
- Eliminate the forfeiture of dividends in the future.
- Enhance ability of shareholders to immediately access and utilize the proceeds of their investments for reinvestment.

Gwarzo also listed problems of warrant divided to include:

- Shareholders without a will (intestate) have died and did not indicate any information on their next of kin.
- Deliberate act to deny investors their benefit through various schemes by companies who lack liquidity to pay and/or have to borrow to pay.
- Poor logistics management and inadequate update of personal data on the part of shareholders.
- Wrong or incomplete mailing addresses of shareholders kept by Registrars because shareholders have not notified Registrars of change of mailing addresses.

Small dividends are abandoned for not being worth the effort to collection.

d) *Regulatory and Statutory Approaches to Unclaimed Dividend Problems*

In the past, different approaches have been proposed by the SEC and other stakeholders to address the problems of Unclaimed Dividends in the capital market.

One of such is proposal (SEC, 2016) to transfer unclaimed dividend of 12 years and above into what its call the Nigerian Capital Market Development Fund (NCMDF), while companies and registrars shall not later than 30 days after the end of every calendar year forward report of unclaimed dividends to the commission.

In pursuant to the provisions of Section 313(1) (n) of the Investments and Securities Act (ISA) 2007, the Commission had proposed that: companies and registrars in custody of dividends which remain unclaimed by shareholders 12 years after the date of declaration or subsequently attain the 12 years threshold shall upon the coming into effect of this rule transfer such monies into the NCMDF. "All companies and registrars shall not later than 30 days after the end of every calendar year forward to the Commission a report of unclaimed dividends in their custody, which shall specify compliance with Sub Rule (1) of this Rule. "Companies shall disclose details of compliance with this rule in their annual reports.

The position of the law on unclaimed dividend is that where dividends are returned unclaimed, the Company and Allied Matters Act (CAMA, 1990) empower an issuing company to take custody of the dividends, while awaiting shareholders to claim not later than twelve years afterwards; subsequently, such unclaimed dividends are considered statute-barred and thus forfeited by the shareholders. But who shall it be forfeited to? CAMA was silent on who should have custody of the dividends beyond this period of 12 years. Thus, SEC through a legislature is advocating the removal of the 12-year Statute of Limitation on Unclaimed Dividends to enable shareholders claim their dividends in perpetuity.

What do other jurisdictions do with their unclaimed dividends? In India the Investor Education

Protection Fund (IEPF) was created to receive, among others, unclaimed dividends which have stayed with a company for a period of seven years from the day it is due. In Australia all unclaimed dividend are transferred to the Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) within a period of six years from the day it is due Mounir Gwarzo (2016).

But market investors suggested that instead of creating a trust fund for the unclaimed dividends, there should be a little fine-tuning of the existing law, simplifying letters of administration for the deceased family, and making the process of claims less cumbersome and rigorous; this will reduce the high level of unclaimed dividend to the barest minimum Olufemi Timothy (2016). Arguing in same line of thought, the National Coordinator Emeritus, Independent shareholders Association of Nigeria Sunny Nwosu (2016) averred the need for reviewing of existing law on unclaimed dividend.

The issues of unclaimed dividends got the attention of the Senate in 2016 where it directed its committee on capital market to look into the problem with a view to finding a solution to it. Muhammad Shitu (2016) through a motion asked the senate to determine the Status of Unclaimed Dividends in the Nigerian capital market and recommend the amendment of the 12 year ban on unclaimed dividend as provided for by section 383 of the Companies and Allied Matters Act 1990. The incidence of unclaimed dividends constitute a serious problem (mainly to the investing public) because distribution of earning (i.e. cash dividend) forms part of the major expectations of the investing public, some of whom may be orphans still in school (for school fees), widows, retirees use it as a means of livelihood; thus, Income from such investments goes a long way in cushioning the effect of economic hardship being faced by these sets of Nigerians Shitu (2016).

e) *Electronic Dividend Option*

As the legislative approach which is considered as one of the option to addressing the problem of unclaimed dividend in the market is being worked on, the SEC introduces electronic dividend Policy also seen by stakeholders as veritable option on unclaimed dividend.

A stock broker George Okafor, while giving kudos to the SEC for the initiative emphasizes the need for awareness to make the system work better and at least put an end to the issue of stale dividend and pains of revalidating of dividend warrants.

Farouk Umar, another shareholder was of the opinion that the returned money as a result of over subscription of initial public offer should be returned to investors through this means. Explaining further he said that these means would hasten the process of returning the money to shareholders and allow them make use of their money on time instead of being tied down

unnecessarily. Also, on the uniqueness of the e-dividend which involves investors having either saving or current account, he said that 95% of those in the northern part of the country do not have bank account and greater percentage of them can neither read nor write. This is also part of the reason SEC should make it mandatory for anyone that wants to invest in shares to first of all open a bank account Farouk Umar (2016).

Managing Director of Ideal Security Limited said that if the options adopted that it would be better because it allows the dividends to go straight into one's account even as it allows for easy cash flow management. He also said that everybody is interested in reducing man hour, noting that anything that would make people to save time is a welcome development and we are all working forward to a day where most things will be electronically done.

For the managing director of PIPC Securities, Mr. Audytacus, "We should all be looking forward to growth and development. Everybody should embrace modernism; we need to migrate from issues that tend to hold us down. If you're going to participate in the industry you must embrace the element of modernism."

Sonny Nwosu (2016) applauded SEC urging the commission to create awareness for shareholders to go and claim their dividend and also go extra mile in publishing the list of registrars attached to the company where to go.

