Ethnicity and Identity Politics of Uighur Muslims of China

By Dr. Md Ehtesham Akhtar
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Abstract- The Uyghurs in China remain under threat of assimilation, repression and discrimination, slowly becoming marginalised in their indigenous home-land. Uyghur Muslims, who constitute over 11 million of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) population, are at the crossroads of victim-hood, deprivation and desire to rebuild their destiny. The Uyghur young minds not only hold high aspirations from their community leaders, but also have a strong desire to lead a respectable life and seek opportunities for progress and development similar to Han ethnicity communities. The Uyghur community at large is in a churning process, the condition of Uyghurs are generally worse than other ethnic races of China. The available research suggests Uyghur Muslims are lagging in all spheres of development including education, employment, income and assets. Deprivation amongst Uyghur Muslims exists due to a number of systematic factors. The marginalised Uyghur Muslim community should pursue social, economic and educational aspirations not only within the framework and with support of government provided infrastructure and opportunities, but also by taking the extra steps to achieve targets on their own.

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Abstract - The Uyghurs in China remain under threat of assimilation, repression and discrimination, slowly becoming marginalised in their indigenous home-land. Uyghur Muslims, who constitute over 11 million of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) population, are at the crossroads of victim-hood, deprivation and desire to rebuild their destiny. The Uyghur young minds not only hold high aspirations from their community leaders, but also have a strong desire to lead a respectable life and seek opportunities for progress and development similar to Han ethnicity communities. The Uyghur community at large is in a churning process, the condition of Uyghurs are generally worse than other ethnic races of China. The available research suggests Uyghur Muslims are lagging in all spheres of development including education, employment, income and assets. Deprivation amongst Uyghur Muslims exists due to a number of systematic factors. The marginalised Uyghur Muslim community should pursue social, economic and educational aspirations not only within the framework and with support of government provided infrastructure and opportunities, but also by talking the extra steps to achieve targets on their own.

1. Geographical and Social History

Uyghurs are Muslim ethnic minorities in China living in Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) from centuries that constitutes 82.7 per cent of XUAR population in 1945, concentrated in the western region of the country. Uyghur accepted Islam when Sahaba (Companion of Prophet) came from Macaa during Khilafat of Usman Ghani (Raje Allah Anh).

The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) is located in the heart of the Eurasian continent in the north-west of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the largest provincial area of the country. It occupies one-sixth of the country’s territory at approximately 1,664,900 square kilometres and is the host to 10.5% of China’s minority population (Shaoying Zhang and Derek McGhee 2014). It also possesses the largest land frontier, bordering Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Mongolia, Russia and India, a quarter of China’s entire boundary length. Thus, since Xinjiang was integrated into China in the 1880s, the region has been growing increasingly important with regard to China’s security and economic policies (Blank 2003: 127- 137; Israeli 2010: 90) Cited in Shaoying Zhang and Derek McGhee: social policies and ethnic conflict in china: lessons from xinjiang.). The region provides a number of critical natural resources of China Oil, gas, gold and uranium. XUAR is the host of 47 ethnic groups, the larger ones include, the Uighur, Kazak, Hui, Mongolian, Kirgiz, Xibe, Tajik, Ozbek, Manchu, Daur, Tatar and Russian, most of them are Central Asian kinship (Sadia Fayaz ). In 1949, the region was integrated into the People’s Republic of China. In 1955, the People’s Republic of China established the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR), in recognition of the Uyghurs’ predominance in the region, a status which according to the Chinese Constitution entitles ethnic minorities to organs of self-government in order to exercise autonomy.

The Chinese sources indicate that the Uyghurs are the direct descendants of the Huns. The name “Uyghur” is mentioned in the chronicles of the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.), Wei Dynasty (265-289 A.D.), Tang Dynasty (618-906 A.D.), and Sung Dynasty (906-960).

Ancient Greek, Iranian, and Chinese sources placed Uyghurs with their tribes, and sub-tribes in the vast area between the west banks of the Yellow River in the east, Eastern Turkestan in the west, and in the Mongolian steppe in the northeast as early as 300 B.C (Uyghur Canadian society 2000). The Uyghurs are the native people of East Turkestan and known as the Turkic speaking, Turkic Muslim group, mainly belonging to Sunni Islamic school of thought with a long history at the heart of central Asia. Uyghur has a rich written literature going back to at least the 10th and 11th centuries, unlike some other neighboring Turkic languages which have oral forms of literature and switched to a written form only during the 19th century.

