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Should Turkey Excluded from NATO or she Should Quit it Itself

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Introduction - The humiliation targeted to the founder of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan portrayed as enemies of the alliance in the NATO exercise “Trident Javelin” held in Norway in November 2017, has created sound indignation either within the public and mass media or government in Turkey. In the same token, it was opened a chat account under the name of Recep Tayyip Erdogan shown him as a collaborator with a “leader of an enemy state” according to the scenario (AFP, 2017). Ultimately, Turkish participants pulled out of the drill, and NATO Secretary-General immediately extended apologize to Ankara. However, it created a great deal of disappointment all over Turkey against NATO solidarity. This event, probably, would be registered in NATO history as a first scandal disquieting one of its member states.

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Should Turkey Excluded from NATO or she Should Quit it Itself

Prof. Dr. Ali Serdar Erdurmaz

I. INTRODUCTION

The humiliation targeted to the founder of Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, and the President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan portrayed as enemies of the alliance in the NATO exercise “Trident Javelin” held in Norway in November 2017, has created sound indignation either within the public and mass media or government in Turkey. In the same token, it was opened a chat account under the name of Recep Tayyip Erdogan shown him as a collaborator with a “leader of an enemy state” according to the scenario (AFP, 2017). Ultimately, Turkish participants pulled out of the drill, and NATO Secretary-General immediately extended apologize to Ankara. However, it created a great deal of disappointment all over Turkey against NATO solidarity. This event, probably, would be registered in NATO history as a first scandal disquieting one of its member states.

Furthermore, this event reinitiated the discourse that Turkey should secede from the NATO or not. In this context, the highest discourse that was given on twitter by the Nationalist Movement Party leader, Devlet Bahçeli (Hurriyet, 2017) (tr. sputnik news, 2017). Yalcin Topcu, President Erdogan political adviser, also came up with that Turkey should quit NATO claiming that “it had supported every military coup in Turkey and said it was time to question Turkey’s NATO membership” (Idiz, 2017) (Aksam, 2017). President Erdogan assessed this scandal as an “outward expression of a skewed attitude toward Turkey that we have been observing for some time” (Idiz, 2017) (NTV, 2017). But above all those statements, any official announcement from government took place in the agenda even to imply of quitting NATO. Turkish high-level authorities in government seemed to be very cautious on this highly sensitive issue not to give any leverage to those, some members alliance, that has claimed that Turkey should be forced to leave NATO (Bandow, 2016).

On the other hand, some contradictory discourses have arisen by the western media, in the course that Turkey adopted the presidential system saying that “Turkey has been moving toward the authoritarian one-party state and Ankara undermines alliances’ security then it is membership in NATO becomes more incompatible. A divorce in civilized way

would be best for all parties” (Bandow, 2016) (Griffiths, 2016).

The reason why that issue emerged between the USA and other NATO members in Europe and Turkey has depended on firstly, the USA has experienced the problem which create the rifts between both countries. Secondly, the problem of Ankara with the individual European countries, also NATO members, and Eastern Mediterranean security crises between them.

The problem with the *USA and Turkey* has emerged within *four-folds*. One of them is the divergency on Syrian issue to solve between the USA and Turkey. First, the decision of the USA to use PYD/YPG, which Turkey considers as a terrorist organization affiliated with PKK, against the ISIS. This problem deteriorated during the “Operation Euphrates Shield” undertaken right after the failed coup 2016 in al-Bab region/Syria. At the beginning of 2018, Turkish Armed Forces began to operate “Olive Brach Operation” to prevent possible emergence of a terrorist state on its borders, after that announcement that the USA plans to form a 30.000-strong Kurdish-led border security force in Syria, create anxiety within both countries (Akal, 2018). And since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, two allies disagree on Iran to take place effectively in Syria. While Washington was strictly against Iran involvement in Syria, in contrast, Ankara was less opposite to Iran since it has flourishing trade relationship (Phillips, 2012).

Another issue of strain is about Mr. Gulen, who lives in the US, is blamed by Ankara for July 15, 2016, failed coup attempt. Ankara officially requested to hand over Mr. Gulen to Turkey, an idea that Washington dismissed (Reuters, 2017).

The one other problematic field between two allied members is Reza Zarrab case. This case has strained relations between Ankara and Washington.

There are one another event created trouble between NATO and Turkey is that Ankara’s decision to buy Russian S-400 anti-aircraft system, in favor of the American Patriot or Franco-Italian SAMP/T systems, because western army suppliers had not offered either reasonable price alternative or transfer of know-how in line with Turkey’s desire. The Pentagon expressed its concern to Ankara about the deal (Dolan, 2017).

The Second issue that problems with *European Union and European NATO members*; In March 2017, Justice and Development Party (JDP) members

attempted to visit Germany and Nederland to make campaigns there before a referendum on constitutional changes to expand presidential power blocked by two countries. Following these reactions, JDP leaders accused Germany using Nazi application caused of undesirable rifts between two states and Ankara (Smale, 2017). On the top of it, other crisis had emerged when soldiers, diplomats, judges and other government officials living in Germany and at NATO facilities in Germany had requested to asylum in Germany after facing persecution following the failed coup on July 15, 2016. Nevertheless, application for asylum had been made by the Turkish government officials who worked all over the EU countries such as Belgium, Greece (Deutsche Welle, 2017a). President Erdogan extended official requisition officially to extradite all asylum seekers in a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, it was rejected due to that is not a political decision but decision of The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Deutsche Welle, 2017b).

The last issue emerged as an Eastern Mediterranean security concerns of EU and Turkey since new natural gas resources were exploded on the offshore of Israel, Southern Cyprus Government and Greece, and Turkey, would be the center of crises for ongoing days.

All events we put on caused mutual lack of confidence between Turkey and the USA and western European countries reflect automatically to NATO and its other alliances. Even though, as a higher authority, NATO Deputy Secretary-General Rose Gottemoller has reaffirmed the alliance's commitment to Turkish security saying that "NATO stands in solidarity with Turkey in the fight against terrorism"(Cebul, 2018), the question that Turkey should leave NATO has been brought by the member states mass media such as the USA, Germany and, Nederland. That means troubles between those countries and, Turkey has been reverberated by those western countries to NATO (The Economist, 2018).

In this article, a study will be held to find answers two different but relevant questions. The first question has two pillars, one is "Do western countries want that Turkey must secede from NATO" and the other is "Does Ankara really eager to quit NATO". The second question is about NATO "as an organization does NATO seriously contemplate leaving Turkey out of NATO".