VI. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Survey research design was employed for this study. Survey in Eze, Ozoemenam (2013) is considered useful because it is important in obtaining from the population about their opinion, attitude and behaviour towards a subject. Sobowale (1983) also opined that survey technique is the most commonly used research method by behavioural scientists. Survey does more than merely uncovering data; it synthesizes and interprets data and point out the implication and interrelationship. It also allows for the standardization of data collection as it involves drawing up a set of questions on various or on various aspects of a subject to which selected members of a population are requested to react.

a) *Population of the Study*

Population of study refer to all the members of elements whether human beings, events, or animals of a defined group Nworgu in Eze (2013). Thus the population of this study is all the investors in the Nigerian capital market with a total population of about 12 million investors. The sampling size was purposively chosen from 100 investors from where the primary data were elicited. The respondents were composed of 70 males and 30 females. Using questionnaire and interviews as the primary instrument for data collection,

secondary source like books, journals, newspapers and magazines formed the core literature.

b) Method of Data Collection

The researcher used a well-organized and structured questionnaire as an instrument for this research work. The questionnaire was developed based on the researcher's knowledge of the researched topic and the results of the survey conducted. In both, open-ended question were used, this is to enable the respondents express their views freely where it was deemed necessary. Out of which 336 questionnaires were distributed, 330 copies were completed and returned.

c) Presentation of Findings

During the presentation and analysis of the data gathered from the field, simple table and percentage were adopted while the researcher personally administered the questionnaire in order to ensure reliability and validity of instrument. The face-to-face approach adopted in instrument distribution aided a high percentage return rate and make sure that only those 100 targeted respondents were reached and the questionnaire administered were returned.

The Data presentation and analysis are as follows:

Table 1: Research Question One: Are you aware of the of e-dividend payment system in the Nigerian capital market?

Response Distribution	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	60	60
No	34	34
Can't say	6	6
	100	100

The table above reveals the awareness of e-dividend payment system in the Nigerian capital market among the stakeholders. It shows that investors in the Nigerian capital market are aware of the e-dividend payment system. 60 respondents representing 60% of sum total says yes, 34 respondents representing 34% answers no, while 6 (6%) gave neither yes or no.

Table 2: Research Question Two: Do you think electronic dividend payment system will reduce the unclaimed dividend in the Nigerian capital market?

Response Distribution	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	64	64
No	28	28
Can't say	8	8
	100	100

The table aboveshow that electronic dividend payment system will reduce the unclaimed dividend in the Nigerian capital market. It shows that investors in the Nigerian capital market believed thee- dividend payment

system will curb the rate of unclaimed dividend in the Nigerian capital market. 64 respondents representing 64% said yes, 28 respondents representing 28% answers no, while 8 (8%) did not respond.

Table 3: Research Question Three: Are they any problems associated with the old warrant dividend payment?

Response Distribution	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	70	70
No	25	25
Can't say	5	5
	100	100

The table above indicates they are problems associated with the old warrant dividend in the Nigerian capital market. It shows that investors in the Nigerian capital market have problems with the warrant dividend. 70 respondents representing 70% of sum total says yes, 25 respondents representing 25% answers no, while 5 (5%) of the 100 respondents had no option.

Table 4: Research Question Four: Are you satisfied with the present capital market regulations?

Response Distribution	Frequency	Percentage
Yes	57	57
No	30	30
Can't say	3	3
	100	100

The table above reveals thatinvestors the Nigerian capital market are satisfied with the present capital market regulations. 57 respondents representing 57% of sum total of respondents says yes, 30 respondents representing 30% answers no, while 3 (3%) claimed can't say.

VII. DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

Based on the presentation and analysis of data of this study, it is evidence the awareness of e-dividend payment system in the Nigerian capital market among the stakeholders is sufficient. This was the perception of investors in the Nigerian capital market where 60% of respondents affirmed that there is sufficient dissemination of information on the newly introduced e-divided policy. This is line with 'Diffusion of Innovation Theory' (DOI) developed by (Everett Rogers, 1962) who sees diffusion as the process by which an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time among the members of a social system. The theory explains how, over time, an idea or product gains momentum and diffuses (or spreads) through a specific population or social system. The end result of this diffusion is that people, as part of a social system, adopt a new idea, behaviour, or product. The e-dividend policy of the Nigerian capital marketis an innovation and has

been affirm members of a social system (investor) to have been properly dissemination.

Adoption of a new idea, behaviour, or product does not happen simultaneously in a social system; rather it is a process whereby some people are more apt to adopt the innovation than others. There are more than 12 million investors in the stock market Taofik Salako (2017), out this figure, findings in the Nigerian capital market, shows that about 2.2 million investors have so far mandated their bank accounts for direct payment of dividends through the e-dividend platform with about Nine million investors yet to join electronic-dividend system. The researchers in line this theory have found that people who adopt an innovation early have different characteristics than people who adopt an innovation later.

Further investigation confirmed that electronic dividend payment system will reduce the unclaimed dividend in the Nigerian capital market. This study reveals that 64% respondents/ investors in the Nigerian capital market are of the opinion the e- dividend payment system will curb the rate of unclaimed dividend in the Nigerian capital market which stood at N117 billion as at December 31, 2016. Out of that figure, from November 2015 when the SEC flagged-off the campaign on e-dividends to February 2017, about N42.2 billion has been paid to investors from the backlog of unclaimed dividends.

Again, the study found they are problems associated with the old warrant dividend in the Nigerian capital market. It shows that investors in the Nigerian capital market have problems with the warrant dividend with 70% responding in affirmative.

Furthermore, the study established that investors the Nigerian capital market are satisfied with the present capital market regulations. Investor satisfaction in regulatory authority is essential in restoring and sustaining investors' confidence in the market operations. Thus 57 respondents representing 57% of sum total of respondents agrees they are pleased with the regulator.

VIII. CONCLUSION

The objective of this study was to ascertaining public perception of the e-dividend policy in the Nigerian capital market development and to among things identified variables that influence the accumulation of unclaimed dividend. All the reviewed variables in the literature provided some useful insights into the causes and problems of the old dividend warrant. The study also established a link between electronic dividend and the Nigerian capital market development.

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings of the study, the following recommended are made toward Nigerian capital market development.

1. To ensure a conducive legal and regulatory framework for deepening and developing of the Nigerian capital market, stakeholders should intensify action in ensuring the repealing of the CAMA Acts.
2. To make investment in the Nigerian capital market attractive to investors, capital market transaction must be competitive in comparison to other jurisdictions.
3. SEC should continue to improve the competitiveness and attractiveness of the capital market by removing drawbacks such as factors responsible for unclaimed dividend in the market.
4. Also processes which eliminate delays in transaction processing such as e dividend system should be encouraged and be sustained.
5. The national assembly through its committee on capital market should, as a matter of priority expedite action on the repeal of the relevant sections of the CAMA Acts 1990 to allow speedy development of the market.
6. The SEC has identified the key to the remodelling of the capital market, which is a favourable regulatory framework and proper corporate governance initiatives which are required to facilitate an enabling environment. Out of 140 countries, Nigeria is currently ranked 47th on the World Economic Forum Global Competitive Index 2015-2016 for regulating its securities exchange and 55th for the strength of our investor protection measures. However, it is 109th for the burden of regulation. These rankings, particularly that of our regulatory environment, will need to be improved to boost investor confidence and increase the number of sizeable investments made through the capital markets.

