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Global Incorporation, Ideology, Foreign and Domestic Economic Policy of Ghana

By Christopher Appiah-Thompson

University of Newcastle

Abstract- It is not simply that most of the countries which were then colonies and protectorates are now independent. It is, rather, that they have asserted their 'Africanness'. Looking ahead in 1950 Professor MacInnes wrote 'Colonial peoples are ceasing to be the docile acceptors of external rule they once were'. Before them, he believed, lay two possible lines of development—the way of the Communist world and the way of the Western powers. During the past quarter of a century the newly independent African states for the most part have striven to show that there was a third way, their own.¹¹

The donor countries that are encouraging Africans to take the democratic path are also the countries that are encouraging Africans to adopt economic policies that alienate the people that make development extremely difficult because of their misunderstanding of the nature and causes of Africa's economic crises.

Keywords: foreign policy, national interest, economic relations, cold war, structural adjustment programme.

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Global Incorporation, Ideology, Foreign and Domestic Economic Policy of Ghana

Christopher Appiah-Thompson

Abstract—It is not simply that most of the countries which were then colonies and protectorates are now independent. It is, rather, that they have asserted their 'Africanness'. Looking ahead in 1950 Professor MacInnes wrote 'Colonial peoples are ceasing to be the docile acceptors of external rule they once were'. Before them, he believed, lay two possible lines of development—the way of the Communist world and the way of the Western powers. During the past quarter of a century the newly independent African states for the most part have striven to show that there was a third way, their own.¹¹

The donor countries that are encouraging Africans to take the democratic path are also the countries that are encouraging Africans to adopt economic policies that alienate the people that make development extremely difficult because of their misunderstanding of the nature and causes of Africa's economic crises.

---Adebayo Adediji *Former executive secretary
U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)*

Over the years, foreign economic policy actions of Ghanaian governments had basically been the by-product of formal political interactions of Ghana with the international system. Specifically, foreign economic relations that center on trade, foreign aid and investment played second fiddle to traditional foreign policy concerns with its known political bias. Ghana, under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) which came to power through a military coup on December 31 1981, was no exception to this norm; until the mid-1980s, the regime professed to be a socialist and pro-East government in its orientation and attitudes towards both public and foreign policy issues. This article argues that the radical transformation of Ghana's foreign policy from a socialist orientation professed by the leaders of the first (PNDC I) regime to the second (PNDC II) regime in April 1983, led to the pursuit of an overly aggressive foreign economic policy, as well as the gradual liberalization of the political space. The research puzzle that needs to be resolved in this context is that; what theoretical constructs best explain the regime's behavior domestically and externally, with specific reference to the international economic or political relations? Invoking the theoretical explanations of Stephen Krasner, K. J. Holsti, Joseph Nye, Jnr., and Grindle and Thomas (1991) this article aims to explore these perspectives empirically in the African context and Ghana, in particular, as well as drawing some valid theoretical and empirical conclusions from them and its implications for contemporary and future foreign and domestic economic policy design and implementation.

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Keywords: *foreign policy, national interest, economic relations, cold war, structural adjustment programme.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Foreign policy is simply about how states relate to each other (Tandon, 1974: 191). The relations are conditioned by certain objective factors, which it is possible to identify in a careful study of the relations between two or more states (ibid). Specifically, states have interacted among themselves, politically, economically, culturally, socially, religiously, and other levels for the well-being of their countries, since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. These interactions can be influenced by the ideological convictions of the leaders of the states, in question, that is, whether political realism or idealism in their international relations. The driving force behind a country's foreign policy formulation is what is popularly known as the "national interest" in International Relations scholarship, irrespective of the ideological persuasions of the dominant actors involved. The concept of "national interest" simply refers to the guiding principles in foreign policy orientation. The latter, refers to the general policies, strategies and obligations of a state in its relations with other states. According to Joseph Nye, Jnr., the national interest is the fundamental building blocks in a country's foreign policy. The national interest is mostly, a set of priorities regarding relations with the rest of the world. A country's national interest should therefore be broader than its strategic interests. In his influential book, "Defending the National Interest," Stephen Krasner, argued that the "national interest" is simply the goals set for the state by its leaders, in his view for country's goals to rise to the level of national interest, it must meet six basic standards: first, these goals must be related to the general societal goals; second these goals are most frequently related to the self-preservation of the political unit; third, that the foreign policy should ensure the sovereignty and independence of the whole territory and should perpetuate, a particular political, social and economic system, based on that purpose; fourth, it should also aim at the promotion of private business interests abroad whether or not this relates to the broad societal needs; fifth it should aim at increasing the prestige of the country in the international system; six, it should be motivated by the desire to support friends and allies; and finally, it may be geared towards the promotion of

¹¹ Quoted from the Preface to the Proceedings of the Twentyfifth Symposium of the Colston Research Society, on Foreign Relations of African States, held in the University of Bristol, on April 4th to 7th, 1973. Edited by K. Ingham, Butterworths: London, March 1974.

Human-rights in other countries. The parameters set here by K. Holsti, may guide us in our understanding and appreciation of what what Ghana's national interest should be, certainly Ghana's national interest should include both the united feelings of the over 22 million people of the country, and also the set of public demands presented by some of the active or passive civil society groups (such groups may be defined in either ethnic, regional, religious or class interests) and individuals within the state and that either oppose or less enthusiastically supported by others.

The objective of this paper is to reflect on certain observed actions and its ideological underpinnings indicated in the domestic and foreign policies of former leader of the (Provisional National Defence Council, hereafter PNDC), Flt. Lt. Rawlings from (1982—1992) in Ghana. Specifically, this paper will critically discuss and explain Rawlings' actions (or inactions) and its pro-east ideological justifications before his change of gear to strong attachment to neo-liberal style of economic governance (i.e. accepting the bitter pill of the Structural Adjustment Programme and its effects on domestic actors and socio-economic policy) as advocated by the West through a combination of economic and political conditionalities. This article argues that the radical transformation of Ghana's foreign policy from a socialist orientation professed by the leaders of the first (PNDC I) regime to the second (PNDC II) regime in April 1983, led to the pursuit of an overly aggressive foreign economic policy, as well as the gradual liberalization of the political space.

a) *Theoretical Framework for Explaining Ghana's Foreign and Domestic Policy: A Brief Overview*

The conceptual analyses explicated above are important not only for understanding Africa's relationship with the world, but also for understanding and appreciation some of the most significant political and economic diplomatic relations on the continent and beyond. According to one school of thought in International politics, the determinants of foreign policy can be broadly divided into three categories: (1) Internal factors, (2) External factors, and (3) Policy making factors. The internal factors can be further subdivided into the following components: (a) Geography, (b) Historical traditions, (c) National capacity, (d) Public opinion, and (e) Ideology.

I will briefly, explicate these internal components in turn: first, Geography includes the location, size, topography, state boundaries, population, climate, etc of a state. Scholars of International Politics have pointed out the important role of geography in the formulation of foreign policy. For instance, they espouse the view that "pacts may be broken, treaties unilaterally denounced, but geography holds its victim fast." That is the presumption that a nation can avoid anything but not the constraints of geography. For example, the foreign

policy of Britain was based on the principles of balance of power, supremacy on the seas and the expansion of the Empire. These features of the British foreign policy were the natural off-shoots of its strategic location (i.e. an island) helped her to rule over the waves in terms of both trade and naval supremacy for centuries. However, scholars have pointed out that, the effect of geography is rather of an intricate nature. Specifically, they posit that it has lost much of its importance in contemporary times, due to the recent advancement in science and technology. These developments have succeeded in relegating the geographical factor to the background. Of course, the great progress being done in the areas of aerial navigation and technological sophistication of warfare have subsequently led to an immense depreciation of geopolitics, but many of the advantages and disadvantages remain operative in all states, in this nuclear age. Second, the historical traditions and national ethos, is also an important determinant of foreign policy of states. As scholars have aptly indicated, it is from a nation's unique historical trajectory that a state adopts a particular style and culture, which in turn influence the course of action or its orientation in its external relations. For instance, India's policy of non-alignment is a logical culmination of its freedom movement and the principles of Panch Steel, which is also rooted in its Buddhist past. The third internal variable, which is the national capacity, refers to the military strength, technological advancement and economic development. It is imperative here that a foreign policy should compromise with these national attributes, in order to succeed. For instance, the British foreign policy had to reconcile with its medium power status after the Second World War. Similarly, the revolution in the US foreign policy in the post- 1945 period can be explained only in terms of super-power status resulting from the War. In the same way, the abandonment of the super-power role by the Soviet Union since 1989 was the result of recognition by Mikhail Gorbachev of the declining capacity of the Soviet Union. Fourth, public opinion is another determining variable among the internal factors. Scholars of International Politics have amply emphasized the assumption that no country can easily ignore or go against the pressure of public opinion for a long time. For example, America had to withdraw from Vietnam (after 1968), under the pressure of public opinion. However, the role public opinion also have certain significant limitations, for instance public opinion is not often well organized or articulated, and whatever role it plays is largely restricted to democratic states only. The policy makers in authoritarian or totalitarian states are immune to the public feelings and demands. Finally, the ideological predispositions of leaders or policy elites are very important determinants in this theoretical framework. This is because the foreign or domestic policy of a state is conceived in the minds of

men who subscribe to certain fundamental beliefs relating to the distribution of power in society, the proper function of government and a particular way of life. For instance, ideological commitments such as those to African socialism, democratic socialism, or law and order tend to be enduring predispositions that color or influence the perceptions of particular foreign policy orientation of a state towards its external relations.

The second main categories of variables consist of the external factors. The elements form what is known as the external influences on a state. They are: (1) World organisation, which includes international law, the United Nations Organisation and other international financial, military, economic, social and cultural institutions, aimed at maintaining the existing world order. For instance, according to Grindle and Thomas (1991:39), closely linked to the historical context of the developing world is the great importance of each country's relationship to international economic and political conditions. They argue further that developing countries continue to be dependent upon and vulnerable to economic conditions such as the prices of the basic commodities they produce, the foreign exchange value of the goods they export and import, and interest rates at which they borrow capital abroad and repay debts. As these factors have created complex relationships with a large variety of multilateral and bilateral institutions, many of whom have major interests in altering existing policy and organizational practice within developing countries.

In sum, the above scholars indicate that these external factors are so important that they often play a very large role in setting the agenda for both foreign and domestic policy initiatives, a situation particularly true of the 1980s and even in today's Africa's diplomatic relations. Apart from this economic determinant, international relations scholars have strongly pointed out that, generally, the explanations for Ghana's foreign policy in the post-colonial era vary in terms of internal and external, but others have also indicated that Ghana's foreign policy, as well as that of most African states around this period were largely shaped by the dynamics of the Cold War politics in the post-colonial era. The Cold War here refers to the situation in the recent past, whereby the superpowers that emerged from the Second World War (i.e. the United States and the former United Socialist Soviet Republic (USSR) or the Soviet Union were engaged in an intractable conflict, that was punctuated by crises, and haunted by virtual nuclear war, but they managed to prevent direct combat (Spiegel, 1999). This is because as most of the African states emerged from European colonial rule in the late 1950s and 1960s, the wave of African political independence interacted with the development of the Cold War, on both a global and local stage. Both superpowers (i.e. the United States and the Soviet Union) officially supported decolonization, but the

United States was sometimes persuaded by its European allies that African determination might open the door to communist influence on the African continent. The Soviet Union's vocal support for African liberation was only occasionally matched by a willingness to provide logistical and military backing to such efforts. Many African political actors sought to remain neutral and "non-aligned" in the Cold War, but others deliberately portrayed local conflicts in Cold War terms, so as to persuade reluctant superpowers to intervene in African contexts which they barely understood and which were usually not a high priority in Washington or Moscow. The ending of the Cold War brought some African conflicts to a close, but the continuation of others suggested the limited relevance of global ideological affiliations to wars that resulted from a complex interaction of global, national and local factors. More importantly, Thad Dunning indicates that during the cold war, 'donor's geopolitical objectives diminished the credibility of treats to condition aid on the adoption of democratic reforms. To a large extent this position of the creditors changed, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War consolidated the ideological stance of the Western donors (particularly the United States) which subsequently led to the strong positive effect of foreign aid on democracy in sub-Saharan African countries.

Furthermore, in Africa, with the advent of the decolonization of African states in the late 50s and early 60s, major European powers (such as Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium and to lesser extent US with respect to Liberia) were noted to have lost their influence on African states, as many of them achieved political independence, paving the way for new geopolitical actors such as the United States and the former Soviet Union. Thus, the period between 1950 and 1990, were marked by the political and economic ideological struggles between these new bipolar superpowers for supremacy and influence in the international political landscape in general and Africa in particular. In this power struggle, the United States and its Western allies tried to keep the former African colonial states under the Western influence with its ideological trappings, whilst the former Soviet Union and its allies also stretch forth its hands to reach some of the new promising African states, of strong anti-imperialist orientation. The fact that the two new super powers, sought to gain alliances in newly independent African states, also exported the Cold War to Africa, as well. This phenomenon actually turned African states into "battleground" for fighting "proxy" wars (Steven Spiegel, 1999).

The final major determinant of foreign and domestic policy is the role of the political leader or policy maker. As scholars have pointed out a policy or decision making process consists of an inter-action between those making the decision and their environment. Thus, from the above discussions, we are

able to strongly assert that leaders and policy elites can have particular goals for the activities of the state. These goals are formed by the shared ideology or approach to problem solving that can be derived from the embedded orientation of the state, from the historical development of state activities and the way in which the state's role has been defined, from particular positions in government, and from personal values and ideological predispositions (Grindle and Thomas 1991: 41). In addition to the latter, the timing and content of any policy implementation depends on the circumstances surrounding the foreign or domestic policy issue in question at a particular point in time and place (ibid). For instance, Grindle and Thomas (1991) strongly argue

that the characteristics of a given foreign or domestic policy can be classified as either "crises-ridden" or "politics-as-usual." Policies which are characterized as "crises- ridden", for example, are likely to be assessed first and foremost in terms of their expected macro political impact. Whereas, policies perceived as "politics-as-usual", in contrast, are considered primarily in terms of how they will affect micro political relationships within the bureaucracy or with narrow clienteles. This provides a framework for assessing systematic relationship between how issues get on the decision agenda and the way policy and institutional changes are analyzed by leaders or policy elites (ibid).

Table 1: A Chronology of Ghanaian Leaders Foreign Policy Orientations (1951-81)

Type of Gov't/ Date	President/Prime Minister/Head of State	Ideological Orientation
Civilian	Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (Prime Minister/President) Convention People's Party (CPP)	Pro—East/African-Centred (1957—66)
Military (1966—69)	Lt General J.A. Ankrah (Head of state) and Later by Lt General Africa (Head of state)	Pro—West National Liberation Council (NLC)
Civilian	Dr. Kofi Abrefa Busia (Prime Minister)	Pro—West (1972—79) Progress Party (PP)
Military	Colonel I. Acheampong (Head of State) National Redemption Council (NRC), Later Transformed in to the Supreme Military Council (SMC1) and Supreme Military Council (SMCII) Led by General F.W.K. Akuffo	Nationalistic/Pro-East Inclinations (1972-79)
Military Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) (June 1979— Sept. 1979)	Flt Lt Jerry John Rawlings (Head of State)	Revolutionary/Anti-Capitalist Ideas Armed
Civilian	Dr. Hilla Limann (President) People's National Party (PNC)	Pro-West Inclinations (1979—81)

Source: Felix Kumah-Abiwu, (2016). *Leadership Traits and Ghana's Foreign Policy: The Case of Jerry Rawlings Foreign Policy of the 1980s*. *The Commonwealth Journal of International Affairs*, UK. pp. 300.

However, it is also important to note here that leaders or policy elites are not absolutely autonomous they are constrained by contextual factors such as the structure of class and interest group mobilization in the society, historical experiences and conditions, international economic and political relationships, domestic economic conditions, the administrative capacity of the state, among others (ibid: 37). Grindle and Thomas (1991:37), argue further that these contextual factors are important because they often act at the intersection of state and society to set the agenda for leaders or policy elites, shape their perceptions of what is desirable and feasible in efforts to positively project their national interests in the international system. In the nutshell, both the (internal and external) variables or contextual factors, together with the perceptions of policy elites, create the broad parameters

of policy space for any given external relation situation at any given time and place.

From the above theoretical reflections on the determinants of both foreign and domestic policy of any state at any particular time and its place in the international system, we can now strongly posit that in this study the foreign policy of post-colonial Ghana and Africa in general, is a combination of three main variables. The first is a set of complex inter-relationship of three domestic variables. It is the assumption of this article that apart from external factors, the apparent pandemic corruption, economic mismanagement and the ideological inclinations of leaders of the past three decades before 1982, when critically analyzed, will turn out to be the main causes of a society that was unable to fully realized its economic, cultural, social and political interests in the international system. As the Ghana case

and elsewhere in Africa (for instance in contrast to Uganda) explicitly demonstrates, the increase in Western pressure on the Rawlings regime to liberalize the economy in order to effectively incorporate it into the global economy before the end of the cold war was mediated by domestic forces that determined the degree of change in the tactics, ideological inclinations and beliefs of the leaders at that time. The second is external, that is, the decades of colonial rule and neo-colonialism of African states which resulted in an extreme dependency relationship with the West as well as certain internal socio-economic policy mal-adjustment (Tandon, 1974: 191). It is also instructive to also note here that, even though the recent wave of democratization (with the huge financial and electoral assistance from the West) across most African states after the end of the cold war played an important part in driving this political reforms, it was the domestic forces that determined how the transition to multiparty politics was realized, as the case of Ghana aptly demonstrate. The third main factor is the role of the leader or policy maker. This refers to the attitudes, ideologies and beliefs of policy makers. Here following Grindle and Thomas (1991), we assume that while the stakes in decision-making situations usually involve the power of individual leaders, bureaucratic organizations, and the state more generally, decision-makers are also influenced by ideological predispositions, the professional expertise and training, as well as their memories of similar prior policy situations. With these domestic, international and the role of policy makers postulated as underpinning Ghana's colonial and post-colonial foreign and public policy in mind, we can now turn to briefly sketch the country's actual foreign policy orientation, before the coming into office of the PNDC regime in 31st December, 1981 and beyond.

b) *The Case of the Rawlings Regime, 1981—1992*

The Early Period, 1981-82: As explicated above, the foreign policy of Ghana cannot be understood without reference to the political history of Ghana's immediate past. For instance, certain structural and institutional regimes of both political and economic in nature were solidly constituted under British colonial rule, which no matter who rules in Ghana today; still provide the basic underpinnings of Ghana's most recent history. These developments and their social and economic consequences must be fully understood in order to analyze Ghana's foreign and public policy. Over the years, foreign economic policy actions of Ghanaian governments had basically been the by-product of formal political interactions of Ghana with the international system (Boafo-Arthur, 1999). It is popular historical foreign policy knowledge that Ghana and many Western countries, especially Britain and the United States, are kept together by neo-colonial economic, education, social, religious, historical and

cultural institutions that bind them together, thus determining the parameters of the policy space for the actions (and inactions) of leaders or policy elites within their external and domestic contexts. There are also racial and psychological bonds that keep Ghanaians permanently united with Africans in the United States and Europe, Asian, as well as in other parts of the world together.

c) *The Diverging Paths, 1982-1992*

However, in a mimeo issued by the Ghanaian Diasporas living in the United States and Canada, popularly known as the Ghana Congress of U.S.A. and Canada in their assessment of some of the foreign policy issues of Rawlings Regime, during this time reported that:

As if oblivious of the above the facts, the Rawlings revolution has persistently antagonised our traditional our traditional friends in the West. For instance, in 1982 the Security Advisor Kodjo Tsikata caused great consternation in diplomatic circles when he published a fictitious German-language document in the Ghanaian papers detailing a US mercenary plan to overthrow the PNDC. Later, following protests from the US and German governments, he conceded that the whole exercise was a hoax, and the government of Ghana apologized.

They indicated further that, now traditional neutrality seems to have been blown to pieces as Rawlings moves more closely to the USSR and Bulgaria, Libya, Cuba and Nigaragua, East Germany, and North Korea than any previous government in Ghana has done. Since, the 1980s due to a combination of colonial exclusionary economic policies, and the nationalist promises of the leaders before and after political independence resulted in limitless expectations of government, both to intervene in the economy to redistribute entitlements and to provide jobs, loans, contracts and favours through political patronage. According to Morris Szeftel, these complex inter-relationships of three factors were of particular importance: economic underdevelopment, the nature of the inherited state, and the pattern of political mobilization in post-colonial Africa. According to the eminent Ghanaian Political Scientist, Boafo-Arthur (1999: 82):

The confusion as to the root cause (s) of the nation's economic problems reflected the differing ideological persuasions within the PNDC. The leftist elements felt the problem was with the capitalist world order whilst the moderates and conservative elements felt the leadership had to pay equal attention to domestic constraints to development. With the dominant position of the left in the ruling junta and also the core support base, the choice of international friends and policy measures initially followed socialist prescriptions.

Similarly, Thomas M. Callaghy noted that, Dr Kwesi Botchwey, Ghana's long time finance minister, explicated these ideological difficulties vividly in these terms:

We were faced with two options, which we debated very fiercely before we finally chose this path. I know because I participated very actively in these debates. Two choices: we had to maneuver our way around the naiveties of leftish, which has a sort of disdain for any talk of financial discipline, which seeks refuge in some vague concept of structuralism in which everything doable is possible ... Moreover, (we had to find a way between) this naivete and the crudities and rigidities and dogma of monetarism, which behaves as if once you set the monetary incentives everybody will do the right thing and the market will be perfect.

In reality, according to Boafo-Arthur the change in orientation of the PNDC came as a result of the failure of the regime to obtain the needed economic support from the East (Boafo-Arthur, 1999: 82). He argues further that, this effectively undermined the influence and role of the radical left in the government. Those with leftish or Marxist-leaning had two options: Either to "commit ideological suicide" or resign from the government. Key personalities in the government who had acquired reputation whilst teaching at the University of Ghana as Marxist socialists such as Kwesi Botchwey, the long serving Finance Minister of the PNDC, and Tsatsu Tsikata, a key Rawlings adviser, took the first option. Young Marxist freedom fighters such as Zaya Yeebo the first PNDC Secretary in charge of Youth and Sport, Chris Atim a member of the PNDC, Akwasi Adu, Taata Ofofu and many others fled into exile (ibid).

In sum, from the outset Rawlings and his PNDC regime placed themselves in a rigid ideological leftish corner and had no other choice than to restructure its political and economic relations or orientations in the international system, along Marxist-Socialist lines. This seeming intractable position was made more compelling by the key advisers of the PNDC regime as well as the main support base. Thus, the change of ideological orientation or the political values from radical socialist views to a more neo-liberal classical economic policies at the instigation of the International Financial Institutions (i.e. the IMF and the World Bank) in April 1983, led to the pursuit of overly aggressive foreign and domestic economic policies. The question that logically arises from these ideological struggles between the African political and bureaucratic elites, the international financial institutions and the major domestic actors, within these structural economic and political contexts is that, what theoretical framework, ideological justifications or approaches best explain this crucial "turning point" or in the words of Grindle and Thomas (1991) in this "crises" situation with respect to the regime's change of behaviour, domestically and

externally with specific reference to the international economic and political relations.

