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Stupidity During the Reformation

Social Intervention Methodologies

Highlights

Sri Lankan Food Retail Industry

Understanding & Cognitive Meaning

Discovering Thoughts, Inventing Future

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Stupidity During the Reformation

By James F. Welles, Ph.D

Abstract- At the same time that people were turning away from theological truths and looking outward at the world, those truths were undergoing dramatic revision as both the Christian religion in particular and Western Civilization in general were thoroughly reformed. In the early sixteenth century, with religious man seeking biblical answers to theological problems, Christianity underwent a number of soul searching revisions which were essentially *conservative* in nature efforts to go back to times before the Church became corrupted. Meanwhile, with Renaissance Man seeking human answers to temporal questions and functional solutions to real problems, the secular religions of capitalism and nationalism were taking shape. Thus, as Christian theology was being redefined, the Bible reinterpreted and the Church both split and reformed, rising capitalism was undermining the medieval guild system while growing nationalism was enfeebling the Holy Roman Empire and weakening the papacy.

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Stupidity During the Reformation

James F. Welles, Ph.D

At the same time that people were turning away from theological truths and looking outward at the world, those truths were undergoing dramatic revision as both the Christian religion in particular and Western Civilization in general were thoroughly reformed. In the early sixteenth century, with religious man seeking biblical answers to theological problems, Christianity underwent a number of soul searching revisions which were essentially *conservative* in nature efforts to go back to times before the Church became corrupted. Meanwhile, with Renaissance Man seeking human answers to temporal questions and functional solutions to real problems, the secular religions of capitalism and nationalism were taking shape. Thus, as Christian theology was being redefined, the Bible reinterpreted and the Church both split and reformed, rising capitalism was undermining the medieval guild system while growing nationalism was enfeebling the Holy Roman Empire and weakening the papacy.¹

The net result was not a reformation but four of them. Martin Luther began the revolt by trying to reform the Church but ended up reforming Christianity. John Calvin carried on the movement by expounding a theology which ended up putting capitalism on a tenuous metaphysical footing. As a reaction to the Protestant challenge, the Catholic Church staged a Counter Reformation which sought to restore power if not goodness to orthodox Catholicism. Meanwhile, princes were reforming the political realm by framing various sects of the secular religion of nationalism.²

In general, the overall reformation of Western Civilization was due to the dilution of Church influence which accompanied the rise of capitalism and nationalism. However, the Christian Reformation (with a capital "R") itself, which splintered the monolithic theocracy of the Catholic Church, was due primarily to a revival of religion. Christianity, if not the Church, thus was saved by reformers who made religion the chief issue again by appealing to the Bible and the spirit of Christ.³ Hence, although the Reformation was a theological backlash against the temporal Renaissance, it likewise began by looking backward to a renewal of the values of antiquity and ended by stumbling forward into the modern world.

The Reformation really was the Middle Ages' way of ending themselves and releasing the Western

mind from the official, singular faith which never had encompassed all of medieval life anyway. As the last great flowering of Medievaldom, it was intensely preoccupied with life in the hereafter, redemption and both the word and world of God. It was characterized by intolerance and superstition, narrow-mindedness and credulity as an upsurge in belief led to an addiction to demons and witches as well as a renewed commitment to Christ and eventually to reason.⁴

While belief was reestablished, the Church and the ecclesiastical structure of the Middle Ages were shattered by the combined attitudes of the princes, people and popes. The princes were particularly vexed not only by the clergy's immorality but by the Church's interference in lay affairs, its claims of overlordship and its financial policies and practices. During the Middle Ages, leaders of the emerging nation-states had gradually lost respect for the Church and come to fear it less and less. By the sixteenth century, when the Church sided with the Emperor against the nobles, the princes reached the point of grumbling about staging an irreligious revolt against the world rule of the Church.⁵

On the other hand, the people objected not to the power of the Church but to its weakness. They wanted a Church which would help them oppose wickedness here on earth: That is, they wanted more Christian control, not less. Their objection to the pope was that he was just another wealthy, strong-armed prince rather than the spiritual leader of the Christian world. In the triangular struggle among the popes, princes and people, the popes sought alliances with various princes but never concerned themselves with their general popularity with the unenfranchised, illiterate, powerless people.⁶

Ultimately, however, the Reformation was caused by the Renaissance popes, who provided the motivation and material for all those who challenged their authority. It was the popes, not Luther, the princes or the people, who destroyed the Western theocracy both by what they did and did not do because of both what the Church was and was not. Far from clashing with secularism, the popes had welcomed it into the Vatican, which they corrupted to the point of shame while inhibiting reforms in theology and thought which would have allowed them and others to understand what was happening. Embracing secular, worldly values while embodying a spiritual void, they eventually caused the splintering of Christendom.⁷

Author: e-mail: JWelles103@aol.com

Beginning with Sixtus IV (1471-1484), papal deterioration was rapid and complete.⁸ Sixtus was a despot who never let his role as servant of Christ interfere with his role as Vatican prince.⁹ He was deemed stupid by the nobles of Italy for compounding nepotism with ineptitude by surrounding himself with nitwit nephews and ignorant, bastard sons.¹⁰ Then came Innocent VIII (1484-1492) a weak, compliant family man who provided for his children.¹¹ Under him, administrative standards reached a level of venality which could no longer be ignored, and in 1488, several high ranking Church officials were arrested and two executed for forging for sale papal bulls of dispensation.¹²

Innocent's immediate successor, Alexander VI (1492-1503), lived a life of deceit centered¹³ on his family, the Borgias,¹⁴ rather than on the Church. Despite all his efforts, his son Cesare^a failed to attain the office the father had so thoroughly defiled.¹⁵ Like his son, Alexander indulged in legendary sins, was responsible for sundry murders and carried perfidy to a new low.¹⁶ As a rake whose conduct firmly established the doctrine of papal fallibility,¹⁷ his disastrous reign, characterized by corrupt excesses,¹⁸ marked the nadir of the Renaissance papacy.¹⁹

His successor, Julius II (1503-1513), was a crusader who missed the Crusades. Europe was dismayed by the role he played in 1506 in instigating wars and stunned by the sight of the pope riding at the head of his oxymoronic Christian army.²⁰ Although his behavior was otherwise not scandalous and he did enlarge the papal domain, everyone especially the Church ended up paying for his militarism.²¹ He defeated the French but at the price of inviting the Spanish to dominate Italy. Both his costly wars and patronizing of artists (like Michelangelo and Raphael) increased the financial burden on the papacy, and although these monetary problems were certainly severe, the basic problem he posed was that his ends were simply incompatible with Christian means and ideals.²² Probably his idea of heaven was a one of riches gained through military might.

If stupidity is the obstinate attachment to a dysfunctional goal, Julius was stupid. His goal was personal glory, which he somehow believed would in turn bestow glory upon the Church, and he pursued this goal with an absolute disregard for both obstacles and methods. His disregard of obstacles made him a successful warrior, but his disregard of methods the means to his worldly ends made him a menace to both the Church and alleged God he was supposedly serving.²³

a) Machiavelli's patron sinner of power.

The unasked question Julius posed was: "What price glory?" His answer was, apparently, "Any!", and he was quite happy to have the Church pay it for his glory in life and death. In life, he needed money to support his chief instrument of papal policy in Italy troops. In death, he needed it to be housed in a tomb whose cost exceeded papal revenues. The price of this "World's cathedral" had to be met by the granting of indulgences, and this was the proximal cause of the Protestant revolt.²⁴ Although the faithful were offended by the general depravity of Rome and the reluctance of popes to reform, the commercialization of spiritual grace was an insult as well as an expense which touched the devout in a very tangible way.²⁵ The money grubbing Church²⁶ had prostituted itself^b to the point that the granting^c of future indulgences actually encouraged sin²⁷ to the unendurable aggravation of thrifty, Bible-thumping Protestants.

Footing the bill for all the papal indulgences was Leo X (1513-1521), who capped the religious irresponsibility of the Renaissance popes. He was an educated, sensitive, pleasure-loving, easygoing, indolent gambler who never understood the game he was playing and losing to Luther. Interested in music, the theater, books, gems and hunting practically everything but the Church, he neglected his official duties and was totally unprepared for the challenge which confronted him. What the Church needed at this point was a pope who would institute internal reforms. What it had was a neoplatonic Christian who did next to nothing to curb its rampant corruption.²⁸

At best, Leo was conscientious about maintaining religious rituals. A careless Christian in office, he kept fasts and celebrated Mass daily.²⁹ At worst, he discredited the papacy. For the sake of fines, he promoted a conspiracy to have himself assassinated, but, unfortunately, the plot failed. In true Renaissance style, he resorted to treachery to dispose of Gianpaolo Baglioni, a dynastic ruler and rival who was invited by Leo to Rome on a safe conduct pass, stupidly accepted^d and then was safely beheaded.³⁰

b) Although much reformed, the Catholic Church remains today the world's largest corporation shaming the most gigantic multinational conglomerates into pettiness as it saps the meager financial resources of the submerging nations of the third world. Would it not be more truly Christian of the Church to use its wealth to help the needy?

c) Technically, they were not sold they were granted, with the grantee just happening to make the Church a gift scaled to the scope of the indulgence and his own financial situation.

d) Why anyone in this age of treachery accepted a safe-conduct pass from anyone remains a mystery even to an expert on stupidity. Perhaps Gianpaolo simply did not know that would-be reformer Jan Hus had been dispatched under identical circumstances 100 years before, (Rabb. p. 26.) [Sad to say, Hussein Kamil, the head of Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction program before he fled the country, did not read this book so was lured back to the same end in 1996 by a promise of pardon from his father-in-law, trustworthy,

Although the man on the spot, Leo did not have a clue as to what was going on. If he had, he would not have known what it meant nor what to do about it. Insulated to the point of being unaware of the issues in dispute, he comprehended neither the specific protests nor that the general condition of the Church had been deteriorating for the previous fifty years.³¹

Once the protests became public and widespread, not even his Loftiness could feign ignorance of the revolt which crashed upon the Church. In 1518, when asked to vote a tax for a crusade against the Turks, the Diet of Augsburg replied that the real enemy of Christendom was "The hell-hound in Rome".³² The popular feeling was that the proper concern of the Church was neither art nor war but the spiritual needs of the faithful. Just as Christianity had developed to fill a spiritual void in the Roman Empire, so did the Protestant movement develop in response to the spiritual vortex created by the internal corruption of the Catholic empire. Thus, it was not so much a response to a failing of the Christian schema as it was a reaction to its replacement by a secular ethic.