II. Uyghur Civilization

At the end of the 19th and the first few decades of the 20th century, scientific and archaeological expeditions to the region along the Silk Road in East Turkestan led to the discovery of numerous Uyghur cave temples, monastery ruins, wall paintings, statues, frescoes, valuable manuscripts, documents and books. Members of the expedition from Great Britain, Sweden, Russia, Germany, France, Japan, and the United States were amazed by the treasure they found there, and soon detailed reports captured the attention on an interested public around the world. The relics of these rich Uyghur cultural remnants brought back by Sven
Hedin of Sweden, Aurel Stein of Great Britain, Gruen Wedel and Albert von Lecoq from Germany, Paul Pelliot of France, Langdon Warner of the United States, and Count Ottani from Japan can be seen in the Museums of Berlin, London, Paris, Tokyo, Leningrad and even in the Museum of Central Asian Antiquities in New Delhi. The manuscripts, documents and the books discovered in Eastern Turkestan proved that the Uyghurs had a very high degree of civilization (Uyghur Canadian society 2000).

III. Uyghur Script

Throughout the centuries, the Uyghurs used three kinds of scripts. When they were confederated with the Kok Turks in the 6th and 7th centuries, they used the Orkhun script, which was actually a Kok Turk invention. Later, the Uyghurs dropped this script and adopted their own script which became known as the Uyghur script. This script was used for almost 800 years not only by the Uyghurs, but also by other Turkic peoples, the Mongols, and by the Manchus in the early stage of their rule in China. As the Mongols did not have their own written language, the Uyghur script was adopted by Chengiz (Genghis) Khan's Empire, for all sorts of correspondence. Guyu Khan's (1246-1248) letter to the Pope of that time was written in Uyghur script. The Uyghurs were also instrumental in shaping Mongol administration, which was formidable by any standards. They manned Mongol chanceries and, probably because of their knowledge of languages, were often charged with visiting foreigners. Both Plano Carpini and Rubruck mention them. The Uyghurs also emerged as teachers of the royal family, governors in China, ambassadors in Rome, today's Istanbul, and Bagdad, scholars in Tebriz and officers in the army. After embracing Islam, the Uyghurs adopted the Arabic script, but common usage of the Arabic script came only in the 11th century (Uyghur Canadian society 2000).

Table 1: Xinjiang Fact Sheet

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Official Name</th>
<th>Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital</td>
<td>Urumqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Official Language</td>
<td>Mandarin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Languages Spoken</td>
<td>Uyghur, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, Tajik and Mongol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Currency</td>
<td>Renminbi (RMB); literally &quot;People's Currency&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Area</td>
<td>1,600,000 square kilometers (about the size of Iran)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Founded:</td>
<td>1955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population</td>
<td>21 million (2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural Population Growth Rate</td>
<td>10.8 per thousand (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Fertility Rate</td>
<td>16.0 per thousand (2003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morality Rate:</td>
<td>5.2 per thousand (2003)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to the Chinese census in 2000, there are more than 18 million people living in the XUAR, of whom 47 per cent are Uighurs, 40 per cent are Han Chinese and 12 per cent are other ethnic groups, including Kazaks, Kyrgyzs, Tatars, Uzbeks and Tajiks. The Han Chinese population has increased significantly.
from 6.2 per cent in 1949 to 39.2 per cent in 2008 (Table No - 02), due to central government policies that include providing financial incentives to Han Chinese who migrated to the region (Amnesty International April 2009).

Late 1980s international attention increased toward Uyghurs primarily for two reasons:

1. Reports of alleged human rights abuses against Uyghurs by the Chinese government

Table 2: Demographic Profile of Xinjiang

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Han (percent)</th>
<th>Uyghur (percent)</th>
<th>Hui (percent)</th>
<th>Kazak (percent)</th>
<th>Other (percent)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>82.7</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>40.3</td>
<td>45.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>8.0</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>39.2</td>
<td>46.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source a: Chaudhuri, 2005.
Source b: Compiled by authors from SBX, 2010

The above table 02 shows, with passes of time Uyghur’s percentage in Xinjiang region has grawn down that lefts lots of serious questions behind for a ordinary people. Han and Uyghurs made up respectively 6.2 and 82.7 percent of Xinjiang’s population before 1982. Since 1982, the percentages have changed, to Han 40.3% and Uyghur 45.7%, the number and proportion of Han in Xinjiang have been comparable to Uyghurs. In 2008, the number of Han and Uyghurs in Xinjiang was 39.2% and 46.1%, respectively. Because Han tended to concentrate in the three largest cities—Urumqi, Karamay, and Shihezi, all of which are in northern Xinjiang, over time the province demographic centre has shifted northward as well. In 1949, 75 percent of Xinjiang’s population resided in the southern part of the province. By 1990, the population of northern Xinjiang exceeded that in the south (Chadhuri, 2005).