II. DETERIORATING RIFTS BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND ANKARA

a) Crises on the Syrian Civil War

Turkey did not immediately react against the Syrian crisis that broke out after 2011. At the first stage, Prime Minister Erdoğan tried to convince the US and the West that he could influence Assad in the desired direction because of his close relations. Therefore, the

Foreign Minister Davutoğlu and various authorities visited Damascus and tried to convince Assad so that he would carry out the demanded reforms (Yeşilmen, 2011). It was clear that these visits did not have any effects when Assad made some statements. Following that, Ankara sent a message indicating that it "lost its patience" (Bakri, 2011). When it was November 2011, the Prime Minister Erdoğan, supporting the initiative by the Arab League and the UN's plan, called for Assad to abdicate (Bağci, 2015) (Arsu, 2011). Afterward, Ankara backed up the opponents in military terms and began to take steps for overthrowing the Assad regime together with the USA (Cumhuriyet, 2013) (Weiss, 2012). Turkey declared many times that it attached great importance to the territorial integrity of Syria (Bilici, 2013).

Since 13 August 2011, Ankara has shifted its policy to support the US, NATO, and the UN. In October 2011, the UN Security Council could not issue a resolution against Syria due to the veto by Russia and China (Adams, 2015) (Council, 2011). In February 2012, the bloody incident in Hama, in which 500 people died, took place (Arnold, 2012).

After June 2012, the Turkish-Syrian relations have deteriorated. Thereafter, Syria shot down a Turkish jet, and Turkey requested an evaluation meeting at NATO, on the grounds of the 4th Article (Al Arabiya, 2012). Following the bombing in Reyhanlı in May 2013, Turkey demanded from the US and NATO for intervention in Syria (Bagci, 2015). NATO was reluctant to intervene because that Syria would require considerably more NATO resources than Libya did (Phillips, 2012). For that reason, NATO Foreign Ministers decided on December 4, 2012, that NATO would *"augment Turkey's air defense capabilities to defend the population and territory of Turkey and contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along the Alliance's border."* Patriot Missiles batteries contributed by the USA, Netherlands, Italy and, Germany deployed to Turkey soils under NATO command and control on February 15, 2013(NATO, 2013)(NATO, 2016). Spanish troops joined in January 2015, replacing a Dutch unit (NATO, 2015). Thus, *"NATO Support to Turkey"* defensive action started (NATO, 2018c). NATO Secretary-General Rasmussen said on December 2012 in Brussels *"we stand with Turkey in the spirit of strong solidarity. ...To the Turkish people, we say, we are determined to defend you and your territory. To anyone who would want to attack Turkey, don't even think about it". ..."**Such a deployment would contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis along NATO's south-eastern border."* (Dempsey, 2012). In other words, the existence of Patriots did not mean NATO wish to intertwine in Syria (Dempsey, 2012).

Nevertheless, Ankara would like to declare a "no-fly zone" that USA considering reluctantly to impose it("Syria crisis: US and Turkey consider no-fly zones," 2012), however, it was not supported by the USA(Cooper & Gordon, 2014)(Report, 2015). And NATO

Secretary-General Rasmussen emphasized that the deployment of Patriots not for the support of “no-fly zone”; *“The Turkish government has supported Syria’s opposition, and as an alliance member had requested that NATO provide the U.S.-built Patriot air defense system to deter further threats to its territory. NATO officials stress that use of the missiles will be purely defensive”*. Rasmussen emphasized that the Patriots will never be used to support a no-fly zone over Syria, as Turkey proposed (Simeone, 2012). As a result, Turkey’s demand for establishing no-fly zone did not consider in a part of the plan applied on Syria either by the USA or NATO in 2012 and 2015, even though, France agreed on this issue(RNW, 2012).

Beginning in August 2011, IS’s presence in Syria has become more evident (Jasser, 2014). As IS made headway, there were some claims that Ankara supported this organization (Gürsel, 2014) (Akinci, 2015). Ankara rebuffed these allegations (Al Jazeera, 2015b). The bombing incidents by the IS in Ankara, in August 2015, and in Suruç, on 20 July 2015, resulted in the death of so many people (BBC, 2015). Following these, Turkey participated in the coalition formed by the US and provided the necessary support through air force (Tuysuz & Bilginsoy, 2015). It was brought forward that the US and the West should counter-action against the IS’s strategy of expansion in the Syrian territory and of spreading terror on the global scale. At the first stage of the uprisings in Syria, the US and Turkey had only one aim; overthrowing the Assad and establishing instead, a democratic regime as demanded by the people (Falk, 2014) (Ayhan, 2011). When the IS came out, the priorities of the US and the West changed. The US has altered its strategic target as primarily eliminating from Syria the IS, which is considered an extremist religious terrorist organization. At the beginning of September 2014, President Obama declared that a coalition consisting of 10 countries was formed against the IS. Turkey, at first, abstained from getting involved in this coalition (Sanchez, 2014). Turkey had some reservations; first was that there were no limitations of striking the Syrian regime; second was that a security corridor through a “no-fly zone” would not be provided; and the last one was the demand for supporting the moderate opponents for the military operation against both the IS and the Assad regime. This new approach caused a dissent with Turkey.

The second significant rift erupted between US and Turkey upon the failure of “train and equipped” (Dohery & Bakr, 2012) aimed for organizing and training the opponents (McLeary, 2015), the US began to look for new elements to utilize for the ground operation (Ahmed, 2015).

The USA has decided to avoid from intervening to Syria directly by using its troops made impact on the United Kingdom parliament not to authorize British military involvement in Syria civil war (Pierini, 2016). Then

US president Barrack Obama is labeled by various media outlets as a “reluctant warrior”(Pierini, 2016). Utilizing the military wing (YPG) of PYD due to its organization and experience could not be prevented by Turkey’s loud objections (“Erdoğan Obama’ya resti çekti! Ortağın kim?,” 2016) (Yeginsu, 2016). President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Washington “Are you on our side or the side of the terrorist PYD and PKK organizations?” (Yeginsu, 2016). Turkey in fact recognizes PYD as a terrorist organization and the extension of PKK in Syria. The reasons are below. Turkey argues that if the US and the West recognize PKK as a terrorist organization, then they should consider PYD in the same manner. Nonetheless, the US declares that it does not consider PYD as a terrorist organization and that their cooperation will be maintained (bianet, 2016). Turkey is isolated on this issue (Pierini, 2015). Even though these problems were prevailing between both countries, the decision has been taken in NATO Summit on 4-5 December 2012 to augmentation of Turkey’s air defense capabilities upon the request of Turkey (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2012). And since January 2013, five Allies, Germany, Italy, Spain, the Netherlands and, the United States, have contributed missile batteries to deploy just along with the Syrian border (NATO, 2016). In May 2015, SCEUR, Gen. Philip Breedlove paid a visit to greed, a Spanish Patriot Unit (Bush, 2015).

In 2012, as the regime forces retreated from the north of Syria, the PYD forces filled in the gap, and the good relations with Damascus tried to be maintained. Because of PYD’s connection with PKK and the Assad regime, Ankara, from the beginning, objected to PYD’s being an influential force in the north of Syria.