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Populism in Latin America and in the European Union: Two Sides of the Same Coin?

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Abstract- Populism is usually seen in an ambivalent perspective, as it is conceived both as a threat for the representative democracy and as an opportunity for the renewal of the democratic institutions. This essay intends to show the evolution of the populist phenomenon in Latin America, since its initial phase in the 30s of the 20th century until the neo-populist or even post-populist conjuncture, and the populist dynamics occurring in the European Union. It will be a comparative study, because a comparison helps to understand one reality vis-a-vis another through similarities and differences. The interrogation in the title points to the starting point of this research: is there continuity or influence between the populist realities in the two continental blocks?

Keywords: *Populim, Neo-Populism, Latin America, European Union.*

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I. INTRODUCTION

The title of the essay requires a double justification. As a matter of fact, in spite of the European Union representing a strong base of regional integration since the Treaty of Rome of 1957, the actual designation is recent, because it only started to be used from the 1st November 1993. Hence, rather than Populism one must speak of Neo-Populism, since the most relevant populist experiences, the Populism of the first phase, go back to 30s and 40s of the last century.

This dating is relevant for Latin America and Europe, even though in the case of Europe the designation Populism appeared in the Czarist Russia of the 19th century, with Herzen as its originator. It was studied by Frank Venturi in his book *Roots of Revolution* that carried a systematizing preface by Isaiah Berlin.

Moreover, the option of putting the word "Populism" in the singular may be insufficient to convey fully a phenomenon that, in its concept and practice, is far from homogeneous. Populism can be seen both as "an ideology (Laclau 1977; Mudde 2004), style of politics (Knight 1998), specific discourse (Hawkins 2009) or the political strategy (Weyland 2001)" (Pappas, 2014, pp. 2-3). However, the comparative study of Populism in a country at two distinct moments of time, or in different countries simultaneously, permits to understand that, despite the specificities, there is something that can be considered as the essence of Populism. According to Taggart (2004, pp. 271-273), "the study of populism has been characterised by three

tendencies" and the third approach "is to argue that there are common features to populism".

I define Populism as a way of articulation of the discourse conveying a fight for hegemony. Unlike the fight by the mainstream political parties, it provokes an antagonism between two collective bodies conceived as homogeneous: the people and the elite. It is a deeply entrenched antagonism that does not accept intermediaries, because the populist leader considers only himself in conditions to decipher the will of the people.

All the demonstrations against the leader's will are severely punished, as Federico Mello proved in what concerns Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S) because Beppe Grillo kicked out several members¹ who did not respect his advice not to participate in television debates.

This presence of the leader is not direct democracy but a sort of referendum democracy as we can conclude from the official sites of some populist parties. There is never a real discussion that precedes a decision. Lanzone and Morini (2017) denounced that "the question of internal democracy has become evident in Autumn 2012 with the complain made by Giovanni Favia, a leading M5S politician in Emilia-Romagna, on the absence of debate and the role played by Grillo and Casaleggi". The party usually proposes the approval of a decision. It is a democracy of consent using the computer keyboard as a tool.

My understanding does not accept Dahrendorf's statement (2007)² that Populism is simple, and that democracy is complex. Neither the former nor the latter are simple. This presumes Woods' view that Populism is still looking for its model, even though there is abundant literature about this evasive phenomenon.

Perhaps the exposition helps to explain the reasons for the choice of our heading. It is not difficult to justify the thematic. Indeed, according to Simón Pachano and Manuel Anselmi (2017, p.3), the populist experience in Latin America "is gradually fading", giving way to a new neoliberal wave, putting aside what was thought as a "twenty-first socialism", but that did not last "more than a decade and has undergone degeneration made of clientelism, personalism, corruption and instability". However, it is not less real

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¹ Giovanni Fava and Federica Salsi for example.

² The sentence «Populismus ist einfach, Demokratie ist komplex» can be found at the beginning of the point 5.

than a “legacy the Latin American neo-populist experiences [...] outside the Latin America” can be identified. Or, one must inquire if this legacy, as cited by the above authors, is characteristic of some cases in the European Union, like Podemos in Spain. If this influence is real we need to understand not only what brings closer or moves away Populism in Latin America and in the European Union, but also the reason why a model that did not succeed in American lands got followers on the other side of the Atlantic.

II. THE POPULISM OF THE FIRST PHASE IN LATIN AMERICA

The analysis of Populism, whatever its definition, implies four issues: the reasons for the emergence of Populism, that is, the description of the initial conjuncture, the cause of its increased intensity, the way a populist party conquers the power, and how the populist agent acts once it reaches the political hegemony.

In what concerns the first issue, Laclau (2015, p. 207) considers that there are two necessary conditions for the emergence of Populism: a particularly serious crisis in the block of power that allows a part of it to intend to establish its own hegemony through the mobilization of the masses, and a crisis of the transformism.

There are, thus, two distinct forms of Populism. One, when a part of the non-governing elite thinks that the situation is ripe to conquer the power. It is the elitist Populism. Another, when the Government does not respond to the demands of its citizens, and one of those demands succeeds in mobilizing and initiating change from a differentialist logic - one that recognizes Government authority - to the equivalential logic. It is a Populism from below.

In Latin America, from the 30s of the 20th century, the two previously identified conditions came together and, therefore, the populist phenomenon spread, even when countries presented different characteristics. For example, Brazil still faced interregional problems, while Argentina had already overcome that phase due to the federalization of Buenos Aires in 1880.

According to Ignacio Walter (2008, p. 2), “the period between the 1930s and the 1940s that saw the emergence of populism in Latin America, corresponds to an authoritarian wave, characterized by negative attitudes towards liberal-democratic institutions and liberal capitalism”. Indeed the world crisis of 1929 modified the *status quo* that assigned the hegemony to the elite or a landowner oligarchy.