Table 3: Ethnic Group

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Living Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uygur</td>
<td>About 8,823,500</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>Hotan, Kash and Aksu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kazak</td>
<td>About 1,352,100</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>Ili, Tacheng, Altay, Barkol, Jichang and Urumqi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hui</td>
<td>Approximately 866,700</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>All over Xinjiang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kirgiz</td>
<td>Around 173,700</td>
<td>0.9%</td>
<td>Kizilsu Kirgiz Autonomous Prefecture</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolian</td>
<td>About 166,900</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>Bayangolen and Bortala prefectures.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajik</td>
<td>About 40,900</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>Taxkorgan Tajik Autonomous County.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xibe</td>
<td>About 40,300</td>
<td>0.2%</td>
<td>Charbur Xibe Autonomous County in Ili</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manchu</td>
<td>Around 23,900</td>
<td>0.11%</td>
<td>Urumqi, Ili, Jichang and Hami.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzbek</td>
<td>About 14,600</td>
<td>0.066%</td>
<td>Kashi, Yining, Tacheng, Urumqi, etc</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russian</td>
<td>Around 11,100</td>
<td>0.048%</td>
<td>Ili, Tacheng, Altay and Urumqi.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Daur</td>
<td>Around 6,700</td>
<td>0.83%</td>
<td>Axier Daur Township in Tacheng.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tatar</td>
<td>About 4,900</td>
<td>0.024%</td>
<td>Mainly in northern Xinjiang.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salar</td>
<td>About 3,762</td>
<td>0.020%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Above data taken from: http://www.china.org.cn/english/139389.htm
V. Political Significance of Xinjiang

The Chinese government in 1949 holds the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) by three important reasons: economic, political, and security.

Economic: As mentioned above, XUAR is the largest state of China having highest per capita gross domestic product (GDP) compared to other states of the country and holds the country's principal oil reserves. It also holds significant amounts of gas, gold, and uranium, also serves as an important economic passageway between China and Central Asian countries. It is Beijing's plan to increase oil imports from Central Asia and decrease dependence on Middle Eastern oil.

With the steady growth of the Chinese economy and its energy demands, Kazakhstan together with other Central Asian countries has become one of the key sources for China's energy supply. In terms of absolute amounts, oil from Kazakhstan still only accounts for a small portion of China's total oil imports in 2004. China imported 1.19 million tons (8.3 million barrels) of crude oil from Kazakhstan, compared with the country's total imports of 91 million tons (636.8 million barrels), about 1.31 percent. Nevertheless, a bilateral strategic partnership underpinned by energy cooperation is believed to fit the fundamental interest of both nations. (Fahim Masoud, March 12, 2014)

The Uyghurs adopted a sedentary life style earlier that the other Turkic peoples. Thus, the Uyghurs knew how to cultivate land as early as 2nd century A.D. The Uyghurs were engaged in a much more advanced agriculture by the 7th century. They raised wheat, maize, corn, millet, potatoes, sesame, sugar beet, peanuts, peaches, grapes, melons and cotton. The fields were irrigated with water brought from far distances by the "kariz" (water canals) built by the Uyghurs. These "kariz" are still in use today around the city of Turfan (Turpan) today.

Cotton was one of the principle local products of commercial value. Cotton and products manufactured from cotton contributed to the prosperity of the region. Another product of commercial value was carpets. The cities of Hoten, Kashgar and Turfan (Turpan) were carpet manufacturing centers (Uyghur Canadian society 2000).

Increasing Chinese population in East Turkestan has brought about widespread unemployment amongst the Uyghur population. The Chinese have taken control of most political and economic platforms. As a result, there is very little unemployment among the Chinese, but Uyghurs unemployment is growing at an alarming state. Despite East Turkestan's natural wealth, the Uyghur people live more or less at mere subsistence level with almost 80 percent living below the poverty threshold.