In September 2015, Russia began military intervention after an official request by the Syrian government to fight on the side of the regime of President Bashar al-Assad against all rebel groups and IS (Aji and Deeb 2015). This attempt would end Ankara’s desire to establish a buffer zone in Northern Syria. However, it had a long time to persuade Washington of the need for (Doha Institute 2016).

On November 24, 2015, the downing of Russian fighter plane by Turkish forces broke ties with Moscow (Tisdall, 2015). Although Russia put some sanctions on Turkey, Russian President Putin was one of the first to condemn the coup attempt and declare support for the elected government of Turkey right after the 15 July 2016 coup attempt that begun to flourish bilateral relations of both countries. Following this initiative, on 28 June 2016, the letter has been sent by President Erdogan to Russian President Vladimir Putin, to extend his condolences and regret over the downing of the Russian fighter plane (Daily Sabah 2016). On 6 August 2016, President Erdogan paid a visit to Russia and said in a press conference in Konstantin palace at St. Petersburg that Ankara determined to restore



relations (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2016).

December 2016, Turkey met in Moscow with Russia and Iran to work toward a political accord to end the Syrian war. Leaving the U.S. on the sidelines which have been sought to proceed the conflict in accordance with their interests (Hubbart and Sanger 2016). With this attempt, Ankara has tried to take counteraction against that the U.S. will go on to support PYD under the Trump administration. On January 2017, Turkey sought a joint effort to end the war in Syria with Russia and Iran while the U.S. sidelined in Kazakhstan capital Astana (Meyer 2017).

Before Operation Euphrates Shield, President Erdogan visits Moscow on 9 August to end the crisis between two countries and strengthened his hand for such military intervention in Syria (Akyol, 2016).

In early 2016, Turkey "Euphrates Shield" military operation, targeted Islamic State and YPG, was completed in Jarablus region successfully (Akyol, 2016). Before the operation, Turkey had informed, and coordinated the USA, Russia and coalition forces. In this course, while the US State Department has made balanced statements, but the Pentagon tries to protect the PYD as a partner (Akyol, 2016).

On January 20, 2018, Turkey commenced an attack in Afrin region (Operation Olive Branch), in northwest Syria just near the Turkish border, after the US announcement that it will set up a 30.000 strong border security force with YPG (Hacaoglu & Syeed, 2018). According to the Russian Defense Ministry statement, *"The main reasons contributing to the development of the critical situation in this part of Syria were the provocative U.S. steps aimed at the separation of regions with predominantly Kurdish populations". "The uncontrolled delivery of modern weapons, including the reported delivery of man-portable air defense systems, by the Pentagon to the pro- U.S. forces in northern Syria, has contributed to the rapid escalation of tension in the region and resulted in the launch of the special operation by Turkish troops"* (Yetkin, 2018a). *Washington collaboration with the PKK-affiliated Syrian Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) has continued since 2014, despite President Erdogan's reiterated calls several times on US presidents to work together as two NATO allies* (Yetkin, 2018a).

On Afrin operation, NATO announced on Jan 21, 2018, that "every country has the right to self-defense." However, US Defense Secretary, James Mattis told reporters on January 21, *"Turkey is a NATO ally. It's the only NATO country with an active insurgency inside its borders. And Turkey has legitimate security concerns", "They warned us before they launched the aircraft that they were going to do it. We are very alert to it. Our top levels are engaged and were working through it"* (Lewis, 2018). Nevertheless, France has brought this issue to the UN Security Council to discuss the

humanitarian situation in Afrin region (Kenyon, 2018). In return for that, Turkey sent a letter to the UN Security Council on the justification for Military intervention in Syria on January 22, 2018, as self-defense in terms of Article 51 of the UN Charter (Behles, 2018).

President Erdogan said *"We shattered the terror corridor being formed on our southern border with these operations. ... Our soldiers,..., are ready for a new mission"* (Reuters & Brown, 2018).

On April 14, 2018, US-led air-strikes together with Britain and France, targeting as an "appropriate response" to Bashar Assad regime facilities in retaliation for a suspected chemical attack. Ankara welcomed this operation considering that as a humanitarian intervention. Minister of Foreign Affairs said in a statement, *"We welcome this operation which has eased humanity's conscience in the face of the attack in Douma, largely suspected to have been carried out by the regime", "The Syrian regime, which has been tyrannizing its people for more than seven years, be it with conventional or chemical weapons, has a proven track record of crimes against humanity and war crimes"* (hurriyet daily news, 2018b). Even though, Incirlik air-base, allocated to the USA, was not used in the course of operation, The USA has informed Ankara about the air strikes in advance (DW, 2017a).

Ankara announced that it would continue a military operation to Manbij, after that Operation Olive Branch to Afrin region, where US troops are stationed, and risking confrontation between NATO allies. President Erdogan demanded that the US administration withdraw its troops from Manbij province. Saying that *"We will continue this process until we completely abolish this corridor. ... One night, we will suddenly enter Sinjari"* President Erdogan revealed Turkey's determination to eliminate all YPG forces exist in Manbij, Raqqa, and Hasaka region in Syria (Sayed, 2018). On the contrary, US General Joseph Votel, the head of US Central Command, pointed out *"withdrawing from Manbij is not something we're looking into," "wherever US troops are, they're going to be able to defend themselves"* (Hacaoglu & Syeed, 2018). At the beginning of 2018, mutual meetings were held between Washington and Ankara to reach "understanding" to normalize ties (Onum, Kutlugun, & Dikme, 2018). On press conference held on the occasion that Rex Tillerson, US Secretary of State, visits to Ankara Mevlut Cavusoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, said *"We clearly expressed [to the U.S. side] our expectations with regard to the fight against FETO and the PKK terrorist organizations, and the U.S. support for the YPG. ... We agreed to establish some mechanisms which will cover and evaluate all the issues.... We should be sure that the YPG crossed to the eastern side of the Euphrates River, and we should see its execution together"*. Thus, Cavusoglu put emphasize to prioritize Manbij issue to coordinate with the USA. (Aliriza, 2018). As a result,

According to The US Embassy and Consulate in Turkey statement, The Turkish and US Working Group on Syria met in Ankara and published joint statement following May 25 talks in Ankara, saying that *"The two sides outlined the main contours of a Road Map for their further cooperation in ensuring security and stability in Manbij"*. Foreign Minister Çavuşoğlu and Secretary Pompeo will meet on June 4 to consider the recommendations of the Working Group (Statement, 2018). However, this roadmap has been explained in Hurriyet Dailynews article as, *"The draft plan oversees the withdrawal of the Syrian-Kurdish People's Protection Units (YPG) militants from Manbij in northern Syria and the security of the region to be maintained by Turkish and U.S. soldiers"* (hurriyetaidailynews, 2018c).