Thus, the option for a political economy that valued the import substitution industrialization led to conflicts of interests between the great landowners and the industrial sector, and to the change of the effective

situation of articulation between liberalism and democracy as compatible, because, according to Laclau (2015, p. 219), the democratic mass demands and the symbols that represented them were increasingly less acceptable to the liberal regime.

The Populism spread across Latin America from the 30s of the 20th century, favoured by the great depression, but in reality the economic and social structure of the subcontinent was mainly responsible. Therefore, in the case of Brazil, Antônio Carlos’ slogan became popular: “let us make the revolution before the people make it”.

If the so-called revolution served the interests of the people or of a part of the elite, it is a matter for discussion with several readings, as Alan Knight (1994, p. 78) wrote about Mexican cardenism, a populist regime that nationalized the oil in 1938 and proceeded to an agrarian reform according to the model of the ancient *ejidos*, small communal properties that could benefit of a specific credit facility. Indeed, “there were Cardenistas who believed that «their» regime was the only one which delivered the goods to the people, literally and figuratively” while revolutionary veterans “reversed this picture and branded Cardenas as a traitor to the Revolution”. Knight had no doubt that Cardenas regime “was more jalousy than juggernaut” (p. 79). An evaluation that is not in favour of a leader who assumed “an autocratic role, «amo y señor de México», less of St. Francis than a wily Machiavellian fox (or worse, *un zorro com sayal franciscano*)” (p. 76). The perfect art of concealment. The ability to hide the force and the craftiness, but to use both whenever necessary.

In what concerns the second aspect, or the increase of Populism, Yascha Mounk pointed out three reasons for this increment: the stagnation of the standard of living of the common people or the middle class, the slow change of countries that ceased to be monocultural and monoethnic and turned into multiethnic and multicultural, and a deep division between flourishing urban areas and agricultural or de-industrialized areas that had lost influence. Such were the areas where, for example, Marine Le Pen counts on a broad supporting social basis.

There are few doubts that the middle class has usually been the preferential victim of the politics of the parties in power. It is enough to watch where the tax burden falls when the public safes are almost empty. In the same way, the times of crisis become propitious for the revolt against the presence of the immigrant, seen as the usurper of jobs, and deemed responsible for growing insecurity, a fertile ground to feed Populism.

As for the way the populists gain power, in the initial conjuncture, Octavio Ianni (1991, pp. 121-122) evidenced that there is no typical way of conquest by the populist forces. A situation already verified when Maquiavel presented the diverse ways of somebody becoming a prince.

In fact, in Latin America, while Lazarus Cárdenas in 1934, Juan Perón in 1946, 1951 and 1973, after the military coup that had dismissed him in 1955, had gained power through electoral processes, in the institutional frame of the representative democracy, Getúlio Vargas did it in 1951, after reaching it through a coup d'etat in 1937, and Velasco Ibarra led Ecuador five times, between 1934 and 1972, using both these processes. This without counting that João Goulart became President after the resignation of Jânio Quadros, supported by a social movement, Victor Estensoro ruled Bolivia after a revolution by the Revolutionary Nationalistic Movement, and Fidel Castro was the guerrilla leader who, on the second attempt, knocked down Fulgêncio Batista, in 1959.

The examples pointed by Octavio Ianni had also been verified in Europe. It seems sufficient to remember that Mussolini was nominated First-Minister as a consequence of the march on Rome in 1922, and Hitler gained power by vote, though after attempting a coup d'etat. Both Fascism and Nazism have their own characteristics, but share in common the Populism. Like the Sovietism that used the Communist Party as the vanguard of the people.

Three regimes based on the antagonism and without any repulse in what concerns the invention of scapegoats. This justifies our use of the term "Populism" in the singular.

Populist regimes with exception of Peronism and of Sovietism, did not survive the disappearance of their charismatic leader. According to Laclau (2015, p. 223), in the case of Peronism, its roots in the factory workers allowed it to spread its influence into the middle class that had been radicalized in the last two decades as a result of the contradictions created by the expansion of the monopolistic capital.

As Philippe Raynaud (2017, p. 12) states, Perón represents an ambiguity because he was an extreme-right military officer, an admirer of Mussolini and Hitler, and ruled in a totally arbitrary way without any regard for the law. However, thanks to his economic and foreign policies, he won sympathies of the left and even of the extreme left. Perón had understood the importance of the trade unions because, as Capelato (2013, p. 145) tells us, the number of factory workers doubled between 1935 and 1946. Similarly, it was the case of the trade unions, which in 1943 represented 20% of the urban workers. In 1948, the unionization reached 30.5%, and 42% in 1954. So, between 1946 and 1951, the number of union members grew from 520 000 to 2 334 000.

The Trade Unions that Perón controlled and placed at the service of the State served as a strategy to guarantee the social peace of the State and the harmonization between the capital and the labour. Similarity with the Carta del Lavoro or the Portuguese Corporativism was not a mere coincidence.

That was the reason of Peronism returning to power and a kind of dynastic succession through Isabelita Perón. A return was a complete failure. As Laclau (2015, p. 224) recognized, the efforts to put back the History clock failed. It was unable to articulate popular-democratic ideology in a way that the bourgeoisie could assimilate.

Instead, the Peronism resorted to a repressive chaos without attempting any form of stable articulation between popular demands and bourgeois ideology. As Chico Buarque sang in Brazil: nobody returns to what does not exist anymore.

As regard the Sovietism, its continuity was the result of conceiving the party as vanguard of the people. Such a single or hegemonic party was not the experience of Getúlio Vargas since the forces that supported him were organized in two parties. Laclau (2015, p. 225) defends that Vargas was supported by the Partido Socialista Democrático that joined the conservative forces of the coalition, and by the Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, based on urban sectors, mainly factory workers, intending through them, to develop a populist jacobinism. With such a mix of contradictory forces Vargas was never the leader of a unified and homogenous movement.

Concerning the importance of a party we must say that the cardenism opted for the constitution of social organizations outside the party, aiming at centralizing in the executive power every decisive element. It did not use the Revolutionary National Party, established by Plutarco Calles in 1929 to institutionalize the Mexican revolution. It was the Government that effectively programmed everything to do with the industrial revolution or the agrarian reform. Capelato (2013, p. 158) considers that it was only in 1946, after the end of the government of Cardenas, with the creation of the Institutional Revolutionary Party, that an elite of politicians would become entrepreneurs through the state management and it started to dominate the social organizations. A change of masters.