The popes, by their very success according to their new standards, alienated those faithful to the old morality while simultaneously fostering hostility among the princes, who became increasingly jealous of the prosperity and influence of the Church. In this context, the conservative nature of the Protestant movement is most noteworthy. In an ideological sense, Protestants rejected the worldly popes and returned to the scriptures to find meaning in their faith and lives. In this way, they were typical of many revolutionaries who break away from establishments which have been corrupted by power and betrayed basic ideals. As it turned out, Protestants were actually interested as much in the economic gains to be made by disemboweling the Church as in doctrine. However, it was not squabbling over riches but theological disputes reflecting doctrinal differences which riddled the Protestant movement from its inception and shattered any chance it might have had at unity and strength.³³

Undoubtedly, the popes were contributing causes to the debacle in so far as they personified and worked within the cognitive framework of the Church and the age. However, while the idiosyncratic quirks of the Renaissance popes contributed to the onset of the Reformation, they do not explain why and how the Church failed to respond to the dissent which was growing all around it but instead persisted in bringing itself into disrepute. The basic problem was that the popes were usually unwilling and always unable to change the system because *they were the system*. In defining the establishment, they compounded two

factors which both corrupted the Church and inhibited reform: One was that the Church had embraced the secular values of the age; the other was that, having become secularized, it refused to heed its many critics, reform and become the spiritual/ religious institution the unconsulted people needed.

Basically, by adopting the values of their general environment, the Renaissance popes became victims of the neurotic paradox. They were continually reinforced by immediate financial rewards as they brought on the longterm ruination of the Church from the top down. In the true spirit of Renaissance artists, they evaluated their policies and acts from their own subjective viewpoint (i.e., as leaders of a rich political institution). Unfortunately for the Church, they perceived their new, worldly perspective itself in its own terms not as a corruption of the sacred Christian schema but as a standard defining a new kind of success.

The problem was not that the Church failed to adapt to new conditions. If anything, the problem was that the Church had become the new conditions. It had become a Renaissance, secular, worldly Church in which few could believe. Far from providing an eternal standard for behavior and rather than reforming the Church to keep or make it a spiritual institution, the clergy led the way to corruption. At a time when some people worshiped money, others power and others the nation-state, devout Christians felt a bit bewildered and very much betrayed by their religious leaders. If anyone could embody a void, the popes embodied the spiritual vacuum which induced the Reformation.

By the early sixteenth century, serious dissatisfaction with and by the clergy had widened and deepened. This discontent was clearly expressed in every medium available both within and outside the Church.³⁴ Specifically, in 1511, Erasmus laid the ideological groundwork for Luther's impending attack with the publication of his biting satire *In Praise of Folly*. To everyone but those in power, an outbreak of dissent appeared both imminent and justified.

The impending out-break was all but assured because efforts at reform were pretty much wasted on Church leaders, who had already turned their collective backs on the faith and the faithful. Well before Luther, there had been numerous attempts to stem the decline of the Church, but none had any significant impact. Outside the Church, there had actually been open revolts, like that of Wycliffe in England, and there had also been a number of attempts at Christian reform within the Church, but all had failed. In addition, criticisms not only from outside the Church but from within the priesthood as well were pointedly ignored.

Such potential reforms failed and criticisms were ignored because no one in a position of authority in Rome was looking to prevent the debacle we know

humanitarian Saddam Hussein. (Feith. D. War and Decision. Harper; NY. 2008. p. 189.)]

was so imminent. If anything, Church leaders generally refused to acknowledge that reforms were necessary. Behind all Church policy was an assumption by the higher clergy that the Church was invulnerable and eternal.³⁵ This self-defeating illusion on the part of the papacy of its indestructible permanence as well as a concomitant, exaggerated sense of righteous power were both based on a presumption of moral inviolability common among those who define right and wrong. This complex is typical of people indulging in groupthink and tended to make Church officials deaf to the calls for reform swelling around them.

Basically, these calls came from two kinds of would be reformers, both of which failed to save the Church. The first was the "Rational" reformer, who was usually a scholarly philosopher. He believed in the idealized intellect that the informed mind would bring about improvements in institutions and morality. Such a potential reformer (like Sir Thomas More, for example) carried on the tradition of the Christian humanist, who emphasized the reasoning faculties of man and venerated the role of the intellectual aristocracy.³⁶

The other was the "Mystical" reformer, who was medieval in approach and emphasized reliance on divine guidance, inspiration and individual sanctity. According to the fervid mystics, the corruptions of society could not be corrected by pious remedies, which were considered useless and misleading: Society could be saved, however, by purification through exhortation and discipline. This was the approach of the orthodox fundamentalist and was personified in Savonarola.³⁷

As a constant source of criticism, friar Girolamo Savonarola (1452-1498) was a voice of religious distress which pope Alexander VI managed to ignore for seven years while it resounded throughout Italy in the 1490's. He castigated the popes for contravening their own creed and proclaimed, "Popes and prelates speak against pride and ambition and they are plunged into it up to their ears. They preach chastity and keep mistresses...They think only of the world and worldly things; they care nothing for souls."³⁸

Of course, some reformers, like Erasmus, combined both approaches into a kind of rational mysticism. He certainly was a humanist scholar, but in religious matters, he emphasized the spirit over formality and piety over reason. Unfortunately, he was a man of conviction with an approach to social reform that was bypassed. His commitment was to Church unity, but as a sixteenth century moderate who disliked fanaticism,³⁹ he was pushed to the fringe as the zealots of the age piqued themselves and each other to frenzies of excess.

The tragedy of Erasmus was that of the humanists generally failure to achieve reform within the Church. In *The Praise of Folly*, he pointed out the stupidity of formality, monasticism, ignorance and

neglect among the higher clergy.⁴⁰ Even though these ills persisted, he and his colleagues could not bring themselves to break with the Church because they were not revolutionaries. They were, if anything, too reasonable, too intellectual, too timid and often too beholden to the Church to lead a popular movement against it.⁴¹

When the rationalists and humanists failed, reformers perforce turned to mysticism. Reason and moderation had been ignored and thwarted, so the field was left to the intense, spiritual reformers of the age.⁴² Among these, Savonarola had already overplayed his righteous hand and been burned at the stake for heresy (i.e., denouncing papal crimes) in 1498. Still, the supreme moral questions of the age would be called by reformers outraged to the point of passion by rampant clerical abuse, and the ensuing break was successful, when it finally came, because princes and priests reinforced each other's concerns about the tax money being used in Rome to abuse the Bible. Like most successful sinners, the popes made the institution they were allegedly serving pay for their indulgences: the Church they secularized lost half of its constituency to the Protestant secession.⁴³

Bad as this abuse was, problems within the Church alone did not cause the Reformation. There was certainly little in the Church to prevent the Reforming, but actually the ecclesiastical abuses in the early sixteenth century were no worse than they had previously been. True, under Julius II, the demands for money reached a new high, but there had been indulgence scandals before, and for three centuries, popes had been accused of avarice. Other problems, like corruption of the monasteries, simony, plurality and neglect of duties, had also been common for centuries.⁴⁴

The Reformation was thus not the result of a progressive decline to the point of revolt. It resulted from a failure of belief in the traditional system. Rather than a reaction against long standing errors and excessive abuses in the established institutions, the Reformation was an expression of age old needs which could not be fulfilled within the existing framework of the Church. People did not cease to believe in the Church because of what scandalous monks and corrupt clergymen had done for centuries, nor what Luther did in 1517 but because they had needs that the Church failed to meet.⁴⁵

Under "Modern" tutelage, the Church became generally indifferent and unresponsive to spiritual needs of the unsung people and so irresponsible that Leo X simply dismissed Luther's first challenge as a quarrel among monks. He was half right. Luther was a monk, but his quarrel was not with other monks: It was with the Church, and in the grandest sense, the movement he

led became a religious revolution because it led to a reformation not of just the Church but of Christianity.⁴⁶ Catholicism would later reform itself in its own fashion with the Counter-Reformation because it had been clearly undermined as a religious institution by Luther's crusade, which was basically a fundamentalist, reactionary movement calling for a return to what was thought to be the pure, unadulterated Christianity of classical times.

Martin Luther (1483-1546) was, as was John Calvin, a throwback to St. Augustine, particularly with respect to the relation of the soul to God a medieval issue if ever there was one. With the aid of his fellow Protestants, he abolished purgatory, from which the souls of the dead could be delivered by Masses, and claimed that predestination made the fate of souls independent of priests, particularly after death.⁴⁷ Also, he emphatically rejected indulgences, the granting of which helped support the papacy.⁴⁸

As a theologian years earlier, Luther had scrutinized every official way to salvation and found them all wanting. Worse yet, he suspected the reason he could not love God was because God was not lovable. Certainly there was something unlovable about a God who damned people regardless of their merit, for which He was responsible anyway. The essential problem was that the Supreme Egotist⁴⁹ was playing God. He was uncontrollable, unregulated, a law unto Himself, a system of intellectual corruption indulging in capricious decisions a celestial case of absolute power corrupting divinely. Love God? Luther hated Him!⁵⁰

In his blasphemy, Luther despaired and panicked. He could not pray for help because there was no one to whom he could pray. He became morbidly introspective but finally found his salvation in the Bible, which led him, from 1513-1515, to reject reason and embrace faith. He somehow found God to be compassionate and forgiving even of those who rebelled. This simply had to be believed and accepted because faith^e alone was the answer⁵¹ despite the fact that the Bible (James 2:25) clearly stipulates that a man proves himself to be among the chosen by deeds and not by faith in itself.

Philosophically, Luther was ironic in his use of logic to reject reason in the cause of faith. He dealt with medieval problems and used a modern method to come up with a primitive solution. He had used reason but could not face the rational conclusion that God was a jerk. Nor could he conclude that the Bible was a book of fables. He was stuck with his religious schema, so his

conclusions had to fit into his Biblical/Christian format. The day of reason for its own sake was yet to come.