II. THE TRANSFORMATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Conventionally, foreign economic relations that center on trade, foreign aid and investment played second fiddle to traditional foreign policy concerns with its known political bias. Ghana, under the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) which came to power through a military coup on December 31 1981, was no exception to this norm; until the mid-1980s, the regime professed to be a socialist and pro-East government in its orientation and attitudes towards both public and foreign policy issues. In other words, before 1982 Ghana's foreign policy of President Hilla Limann (1979—1981) was more or less non-aligned (i.e. not involved in the Cold-War disputations between the West and East) but with some pro- Western ideological inclinations. When Rawlings took office through a military coup in 31 December 1981, he accused the Limann Administration of corruption, economic mismanagement, and more seriously, mortgaging of Ghana's resources to Western International Financial Institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. As Gyimah-Boadi (1993:1) indicated, in its initial stages, Rawlings regime attracted considerable attention with left-leaning, revolutionary and radical postures, and consulted with similar regimes in Libya, Nicaragua and Ethiopia—provoking deep loathing from Ronald Reagan's Administration and other Western governments. This was initially the case before mid-1983, as the Rawlings's PNDC regime had gone along with the sentiments and ideological inclinations of the radical Marxist-Socialist against Western investment, devaluation and trade liberalization and in favour of rather self-reliance through import substitution economic policies and popular mobilization. However, in 1993 powerful domestic and external factors such as drought and bush fires, famine, dwindling foreign exchange receipts, the Nigerian oil embargo and the expulsion of over one million Ghanaians from Nigeria, as well as the failure of the Eastern-bloc allies, towards the end of the cold war to help meet Ghana's foreign exchange needs, prompted Rawlings regime to embrace the IMF and the World Bank's neo-orthodox structural adjustment programme in April 1983.

a) *Implications for Domestic Economic Policy Formulation and Implementation*

This section we will attempt to critically examine some aspects of the ideological justifications and theoretical underpinnings of the structural adjustment programmes and the policy measures that are typical of the stabilization/structural adjustment programme, which were designed by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and implemented by African leaders and policy elites in almost every Sub-

Saharan African country. The analyses of these economic ideological struggles between Africa, and Ghana in particular, on one hand; and the West is very important for an appreciation and understanding the economic crises which was at stake at that time of the introduction and rigorous implementation of the SAP policies and its discontents, because for example according Nic Cheeseman (2016: 14) notes that:

The debate about the design and impact of foreign loans and economic advice is closely associated with the literature on aid and governance. In both cases, scholars have argued that the ability of African leaders to secure international assistance from foreign partners has encouraged them to ignore the needs of their own populations, with whom they not they do not need to engage in order to raise revenue.

In addition, with the end of colonial rule in the late 50s and early 60s, the leaders and policy elites of most of the political independent African states at that time were very hopeful that a change in political, economic and social governance will propel significant socio-economic development. But, by the end of the over four decades of self-governance, has resulted in rather chronic manifestations of underdevelopment (in the social, cultural, economic, security and political realms. The question that arises is that how can we explain and better understand the imposition of the Western directed SAPs and democratic governance in Africa, in the early 1980s and 1990s? As Nic Cheeseman, puts it, in the 1980s, the IMF and World Bank came to the firm belief that the main problem with African economies was African politics. He argues further that it was believed that the state, was corrupt and inefficient, and hence was undermining economic growth. As a result, the World Bank loans were made conditional upon the structural adjustment of African economies (2016: 15).

In order to test the potency of these competing theories, the study employs the classic Ghanaian structural adjustment experience as it is deemed as the most successful among the “adjusting” Sub-Saharan African countries. It is our hope that this “deviant” case study will help to illuminate the limitations of Ghana’s foreign economic policy design (with regards to the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) or diplomatic economic negotiations and its implications for domestic political-economy in Ghana and Africa in general and derive some recommendations, among others for a critical look at the consideration of some of the policy suggestions from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) for the future re-modelling of the current adjustment package as a minimum effort to correct the current economic crisis facing most African states, since political independence between the mid-1950s and late 60s (Hekpo, 1992:25). To achieve these objectives, this section will first, re-examine and define the theoretical concept “structural adjustment”, thereby sharpening

and clarifying the content of the concept, with the view to understand the nature of the disagreements surrounding it. Second, it will present the arguments for and against the rationale for the design and implementation of SAPs in Africa. Third, we will test the empirical validity of these two opposing theoretical points of views from the two schools of thoughts. Finally, it will attempt to draw some lessons and make recommendations based on the empirical case.

b) *What is Structural Adjustment?*

According to Engberg-Pedersen et al (1996:3), the term “Structural adjustment” is normally used in one of the two closely linked senses. First, it implies a shift in economic policies from an interventionist stance, which permits and sometimes encourages state intervention in the economy, towards a neo-liberal position which aims to minimize it, letting the market allocate resources wherever possible (ibid). Second, it also stands for the mechanisms which have been used since about 1980 to persuade Third World Countries often very reluctantly, to follow such policy prescriptions (ibid).

c) *What is ‘Structural’ about Structural Adjustment?*

From, the above conceptual analysis, “Structural Adjustment” specifically consists of reforms aimed at ‘stabilizing developing countries’ external and internal balances and promoting their growth by devaluation, producer price increases, trade liberalization, privatization and supporting institutional changes’ (ibid). Its adoption has usually (but not always) occurred in a context of economic crisis and on the basis of promises of resources from donors, led by the two foremost International financial institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank (ibid: ix). The latter are also largely responsible for the design of adjustment programmes (ibid). Now, the question is: What is ‘Structural’ about this? The point is worth pursuing is that, since the notions of “Structure” as used by the IFIs and their critics are almost diametrically opposed (ibid). To show this simply, one can outline how each side perceive as major ‘Structural’ problems (ibid). In the words of Svendsen (1996:402), “structural adjustment followed a grand design, inevitably generating disagreement. To understand the policy process over the years it is useful to look first at the broad features of these disagreements and then to review the more specific disputes.”

d) *The Theoretical Position of International Financial Institutions*

According to Engberg-Pedersen et al (1996:4), for the IFIs, first their main conceptual definition of - or only - “structural” problem is “the market distortion,” usually as a result of state intervention in the economy. In the African case this means assuming that the root cause of Africa’s current ills lies not in its history of colonialism and its form of integration into the world

economy, but in the policies which have aimed to offset these imbalances, with their unintended effects in the form of excessive state intervention in the economy and especially parastatal monopolies. Svendsen (1996:403) points out further that, "the Second disagreement centres on the appropriate role of the state in economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa. Most are ready to accept that 'the state' was in crisis...while some adjustment was needed there is not agreement on how far the pendulum should swing in the other direction." Hence, for the IFIs there is strong call for the reduction of state intervention in the economy and an acceptance of the dominance of the private sector to lead in the development process.

The Economic Formulations from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and African Governments: In the view of Engberg-Pedersen et al (1996:3), for this school of thought the cause(s) of Africa's economic underdevelopment and its subsequent effects of corruption and poverty is result of lack clear, logical and coherent effort in the definition and the formulation of the so-called "Structural" problems, and the effects of these external influences, tend to cause the economic and social imbalances perceived to obstruct development. They explain further that, the theoretical position explicates basically that the export bias of colonial economies and its distortion of transport networks could be seen as the major cause or the lack of transformational policies which have kept some areas undeveloped sources of outmigration. Development is seen, at least in part, as a matter of overcoming these structural imbalances. Since their effects include distorting markets, state intervention is suggested to improve structure and to provide the optimal conditions for private sector participation" (Engberg-Pedersen et al (1996:3-4). In other words, Engberg-Pedersen et al, explains further that "the 'development' process has probably been more extensively and heavily state-controlled in Africa than in most other parts of the Third World, though this says as much about the small size of the private business sector as about the size of the state (ibid). Even though, this development strategy has led to a "massive increase in foreign debt and the proportion of exports needed for debt-service, implying a vicious cycle of increasing dependency on external donor funding" (ibid: 4-5).

Thus, according to this school of thought, the external environment for African leaders and policy elites were not conducive enough for the kind of "structural adjustment" in their international economic and political relations with the Western powers due to the interrelationship of three main variables in the recent history of Africa's political-economy. These include: first, the authoritarian character of the inherited colonial state; second, the nature of its global incorporation into the international political and economic system; and the mode of political mobilization by the ruling elites in Africa

and its associated problem of neo-patrimonialism. These theories were the major underpinning building blocks in the ideological postulations of this school of thought as being the underpinning causes of the challenges faced by African leaders or policy elites in their determination to reduce or eliminate the political, economic and social ills of the African states. First, the African ruling elites inherited an authoritarian colonial state, plagued with oppression; brutality and economic exploitation governed by divide and rule tactics within the society. Since, colonial rule by the Europeans was imposed on the African public, it was also characterized by brutal force and oppression rather than being consultative and participatory. Thus, the new African leaders and policy elites lack the necessary political culture and a well-established rational political system governed by the rule of law and separation of powers. Under these unfavourable conditions, the new ruling African elites lacked the managerial values to effectively manage the natural rich resources which were logically placed in their hands. More importantly, their inability to transform the colonial state they inherited from the European powers resulted in making the state irrelevant to the welfare of their people, as well as employing it to promote their national interest but rather they helped to deepen the exploitation of the resources of the state for the benefit of external powers.

Furthermore, the nature of the colonial system were characterized by what scholars of African Politics have termed the "duality" of competing powers, in the sense that two different contradictory systems of political rule were created to co-exist with each other, resulting in the problems of nation-building and place of ethnic groups in this new artificial political superstructure known as the "weberian" state. This simply implies that, first on one hand, at the rural level, the people were left in the hands of native authorities through the system of indirect rule, whilst at the urban area, were the colonial governor with the support of the Executive and Legislative Councils that were established; were effectively employed to discriminate against the "African elites" in the decision-making process of their own country. The result of this "divide" and "rule" political strategy was the deepening of the incidence of "ethnicity" at the local level, which in turn impeded the formation of a strong middle class in most African states and its negative patrimonial effects on economic governance and the recent surge of democratization in most African states, since the 1990s. Thus, the failure of the nation-building project resulted in the use of patron-client relationships as a political strategy and tool to redistribute public goods for regime support. Moreover, the lack of strong private-sector in most African countries meant that the state or the public sector continued to be the only source of achieving the economic well-being by citizens. This motivated the mismanagement of the state resources for private use,

in the context of the winner takes all political system by the minority ruling elites to the detriment of the numerous powerless African citizens. For instance, using Nigeria as a classic case, scholars have hereby indicated that in Nigeria “corruption is the order of the day” and this pertains to most other African states as well. Moreover, the effects of economic and social inequalities among the population, and the manipulation of ethnic identities by the ruling elites to their own political advantage like the experience in Kenya and Zambia amply demonstrates, in the 1960s and 1970s, led to economic mismanagement and corruption, leading to the justification for the radical imposition of SAPs on most African states in the 1980s, until now.

Finally, related to the first point of colonialism is also the inheritance of loop-sided nature of the colonial economy. This involves the process whereby the state is allowed only the production of one agricultural produce; for example, Kenya specialized in the growth and export of tea and coffee, with Ivory Coast and Ghana producing cocoa, whilst the Gambia specialize in the export of groundnuts, and so on for the international political-economy as their major source of foreign exchange, instead of equally focusing on the rapid industrialization of the economy. The implications of this “colonizing structure” of the global economy on Africa’s weak political-economy is that over time, most African states become effectively dependent and marginalised in terms of participating on an equal basis in the global economy. As a result, African economies began to respond either negatively or positively to the “shocks” of contraction and expansion of the international commodity markets. In this regards, in times of global economic decline, also negatively affects most African economies as it suffers from serious draw-backs, leading to deficits in the balance of payments and debts to foreign rich industrialized countries, which controls the International Financial Institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, by giving generous loans to African governments to help them to off-set some of their internal and external debts as well as balancing the national budget accordingly, in order to enhance the welfare of their citizens. The latter in conjunction with other problems economic mismanagement and bad governance resulted in the imposition of the Structural Adjustment Programmes by Western powers on African states. For them, as explicated elsewhere they defined the problems of the African states not in terms of external factors but in terms of internal economic and political governance issues within most African states.

Hence, from the above discussions we can discern from the theoretical literature at least two main fundamental disagreements that exist between the IFIs, on one hand and the African governments and ECA, on the other. The first relates to the distinction between internal and external causes of the socio-economic crisis facing Sub-Saharan African Countries. Whiles, the

second disagreement focuses on the appropriate role of the state in the economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa (ibid). With these conceptual and theoretical foundations to guide our analysis, we now turn to our empirical cases (i.e. the country specific cases selected to test these rival theories)

e) *The Debates on the Justification and the Success of SAPs*

In Ghana, Gyimah- Boadi (1993:1) pointed out that the Rawlings regime has ruled Ghana continuously since 31 December 1981, making it the longest serving government in the country’s turbulent political history. In its initial stages, the regime attracted considerable attention with left-leaning, revolutionary and radical postures, and consorted with similar regimes in Libya, Nicaragua and Ethiopia- provoking deep loathing from Ronald Reagan’s Washington DC and other Western governments. Gyimah- Boadi, notes further that later on, Rawlings became widely perceived as the ‘blue-eyed-boy’ of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. His government’s Economic Recovery and Structural Adjustment Programme were judged as one of the most thoroughgoing and consistent in the world (ibid). In other words, since April 1983, the PNDC² regime led by Flt. Lt. Jerry Rawlings carried out a programme of far-reaching economic reforms intended to reverse the decline in the Ghanaian economy which began in the 1970s and reached crisis proportions in the early 1980s (Anyemedu, 1993:13). Against this background, following the analytical approach of Anyemedu, this section will attempt an evaluation of the policies the PNDC employed from 1983 to 1992, in order to reverse the economic crisis that faced the country, during the stipulated period in question. These include a brief analysis of the economic situation which existed at the inception of the ERP and the policies and measures adopted to resolve the problems. These policies are finally reviewed in terms of the criteria of justification, and success or failure (ibid).

f) *The Nature of the Pre-ERP Economic Crisis and the Framework for Analysis*

In general, Henko observed that “the countries of West Africa continue to experience underdevelopment despite growth of the early and late sixties. The sustained crises, evidenced in low productivity, high rates of inflation, high rates of unemployment, deterioration in standards of living, huge external debts, social and political costs, etc” (1992:25). In particular, the economy of Ghana underwent a comprehensive and pervasive decline in the 1970s. Real GDP stagnated and per capita incomes declined at the average annual rate of about 3%. Inflation averaged over 50% during the period and reached triple digits in some

² Provisional National Defence Council.

years Anyemedu, 1993:13). This prompted the Ghanaian government to implement, in one form or another, the typical IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes (ibid). The framework for analysing the performance employed is the 'classical' view of economic development defined as the increases in per capita gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP) sustained over a considerable time period (Hekpo, 1992:26). Moreover, the following measures of performance are also examined: the rates of inflation, and unemployment, the changes in external trade and the debt service ratios; in addition to the political and social costs of adjustments in general (ibid).

After the Implementation of the Neo-Orthodox Adjustment Programs: In measuring how the ERPs fared in terms of its impact on the Ghanaian economy, social and political structures on its impact the following findings were recorded against the objectives of the programme which were: basically the stabilization of prices through balanced budgets, achieving an average annual real GDP growth of at least 5 percent, reducing the size and cost of the civil service, reducing the average inflation from 37 percent in 1990 to 5 percent in 1993; and generating an overall balance of payments surplus of at least \$90 million a year (World Bank, 1995; Anyinam, 1996:451; quoted in Konadu-Agyemang and Takyi, 2001:24).

First, with the ability of the government to manage important aspects of macro- economic management, such as combating inflation, controlling the wage-bill and managing the budget were generally positive as a result of the reform measures. As reported in the evaluation report on the SAPs by the Pricewaters Coopers (2003), by the early 1990s, the results of the ERP was clearly visible. First, the GoG had been able to transform its financial position, moving from a fiscal deficit of 4% in 1983 to a surplus of 2% in 1991. In this regard, Ghana "registered smaller deficits...than the rest of the continent. Second, by 1992 inflation was at an all time low of 9.5% (compared to 77% in 1981). Finally, by early 1990s, GoG's wage bill had dropped to 4.5% of GDP following a reduction of central government employment by 40, 000 to 260,000 (Pricewaters Coopers, 2003:9).

However, these successes were rapidly reversed for a number of reasons. Increased pressure in the late eighties to deepen the democratization process, led the Ghanaian government to promulgate a new constitution and hold multi- party elections in 1992. Specifically, these changes gave Parliament more powers to veto proposed policy, previously largely driven by a group of technocrats who enjoyed military protection. Moreover, the democratization process is perceived to have given voice to influences which, overall was not supportive of macro-economic reforms; and lobbying on behalf of particular interest groups (e.g.

With respect to employee welfare) in return for regime support affected the sustainability of the reform measures. For example, prior to the 1992 general elections, an 80% pay-hike for civil servants raised the wage bill to 8% of GDP. Moreover, the government lost control of recruitment and by the mid-nineties, central government employment had grown to 330, 000. These factors triggered the suspensions of financial support of the World Bank and IMF. The increased wage bill contributed to fiscal instability and macroeconomic failure (Koranteng, 2002; Arthur, 1999; quoted in PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2002:9-10).

Moreover, in the area of poverty reduction, according to a report by the Ghana Living Standards Survey, in 1987/88, about 36 percent of the Ghanaian population lived below the poverty line. Even though rural poverty was higher than urban poverty, 26 per cent of the urban population lived below the poverty line of C36000 expenditure per annum. The results of the second report of the Ghana Living Standards Survey suggest a worsening of poverty between 1987/88 and 1990 (Jebuni and Oduro, 1998:38).

III. DEBATES ON THE SUCCESS OF THE SAPS IN GHANA

The view of the IMF and World Bank: In the view of Anyemedu (1993:13), the implementation of the Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) in Ghana was praised by the International financial Institutions and the donor community in general for its impressive achievements. Ghana in this case has been noted in recent years as an example of successful development in Africa. Gyimah- Boadi (1993:9) also agrees on the fact that "there is no doubt that the ten years of PNDC rule brought about a significant measure of macro-economic improvements. There was a reversal of economic decline and a resumption of economic growth. There also appeared to be abatement in Ghana's chronic fiscal crisis, which in turn made possible a partial but significant rehabilitation of the country's long- decaying social and economic infrastructure and a restoration of the organisational capacity of the state".

The View of the African governments and the ECA: However the PNDC regime's economic reconstruction was not without its limitations. In the words of Anyemedu (1993:24), "there were, of course, dissenters to the new orthodoxy. In addition to the misgivings on individual policies, the dissenters emphasised the inappropriateness of applying any single policy programme as a universal remedy in the developing world. In the African context, the foremost dissenter was the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)". According to Ekpo (1992), the ECA's document, African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socioeconomic Recovery and

Transformation (AAF-SAP), completely rejects the IMF and World Bank adjustment programmes (ECA AAF-SAP, 1989:25, quoted in Ekpo, 1992:28). It states categorically that:

It should have become abundantly clear by now that, both on theoretical and empirical grounds, the conventional SAPs are inadequate in addressing the real causes of economic, financial and social problems facing African countries which are of a structural nature. There is, therefore, an urgent need for an alternative to the current stabilization and adjustment programmes in Africa. Such an alternative will have to take into consideration, among other things, the structure of production and consumption and the people who are the main actors in the development process.

Ekpo (1992) summarizes the debates indicating that the main contention of the ECA as due to the nature of the IMF recovery package in terms of "its classical and neoclassical assumptions of clearing markets and insignificant roles for the state in economic activities, does not address the "structure" of Africa's political economy". Ekpo, explain further more concretely that "the main problems of mass poverty, food shortages, low productivity, weak productive base and backward technology that confront Africa are essential constraints that arise from the structures of production, consumption, technology, employment and socio-political organisation" (ECA AAF-SAP, 1989:1, quoted in Ekpo, 1992:29). Specifically, the above observation seems to have been confirmed in relation to the effects of the Ghanaian SAP implementation, as Gyimah-Boadi (1993:9), explicates this that there was no reduction in the country's structural dependency (a problem dramatised by the steady decline in the world market prices for most of Ghana's leading export commodities in the late 1980s and early 1990s) external debt grew and infrastructural rehabilitation and restoration of the organisational capacity of the state remained inadequate. Gyimah-Boadi, notes further that the 'the economic growth and other ERP/SAP improvements did not necessarily translate into direct benefits for the general public. The contraction of the state meant immediate job losses and a reduction in employment opportunities in the state sector. The withdrawal of subsidies caused a decrease in social wages and cost recovery, the introduction of user fees and a steep devaluation of the currency led to increases in the cost of basic social services and consumer items' (ibid).

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

This paper opened by reviewing some of the definitions by scholars with regards to key concepts in the analysis of any foreign policy of a state, specifically the notion of the "national interest." Secondly, the question of what is actually meant by the idea of a state's orientation towards foreign actors and states (i.e.

the idea of "us" and "them")? Thirdly, the general theoretical framework for explaining the foreign policy of Ghana is then concisely presented. Afterwards, the ideological debates and contests between the International Financial Institutions (i.e. the IMF and the World Bank), on one hand and the ECA and reluctant African governments, on the other, concerning negotiations on international and domestic economic policy is also reviewed here, using Ghana's experience, as classic case study. It should be noted here in the final analysis the IMF and the World Bank won because they had the best economic ideas or policies, rather they won because of the "neo-colonizing structure" of the post-colonial African states (particularly Ghana), which still depends on the global economic order which was constituted by the Western powers for its foreign exchange through the sale of cocoa and other natural resources. For instance, the ECA's African Alternative Framework to Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) is holistic in nature and captures the realities of the African economy (Ekpo, 1992:38). Its major strength is in the emphasizes on the human dimension rather than on technocratic approaches of the International Financial Institutions. In other words, the inclusion of transformation in the adjustment process, as well as the ingredient for eventual self-reliance, makes the ECA-SAP a qualitative improvement over the IMF and the World Bank adjustment package. Hence, the implementation of the ECA's alternative programme stands as a necessary condition in attempting to address the economic crisis of Ghana and Africa in general (ibid). In the final analysis, this study of Ghana's international and domestic economic policy was undertaken partly for what it has to say about Ghana, but partly for what lesson it has for us in the study of the foreign policy of African states.

Moreover, what the Ghana demonstrates best of all, concurs with the findings from similar studies, on the study "analysis of the foreign policy of Uganda" by Tandon, is the invalidity of the proposition often made with respect to the foreign policies of small states that these are conditioned mostly by domestic factors, that it is the big states that which react to each other and have interests that so beyond their boundaries in proportion to their size so that a United Kingdom would have significant regional and cross-regional interests and a United States would have interests all over the globe. But for small states, they neither have the capabilities nor interests that go much beyond their national geographic confines (Tandon, 1974: 207). In other words, this study validates the proposition that for those African states that had acquired formal political independence from colonial from the European powers, their internal development is still largely a reflection of their colonial past, and most important determinant in their foreign policies was their dependent relationship upon the foreign colonial powers for foreign aid and

technical assistance in their political and economic governance institutions. In consequence, much of what happened internally is still in response to externally imposed conditions through a political system of unfair international diplomatic relationships and negotiations on the global economic order with regards to their own interests.

As explicated elsewhere, at the outset the belief held by the key political and policy elites in the Rawling's PNDC regime was that Ghana's domestic economic problems were as the result of the negative nature of the nation's incorporation into the international political-economy, as postulated by the consultants at the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) above. Thus, the immediate concern was the initiation of populist structural economic and social reforms, including placing the management of the state enterprises and corporations in the hands of committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). However, apart from the rhetorical attacks on imperialism and western capitalism, no serious measures were aimed at restructuring the economic base of the country for lack of enough foreign exchange reserves. Nevertheless, the change in ideological orientation of Rawling's PNDC regime came about as a result of mainly the failure of the regime to successfully secure the needed economic support from the Eastern bloc, especially the Soviet Union. The Ghanaian high powered diplomatic delegation to the Soviet Union came backed empty-handed, rather they were directed to go the IMF and try at the same time to hold on to the revolution. The negative outcome of the Russian trip had a strong sobering effect on the radical left within the PNDC and among its key supporters. It greatly undermined the leftist influence on international and domestic economic policy making and implementation and paved the way for the realignment of relations between the regime and the Western powers. Moreover, the fragile domestic economic conditions were compounded by the populist economic policies being implemented at the time in question. These policies included the confiscation of the assets of traders, imposition of price controls, and the imposition of heavy fines on alleged hoarded goods, among others. These policies failed to improve the economic situation of the country and furthermore, severely reduced the incentives for production, savings, domestic and foreign investments, which obstructed increased economic productivity in the polity.