According to a report released by the "Xinjiang Provincial Government" on October 2004, the average income of the Chinese settler in East Turkestan is four times higher than that of a Uyghur. Almost 85 percent of the Uyghurs are farmers. According to the same official report, the average annual income of a Uyghur farmer is 820 Yuan (US$100) whereas a Chinese farmer in East Turkestan earns an annual income of 3,000 Yuan (US$ 400). Most private businesses are contracted to the Chinese. The rich resources of East Turkestan, including oil, gas, uranium, gold and silver reserves are transported to mainland China. The exploitation of these natural resources is strictly controlled by the Chinese Central Government. The Uyghurs have no control over these resources, they have no access to information on profits generated by these resources and have no chance to benefit from their own wealth (Unrepresented nations and peoples organization, march 2008)

Political: Xinjiang, like Taiwan and neighboring Tibet, is a neuralgic issue for China, which desperately needs internal stability in that predominantly Muslim, resource rich and strategically important region. Beijing's strategic and energy objectives are based on stability in Xinjiang and its Central Asian policies grow out of its reoccupation with stability there. Chinese scholars explicitly articulate the connection between Xinjiang and Central Asia, arguing that China's policy to expand economic cooperation with Central Asia is undertaken, among other reasons, because to a large extent the stability and prosperity of northwest China is closely tied to Central Asia's stability and prosperity. Thus economic growth, energy and strategic interests are inextricably tied together. But the precondition for realizing China's strategic and energy objectives is founded on the premise of internal stability in Xinjiang. Thus China's Central Asian policies as a whole are fundamentally strategically conceived and grow out of a preoccupation with internal stability in Xinjiang. These assertions offer significant clues to understanding Chinese policies in Central Asia, including Xinjiang, because they make clear that Chinese policies are intrinsically strategic in concept and goal, if not in implementation. Analysts like Wu Xinbo confirm the linkage between domestic and foreign policy when they argue that "China is still a country whose real interests lie mainly within its boundaries, and to a lesser extent, the Asia-Pacific region, where developments may have a direct impact on the country's national interests (Stephen Blank, 2004).

Security: China has undertaken a massive "go west" program for the better part of a decade, believing that the main spur to ethnic-nationalist and religious unrest is a lack of economic development and opportunity. Thus it has launched massive development projects in energy and transportation infrastructure to more fully tie Xinjiang to China's coastal development and to Central Asian economies. Foreign analysts, distinguish the key strategic significance in China's domestic policies in
Xinjiang and its western borderlands more generally vis-à-vis major Asian actors, especially India and the US. Since September 11, China sees Washington's military presence in Central Asia, the US air base at Manas in Kyrgyzstan is only 200 miles from China as presaging a potentially permanent threat to Xinjiang and China. The Australian Sinologist Greg Austin has even written that China, according to its own official sources in Beijing, has lost control of the borders of Xinjiang with Central Asia, specifically Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, and cannot prevent infiltration across those borders. American observers like S Frederick Starr and Graham Fuller, writing for the Central Asia Caucasus Institute of Johns Hopkins University, also maintain that China cannot evade the classic dilemma of minority people's uprisings against colonialist powers within the latter's home territory, the so called metropole. In other words, no matter whatever policies China adopts, it is likely to face continuing and long term unrest, including violent, even possible "terrorist" operations, in Xinjiang and even in Beijing itself. While this problem has not reached the level in other conflicts, such as Kashmir or Palestine, it is real enough and growing. Worse, Chinese experts appear to concede that there is no way out (Stephen Blank, 2004).

Sources: https://www.chinasage.info/provinces/xinjiang.htm
VI. ICCPR AND VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHT

As a state party to the International convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, China is obligated to guarantee the rights of everyone to take part in cultural life and to take steps including those necessary for the conservation, development and diffusion of culture to achieve the full realization of this right. China is also a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which guarantees the right to freedom of expression and freedom to hold and manifest religious beliefs. Article 27 of the ICCPR states that ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their own group, to enjoy their own culture, to practice their own religion, or to use their own language. Chinese domestic law, including its Constitution, and the 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law (REAL), also gives ethnic minorities the right to protect, preserve and promote their culture. The REAL states that “schools (classes) and other educational organizations recruiting mostly ethnic minority students should, whenever possible, use textbooks in their own languages and use these languages as the medium of instruction.” Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution states that “Regional autonomy is practised in areas where people of minority ethnic groups live in compact communities. All ethnic groups have the freedom to use and develop their own spoken and written languages and to preserve or reform their own ways and customs (Amnesty International 2009).