As one who as a priest had not only read the Bible but taken it seriously—indeed, literally, Luther was nevertheless more a product of his life experience than of thinking, reading or speculating.⁵² A stubborn, unruly victim of excessive corporal punishment as a youth,⁵³ when he visited Rome in 1510, he was shocked to bewilderment by the levity and worldly splendor of papal life he observed and, after an extended incubation period, said so. In 1516, he protested that indulgences were deceptive and pernicious, rested on a false assumption of extra credits of saints and induced complacent immorality rather than contrite piety.⁵⁴ A year later, he denounced papal expedients and papal conduct as well and defiantly refused to recant unless shown specifically on Biblical authority where he had erred. He quickly had the people in ferment and princes committed, for their own Machiavellian reasons, to support and protect him from the pope.⁵⁵

Abuse of the Church by its officials was to continue ever after, but 1517 was still a turning point in history: the Church simply failed to turn. This was the year when Martin Luther nailed the clergy to the Church door. As an agent of the Reformers, Luther was inspired by the idea that the Church should live up to itself. It was this peculiar notion which led him to become the greatest whistle blower in history.

Although Luther was a theological rebel, he certainly did not perceive himself as an innovator. On the contrary, as a spokesman for reform, he leveled the charge of innovation against a Church which he contended was really only 400 years old. He objected to the papal theocracy which had developed since the reign of Innocent III and wanted to restore the Church of the eighth century the time when he thought the worldly power of the Church began. His goal was to recover the innocent, virginal Church⁵⁶ which had discredited itself by surviving. To him, the Church had simply given up too much by compromising fundamental essentials when it mixed with life in the Middle Ages. He denounced it as a power conscious institution devoid of a Christian conscience and aspired to restore the religious spirit to Christianity.

As an archly conservative, inadvertent rebel who accidentally popularized the individual conscience, Luther did not try to start a new sect: He simply wanted to reform the Church that existed. However, he was more extreme than most reformers in that while others complained about abuses within the Church, he regarded the Church itself as an abuse. As a theological fanatic, he struggled over the relation of man and God and was not as much concerned with ending papal corruption as he was with saving a compromised

e) This is one of the great historical examples of what we now call a transcendental psychological experience. When his ego-sustaining schema was shattered, Luther was forced to fall back on faith in something superior in this case, faith itself.

religion.⁵⁷ For him, corruption was a side issue that just happened to play into his hands as a reformer.

Luther was not only a conservative rebel but an authoritarian who hated the Church not for being authoritarian but for being slack and corrupt. In fact, he lost himself in the Germanic authority of a Führer Gott whose only commandment was blind obedience and who was unattainable through priests, good works or reason which Luther considered the "Devil's bride", "God's worst enemy"⁵⁸ and "The greatest enemy Faith has".⁵⁹ If one relied on reason alone, he would not attain faith, and only a fool would think reason could lead him to understand life's mysteries.⁶⁰ Reason might be useful in some ways, but, it was useless for attaining faith, which is what Luther was all about. Faith alone would secure God's blessing⁶¹ regardless of good works and despite rational thought.

Ironically, the revolt begun by the authoritarian Luther became essentially a matter of individual rebellion in the true artistic spirit of the Renaissance and prefiguring democracy. Previously, only the Church as Christianity's equivalent of Islam's corporate conscience⁶² had perverted God's Word, but now, thanks to Luther's translation of the New Testament into German in 1522 and the whole book in 1534, everyone could pervert it. Every person was to be his own priest, with each reading the Bible and deciding for himself who and what God was. This was moral anarchy, with each individual disregarding externals, concentrating on his own conscience, listening to his own heart and developing his own soul. Luther advocated this intensely subjective approach to religion because he naively assumed everyone else would come to the same conclusions that he had reached. Like Plato before him, he took for granted that most people were pretty much like himself quieter, perhaps, and maybe not quite so gifted, but still basically little Luthers. During the peasant revolts of the early 1520's, he was dismayed to find that some people wanted things quite different from what he did,⁶³ and when some carried their causes to shocking excesses, he lost confidence in the free judgment he had promoted and defended.⁶⁴ Apparently, the people might make up their own minds about the all-defining Bible but not about their own lives.^f

To his holy dismay, Luther found people were inspired by his spirit rather than his theology, won over by their leader Thomas Münzer's screwy notion that all men are created equal⁶⁵ and had come not only to disbelieve the Church but to disobey secular authority. He abandoned them and denied them the right to resist worldly tyranny⁶⁶ in a pamphlet with the catchy title *Against the Murdering, Thieving Hordes of Peasants*

(1525). However, while faith in God would bring salvation, faith in the Establishment when coupled with an indifference to political and social iniquities does not bring justice. His immediate legacy was not secular reform but theological division and a century of holy wars that devastated his divided land.⁶⁷

This division began when Luther realized that since the Church was obviously not going to accommodate him, he must start his own. Ironically but not surprisingly, it quickly became institutionalized and developed its own priestly laws, dogmas and doctrines. Although Luther always pictured himself as offering people correct beliefs, his rebellious spirit conquered more souls than did his authoritarian dicta. Protestant disciples piously carried on his tradition, generalized his means to their own ends and claimed their faiths justified their beliefs. Some of these claims were completely lost on Luther, who never could see how any amount of faith could justify Anabaptism, for example,⁶⁸ but in such cases, he seemed to be simply a victim of his own success.

Actually, the success of Protestantism was not as much "His" as he thought anyway. Luther succeeded where Wycliffe had failed as much because of the printing press as because of doctrine. With the Bible, rather than the Church or himself established as *the* source of authority and a sufficient number of people with it in their hands, there could be as many popular religious movements as ways to interpret God's Word, and there were.⁶⁹

While Protestantism was thus transforming the religious world, capitalism was reforming the secular world of the sixteenth century. By this time, capitalism already had a long history of its own going back to the Middle Ages, when the guild system gave way to the entrepreneur. As factories developed, so did a business "System", which was supposed to be under rational control.⁷⁰

Behind the rational system, however, was a capitalistic spirit which represented a new attitude toward life and which became something of a new religion for Westerners. In the East, people untouched by the capitalistic spirit today work in order to reach a certain standard of living and then stop. The Western businessman does not stop: He keeps going just to be going. He works for the sake of work because, in true religious fashion, good capitalists developed a sense of shame if they did not work continually while there was still strength and time for more. Thus, the capitalist's schema became an attitude which defined work as an intrinsic good directed toward the good life, which was eventually redefined as prosperity.⁷¹ When carried to a positively feedback extreme, this attitude still produces the workaholic⁷² capitalism's equivalent of the religious fanatic.

f) Albeit a trivial example, would you like to dance? Go ahead, but every dance step is a step toward Hell. (Chalkley) Have a good time!

Max Weber suggested that, within the Western community, Protestants made better businessmen than did Catholics because of the difference in their attitudes toward work.⁷³ Certainly the Protestant business spirit proved to be more dynamic and progressive than Catholicism, which was generally stodgy and repressive when and where it predominated. Further, this difference has been attributed to John Calvin (1509-1564) the source of the Protestant work ethic. Commercialism began its development in the Catholic dominated Middle Ages, and Luther exalted common occupations as ways of serving God and promoting self-reliance, but it was Calvin who transcended the biblical notion that "...the love of money is the root of all evil."⁷⁴ and gave the spirit of capitalism its theological basis.⁷⁵

Like Luther, Calvin found his way to genuine Christianity via that outmoded pillar of orthodoxy, St. Augustine,⁷⁶ and although his theology was suited to the developing commercial class, it was not planned that way. When he sat down to write his great work *Christianae religionis Institutio* (Institutes of the Christian Religion) published in 1535, he intended to put forth his explanation of God's Holy Word. According to Calvin, God allowed no freedom: As He was all-everything (knowing, powerful, etc.⁷⁷), He planned everything and left people no choice. After planning Adam's fall and condemning humanity to damnation for it, Calvin's all-loving God apparently decided to give some people a second chance via salvation through his Son. These few the elect were Calvinists.⁷⁸

Calvin's rigid determinism could have been (and has been) taken to justify sin if indeed the term would apply, as everything is God's will or fault. However, Calvin set logic aside just long enough to establish the most intense moral conscience⁹ in Christendom.⁷⁹ This is apparently just a pale reflection of the conscience developed by Calvin's deterministic God, who allegedly listens to Calvinists' prayers, when they ask Him to help them avoid their predetermined sins.⁸⁰

This problem of God creating or allowing sin harks back His original act of creating Adam and then forever tinkering with His handiwork as if he were an organic experiment gone slightly awry. Perhaps it would have been better for all if God had worked just a five day week for He showed the strains of fatigue when setting up Eden. He may have been a slow learner or creationally challenged but for whatever reasons, He decided to start over and benignly flooded out everyone except Noah's upright, uptight family.⁸¹ Their descendants have, struggled ever since to make an

economic if not spiritual success of their lives in the context of God's plan, which we are too dumb to understand.

Although Calvinists became noted for their business sense, upright character was essential in all walks of life, and the test of success for a true believer was not economic but ethical. In business, emphasis was on integrity rather than profit, and worldly success was not taken as proof of divine favor for or by Calvinists. Their disciplined faith just happened to engender economic virtues industry, sobriety, honesty and frugality and these advanced them as individuals financially while ameliorating their society generally.⁸² There certainly is something to be said for people who abide by such virtues, and Calvinism suffered no shortage of heroes fully committed to the cause. Of course, it was to their advantage that they wasted no time or energy pondering imponderables: Whereas Luther agonized over faith, Calvinists just had it.⁸³

A further advantage was that their job on earth was simple and straightforward establish a Holy Commonwealth, and they came nearer than anyone to realizing their own brand of utopia, however self-righteously strained it may have been. This was sixteenth century Geneva, which was incongruously an ideal place for anyone ascribing to medieval values as well as a place where work/slave virtues were vigorously applied so that acquisitive businessmen could selflessly fulfill their assumed obligation of public service to the community.⁸⁴

Further, it is altogether ironic that the spirit of classical capitalism has been misattributed to the Calvinists, because capitalism was more developed in Catholic Flanders and Florence before the Reformation than it was in Calvin's Geneva.⁸⁵ In addition, Calvin himself would have regarded *laissez faire* as a moral outrage, while the business class in Geneva regarded his moralism as an outrage. The essence of Calvin's schema was not freedom but discipline, and as the business of Geneva was really religion, not business, he drew up elaborate directives designed to shape all aspects of life in his model city to the Christian ideal. Among these were business regulations, including price and rent controls, which were supposed to assure everyone that economic affairs would be conducted with religious propriety. In later centuries, Puritans would remain firm believers in government regulation of business⁸⁶ the defining characteristic of modern fascism while businessmen were morally free to indulge in orgies of undisciplined, cut-throat capitalism.