Hence, in 1983 a combination of powerful domestic and external factors such as drought and bush fires, famines, dwindling foreign exchange receipts, the Nigerian oil embargo and the expulsion of over one million Ghanaians as well as the failure of the Eastern Bloc allies to help meet Ghana's foreign exchange needs, prompted the PNDC regime to embrace the IMF and the World Bank's neo-orthodox Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), in April

1983. This wide-ranging economic reform packages especially its austerity and ideological implications caused considerable political problems for the PNDC regime. Several features of the reforms caused great bitterness among the working class: labour retrenchment; trade liberalisation (symbolized by the demise of the people's shops); devaluation (which induced high prices of consumer goods); user fees and subsidy redrawing (which rendered basic services like health and education unaffordable to the average worker). Indeed, the introduction of the Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Effects of Adjustment (PAMSCAD), with the objective of lessening the burden on the poor as a result of the religious implementation of externally imposed economic policies without any local input, undermined the high praises which was heaped on the PNDC regime in the corridors of the International Financial Institutions and Western governments. In January, 1990 Rawlings, himself declared that "I should be the first to admit that the SAPs has not provided all the answers to our national economic problems." Since, the successful transition to multi-party, constitutional rule in 1992, the parameters of the Ghana's interactions with the international system have been clearly stipulated in Article 40 of the 1992 Fourth Republican constitution, which is reinforced by Articles 74 and 75 and to some extent by the Directive Principles of State Policy of the same constitution. Since, the end of the Cold-War true to the unipolar system of the international system, both the two administrations of the dominant political parties in Ghana (i.e. the National Democratic Congress (NDC) and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) have pursued foreign policies characterized by neo-liberal economic diplomacy and the promotion of international peace and democracy in the West-African sub-region.

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Implications of Illicit Financial Flows on Africa's Democratic Governance

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Abstract- Illicit Financial Flows (IFFs) are a major challenge to Africa's democratic governance. They have a direct impact on a country's stability to raise, retain and mobilise its own resources to finance sustainable economic development. GFI (2017) finds that IFFs remain persistently high. The study finds that over the period between 2005 and 2014, IFFs on average accounted for between 14.1 percent and 24.0 percent of the total developing country trade, while outflows were estimated at 4.6 percent to 7.2 percent of total trade and inflows were between 9.5 percent and 16.8 percent. The problem with IFFs is that they are not only illicit but that their effect spreads far beyond their immediate area of occurrence. Millions of people are affected, economies are weakened, and development is stagnated, while a shady few accumulate wealth and influence. Financial flows are crucial for poor countries and have played an important role in most African countries that have made developmental progress. Since not all financial flows are good for development, the integration of poor countries into the global financial system poses opportunities as well as risks. IFFs usually facilitate most of these risks and have an overall negative impact on African countries.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The challenges of IFFs have been high on the international agenda for the last decade. There has been an increasing need to find workable solutions. IFFs have become one of the major challenges confronting the surge for structural transformation in Africa. They perpetuate Africa's economic dependence on other continents and also undermine the capacity of the African governments to articulate and implement a developmental state approach that prioritises capacity expanding, transformative and distributive economic and social development policies. Improving Africa's productive capacity requires increasing investment in infrastructure, promoting technology transfer and innovation for value addition, and boosting agricultural productivity, among other issues (UNECA and AUC, 2012). However, the quest for a developmental state in Africa has been significantly constrained by the financial structures of IFF. These structures undermine the potential for economic transformation in the continent through draining tax revenues and scarce foreign exchange

resources, stifling growth and socio-economic development, and weakening governance. High and increasing IFFs from Africa impact on development through losses in tax revenue and the opportunity cost of savings and investment in various sectors of the African economy. These impacts are of particular policy significance due to the increasing importance of domestic resource mobilisation at a time when the role of official development assistance is declining (Kar, 2012).

The estimated volume of illicit flows has been staggering. It ranged between US\$2 trillion and US\$3.5 trillion in 2014. Illicit outflows from developing countries to the advanced world alone were estimated to be US\$620 billion in 2014 in the most conservative calculation, while illicit inflows from the developed countries into the developing world totalled more than US\$2.5 trillion. The total IFFs are estimated to have grown at an average annual rate of between 8.5 percent and 10.4 percent a year over the period 2005-2014. Outflows were estimated to have risen between 7.2 percent and 8.1 percent a year, while inflows rose at an even higher rate between 9.2 percent and 11.4 percent annually. By comparison, inflation in developed countries averaged only 1.4 percent a year over that ten-year period (GFI, 2017).

Over the last 50 years, Africa is estimated to have lost in excess of US\$1 trillion in IFFs (Kar and Cartwright-Smith, 2010; Kar and Leblanc, 2013). This sum is roughly equivalent to all of the Official Development Assistance (ODA) received by Africa during the same timeframe. Currently Africa is estimated to be losing more than US\$50 billion annually in IFFs. These estimates may however, fall short of reality because accurate data for all African countries does not exist given the nature and secrecy of such proceeds like bribery, trafficking, drugs, people and firearms. The amount lost annually by Africa through IFFs is therefore likely to exceed US\$50 billion by a significant amount (Kar and Cartwright-Smith, 2010).

The massive flows of illicit capital in Africa represent diversions of resources from their most efficient social uses and have an adverse impact on domestic resource mobilisation and hamper sustainable economic growth. For example, in some countries illicit flows correspond to tax revenues lost (GFI, 2008). Such revenues will then not be available for use by

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governments in reducing inequality, eliminating poverty, and raising the quality of life for citizens. It is necessary to consider the source of illicit flows, and their role in any discussion of the sustainable economic development agenda. It is important to consider the volume of resources legally flowing into and out of developing countries and also the illicit flows associated with leakages of capital from the Balance of Payments (BOPs) and trade misinvoicing. Governments and international organisations must strengthen policy and increase cooperation to combat the scourge of IFFs (GFI, 2017).

IFFs are of great concern given the inadequate growth, high levels of poverty, resource needs and the changing global landscape of official development assistance. Although African countries have been growing at a rate of 5 percent annually since 2000, this rate is considered encouraging but inadequate. Poverty remains a serious concern in Africa in absolute and relative terms. The number of people living on less than US\$1 a day in Africa is estimated to have increased from 290 million in 1990 to 414 million in 2010 (United Nations, 2013). This is because population growth outweighs the number of people rising out of poverty. Moreover, GDP per African was around US\$2000 in 2013, which is around one-fifth of the level worldwide (IMF, 2014). Poverty in Africa is also multidimensional, in the sense of limited access to education, health care, housing, portable water and sanitation. The situation puts the loss of more than US\$50 billion a year in IFFs in better perspective.

II. DEFINING ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS

There is no clear consensus on a single definition of IFFs, since the word illicit can be understood to mean both illegal and legal, but legally or morally contentious and otherwise not fully legitimate (Fontana and Hearson, 2012). There are many reasons why finance flows out of African countries illicitly, usually in contravention of national or international rules. There are a variety of definitions of IFFs in the literature. Epstein (2005) defines IFFs as "capital taken abroad in a hidden form, perhaps because it is illegal, or perhaps because it goes against social norms, or perhaps because it might be vulnerable to economic or political threat". Other scholars have also summarised IFFs as money illegally earned, transferred or used (Reuter, 2012; Barker, 2005 and Kar, 2011). These flows of money are in violation of laws of their countries of origin, or during their movement or use, and are therefore considered illicit. This study emphasises the issue of illegality of such outflows across countries. A legal act in one country does not nullify the intent and purpose of such outflows of hiding money even if it was legitimately earned. The term 'illicit' is also a fair description of activities that while not strictly illegal in all cases, go

against established rules and norms, including avoiding legal obligations to pay tax (Cobham, 2014).

The term IFF underpins a different manifestation of the state-market relationship to that characterising the conventional work on capital flight. Khan and Blankenburg (2012) refer to IFFs as the portfolio choice. These follow standard mainstream neoclassical models of utility and profit maximisation while capital flight is explained as a portfolio diversification response by rational economic agents to higher foreign returns relative to domestic returns on assets. The emphasis on criminal, corrupt, and commercial activities of IFFs underlines a policy response that encourages a more active role for the State and that highlights the need for a better regulatory environment through enforcement of national and global standards of financial transparency and democratic accountability (Haken, 2011).

According to the OECD (2013), IFFs are cross-border capital transactions either concealing illegal activities or facilitating them. It argues that 'There are various definitions of illicit financial flows, but essentially they are generated by methods, practices and crimes aiming to transfer financial capital out of a country in contravention of national or international laws. In practice illicit financial flows range from something as simple as a private individual transfer into private accounts abroad without having paid taxes, to highly complex schemes involving criminal networks that set up multi-layered multi-jurisdictional structures to hide ownership.' (OECD, 2013).

The World Bank appears to give a broader definition than the one suggested by the OECD. The organisation explains the phenomenon of illicit financial flows as financial flows that have a direct or indirect negative impact on (long-term) economic growth in the country of origin (depending on the particular national development situation). This definition underscores the outcome of a particular activity. The breach of the law is not required to classify a particular action as illicit. Instead, the activity is categorised as illicit if it hampers economic growth (Blankenburg and Khan, 2008).

GFI (2013) defined illicit financial outflows as 'all unrecorded private financial outflows involving capital that is illegally earned, transferred or utilised, generally used by residents to accumulate foreign assets in contravention of applicable capital controls and regulatory frameworks'. The basic assumption in this definition is that the transfers in question take place via unregistered channels because their background or purpose is illegal. Similar to the definition proposed by the OECD, the GFI requires that a particular activity is illegal. The OECD and the GFI both limit the definition of IFFs to illegal actions. Those financial flows that are against the spirit of law or are just not criminalised in a particular country but as such are perceived as unacceptable are not covered (OECD, 2013).

The above definitions represent a major departure from the dominant notion of capital flight. Capital flight is understood as the movement of funds abroad in order to secure better returns, usually in response to an unfavourable business environment in the country of origin (Kant, 2002). Capital flight may be legal or illegal. However, IFFs present new conceptual conjecture that departs from capital flight both conceptually and in policy terms. The term IFFs reflects a more narrow definition that focuses unrecorded capital flows that derive from criminal, corrupt (bribery and theft by government officials) and commercial activities (Barker, 2005). The focus on hidden resources and their potential impact on development place the issue of capital flight firmly in the broader realm of international political economy which emphasises the role of governance at both origins as well as at the destinations. This stand in sharp contrast to the conventional models of capital flight, which tend to place the burden on developing countries rather than understanding the shared responsibility between developed and developing countries.

Income from illegal activities transferred across borders is considered as the first group of IFFs (Baker, 2005). The original sources of these IFFs can be both illegal (drug trafficking) and legal (legitimately generated funds can be transferred in an illicit way to another country for the purpose of reducing tax obligations in the country of origin). This group includes illegal activities such as money laundering, drug and human trafficking, smuggling, illegal trade with weapons, counterfeiting, corruption, bribery, customs fraud, or terrorist financing. These illegal activities may be practiced by individuals, corporations, governments or other entities. Cross-border financial flows associated with any of these illegal activities are considered IFFs (Ostfeld, 2013).

The GFI in its 2017 report established that IFFs from Africa are large and increasing. This finding is valid and is evident across the three main categories of IFFs: commercial, criminal, and corrupt activities. Empirical researches focusing mainly on the merchandise trade sector, found that IFFs from Africa had increased from about US\$20 billion in 2001 to US\$60 billion in 2010. The same conclusions were reached from a review of other related work undertaken by Global Financial Integrity (GFI), the African Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and several Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). Using a different methodology, GFI puts the trend growth of IFFs from Africa over 2002–2011 at 20.2 percent a year. Even those who question the methodologies used to estimate the outflows tend to agree that the problem of IFFs is serious and demands urgent action (GFI, 2017).

Existing work on IFFs has mainly examined discrepancies in recorded capital flows or discrepancies in recorded trade flows. In taking one of these

approaches, researchers have worked on the basis of gross figures or netted out illicit inflows into Africa. The motives of the researchers determined which approach was taken. The researchers intent on showing the direct economic effects of IFFs preferred to use the net approach, while others preferred to work on gross outflows because other researchers argued that there is no such thing as 'net crime' (Kar and Freitas, 2012).

The occurrence of IFFs is first and foremost a governance problem, since good citizenship is the foundation of good government. In as much as IFFs are driven by the desire to hide wealth and to evade taxes, perpetrators clearly do not respect the obligations of citizenship. It is well established in the literature that there is greater government accountability when the bulk of public sector resources derive from taxpayers, who almost always demand to know how their tax monies are being used (Barker, 2005). It is also a governance problem in the sense of weak institutions and inadequate regulatory environments. IFFs accordingly contribute to undermining state capacity. To achieve their purposes, the people and corporations behind IFFs often compromise state officials and institutions. If left unchecked, these activities lead to entrenched impunity and the institutionalisation of corruption (Manton and Daniel, 2012).

Given the well-known dependence of several African countries on significant amounts of ODA, the loss of resources through IFFs can only serve to deepen reliance on donors. Such dependence is apparent not only in terms of funds to support the social sector and state institutions, but also in terms of development ideas. It is an established fact that despite assertions of ownership, development policy very often reflects the perspectives of creditors or donors. Thus, when strapped for resources, African countries can often find themselves at the receiving end of externally imposed ideas that might not really be in their own perceived interests (Kant, 2002).

Another governance dimension of IFFs relates to the unequal burden of citizenship imposed on other sectors of society, both in terms of tax fairness and 'free-riding'. When large companies, particularly Multi National Corporations (MNCs), engage in base erosion and profit-shifting activities, the bulk of the tax burden as a result falls on small and medium-scale enterprises and individual taxpayers (GFI, 2008). This runs counter to the idea of progressive taxation, in which those who earn more income contribute a larger percentage of tax revenues. Just as pernicious to governance is the 'free-riding' that results when entities evade or avoid taxes where they undertake substantial economic activities and yet benefit from the physical and social infrastructure, most of which is still provided by the public sector in Africa (GFI, 2013).

The development consequences of IFFs are quite severe. When monies are illicitly transferred out of African countries, their economies do not benefit from the multiplier effects of the domestic use of such resources, whether for consumption or investment. Such lost opportunities impact negatively on growth and ultimately on job creation in Africa. Similarly, when profits are illicitly transferred out of African countries, reinvestment and the concomitant expansion by companies are not taking place in Africa (Kant, 2002).

Further, illicit financial outflows from Africa end in developed countries. Countries that are destinations for these outflows also have a role in preventing them and in helping Africa to repatriate illicit funds and prosecute perpetrators. Thus, even though these financial outflows present a problem to Africans, united global action is necessary to end them. Such united global action requires that agreement be reached on the steps to be taken to expedite the repatriation of the illicitly exported capital. This must include ensuring that the financial institutions that receive this capital do not benefit by being allowed to continue to house it during periods when it might be frozen, pending the completion of the agreed due processes prior to repatriation (Cobhan, 2012).

a) *The World Bank Residual and Trade Misinvoicing Models*

There are two main channels through which illicit capital, unrecorded in official statistics can leave a country. The World Bank Residual Model captures the first channel through which illicit capital leaves a country through its external accounts. The second type of illicit flows, generated through mispricing of trade transactions is captured by the Trade Misinvoicing model which uses International Monetary Fund (IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics (GFI, 2008). The World Bank Residual Model compares a country's source of funds with its recorded use of funds. The country's inflow of capital includes increases in net external indebtedness of the public sector and the net inflow of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The net external indebtedness is derived by calculating the change in the stock of external debt which was obtained from the World Bank's Global Development Finance database. Use of funds includes financing the current account deficit and additions to central bank reserves. Both these data series along with data on FDI were obtained from the IMF Balance of Payments database. According to the model, whenever a country's source of funds exceeds its recorded use of funds, the residual comprises illicit capital outflows. The trade misinvoicing model can also yield estimates that are negative, suggesting illicit inflows through export over invoicing and import under invoicing (GFI, 2008).

Estimates of IFFs can be based on the Gross Excluding Reversal (GER) method and the Traditional Net Method (TNM). In the TNM, gross capital outflows are reduced by gross capital inflows to derive a net position. The net positions are then added to the World Bank Residual Model estimates. In contrast under the GER method, only estimates of export under-invoicing and import over-invoicing are included in the illicit flows analysis, while inward illicit flows (export over-invoicing and import under-invoicing) are ignored. The rationale for the GER method is as follows:

- i. The netting of illicit inflows from outflows is not realistic in countries with a history of governance issues, political instability, and lack of prudent economic policies. As structural characteristics that derive IFFs are unlikely to swing back and forth, the GER method limits inward illicit flows to clear cases where flight capital returns following genuine and sustained economic reform. Since legitimate traders do not often use the trade misinvoicing mechanism to bring money into the country, the GER method is preferred rather than the TNM.
- ii. The traditional method equates all 'wrong signs as genuine reversals of illicit capital. This flies in the face of macro-economic reality. For instance, if substantial and sustained inflows of illicit capital (above recorded capital inflows) were in fact true then central bankers in developing countries should have been complaining of the impact on inflation as well as the tendency of such inflows to appreciate the real effective exchange rate. Instead inflation is mainly driven by well known factors affecting the monetary base while the domestic currencies of most developing countries have depreciated over time against most convertible currencies like the US dollar. Macro economic theory holds that in general a reversal of capital flight is only likely to occur when economic reforms and agents are convinced that the government has implemented lasting economic reforms and there are improvements in governance and or political stability.
- iii. The netting of inflows from outflows implies that a country somehow gains from illicit inflows which therefore need to be set off against what the country loses through illicit outflows. Illicit inflows captured by these models are also unrecorded and hence the government cannot tax them or use them for productive purposes.

Trade misinvoicing has long been recognised as a major conduit for IFFs. By overpricing imports and under pricing exports on customs documents, residents can illegally transfer money abroad. To estimate trade misinvoicing, a developing country's exports to the world are compared to what the world reports as having imported from that country, after adjusting for insurance

and freight. Additionally, a country's imports from the world are compared to what the world reports as having exported to that country. Discrepancies in partner country trade data, after adjusting for insurance and freight indicate misinvoicing. However, this method only captures illicit transfer of funds abroad through customs re-invoicing and the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics cannot capture mispricing that is conducted on the same customs invoice (Manton and Daniel, 2012).

III. THE NORMATIVE AND LEGAL ARGUMENTS OF IFFS

The normative and legal arguments have been advanced to define financial flows as illicit. The normative interpretation argues that financial flows are illicit because they hinder development and are regarded as illegitimate from the perspective of an existing consensus about the social good (Blankenburg and Khan, 2012). The legal argument focuses on IFFs as money that is 'earned, transferred or used' in contravention to a country's existing laws (Kar and Freitas, 2012).

Barker (2005) classified illicit money into three main forms, namely:

- i. The proceeds of theft, bribery and other forms of corruption by government officials;
- ii. The proceeds of criminal activities including drug trading, racketeering, counterfeiting, contraband, and terrorist financing; and
- iii. The proceeds of tax evasion and laundered commercial transactions.

Barker (2005) estimates that laundered commercial money through multinational companies constitute the largest component of IFFs, followed by proceeds from criminal activities, and lastly corruption. However, the proceeds of components of IFFs are so intricately connected that makes it virtually impossible to disentangle them into concrete unified units. The cross border nature of IFFs highlights the critical need for a better crosscutting analysis of IFFs as a phenomenon.

The UNODC World Drug Report (2012) estimates that drug trafficking generates between 20-25 percent of all income derived from organised crime and approximately half of the income from transnational organised crime. The trend in illicit drug market seems to be stable and changes in flows can mainly be observed below the surface. This indicates that the illicit drug market is resilient and illicit drug suppliers and users are quick to adapt to preventative measures (UNODC, 2012). Tracking the flows of illicit funds generated by drug trafficking and organised crime and analysing the magnitude and the extent to which these funds are laundered through the world's financial systems remain daunting. A 2009 study by UNODC on 'Transnational Trafficking in West Africa' noted that

much of the best information on contraband flows through the region comes from data sources outside the region.

UNODC (2011) estimated that about US\$1.6 trillion (equivalent to about 2.7 percent of global GDP) was available for money laundering activities across the globe. The largest income for transnational organised crime seems to come from illicit drugs, accounting for a fifth of all crime proceeds. It is estimated that the illicit flow of goods, guns, people and natural resources is approximately US\$650 billion. Illicit drug trafficking and counterfeiting are the two largest components of these criminal activities. The market for illicit drug trade is estimated to be worth US\$320 billion (50 percent) while the market for counterfeiting comprises US\$250 billion (39 percent) and other sources such as human trafficking and illicit oil trade comprise 5 percent and 2 percent of the total respectively (Haken, 2011).

IV. ACTORS IN ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS

There are different actors in the policy sphere of IFFs. These actors have different stakes, with some of them implicated as perpetrators while others are actively engaged in combating IFFs (Haken, 2012). These actors have also different capacities with regard to responding to the policy and regulatory requirements of IFFs and have different levels of information at their disposal. It is important to understand the respective roles, motives and incentives of these different actors, as well as the complex interrelationships between them. These actors include governments within and outside Africa, the private sector, CSOs, criminal networks and global actors such as international financial institutions. The actors are looked at in detail below (Kar, 2010).

a) *African Governments*

African governments have a political interest in IFFs because these flows impact their national development aspirations and encroach on state structures. Governments therefore have law enforcement and regulatory agencies whose duties include preventing IFFs. Among these agencies are the police, financial intelligence units, and anticorruption agencies, customs, and revenue services whose purpose are thwarted or hindered by IFFs (Barker, 2005). Most African governments have a strong interest in stemming IFFs, including through obtaining the cooperation, compliance, and commitment of other actors. They seek to stop IFFs in order to maximise tax revenues, keep investible resources within their countries, prevent state capture and impede criminal and corruption activities. Most African governments lack specialised agencies to deal with IFFs. They also lack various capacities in law and finance to tackle IFFs effectively, with unbalanced institutional capabilities in some countries. For example several African countries

have set up anticorruption agencies. Policy on IFFs is generally set by one more central government departments which may also play a coordinating role in the implementation of law (GFI, 2008).

b) *The Private Sector*

The private sector in Africa consists of large companies, small and medium-scale enterprises and the informal sector. The large companies are engaged in all economic sectors such as agriculture, mining, manufacturing and services. These include multinational corporations, international banks, international legal and accounting firms that operate in several African countries. In terms of the financial flows involved, it is the large companies that engage IFFs through abusive transfer pricing, trade misinvoicing, misinvoicing of services and intangibles and use of unequal contracts (Moore, 2012). They exploit the lack of information and capacity limitations of government agencies to engage in base erosion and profit shifting activities. Given their scale, IFFs will at some point pass through banks and the financial system. The international banks sometimes facilitate IFFs even when they know that the money is tainted, as became evident in several asset recovery cases. Even where banks have an obligation to file suspicious transactions reports, this requirement is often overlooked in some countries in transactions emanating from small, rural branches (Moore, 2012). In some cases banks sometimes knowingly establish infrastructure to facilitate IFFs moving to financial secrecy jurisdictions. As gatekeepers to the financial system, banks and other financial institutions are supposed to implement a wide range of measures to combat IFFs and are an essential source of information for the government.

c) *Civil Society Organisations (CSOs)*

CSOs have been actively fighting against IFFs. They have campaigned against IFFs from Africa and other parts of the world from the perspective of social justice and also because of their effects on development and governance. CSOs have used various means to draw attention to the negative consequences of IFFs, ranging from advocacy campaigns and naming and shaming perpetrators to undertaking research and proposing policy solutions. CSOs such as Action Aid International, Global Financial Integrity, Oxfam, Pan African Lawyers Union, Tax Justice Network and Transparency International have been actively fighting against IFFs. However, these CSOs face political pressure and need to be provided with the space and support that will enable them to continue their campaigns (Kar, 2011).

d) *Criminal Networks*

Criminal networks engage actively in laundering money from Africa, with the motive of hiding their activities, facilitating payments across their illegal supply

chains and concealing the resulting illicit wealth. Criminal networks by their very nature minimise contact with law enforcement agencies, tax, customs, and regulatory authorities (OECD, 2016). These networks include maritime piracy, narcotics, arms, human trafficking, and sophisticated people who run the operations, and related financial transactions. Illicit financial transactions are used to finance, and sponsor terrorist organisations such as Boko Haram of Nigeria. They also use part of their resources to capture state structures such as the police, tax and customs (Thoumi and Anzola, 2012).

V. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE GENERATION OF IFFS

There are a number of factors that influence the decision to send money out of the country for each of the sources. These factors include portfolio diversification, hiding assets from government, political stability and currency controls.

a) *Portfolio Diversification*

In most cases owners wish to reduce the riskiness of their portfolio by acquiring assets in other countries whose economic fortunes are only weakly correlated with those of their home country. Tax evaders seek to maximise return on investments. The failure of the State to provide a stable investment environment encourages exit of capital, legal or illegal. A stable investment environment is one that generates predictable exchange rates, interest rates, returns on investment, and tax rates which are all necessary for investor confidence. These factors are part of the general macro-economic management, and not specific policies directed at IFFs. If a country's macroeconomic condition deteriorates or if investment rules change in ways that reduce the attractiveness of the home country relative to others, IFFs will increase along with other outward capital flows (OECD, 2016).

b) *Hiding Assets from Government*

Funds held overseas are presumably more difficult for the domestic government to track and confiscate. There are more legal hurdles for the government to go through in establishing ownership of assets, and persuading a foreign country to return the illicit funds (Manton and Daniel, 2012; Chene, 2006). There are also other multiple factors that may affect the extent to which corrupt officials will seek to hide assets overseas, for example, transparency in the domestic country's financial system. It is easy to create domestic nominee bank accounts or shell corporations for real estate holdings. This will make foreign assets not attractive. Moreover, foreign assets can be harder to liquidate or access in an emergency compared to assets concealed at home. Opacity of the domestic

system of financial regulation may reduce incentives for sending funds out of the country. More competent law enforcement will also increase the incentive to move money out of a country. A country in which law enforcement is weak poses little threat of seizure of illegally gained assets. In 2009 Switzerland returned US\$93 million to Peru from the accounts of Vladimiro Montesinos, the *defacto* Chief of Intelligence and main Advisor to former Peruvian president Albert Fujimori. In 2004 the Philippines recovered US\$683 million from the Swiss accounts of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos, the former president and first lady of the Philippines. In both cases the money recovered would have been enough to fill at least 25 percent of the nation's poverty gaps in the same year (Kar, 2010).

c) *Political Stability*

In most African countries there have been successive predatory governments, kleptocratic regimes whose primary goal is the enrichment of senior government officials. Under such circumstances corrupt officials may seek to avoid confiscation of assets by a successor government. Political instability in the predatory state may mean that the next predator may seize all illegally generated assets from the previous predatory government (Moore, 2012).

d) *Currency Controls*

Restrictions on repatriation of corporate profits will increase the incentives for corporate profit shifting. The stricter the currency controls for individuals, the greater the incentive to violate them for purposes that might otherwise be regarded as legitimate (GFI, 2013). Such restrictions also make it difficult to move assets overseas legitimately and encourage illegal methods. Non African governments have a crucial role to play in stemming IFFs from the continent by ensuring that their jurisdictions are not used as conduits or destinations for IFFs. Some developed countries have taken a firm stance against some aspects of IFFs while others have put in place institutional mechanisms that encourage such flows and that can qualify them as financial secrecy jurisdictions. Apart from helping to establish a global norm against IFFs, non African governments have a key role to play in assisting African countries acquire the capacities to fight the scourge of IFFs (GFI, 2008).

VI. THE CASE OF THE PANAMA PAPERS

In 2016, 11.5 million confidential documents were leaked from a private legal firm based in Panama. The documents contained information on assets held in offshore companies in more than 40 countries by wealthy individuals, including public officials. Although holding assets in a tax haven is not illegal *per se*, the prevailing sentiments expressed in newspaper articles and the reaction from the public mainly took the form of

condemnation and criticism of a practice interpreted as powerful economic and political elites concealing taxable income from domestic fiscal authorities, with the assistance of the financial systems of many developed countries. After the leak of the documents, the top five European economies (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and United Kingdom) announced actions to improve information sharing in order to fight tax evasion and money laundering. Of these economies, United Kingdom plays a particularly important role in this respect because a number of its Overseas Territories and Crown Dependencies such as the British Virgin Islands and Jersey derive a substantial share of the GDP from providing financial non-resident depositor services. Recently all such offshore jurisdictions have joined this initiative and started to implement rising transparency standards. Panama has also recently taken steps to strengthen its tax transparency and financial integrity frameworks. Fundamental reforms that seemed imaginary just 10 years ago are now being considered as active proposals by powerful bodies such as the G-7 and G-20. These proposals include country by country reporting of corporate profits which facilitate detection of transfer pricing abuse and other instruments to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions and the creation of public lists of beneficial ownership to prevent concealment through shell corporations (OECD, 2016).

VII. AFRICA'S FINANCIAL ILLICIT FLOWS

Existing research shows that African countries have experienced massive outflows of illicit capital mainly to Western financial institutions. The continent has turned into a net creditor to the rest of the world (Ndikumana and Boyce, 2003; 2008). Other researchers such as Collier, Hoeffler and Pattilo (2001) indicate that many African investors seem to prefer foreign over domestic assets to the extent that the continent now has the highest share of private external assets among developing countries with serious ramifications for self-sustaining economic growth which allow countries to graduate from aid dependence.

A 2008 estimate by GFI and the ADB on illicit outflows suggest that Africa lost US\$1, 2-3 trillion on an inflation adjusted basis over the period 1980-2009. GFI also estimated that South Africa lost more than US\$100,7 billion during the period 2002-2011. South Africa is ranked number 13 in terms of illicit outflows among developing countries. At continental level, illicit financial outflows continue to deny Africa much needed capital for its economic and social development. Estimates presented by GFI (2008) indicated that Africa lost an astonishing US\$854 billion in cumulative capital flight over a period of 38 years from 1970 to 2008. This amount was enough to repay the continent's debt of around US\$250 billion and potentially leave US\$600 billion for poverty alleviation and economic growth.

Instead, cumulative illicit flows from the continent increased from about US\$57 billion during the period 1970 to 1980 to over US\$437 billion during the period 2000-2008 (Global Financial Integrity, 2008).

Table 1: Africa's Illicit Financial Flows from 1970-2008

Group	1970s	1980s	1990s	2000-2008	1970-2008
Africa	57,291	203,859	155,740	437,171	854,061
North Africa	19,161	72,020	59,813	78,742	229,737
Sub-Saharan	38,130	131,839	95,927	358,429	624,324
Horn of Africa	2,354	14,131	5,108	15,603	37,197
Great Lakes	6,925	16,079	4,978	10,285	38,267
Southern	5,894	20,581	31,447	116,826	174,751
Western and Central	22,956	81,047	54,394	215,712	374,109
Fuel Exporters	20,105	67,685	48,157	218,970	354,9155
Non-fuel exporters	7,867	26,517	22,375	23,342	80,102

Source: *Global Financial Integrity* (2008)

While the overwhelming bulk of the above losses in capital through illicit channels over the period 1970-2008 were from Sub-Saharan African countries, there are significant disparities in the regional pattern of illicit flows. For example, capital flight from Western and Central Africa, by far the dominant driver of illicit flows from the Sub-Saharan Africa region, is mainly driven by Nigeria which is also included in the economic group 'fuel exporters'. In fact, the proportion of illicit flows from West and Central African countries that are poor reporters of data and thereby underestimate their contributions to illicit flows. For example flows from the Horn of Africa are likely to be understated particularly in the earlier decades due to incomplete balance of payments and bilateral trade data from Eritrea, Somalia, and Sudan, which have been historically unstable, and prone to conflict. By the same token, civil strife for some periods in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda are reflected in incomplete and poor quality data which likely underestimate the volume of illicit transactions from the Great Lakes region. Hence, the long-term evolution of illicit flows from the different regions of Africa need to be interpreted with caution in light of such data deficiencies (OECD, 2016).

Some data on IFFs from developing countries are also provided by Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The most prominent come from the GFI. In its 2017 report from 2014, the GFI estimated that, between 2003 and 2012, developing countries lost about US\$6.6 trillion in illicit financial outflows. In the analysed period, these flows were estimated to increase at 9.4 per cent

per annum. Although a brief slowdown was recorded during the financial crisis, in 2010, the recorded trend was again growing and, in 2012, the illicit outflows were estimated to be US\$991.2 billion. In reference to Sub-Saharan countries, about US\$68.6 billion out flew just in 2012. It is noteworthy that countries from this region received \$39.9 billion in official development aid. These numbers prove that IFFs exceed even the help received from developed countries. According to data provided by the GFI, the largest scale of these illicit outflow activities are from Asia estimated at the level of \$473, 9 billion, followed by the Western Hemisphere and thirdly by Europe (GFI, 2016).

a) *The Zimbabwean Experience*

According to AFRODAD (2016), Zimbabwe is estimated to have lost US\$2.83 billion through IFFs during the period 2009-2013. This translates to an annual average loss of US\$570.75 million. These IFFs were mainly from mining, timber, fisheries and wildlife. Of the cumulative outflows 97.88 percent (US\$2.793 billion) was from the mining sector. IFFs in wildlife accounted for 0.53 percent (US\$15.07 million) while fisheries and timber accounted for 0.98 percent (US\$28.04 million) and 0.61 percent (US\$17.30 million) respectively. These estimates are based on the analysis of data sets for partner-country trade from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Data base (UNCOMTRADE) and Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).

In Zimbabwe IFFs are mainly underpinned by a number of factors such as legal and institutional lapse in the domestic fiscal and financial systems, leading to corruption and other forms of trade malpractices. Other key drivers of IFFs in the wildlife and fisheries sectors include demand and supply mismatches resulting from price controls, tax and exchange control loopholes. In the mining sector IFFs are mainly a result of corruption, dysfunctional regulations, weak enforcement of rules, tax evasion, and tax avoidance, and smuggling, lack of transparency and accountability in the collection and management of natural resources revenue. The government's limited information on the quantity and quality of geological deposits and shortcomings of the Mines and Minerals Act [Chapter 21:05] create room for rent seeking behaviour and under declarations of quantity and quality of minerals. Such a scenario aids the illicit outflows of money from the county.

b) *The Chinese Experience*

Wang (2008) provides an interesting assessment of illicit outflows from China through commercial activities. He suggests strong links between trade misinvoicing, transfer pricing, tax dodging and reducing interest rate costs. In the case of China, firms sell their goods at inflated prices to subsidiaries located in tax havens as a means to inflate production costs,

thereby minimising profits and ultimately their taxes. Wang (2008) further notes that given the deductibility of interest rate costs from their taxable incomes, firms can over-borrow at low costs and subsequently transfer assets overseas to meet 'debt service obligations'. What this effectively suggests is that firms utilise a variety of instruments comprising parallel loans, currency swaps, and quasi-money loans between subsidiaries and their joint venture partners to maximise their profits. Despite the compelling high levels of illicit flows from China, where it lost 10.2 percent of GDP or US\$ 109 billion in 1999 alone, it has maintained strong capital formation. Murphy (2007) suggests that this is due to the fact that China offers investors lower tax rates, favourable land use rights, convenient administrative support, and financial services, which collectively act as incentives for re-investment. Accordingly it is estimated that US\$25 billion of China's US\$ 100 billion of its illicit outflows return each year in the form of 'round tripping FDI'.

VIII. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS ON THE GOVERNANCE OF ILLICIT FINANCIAL FLOWS

There are various international instruments and agreements that aim to curtail the various forms of IFFs. These include: (i) United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime; (ii) United Nations Convention against Corruption; (iii) United Nations Model Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing Countries; (iv) Manual for the Negotiation of Bilateral Tax Treaties between Developed and Developing Countries; (v) Addis Ababa Action Agenda and the (vi) Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative.

The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) call on countries to significantly reduce illicit financial and arms flows by 2030 (SDG target 16.4); to substantially reduce corruption and bribery in all their forms (16.5); to develop effective, accountable and transparent institutions (16.6); to strengthen domestic resource mobilisation, including through international support to developing countries (17.1); and to enhance global macro-economic stability (17.13). The 2030 Agenda also calls on countries to enhance policy coherence for sustainable development (17.14); and to respect each countries policy space and leadership to establish and implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development (17.15).

There are also some initiatives by OECD which prepared a model bilateral agreement that requires transparency and exchange of tax information between the signing countries. There are also agreements between the EU and tax haven jurisdictions with regard to exchange of information on suspicious money transfers.

IX. CONCLUSIONS

It is arguably clear that the social and economic impact of IFFs is particularly severe for African countries. The transfer of proceeds from corruption, tax evasion, and other crimes drain resources from economies and thereby stifle development and enhancement of infrastructure. Illicit outflows strip resources that could be used to finance much-needed public services. The reduction in domestic expenditure and investment affects the everyday lives of people since it means fewer hospitals, schools, and other essential facilities. While IFFs occur in many countries around the world, their social and economic impact on Africa is far more severe given its smaller financial resources base and markets. IFFs impact adversely on both public and private domestic expenditure and investment. This implies fewer hospitals and schools, less roads and bridges and fewer power plants. Many of the activities which generate illicit funds are criminal. IFFs out of Africa are becoming of growing concern given the scale and negative impact of such flows on Africa's governance and development agenda.

When commenting on the scale of IFFs, it has to be underlined that proceeds of these activities are difficult to measure. Estimates vary greatly and are heavily debated. This is due to the secret nature of illicit finances. Nevertheless, it is worth analysing data provided by different bodies to help in understanding why this phenomenon deserves in-depth research and widespread recognition as they clearly indicate that IFFs are a global issue.

Good governance offers the solution to most drivers and enablers of illicit financial flows. It contributes significantly to combating IFFs at all levels. Good governance is at the centre of the effective, efficient, and transparent mobilisation and use of resources. To ensure the shift towards good governance and, in the aftermath, to sustainable economic development and poverty eradication, appropriate steps have to be undertaken. It requires strengthening national and international policy environments and regulatory frameworks and their coherence, harnessing the potential of science, technology and innovation, closing technology gaps, and scaling up capacity-building at all levels. A potential disabler of development efforts are IFFs that thrive on weak institutions, lack of cooperation between main stakeholders, and secrecy in legal framework.

The capacity to contain IFFs in Africa is limited and further complicated by the need to significantly improve cooperation between existing institutions. The effective fight against IFFs demands participation of different sets of actors. Among them, tax authorities, customs administrations, the police, financial intelligence units, and anti-corruption agencies play the

most significant role. However, in many African countries, there is a lack of cooperation between these institutions. Responsibilities are duplicated and information is very limited. As Grace Perez-Navarro, deputy director at the Organisation for Economic and Social Development (OECD) said, "Tax administrations are trapped by their national borders, and they need some way to overcome that." (Chrispin, 2015).

Illicit financial outflows from developing countries not only have damaging economic impact but also have a subversive effect on governance, level of crime, and tax revenues. Legal tools, even the best tailored, might not be effective if they are not understood and not applied in a consistent and effective manner (Cobham, 2014). Raising awareness of risks related to IFFs is of highest importance. The very first step should be to educate society on how such flows have pernicious effects on society, businesses, and governments. Corruption, money laundering, and other types of IFFs undermine the foundation of existing political, legal, and institutional systems. They have a spill over effect on all areas of social life. Their wider implication on political and civil society contributes to creation of a so-called vicious circle of IFFs (Moore, 2012).

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The Impact of Social Identities and Public Goods on Electoral Violence in Africa: Lessons for a Better Election Administration

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Abstract- The long period of colonial rule in Africa came to an end in the four decades between 1950 to 1990 and revolutionized the political landscape of the continent. Apart from the springing up of independent states in the continent these four decades witnessed the resurgence of nationalism, not against colonial rule but within the new states as ethnic and religious enclaves which were isolated during the colonial period saw the new state as one in which its objective within it is to gain political hegemony and control the resources for the benefit of its own enclave – a situation which has become the primary source of political competition and violence. Armed with this observation, this study examined the linkages between social identities (ethnicity and religious polarization) and public goods (dividend of political office) and electoral violence in these emergent African democracies drawing evidence from Nigeria and Kenya. The methodology adopted in the study is content analysis based on data obtained from the POLITY IV and State Failure Datasets. This data was augmented with information obtained from electoral bodies – the Independent National Electoral Commission and Independent Electoral and Boundary in Nigeria and Kenya respectively and some other secondary sources (books, periodicals etc).

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The Impact of Social Identities and Public Goods on Electoral Violence in Africa: Lessons for a Better Election Administration

Onuoha, Chijioke Basil ^α & Ufomba, Henry ^σ

Abstract- The long period of colonial rule in Africa came to an end in the four decades between 1950 to 1990 and revolutionized the political landscape of the continent. Apart from the springing up of independent states in the continent these four decades witnessed the resurgence of nationalism, not against colonial rule but within the new states as ethnic and religious enclaves which were isolated during the colonial period saw the new state as one in which its objective within it is to gain political hegemony and control the resources for the benefit of its own enclave – a situation which has become the primary source of political competition and violence. Armed with this observation, this study examined the linkages between social identities (ethnicity and religious polarization) and public goods (dividend of political office) and electoral violence in these emergent African democracies drawing evidence from Nigeria and Kenya. The methodology adopted in the study is content analysis based on data obtained from the POLITY IV and State Failure Datasets. This data was augmented with information obtained from electoral bodies – the Independent National Electoral Commission and Independent Electoral and Boundary in Nigeria and Kenya respectively and some other secondary sources (books, periodicals etc). Result of the data analysis revealed that there is a linkage between ethnicity, religious polarization, dividends of political office and electoral violence. Based on this the study made recommendations to alleviate this problem which includes the institutionalization of fiscal federalism and reorientation of the electorate on the prerequisite of peaceful elections.

Keywords: ethnicity, religious polarization, election, dividend of political office, electoral violence, democracy.

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990's Africa has been in the process to chart its path towards the institutionalization of sustainable democratic institutions as a prerequisite for accountability in governance and to lay the foundation for sustainable development. This is so because support for democratization has primarily been used as an instrument to achieve accountability, install broadly legitimate governments and help in mediating disputes among the diverse ethnic groups that were put together by colonial powers under one political umbrella (Dercon & Gutierrez-Romero, 2010: 2). This is necessary for the building of institutional frameworks which are

expected to improve economic performance and act also as a framework for dispute settlement to reduce the occurrence of political based violence (Soudriette & Pilon, 2007; Fearon & Laitin, 2003). But one characteristic of modern day democracy is election. Election is the process through which the people upon whose shoulders the burden of sovereignty rest directly or through their representative choose through a competitive and legitimate means holders of public office for a specified period of time. For there to be an election in a credible sense the following criteria must be observed:

- Election as a process must involve the people (populace) or representative (adults, electoral colleges, etc).
- Election must be competitive in that two or more candidates must be involved; each capable of winning.
- Election must be legitimate in that there must be a legal framework with which a winner must be declared and there must be rules governing the pre-election, election proper and post-election conducts of candidates and their supporters.

While this process has been the bedrock of the success of western democracies it has turned out to be the "root" of most "political evil" in Africa. To this, Dercon & Gutierrez-Romero (2010: 20) observed that:

With few exceptions the recent record of African elections has raised concerns that in ethnically divided societies. Competitive electoral processes could in fact be destabilizing by widening existing divisions and deepening divisions between winners and losers.

In a similar vein, Collier and Rohrer (2008) opined that elections in poor African countries have tended to significantly increase proneness to civil war and various manifestations of violence. This is so because according to previous studies the high stakes of the dividends of political offices makes politicians to resort to a variety of means including vote buying, intimidation, invoking of ethnic sentiments, electoral violence among others to ensure victory in the poll (Lindberg, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004; Schaffer, 2007; Vicente, 2007). Since there is no institutionalized framework to mediate over

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who gets what, how and why from the land and the resources controlled by the state, ethnic and religious enclaves therefore sees winning an election by a member of the group as a quest for survival of their social group because elections in Africa is a “zero-sum game” and a “winner-takes-all” process. Since the social group whose “son” holds political power also control and invariably owns the resources of the state (Bratton, 2008; De Smedt, 2009; Peters, 2009; Thomson, 2004). These observations generates therefore some over-arching questions that will shape the forms of this paper:

- i. Is there any linkage between the politicization of ethnic cleavages and electoral violence in Africa?
- ii. Do religious polarization increase the tendency of electoral violence occurring?
- iii. Do the dividends of political office increase the likelihood of electoral violence occurring?
- iv. Anchored around these questions our a-priori expectations are:

Hypothesis One: There is a significant relationship between the dividends of political office and electoral violence in Africa.

The logical behind this hypothesis is that most African states are rentier states that depends largely on the exploitation of natural resources and the junk of this resources is appropriated by holders of political office. This makes this office to become a means to an end - the accumulation of wealth by the individual occupying the office and patronages to members of his ethno-religious enclave. The attractiveness of political office due to the dividends that accrue from it makes election to occupy this position a do-or-die affair and infact a matter of life and death. This provides a fertile ground which breeds electoral violence. Since ethno-religious enclaves enjoys the benefit of its member occupying a political office we therefore assume that ethnicity and religious polarization may increase the tendency of electoral violence occurs. Hence we our a-priori expectation are:

Hypothesis Two: Ethnicity increases the likelihood of electoral violence in Africa.

Hypothesis Three: Religious polarization increases the tendency for violence occurring in an electoral process.

To validate these hypotheses, we shall analyze data drawn from two African countries that are noted for electoral violence and heterogeneous in terms of ethnic and religious composition, to this end Nigeria and Kenya will be used as cases.

Electoral Violence: A Conceptualization

Before discussing the state of the debate on the linkages between ethnicity and religious polarization in one hand and electoral violence, it is imperative here to first conceptualize election and electoral violence.

As a political concept, election is a set of activities leading to the selection of one or more persons

out of many to serve in positions of authority in a society (Nwachukwu & Uzodi, 2012). It is the institutional technology of democracy and has the potential to make government both more accountable and also legitimate (Collier 2007). To Sodaro (2001) the essence of this concept is that people should have the right to determine who governs them, hold them accountable for their actions and also impose legal limits to the government's authority by guaranteeing certain rights and freedom. But, although it's the engine room of a democratic setting, its experiment in Africa has been one of controversies since rather than serve as a means of political cohesion, election has gradually become synonymous with violence in the continent. Sharing this view, Segun (2013) opined that:

There seems to be a growing body of literature on the relationship between democracy and violent conflict... election an integral feature of democracy has equally generated much controversies.