Silently and systematically Erosion of Uyghurs ethnic identity: The ethnic identity of Uyghurs in Xinjiang is being systematically and silently eroded by the Government policies, including maximum use of the Uighur language, harsh restrictions on religious freedom. Continue Han migration into the region are destroying customs and tradition of Uyghurs. The Chinese government has failed to protect Uighurs from employment discrimination which has resulted in extremely high rates of unemployment among Uighurs in the XUAR and fuelled discontent. Many Uyghurs report seeing “Uighurs need not apply” signs posted by employers at job advertisements. Even university graduates who speak fluent Chinese have difficulty finding employment. Discrimination in Employment also creating dissatisfaction among uyghurs and ethnic tensions in the region. The Chinese government has planned an aggressive campaign against Uyghur that has led to the arrest and arbitrary detention of thousands of Uyghurs on charges of “terrorism, separatism and religious extremism.

As the Beijing authorities started an aggressive campaign against the three evils “terrorism, separatism and religious extremism”. As a result, increased numbers of Uighurs have been subjected to arbitrary arrests, unfair trials and torture, and their economic, social and cultural rights have been slowly eroded. This has worsened since the attacks in the USA on 11 September 2001 as the authorities cast Uighur discontent within the framework of international terrorism, claims that many academics and other observers consider unsubstantiated. In 2008, the authorities used a series of violent incidents, allegedly carried out by Uighur separatist groups, as a pretext for launching a sweeping crackdown on the Uighur population in the XUAR. According to official media, almost 1,300 people were arrested during 2008 on state security charges that included terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, and 1,154 were formally charged and faced trials or administrative punishments. On 14 August, Wang Lequan, Communist Party Secretary of the XUAR, announced a “life and death” struggle against Uighur “separatism” (Amnesty International 2009).

Language and Identity risk: The Chinese authorities continue to pursue a language policy that purports to make the school system in the XUAR “bilingual” but which is in fact making Chinese the sole language of instruction. The policy began in the 1990s with the elimination of Uighur as a medium of instruction at the university level. Today, at Xinjiang University, only Uighur poetry courses are taught in Uighur. In 2006, the authorities initiated policy measures that are making Chinese the primary medium of instruction at the preschool level. Contradicting the spirit of true “bilingualism”, Uighur children and teachers from a town in southern XUAR reported that they would be fined if they said one word in Uighur while on school premises. (Amnesty International 2009).

Uyghurs are aware of the impact of language on culture and tradition. They know language is the vehicle of change as parallel to globalization and westernization. As Uyghur believes ban on Uyghur language could vanish their culture and ethnic identity. Uyghur believes “If the children don’t learn their mother tongue they won’t know their culture, they won’t know their religion then they won’t be Uighur. With time young will adopt Chinese culture and become Chinese. They know Chinese authorities are destroying them through language. The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has called on China to “ensure that all teaching and learning materials for the primary and secondary level are also available in ethnic minority languages and with culturally sensitive content” (Amnesty International 2009). It can be strongly said, Han presence exerting a strong dominant language pressure on minority languages and cultures.

As an adjoining area, Chinese Inner Asia show off the largest concentration of fluent non-Chinese speakers within China. Of these peoples, those with
significant populations and territories the Uyghurs, Tibetans, and Mongols each have standardized prestige language forms (acrolects) as well as a large body of written literary and historical material. In addition to the flagship standard languages of these three groups, a plethora of dialects and non-standard language varieties also exist. Under these complex multilingual circumstances, language policy be it covert or overt is an integral part of virtually any policy decision for these regions (Arienne M. Dwyer 2005).