Thus, the reason Calvinism is associated with the spirit of capitalism is not because of Calvin's attitude toward business but because of his emphasis on discipline and Calvinists' financial success when applying their discipline in a capitalistic society. In

g) In so doing, Calvin was but typical of all great Christian thinkers who invariably evade the moral nihilism that accompanies determinism. I am of a mind with Sartre that we must recognize our actions determine the behavior of others and thus demand that we be moral. (Hecht. p. 457.)

succeeding, they did give capitalism its spirit, but that was just an historical accident which occurred because they were working in a capitalistic system.^h They would have undoubtedly imparted a defining spirit to any system be it agri-cultural, industrial, or whatever in which they worked, as did their direct spiritual descendants, the Puritans, for example, when subduing the wilderness a century later in New England.⁸⁷

Although Geneva was a commercial city,⁸⁸ Calvin's totalitarian regulations, far from making it a heaven or haven for capitalists, made it a living satire of hell on earth a theologian's utopian Eden religiously committed to combating secular evils and joys. There was compulsory church service twice daily for everyone, enforced, when necessary, by civil authorities.⁸⁹ There were penalties for dancing or having one's fortune told by a Gypsy, and a woman could be imprisoned for wearing clothes made of forbidden materials or donning an immoral hat.ⁱ To the credit of the citizens,^j such rules were made the objects of popular ridicule and were routinely ignored if not broken.⁹⁰

Calvin was canny enough to reach a compromise with the business community on economic regulations, but his religious schema folded inward upon itself until Geneva became something of a living nightmare. Regulations regarding religious pursuits made it an offense to laugh during preaching, give the names of Catholic saints to children, be unable to recite prayers, or say that the pope was a good man. To hold office, a Catholic magistrate was required to say, "Mass is bad" and then had to confirm it without qualification. If Catholicism was thus grudgingly accepted, heresy was rigorously combated as treason to God. Denial of predestination meant banishment and denial of immortality or the Trinity meant death,⁹¹ and from 1542 to 1564, fifty-eight disbelievers were executed and seventy-six banished out of a population of about 20,000.⁹² As a positive feedback system going to excess during this period, Geneva became less a city of the elect than the select intolerant saints who expelled or executed dissenters and accepted only immigrants who conformed to Calvin's narrow standards for propriety in piety⁹³ and society.

The regime became not only intolerant of moral waywardness but so sensitive to political opposition that

a street fight was interpreted as an attempted coup and the leaders executed or banished.⁹⁴ This reaction was based on fear but not paranoia, as Calvin's followers had made plenty of enemies in the fervent pursuit of righteousness.^k After his death in 1564, the city relaxed, control of the economy reverted to the capitalists, and business ethics returned to their pre Calvinist condition.⁹⁵

Along with Luther's and Calvin's theological reformations of Christendom, there was also the Catholic Church's reformation of itself. This was the Counter Reformation, and it was nearly obviated by the accidental election of Pope Adrian VI in 1522 because, as a reformer, he might have led the Church back to Christianity. However, he could do little to overcome long entrenched corruption in his reign of fifty-four weeks,⁹⁶ and with his passing, the Church reverted to form and chose Clement VII to preside over a series of disasters. Protestantism continued to advance while the pope ineptly engaged in self-destructive diplomacy which was designed to thwart the growing power of Charles V but which ended up with imperial troops sacking Rome in 1527.⁹⁷

Although the significance of the Protestant secession took a while to register on the Catholic Church, the sacking of Rome was quickly recognized for what it was divine punishment for the worldly sins (i.e., failures) of the popes and their cronies.⁹⁸ Perhaps it was ten years too late, but the realization finally broke upon the Vatican rulers: They were doing something wrong. As their response, the CounterReformation was an intensely conservative movement for internal reform of the Church.

In an age of sectarian splintering and theological invention, the Church leaders sought to achieve Catholic unity by intellectual repression. Thus, the CounterReformation was a revolt by the established powers against freedom the moral freedom of the Renaissance popes in particular and the intellectual freedom of the Renaissance in general. It aimed at uprooting heresies, reforming ecclesiastical discipline and pacifying the Church⁹⁹ and was characterized by a strengthened spiritual commitment to doctrine which itself became ever narrower just when worldly knowledge was expanding and growing.¹⁰⁰ Its specific manifestations were the Jesuits, the Inquisition, the Index of Prohibited Books and the Council of Trent.

This repressive spirit of intense Catholicism was embodied in St. Ignatius of Loyola (1491-1556) founder of the Jesuit Order and the Church's belated answer to

h) In this regard, they were sort of Protestant Jews, in that they worked hard and succeeded at all types of endeavors in which they were engaged wherever they were.

i) Actually, in many towns in the sixteenth century, ostentatious displays of clothing were regulated by law so as to suppress public extravagance by the bourgeoisie. However, even by the standards of the time, Geneva's regulations were excessive.

j) As an aside, my fourth great-grandfather Welles, as a Justice of the Peace was charged with tracking down persistent sinners in puritanical Wethersfield, CT, in the 1770's. Way to go, Sol. JFW

k) But the righteousness lived on albeit in a the perverted form of the morally incestuous, censorious, prudish "Rodent Fornicators" of the Nixon administration in the early 1970's. With an equal fondness for Billy Graham and break-ins, (Wills.) Nixon knelt every night in prayer for guidance. (Wheen. p.111.) Apparently, God is a Democrat.

Luther. A former soldier, Loyola founded the Order upon order: There would be unquestioning obedience to the General in the war against heresy. In accordance with his battle plan, Jesuits were to be zealous missionaries, and through preaching and even more through teaching, they raised the level of the Catholic conscience and improved the sagging moral tone of the Church.¹⁰¹ However, their efforts to raise the intellectual level of the Church were limited by the determined opposition of the Catholic hierarchy to freedom of thought.

The most concrete expression of the Church's anti-intellectual attitude came in the form of the revival of its most insidious institution the Inquisition. Along with the Index, this constituted a direct counter attack by the faithful against heresy. Although it may be fair for anyone to question the worth of an organization which presumes to save itself by suppressing thought and banning books, Catholics in general in the sixteenth century were not inclined to be fair. More specifically, Church leaders were under attack and intended to survive by using all means at their disposal to defend themselves. Hence, as when in its medieval glory, the tragedy of the Inquisition was that it was not an invention of some madmen but a reaction of otherwise responsible and certainly powerful people who insisted on perceiving a diversity of ideas and, worst of all, conscientious intellectual inquiry as threats.¹⁰²

On the eve of the Reformation, the Spanish had reinstated an inquisition as a means of achieving national unity. This was but another specific example of the periodic Western passion for a monolithic mind a unitary culture of one ruler, one religion, one race. After the fall of Granada in 1492, Spain was to be orthodox and authorities used bribery and force to win over remaining Moors and Jews to Catholicism. When converts relapsed, the Inquisition became a means to a higher end and was justified by, of all things, national honor. In the face of widespread un Spanish activities, some officials became full-time inquisitors and even specialized some in torture, others in burning. Flesh, thought, the Church and Spain all suffered (although not equally) from these police tactics.¹⁰³

Such sufferings notwithstanding, the success of the Spanish Church and nation in thus suppressing Protestantism led Counter Reformer Pope Paul XIII to set up a general Inquisition for the entire Church in 1542. As a means to European purification, this Roman Inquisition was most effective in Italy, where it had the support of the secular powers. However, even there, this revival of institutional persecution of heretics was milder than its Spanish model, and very few people were executed.¹⁰⁴

As a more general and broader approach to combating heresy, the Church developed the Index of Prohibited Books a list of books which Catholics were

forbidden to read. Like the Inquisition, this had its historical antecedents, as the Church had long been committed to preventing the faithful from reading heterodox literature. As long as books could be produced only by the laborious process of copying by hand, book burning sufficed as an effective means of censorship, but the printing press necessitated a change in strategy on the part of those opposed to the dissemination of information. Thus, in 1515, the Fifth Lateran Council forbade the printing of any book in Christendom without Church permission a method that worked reasonably well until Protestant printers flooded Europe with unauthorized books.¹⁰⁵

The response to this new threat was the Index (or Indices, as there were many). Early versions appeared in Cologne and Paris in the 1540's but were only of local importance. The first papal list of prohibited works was issued by Pope Paul IV in 1559. As an attempt to suppress books which might corrupt morals, endanger the faith or promote thinking, the Papal Index eventually came to read like a "Who's Who" of world literature. Being listed became a backhanded compliment a mark of distinction which placed an author in the company of, among others, Francis Bacon, Balzac, Descartes, Dumas, Gibbon, Hobbes, Hugo, Hume, Kant, Locke, Mill, etc.¹⁰⁶ meaning al-most everyone worth reading except Anonymous.

The Council of Trent constituted yet another aspect of the Counter-Reformation which became, in its way, short-circuited and worked to the long-term detriment of the Church. Meeting intermittently from 1543 to 1563, the Council did effect some internal reforms for the Church and arrested the crimes and blunders which had driven one state after another from the Catholic fold. Theologically, however, it took a hard line and confirmed basically all of Catholic dogma, specifically rejecting the right of individuals to private judgment in matters of faith and morals, reserving for the Church the right of interpreting Scripture, opposing unauthorized circulation of the Bible¹⁰⁷ and setting the stage for the idiotic battle between science and religion which haunts down to this very day.