Other studies have linked democracy with an increase in the risk of armed conflict in newly democratizing nations (Mansfield & Snyder 2007), it also heighten the probability of violent conflict in post-conflict societies (Jarstad 2008) and increases the risk of political violence in low income countries (Collier 2009). But of these controversies one that is most rampant is electoral violence. To Nwoli (2007) electoral violence refers to:

A form of organized acts or threats – physical, psychological and structural aimed at intimidating, harming (or) blackmailing a political stakeholder before, during and after an election with a view of determining, delaying or otherwise influencing an electoral process (Nwoli 2007:133).

In similar vein, Laakso (2007) sees electoral violence as:

An activity motivated by an attempt to affect the results of elections either by manipulating the electoral procedure and participation or by contesting the legitimacy of the results. It might involve voters and candidate's intimidation, killing, attacks against their property, forceful displacement, unlawful detentions and rioting (Laakso 2007: 227-228).

Ojo (2014) conceptualized electoral violence to mean:

Any act of violence perpetrated in the course of political activities, including pre, during and post-election periods, and may include any of the following acts: thuggery, use of force to disrupt political meetings or voting at polling stations, or use of dangerous weapons to intimidate voters and other electoral process, or to cause bodily harm or injury to any person connected with the electoral processes (Ojo 2014:4).

In his own definition, Anifowoshe (1982) sees electoral violence to involve:

The use or threat of physical act carried out by an individual or individuals within a political system against individual or individuals/ property with the intent to cause injury or death to persons and/or destruction of property; and whose objective, choice of target or victims, surrounding circumstances, implementation and affects political significance.

It is a form of anomia participation in the electoral process (Elaiwu 2006) done with the intent to 'delay, disrupt or derail a poll and determine the winners of competitive races for political office' (UNDP 2009:4). Fischer (2002) operationalized electoral violence to include:

Any random or organized act that seeks to determine, delay or otherwise influence an electoral process through threat, verbal intimidation, hate speech, discrimination, physical assault, forced 'protection', blackmail, destruction of property or assassination (Fischer 2002:18).

This has four main characteristics:

- It occurs in order to achieve a specific political objective which is to affect the various aspects of the electoral process and thus its outcomes (Hoglund 2009:415; FES 2001:1).
- It may occur in any stage of the electoral process. Three of these stages are the pre-election period, the Election Day and the post-election period (Sisk 2008; IPI 2010).
- It provides different actors. These include government forces (police and ministry), political parties (leaders, members and sympathizers) and non-state armed groups like militia, rebels and paramilitary (Laakso 2007; UNDP 2009).
- It includes such activities as threats, coercion, obstruction, abduction, detention, assault, torture, and murder as well as rioting, plundering and destroying properties, distracting campaign activities and destroying materials, disturbing public gathering and educational activities, shutting down offices, establishing 'no go' areas (Marco 2009; UNDP 2009).
- It is target specific. Usual target includes electorates, candidates, election officers, observers and media groups, electoral materials such as ballot boxes, campaign materials, registration data, polling results, electoral facilities such as voting and tallying stations and electoral events such as campaign meetings and demonstrations (Hoglund 2009; USAID 2010).

Evidence from existing studies show that electoral violence is a recurring phenomenon and has come to become almost an aspect of the electoral

process in Africa as the casting of ballot papers. In his study of 57 countries that held elections in 2001, Fischer (2002) observed that violence occurred in 14 of them which represent 24.5% of the poll data. This observation is consistent with Bekoe's later findings that showed that 19-25% of elections in Africa was marred by electoral violence, chief among the affected countries and those that have deep-rooted ethno-religious cleavages with Egypt, Nigeria, Liberia and Zimbabwe topping the list (Bekoe 2012; Sisk 2008; IDEA 2006). Several attempts have been made to explain this phenomenon. To some scholars electoral violence occurs because political office is considered a resource which must be fought for and acquired at all cost, which once acquired is a perpetual gate-way for the betterment of the individual consolidating and wielding it, his clan and those that comes from his ethno-religious cleavage. Sharing this opinion, Fortman (2000) posited that:

In the Asian context, political power is considered as a major social good because those who hold it, also have a significant control over a variety of other social goods.

So violence becomes meritable when elections pose a real probability for transforming the prevailing power configuration (Fortman 2000; EISA 2010). Further evidence shows that both ruling and opposition political parties use violence (Mehler 2007) while opposition groups also employ it to express their grievances over the electoral process or outcomes when they lose. The ruling elite are not exceptions to this, studies also indict them. It is suggested that the ruling elite take arbitrary and suppressive measures against their political opponents due to deep-seated fears of losing political power (Mehler 2007; Laakso 2007). In sum, this shows that competitive elections are prone to conflict and violence due to the stakes involved. The stakes of winning and losing a political office becomes extremely high within the contexts of patronage and identity politics (Sisk 2009) and when the benefits of office is put into consideration (Sisk 2008; Chandra 2007; Thompson & Kuntz 2006; IDEA 2009; Hoglund 2009).

Adolfo et al (2012) in their own study identified two root causes of electoral violence. The first is structural factors which are related to the underlying power structures prevalent in new and emerging democracies, such as informal patronage systems, poor governance, exclusionary politics, and the socio-economic uncertainties of losing political power in states where almost all power is concentrated at the centre. Secondly, factors related to the electoral process and the electoral process itself, such as failed or flawed elections, election fraud and weak or manipulated institutions and institutional rules governing the electoral process.

Taking a step further in the attempt to explain electoral violence in Africa, several studies have linked

electoral violence to ethnicity and religious polarization (Segun 2013; Thomson 2004; Osita 2007; Harris & Reilly 1998; Adebani 2004; Abbass 2008; Cervellati & Sunde 2011; Jega 2002; Onapajo 2012; Adeyemo 2009; Alemika 2001; Obakhedo 2011; Agbehonou 2014; Nwachukwu & Uzodi 2012). This is so because the resources of the state in Africa are concentrated at the centre and each ethnic group compete for its control which can only be achieved legitimately through the acquisition, consolidation and use of state power. As a result of this, political mobilization rather than to have an over-arching nationalistic tone is more of an ethno-religious mobilization. Drawing similar conclusion, Hoglund (2009), Seifer (2012) and Oyugi (2000) posited that existing ethno-religious cleavages within the society in Africa remains the most important factor which determine whether elections become peaceful or violent.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

This study examines the role of dividends of political office, ethnicity and religious polarization in the reoccurrence of electoral violence in Nigeria and Kenya. To this end, the relative deprivation theory is adopted as a framework of analysis because of its ability to encapsulate the competition for power and resources between ethnic and religious enclaves in Nigeria and Kenya and the resultant violence.

The relative deprivation theory uses the frustration-aggression model to explain why ethnic competition give rise to violence. The main tenet of this ubiquitous theory is that the potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity (Gurr 1970:24). The key to this postulation is 'deprivation' which has been identified as an essential source of discontent. To Dowse & Hughes (1986) 'deprivation' as used by relative theorists refers to:

The ideas that people have on the gap between what they believe they are entitled to and what they receive or believe they can attain, whether or not objective observers would consider the deprivation real or apparent (Dowse & Hughes 1986: 412).

To Esman (1994) the concept of relative deprivation refers to:

The gap between a group's current status and prospects and what appears to be reasonable and legitimate expectations, or to a gap between what comparable groups are believed to enjoy and what is available in material, cultural and political satisfactions to the collectivity and its members (Esman 1994:293).;

The theoretical prospects of this theory are derived from three assumptions:

- The resources in a given political scenario are limited. for example political office.

- One ethno-religious group's gain is a loss to the other. As Gurr (1971: 125) puts it "the benefit of one's group is an automatic loss for all others. Life is an inelastic pie".
- The frustration of being deprived access to state resources will prompt the losing ethno-religious enclave to be frustrated and then resort to aggression.

Developing these assumptions into a robust and encompassing theory, Ted Gurr in his seminal work "Why Men Rebel" conceptualized 'relative deprivation' as the:

Tension that develops from a discrepancy between the 'ought' and the 'is' of collective value satisfaction and this disposes men to violence (Gurr 1971:23).

He went further to explain that the discrepancies between what people want, their value expectations and what they actually gain is the driving force for political discontent and by extension electoral violence. To Dowse & Hughes (1986) relative deprivation is the degree to which the individual feels deprived and, as such is related to anger and aggression. This existence of frustration to Gurr (1971) always leads to some forms of violence. But deprivation on its own do not directly lead to violence. Rather it depends on the collective intensity of the level of deprivation. To this, Ted Gurr averred that:

The intensity of relative deprivation varies strongly in terms of the average degree of perceived discrepancy between value expectations and value capabilities... (violence therefore depends on) the severity of depression and inflation (Gurr 1971: 87).

Explaining this phenomenon further, Dowse & Hughes (1986) opined that:

Whether or not deprivation eventually culminates in violence depends on a number of factors, among them the intensity and scope of the deprivation. Most people at sometime experience deprivation of one sort or another but this rarely leads to collective violence. The deprivations then must be sufficiently intense and experienced by a sufficiently broad sector or a strategically located sector of the society in order to create a potential for civil violence. As a corollary, the intensity of the perceived deprivation is related to the intensity of the violence (Dowse & Hughes 1986: 412).

This deprivation originate from the social processes which create the gap between what people believe they are entitled to and what they receive (Dowse & Hughes 1986: 413).

When deprivation reaches a high level of intensity it give rise to problems known as societal insecurity. Societal insecurity occurs when states are "undermined" or destabilized by "their" societies,

becoming threatened or weakened in terms of social cohesion and identity. To Saleh (2013: 166) societal insecurity occurs when people within a certain geographically defined state assume that their identity is threatened. This perceived threat could be triggered and bolstered by a collective feeling of relative deprivation, be it social, economic, political or cultural. This also arose from a general sense of the failure of the state to meet people's value expectations which they believe they are rightfully entitled to which can eventually lead to disorientation amongst its members and discontentment on the part of the people towards the state (Saleh, 2013).

The employment of this theory as a framework of analysis in this study lays on the robustness of the theory to explain political violence arising from discontent in a heterogeneous state. It is a general principle that state resources are scarce and the political configuration of most African states makes it difficult to distribute these resources equitably among all ethnic groups due largely to the zero-sum nature of politics in these states. As a result the resources whether social, political or economic is not as Gurr (1970) said an "elastic pie" hence there is a sense of "do-or-die" in the competition for power during the electoral process. This gives a solid foundation for the study of electoral violence along ethno-religious lines.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Data for this study was obtained from secondary sources. The main source of information on electoral violence was the POLITY IV and State Failures Datasets. The POLITY IV dataset is a widely used data series in political science research (Gretchen & Tufis 2003) and contains annual information on the democratic condition and processes of all countries with a population greater than 500,000, and covers the period between 1800-2013. With population estimate at 150 million and 45 million respectively, both Nigeria and Kenya are adequately represented in the dataset. The State Failure dataset is compiled by the Political Instability Task Force and catalogues information on nearly 1,300 political, demographic, economic, social and environmental variables for all countries of the world from 1955 to 2015. The dataset includes major episodes of state failures which consist of five different kinds of internal political crisis-political (electoral) violence, revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes and genocides. The State Failure dataset is compiled from existing databases provided by the World Bank, United Nations, US Census Bureau and other organizations and independent scholars along with data developed specifically by the Political Instability Task Force.

The data obtained shall be augmented with information from other sources like the database of the

Independent National Electoral Commission (Nigeria) and Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission (Kenya). The reports from the agencies of the Nigerian and Kenya government, gazettes, reports of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), periodicals, journals, books, monographs, newspapers among others shall be adequately consulted. These will be compared to ensure consistency and correctness after which it shall be analyzed using qualitative and quantitative method of data analysis.

IV. DATA ANALYSIS

The empirical analysis of electoral violence in this study uses the Polity IV and State Failure datasets. The Polity IV datasets, compiled through the Polity IV project, covers all major, independent states with a total population of over 500,000 between the years of 1800 and 2009. Polity IV codes data concerning democratic and autocratic patterns of authority as well as regime changes. The State Failure dataset is compiled by the Political Instability Task Force and catalogues information on nearly 1,300 political, demographic, economic, social and environmental variables for all countries of the world from 1955 to 2002. The dataset includes major episodes of state failures which consist of five different kinds of internal political crisis – political (electoral) violence, revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes and genocides. The State Failure dataset is compiled from existing databases provided by the World Bank, United Nations, US Census Bureau and other organizations and independent scholars along with data developed specifically by the Political Instability Task Force. The State Failure dataset was chosen because of its robust nature including numerous variables and cases from which to draw from. The dataset is very large, comprehensive and have been used in several studies concerning violence arising from ethno-religious diversity.

This study gathered data from the ethnic violence section of the State Failure dataset and specifically the variables of religious diversity index. The unit of analysis for the State Failure dataset is a violent electoral year. A violent is coded separately for each electoral year the violence occurred including partial years in which the violence began or ended. For control variables, this study uses data concerning political tolerance and levels of democracy taken from the Polity IV datasets. Data concerning ethnic political mobilization is computed using data obtained from the electoral commissions of Nigeria and Kenya which are the Independent National Electoral Commission (Nigeria) and Independent Electoral and Boundary Commission (Kenya). The electoral violence variable is a discrete dichotomous variable. This variable is measured simply by noting if there was electoral violence in a given election year. Cases in which electoral violence

occurred are coded with a 1 and cases in which it did not occur is coded with a 0.

Multiple variables are used to control for various factors discussed in the large body of literature. The first two control variables are state/region and elite influence both derived from the Polity IV dataset. State/region is a discrete variable ranging from 1-5 where each category represents a distinct state or province. Elite influence is a continuous variable that measures the capacity of the elite class to mobilize the masses and rally support. This variable is measured in terms of votes they are able to win for their political parties in a defined state/region. The third control variable is political tolerance as measured in terms of the openness of the electoral process, freedom of the media, existence of credible opposition and impartial judiciary system. Political tolerance is an important aspect in measuring a nation-state's democratic progress and is used to control democratic factors discussed by earlier studies. The final control variable is democracy, as measured in the Polity IV dataset. Democracy is measured on an eleven-point scale (0-10), where 10 represents full democracy. The democracy indicator is based upon the four different coding of competitiveness of political participation, openness of executive recruitment, competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive.

The first independent variable, religious diversity, is measured using the religious diversity index and is a continuous variable. The religious diversity index is calculated from the seven largest religious groups present in the state. The index is the sum of the square population fractions and ranges from 0 to 1. Lower values indicate religious heterogeneity and high values indicate religious homogeneity (Bates et al., 2003). Religious diversity is derived from census data and measures are therefore available for only once every ten years. To replace missing values, the religious diversity variable was interpolated. For this study, the religious diversity variable is recoded to represent a non-linear relationship. We recorded the variable turning it into a dichotomous variable. Religious diversity scores lying between the 25th and 75th percentiles were coded as a 1. Religious diversity scores outside of this middle range were coded as 0. In recoding the variable to distinguish between moderate levels of religious diversity versus highly homogenous or heterogeneous levels, we were able to measure if a non-linear relationship exists between it and electoral violence as predicted in my second hypothesis. The second independent variable, ethnicity, is a simple continuous variable that uses a ratio measurement. The variable is coded by accounting for the number of ethnic groups per state/region we classify this as the 'ethnic density' of the state/region. The variable ranges from 0, meaning single ethnic group, and increasing depending on how many groups are recorded per state/region. In this

study, it was found that the highest number of ethnic groups in a state/region measured a 7. Data for this study was sourced from the report of the Willinks commission for Nigeria and Middleton's 'Encyclopedia of Africa South of the Sahara'. The third independent variable is elite influence within an ethnic enclave. The variable is a continuous variable that measures the level of support a political dynasty, cabal or godfather is able to get in a given state/region at a designated election year.

The main issues with the validity of this dataset concerns internal validity. Since the State Failure dataset contains information from census data, some variables were only coded once every ten years. By using census information, this dataset may be subject to history effects, or is affected by the passage of time. The measurements used in this study were chosen because of their simplicity and scope. The measures of ethnicity and religious polarization and electoral violence in a country were largely in agreement with previous literature. Furthermore, measures of state/region, political tolerance and democracy are consistent with previous studies. These measurements were used because they are straightforward and unlikely to vary from country to country making it appropriate for the comparative method adopted for this study. The only modification to the data was with the religious polarization variable. The measure was changed to be a squared value because this study looks at the possibility of a non-linear relationship, something that has not been addressed in previous literature.

V. DATA PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION

The correlation analysis found that religious polarization and electoral violence were not significantly related with an R-value of -0.0167, meaning low levels of correlation. However, this was expected because religious polarization was predicted to be a non-linear relationship and correlation tests only measure linear relationships. In terms of the ethnicity variable, the analysis presented an R-value of 0.2070 indicating a positive correlation between ethnicity and electoral violence. Analysis showed the dividends of political power to have a positive correlation with an R-value of 0.1753. The logistic regression analysis took into account all the variables including the non-linear squared religious polarization variable. As presented in Table 1, the logistic regression shows a log likelihood of -577.59 and a Wald Chi-square value of 52.27. Furthermore, the degrees of freedom was measured at seven and the significance was 0.00, indicating that models fits reasonably well. The final results showed that several variables were statistically significant including religious polarization, ethnicity and dividends of political power. The first variable found to be significant is elite influence. The B coefficient of 0.01 for

population shows a positive relationship in that as elite competition for control in an ethnic enclave increases the likelihood of electoral violence also increases. Political tolerance was also found to be significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level with a B coefficient of -0.12, meaning there is a negative relationship between political tolerance and electoral violence.

Dividends of political power were also found to be significant at the $p \leq 0.1$ level with a B coefficient of -0.55. Religious polarization was found to be statistically significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level with a B coefficient of 1.48. This indicates that there is a relationship between religious polarization and electoral violence in that moderate levels of religious diversity increase the likelihood of conflict occurring. The two contagion variables were also shown to be statistically significant. Ethnicity is significant at the $p \leq 0.01$ level with a B coefficient of 0.33. The number of refugees coming into a state is significant at the $p \leq 0.05$ level with a B coefficient of 0.07. Both indicate a positive relationship in that increases in the feeling of depravity of ethnic groups increase likelihood of electoral violence.

Table 1: Ethnicity, Religious Polarization and the Likelihood of Electoral Violence in Nigeria and Kenya using Logistic Regression 1960 – 2015

	Model 1
Independent Variables	
Religious diversity (dichotomous variable)	1.48*
	(0.73)
Ethnicity (dichotomous variable)	0.32**
	(0.11)
Dividends of political power	0.07*
	(0.03)
Control Variables	
Elite influence	0.01***
	(0.003)
Federalism	-0.55 ^
Political tolerance	(0.31)
	-0.12*
Democracy	-0.01
	(0.04)
Constant	
N	-5.42
	(1.09)
Log likelihood	-577.59
Wald X ²	52.27

* $P \leq 0.1$, ** $P \leq 0.05$, *** $P \leq 0.01$, **** $P \leq 0.0001$

The effects of the coefficients for the ethnicity, religious polarization and dividends of political power variables on electoral violence can be interpreted using a metric or logistic function where all the other variables are kept constant. The following metric was used:

$$P = e^{\mu 1} + e^{\mu}$$

Where P is the probability of an electoral violence occurring, e is a constant (2.718), and μ is the logit. When all the other variables are kept constant, the effects of the B coefficient of the ethnicity variable can be measured to see how the probability of an electoral violence occurring changes with each change in the ethnic groups involved in an election. Keeping all other variables at their mean, it was found that states/regions in Nigeria and Kenya with moderate levels of religious diversity are approximately 4.39 times more likely to experience an electoral violence than those with high levels of religious heterogeneity or homogeneity. This supports the hypothesis that stated that religious polarization has a non-linear relationship with electoral violence.

The first contagion variable of ethnicity was also significant, and its effect can be measured using the same metric. Again, keeping all other variables at their mean, it was found that states/regions in Nigeria and Kenya having at least three ethnic groups are approximately 9.80 times more likely to experience an electoral violence than those that are largely homogeneous. It is evident that the number of ethnic groups have a significant impact on the likelihood of electoral violence occurring.

The same metric is applied to the dividends of political power variable to determine what the likelihood of electoral violence would be for every increase pay-off in acquisition of political power. Keeping all other variables at their mean, it was found that states/regions with high resources and allocations are approximately 39.35 times more likely to experience an ethnic conflict than other states/regions in Nigeria and Kenya.

In general, the evidence shows that; first, religious polarization has a non-linear relationship with electoral violence. Analysis indicates that states/regions in both Nigeria and Kenya with moderate levels of religious diversity are more likely to experience electoral violence than those that are highly homogenous or heterogeneous. This supports the literature that religion is an important factor in any conflict in Africa, but goes against previous findings that religious polarization has a linear relationship with electoral violence. Second, the evidence shows that context and environment matter in terms of electoral violence. Analysis of data confirms that as the ethnic cleavages increases, there is an increased likelihood of electoral violence occurring. Furthermore, analysis also shows that an increase in the dividends of political power also increases the likelihood of electoral violence occurring. This data supports theories of electoral violence in Africa.

Taken into a broader perspective, this evidence adds to a larger knowledge base of electoral violence overall. Considering the prevalence of electoral violence in Africa, it is vital to know what causes this phenomenon. Knowing what causes these violence could possibly help in preventing electoral violence from

occurring in the future or help alleviate and settle it more efficiently.

VI. CONCLUSION

The study of the linkage between ethnicity, religious polarization and electoral violence in the emerging democracies in Africa is not a new issue in the study of the socio-political dynamics of the continent. This phenomenon exists because rather than integrate at the national level the various ethnic groups did not only maintain their distinct identity which they place ahead of their allegiance to the state but rather the 'fracturing' nature of these differences have been used as the basis of political mobilization by the elite during elections. This was inherited from the policy of colonial powers as an instrument to sustain control over their spheres of interest. This institutionalization of ethno-religious cleavages in the political landscape have dire consequences. Nwosu (1999) explained this timeously. He opined that:

It is not surprising that years after colonialization (these) states (in Africa) remained lowly integrated. This low level of integration has precipitated crises in many countries. The African continent for instance has witnessed many conflict situations leading to shooting wars, political and economic instability as well as social disequilibrium.

In a similar vein, Thomson (2004) noted that:

Ethnic diversity (has) led to increase civil strife. This perception is fostered both by some graphic individual scenes of interethnic violence, and by an aggregate correlation Africa has not only the highest ethnic diversity but also the highest incidence of civil war (Thomson, 2004: 20).

This conclusion has been given sufficient credence in the literature as most scholars admit that there exist linkages between ethnic diversity and religious polarization in one hand and electoral violence in Africa.

Adopting the framework of the relative deprivation and elite theories, this study agrees with these conclusions. The empirical evidence from its comparative analysis of the experiences of Nigeria and Kenya suggested the following:

- i. There exist a linkage between the politicization of ethnic cleavages and electoral violence in both Nigeria and Kenya.
- ii. There exist a linkage between religious polarization and electoral violence in both Nigeria and Kenya.
- iii. The dividend of political power is shown to be the main cause of ethno-religious competition in the electoral process of Nigeria and Kenya.
- iv. Ethnic cleavages and religious polarization have similar implication as causes of electoral violence in both Nigeria and Kenya.