**Government interferences in Religious Practices:** The Beijing authorities have tight control over Masjid and religious clergy, intervening in the appointment of local imams, stationing police within and outside mosques, and closely monitoring all religious activities. Government employees in the XUAR, including teachers, police officers, state enterprise workers and civil servants risk losing their jobs if they engage in religious activity. The Chinese authorities have also put many obstacles in the way of Uighurs attempting to make the pilgrimage to Mecca (known as the Haji), which is a requirement for all wealthy practicing Muslims. Children under the age of 18 are not allowed to enter mosques or to receive any sort of religious education. Many young Uyghurs are afraid that if they do enter a mosque, or are found to be praying at home, they will be expelled from school and calls for their immediate and unconditional release. Many also report that it is only on Fridays, the most important prayer day of the week for Muslims that schools force students to stay at school for lunch in order to prevent them from going home to pray (Amnesty International 2009). Previously such bans were witnessed on the Muslims only in communist regime in the world. Such bans were also witnessed in communist rule in undivided Russia where churches were free to preach their religion but Muslims have ban to offer Namaz and learn Quran. It could be strongly said Beijing authorities have borrowed the past policies from neighbouring countries. The policy of moving Hans into XUAR has also realized a classic colonialist system of economic and social stratification that is visible in many other cases of internal colonialism. In those cases, the representatives of the dominant nationality (Han) enjoy disproportionate economic and political advantages in education, job placement, and access to public goods.

After a Uyghur uprising in 1990, the Communist Party took steps to accelerate the integration of Xinjiang into China by stepping up migration and increasing the security presence and control over religion in the region. Uyghur Islam practising is traditionally extremely moderate on social issues, though in recent decades, more essential traditions were introduced by students who studied abroad in Central Asian and Pakistani madrasas. The Uyghur independence movement has had a strong Islamic character since the 1980s. Until recently, there was almost no tradition of Islamist militancy in Xinjiang. The government tightly regulating the practice of Islam and preach of clerics in Masjid and other religious gathering.

**VII. Hashar and Human Right Abuse**

The XUAR is the only state of China where the general population is systematically subject to a government policy of forced labour. The Bingtuan has taken control over much of the best farmland in East Turkestan and also has control over the surface water supply. Under a system referred to as “hashar”, farming. Under which farming families predominantly ethnic minority are fined if they fail to send a family member, sometimes several times each year, to labour on agricultural, infrastructural and other public works for up to two to three weeks at a time. The individuals are given no compensation for their labour, no room or board, and are expected to pay their own transportation costs. Many describe sleeping out in the open and eating nothing but instant noodles for days while doing hard labour. The systematic erosion of Uighur ethnic identity by the Chinese authorities is characterized by repression and human rights abuses. The Chinese authorities must immediately reverse policies that limit use of the Uighur language and severely restrict freedom of religion and Uighurs’ ability to enjoy and replicate their culture (Amnesty International 2009 and World Uyghur congress December 2010). President of the Uyghur Canadian Society “Kayum Masimov” says I am deeply concerned that further human rights violations will happen, “In years gone by, Uyghurs have been subjected to severe restrictions upon their freedoms. Women have been forced, often physically, to unveil, refused entry to mosques and coerced into renouncing their faith in order to obtain social security and access to medical treatment. Communication blackouts are a common occurrence to quell open discussion of human rights violations, and many people have been harassed, arrested and imprisoned for doing so, and extrajudicial killings have also happened to those who have not complied, including women and children.” (World Uyghur congress 11 July 2013).

**VIII. Economic Importance of Xinjiang**

From establishing control over the region in the 1950s to the present day, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has made large investments in Xinjiang’s economic development. The first priority of development has been the exploitation of raw materials. Xinjiang is believed to contain one third of China’s oil reserves (AP-Dow Jones July 2, 1996) as well as most of China’s uranium, significant coal deposits, and many other minerals. Central Xinjiang, in a formerly Uyghur area about 265 kilometres southeast of Urumchi, is a missile testing site, and was also the site of 44 nuclear tests (22
Chinese encroachment on the region’s natural and cultural resources has made activists and nationalists out of formerly apolitical minority people. Chinese development of Xinjiang has included significant transportation and administrative infrastructure building. The rapid construction of roads, railways, and cities facilitated the flow of goods and services from Inner China, the Central Asian republics and Pakistan beginning in the 1980s. Xinjiang residents who travelled to these countries noticed that at least northern Xinjiang seemed better off than its neighbours, many more foodstuffs and goods were available in the markets. From these observations, some local people, particularly merchants and intellectuals, concluded that Chinese rule in Xinjiang, while not ideal, was a legitimate means of achieving economic development (Arienne M. Dwyer 2005).