This uncompromising position of the Council was typical of the generally conservative nature of the whole Counter-Reformation. Threatened by Protestants and attacked by princes, the Church, far from transcending itself, demonstrated the desperation of a besieged mentality trying to reduce cognitive dissonance by turning inward and backward and clinging ever tighter to orthodoxy.¹⁰⁸

Thus, although the Counter-Reformation did address specific abuses like immorality and corruption, it must be rated a failure because it reaffirmed and perpetuated the basic authoritarian schema of Catholicism. With Western Civilization on the brink of the

modern age, the Church remained firmly committed to its medieval mentality and was bypassed. Actually, it was ironic that the Church espoused its medieval doctrine of "Free will" while demanding obedience and conformity from the flock. The modern age is modern precisely because the people make their own decisions, but the Church did not want people thinking for themselves: Doctrine was to come from the top down, and believers were to obey.¹⁰⁹

It was indeed a tragedy for the Church that it became intellectually reactionary just when Europe was awakening. It condemned not only immorality and heresy but the spirit of inquiry, as faith was to squelch not only misbehavior and doubt but curiosity as well. With the Church's Biblical interpretations becoming increasingly irrelevant to the ever expanding world and changing cultural environment, the intellectual leadership of the West passed to those people who first overcame and then ignored Catholic theology and simply thought for themselves.¹¹⁰

This tendency of people to think for themselves was particularly evident in affairs of state, where politicians were coming to grips with the growing spirit of nationalism. Nationalist sentiments developed against the background of the raging religious disputes of the age but (unfortunately for historians) did not conform neatly to any theological arrangements. The Catholic Church both helped and hindered nationalism helping it by weakening the Holy Roman Empire but hindering it by resisting nationalistic attempts to reduce its own influence. On the other hand, Protestantism helped states opposing Rome, although the main concern of Protestants was not the form of the state but the right to worship their way.¹¹¹

Viewed the other way, Protestantism in the sixteenth century was aided by the nationalism of both ruling groups and popular masses. Some ruling princes used Protestantism to help in their struggle against the popes, so in their domains, the Protestants were simply the nationalistic in-group. Such rulers, like Henry VIII (1509-1547) of England, for example, replaced clerical privilege and corruption with secular privilege and corruption as official bureaucrats assumed the trappings and reality of power.¹¹²

Theologically, the nation states of the sixteenth century, with religion determined by the given ruler, were smaller models of the medieval system. However, the political strains which resulted from religious tensions could be eased, if and when they were to be eased at all, by three different methods: Migration, territorial division and comprehension.¹¹³

Before the New World opened, the only escape for free spirits was to the east. In the Far East of the day, infidel Muslims proved to be more tolerant of heretics than were either Catholics or Protestants. In politically

backward Eastern Europe, feudalism retained the diversity that had been crushed by nationalism in the West, so in Poland, for example, the different sects accommodated each other by agreeing to disagree. In Western Europe, a believer could emigrate to a land of his particular faith, but in each of these, there was little or no tolerance, with even Protestant lands normally officially accepting only one sect.¹¹⁴

The second method territorial division was really just a refinement of the first and likewise produced considerable emigration. Local rulers were allowed to decide what the religion would be for their areas with dissenters free to move elsewhere. This later became the method adopted by the Founding Fathers of the United States, and to this day the Constitution (i.e., the First Amendment) prohibits only a *national* religion, leaving states free to unify Church and government¹¹⁵ should they want to.¹

The third method comprehension meant that one religion would be officially recognized in an area, but only limited demands would be made on other faiths. This small step away from the West's prevailing "One state, one ruler, one faith" mentality was a giant leap toward toleration. It kept emigration to a minimum, as doctrinal requirements permitted all but the most fanatical dissenter to live with them, and was the method tried by Charles V and accepted by Elizabeth I (1558-1603).¹¹⁶

As head of the House of Hapsburg and then as Holy Roman Emperor, Charles would have come down hard on Luther early on had he been free to do so. However, he, Henry VIII, Francis I (1515-1547) of France and Pope Clement VII (1523-1534) were caught up in a tangle of power politics which must have warmed Machiavelli's analytic heart. The basic principle was that the other three would align themselves against any one who appeared to be getting too powerful. Of course, the great beneficiaries of these machinations were the Protestants and the Turks because the pope could not do much about the former and was not willing to help Charles suppress heresy or lead a crusade against the latter lest the Emperor become too strong. By 1550, when Charles was finally free to persecute the Protestants, they were too firmly entrenched for him to have much success.¹¹⁷

By then, there really was no longer any hope of solving religious disagreements by reconciling the

1) Of the eleven original thirteen states which framed the Constitution, five permitted or provided for an establishment of religion in the form of tax support for churches an arrangement that lasted in Massachusetts until 1833. (Smylie. p. 117.) Likewise, at the time of ratification of the Constitution, most states had limitations on freedom of speech and the press in the form of laws which forbade blasphemy, libel and obscenity. (Kaplan. p. 50.) *The first amendment guarantees nothing except that the federal government will not do likewise.*

various faiths. Nor would an agreement to disagree have suited Charles, since he was basically as intolerant as most people of the time. Having dissident subjects leave the Empire or splitting it up to accommodate the many sects ran counter to his role and image of Emperor, so "Comprehension" was the option imposed by circumstance. Even this compromise was opposed by the German Lutherans, however, thus preventing Charles from realizing a universal solution to the problem of religions which confronted him.¹¹⁸

In despair, he resigned and spent the last two years of his life tinkering with clocks, studying maps of his former empire and rehearsing his funeral.¹¹⁹ His struggle for supremacy in Europe as well as his quest for peace and religious unity had been in vain. He failed because political circumstances were changing while his mind was stuck in its original mold, clinging to the imperial ideal when rising nationalism in Germany made the failure of an imperial reality a for gone conclusion. Likewise, he persisted in his pursuit of religious unity (and even resorted to force) when Lutherism was immovably entrenched.¹²⁰

Worse yet, in failing to understand his times, Charles was not alone. When his approach of comprehension as a possible solution to Germany's religious problems broke down, his political heir, brother Ferdinand, was forced to fall back on territorial division the principle adopted at the Peace of Augsburg in 1555.¹²¹ This was a mixed blessing in that it initiated fifty years of peace in Germany¹²² but also set the stage for the Thirty Years' War because the German princes were reacting to their immediate plight while remaining blind to the fundamental issues at hand. As princes, they thought in terms of principalities, not people,¹²³ and were predisposed to learn from history only those lessons that suited their purpose and supported their position. Specifically, these rulers had learned (perhaps from experiences with the Anabaptists) that subjects should not be left free to exercise judgment in religious matters.¹²⁴ The principle of religious freedom was applied to individual states rather than to individual citizens as the right of private judgment, upon which the Reformation had been founded, was summarily rejected by everyone.¹²⁵

The most successful example of this principle of a state religion in a religious state was sixteenth century England.¹²⁶ Under the Tudors, royal power reached its absolute apex as leaders of church and state supported each other in an incestuous, religious fascism. Henry VIII represented a culmination of religious nationalism as a king who claimed control of at least all outward forms of worship, and all but the existence of God came to depend on royal whim. His was the first totalitarian state, and the fact that it was supported by an accepting population made it simply all the more powerful.¹²⁷ It was

not until the seventeenth century that democracy raised its head when Puritans claimed that the state should reciprocate and return the support the people by embodying their moral values.

Actually, in totalitarian Tudor England, the Anglican Church evinced a canny capacity for compromise with the state or at least the self-deceptive ability to pretend that certain theological problems did not exist. The church was a conservative institution which lacked the usual Protestant zeal for saving the world from itself, and its history in the mid-sixteenth century showed how easily masses of people can be pushed through a series of mutually conflicting beliefs,^m particularly if they are secondary to the identifying schema of the believers. To wit, in 1534, Henry led the country away from the Catholic Church, only to have Bloody Mary return it to Catholicism starting in 1553,¹²⁸ only to have her sister Elizabeth re-return it to Anglicanism six years later.ⁿ There was no one stupid enough even in England to believe the contradictory pronouncements everyone was required to make during this period. It was mostly a matter of taking theology lightly or going mad, and going mad just was not, well,"English".¹²⁹

In Europe generally, religious thinkers contributed to this growth of democracy by denying the absolute power of the state. The developing nation-states went to aggravating excesses in some cases and could not be constrained by forces within government nor by any amount of praying. Theologians attempted to counter absolutism by appealing to a universal morality which presumably was binding on states.¹³⁰ This was supposed to be "Natural law", which superseded national law and provided a theoretical basis for those who wished to combat arbitrary abuses of power.

In a more general sense, the Protestants' Reformation brought both achievement and failure, with their achievements being inadvertent while they failed in what they intended to accomplish. In fact, as reformers, Luther and Calvin were ironic and incongruous and really did not know what they were doing. Nonconformists who demanded conformity, they were authoritarians who introduced intellectual independence to theology. Both were medieval in spirit and neither believed in freedom, but they liberated the Western mind

m) In many periods of social, political and intellectual turmoil, people have been able to adjust thinking or change their minds with surprising ease. A modern day example would be the way attitudes of faithful Communists had to flip-flop and then flop-flip as the official party line toward Germany alternated between early August, 1939 and late June, 1941.

n) And the pendulum kept on swinging when Charles I took over after Liz in 1603. He wanted to take "His" country back toward Catholicism and succeeded to the point that his son, Charles II, induced a civil war which put the Puritans (i.e., Oliver Cromwell) in power during the 1650's.

from the Catholic Church.¹³¹ The religious movement they started was an accidental success they could not understand, control or stop, and it became modern in spite of itself as it was taken over by individualism, capitalism and nationalism.¹³²

As theologians, the Protestant reformers replaced the authority of the Catholicism with the authority of the Bible, which they opened to the public. The inevitable but unforeseen result was that every individual who could read thought God could communicate directly with him. Unfortunately, as recorded in the Bible, the voice of God often rambles incoherently like that of a self-absorbed, underachieving, slightly schizoid, manic depressive paranoid with delusions of grandeur. Part of Her inconsistency was no doubt due to having a son, which mellowed the Supreme Parent considerably.