III. THE FAILURE OF THE FIRST POPULIST EXPERIENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

This first populist wave in Latin America lasted a long time, but it did not create conditions for its continuity. Errors of planning and execution, patronage due to social Populism, and personalization and abuse of power would be sufficient to pull down the populist construction. The adhesion or sympathy for ideas connected with the left, in a conjuncture that partially coincided with the cold war, hastened this process.

After all, Latin America is a close neighbour of one of the two superpowers that controlled the World, and for the United States of America the Soviet influence in Havana was serious enough. In Cuba the Populism

imitated, and even exceeded the Sovietism benefiting from its support for a longer time.

In this initial phase of Latin American Populism, History demonstrated the importance of the military in the subcontinent, and that the elites have many lives. In Brazil, João Goulart, like Vargas, did not count on urban social bases due to the low industrialization. He was overthrown by the military coup d'etat on the 1st April of 1964. Populism gave way to the military dictatorship that ruled the country with Constitutional Acts, before promoting the transition to democracy that would allow the populist return. Populism did not exist during the mandates of Humberto Castelo Branco, Artur da Costa e Silva, Emilio Médici, Ernesto Geisel and João Figueiredo, because, as Canovan says, Populism follows democracy as a shadow, while the authoritarianism tramples any shadow.

In Argentina, General Jorge Videla put down Isabelita Perón through the military coup of 24th March of 1976 and led the country into a five year long dictatorship, before being replaced by Robert Viola, his military chief. Videla has a record of two convictions to life imprisonment, in 1985 and 2010, respectively.

In Paraguay, General Alfredo Stroessner staged a coup d'etat in 1954 and through manipulated elections, ruled during seven consecutive mandates, until being knocked out by another military coup in 1989. However, in the case of Paraguay it will be more correct to speak of Populism after 2008.

In what concerns Mexico, the measures adopted by Cardenas would be reverted by his successors: Ávila Camacho (1940-1946), Miguel Alemã (1946-1952) and Adolph Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958). The revolution was not institutionalized. The interests of the erstwhile big landowners and of the recent industrial entrepreneurs became compatible at the expense of the workers' rights. The triumph of a neoliberalism *avant la lettre*.

However, if the elite is like a Phoenix, also Populism saw a second life in Latin America, the Neo-Populism, that, according to Walter (2008, p. 2) appeared "in this third and unprecedented wave of democratization in Latin America and around the world". Between Populism and Neo-Populism, as mentioned in the previous paragraphs, the military sought to leave the authoritarian mark.

IV. NEO-POPULISM: OLD WINE IN NEW BOTTLES

Vélez-Rodríguez (2001) defines Neo-Populism as a political style of wide ideological spectrum and lists its twelve characteristics: soteriology or incarnation in the figure of the savior of the people, personalism, demagoguery, seduction, plea, direct action, popular image, wide phenotype, denunciation, antipolitical feature, anti-elitism and nationalism. These

characteristics could be grouped into just one single category, a discourse form of fighting for the hegemony.

However, the inclusion of the nationalistic element represents a newness, which makes Populism and Nationalism represent different concepts, though Walter (2008, p.2), referring to the previous wave of Latin American Populism, defends that it was a popular and national phenomenon. Popular "in terms of its anti-oligarchic component", and national "in terms of its anti-imperialism", because rejecting "foreign control of natural resources and national economies".

In the case of the European Union, it does not seem abusive to attribute that inclusion to the fact of the financial crisis and the conflicts, some of which by proxy, have originated hordes of immigrants and refugees, a circumstance that allowed the populist parties to discover an enormous potential to attack the governmental elite. Hence the use of flags, which were initially raised on behalf of other interests. The context dictated the adaptation. On this issue we may refer to Mény and Surel's study about the people and its three levels: the people-class, the people-sovereign and the people-nation. The latter is the one that seems more sensitive to the populist appeal.

In South America, Vélez identifies some faces of the neopopulism: the Kirschner couple in Argentina, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Correa in the Equator, Evo Morales in Bolivia, the bishop Lugo in Paraguay, when a populist coalition Populist won the 2008 elections and took power out of the Party Colorado, and Lula da Silva in Brazil.

Larry Diamond (2015, p. 147) and Kenneth Roberts (1995) complete this list. Diamond agrees that "Hugo Chávez (1999–2013) gradually suffocated democratic pluralism during the first decade of this century" and he defends that "after Daniel Ortega returned to the presidency in Nicaragua in 2007, he borrowed many pages from Chávez's authoritarian playbook". Roberts considers that "the leadership of Alberto Fujimori in Peru suggests that new forms of populism may be emerging despite the fiscal constraints of neoliberal austerity".

In the cases of Venezuela and Brazil, Vélez's list could also include the successors, Maduro and Dilma, although one needs to take into account the warning of Pachano & Anselmi (2017, p. 3) about "a post-populistic condition, in which the disappearance of a populist leader leaves, on one hand, a strongly shaped institutional political system imprinted on personalist leadership, and on the other, a highly polarized society, where the possibility of a democratic dialogue between the opposition and the government is almost completely deleted".

A more intense Post-Populism surged in Venezuela due to Chavez's physical disappearance, despite Maduro's attempt to invoke the continuation of Chavez's presence and the influence of the erstwhile

leader, than in Brazil, where Dilma, although re-elected, has often been seen as a creation of the lulism. A hiatus until Lula da Silva comes back to the Presidency. It is an assumed intention, but the problems with Justice and the destitution of Dilma Rousseff during the second mandate are making such a come-back difficult.

Will Lula da Silva obtain, as it happened in the re-election that many analysts considered impossible - in accordance with the polls the dispute would be between Alckmin and Jose Serra - a social base of support to put him again in Planalto Palace? The answer is not easy, even considering that the re-election of Lula had been preceded by the *Mensalão*. However, in the next presidential election it is not sure if the subproletariat - a creation of Paul Singer in the 80s to identify the voters of very low income - remains faithful to Lula, their late option of vote. In other words: after the generalized corruption - *Mensalão* and *Lava-jato* are examples - could there be a space for a direct intervention and ubiquity of the State, without confronting the interests of the capital?