b) *Gulen's Coup Attempt*

On the night of July 15, 2016, Turkey was surprised and shocked by an outrageous and bloody coup attack attempted by Gulenist terror organization (Keyman, 2017). This attack was to accomplish to topple down the current Justice and Development Party government and Grand National Assembly, and President Recep Tayyip Erdogan as well. However, this attempt failed thanks to the wisdom and common sense of the Turkish people. And, Turkish unity displayed by Turkish citizens, in the name of protecting democracy over insurgents of Gulen organization. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Turkish government accused Fetullah Gulen of orchestrating the coup attempt along with the CIA, FBI, and demand for the extradition of Gulen, even though, Gulen denied any involvement in the coup attempt (Spetalnick & Harte, 2017). Shortly after the suppressing uprising, the Turkish government sent official request to the US administration to prove Gulen's involvement in it. Even, President Erdogan demanded directly from US President Donald Trump in his official visit to the USA, May 17, 2017. But before that he sent two top officers, Chief of General Staff of Turkish Armed Forces Hulusi Akar and Chief of Intelligence Hakan Fidan, to hold talks with senior US officials on this issue (Al-jezeera, 2017). In September 2017, Turkey detained a US pastor and suggested to free him if Washington handed over Fetullah Gulen to Ankara. However, Washington seemed to dismiss this swap (Reuter, 2017). Washington has denied repeated demands of Ankara for Gulen's extradition, citing a need for evidence of his involvement in the coup was one of the causes of the main tension between two NATO partners (DW, 2017b).

c) *Reza Zarrab Case*

In March 2016, US authorities accused Reza Zarrab and three others of participating in a broad conspiracy to violate the US' sanctions against Iran (Weiser, 2017) and arrested Reza Zarrab, a businessman who has both Iranian and Turkish

citizenship, for breaching US sanctions against Iran (TRT World, 2018). After a while, Reza Zarrab case turned on against Hakan Atilla, former deputy CEO of Turkey's public bank, due to that Zarrab agreed with the New York prosecutor to become the witness. The case angered Turkish President Erdogan and Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gul said, the verdict *"an attack on Turkey's judiciary and sovereignty"*. And, Presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said, *"This case is a conspiracy with the purpose of complicating Turkey's internal politics and intervening in Turkish internal affairs."* According to Al-Jazeera news, *"The case against Atilla was built on the testimony of Turkish-Iranian gold trader Reza Zarrab, who cooperated with prosecutors and pleaded guilty to charges of leading the operation to evade US sanctions on Iran. Zarrab alleged that top Turkish officials, including Erdogan, personally authorized two Turkish banks to join the scheme when he was prime minister, in addition to other ministers"* (Al-Jazeera News, 2018). On top of all other strains between both NATO allies, this case, accusations, and verdict also increased the tension of Ankara against Trump administration (The Telegraph, 2018).

d) *Russian S-400 Purchase*

After that shooting down of Russian fighter plane, Ankara try to re-establish mutual relations with Russia. In this context, the Erdogan Government has signed an agreement with Moscow to purchase Russian S-400 missile defense systems, which are incompatible with the NATO system (Reuters & Brown, 2018). However, this agreement has been made on the one hand to restore the relations with Russia, on the other hand, to use as a pressure instrument on the USA and the other NATO allies (Wasilewski, 2017). This partnership with Russia brought some questions about Turkey's role as a loyal ally in NATO in mind. The main goal of this agreement to obtain "know-how" to domestic production, that NATO member countries did not agree to transfer of such technology to Turkey. Nevertheless, US Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo has warned Ankara to underscore the seriousness of the US concerns that Ankara could face sanctions if Turkey would purchase this system (Radio Free Europe, 2018). S-400 missiles were delivered on July 2018 by Russia, is a great concern for the USA claiming that they will pose a security threat to NATO military system in Turkey since this missile system has counter-measures against F-35's stealth technology. U.S. concern on this issue, on the one hand, that Turkey wants to connect the F-35 systems with the Turkish Air Force information network (HvBS-Hava Bilgi Sistemi) would create a risk that data collected by the advanced Joint Strike Fighter's sensors may end up being transmitted to Russia (Fergus, 2019). On the other hand, the flight of F-35 in Turkey could be detected by its S-400 radar systems, and that data

would send to Russia to improve and targeting of the stealthy F-35(Fergus, 2019).

As is known, Turkey is the partner country in the F-35 program, even some parts of it are produced in Turkey (Joe, 2019). Nevertheless, the objections put forward in the U.S. Congress introducing the bill by some of the Senators saying that "It concerns that Turkey would seek close defense cooperation with Russia, whose authoritarian ruler seeks to undermine NATO and U.S. interests at every turn...the Kremlin is an adversary of the United States and many of our NATO allies. The prospect of Russia having access to U.S. aircraft and technology in a NATO country, Turkey, is a serious national and global security risk" (Joe, 2019). Supreme Allied Commander Europe for NATO and the head of American forces in Europe, U.S. Army General. Curtis Scaparotti said that the F-35 sale to Turkey should be canceled if Turkey buys the S-400. However, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced immediately to local tv. Channels that Turkey will stick to its S-400 acquisition program, and even it might go further to have more advanced S-500 in the future(Joe, 2019).

Since Turkey obviously is interested in a missile technology transfer and joint production of the ballistic missile defense system that she will purchase. And the U.S. and other NATO allies who have that of rejected such request but Russia accepted(Fergus, 2019).

This purchase has brought some other challenges with Turkey and the USA that the US put some restrictions even to sell some rifles due to concerns of the US Congress, under the Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which was signed by the US President last August(RT News, 2018).

This event has two folds; one of them is the tensions escalate between Ankara and Washington. The other is NATO's different stance that NATO Secretary-General did not say anything about Turkey cannot buy S-400 system. On the contrary, He told ally ever has the right to purchase any system (Jones, 2019). According to the NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg Press release to remain Conference release following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Foreign Minister's session, NATO tries to remain unbiased leaving this issue between Ankara and Washington to solve with compromise. (NATO Press Release, 2019)

Nowadays, even though, it is witnessed that Ankara and Washington are in the process of negotiation to solve all problems between themselves. However, there is not sound result yet. Both sides should make concessions mutually without making any sacrifice from their national interest particularly on Syria issue vital matter for Turkey to preserve its sovereignty and solidarity with NATO.