Confusion cum diversity was also promoted by the fact that Her Protestant readers promptly splintered into numerous sects¹³³ which agreed on only one essential theological point they wanted to be separate. By 1650, there were 180 denominations all based on the Bible and each more dogmatically intolerant than the next.^o As they were all right, the called each other names, argued, mobbed and stoned each other, destroyed each others' churches¹³⁴ and otherwise displayed the civility which characterizes Christianity. Even these sects, however numerous, failed to meet the religious needs of the people, so there were revivals (like Methodism) and reversion to more primitive forms of Christianity.¹³⁵

In the New World, fragmentation continued apace so that in 1770, Governor Bull of South Carolina noted that Christian denominations had subdivided ad infinitum as illiterate enthusiasm and wild imagination misinterpreted the Scripture.¹³⁶ By 1800, there were not just Presbyterians, but Old and New School Presbyterians, Cumberland, Springfield, Reformed and Associated Presbyterians. Likewise, there were Baptists, General, Regular, Free Will, Separate, Dutch River, Permanent and my favorite Two Seed in the Spirit Baptists¹³⁷ eventuating in some 325 competing sects by 2000.¹³⁸

To Luther and Calvin, the plight of Protestantism would have seemed tragic, but if there was a saving grace, it was that the new sects tended to ally themselves with the new forces of capitalism and nationalism that were shaping the modern world and mind. As Protestantism was open and responsive to its general cultural milieu, it never became as dogmatic as

Catholicism. If anything, Protestants were arbitrarily selective about their Biblical interpretations, picking and choosing what suited them and rejecting anything counter to their particular cause of the moment.¹³⁹

Thus, the reformers were triumphant in that they protested successfully against centralized authority, paved the way for religious and political freedom and established the pattern of individualism. Nonetheless, they failed in their original intent to establish a pure, primitive, uncorrupted Christianity. Their medieval obsession with sin, grace and salvation was overwhelmed and buried by secular concerns with profit and national honor. Devoted to a uniform faith and intolerant of diversity, they complicated Christianity with their endless, contradictory theologies.¹⁴⁰

If there was anything consistent about Protestant theology, it was that it looked backward. In fact, most of the various sects permitted less freedom of thought than did the Catholic Church, so the only freedom presented was that of choice among intolerant denominations. Further, if Protestantism generally was more practically adaptable than Catholicism, it blocked traditional theological avenues to divine grace by banishing the Virgin, saints and father confessor. Thus, if Protestants were worldly, they were left alone in the world to fight the Devil and sternly warned against enjoying the beauty and sins of Renaissance life.¹⁴¹

Altogether, the Reformation was a blight on hope and a boon to bigotry. Its incongruities inspired outrageous persecutions and unreasonable wars. Luther would have been stunned and horrified at the results of his revolution, which bequeathed a legacy of violence and uncertainty in a world ruled by profit and sword rather than love and understanding. God remained inscrutable but was now unrestrained by either logic or common sense and devoted to divine domination rather than Christ-like peace.¹⁴² Free of scruples, the Protestant God became Machiavellian in His public capacity and condoned many things in business and affairs of state which were considered immoral in the private lives of individuals.¹⁴³

For all the hype about theology, capitalism clearly carried the day or century as reality once again bent behavior away from belief. Predestination was shelved for liberty, and with economic liberty the big winner, the big losers were the poor. During the Middle Ages, they had received Christian charity. In the Puritan schema, the poor were moral outcasts who received retributive justice: They were poor because they were paid low wages, which they were paid because they were poor. Protestant theology supported the "Haves", who were rather condescending in their attitude toward the pre-rejected, unelected damned, and a venerable tradition which survived to our own day was established

o) While much can be made of the negative effect religion had on intellectual development at this time (and others), the competition among sects did promote reading and learning as they all strove to get their sacred messages out to retain supporters and gain converts. (Blanning, p. 477)

of ministers preaching the need for poverty in the Divine Capitalist's Holy Economy of things.¹⁴⁴

Ironically, by attributing success and failure to the moral worth of the individual, Protestants actually kept themselves from understanding the workings of economics and the nature of their own business society. This trend continued well into the Industrial Revolution, as business steadfastly refused to acknowledge any responsibility for unemployment, poverty and social distress. Indeed, it was not until business hurt business in the twentieth century that capitalists began to pay some serious attention to the effects of enterprise beyond immediate, short term profit.

The political importance of the Reformation was that the Western mind became modern, progressive and democratic. Protestantism promoted not only the initiative of the disciplined capitalistic businessman but individual freedom in general and democratic self rule. Its vocabulary was that of resistance, its appeal that of individual rights and its cause that of predetermined liberty. By attacking the authoritarian, privileged Catholic Establishment, it broke down medieval politics and furthered the emergence of the contemporary nation state.¹⁴⁵

Thus, in general terms, the overall effects of the Reformation were both incongruous and profound. As a theological movement, it both rent and bound. The unity of the Catholic Church was shattered, but the spirit of Christianity was renewed by the Protestant emphasis on ethical conduct. Even the Catholic Church was stimulated to effect reforms of its grossest abuses as it renewed its moral commitment to be true at least to its own authoritarian version of Christian theology.¹⁴⁶

Actually, the effects of the Reformation would have been greater had it not been essentially a theological movement, but in their revolt against Rome and earthly pretensions, the reformers were stuck with their confining, religious schema. Thus, an ideological consideration limited their interactions with the real world in that, as they firmly believed humanity could be saved for the next life by the grace of God, they were less interested in learning from or about this life than in making it conform to Biblical standards. In addition, they afflicted Western intellectual life with the same arrogant pride and narrow-minded bigotry they had opposed in others because they were basically conservative within the domain of theology. Having rejected authority and tradition, they could save their positions of power and influence only by also rejecting any further liberties being taken with their new, true faith(s).¹⁴⁷

As Erich Fromm noted in *Escape from Freedom*,¹⁴⁸ Luther sought security i.e., medieval certainty. In his quest, he opened a Pandora's jar of private opinion, but no matter how many answers there were to the question of Man's relation to God, none was

rational and satisfying enough to everyone, much less to Luther. Thus, he never did overcome his irrational feeling of helplessness and his own "True" answer remained an ambiguous combination of faith and fear, hope and humiliation.¹⁴⁹

In fact, what Luther (i.e., the Reformation) did was individualize certainty. The overall, general certainty of medieval society was gone and replaced by new, true faiths held by the citizens. These differed as citizens differ, but a universal constant of the sixteenth century was that each person was sure that his belief was correct because, thanks to printing, each had recourse to the ultimate authority the Bible.¹⁵⁰

A correlated universal was the assumption that there was a correct belief. Everyone agreed there were divergent interpretations of the Bible, but only one was right, the others wrong and naturally each home grown expert was convinced his was correct. Only a few people, like Erasmus, pointed out that part of the problem was that the Bible was not clear, with some parts being ambiguous and others contradictory. As usual, his voice was lost in the temper of the times as people continued to wrangle over obscure issues and debated questions which themselves were unclear.¹⁵¹

Just as those who wrangled and debated agreed that there was only one right answer to each major religious question of the day, they were also all opposed to religious freedom. Tolerance was condemned as indifference and religious liberty as diabolical a means of letting each go to hell in his own individualistic way. Each faith fought for its own right to dominate, as each was convinced that it had The Truth. None saw that perhaps each had part of the truth and that errors are better revealed by discussion than concealed by suppression. Still, the Reformation did break the intellectual grip of the Catholic Church on the Western mind by creating a diversity of sacred truths which might be reconciled through reason.^{152*}

The first half of the sixteenth century was a period of major reform for Western Civilization in politics, economics and above all religion. However, theologically, the Reformation raised more issues than it settled. Fundamentalists who believed that the Scriptures provided all solutions for all problems were still left with the problem that different people seek and find different things in the Bible. The Bible does not speak: It must be read and, worse yet, interpreted—invariably to mean not what it says but what the reader means.¹⁵³ All the Protestants did was substitute the people for the priests as the readers and interpreters. While the reformers all expected conformity to a new theology, they found they did not have a new form of Christianity but many.¹⁵⁴

p) The Anabaptists excepted.

Perhaps the only thing clearly settled was that the central authority of the Catholic Church had broken down, although this had many very mixed results. The immediate effect of the ethics vacuum was a plethora of Christian sects which all shared a mutually intense bigotry and engaged in a rage of religious spats which, like the Reformation, settled nothing profound. On the other hand, when it finally became clear that neither Protestantism nor Catholicism would triumph completely, the medieval hope of doctrinal unity was gradually abandoned and grudgingly replaced by tolerance and freedom of thought about fundamentals. The new hope was that theological disputes might be conducted calmly and settled peacefully by appeals to fact and logic.¹⁵⁵ The reality was that the Western mind was left in the heretical state of eternally seeking temporal reform.

Thus, the Protestant Reformation is still underway, although the revolt which began as a regressive, medieval, negative movement has become transformed by the modern world into something positive: Freedom from Church authority has led to a developing realization that the task of creating peace and justice here on earth is one for all of us. In this vein, Protestant leaders are now reappraising the responsibilities of the individual to society, taking a direct active role in social reform and even sort of trying to Christianize business. Further, in terms of theology and organization, Protestantism is attempting to overcome the splintering effects inherent in its own subjective nature by the merging of some modern sects.¹⁵⁶

In and of itself, however, the Reformation of the sixteenth century remains significant for us today because it showed that pride and self righteousness can become self-defeating sins when carried to excess by either the establishment or reformers. In fact, nothing fails like excess because any self-justifying belief system (be it theological or secular) courts failure when it carries its sins to extremes which preclude reform through human reason.

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62. White, Richard. *The Republic for Which It Stands*. Oxford; New York. 2017. p. 315. In the 1870's, in Utah, Protestants objected to Mormonism for the same reason. (p. 386.) The rub was that democracy is relevant when individuals make up their own minds about secular issues. In a theocracy, like Brigham Young's Utah, they do not: He does their thinking for them. (p. 387.)
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75. Bainton. op. cit. p. 246.
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Understanding and Cognitive Meaning: An Introduction

By Mark Crooks

Introduction- Meaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in value than is truth But even as respects truths, meaning is the wider category; truths are but one class of meanings, namely, those in which a claim to verifiability by their [deduced empirical] consequences is an intrinsic part of their [validated] meaning. Beyond this island of meanings which in their own nature are true or false lies the ocean of meanings to which truth or falsity are irrelevant.”

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Understanding and Cognitive Meaning: An Introduction

Mark Crooks

Institute of Mind and Behavior

“**M**eaning is wider in scope as well as more precious in value than is truth But even as respects truths, meaning is the wider category; truths are but one class of meanings, namely, those in which a claim to verifiability by their [deduced empirical] consequences is an intrinsic part of their [validated] meaning. Beyond this island of meanings which in their own nature are true or false lies the ocean of meanings to which truth or falsity are irrelevant.”

John Dewey, 1939

I. TWO EPISTEMOLOGIES

The following prolegomenon is intended as an heuristic regarding an empirical epistemology, an interpretive framework that properly delineates our reason, the human understanding. This introduction provides a bare summary and synopsis of a radical approach to epistemic foundations, designed to challenge the extant, prevalent one that arose principally from Descartes's work. The contrast between the two views may be put in terms of their respective emphases, namely, the Cartesian *gnostic* rather an alternative *Semantikal* hypothesis. *Gnosis* in Greek signifies knowledge and hence the focus of the gnostic schema, respecting its analysis of cognition, is upon knowing and certainty. *Semantikos* in Attic Greek denoted meaning or signification, with its implications of meaningfulness, ambiguity, meaninglessness, and understanding.