According to Pachano & Anselmi (2017, pp. 3-4) "the Latin American neo-populist experience to date" has been an "attempt to replace the classical liberal democracy with a model of plebiscitary democracy" of a "socialist and participatory" nature, implying "direct relationship between the president and the people, and where the intermediate bodies and pluralist dialogue between the parties are almost excluded".

The leader appears as the only person who can understand the will of the people. A leader who, in a first moment, "allowed the political and social inclusion of large sectors of the population which were excluded". Then, "with the phase of institutionalization" Neo-Populism "caused an impact on the structures of liberal democracy". Finally, "a phase of disillusionment and political realism" did not take too long to emerge.

The multidimensional crisis that Venezuela actually lives constitutes an example of this evolution and a mirror of disillusion. A frustration that with the decline in oil prices became undisguised and appeared in Bolivia of Morales, leading Dahrendorf to affirm that the revolutions create as many problems as they solve.

At this point it is apposite to cite César Rojas Rios (2014, p. 97), who, after pointing to Morales' positive points, identified the menace of the negative ones, covering four new problems: "the quality drop in democracy, the imbalance in the quality of governance, deterioration in institutional quality, and the mediocrity of the quality of society".

In the 30s, Populism appeared mainly due to economic crisis and the impossibility to continue the distribution of subsidized benefits that allowed to replicate the Roman bread and circus. In the 21st century, the financial crisis and the strong decline in oil prices have placed the Venezuelan government before the same deadlock.

What had been the main factor for the emergence of Populism changed into the basic element for the disintegration of Neo-Populism. Meanwhile, the patronage, the corruption and the bad management of the *res publica* did not fail to fulfill the role that the system attributed to them.

That helped Macri's victory in Argentina, marking a return to the power of the most conservative forces. The *Ola rosa* that had allowed the triumph of the left Neo-Populism started to faint. This Neo-Populism, in the Argentine case, was object of disparate evaluations. Peruzzotti (2017, p. 48), who cites two Argentine scholars who studied the phenomenon, namely Ernesto Laclau and O'Donnell, shows that they totally differ in the evaluation of the twelve years under Kirchner's leadership, because, while Laclau "sees kirchnerism as a deepening democratic experience", O'Donnell considers it "as an illustration of a defective version of polyarchy". Concerning this evaluation, Chantal Mouffe (2015)³ agrees with Laclau's opinion. She considers that kirchnerism is a source of inspiration.

These are the reasons for the decline of Neo-Populism in Latin America. All Populism, while it fights for the hegemony, has economic base and drives with an executive centralism that almost ignores the participation of the institutions. The State is seen as a factor of enrichment of the new elite and it is sustained through a wild distribution of benefits. In the initial phase, when the money is plentiful, the common people are not ignored. The bill of the messianism comes for payment later. It is a behaviour that the dictatorial systems also practise. In Bolivia, before Evo Morales' Populism, "the military dictatorships, and especially the first government of Hugo Banzer (1971-1978), distributed thousands of hectares of land in eastern Bolivia through fraudulent means, free of charge, and mainly as payment for political support" (Colque, 2014, p. 178).

The Neo-Populism is a centralism with no place for what Enrique Peruzzotti and Catalina Smulovitch (2000, 2002) call social accountability. The centralized power does not appreciate the monitoring of its actions. It is in keeping with the synthesis of Adriano Moreira (2001, p. 153): the power is accustomed to hearing «yes» and it resents hearing «no», because "from the point of view of Political Science", the law is more an instrument of the Power than its limitation.

V. THE POPULIST REALITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

And how has Populism and its dynamics developed in the European Union? In first place, after fifty million died in the Second World War, Western

³ In an interview made by Eduardo Febbro published in *Página/12*, 14 Jun 2015.

Europe realized false messianisms were not an assumed option in the West, and the phenomena, such as *poujadism*, that gave rise to the French National Front, became rare and socially little recommended.

Meanwhile, the European world view became dysfunctional, and the West Europe began to be rebuilt thanks to the Marshall Plan and the early forms of regional cooperation and integration, Populism was becoming more visible, though not presented as such. It corroborates the idea that Populism follows democracy as a shadow. It is not democracy's bastard, but a twin that is able to take advantage of the right moment.

Grossman and Saurugger (2006, pp. 85-86) consider that the fear of capture is an old fear, and the State is consequently afraid that the interest groups succeed in capturing a sector of public politics. The mainstream parties which consider themselves as the agents of democracy, resort to a blind inbreeding and they fail to understand that Populism is more than an epiphenomenon.

That is why the populist parties won the elections in three countries⁴ of the European Union and we see an increasing visibility, as the Index of Authoritarian Populism elaborated by Andreas Heinö of the Timbro Foundation shows⁵. Indeed, by entering in the zone of the Neo-Populism and by comparing the data collected in 2000 with those of 2016, we can verify that the number of countries where the rate of Populism tax rose – twenty-two –, noting that the increase was much higher in Hungary - from 9,6% to 66,4%, in Greece - from 9,3% to 57%, and in Poland - from 0,1% to 46,4%, that is, in three countries whose governments are presently led by populist parties - FIDESZ, SYRIZA and PiS.

In two of these countries – Hungary and Poland - the fall of the Berlin wall was followed by the opening up to democracy, but the new order was replaced by a disorder. In Greece, the end of the military dictatorship allowed a return to democracy, but the bad performance of the parties that ruled the country became a fertile ground for Populism.

In the remaining countries the growth of Populism was weaker, in spite of the increasing trends in Denmark - from 12,5% to 28,9%, in Italy – from 19,5% to 33,7%, in Spain - from 5,6% to 21,2%, in Bulgaria - from 1,4% to 17,5%, in Finland – from 2,1% to 18,2%, in Sweden - from 0,4% to 12,9%, in the United Kingdom – from 0,8% to 12,6%, and in Portugal - from 12,2% to 20,5%.

It is important to note that the recent elections in Germany and Czech Republic showed a strong increase

of Populism. In Germany, a new right populist party - Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – founded in 2013, got 12,9% of the votes and entered into the National Parliament – Bundestag – where it has won 94 seats. It was the first time, after 1945, that an extreme right party won seats in the German Parliament. In Czech Republic, Action of Dissatisfied Citizens (ANO), also a recent right populist party, overpowered the Czech Republic's mainstream parties.