Furthermore, it was discovered that the existence of ethno-religious differences is not a sufficient pre-condition for electoral violence rather it is the irreconcilable differences in the preference and interest of the elite across the ethnic cleavages that is fundamentally the essentially ingredient that translate ethno-religious competition during the electoral process into electoral violence.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

In the face of diversity, there is need to find a common ground to ensure the sustenance of the society. With this in mind, the following recommendations are made as important ingredients in a policy framework to check the impact of ethnicity and religious diversity on the electoral processes in general and electoral violence in particular in emerging African democracies like Nigeria and Kenya:

- i. There should be an institutionalization of fiscal federalism as the structure of government in heterogeneous states like Nigeria and Kenya. By lowering the 'pay-off' at the center ethnic and religious cleavages will find the 'center' unattractive and therefore limit the tendency for an all out 'do-or-die' competition for power at the center.
- ii. Electoral commission should discourage political parties from playing ethnic oriented politics and developing strongholds that is based on ethno-religious considerations.
- iii. The benefits accruable to political offices should be reduced to make them less attractive. This is because the large incentive attached to political offices makes office seekers to go extreme in their quest to acquire such office. This extremities includes political mobilization along ethno-religion lines, electoral violence etc.
- iv. The judiciary and the electoral commission should be made to be truly independent of the influence of the executive in order to operate efficiently without bias or prejudice.
- v. The National Orientation Agency, the mass media, stakeholders and other relevant agencies should embark on massive and sustained civic education of the citizenry on the negative consequences of electoral violence.
- vi. Electoral laws should be amended to give harsher punishment for people that perpetuate violence during or after elections.
- vii. Security agencies should be well equipped and trained to detect possible hotspots for electoral violence and avert it.

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Public Records and Management of Information Materials in Nigerian Local Government: A Transformative Route

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Abstract- In every organization, set objectives had always remained paramount for its growth and delivery of quality services. Local government like every other organization has its objectives to be achieved and these could only be delivered through effective and efficient utilization and management of information and records at its disposal. Worrisome is the continued existence of the institution of local government in Nigeria which has in the recent time attracted many criticisms due largely to serial poor performances in achieving quality service delivery to the people within its area of jurisdiction. However, it is against this established premise that the paper sets to appreciate available information materials and records management for quality service delivery in Nigerian local government system. Methodologically, the study adopts qualitative method and data were ostensibly generated through secondary sources of data collection and analyzed in content.

Keywords: local government, nigeria, records, registry, service delivery.

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Public Records and Management of Information Materials in Nigerian Local Government: A Transformative Route

Okafor, Nneka Ifeoma Abada ^α, Ifeanyichukwu Michael ^σ & Tr. Omeh, Paul Hezekiah ^ρ

Abstract- In every organization, set objectives had always remained paramount for its growth and delivery of quality services. Local government like every other organization has its objectives to be achieved and these could only be delivered through effective and efficient utilization and management of information and records at its disposal. Worrysome is the continued existence of the institution of local government in Nigeria which has in the recent time attracted many criticisms due largely to serial poor performances in achieving quality service delivery to the people within its area of jurisdiction. However, it is against this established premise that the paper sets to appreciate available information materials and records management for quality service delivery in Nigerian local government system. Methodologically, the study adopts qualitative method and data were ostensibly generated through secondary sources of data collection and analyzed in content. The findings of the study revealed that serial poor performances of local government in developmental state of Nigeria were because of poor culture, negligence, improper and ineffective documentation of information materials at the disposal of local government. However, the paper on its part strongly recommends a transformative route such as the utilization of e-governance and frequent auditing in the administration of local government.

Keywords: local government, nigeria, records, registry, service delivery.

1. INTRODUCTION

The position of local government as the third-tier level of governance has come to the level where it strives to deliver based on the constitutional provisions establishing it. These are the functions that local government has been charged to ensure smooth operation of the third-tier governance in country. In Nigeria, local government has been periscope based on the utilization and management of information materials made available at its disposal. The resultant seems that local government in Nigeria is still battling with treatment to cope with the trending information development sweeping the entire world. However, the development gap between the locales and the institution of local government has been a source of worry to many as government at the grass roots level has continued to fail

to take cognizance of the needs and deliver on its good promises.

Moreover, scholars and other relevant stakeholders had over time fingered at the inabilities of third tier level of governance to keep up-to-date records and vital information materials at its disposal. The development of information and the utilization of records resources have become a matter of strategies for ensuring transparency and accountability in the local government. In this regard, the institution of local government cannot be adequately being exempted from proper use of information materials for the achievement of maximum productivity. It is noted that information is the life wire of every organization and that; local government councils cannot claim to have been performing without adequate appreciation, utilization and management of information records within its jurisdiction.

Furthermore, over the decades, an unprecedented increase in the volume and complexity of records and information materials at the local government level is a direct result of the global increase in the socio-economic, scientific and technological innovations (Nweke, 2003:9). According to scholars like Abada, Okafor and Omeh (2018); Nweke (2003) and Abass (2003:10), they aver that records and information materials require proper management with a view to enhance productivity, efficiency and effectiveness in the discharge of essential functions of local government. However, it is based on this backdrop that the paper sets to appreciate the position of information management and records keeping for quality service delivery in the Nigerian local government.

a) *Managing Public Records and Information Materials for Service Delivery in the Local Government*

The local government councils in Nigeria had been pre-occupied with enormous activities and functions that require collection, filing, documentation and retrieval of information for up keep of the third-tier governance in Nigeria. The ability of local government councils in the transitional society of Nigeria to manage such gamut of information and organize them for records purposes makes local government registry the custodian and manager of information in the local government. Records are very significant and strategic

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for effective administration of local council. Accordingly, without good records keeping and availability of information materials, there cannot be an iota of accountability for maximum production and service delivery in the local council. It is pertinent to note that local government without proper records and information materials at its disposal is forced to take decision and make policies on ad hoc basis without the benefit of an institutional memory, (Abass, 2003:14).

The poor delivery by Nigerian local government on the dividends of its institutional provisions is largely hinged on its inactive nature toward records keeping and making them available when needed. Sadly, it is observed that the inability of local government in Nigeria to achieve set objectives and fundamental targets were because of poor and ineffective handling of records and management of rare information materials. According to Unuigbo (1990); Evborokhai (1990); and Alegbeleye (1988); they identified the factors that had proved intractable and stubborn towards achieving quality services by the local government. According to them, they observed that the absence of an enforcement of records, mismanagement programs, gross inefficiency, lack of continuity in policies, procedural deficiencies and leakages as huge causes of poor public service delivery by Nigerian local government.

Corroborating the above, Abdullahi; Abiola & Abduwahab (2016:53), Mnjama (1998), noted that one of the fundamental factored problems conscripting the operation of local government as it concerns public records and management of information materials in Nigeria are lack of financial resources, poor management and inappropriate staffing training and development. It is the misplacement of priorities, weak local government general order and lack of established new laws for regulating the conducts of the staff of the local government; then coupled with unavailability of records units and centers, shelves, logbooks and registers and manual method for creation, filing and retrieval of information that had forced the existence of local government in the contemporary global governance in to an illusion.

b) *Record Books and Information Materials Available in Nigerian Local Government*

The daily administration and routine practices in the local government cannot be really over-emphasized as they are expected therein to contain every actions and inactions of government. This is to say that local government is full of activities and functions and there is the need to record them in their appropriate registers for proper documentation and records purposes. However, to carry out local government obligations, Oni (2003:44), maintained that certain records have to be put in place for prudent maintenance by the officials of local government. As contained in the Financial Memorandum (FM), the chairman of the council who is

the chief executive officer shall face periodic checks in order to ensure full adherence to the Financial Control and Management Act of 1958.

In the management of records and information materials in the local government, there are about twenty-four vital record books and information materials at its disposal which must not only be made available, but must always be kept and maintained. These records books and information materials include but not limited to the following:

- The cash book: It is the book for recording detailed particulars of all money received and paid in the local government. All cash transactions and transaction with cheque must be made through the cash book. This is to acknowledge that the cash book is a book at the centre of administration of the local government financial management, because all transaction in the local government has high degree of affinity with it.
- Journal Book of Records: It is a book of original entries or prime entries which records transactions in chronological order; that is, the day to day recording of transaction arranged accordingly. It represents a complete summary of adjustments used to record financial transactions which do not involve the actual payment or receipt of cash.
- Daily and Monthly Abstracts of Revenue and Expenditure: These records comprise daily and monthly summaries of accruable and corresponding expenditures, prepared from payment, receipts and journal voucher.
- Bank Reconciliation Statement: According to Oni (2003:53), he acknowledged the fact that since accounting for money or cash occupies a strategic position in the overall accounting function, the efficient management thereof is ensured by the requirement in Financial Memoranda 19 – 25 that monthly bank reconciliation statement be prepared to ensure agreement between the banker and the cashier.
- Treasury Payment Voucher: A requirement of the Financial Memoranda that properly authorizes payment voucher prepared on one of the forms suitable for the type of payment in question (Oni, 2003; 50). Treasury payment voucher has four types of payments, general payment – LGT 45, salaries – LGT 46, pensions – LGT – 48, and travelling allowances - LGT 49. It is important that excessive cancellation of the voucher is bent to be rendered null and void and rejected by treasurer of the local government.
- Monthly Trial Balance: The monthly balance of the local government shows the debits and credits balances extracted from the ledger; to show the arithmetical accuracy of the ledger. In the preparation and compilation of the local government

trial balance, all the ledger accounts must be prepared and the balance extracted and entered in the trial balance; that is the totals of debits and credit must be equal. When there is a difference between the two sides, then some errors have occurred.

- Personal Emoluments Register: According to Ayeni (2003), and Oni (2003); they see Personal Emoluments Register (PER) as records containing information in respect of every employee of the local government by departments indicating details of head and sub-heads to which salary is chargeable, name of employee, post, grade level, salary, personal allowances and relevant authority for the employee is also entered therein together with the payment voucher number.
- Suspense Ledger: it is the accommodating ledger for all the various suspense accounts opened in the local government. Suspense account in the local government is account used to record the difference on a trial balance temporarily until the errors are detected and corrected. This will be shown on the assets side, if the difference is a debit and on the liabilities side, if it is a credit. When errors affect the trial balance, it must pass through the suspense account. The correction requires some account to be debited or credited and the corresponding debit or credits must be made in the suspense account. (Longe and Kazeem, 2012; Abada, Okafor & Omeh, 2017).

II. METHODOLOGY

The day to day execution of the activities of the government at the grass roots level has seems to have been neglected over time. This is due largely to poor records keeping and management of information materials at the disposal of the local council. Methodologically, the study adopted documentary method. Data for the study were gathered through secondary sources of data collection and data analyzed in content. The secondary sources of data collection include text books, journal articles, archival records, mimeograph etc.

III. FINDINGS

The findings of the study revealed that the institution of local government in Nigeria has adequately lacked the culture of managing information and other relevant documents made available at its disposal. Also, identified as gap is the poor state of information materials and documents, inability to distinguish records books for different records purpose among the staff of the local government. The needed human resource that would have helped as the custodian of records and information in the local government lacked the requisite

skills, training and development in the contemporary act of secretarial jobs.

IV. RESULTS

However, the results of the findings depict that local governments in Nigeria cannot by any means claim to have delivered or discharged the dividends of good governance to the locales. Also, inability of local government and staff to take proper account of records, and information materials hamper the execution and administration of auditing system in the local government for quality service delivery.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The study aimed at interrogating and appreciating the position of records keeping and management of information materials available at the disposal of the local government. These records, registers etc are necessities for efficient and effective administration of local councils in Nigeria. The paper discloses that the inability of local governments in Nigeria to achieve a clear template of governance at grass roots level were significant attributed to poor culture of information management of records keeping and total negligence by the staff due to insufficient knowledge and skills in the act of secretarial obligations. However, arising from the results of the findings; the paper sets to recommend the following practical and theoretical strategies for public policy by government and other relevant stake holders to reposition the system of local government to met demanding needs of the local populace.

- There should be a platform for e-governance at the local government level. This will enhance quality records keeping and retrieval of information as at when due. Vital informational materials for the local council should be stored online to avoid unwarranted disposal of essential materials.
- The practice of auditing at the third tier level of government shall not be ceased. This would help to appraise how well the local government has done in regard to information materials at its disposal
- The staff of the local government needs to resurrect from its grave of armature. Designs should made to foster human resource training and development. These would be of greater help to expose the staff in the contemporary act and skills of secretarial jobs and manipulation of computers for quality archival purposes.

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Analysis of Online Reactions to the Proscription of IPOB as Terrorist Organization

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Abstract- The classification of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) as a terrorist organisation has been condemned by those who felt government went overboard. The voice of these individuals and groups are so strident that it seemingly drowned the support accorded the proscription by those who believe that IPOB deserved to be so labelled. These divergent positions of newsmakers were examined since as opinion moulders they greatly influence the thinking of the populace towards any particular subject. The analysis was done within the framework of the democratic participant theory which posits that input of the people in public policy and decisions should matter. Using Google filters, the researcher x-rayed a sample of the reactions of newsmakers published online as news to answer four research questions, yielding among other things that government's designation of IPOB as terrorist organization was not popular, especially as a much more violent group – Fulani militia – recognized abroad as terrorist organization was not so classified locally. Therefore, this paper called on the authorities to be even handed when dealing with criminal groups irrespective of the part of Nigeria they come from, and advocates that government should give every segment of society a sense of belonging.

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Abstract- The classification of the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) as a terrorist organisation has been condemned by those who felt government went overboard. The voice of these individuals and groups are so strident that it seemingly drowned the support accorded the proscription by those who believe that IPOB deserved to be so labelled. These divergent positions of newsmakers were examined since as opinion moulders they greatly influence the thinking of the populace towards any particular subject. The analysis was done within the framework of the democratic participant theory which posits that input of the people in public policy and decisions should matter. Using Google filters, the researcher x-rayed a sample of the reactions of newsmakers published online as news to answer four research questions, yielding among other things that government's designation of IPOB as terrorist organization was not popular, especially as a much more violent group – Fulani militia – recognized abroad as terrorist organization was not so classified locally. Therefore, this paper called on the authorities to be even handed when dealing with criminal groups irrespective of the part of Nigeria they come from, and advocates that government should give every segment of society a sense of belonging.

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I. INTRODUCTION

The Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) was until its designation as a terrorist organization a self-determinist group led by Nnamdi Kanu. After spending about two years in prison over charges bordering on terrorism, treasonable felony and illegal possession of firearms among others, the IPOB leader regained freedom on April 28, 2017 after meeting stiff bail conditions. He was incarcerated by the Nigerian state alongside other IPOB members namely:

Onwudiwe Chidiebere, Benjamin Madubugwu and David Nwawuisi, but was granted bail on health ground. Kanu, who prior to his arrest was the Director of the pirate Radio Biafra station based in London, shot himself into prominence by feeding on the sentiment of 'marginalized' Igbos as by hurling relentless insults on the Nigerian establishment and political leaders mostly from the 'oppressor' regions. In his very abusive broadcasts, he referred to Nigeria as a "zoo". But while his activities in the United Kingdom gave him a measured popularity, Kanu was turned into a "hero" and

had a cult following as a result of his arrest upon return to Nigeria in 2015, and the refusal of the Nigerian government to release him in defiance of several court orders to that effect.

When eventually released from prison, the IPOB leader soon loomed larger than life to the extent that South-East and parts of the South-South was by his pronouncement shut down in commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the declaration of defunct Biafra republic. This was part of the grievance of the Coalition of Northern Youths, otherwise called Arewa youths, who weeks later issued a three-month ultimatum for the Igbo to be out of the North, asking northerners in the South-East to return home.

On September 15, 2017, the Nigerian military high-command launched Exercise Operation Python Dance II in the South-East. The operation, also tagged Exercise Egwu Eke II, witnessed clashes between soldiers and IPOB members particularly when the troops started its show of force prior to the commencement of the exercise on the streets of Umuahia, which is the homestead of the IPOB leader, Mazi Nnamdi Kanu.

While announcing the exercise at a press conference, the Army Chief of Training and Operations, Major-General David Ahmadu, said, "Exercise Ogbu (sic) eke II has become more expedient due to spate of assassinations, even in religious places, attacks on security personnel and theft of weapons, kidnapping, armed banditry, violent agitations by secessionist groups, among other crimes that have recently bedevilled the region".

The planned exercise did not go down well with the IPOB as its media and publicity secretary, Emma Powerful, latched on to the "violent agitations by secessionist groups" reason given by the military to claim that the federal authorities launched the python dance as smokescreen to assassinate its leader and other IPOB members. He further described the operation as "wickedly undemocratic silent Jihadi war unleashed on peaceful Biafran populations in order to complete the extermination of the Igbo race under the pretext of a military exercise in a peaceful civilian environment".

Going by the suspicion that greeted the exercise, Exercise Python Dance II ran into troubled waters as there were clashes between soldiers and IPOB members with unconfirmed reports of killings and dehumanization of the Biafra proponents. On

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September 10, 2017, soldiers were said to have made an attempt to invade Kanu's family home at Afaraukwulbeku located in the heart of the Abia capital city of Umuahia, but were stoutly resisted by IPOB members who formed a human shield around the compound.

Giving an account of what transpired, Nnamdi Kanu said,

I was sleeping this evening (Sunday) when suddenly I was woken up by the blaring of sirens. Initially, I thought it was the Commissioner of Police who lives in the neighbourhood that was returning home. But the blaring persisted and was followed by sporadic gunshots. They wanted to bulldoze their way into the palace but IPOB members formed a human shield and resisted them. They wanted to break the shield and fired at three persons and wounded others before leaving. Everybody including children were running away in confusion.

The situation in Abia state became so tense that the state governor, Okezie Ikpeazu, imposed a four-day curfew on Umuahia and Aba which were the flashpoints of agitations in the state. Kanu's claim was however refuted by the Army which explained in a statement by the Deputy Director, Public Relations, 14 Brigade Nigerian Army, Oyegoke Gbadamosi, thus:

It was a group of suspected IPOB militants that blocked the road against troops of 145 Battalion while on show of force along FMC-World Bank Road in Umuahia town, Abia State at about 6.00-6.30pm, today (yesterday). They insisted that the military vehicles would not pass and started pelting the soldiers with stones and broken bottles to the point of injuring an innocent female passerby and a soldier, Corporal Kolawole Mathew. The troops fired warning shots in the air and the hoodlums dispersed. No life was lost.

There were other clashes which reports say led to the death of four IPOB members with the group stating that the four dead bodies were just the ones recovered, alleging that the troops had made away with several bodies. Kanu's younger brother was quoted as saying that 15 IPOB members were taken away by the soldiers while his father's dog was also shot dead, apparently for challenging the troops it might have regarded as intruders.

Meanwhile, after allegedly raiding the home of Kanu and discovering a large cache of arms, the military designated the group as a terrorist association, this was before the Federal Government placed a stamp of authority on that declaration. The Defence Headquarters explained that the IPOB had metamorphosed into a "militant terrorist organisation" and that it reached this conclusion after professional analysis of recent developments in the South-east.

This position was contained in a statement by the Director of Defence Information, John Enenche, who advised parents, especially unsuspecting residents of the South-East and other Nigerians to guard their wards against joining IPOB.

The Independent People of Biafra (IPOB) group, which has posed to be a security challenge in the country, has been metamorphosing from one stage to the other. After due professional analysis and recent developments, it has become expedient to notify the general public that the claim by IPOB actors that the organization is non-violent is not true, hence the need to bring to public awareness, the true and current state of IPOB. (Ugwu 2017).

On September 20, the Acting Chief Judge of the Federal High Court, Justice Abdu Kafarati, issued an order proscribing IPOB following an ex parte application by the Attorney-General of the Federation and Minister of Justice, Mr. Abubakar Malami SAN. The gazetting of this order by the Federal Government finalized the proscription of IPOB as a terrorist organization.

II. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The classification of members of an organization or group as terrorists is one instance where the classifying authority needs the buy-in of the populace. This is because a major reason for proscribing a group is to ostracize and make the society perceived it as an enemy. Indeed, terrorism is one toga that automatically attracts ill-will to whichever organization is so identified.

Nigerians already have a fair idea of what a terrorist organization or group is. The activities of Boko Haram insurgents in the North-East have afforded Nigerians a classic definition of a terrorist organization. Hence, it would ordinarily take a lot of work to get Nigerians to see IPOB in the same light when the *modus operandi* of the Kanu-led group appears quite different from that of the Boko Haram sect and the Fulani militia ranked by the Global Terrorism Index (GTI) as the fourth deadliest in the world after Boko Haram, Isis, and al-Shabab.

In the circumstance, it may seem difficult for Nigerians nay the international community to agree with the labelling of IPOB as terrorist organization, particularly when the murderous Fulani herders which made it to the GTI, is not proscribed as terrorist organization by the same Federal Government. Yet, the people need to be carried along in the declaration of any organization as an enemy of state, so much so a terrorist organization. This is important so that the supposed terrorists who live among the civil populace will have no hiding place when federal troops come for them.

The role of civilians in asymmetric warfare cannot be overemphasized. This is why the nation's

armed forces usually embed soft approaches like medical outreaches and other community services in their operations as a way of getting the people to side with them against the enemy. Again, the aim of declaring IPOB a terrorist organization may stand defeated if the hunted group sees that the people are not in sync with its proscription. This can prompt the proscribed organization to dare the state and continue acting as if it is a legitimate group.

It is in the light of the above that this study seeks to ascertain the pulse of the people to the proscription of IPOB as a terrorist organization, through a textual analysis of reactions published as online contents.

a) *Study hypotheses*

1. The Nigerian government has reasons for classifying IPOB as a terrorist organization.
2. Online news content consumers think that IPOB members engaged in activities for which IPOB was declared a terrorist organization.
3. Online news content consumers believe that the reasons given by government for declaring IPOB as terrorist organization are weighty enough for the group to be so proscribed.
4. Online news content consumers see a similarity between operations of IPOB and those of known terrorist organisations like Boko Haram, Fulani herdsmen.

b) *Research Questions*

Based on the above-listed objectives, the following research questions were drawn:

1. What were the reasons given by the Nigerian government for the proscription of IPOB?
2. Do online news content consumers believe that IPOB members engaged in the activities for which IPOB was declared a terrorist organization?
3. Do online news content consumers think that the reasons given by government for declaring IPOB as terrorist organization are weighty enough for the group to be so proscribed?
4. Do online news content consumers see any similarity between operations of IPOB and those of known terrorist organisations like Boko Haram sect, Fulani herdsmen?

c) *Conceptual Clarification*

It is necessary at this juncture to properly define major terms in the topic of this study in order for their intended meanings not to be lost to interpretations. The terms to be clarified here are those whose meanings serve as a guide to understanding the context of this study. The terms are also operationalized into a framework that brings to the fore the intended meaning of the work to the reader. To this extent, the following terms are hereby explained: analysis, online reactions, classification, IPOB, terrorist organization.

Analysis refers to the unbundling and x-raying of a development or developments into its constituent parts for the purposing of deducing some hidden facts. In this context, it is online reactions that are to be unbundled for analysis.

Online reactions refer to the reported opinion of newsmakers which can be individuals or group published in online sites as news. These opinions however must be on the declaration of IPOB as terrorist organization.

Proscription is an order or decree prohibiting and forbidding something, as well as the exclusion of that thing from the society.

IPOB is an acronym which stands for the Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB). On its website – ipob.org – the group said it comprises, “the original inhabitants (sic) and owners of the Lands and Communities of Biafra and Biafraland spanning centuries of tradition and historical ancient cultural ties. They are presently located in the areas called South East, some parts of South South and Middle Belt of Nigeria”.