Certain Hellenic philosophers were oriented perhaps more toward a Semantikal perspective than the gnostic view, inasmuch as Plato and Aristotle alluded frequently to the inherent intelligibility of the cosmos, a universe discernible by reason, rather than to any absolute certainty attainable by dialectic.¹ Nonetheless this observation must be qualified, given Plato's domain of *eidos* or eternal Forms and Aristotle's "final" and complete knowledge had by his Prime Mover. In modern philosophy, Descartes and Kant are foremost expositors of the Gnostic view, with mathematics construed by them as by Plato as the exemplar of infeasible knowledge. Hegel's system also portrays

idiosyncratically reason's attainment to (his) finalized truth, but he situates this within a broader compass of an *intelligible*, hence *comprehensible* universe.

Probably all ancient and modern philosophers who have written on epistemology have referenced both meaning and understanding in varying degrees, as these are folk psychological categories that constantly inform every deliberation on such matters, no less so than the equally ubiquitous categories of truth, certainty, and knowing. In contrast, it may be argued that epistemology since Descartes is little more than a codification of folk psychology's gnostic proclivities. Beginning the seventeenth century, epistemic enquiry shifted dramatically with Descartes to an outright fixation upon certainty as the proper terminus of ratiocination, said to be consummated through a rather unspecified cognitive function called knowing.

Perhaps more accurately and charitably, folk epistemology has it that *thinking* leads or leads not, per each particular cognitive attempt to tentative certainty, while *knowing* is usually characterized as the outcome of exploratory thought, the grasping and retention of a truth finally achieved that preceding thought had studiously uncovered. But this progressive thinking is no other than *understanding by stages*, as sketched below. Hence, by implication the gnostic folk epistemology willy-nilly shades into our alternative Semantikal schema that highlights intelligible cognitive meaning: *semantikos*, hereby defined.

When I first read Descartes's *Meditations*, his most emphatic emphasis upon the question, "Of what can we be certain?" left me puzzled as to what this presumptive cognitive phenomenon of certainty might be. Rather than taking our concept of certain knowing as a simple given and then ascertaining the extent of knowledgeable certainty's jurisdiction and extent, the presumptive faculty of knowing with its predicated certainty might instead be critiqued even as to its actual existence.

The Cartesian gnostic desideratum is epitomized by the master as follows:

I shall . . . make every effort to conform precisely to the plan commenced yesterday and put aside every belief in which I could imagine the least doubt, just as though I knew that it was absolutely false. And I shall continue in this manner until I have found

Author: e-mail: crooksma@msu.edu, This paper is an extensive revision of one published 2011 in *The Journal of Mind and Behavior*, Vol. 32, No. 2.

¹ Far to the contrary, in fact: we witness the frequent denouement of intellectual irresolutions that characterize the Socratic dialogues.

something certain, or at least, if I can do nothing else, until I have learned with certainty that there is nothing certain in this world. Archimedes, to move the earth from its orbit and place it in a new position, demanded nothing more than a fixed and immovable fulcrum; in a similar manner I shall have the right to entertain high hopes if I am fortunate enough to find a single truth which is certain and indubitable. (Descartes, 1641/1960, p. 23)

Leibniz argued (e.g., 1712/1973) that though we can successfully explain human actions teleologically in toto, we should also endeavor to give naturalistic ("mechanical") explanations for the actual execution of our providence as it occurs in the world. By analogy, we might allow that cognition in an ultimate construal is somehow "one" with its intelligible objects, in the sense of a heretofore inexplicable ontological and epistemic conformance of them. Yet we should, in first heuristic approximation anyway, resist the esoteric temptation to give such "transcendent" explanations for the individual's understanding and the broader cultural, secular development of knowledge.

This then is the challenge: to explain naturalistically how knowledge can arise between a discrete conceiver and the conceived universe. The Semantiks model discloses how our proprietary abstract conceptuality furnishes access to its intelligible cosmos, which clairvoyantly transcends the deliverances of sensorial immediacy. Civilization represents a corporate understanding among reasoners together possessed of linguistic conceptuality, all housed within a shared acculturating context. Ex hypothesi, it is possible to ascertain how the actual cognitive coherence involved between the intellect and its intelligible cosmos obtains.

II. COGNITIVE MEANING CENTRALIZED

It may first be questioned *whether "knowing" is an actual cognitive function*: if it be a real form of cogitation by which a thinker "comes to apprehend reality" or if that presumed knowing be rather an epistemic fiction, inadvertently confabulated by folk psychology and its philosophical extensions. Taking Descartes's *Meditations* or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* as paradigmatic, it may be seen that those philosophers did not doubt notwithstanding the legendary Cartesian skepticism the actual existence of such gnostic constructs as "clear and distinct ideas" or "synthetic a priori judgments." Their primary enterprise lay in circumnavigating the extent of that knowing, so as to, in Locke's formulation, "determine the limits of human understanding," i.e., survey the boundaries of validated knowledge.

Might there obtain legitimacy in an attempt to question that paradigm of gnostic epistemology, which emphasizes so strongly the presumptive actuality of cognitive knowing and its consequential certainty (or

uncertainty, if knowledgeably unsuccessful) and to query the standard epistemic search for the "scope and limits of indubitable knowledge"? Semantiks suggests that ratiocinative understanding can account for progressive science without suppositional recourse to either Cartesian certainty or its generative "coming to know." What rationale might induce us to challenge the status of these latter as indefeasible givens, and consequently to seek an alternative to them in any identification of a more empirically oriented epistemology?

(1) A strong intimation that knowing is not a fundamental cognitive function but at best a subsidiary one – if indeed existent at all – is hinted by the epigraph to this work from John Dewey, on the indefinitely greater extent of meaning over that of verifiable truth. The keynote of Dewey's excerpt regards that far greater generality of meaning over truth valuation, wherein is to be found an extraordinarily suggestive insight. "*Meaning to be explicated is the genus to which truths, i.e., "certain" knowledge, are but a subclass.*" By Semantikal hypothesis, there would exist an actual cognitive function that generates intelligible meanings, while "understood truths" would be produced by a further, higher order cognitive determination. Contrarily, even if there were such an actual gnostic faculty of knowing that in a consummating intellectual operation grants us certainty, then before one could attain to that status of absolute certitude one provisionally first must have *understood the meaning* of the proposition under scrutiny. This assessment may be illustrated by a pair of antithetical statements:

It is raining.

It is not raining.

These contradictories, to an incarcerated and incommunicado person locked in a dungeon, would be completely indeterminate as regards their respective truth values. Notwithstanding, the prisoner would be able to *comprehend* unequivocally the cognitive meaning of both disjunctive propositions, though would not be able to *verify* in such opaque circumstances which one were the veridical disjunct. That this is not an unusual or contrived example can be seen, if someone were asked (say), "Was the sun shining all day or not on October 3rd, 1900 in your hometown?" Our inability to immediately supply an unequivocal answer betokens our "*uncertainty*" regarding the event but not our undeniable capacity to *understand* the question put to us.

Frye and Levi (1941) expound a logical dictum implicate with Dewey's pronouncement: truth value cannot be assayed and assigned until meaningful propositions are first formulated. And always keep in mind that such objective truth value is epistemically distinct from (fictitious) subjective Cartesian certainty about such truth.

(1) That contradictories may not be evidently determinate as regards their truthfulness, yet completely determinate respecting their intelligibility qua propositional content, underscores in a formal fashion the subsuming generality of cognitive meaning over verification. Therefore the emphatic centrality of knowing and certainty within gnostic epistemology appears a probable misdirection. Employing Dewey's metaphor, if cognitive meaning is an ocean then the territory of "certain knowing" must be seen as small isles against the oceanic background of intelligible *semantikos*. Why should one fixate merely the figure in any given scenario rather than its all-encompassing ground, as though the latter were conceptually invisible to us? This contrasting generality gives us the first reason for jettisoning the traditional epistemic overemphasis upon "finalized indubitable knowledge."

(2) The second posit against gnostic epistemology concerns the paradigm's explanatory poverty. Even if one grants that there were some sort of absolute knowledge or even *any* form of "knowing," partial or complete, the gnostic interpretive apparatus would cover only those islands of truths beyond question within the indefinitely larger ocean of rational meaning. Consider the other miscellaneous types of organized meaningfulness in the domains of our understanding, as (say) the "meaning" of the Ninth Symphony or Newton's *Principia*; or less exaltedly, the sensory schemata that endow familiar recognizability to our everyday perceptual surroundings; and the punchline of an ironic witticism.² (Non-semantikal meanings as within music understanding are here termed *intuitive sensibilities*. They will be treated in greater depth within my forthcoming tome, of which this monograph is a synoptic prolegomenon.)

(3) Not only is there no comparability between the respective numbers of typical instances that can be ranged beneath classes of *semantikos* versus certitude.

² "The college I went to turned out some great men."

"When did you graduate?"

"I didn't exactly graduate. I was turned out." (Braude, 1964, p. 34)

This joke typifies in several ways irony qua inverted meaning. (1) It initially appears that the speaker is to be placed in the company of certain "great men"; when in fact he "turns out" relatively insignificant in their presence insofar as he did not even graduate from college. Such an eventuation bespeaks an inversion of implied stature, an antithetical contrast that informs typical irony in that what is stated is opposite to what is meant, wittingly or unwittingly. (2) The jocularity pivots upon a term's equivocatory meaning, "turned out." In the first statement, it means to productively generate; in the concluding punchline, it means to expel from an educational institute, to disenroll from matriculation. By means of that semantikal equivocation, the irony of the punchline is highlighted. For what was implied as extremely positive self-flattery turns out negative in the extreme – hyperbolic contrast that is the essence of irony qua lampoon. (3) The speaker's satirization of self appears inadvertent. This constitutes another expressive form of irony -- a contrast between expectation and reality -- in which one's inflated and delusional self-estimate continues unabated despite heightened disconfirming evidence to the contrary.

Gnostic epistemology maintains a hyperbolic inversion of their proper order of inclusiveness. By this is meant that, when centering our investigative attention on cognition wholly through the lens of that gnostic template (e.g., "How far does our certainty extend?"), we pass by the entire field of *semantikos* within which any ostensible certain truth has its intelligible ground. Put more pronouncedly, it is "certain" truths that manifestly are incorporated beneath *semantikos*, not the other way around. Seen otherwise through the gnostic perspective, much or all of the genus that constitutes meaningfulness, excepting semantics and semiotics, is in practice left out of epistemological disquisition as if it were already perfectly understood. Hegel paraphrased the Socratic method, writing that it is precisely that which is most obvious to the point of conceptual invisibility that is most in need of expository clarification.