On the other hand, there was a decrease of Populism in eight countries, but only in two cases the descent was striking: In Slovakia - from 40,2% to 17,2% and in France - from 32,1% to 21,7%, even if the French electoral system – two round system - makes it possible to hide in the electoral results the manifestations of Populism present in everyday life.

All the other expressions of decrease had been almost residual: Cyprus - from 33% to 29,4%, Austria - from 27,4% to 25%, Romania - from 21,9% to 15,3%, Belgium - from 11,4% to 7,4%, Slovenia - from 4,4% to 2,2% and Luxemburg – from 3,3% to 1,6%.

As the Populism and the Latin American Neo-Populism are almost entirely the responsibility of the left, even if a careful analysis also reveals the existence of elements of the right, it may be interesting to know if the same happens in the European Union. That could permit testing the hypothesis of an influence or ideological continuity between the two realities.

It is a controversial issue because there are populist parties, like Podemos and Syriza, which do not accept the traditional division between left and right, considering it necessary to draw a new borderline.

This happens perhaps because of the mix in the populist parties' programs of elements from the left and the right. Indeed, it is possible to agree with the left on ecological issues or on issues of work insecurity, while supporting the ideas of the right concerning immigration or the decrease of taxes paid by the companies.

In the European Union, the use of the Index of Authoritarian Populism as a source shows the left and right Populism in twenty-seven countries, excluding Malta. One of them, Belgium, evidences a tie between right and left Populism. In the remaining twenty-six countries, the right Populism is dominant in fifteen: Hungary, Poland, Denmark, Austria, France, Finland, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Latvia, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Netherlands, Lithuania, Estonia and Slovenia; while the left Populism imposes itself in eleven: Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Spain, Czech Republic⁶, Portugal, Romania, Germany, Croatia, Republic of Ireland and Luxemburg.

⁴ They are four after the 2017 Parliamentary Election in Czech Republic.

⁵ Andreas Heinö explains that «to measure influence two indicators are used. Firstly, the total amount of mandates. The index shows how many mandates are held each year by representatives of authoritarian parties. [...]The second indicator is participation in a government".

⁶ As it was already said, in Czech Republic the situation changed because ANO, a right populist party founded by a billionaire oligarch, Andrej Babis, won the parliamentary election in October 2017. The extreme right-wing Freedom and Direct Democracy also doubled its proportion from the previous election in 2013.

Assuming that in some States the predominance of one side of the spectrum does not invalidate the existence of Populism of contrary ideological drive, one can safely say that, contrary to what it is occurring in Latin America, the right-wing Populism predominates in the European Union.

However, the predominance of the right-wing Populism does not mean the inexistence of populist parties in the European Union that resemble the Latin American populisms. In the political discourse of the European left-wing Populism there is sympathy for the way of governing of some American populist leaders. The same happens with the rightist declarations of Marine Le Pen, Nigel Farage or Geert Wilders concerning Donald Trump. This can be a matter for subsequent research, because U.S.A., despite the increasing number of Hispanic population, does not belong to Latin America.

For the moment, it may be relevant to point out that Donald Trump's populist discourse was against the elite, and Hillary Clinton failed to show to the electorate that Donald Trump belonged to the elite as well.

Coming back to the left Populism, the sympathy that the Spanish Podemos and the Greek Syriza reveal for some manifestations of the Latin American Neo-Populism is connected with their adoption of the doctrinal post-gramscian line, even when the intellectual formation of the actual leaders cannot be compared to that of the past leaders. The university replaced the school of life.

On this doctrinal sharing we can say that the problems start when a populist party gains power. When Syriza's delegation was presented at the 10th Convention of a populist party which supports the present Portuguese Government, namely the Left Block, in 2016, it was booed, while in the previous meetings it had been warmly received.

Besides, Muller (2017)⁷ affirms that the idea of a progressive populism is mainly an American phenomenon. According to Baquero (2010)⁸, it results from the lack of confidence in the political institutions responsible for keeping the social contract. It applies also to the European Union as the regional integration imposes a sovereignty of service to the members, i.e., gives the community and the supranational institutions the possibility of taking decisions which belonged to the national organs. It is a change that is not acceptable to Populism and it allows the populist discourse an increasing media power.

Therefore, failures are justified not by one's wrong performance, but by internal and external boycott. The caste and its external allies are perceived saboteurs of the political action of the masses.

In what concerns the appreciation by some European communist parties, such as the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP), of the Populism in Cuba and in

Venezuela, it reveals that these parties have not felt, at ideological level, the URSS implosion. The new orthodoxy manifests the same behaviour of old orthodoxy, in keeping with what Gramsci wrote in a letter to the Communist Party of the URSS, denouncing the repression of the soviet regime against the left opposition.

The 15th Congress of the PCP witnessed 59 foreign delegations, including the Communist Party of Cuba, and 27 organizations sent greetings, including the Communist Party of Venezuela. For these totalitarian populist parties the appeal to the unity of the whole world proletarians is still relevant. This is a call that has not yet brought fruits for Populism, despite the existence of two clear populist groups in the European Parliament and the strong relationship among their leaderships.

We can also see that, despite the enormous potentialities of the Internet for an almost unlimited communication, the populist leaders, both in Latin America and in the European Union, prefer the monologue of their master's voice.

VI. CONCLUSION

I had questioned in the Introduction the title of my essay. At the end of this article I hope to have shown that despite the temporal or regional specificities of Populism, it can retain its singular form, without the need of being referred in plural. Moreover, the plurality represents a threat for a form of articulation of the discourse that, in its fight for the hegemony, tends to impose a single vision.

It is the same coin with two sides. Populism does not represent an ideology, but it admits ideological influences from the left and the right. That explains why some populist parties in Europe, including their prominent political leaders and analysts do not hide their sympathies for some populist models tried in other regions with ambivalent results.

In the colonial times, different metropolises adopted different approaches to their political motivations and strategic visions. It was the civilization for the English, the lights for the French and the religion and the pepper for the Portuguese.

Héctor Leis (2008, p. 35) defends that the South American populist leaderships adopted a *caudillesco* profile borrowed from the Iberian tradition and the influence of the *fascisms* (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese and German). This study confirms this reality, but it would not be correct to brand all four regimes univocally under fascism. A profile that helps to understand the mobilizing potential of a leader who appeals to people's feelings and emotions.