III. TROUBLES WITH EUROPEAN UNION AND EUROPEAN NATO MEMBERS

- a) *Some, particularly striking evens took place between Ankara and Germany to strain diplomatic relations between two ancient friends after the first quarter of 2016.*

First strain emerged between two countries due to that German comedian and satirist Jan Böhmermann's defamatory poem about Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, on March 31, 2016. President Erdogan sued him, but German prosecutors eventually dropped the charges on October 4, 2016, that was the first case to spark a diplomatic strain between Ankara and Berlin (Staudenmaier, 2018). On June 2, 2016, the resolution recognizing 1915 Armenian Genocide passed unanimously in German Parliament, in response that Ankara recalled its ambassador in Berlin and the Turkish community in Germany held protest in several German cities. Ankara accused Berlin and other NATO allies of not taking a clear stand against the failed coup attempt in On July 15, 2016 the Turkish authorities purged the governmental institutions such as army and judiciary, detaining some of them caused to criticize of German politicians. On the top of it, another crisis had emerged when soldiers, diplomats, judges and other government officials living in Germany and at NATO facilities in Germany had requested to asylum in Germany after facing persecution following the failed coup on July 15, 2016. Nevertheless application for asylum had been made by the Turkish government officials who worked all over the EU countries such as Belgium, Greece (Deutsche Welle, 2017a). President Erdogan extended official requisition officially to extradite all asylum seekers in a meeting with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. However, it was rejected due to that is not a political decision but decision of The Federal Office for Migration and Refugees(Deutsche Welle, 2017b). Since Berlin did not take any reaction to extradition who applied for asylum, in return for that, Ankara has taken into custody two German journalist accusing them supporting terrorist organizations, on February 2017. On March 2017, the Justice and Development Party (JDP) members attempt to visit Germany and Nederland to make campaigns there before a referendum on constitutional changes to expand presidential power were blocked by two countries. Following these reactions, JDP leaders accused Germany using Nazi application caused by undesirable rifts between two states and Ankara (Smale, 2017). It goes on like a chess game, Berlin accused Ankara of spying in Germany, then President Erdoğan announced of Germany's main political party as "enemies of Turkey" and urges German-Turks not to vote for them in 2017. German Chancellor Angela Merkel said on the eve of the election that Turkey should

not become EU member and backed a move to cut Turkey's pre-accession EU funds in October 2017. German politicians criticized "Operation Olive Brunch" in Afrin region also allowed mass protest of Kurdish communities in Germany, on 20 January, 2017 (Staudenmaier, 2018). Now, in Germany, foreign politicians are banned from election campaigning for up to three months ahead of the vote in their home country. Netherlands and Austria have also made similar moves (MacKenzie, 2018). On March 2017, Cavusoglu called Netherlands "the capital of fascism" (MacKenzie, 2018).

Nevertheless, On February 2018, Turkish Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim paid a visit to Germany and started in Berlin with face-to-face talks between German Chancellor Angela Merkel to revive relations again (Jurgens, 2018). In response, the formation of the new grand coalition in Germany by the leadership of Angela Merkel made an attempt bringing an end to the icing period in Turkish-German relations (Yetkin, 2018b). In May 2018, German Chancellor Angela Merkel with other German leaders gathered in Düsseldorf met with Turkish political leaders, including Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu, on the 25th anniversary of a neo-Nazi arson attack in Solingen that killed five members of a Turkish-German family on May 29, 1993. This action taken by German Chancellor should be assumed a good-will intention to the de-icing and re-improve mutual interest of both countries (DW, 2018). According to Aksam newspaper in Turkey, Der Spiegel magazine on June addition claimed that German government reviewed its approach to FETO (Fetullah Gulen organization) and has taken Turkey's warning into accounts on that FETO members fled to Germany had attended the failed coup attempt on July 15 (Aksam, 2018). This policy changing should inevitably be a positive effect on Ankara-Berlin relations without any doubt.

All those events happened with Germany, which is the most influential member of the EU and NATO eventually affected relations between the EU, NATO, and Turkey. EU leaders and Germany made a meeting to reevaluate and discussed Turkey position and avoid making any rash decisions that could reduce its engagement with the country and its ability to offer support to civil society and other pro-democratic and pro-EU actors in Turkey (Paul, 2017).

According to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mevlut Cavusoglu, expressed in an exclusive interview on DW's top political interview show Conflict Zone, "Europe and the West are showing "double standards" over democracy and their treatment of Turkey"(MacKenzie, 2018).

b) *The last issue emerged as an Eastern Mediterranean security concerns of EU and Turkey,*

Turkey has a great deal of impact and an exclusive role for the Eastern Mediterranean Energy

security mainly in two different but intertwined aspects. *Firstly*, in the second decade of the 2000's, hydrocarbon energy resources exploited in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea region, just near the offshore of Israel, Egypt, and southern Cyprus. This development has brought new aspect to geostrategic importance of Turkey because its proximity to the research area of particularly to Cyprus region, regarding the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) is overlapping. Exploding new natural gas resources on the offshore of Israel, Southern Cyprus Government and Greece, and Turkey would be the center of crises for ongoing days. *Secondly* Turkish territory has a unique location as transit hub for oil and gas pipelines. Turkey, the fact that its advantageous geopolitical position, has the privilege of playing a crucial role as an energy transit route country for hydrocarbon sources directed to the European countries, either from the Caspian Sea, from the Middle East or Russia. Many interregional oil and gas pipelines already pass through its soils makes it a unique geostrategic asset as an energy transit country and an energy hub ('The East Mediterranean Geopolitical Puzzle and the Risks to Regional Energy Security' 2018). By establishing an Eastern Mediterranean Energy Corridor, offshore natural discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean will pave the way for European countries to reach new energy supplies (Pelagias, 2012). Today Europe has scarce options to provide natural gases except for Russia. However, Russia has always an opportunity to use this option as leverage to European countries due to the Russian-Ukrainian problem. In this regard, building up new transit routes to reduce dependence on Russian gas, the geographical position of Turkey has critical and significant in respect to its exact central location of the European continent and the Middle East and Caucasian Countries which have a huge amount of energy sources (Hardem, n.d.). According to the Hardem Attorneys at Law assessments "Due to the current situation of Middle East and geographical position of Israel the transmission of Israeli Gas is a critical issue with regards to security so that it is obvious that pipelines should be constructed through the Mediterranean Sea if Turkey achieves to solve politic problems with Cyprus because in the event of transmission of Israeli gas, most probably the pipeline route would be planned through Cyprus. Given that the fact that Turkey does not recognize Cyprus as a state, it can be easily predicted that challenging negotiations are close at hand for Turkey."

In a website of Minister of Foreign Affairs, "Turkey's Energy Profile and Strategy," Turkey's role in the regional energy trade has been explained as follows; (MFA Turkey, n. d.)

"Turkey is geographically located between energy-producing countries of the Region with more than 75% of the world's proven oil and gas reserves and the well-developed European energy consumer markets. This privileged natural bridge position provides Turkey with both opportunities and responsibilities in term of energy security. ... In this regard, while developing its energy strategy, Turkey aims to strengthen its position between East-West and South-North Energy Corridors.