Terrorist organization is a group or sect that perpetrates acts of terrorism, which according to Alexander (2011) is “the use of violence against random civilian targets in order to intimidate or create generalized pervasive fear for the purpose of achieving political goals”. According to the U.S Department of Defense (2002), terrorism is “the calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological”.

d) *Literature Review*

Adesomoju (2017) writes that the proscription of IPOB is contained in Volume 104 of the Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette, adding that it warned that any person or group of persons who takes part “in any manner” in the activities of IPOB would be violating the provisions of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 as amended in 2013 and would be liable to be prosecuted. He reports that the notice read in part,

the activities of the Indigenous People of Biafra are declared to be terrorism and illegal in any part of Nigeria, especially in the South-East and South-South regions of Nigeria as proscribed, pursuant to Section 2 of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 (as amended). Consequently, the general public is hereby warned that any person or group of persons participating in any manner whatsoever in any form of activities involving or concerning the prosecution of the collective intentions or otherwise of the said groups will be violating the provisions of the Terrorism (Prevention) Act, 2011 (as amended) and liable to prosecution.

What led to this proscription of IPOB had already been trashed in the background of the study; the military set the ball rolling when it named the group a militant terrorist organization following clashes between members and troops exercising under the Operation Python Dance II. The declaration also came in response to reported discoveries made by soldiers at the home of NnamdiKanu, the IPOB leader. As far back as 1947, the League of Nations Convention defined terrorism as “all criminal acts directed against a State and intended or calculated to create a state of terror in the minds of particular persons or group of persons or the general public”.

A terrorist organization, was defined by Disa(2016, p.11), as “an illicit clandestine organization that generally consists of planners, trainers and actual bombers/killers”. Meanwhile, Chuka & Udumaga (2016) wrote that the aggravation of ethnic identity after Nigeria gained independence from Britain was as a result of the lopsided federal structure which eventually implicated on the violent ethno-political discontent prevalent during the post-colonial Nigeria. Contemporary ethnic tension and identity relation in Nigeria was worsened by the perception of some section of the society is that the military is serving the interest of the Hausa- Fulani major ethnic group since they dominate the military institution of Nigeria exercising hegemony over its major institutional structure of the security apparatus of the state (Fatai, 2012).

Writing that the military had been in power for 29years and that the Hausa-Fulani ethnic stock has, had more benefit from the federal power at the expense of other ethnic groups, Chuka & Udumaga (2016, p. 147) averred that, “The tactical alienation of the Ibo in the federal power on account of their suspicion after the Biafra attempt at secession by the federal government had continue to be a source of agitation on the part of the Ibo major ethnic group”. This possibly explains why NnamdiKanu, the leader of IPOB, was able to get a good number of people from the South-East to rally round him and his agenda.

Momodu (2017) reported that NnamdiKanu inspects a guard of honour formed by his Biafran Security Service and the Biafran National Guard in military uniform, hoisted the Biafran flag, flaunted a Biafran passport and a coat of arms, and even sought for funds at the World Igbo Congress in Los Angeles in the United States to buy arms to fight Nigeria in 2015 before his arrest. Claiming that Kanu had effectively created a sovereign state within a sovereign state, he wrote:

Out on bail, he (Kanu) upped the ante by declaring Aba as the spiritual capital of Biafra on August 27, 2017, where he stated inter alia: ‘Where we are is Biafraland. Aba is the spiritual capital of Biafraland. We started in Aba in 2015 at CKC. That day, heaven

authenticated our move that IPOB will restore Biafra and that’s what we have come to do. We died in Aba at National High School. They shot and killed us in other places in Biafraland and where they were protesting for my release. As our people rest in the grave, we’ll never rest until Biafra is restored. I don’t care what they say in Abuja. I don’t give a damn what they say in Lagos. I’m a Biafran and we are going to crumble the zoo.

The IPOB leader was said to have used to excite his followers everywhere he went using the following rhetoric: Some idiots who are not educated said that they’ll arrest me, and I ask them to come, I’m in Biafra. If any of them leaves Biafraland alive, know that this is not IPOB. Tell them what I said. Tell Buhari that I am in Aba and any person who comes to arrest Nnamdi Kanu in Biafraland will die here. I’ll never go on exile I assure you. Some people talk about restructuring, are we doing the restructuring of Nigeria now? Are we doing fiscal federalism? Are we doing devolution? What we want is Biafra! Forget all the nonsense they write about us. We are not slowing down and no man born of a woman can stop us...

Momodu (2017) continued that he watched the video of some women spreading their wrappers on the ground for Kanu to walk on, and of a man prostrating to kiss his feet, stressing that “Many men and women, both young and old showered praises on him and even worshipped him... There is another video of a man describing Kanu as god-like to him and that anything he commands him to do, he would gladly do”.

Not with standing this deification of their leader, Braithwaite (2017) pointed out that “IPOB is not particularly known for violence, at least not for murder, bombing and the extreme violence that is typical of terrorists (correct me if I am wrong)”. She suggested that the activities of the group pales into insignificance when compared with...

the Fulani Cattle Herdsmen, who have unleashed so much violence against innocent, defenceless rural communities in various parts of the country, senselessly and selfishly invading and destroying their farms and means of subsistence, so that their own cows can graze, killing and maiming people, raping their women, looting and carting away the little valuables that these rural people have struggled for.

Braithwaite (2017) noted that “while the military accused IPOB members of throwing stones (missiles!) at them, it was IPOB who accused the military of murdering some of its members and NnamdiKanu’s family dog!” and submitted that “Proscribing IPOB, is not a magic wand, that can be waved to make the frustrations and discontent that many Igbo people feel, vanish”. However, Mohammed (2017) insists that IPOB must be seen as a terrorist organization, as the group

breeds insecurity across Nigeria and uses their divisive and inciting rhetoric to jeopardize the very social fabric that binds the people of Nigeria. According to him,

IPOB's public announcements endanger Igbos that reside outside the South East. In claiming to speak for the Igbo, they falsely represent the group. But the public may sometimes miss this distinction. And whilst the government has taken all measures to soothe tensions, rumor still takes hold. This is a terrorist tactic we have seen through history across the world. IPOB intend to drive a wedge between the Igbo and the rest of Nigeria... The violence they have sown in the South East has the same intention. The attacks on police officers, army stations, local Hausa groups as well as the establishment of a national guard and secret service are all breeding uncertainty in the region.

A thesis by Lieutenant Harry R. Jackson of the United States Navy entitled 'Understanding Terrorism' and cited by Braithwaite (2017) identified five crucial components of terrorism thus: "an involvement of an act of violence, an audience, the creation of a mood of fear, innocent victims, and political goals or motives", and asserted that "They (Terrorists) endeavour to legitimise their activities in their own eyes, as it is to convince the public of their worthiness".

e) *Review of practical studies on the issue*

Shortly after IPOB was classified as a terrorist organization by the Nigerian government, one of the nation's newspapers, Nigerian Tribune carried out a survey on its Facebook page. The opinion poll yielded over 2000 comments and showed that criticisms against IPOB designation as a terror group and the deployment of soldiers to South-East on Operation Python Dance II were more than respondents cheering same moves by the authorities. An analysis of the comments however showed division along ethnic lines with most respondents from the northern part of the country supporting the actions taken by the military, contrary to the views expressed by respondents from the south.

Abdur-rahman (2013) in a study on 'Media and security in Nigeria' examined the role of mass media of communication in the coverage and reportage of security matters in particular and in informing, educating, enlightening and entertaining the populace on societal issues in general. It also interrogated the extent to which mass media practitioners adhere to the professional ethics of objectivity, impartiality and balancing while reporting security issues and recommended that the media should operate with the understanding that security is not just about the army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Customs, the Immigration but should include the country's socio-political cum economic systems, researches and all other activities that go with the normal civilian life.

A study on Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria: the challenges and lessons, conducted by Oladimeji, Olusegun&Oluwafisayo (2012) found out that the terror activities of the Boko Haram sect since 1999 have created a state of palpable fear in Nigeria and beyond, even as government was said to have adopted a helpless posture which was worrisome. The descriptive study found out that insurgency was a manifestation of frustrations arising from national political, religious and economic systems while the institutional mechanism adopted in managing the crisis proved defective.

Chuka & Udumaga (2016, p. 153) in a work entitled "Ethnic conflict in pluralist Nigeria: Entrenching participatory democracy", discovered from the review of literatures "that Nigeria as a nation is riddled with a lot of ethnic conflicts. These conflicts result because of the religion and cultural diversity amongst are people. Most authors opined that these conflicts result because of a feeling of marginalization by some ethnic groups. The authors argued that ethnic conflicts is prominent in Nigeria's political sphere because many citizens do not participate in the political process and policy formulation process of the country, so they appear to be left out on the scheme of things".

In a study titled, "The Politics of 'Hope' and 'Despair': Generational Dimensions to Igbo Nationalism in Post-Civil War Nigeria", Onuoha (2014, p. 22) found out that "there is a general perception that the Igbo are neither fully part of Nigeria nor are citizens of an alternative political and administrative arrangement". The study also revealed that,

A detailed reading of Nigeria's history since independence shows that virtually all ethnic groups in the country have a central ethnic organization committed to advancement of the collective interests and aspirations of each group. This provides the context within which the uneasy relations among Nigeria's 250 ethnic nationalities (or more) can be viewed. But the relations between the supposed 'mega ethnic-nationalities'- the Hausa Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the West and the Igbo in the East- have been central to the tri-polar power struggle in Nigeria's post-independence politics.

Identifying the Movement for the Actualization for the Sovereign State of Biafra, MASSOB, and the Ohanaeze Ndi Igbo as the two groups promoting contemporary Igbo nationalism, Onuoha (2014) stated that,

MASSOB believes it represents and defends Igbo culture and interest in a federation it perceives as structured against Igbo interest. This informs the movement's rejection of a state-led process, and explains why it latches on to ethnicity and a nationalist ideal to pursue the dream of a "New Biafra". On the other hand, Ohanaeze's conciliatory

stance with the state with emphasis on devolution of power from the centre to the periphery, true federalism, and equal access to resources and power, power shift to the east, and ultimately, an Igbo presidency is yet to yield any substantial outcome.

The above-explored studies are the closest literature this researcher could get as it pertains to the focus of this, which is on the proscription of IPOB as a terrorist organization. It therefore means that indicates that there exists a glaring gap in literature which this study hopes to fill.

f) *Theoretical Framework*

This work is anchored on the Democratic Participant Theory, also known as the democratization theory. It came about as an opposition to commercialization and monopoly of the means of disseminating information as well as the bureaucracy experienced in public service institutions at the time.

Aside placing greater importance on receivers' participation and full circular communication, the theory advocates that the press should be pluralistic, decentralized, bottom-up or horizontal and must have equality. Wogu (2008, p. 77) wrote that the Democratic Participant Theory believes that "people in a society should fully partake in information exchange, rather than remain just recipients of communication from mostly the government". The succinct manner this author described the theory shows its import in this study. From the Democratic Participant Theory, it can then be understood why communication from the government or its actions will not be overtly accepted by the citizens in a situation where that communication or action contradicts their belief or perception.

McBride et al (1981, p. 166) cited in Wogu (2008) pointed out that media democratization is a situation that guarantees the following:

- i. The individual becomes an active partner and not a mere object of communication – [media programmers need to plan with, not just for, the audience]
- ii. The variety of messages exchanged increase;
- iii. The extent and quality of social representation or participation in communication are augmented.

III. METHODOLOGY

To get the population for this study entitled 'An analysis of online reactions to the declaration of IPOB as terrorist organization', the headline – FG(Federal Government) declares IPOB terrorist organization – was by 1:22pm on February 2, 2018 searched on Google. This yielded 239,000 results. Using filters, the tool 'Country - Nigeria' was clicked on and the results came down to 223,000. When "News" was selected among the tools, the results reduced to 2,140. Not yet done,

'Past year' under 'Recent' was selected, and the outcome was 798 posts. This became the population of study.

But given that the opinion expressed in the 798 news stories on the proscription of IPOB will be too unwieldy to study, the researcher, in arriving at the sample size, was guided by the submission by Nwana (1981), cited in Okoro (2001, p. 69) thus: "if the population is a few hundreds, a 40% or more sample will do; if many hundreds, a 20% sample will do; if a few thousands, a 10% sample will do; and if several thousands, a 5% or less will do".

Considering that the population (798) is in many hundreds, 20 per cent of 798 was worked out, resulting approximately in 160 as the sample size. Thus, this researcher went on to analyze the opinion expressed in the first 160 news stories on the subject. The sample was then drawn on the basis of the first 160 reports that contain opinions of newsmakers regarding the classification of IPOB as a terrorist organisation.

IV. PRESENTATION AND DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS

While going through the first 160 published contents, it was discovered that 30 of the items were strictly news reports hence not fit to be used in answering some of the research questions as no opinion was expressed in them. These 30 items however came handy in answering some of the research questions and in the discussions of findings, hence cannot be said to be invalid. But for answering questions that is strictly on online reactions, the valid sample size becomes 130 published stories. However, all first 160 stories from the population of 798 published stories will feature in answering the four research questions of this study. The presentation of findings will be done both in sentence and through the use of tables and percentages.

Research question 1: What were the reasons given by the Nigerian government for the proscription of IPOB?

According to a statement issued by the Director of Defence Information, Mr. John Enenche, the military high command pronounced IPOB a militant terrorist organization for following reasons: formation of a Biafra Secret Service; formation of the Biafra National Guard; unauthorised blocking of public access roads; extortion of money from innocent civilians at illegal roadblocks; militant possession and use of weapons (stones, Molotov cocktails, machetes and broken bottles among others) on a military patrol on 10 September 2017; physical confrontation of troops by Nnamdi Kanu and other IPOB actors at a checkpoint on 11 September 2017 and also attempts to snatch their rifles; attacks by IPOB members, on a military checkpoint on 12 September 2017, at Isialangwa, where one IPOB actor attempted to snatch a female soldier's rifle.

On its part, the Nigerian government through the Minister of Information and Culture, Mr. Lai Mohammed said the IPOB was branded terrorist organization for: stockpiling weapons through funding from foreign countries, has lust for destruction, its leader, NnamdiKanu uses divisive and inciting rhetoric such as: "If they fail to give us Biafra, Somalia will look like a paradise compared to what will happen to that 'zoo' (Nigeria)." "I don't want peaceful actualisation of Biafra"; "We need guns and we need bullets"; "If they don't give us Biafra, they will die".

In another instance, Mohammed reiterated the position of the military thus: "All I know is that IPOB has engaged in terrorist activities, viz: clashing with the national army and attempting to seize rifles from soldiers, using weapons such as machetes, Molotov cocktails and sticks, and mounting roadblocks to extort money from people, among others". Similarly, presidential spokesperson, Mr. Garba Shehu, stated that IPOB members deserved to be labelled terrorists because they have carved out a territory to themselves and have shown the willingness to invade other neighbouring states.

But lawyers to the IPOB insist that members of the organisation are lawful and non-violent socio-ethnic pressure group, largely made up of Indigenous People of Igbo extraction, and of Igbo neighboring states of Biafra region/origin. When troops on Exercise Python Dance II stormed his neighborhood, NnamdiKanu did not use the inciting rhetoric referred to by Mohammed but told reporters "They (the military and the government) want to trigger war but we won't oblige them because we are committed to our non-violent philosophy".

Research question 2: Do online news content consumers believe that IPOB members engaged in the activities for which the group was declared a terrorist organization?

Table 1: Perception on IPOB deserving terrorism tag

	Frequency	Percentage
Those who believe...	72	55
Those who do not believe...	58	45
Total	130	100

This study found out that the ills which the authorities accused members of the IPOB of perpetrating resonated with more people whose reactions to the classification of IPOB as terrorist organization were reported in the news. For instance, three members of the House of Representatives, Aiyu Madaki, Sani Zorro and Mohammed Soba, issued a joint press statement where they talked about "the murderous activities" of the IPOB. Reacting to Senate President Bukola Saraki's rejection of the proscription of IPOB by the military, the three lawmakers wrote,

Is the senate president unaware of the more than 1,900 Internally Displaced Persons presently taking refuge at the Aba Central Mosque, the more than 800 IDPs now sheltering in the Aba central police station after the gruesome murder of its Divisional Police Officer and his men? Is the SP not aware of the killing fields Sabon Fili where innocent sellers of fruits were subjected to the gory, slow but painful deaths, or the killing of many and destruction of the property of Northerners at Oyibo, in Rivers State? What has he said about the premeditated murder of 9 other Nigerians of Northern extraction at Asaba, Delta State – all of which have been in circulation especially in the social media, in the last few days?

Also agreeing that IPOB engaged in activities for which it was labelled a terrorist organization, a group known as Coalition for the Defence of Nigeria's Sovereignty for the Defence of Nigeria's Sovereignty through its leader, Otunba Bolaji Alabi. accused NnamdiKanu of directing his members to kill Yoruba and saying the following: "No Igbo man should attend any Church where the pastor is a Yoruba man, they are criminals and fools"; "Any Igbo Person who attends any Church Pastored by a Yoruba Man is an Imbecile"; "Pastor Kumuyi should be stoned and dealt with thoroughly if he comes to Aba for his planned crusade"; "Nigeria should prepare for war, we are coming to annihilate you, my secret service is already studying the zoo and strategising".

The League of Patriotic Elder Statesmen in Nigeria were also in the news for seeing IPOB in the same light as the government with their leader, former Senate President, Ameh Ebuta, warning that "IPOB sect members, led by NnamdiKanu have embarked on bile and hate campaigns against other ethnicities in Nigeria, adopting inciting or indecorous language, and laced in distasteful violent acts, intent on provoking another civil war in Nigeria". But these and the 69 other online articles which cannot all be summarized here only attested that IPOB members were engaged in what the authorities accused them of, whether those actions are germane enough to warrant a terrorism tag would be ascertained in the next research question.

Research question 3: Do online news content consumers think that the reasons given by government for declaring IPOB as terrorist organization are weighty enough for the group to be so proscribed?

Table 2: Whether reasons given by government warrants proscription of IPOB

	Frequency	Percentage
Reasons qualify to make IPOB terrorist	63	48
Reasons don't qualify to make IPOB terrorists	67	52
Total	130	100

It came to the fore from this study that the declaration of IPOB as a terrorist organization is not as unpopular as people thought, that is judging from the slant of news articles published online. On this research question, only 52 per cent of the audience who are privileged to have their views reported online, believe that the reasons given by the authorities are not enough to classify IPOB as a terrorist organization. The remaining 48 per cent think otherwise. While it may be expected that answers to this research question go the way of the preceding one, this researcher found out that there were some newsmakers who believed that IPOB members actually engaged in the activities cited by the authorities but that those actions were not strong enough for the pro-Biafra agitators to be classified as terrorists. A Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Seyi Sowemimo SAN, was reported as saying: "I have some difficulty in classifying them as a terrorist organisation because you could also call this a political struggle, although it's not supposed to be an armed struggle. There is a tinge of criminal offence associated with it. Those that have committed offences and are members of IPOB should be charged to court under the appropriate law, but classifying the organisation as a terrorist one is not helpful."

There was also the condemnation of the manner which IPOB was declared a terrorist organization as the Senate President, Bukola Saraki said, "I wish to state that the announcement of the proscription of the group known as Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) by Governors of the South-east states and the categorization of the group as a 'terrorist organisation' by the Nigerian military are unconstitutional and does not follow due process. Our laws make clear provisions for taking such actions and without the due process being followed, such declaration cannot have effect".

Nonetheless, the answer to this research question validates the Facebook opinion survey by the Nigerian Tribune which showed that more users are against IPOB designation as a terror group and the deployment of soldiers to South-East on Operation Python Dance II than those who supported both actions. It bears pointing out that also among the 67 news articles captured above is a report on the Ooni of Ife, Adeyeye Ogunwusi who stated that members of the IPOB should not be seen as terrorists because they were only seeking justice and equity. He said, "There is something that is bothering them (IPOB members), that is making them to cry. We should not throw them away".

Research question 4: Is there any similarity between operations of IPOB and those of known terrorist organisations like Boko Haram sect, Fulani herdsmen?

Answer to this research question which flowed from the third indicated that 24 of the 67 published opinions, which had disagreed that the reasons given by

government for declaring IPOB as terrorist organization are weighty enough for the group to be so proscribed, (36%) went further to argue that the activities of IPOB is not in any way similar to those of known terrorist organization. On the flipside, only 10 of 63 published opinions of groups and individuals who think that the reasons given by government for declaring IPOB as terrorist organization are weighty enough for the group to be so proscribed, (16%) went further to link IPOB to other terrorist organisations. Few examples from both sides of the divide are presented below.

Writing on the murderous activities of Fulani herdsmen, Soyinka (2018) wrote, "I am not aware that IPOB came anywhere close to this homicidal propensity and will to dominance before it was declared a terrorist organization. The international community rightly refused to go along with such an absurdity". In an opinion piece, Fisayo Soyombo asked, "how on earth can IPOB members be terrorists when notorious killers, the herdsmen, have no such designation? We are talking about a group that was named in 2015 by the Global Terrorism Index as the fourth deadliest terror group in the world. Only Boko Haram, ISIS, and al-Shabab were deemed deadlier than this nomadic group of militants". Not yet done, the essayist said, "If IPOB members are terrorists, what do we say of militants in the delta, particularly the Niger Delta Avengers, who actually did terrorize Nigeria by freely bombing oil installations, consequently plummeting oil production capacity, which in turn lowered the country's crude oil earnings".

But there is the government and other shade of opinion that see IPOB in the same light as Boko Haram, and even explained why the separatists are worse than Fulani herdsmen. Presidential spokesman, Garba Shehu had this to say,

There is a difference between a criminal activity and a terrorist activity. Yes, some Fulani herdsmen are a criminal gang and they are being dealt with according to the law. But IPOB like Boko Haram has a territory they have carved out to themselves ...as a sovereign state of its own.... They have shown the willingness to invade other neighbouring states. They have raised concerns in neighbouring Kogi and Benue states. They have said they are interested in taking over Bayelsa and Rivers. That is exactly what Boko Haram has done. This is not acceptable to the law of the country.

Speaking in the same vein, a group, Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Transparency and Good Governance stated that Nnamdi Kanu-led IPOB had exhibited all the characteristics of a terrorists group to the extent that it had become the metaphor for describing the southern equivalent of Boko Haram led by Abubakar Shekau, adding that "Both men promised to deliver the heads of Nigerian Presidents to their declared enclaves; IPOB and Boko Haram adopted

flags other than the green-white-green; they formed cabinets; they radicalised youths, they called for attacks on Nigeria and Nigerians; and they both declared the state and its military as their enemy."

Thus, while opinions are sharply divided on this research question, contents which do not see IPOB as being in the same mould as known terrorist organisations are more in number.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The classification of IPOB as a terrorist organization had been long in coming. Indication that the government will take that action surfaced in November 8, 2016 when the Nigerian government re-arraigned Kanu, the National Coordinator of IPOB, Mr. Chidiebere Onwudiwe; an IPOB member, Benjamin Madubugwu; and a former Field Maintenance Engineer on secondment to the MTN, David Nwawuisi, before a Federal High Court in Abuja. They were prosecuted on 11 counts, comprising terrorism, treasonable felony, managing an unlawful society, publication of defamatory matter, illegal possession of firearms and improper importation of goods. However, the fact that the Judge dismissed charges contained in counts 3, 5, 7, 9, 10 and 11 which related to the management of unlawful organisation, intention to manufacture Improvised Explosive Devices planned to be used against some Nigerian security agents and alleged improper importation of a radio transmitter, indicated that the court did not see IPOB as terrorist organization as was widely reported after the ruling was delivered.

This goes to show how debatable the classification of IPOB as a terrorist organization can be, and this study has gone a great length to analyze the sides to this debate which were summed up in answers to the research questions posed in the study. But the proscription of IPOB came long after the ruling was delivered and was predicated on more recent developments as the reasons given by the authorities.