In the year that marks the centenary of Roberto Campos it seems timely to recall his vision focused upon two dangerous personalities for the consolidation of the democracy in Latin America, namely that of the

demagogue and that of the extremist. Granted that Populism is democracy's twin brother and that demagoguery was the Greek term for Populism, it does not seem abusive to say that, in our times, there are many situations in which the demagogue and the extremist trend to merge themselves in the same person: the populist leader. If it is the lion that disguises the fox or if it is the fox that hides the lion, it makes little difference.

The reality extends beyond Latin America as demonstrated in this study. To get back yet once again to the significance of our title of this study, particularly in a context of opinions claiming that the European Union can only succeed in combating the right-wing populism if there is an intensification of left-wing populism, prudence suggests that we should distrust either. As Mounk (2017) affirms, while left populist "diagnosis of society's problems is often accurate, and their passion for economic justice genuine, their solutions are just as simplistic as those propagated by the populist right".

Moreover, the examples of the ruling populist ruling parties in the European Union show that when they belong to the right, like PiS in Poland and FIDESZ in Hungary, the Index of Democracy begins to fall. Till now, only one left populist party gained power in the EU, namely Syriza in Greece, but its discourse, as well as its action, have changed significantly. Many of its promises are forgotten. There is a big distance between dreams and reality.

Further research is required to analyze two new situations. One in Finland. The populist party, True Finns, accepted to participate in a ruling coalition, but when its new leader, Jussi Halla-aho, was elected, the twenty-one moderate MPs broke away in protest at his tough anti-immigration and anti-EU message. They called themselves New Alternative and saved the ruling coalition. The second case happened in Portugal, when populist parties lent support to the Government without participating in it.

Is the European Union facing a Post-Populist phase? For the moment, Populism is best viewed as a two-faced coin.

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33. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. Significant figures and appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibitive. Proofread carefully at final stage. In the end give outline to your arguments. Spot out perspectives of further study of this subject. Justify your conclusion by at the bottom of them with sufficient justifications and examples.

34. After conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print to the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects in your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form, which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criterion for grading the final paper by peer-reviewers.

Final Points:

A purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people to interpret your effort selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, each section to start on a new page.

The introduction will be compiled from reference matter and will reflect the design processes or outline of basis that direct you to make study. As you will carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed as like that. The result segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and will direct the reviewers next to the similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you took to carry out your study. The discussion section will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implication of the results. The use of good quality references all through the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness of prior workings.



Writing a research paper is not an easy job no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record keeping are the only means to make straightforward the progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear

- Adhere to recommended page limits

Mistakes to evade

- Insertion a title at the foot of a page with the subsequent text on the next page
- Separating a table/chart or figure - impound each figure/table to a single page
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence

In every sections of your document

- Use standard writing style including articles ("a", "the," etc.)
- Keep on paying attention on the research topic of the paper
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding for the abstract)
- Align the primary line of each section
- Present your points in sound order
- Use present tense to report well accepted
- Use past tense to describe specific results
- Shun familiar wording, don't address the reviewer directly, and don't use slang, slang language, or superlatives
- Shun use of extra pictures - include only those figures essential to presenting results

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Choose a revealing title. It should be short. It should not have non-standard acronyms or abbreviations. It should not exceed two printed lines. It should include the name(s) and address (es) of all authors.



Abstract:

The summary should be two hundred words or less. It should briefly and clearly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript-- must have precise statistics. It should not have abnormal acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Shun citing references at this point.

An abstract is a brief distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approach to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

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- Reason of the study - theory, overall issue, purpose
- Fundamental goal
- To the point depiction of the research
- Consequences, including definite statistics - if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account quantitative data; results of any numerical analysis should be reported
- Significant conclusions or questions that track from the research(es)

Approach:

- Single section, and succinct
- As a outline of job done, it is always written in past tense
- A conceptual should situate on its own, and not submit to any other part of the paper such as a form or table
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- What you account in an conceptual must be regular with what you reported in the manuscript
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- Present a justification. Status your particular theory (es) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
- Very for a short time explain the tentative propose and how it skilled the declared objectives.

Approach:

- Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done.
- Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point with every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need a least of four paragraphs.



- Present surroundings information only as desirable in order hold up a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read the whole thing you know about a topic.
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This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A sound written Procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replacement your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt for the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to spare your outcome but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section. When a technique is used that has been well described in another object, mention the specific item describing a way but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to text all particular resources and broad procedures, so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step by step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

- Explain materials individually only if the study is so complex that it saves liberty this way.
- Embrace particular materials, and any tools or provisions that are not frequently found in laboratories.
- Do not take in frequently found.
- If use of a definite type of tools.
- Materials may be reported in a part section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

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- Report the method (not particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology)
- Describe the method entirely
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures
- Simplify - details how procedures were completed not how they were exclusively performed on a particular day.
- If well known procedures were used, account the procedure by name, possibly with reference, and that's all.

Approach:

- It is embarrassed or not possible to use vigorous voice when documenting methods with no using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result when script up the methods most authors use third person passive voice.
- Use standard style in this and in every other part of the paper - avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings - save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.

Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part a entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Carry on to be to the point, by means of statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently. You must obviously differentiate material that would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matter should not be submitted at all except requested by the instructor.



Content

- Sum up your conclusion in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In manuscript, explain each of your consequences, point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and comprise remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
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What to stay away from

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surroundings information, or try to explain anything.
- Not at all, take in raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present the similar data more than once.
- Manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate the identical information.
- Never confuse figures with tables - there is a difference.

Approach

- As forever, use past tense when you submit to your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.
- Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report
- If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results part.

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- If you put figures and tables at the end of the details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attach appendix materials, such as raw facts
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- Make a decision if each premise is supported, discarded, or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."
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- Give details all of your remarks as much as possible, focus on mechanisms.
- Make a decision if the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory, and whether or not it was correctly restricted.
- Try to present substitute explanations if sensible alternatives be present.
- One research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind, where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

- When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from available information
- Submit to work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.
- Submit to generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.



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


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References	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring





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