The "East-West" gas pipeline projects which are envisaged to bring gas from Caspian and the Middle East regions to Europe through Turkey are referred to as "Southern Gas Corridor" (SGC). South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum Natural Gas Pipeline (BTE), Turkey-Greece Interconnector (ITG) are existing pipelines while the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans-Adriatic-Pipeline (TAP) are planned projects within the context of Southern Gas Corridor. The delivery of gas to Turkey through TANAP will start in mid-2018 and to Europe in 2020".

In this article, recently explored hydrocarbon sources in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea will be taken under consideration, but the others in which Russia, Iran, and other gas and oil producer states put aside.

The most economical way for transporting gases from Israel to European market is neither to carry it with huge transatlantic cargo ships or with the pipeline along with Israel to Italy via Cyprus and Greece, but using Turkish territory as a transit hub from Cyprus, to convey Europe which costs approximately 4.7 billion US dollars, while the others costs would be much more respectively (Sandikli, 2016) (Litsas & Tziampiris, 2015).

As a result, geographically Turkish territory is most an appropriate and reasonable transportation route to convey Mediterranean natural gases to European markets primarily, in respect to the project costs, constructions, and maintenance and operation point of views.

IV. RELATIONS WITH NATO AND TURKEY AFTER THAT SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

- a) *Syria is the cradle of a "proxy war" currently, with regional and international actors arming one side or another. On the one hand Russia, Iran, and Lebanese Hezbollah fighters together with supporting Assad regime are very active in Syria, on the other hand, the USA and Syrian Free army mostly composed by YPG/PYD forces backing by the US, France, and Britain have taken place in the region against those who support Bashar Assad (Coleman, 2018). While Turkey tries to protect its sovereignty rights and national interests against Assad regime,*

Daesh and Kurdish insurgents (YPG/PYD) in Syria to keep the unified structure of Syrian territory without taken any solid support from NATO allies (Winter, 2017).

Nonetheless, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg recent visit to Ankara (April 16, 2018) reflected NATO political perception on Turkey. In a press conference held in Ankara, Secretary-General Stoltenberg said that *"No other Ally has suffered as many terrorist attacks as Turkey. And you are the Ally most exposed to the instability in this region. Turkey generously hosts more than three and a half million refugees. But you do not stand alone. NATO stands with you in solidarity."* and pointed out, *"You make essential contributions to NATO operations and the fight against Daesh. Our AWACS surveillance aircraft flies from Konya in support of the Global Coalition to defeat Daesh. Turkey also helps to build stability abroad:*

- *By playing a lead role in Afghanistan with hundreds of troops in our Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan and Turkey also helps with funding for the Afghan national army and security forces;*
- *Turkey is contributing to NATO's mission in Kosovo;*
- *And you actively support our training activities in Iraq.*

So Turkey does a lot for our Alliance, despite facing serious security challenges" (NATO, 2018b).

In 2015, after that the involvement of Russian forces in Syria civil war and Moscow's support for the Assad regime, NATO defense minister had decided to enhance response forces to be able to deploy troops speedily. Also, Turkey has complained that Russian fighter planes have violated its air space frequently. Secretary-General Stoltenberg said, the doubling of the size of the NATO Force to 40.000, NATO would be able to intervene the situation (Marcus, 2015). Thus, NATO has assured to defend allies given the escalation of Russian military activities in Syria (Marcus, 2015).

But, according to the study made by Carnegie Europe in 2015, titled, "NATO's Powerlessness over Syria and Refugees" assessed the NATO position on Syria issue. In this article writer, Judy Dempsey said, *"NATO is unwilling to become involved as an alliance in fighting the so-called Islamic State, and with good reasons: fears of being dragged into a prolonged conflict, fears of retaliation by the Islamic State in other European countries, and no clear post-military goal."* NATO countries are also not prepared to boost the defenses of the organization's Southern members, which are vulnerable to the Islamic State—and now to Russia too, given Moscow's increasing presence in the Mediterranean" (Dempsey, 2015).

Syrian Democratic Forces were formed on October 2015 by the military support of the USA and

provided Washington with the opportunity to deepen its relationship with PYD, considered as terror group affiliated with PKK, to occupy a large area in the guise of fighting Daesh. Moreover, Meanwhile, PKK is listed as a terrorist group by Turkey, the USA, and the EU, Washington has considered the YPG/PYD a key ally of it in fighting against Daesh in Syria (Anadolu Agency, 2017) (Winter, 2017). The USA provides explosives and weapons to the PYD in Syria are also used by PKK terrorist in Turkey. In this framework, some of the Turkish media assess that The United States is obviously in default of its obligations under Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the NATO treaty by giving a hand the PYD/YPG terrorist groups in the fight against Daesh in war-torn Syria (Anadolu Agency, 2017).

Article 3 of the NATO charter states: *"In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, using continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack."*

Article 4, The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence, or security of any of the Parties is threatened.

Article 5, asserting the principle of collective defense, says: *"The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them ... shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defenses recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force to restore, and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."*(NATO, 1949)

Moreover, NATO's New Strategic Concepts define in the title of *"Core Task and Principles"* as Collective defense, Crises management and Cooperative security (NATO, 2010). Collective defense, *"NATO members will always assist each other against attack, by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. That commitment remains firm and binding. NATO will deter and defend against any threat of aggression, and against emerging security challenges where they threaten the fundamental security of individual Allies or the Alliance as a whole".* And Cooperate security, *"... NATO is remaining the unique and essential transatlantic forum for consultations on all matters that affect the territorial integrity, political independence and security of its members, as set out in Article 4 of the Washington Treaty."* The security environment depicted in the new concept, *"...Instability or conflict beyond NATO borders can directly threaten Alliance security, including*

by fostering extremism, terrorism, and trans-national illegal activities"(NATO, 2010)

Turkey's approach to current NATO policy on Middle East issue was nothing much beyond the discourse of the government authorities to give some massages to the United States as a NATO member that reminded it on collective defense principle. In this course, Ankara saying that "one for all, all for one", would like to have NATO support against the decision that Washington is opting for supporting PYD/YPG terrorist organization. However, even though President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has made exclamation from time to time, saying that "NATO where are you?" President Erdoğan urged NATO to come to Turkey's aid, saying its borders are "under threat right now." (hurriyet daily news, 2018a) And Minister of Foreign affairs pointed out that *"we called upon the Allies and NATO to give more support to us in our counterterrorism efforts. At the beginning of my words, I said that the biggest threat against the Allies is terrorism and terrorist organizations. That's why it's not the task or duty of one Ally to fight against terrorist organizations, and we must refrain from double standards in fighting against terrorism. But unfortunately, this double standard is so obvious."*(NATO, 2018a) As is seen those statements Turkish authorities never mentioned any words about quitting NATO but needs much more support to fight against terrorism threat to protect its territorial integrity in the framework of NATO concept.