IX. DEMOCRACY AND UIGHUR

Most of us are familiar with the word Democracy, but still its concept are misunderstood and misused by the totalitarian regimes and military dictatorships alike have attempted to claim popular support by pinning democratic labels upon themselves. In a democratic country anywhere in the world majority rule cannot be the only expression of "supreme power". If so, the majority would too easily tyrannize the minority. It is the qualities of democratic country to must guarantee the expression of the popular will through majority rule, it is equally clear that it must guarantee that the majority will not abuse its power to violate the basic and inalienable rights of the minority. For one, a defining characteristic of democracy must be the people's right to change the majority through elections. This right is the people's "supreme authority." The minority, therefore, must have the right to seek to become the majority and possess all the rights necessary to compete fairly in elections speech, assembly, association, petition since otherwise the majority would make itself permanent and become a dictatorship. For the majority, ensuring the minority's rights becomes a matter of self-interest, since it must utilize the same rights when it is in minority to seek to become a majority again. This holds equally true in a multiparty parliamentary democracy, where no party has a majority, since a government must still be formed in coalition by a majority of parliament members. In Chinese democracy Uighurs could not serve their freedoms. Women have been forced, often physically, to unveil, refused entry to mosques and coerced into renouncing their faith in order to obtain social security and access to medical treatment. Communication blackouts are a common occurrence to quell open discussion of human rights violations, and many people have been harassed, arrested and imprisoned for doing so, and extrajudicial killings have also happened to those who have not complied, including women and children (World Uyghur congress 2013). Entire democratic world are silent no one raising voice for democratic right of Uyghurs in Uyghurs home land. Entire world are watching the dance of democracy.

X. CONFLICT AND MARX

Due to Low literacy and weak political leadership Uyghurs are internally facing lots of diversities in their opinions. The literature on the political consolidation of the Uyghurs falls into two general categories. The first is that the Uyghurs are not a politically consolidated group they are divided in numerous ways and for various reasons face significant challenges to strengthening their political cohesion. The second viewpoint is that the Uyghurs do indeed face challenges to political consolidation but they are nonetheless achieving some measures of political unity. Many researchers point out that the Uyghurs are not uniform in their demands. Some Uyghurs want greater autonomy for the region while others want full independence from the PRC. Some focus on rectifying human rights abuses while others desire greater economic opportunities at improving their standard of living. There has yet to be a political organization that is considered truly representative of the Uyghur people.

According to Marx, changes are produced mainly by internal contradiction and conflict. Each stage of human history is marked by certain contradictions and tensions. These become intensified over a period of time to such an extent that the existing system has to break down, giving way to a new system. In other words each historical stage contains within itself the seeds of its own destruction. The New system emerges from the womb of the old. Thus, Marx understands conflict not as something pathological and harmful, but as a creative force. It is the engine of progress. His conception of conflict as the major harbinger of change reflects in the unique way in which he deals with both the past and the present and also in his anticipation of future. It can be strongly said that conflict within the Uyghur is not poisonous for the Uyghur movements. The conflict will strengthen the Uyghur and movement will not be easy lasting. When the movement will pass from one generation to another generation it will be uncontrollable for china.

In Islamic teaching conflict within Muslims are “Rhamat (Peace)” for the Ummah (Entire Muslims on the globe). Conflicts are not harmful. The internal conflicts always minimize the mass human killing or loots. In the world history Mass of the human killing are witnessed in communist regime. Lesser number of human killing are witnessed in all Islamic Jang (war) not more than 1500/.
XI. Conclusion

Uyghurs in China suffer under restrictive and discriminatory policies that are so pervasive that many say surprisingly “their cultural survival in their historic homeland”. Article 4 of the Chinese Constitution guarantees cultural and linguistic protections for all nationalities within the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, in practice, heavy handed state suppression of everything the Chinese government associates with Uyghur “separatism,” including a broad range of religious practice, literary writing, and Uyghur language education, has created a dire human rights environment for the Uyghur Muslim minority population of northwest China.

Internationally Respect and protect the right of Uyghurs to enjoy their own culture, language and to practice their religion. Release all those detained solely for exercising their rights to freedom of expression and freedom of religion. Immediately abolish the practice of “hashar”, a form of forced labour. Make a clear distinction between activities that involve the peaceful exercise of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and those that would be internationally recognized as criminal acts. To stop Government tight monitoring in daily five time prayer and interference of Imam Selection in the region. Provide equal economic and education opportunity to Han and Uyghur.

International human rights groups say China is exaggerating the extent of Uighur terrorism and that many of the incidents labelled “terrorist attacks” are actually spontaneous civil unrest. The Uyghur independence movement has received far less attention in the Western media than has neighbouring Tibet, but its profile has been growing in recent years.

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