Based on the opinion of newsmakers published on online platforms as news and article, this researcher discovered that the proscription of IPOB did not resonate with the majority, even though newsmakers who supported IPOB's designation as terrorist organisation put up a strong showing to the extent of constituting 48 per cent. Meanwhile, a popular grouse of the opinion sampled is that IPOB was tagged terrorist when the far deadlier Fulani militia recognized internationally a terrorist group was not proscribed by the Nigerian government. But the Minister of Information, Lai Mohammed insists that IPOB is a terrorist organization like ETA in Spain, the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, and the PKK is in Turkey, all of whom are proscribed by the U.S. State Department.

VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

1. It emerged from this study that Nnamdi Kanu was able to galvanize a formerly nondescript group what it eventually became because he fed into the sentiment of the people who believe they were being marginalized by the government of the day. Therefore, it is recommended that government should carry about in manner that gives every segment of the society a sense of belonging. It should do this by not pandering to sectional interests and by being equitable in the distribution of public offices and resources.
2. Similarly, there is the need for all criminal groups to promptly and adequately dealt with by the security agencies. Excuses should not be made by the authorities for the murderous activities of some criminals from a section of the country while going full blast against those from other parts which seemingly does not control political party. When government and the authorities apply this double measure, they would find it difficult getting the public to back its offensive against criminal elements.
3. Groups which profess to be peaceful must eschew all acts that give them away as violent. They must not in the course of exercising their constitutionally-guaranteed rights spew hates and utterances that threaten the peace and stability of the country. While members of such group must not go out of the lines, its leaders must be extremely careful in what they say and do.
4. Elders and other leaders in the society must be alive to their responsibilities and not keep mum when youths and younger persons go out of line even in the course of venting their grievances. Parents have a duty to impress orderly conduct on their children and wards. For instance, elders who had experienced the pangs of civil war must never keep quiet when the drums of war are been sounded by those who never experienced it.
5. Government must never be quick to brand any section of its populace terrorists owing to the stigma that goes with such classification in the international arena. Developed countries are usually reluctant in issuing visas to nationals of countries where terrorists operate. Even when they grant visas to such people, they subject them to thorough checks and profiling before allowing the travelers in. Therefore, it does not pay the government or its citizens when an otherwise criminal group or recalcitrant persons are called terrorists.
6. There must be conscious efforts by government to instill the spirit of patriotism and nationalism in its populace so they would not have to refer to their country as a 'zoo' but rather own the country. The struggles of the nation's founding fathers must be

rehashed to citizens through the reintroduction of History as a subject in the educational curriculum. The National Orientation Agency must also do more to enlighten the populace on their rights and the limitations of same, including their civic duties.

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Development Crises and Peasant's Survival Mechanisms in the Niger Delta: The Effects of Illegal Oil Bunkering

By Rufus, Anthony

Niger Delta University

Abstract- Despite the fact that the Niger Delta region contributes a significant amount to the nation's GDP, its rural communities are still grossly underdeveloped and its inhabitants considered among the poorest in the country. With an official oil production figure of 2.4 million barrels per day, Nigeria ranks as Africa's biggest petro-state after South Africa; it ranks in billions of dollars in petroleum revenue. However, as noted by scholars, there is one indication that the nation may be producing more than the official figure while the rest is lost through the illegal activities and manipulations of criminal cartels who engage in oil theft. Using the queer ladder theory as a theoretical roadmap for the study, the research revealed those factors that have engendered the growing incidence of oil bunkering in the region. Based on the findings of the research, the research made recommendations which included that government should clean up the environment as a matter of urgency so that those that depend on it to survive can have a means of livelihood while also contributing to the nation's economy as the development crisis in the region has been linked to the production of crude..

Keywords: *development crises, peasants and oil bunkering.*

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Keywords: development crises, peasants and oil bunkering.

I. INTRODUCTION AND STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The Niger Delta region which is considered the mainstay of the nation's economy by scholars has been faced with several developmental challenges this is despite the fact that "oil and gas resources from the region accounts for over 90% of Nigerian export and foreign exchange earnings, and over 70% of total Nigerian revenue" (Ekuerhure, 2002). In a bid to tackle this anomaly, youths in the region picked up arms against the state, and as a result engaged in so many social vices which included but not limited to: kidnapping/hostage taking for ransom, killing of military personnel, illegal oil bunkering etc. The major reason why these vices were carried out as captured by Ugor was "In a frantic bid to gain attention from an indifferent global corporate world and an impervious local political class" (Ugor, 2013: 1).

With an official oil production figure of 2.4 million barrels per day, Nigeria ranks as Africa's biggest petro-state after South Africa; it ranks in billions of dollars in petroleum revenue. However, as noted by

scholars, there is one indication that the nation may be producing more than the official figure while the rest is lost through the illegal activities and manipulations of criminal cartels who engage in oil theft. (Victor, Offong and Sunday, 2016: 70). Akpan, Olusola, Odemwingie, and Okere collaborates the above assertion when they noted that "The upsurge of oil theft in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria in recent times is alarming. Presently, Nigeria is losing over 300,000 barrels of crude oil per day to oil theft, pipeline vandalism and related criminal vices in the country's oil sector" (Akpan 2013; Olusola, 2013; Odemwingie and Nda-Isaiah, 2013; Okere, 2013) in (Boris, 2013).

The above is interesting to note when one puts into consideration the fact that government security spending in the region has been on the rise as it has strengthened its pipeline security by equipping the Nigerian Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) with ammunition. The scenario leaves one to ponder why the government has not been able to tackle the incidence of oil theft, despite the increase in security. It is thus as a result of the above, that the research work has attempted to look at oil bunkering as a peasant survival mechanism as the Niger Delta economy transit from an agrarian economy to an oil-based economy.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The theoretical underpinning for this research endeavor is the QUEER LADDER THEORY. The theory was developed by Daniel Bell (1919- 2011). The main proposition of the theory is that "organized crime thrives in a context where the government's capacity to dictate and sanction abnormality and crime is poor, where public corruption is endemic and where legitimate livelihood opportunities are slim". (Nwoye, 2000; Lyman,2007). Thus, the *Queer Ladder Theory* has three assumptions:

1. Organized crime is an instrumental behavior/practice, it is a means to end.
2. It is an instrument of social climbing, fame, and socio-economic advancement.
3. It is a means to accumulate wealth and build power. (Mallory, 2007).

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III. CONCEPTUALIZATION /CLARIFICATION OF TERMS

a) *Development Crises*

The term development crisis cannot be understood in isolation of the term development. Thus, in order for us to conceptualize the term development crisis properly, we must, first of all, familiarize ourselves with the concept of development.

A delve into the available literature on development will reveal that there are different variations as to what scholars agree as to what constitutes development. In other words, there is no one single or encompassing definition of the term development. For example, while Chambers (1997) in hubcymru.org (nd) holds that Development is 'Good change', the question that readily comes to mind is; who decides what constitutes a 'good change'? It is in line with this semantic confusion that Seers argued that

The starting point in discussing the challenges we now face as to what constitutes the term of development is to brush aside the web of fantasy we have woven around 'development' and decide more precisely what we mean by it. (Sears, 1969)

It is in line with the above that Sears went further to define development in terms of what it seeks to achieve. Thus to him, "the purpose of development is to reduce poverty, inequality, and unemployment" (Sears, 1979). In other words; if a 'good change' does not bring about a reduction not just in poverty, but also in inequality and unemployment, then it cannot be regarded as development. Sen (1999), went a little further than Sears as to what constitutes development when he argued that

...development involves reducing deprivation or broadening choice. Deprivation represents a multidimensional view of poverty that includes hunger, illiteracy, illness and poor health, powerlessness, voicelessness, insecurity, humiliation, and a lack of access to basic infrastructure

While scholars seem not to be in agreement as to what constitutes development, they seem to agree that development connotes a degree of progress. Going by the above, development crises can be taken to mean a distortion in transitional phases in the development process. In the case of the Niger Delta, it can be taken to mean the distortion or total destabilization of the agricultural/ peasant-based economy into an oil-based economy.

b) *Peasant*

Just like every other concept in the social sciences, the term peasant is blessed with an abundance of definition, however, for the purpose of this study, the term would be taken to mean a smallholder or

agricultural laborer of low social status. They are small farmers, producing crops more for family consumption than for market exchange, using family labor throughout the farming season. Peasants live in villages and small towns. They are in face-to-face relations with neighboring farmers; they possess a diverse range of cultural and religious beliefs and practices; they fall within a diverse range of social networks and local organizations (kinship organizations, temples, labor-sharing networks) etc.

c) *Oil Bunkering*

While there are so many definitions of the concept of what constitute oil bunkering, the definition that is adopted by this study is the one given by Asuni (2009) according to him, "oil bunkering refers to oil taken from pipelines or flow stations, as well as extra crude oil added to legitimate cargo that is not accounted for".

d) *The effect of Oil Production on Agriculture: A case for oil Bunkering*

While oil production has brought a significant level of development to the Niger Delta region in particular and Nigeria at large, its effect on the host communities where it is derived is nothing but disastrous. Prior to the discovery of crude at Oloibiri in 1956, the people of the Niger Delta heavily depended on her environment (agriculture) for survival as most of its inhabitants especially the rural dwellers are fishermen and farmers. But with the discovery of crude and its subsequent production in commercial quantity, its effect on the environment made nonsense of agriculture production as constant oil spillage affected the fertility of the soil and destroyed aquatic life. The above assertion is supported by the report made by UNDP when they revealed that, "more than 60 percent of the people in the region depend on the natural environment for their livelihood. For many, the environmental resource base, which they use for agriculture, fishing and the collection of forest products, is their principal source of food. Pollution and environmental damage, therefore, pose significant risks to human rights" (UNDP. 2010)

Oil spills on land as analyzed by Akpomuvie (2011) "destroy crops and damage the quality and productivity of soil that communities use for farming. Oil in water damages fisheries and contaminates water that people use for drinking and other domestic purposes. Environmental pollution from oil spills has been identified as the major cause of poverty in the Niger Delta". The table below shows the alarming rate at which oil is being spilled in the region.

Table 1: Oil Spillage volume and causes from 2005 to 2010 in the niger delta region of nigeria


Year	No. of spills	Vol. of spills / barrels	Major causes
2005	180	10,000	Sabotage - 95%
2006	170	20,000	Sabotage and operational 50% each
2007	250	30,000	Operational 70% sabotage 30%
2008	170	100,000	Operational and sabotage 50% each.
2009	150	110,000	Sabotage 90% and operational 10%
2010	190	28,000	Sabotage 80% and operational 20%.

Source: Amnesty International (2011)

Consequently, from the above, we can draw a linkage between oil production and poverty in the Niger Delta region. Having said this, it is important to note that with the destruction of their source of livelihood, the people are left with little or no choice than to engage in criminal behavior to survive. Thus, it could be argued that the sabotage of oil installations in the region for oil bunkering is as a result of the economic hardship brought on the people by oil production itself.

IV. THE DIALECTICS OF THE DEVELOPMENT CRISES

It is however worthy of note that the development crises in the Niger Delta are dialectical in nature. This is because while the aborigines (Niger Deltans) quarry the attitude of the oil multinationals over the destruction of their environment which is their source of survival and the government over neglect, they also destroy and terrorize the environment in form of oil bunkering and destruction of oil facilities. This makes the issues even more complicated to think of and which of course requires more of government's attention. It in this light the paper sees *Development Crises* as the critical turning point in a society where there is a decline, reversal of the developmental process which results from the stagnation of the productive forces due to the contradictions in resource production and distribution. It also involves a crucial point at which the path of development is distorted, truncated or violated, making it impossible for it to continue on the previous development path. Gunder Frank (cited in Thomas and Johnnie, 2008:1017) captured this point when he noted that; "the world system has experienced crises throughout history...a period in which the previous expansion could not continue on the basis".



V. DIALECTICAL POVERTY CYCLE IN THE NIGER DELTA

The above figure captures the grim realities of poverty cycle in the Niger Delta. First, the peasant base agrarian economy was dash/invaded and penetrated by the exploitative capitalist system through trade and the multinational corporation. The activities of the MNOCs degraded the environment that negatively impacted the peasant economy which led to poverty and frustration/aggression on the part of the people. This state of affairs further led to militancy, vandalism and oil bunkering as survival mechanism. The Government having a desire for uninterrupted oil extraction had to apply repressive policies and later the distorted amnesty program to sustain the oil exploration. This creates a character of idleness among the youths who are paid for doing nothing. Predictably, the ending of the amnesty program may result in despair which may lead to a revived/renewed dimension of militancy. This pictures a clear cycle of poverty and crime. Only man-centered development, building sustainable infrastructure, massive environmental cleanup, robust educational programs and peacebuilding/education can break the cycle.

Ibaba S. (2005) captured the above realities when he highlighted seven features of a society that is faced with development crises. These include high and rising level of unemployment and poverty, economic and material deprivation, distortions in the societies engine of growth and development, declining economic growth, the collapse of local economies, the absence or collapse of social infrastructure, disillusionment and social tension. These crises are exemplified in the Niger Delta in the continued prevalence of poverty in the region in the face of opulence from oil segmental profligacy by oil operators and government functionaries; the apparent decay, collapse and or absence of social infrastructure in the area, absence or gross lack of health facilities, inaccessible and non-affordable educational facilities, complications in gender issues, exclusion from global reach, the siege of crime, violence and general insecurity in the area, and the obvious threat to the state and government (Thomas and Johnnie, 2008).

Oil theft, also known as illegal oil bunkering, is the act of hacking into pipelines to steal crude which is later refined or sold abroad (Ugwuanyi, 2013). Asuni (2009) refers to oil theft as oil taken from pipelines or

flow stations, as well as extra crude oil added to legitimate cargo that is not accounted for. The act of oil bunkering is a common behavior in the Niger Delta region as most of her youths (which form the bulk of the unemployed population) see it as a survival mechanism.



Figure 1: Showing transportation of illegal crude, Figure 2: Showing the production of illegal crude

While it is assumed that the incidence of oil bunkering is carried out by a cluster of unemployed youths as a mechanism for survival, the reverse might be the case as noted by Ikelegbe (2005) who revealed that:

"There is a large scale illegal local and international trading on crude oil. This has grown from a few amateurs in the 1980s who utilized crude methods to extract crude from pipelines to a very sophisticated industry which uses advanced technologies to tap crude and sophisticated communications equipment to navigate through the maze of hundreds of creeks, rivers, and rivulets. The oil theft syndicates have also graduated from boats and barges to ships and large oil tankers in the high seas. The stealing and smuggling of crude have become very extensive and large scale since the late 1990s".

As revealed above, illegal oil bunkering—long prevalent in the delta—has become a sophisticated

operation that no longer requires the cooperation of oil company staff to operate equipment at wellheads or allow access—though there are still reports that they are involved. The bunker's tap directly into pipelines away from oil company facilities and connect from the pipes to barges that are hidden in small creeks with mangrove forest cover. Frequently, both in the riverine areas and on dry land, the police and military are involved in the process or are paid off to take no action against those tapping into pipelines (Human Right Watch, 2003). Illegal bunkering on its own is bad business, capable of further undermining the legitimate economy when organizations like the NNPC, banks, major and independent marketers are involved in the shadow economy. For instance, it was reported that three Nigerian banks allegedly funded MT African Pride bunkering activities to the tune of \$ 15 million (Daily Champion, 2004) in Onouha (2013).

The above shows the level of sophistication that the illegal bunkering industry has grown into. This no doubt has caused the government billions of petrodollar as the government attempts to checkmate the menace of illegal oil bunkering through heavy and improve spending on security in the region. Human Right Watch (2003) revealed the monumental loss suffered by the government as a result of illegal of bunkering when they revealed that "The loss to the Nigerian government from illegal oil bunkering amounts to figures in the order of U.S.\$750 million to \$1.5 billion annually at oil prices between nineteen to thirty dollars a barrel, assuming bunkering at around 150,000 bpd (close to 55 million barrels a year); or \$3.5 to \$6.2 billion annually, if the figures are as high as 250 million barrels stolen each year. Former Governor of Delta state Ibori has stated the amount lost is around \$3.5 billion a year" (HRW, 2003).

VI. THE COST AND CAUSES OF ILLEGAL OIL BUNKERING

There is no doubt that sabotage, vandalism of oil infrastructure and thefts of oil are serious problems in the Niger Delta, although the scale of the problem is unclear. Sabotage ranges from vandalism by community members to theft of oil and deliberate attack by criminal groups. Some people damage pipes while trying to steal small quantities of oil for sale at local markets or for personal use. Others damage pipes and installations to extort compensation payments or clean-up contracts from companies (Mba, 2013).

Illegal oil bunkering has cost the government billions of petrodollar no doubt, but it has also cost the lives of some of those who engage in it. According to a report released by the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company (Shell), "Theft of crude oil on the pipeline network was 25,000 barrels of oil per day (bbl/d) in 2015, which is less than the 37,000 bbl/d in 2014. The number of

sabotage-related spills declined to 93 incidents compared with 139 in 2014. In 2015, the decrease in theft and spills was also in part due to divestments in the Niger Delta. However, theft and sabotage are still the cause of 85% of spills from SPDC JV pipelines,"

The financial implication of this to the country's economy is enormous as illegal oil bunkering coupled with the growing activities of militants group has ensured that Nigeria no longer occupies its position as the largest crude producer in Africa which has been taken over by Angola. As revealed by Dalby, (2014).

...the Nigerian economy is in a precarious situation. She is facing an economic emergency unprecedented among the oil producers of the world and something urgent needs to be done to reverse the ugly trend. For instance, Nigeria has been tagged the most country plagued by oil theft among her contemporaries of Indonesia, Russia, Iraq, and Mexico. Statistics of oil theft among these major oil-producing countries shows that Nigeria is losing as much as 400,000 barrels of oil per day which equates to losses of US\$1.7-billion a month.

It is casually assumed that the success recorded by oil bunkerers in Nigeria as compared to other oil-producing countries is as a result of the level of development in the Niger Delta region which has made it difficult for security forces to engage those involved in this unwholesome activity as the creeks have proven to be a difficult terrain for security forces to navigate.

Boris (2015) highlighted some of the factors that are responsible for illegal oil bunkering to include: (a) poverty; (b) ignorance; (c) greed; (d) lack of respect for national economic survival; (e) get rich syndrome; (f) lack of gainful employment ; (g) exploiting the loopholes in the criminal justice system to circumvent the law ; (h) evolving culture of impunity from the wrong perception that some people are above the law; (i) weak institutional structure to checkmate criminals; (j) malice; and (k) bad governance (corruption, incompetency).

VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusively, it is important to note that while the oil industry has brought a significant amount of development to the Niger Delta region, it has also made the poorest of the poor in the region poorer by destroying wide and aquatic life in which the rural communities depend on to survive. The consequence of this has resulted in a developmental crisis in the region which has pushed so many of her youths to become unemployed and has thus forced them into illegal oil bunkering. In turn, the government has suffered a monumental loss running into billions of petrodollar as a result of oil theft which has now become a sophisticated industry run by several cartels.

From the above, this study has proposed the following as a solution to the illegal refining of crude.

- Government should clean up the environment as a matter of urgency so that those that depend on it to survive can have a means of livelihood while also contributing to the nation's economy.
- Government should ensure that the development of the area is placed in high priority as this is the best way to checkmate oil theft.
- Government should engage in a massive skill acquisition program to ensure that the unemployment rate in the region is massively reduced and that the youths are gainfully employed

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- Findings
- Writings
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Acknowledgments

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The following is the official style and template developed for publication of a research paper. Authors are not required to follow this style during the submission of the paper. It is just for reference purposes.



Manuscript Style Instruction (Optional)

- Microsoft Word Document Setting Instructions.
- Font type of all text should be Swis721 Lt BT.
- Page size: 8.27" x 11", left margin: 0.65, right margin: 0.65, bottom margin: 0.75.
- Paper title should be in one column of font size 24.
- Author name in font size of 11 in one column.
- Abstract: font size 9 with the word "Abstract" in bold italics.
- Main text: font size 10 with two justified columns.
- Two columns with equal column width of 3.38 and spacing of 0.2.
- First character must be three lines drop-capped.
- The paragraph before spacing of 1 pt and after of 0 pt.
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- Large images must be in one column.
- The names of first main headings (Heading 1) must be in Roman font, capital letters, and font size of 10.
- The names of second main headings (Heading 2) must not include numbers and must be in italics with a font size of 10.

Structure and Format of Manuscript

The recommended size of an original research paper is under 15,000 words and review papers under 7,000 words. Research articles should be less than 10,000 words. Research papers are usually longer than review papers. Review papers are reports of significant research (typically less than 7,000 words, including tables, figures, and references)

A research paper must include:

- a) A title which should be relevant to the theme of the paper.
- b) A summary, known as an abstract (less than 150 words), containing the major results and conclusions.
- c) Up to 10 keywords that precisely identify the paper's subject, purpose, and focus.
- d) An introduction, giving fundamental background objectives.
- e) Resources and techniques with sufficient complete experimental details (wherever possible by reference) to permit repetition, sources of information must be given, and numerical methods must be specified by reference.
- f) Results which should be presented concisely by well-designed tables and figures.
- g) Suitable statistical data should also be given.
- h) All data must have been gathered with attention to numerical detail in the planning stage.

Design has been recognized to be essential to experiments for a considerable time, and the editor has decided that any paper that appears not to have adequate numerical treatments of the data will be returned unrefereed.

- i) Discussion should cover implications and consequences and not just recapitulate the results; conclusions should also be summarized.
- j) There should be brief acknowledgments.
- k) There ought to be references in the conventional format. Global Journals recommends APA format.

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Author details

The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

Abstract

The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

Keywords

A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, "What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?" Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

Abbreviations

Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

Formulas and equations

Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

Tables, Figures, and Figure Legends

Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.



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Figures are supposed to be submitted as separate files. Always include a citation in the text for each figure using Arabic numbers, e.g., Fig. 4. Artwork must be submitted online in vector electronic form or by emailing it.

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TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality human social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of human social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

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6. Bookmarks are useful: When you read any book or magazine, you generally use bookmarks, right? It is a good habit which helps to not lose your continuity. You should always use bookmarks while searching on the internet also, which will make your search easier.

7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

8. Make every effort: Make every effort to mention what you are going to write in your paper. That means always have a good start. Try to mention everything in the introduction—what is the need for a particular research paper. Polish your work with good writing skills and always give an evaluator what he wants. Make backups: When you are going to do any important thing like making a research paper, you should always have backup copies of it either on your computer or on paper. This protects you from losing any portion of your important data.

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10. Use proper verb tense: Use proper verb tenses in your paper. Use past tense to present those events that have happened. Use present tense to indicate events that are going on. Use future tense to indicate events that will happen in the future. Use of wrong tenses will confuse the evaluator. Avoid sentences that are incomplete.

11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources.

Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.



20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.



Mistakes to avoid:

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- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
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- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
- Avoid use of extra pictures—include only those figures essential to presenting results.

Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
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Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.



The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
- Defend the model—why did you employ this particular system or method? What is its compensation? Remark upon its appropriateness from an abstract point of view as well as pointing out sensible reasons for using it.
- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
- Briefly explain the study's tentative purpose and how it meets the declared objectives.

Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

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This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

When a technique is used that has been well-described in another section, mention the specific item describing the way, but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to show all particular resources and broad procedures so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step-by-step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- Describe the method entirely.
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.



Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

What to stay away from:

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
- A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

If you put figures and tables at the end of some details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attached appendix materials, such as raw facts. Whatever the position, each table must be titled, numbered one after the other, and include a heading. All figures and tables must be divided from the text.

Discussion:

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Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."



Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

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- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
- One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

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Topics	Grades		
	A-B	C-D	E-F
Abstract	Clear and concise with appropriate content, Correct format. 200 words or below	Unclear summary and no specific data, Incorrect form Above 200 words	No specific data with ambiguous information Above 250 words
Introduction	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
Methods and Procedures	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
Result	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
Discussion	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
References	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring



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