Even Though, according to Collective security principle of the New Concept of NATO pointed out that the members will always assist each other against attack,... and, *that commitment remains firm and binding.* NATO member states especially, Washington has a different strategic and political comprehension in Syria, in spite that above-mentioned article stated clearly *"that commitment remains firm and binding,"* and seems to apply a double standard regarding to Turkey's integrity coming from beyond its and NATO borders which are cooperative security. The USA and European members of NATO hypocritically ignoring the threat that Turkey faces due to the fact that the severe distinction of perception between Ankara and Washington on the YPG/PYD, which Turkey considers as a terrorist organization to threat and the USA counts as an ally to fight with against Daesh, constitute a significant inconvenience that retains the chance of NATO consensus in Syria. (Ulgen, 2017)

As the last word on NATO strategy to involve in Syria affairs and the current USA strategy dealing with PYD/YPG, versus Turkey's national interest, explained very well by the article written by Mevlut Cavusoglu, Minister of Foreign Affairs, also published in Foreign Policy Journal. It said, *"...The weaknesses of Daesh were most clearly exposed after Turkey became the only*

NATO army to directly engage — and unsurprisingly crush — it in Jarablus in northern Syria. A prospective regrouping of Daesh is now being prevented by the dedicated work of a coalition that includes Turkey, which maintains the largest no-entry list of foreign terrorist fighters and runs the world's biggest civilian anti-Daesh security operation...". In this sentences, Mr. Cavusoglu put emphasize Turkey's position as a NATO member very and coalition attentively. That means Turkey is proud of its membership in NATO on the contrary to all claims against it.

In a statement, "A point of discord with the United States is its policy of arming the PKK/YPG to act as foot soldiers, even as they have a history of terrorism. This (policy) is a legally and morally questionable policy that was prepared by the Obama administration in its waning days and somehow crept into the Trump administration. The United States has played into the hands of all its critics and opponents by deciding to ally with terrorists despite its values and its 66-year-old alliance with one of their primary targets, Turkey....I have been pleased to see many NATO allies distance themselves from this U.S. policy, which flies in the face of our alliance's values. It also runs against our common interests in the region and beyond." (Cavusoglu, 2018) Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs put Washington strategic approach to handle the Syrian issue could not be accepted by Turkey in any case. And, Ankara announced once again its happiness that most of the NATO allies do not approve of this U.S. policy without and doubt.

b) Energy Security for NATO

Today, NATO is not only a military organization but also political organization after that the end of the cold war. Addition to that its mission against potential Russian threat, especially, its security concern beyond the military affairs has taken priority, regarding protecting the national interest of allied members, covering out of NATO borders as well as that of within its borders.

In Chicago Summit Declaration article 20, May 20, 2012, said, "NATO and the EU share common values and strategic interests. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO. Fully strengthening this strategic partnership, as agreed by our two organizations and enshrined in the Strategic Concept, is particularly important in the current environment of austerity; NATO and the EU should continue to work to enhance practical cooperation in operations, broaden political consultations, and cooperate more fully in capability development." (NATO Press Release, 2012)

Except for the USA, Canada, Norway, Montenegro, and Turkey, all NATO countries are also members of the EU. All European countries either being

a member of the EU or NATO are not only depending on Russia for their oil and natural gas needs in Russia, but also depending on the Middle East, Middle Asia and, Northern Africa. Meanwhile; all those countries would like to diversify finding some other resources and transit hub in order to free their dependence, particularly to Russia since Moscow has greater leverage as an energy power. (Beehner, 2006) In this point, Turkey, as a NATO member, has undertaken a new strategic role as an energy transit hub for the transportation of hydrocarbon reserves from its neighboring regions to NATO member countries and the UE as well. Turkey's Geopolitical location gives the privilege to be driving force due to its proximity to natural resources reserves, especially in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. In this framework, Turkey could contribute to enhancing the European and NATO "energy security" concerns as a NATO member offering a relatively safe "transit route" for these resources. (Biresselioglu, 2011)

NATO, aware of this subject, has established its pipeline system funded by NATO Security Investment Programs, 10.000 km long and runs through 12 NATO countries, including Turkey and has a storage capacity of 4.1 million cubic meters.(NATO, 2017) NATO pipeline System consists of eight national pipeline systems and two multinational systems. And the Turkish Pipeline System (TUPS), which comprises two separate pipeline systems known as the Western Turkey Pipeline System and the Eastern Turkey Pipeline System. That means Turkey has undertaken an important role in this respect (NATO, 2017).

On December 2005 and January 2006, a natural gas crisis experienced between Ukraine and Russia has made mainly to be Turkey, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland, France and Romania, impact on most of NATO member states. This subject has been taken as main security problems that affect the NATO energy security concerns and adopted one of the main articles (13) of NATO New Concept in NATO Lisbon Summit on November 19, 2010. (NATO, 2010)

Taking some lessons from above case, in Chicago Summit Declaration article 52, covers energy security, "A stable and reliable energy supply, diversification of routes, suppliers and energy resources, and the interconnectivity of energy networks, remain of critical importance. ... We will continue to consult on energy security and further develop the capacity to contribute to energy security, concentrating on areas where NATO can add value.... To this end, we will work towards significantly improving the energy efficiency of our military forces; develop our competence in supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure; and further develop our outreach activities in consultation with partners, on a case-by-case basis" (NATO Press Release, 2012).

In this token, NATO has taken the role to provide security of energy resources and transit hubs in the Middle East, using member states that established a coalition in Syria civil war to fight against Daesh and Assad regime supported by Russia and Iran.

In April 27, 2018, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said a group of Turkish reporters, reiterating Turkey's importance to the joint defense of the alliance, to look at the map is enough to recognize the country's value, amid rising criticism of Turkish actions in the media and Western capitals (Demirtas, 2018).

"Turkey is a highly valued ally. Turkey is important for our shared security. Not least in the fight against terrorism because Turkey has provided infrastructure basis for the efforts to the global coalition to defeat [the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] ISIL. We are grateful for Turkey for that," "It's enough to just look at the map and see the strategic geographic location of Turkey, bordering Iraq and Syria, bordering the turmoil and violence that is a threat to Turkey and to all other NATO allies," "As you know, NATO is not present on the ground in Syria, but some allies are (there). For me, the important thing is that the U.S. and Turkey now talk, have contacts, and see how they can deal with the situation in northern Syria in a coordinated way. I welcome this dialogue between Turkey and the U.S.," "We recognize that Turkey is the NATO ally that has suffered most from terrorist attacks. Turkey, of course, has the right to protect itself, and we expect it to be done in a proportionate way (proportional). Turkey has the right to protect itself because Turkey has suffered from many terror attacks." On the question of growing tension between Turkey and Greece, he said; "There are differences between Turkey and Greece related to issues in the Aegean Sea. I hope these differences can be solved in the spirit of dialogue and I welcome that the Greek prime minister and the Turkish prime minister have spoken to address these issues. It's only through this kind of dialogue that these differences can be solved. I have spoken of course with both the Turkish and the Greek authorities. I welcome the fact that these issues are being addressed through direct dialogue between Turkey and Greece." (Demirtas, 2018)

Nevertheless, in joint press conference on April 17, 2018, a question asked to the Secretary-General Stoltenberg, "some NATO Allies have stated that Turkey should be excluded from NATO" and about "Turkey-Greece increasing tension on Greece flags on some islands which are not knowing who own." Secretary-General Stoltenberg's respond to the first questions in line with Turkey's contribution on NATO is highly valuable. And going on putting emphasize that *"And I would like to underline that all NATO Allies welcome Turkey as a highly valued Ally. We understand the*

importance of having Turkey in the Alliance. Turkey has been a committed Ally for decades, and we would like to continue to work with Turkey, especially in the more demanding and challenging security environment as we see today" (NATO, 2018a). On the Turkey-Greece tension, he opted for not stepping in or interfering in such bilateral problems between Allies. Ultimately, he would like to keep his neutral position as a Secretary-General. This neutral position could be assessed that NATO is reluctant to take sides on the problems emerged natural gas resources in the Eastern Mediterranean, between Turkey, Greece, and Southern Cyprus. Meanwhile, European Union unconditionally supports Greece, and Southern Cyprus claims on this issue.

As is seen clearly, NATO would like to take any sides either Ankara-Washington relations or that of Ankara-Athens and the same goes Turkish relations with other NATO members such as Germany and Netherlands.

When we consider the energy security necessities of NATO in comply with its "The New Concept," Turkey has gained much more weight than it had during the Cold War era.

V. CONCLUSIONS

In this article, either Western countries, particularly the USA and EU countries or Turkey's approach to Turkey's membership to NATO was studied by analyzing empirically of the experienced problems between them. To find an answer both of the question that "Do western countries really want that Turkey must secede from NATO" and "Does Ankara really eager to quit NATO organization", the second question is about NATO; "as an organization is NATO seriously contemplate leaving of Turkey out of NATO" are not very difficult. Since, most of the problems with the Washington and Turkey and with some European countries like Germany and Turkey are exclusively the issues relevant to their relations individually, but not whole NATO concerns.

There are four major conflicting issues between Ankara and Washington as NATO allies, as it is mentioned above. The major problem emerged on Syrian issue that the USA has insisted to cooperate with PYD/YPG, a terrorist organization affiliated with PKK, which Ankara considers as a threat aiming to sovereignty right and territorial integrity of Turkey. And this partnership with PYD/YPG creates non-negotiable and un-accepted situation against Turkish unification as a sovereign country. The recent development of diplomatic negotiations with high-level authorities between both countries in Manbij region has been brought a common understanding that the USA should leave the cooperation with PYD/YPG. Instead, Washington and Ankara would act together to fight

against the common threat in Syria. This development shed a gleam of hope to quick resilience between both countries. It is assumed that Gulen issue and Reza Zarrab case could be considered as a secondary matter to work out later that would not harm mutual relations.

Some striking events took place between Ankara and Germany to strain diplomatic relations between two ancient friends after the first quarter of 2016. However, an account of Turkey, the most troublesome issue between Berlin and Ankara is that various diplomats and FETO members from Turkey fled to Germany and other European countries after that failed coup attempt and requested asylum. Ankara continuously put official request to the extradition of those asylum seekers although, German law makers rejected this demand. But, according to Der Spiegel magazine on June addition, German government reviewed its approach to FETO and has taken Turkey's warning into accounts on that FETO members fled to Germany had attended the failed coup attempt on July 15. Without any doubt, whole this policy changing should inevitably be a positive effect on Ankara-Berlin relations. The recent meeting held with Prime Minister, Bin Ali Yılmaz and Chancellor Merkel, the Chancellor of Germany, the most influential member of EU and NATO, eventually would contribute the improvement of relationships between Ankara and Berlin, which would make a positive impact of and improve Turkish relations with NATO and the EU as well.

Erdoğan government has never put agenda that Turkey should leave NATO Organization. On the contrary, Ankara reiterated several times that NATO should give hands to Turkey to fight with the terrorist threat to its territorial integrity. But NATO is reluctant to intervene in Syria. Meanwhile, Turkey's NATO membership questioning by some journalist or some opposition against Turkey's operation in Syria to protect its vital national interest in the expense of United States leadership in the course of Washington's strategy in partnership with PYD/YPG. This is what Turkey would not agree in any case even as a member of NATO. For that reason, Washington must respect Turkey's very delicate and vital issue on that matter. According to the latest diplomatic initiatives, the common understanding could be established between Washington and Ankara, in line with Turkey's indispensable and vital necessities.

The latest event that escalates tensions between Turkey and the United States over the procurement of Russian S-400 missile systems has brought a question that Turkey has turned its face to Russia, ignoring NATO ally. As Turkish presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin said: "*we (Ankara) will not allow the questioning of Turkey's position in NATO since Turkey has a word in all decisions as a NATO member*" (Jones, 2019). Against all odds, "*Russia is not alternative to Turkey*", as said professor Bağcı in his interview to Voice of America. "*Turkey will not look to Russia as a*

trusted ally. It is not the case and will not be. Turkey always uses Russia as a balance of power. as leverage. Turkey will not leave NATO... ." (Jones, 2019)

Moreover, this idea was strongly advocated by the prominent diplomat and former ambassador Sukru Elekdag in his interview, in Sozcu newspaper, was made by Ugur Dundar recently. (Dundar, 2019a) Mr. Elekdag also added that "*In case that Turkey leaves NATO not only the relations with the U.S.A. but also that of with EU would be cut.*" (Dundar, 2019b)

Regarding NATO concern on Turkey's position. On the one hand, NATO Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg stated very clearly that Turkey's membership is very valuable for NATO. That means there is no official statement that Turkey should be excluded from NATO, and it is out of the question. On the other hand, NATO has the determination that it would like to remain in a neutral position on the problem of Turkey and Greece just as its role on the Cyprus issue.

In summary, there is an inconvenience that NATO concerns about Turkey membership. While NATO as an organization put a great value of Turkey's membership and contribution to it. Some alliances try to use Turkey's membership as leverage to direct Ankara's foreign policy in parallel with their requirements. The United States and some other European countries using some of the mass media, spend efforts to force Ankara in line with their desire, to create an agenda that Turkey's NATO membership is in question since Ankara follows the independent foreign policy to fulfill its sovereignty requirements. Such initiatives have created anxiety in Turkish public opinion and cause a counter-reaction in Turkish media. Despite all those negative pressures, the government of Ankara has never brought that matter, which Turkey would leave NATO, on the international agenda officially. Ankara always put emphasize that NATO has a double standard when Turkey needs NATO contributions. This is what the Turkish government and people believe by heard.

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