Again, intelligibility per elementary logic is the genus subsuming truth values. Accordingly if we direct the orienting *modus operandi* of *Semantiks* upon conceptual meaning and understanding, our possible comprehensive inclusion and explanatory prowess expands immeasurably insofar as so much more cognitive phenomena fall within the purview of meaningfulness rather than of certainty. Nevertheless, objective truth value of course still must be accounted for in *Semantiks* as in the gnostic schema, but there as a function of understanding sans certainty and absolute knowing. Our dutiful epistemic burden and obligation increase commensurately therewith in terms of greater explicative requirements when facing such an expansive array of semantikal phenomenology. The recompense is that should we fathom the outlines of a genus, *a fortiori* will its inclusive species be delineated more clearly in the procedure, per Aristotle's *Categories*. Translation: once *semantikos* is comprehended as to its defining generic parameters, its species will take on a Kantian architectonic unity. Anticipating my argument, *semantikos* is a natural kind underlying every homological form of rational understanding, which includes music, scientific hypothesis, mathematical deduction, humor, logic, and language inter alia. Staged ratiocinative *semantikos* is the means whereby the intelligible cosmos in its multidimensional systematic entirety comes to "makes sense" progressively for our intellectual thought.

III. TRIANGULATING SEMANTIKOS

Tentative terms and methodology may be established for a summary investigation into cognitive meaning. *Semantikos* is the *meaningful cognitive product* that is generated by its fundamentally underlying *cognitive process* called *ratiocination*. By way of analogy, there is a proportion between the ostensible gnostic faculty of knowing with its outcome of certainty, and that of the actually existent interpretive function of

ratiocination with its own upshot of *semantikos*. Further, there can be no cognitive ordering by ratiocination without a correspondent expression of *semantikal* meaning or vice versa either conscious or otherwise. To emphasize this indissociable nature of ratiocination and conceptual meaning, their totality is termed *understanding*. Understanding, then, is the total process of ratiocination in its act of generating *semantikos*, as this generic meaning manifests in various contexts to be explored.

Additionally, while the denotation of "semantikos" is explicitly delimited here to cognitive meaning rather than to (say) "aesthetic meaning" or "empathic meaning," *semantikos* indeed is implicated in such *intuitive sensibilities*. Like perception, their intuitive contents undergo *sublation* ("semantikal raising") into cognitive schemata and thereby obtain conceptual signification, as when otherwise inherently meaningless visual percepts of printed ink on paper become intellectually understood by their being read. Though the term "meaning" in English denotes intention, purpose, and signification, it is solely this last character being examined presently. Of course in actual thinking cognitive meaning cannot be divorced from such as emotion, motivation, and providence excepting in pathologies yet nonetheless *semantikos* may be intellectually abstracted for greater expositional clarification of its presumed relatively autonomous functions within the mind as an operative totality.

Finally regarding nomenclature, *Semantiks* signifies the study of cognitive meaning in its various parallel instantiations, hypothesizing the nature of the ratiocinative process that brings into being those varied expressions of *semantikos*. By *semantics* is meant ordinarily the analysis of linguistic meaning; here it is assumed that language has no monopoly on cognitive meaning as such, being but one domain among many within the totality of *semantikos*. Howbeit, language stands alone as the first construction and ongoing instrumentality of ratiocination for the elaboration of *semantikal* conceptuality in its entirety.

Above was referenced an ocean of meaning within which objective truth appeared as scattered islands.³ This imagery of ocean and isles sounds much like Gestalt Psychology's distinction between figure and ground. The suggestion is not simply an intended analogy but instead should be construed as homology: certainty qua figure, meaningfulness qua ground. If we objectively examine our cognition, especially learning per se, what act do we find ourselves engaged in during virtually all its moments? How often does the pole star of "fixed certainty" appear relative to those times of understanding or at least attempting to come to an

understanding? Whether comprehended speech of formal learning comes from a textbook or classroom lecture or within a more informal setting as by interlocutory discourse or silent thinking, incessantly we are occupied cogitatively in a tentative process of progressively *coming to understand thinking* as such.

What this continuous cogitation engenders is a routinized, experiential familiarity with the operation of understanding, viz., thought punctuated by salient highlights of *semantikos* characterized by folk psychology as moments of *insight*. When these moments of insightful understanding consummate comprehension and are believed to constitute instances of eureka truth, especially after periods of long discursive exploration, they become the focus of our riveted attention and admiration: "Just what I have been searching for!" Accordingly we may discern here the rationale for Descartes and the other gnostic epistemologists' fixation upon the query, "Of what can I know for certain?" We have before us at all times the vast and omnipresent conceptual field of meaningful understanding, so ubiquitous that *semantikos* becomes imperceptible to our introspective observation; compare the perceptual phenomenon wherein a stabilized retinal image quickly fades from vision. The rare prominence that stands out in relief against that transparent meaningfulness barring ambiguity or outright meaninglessness are those instances of confirmed, validated meanings that have been insightfully discovered. Within our apperception, "certain knowledge" (read: objectively validated insight) is the salient figure manifest against the invisible back/ground of oceanic cognitive meaning.

How can such cognitively global *semantikos* be rendered unnoticeable by a figure of truth within apperception? What happens is that the gnostic motivational impetus requiring intellectual "certainty," i.e., objective verification, invades the ocean of *semantikos* and fixates those figures of verified insight that stand out so prominently visible against the *semantikal* ground in toto. That grounding gives such truths their contextual setting and thereby their very existence qua objective and subjective "certainties" in relief against "mere" (unseen) meaningfulness. To re/orient our apperception to *semantikos* would necessitate a figure/ground reversal, in which habitual background became apparent figure and vice versa.

How might we induce such? A good start would be detailed re/examinations of the various forms of *semantikos*, its ubiquity now manifestly emergent after said transposition, asking then the question as to how we ever could have neglected the sheer number and typical diversity of cognitive meanings in favor of a tiny subclass of their confirmed instances.

³ Dewey there contrasted determinate truths versus intelligible meanings but did not oppose knowing and certainty against understanding and cognitive meaning as we are doing here.

IV. SEMANTIKAL EPISTEMOLOGY

As per Semantikal postulation our ratiocinative understanding is the true ground and essence of human cognition, then when the "limits of knowing," "indubitable certainty," and "un/certain knowing" inter alia are spoken of, such talk must be misinterpreting the nature of thinking because of folk psychology's and gnostic epistemology's distortions and fictitious impositions upon our introspective deliverances. To set the picture aright, that characterization should be transposed from the gnostic scheme to our alternative paradigm.

In Cartesian perspective, there is a gnostic spectrum that ranges from nescience (ignorance) to uncertainty thence to certainty. In Semantikal terms, the proper cognitive continuum runs from meaningless to ambiguous or vague and thence to meaningful. Insight represents a moment of maximally coherent semantikos formation, which qua hypothetical schema admits of varying degrees of probable dis/confirmation; its distorted parallel gnostic version stipulates certain knowledge as the consequence of coming to know.

A glaring anomaly appears before our folk gnosticism that necessarily contests whether there actually be such a cognitive function identified as knowing. There has never been any body of knowledge, even -- indeed especially within -- science that might be considered finalized. I am not here repeating the academically fashionable shibboleth that no knowledge is ever complete. I instead maintain, *There exists no cognitive function above and beyond understanding that could generate anything except semantikos.*

That reservation emphatically includes any supposed Cartesian "un/certain knowledge." To state that *certain* knowing is nonexistent is not necessarily to imply that there ever obtains only *uncertain* knowledge, insofar as ex hypothesi there be no actual faculty of knowing that establishes or determines certainty to any degree and whose functional privation would eventuate in a contrary uncertainty. When we affirm that "There is no knowing," this is not meant to signify that there is only uncertainty throughout our cogitations for that would imply an acceptance of the dichotomous certainty versus uncertainty posit.

If it were rejoined that of course our certainty is always only tentative then by that proposition we have returned right back to the epistemic starting block. What is this certainty -- is it a genuine reason/able function or a fictitious one indeed might it somehow be a contextual expression of semantikos rather than a real cognitive phenomenon in its own right? If perchance knowing were a species of ratiocination, which latter represents knowing's genus, their respective products of certainty and semantikos should also show that same classificatory relationship of superordinate to subordinate. But our other rehearsed arguments

strongly suggest the feasibility of simply eliminating entirely such unnecessary gnostic complications.

What is notoriously undeniable in the realm of scientific advance, namely, that complete and unequivocal understanding is unattainable, surely holds in our everyday transactions with the uneventful world, in the sublunary constructs formed by a less exalted mode of understanding. A psychological sense of certainty is absolutely no guarantee of sound conception even if Cartesian criteria as clarity and distinctness were added thereto. Any person might adduce myriad instances in this life where conclusions theretofore seeming intractably indubitable have come crashing down when refuted by further evidence, experience, or logic (Frye and Levi, 1941). Within science and our mortal realm there evidently manifests no cognitive function as knowing that constructs let alone guarantees any kind of permanent, unequivocal knowledge.

When naïve apperception looks at cognition "from the inside" as duly informed by folk psychology, it sees a function of knowing. This may be understood in our Semantikal analysis as essentially a composite of ratiocination in its act of generating coherent semantikos followed almost immediately by a consequential rational assent. The latter's emergence from validated or self-evident insights qua schema/tic hypotheses generate cognitively firm articulates that do not blow away with the first challenge to their presumptive veracity, which beneficently prevents us from relinquishing successful interpretations that have repeatedly proven their worth. Nonetheless insofar as all "knowledge" (confirmed hypotheses) is inherently and ultimately provisional, necessarily applicable only within delimited contexts, there must be an operational egress to keep schemata from becoming permanently ossified and thereby precluding more comprehensive and veracious schemata from being eventually attained through further enlightening thought.

This is where imagination so eminently variable among individuals enters the fray on behalf of obsolescent ratiocination. Creative imagination can plasticize constructs when and where their limits of efficient application break down. Such cognitive adaptation is required either for better accommodation to the facts or to other components of the reticulated totality of semantikos, making for more comprehensive logical consistency. Our intellectual economy and equilibrium are in this way balanced between forces of malleable renovation and unyielding staticism.⁴

⁴ The average understanding prefers its cherished prejudgments to the emotional hardship of questioning, let alone overturning its unworkable ideologies. It appears to be not a coincidence that those who are most ignorant tend to be those who are yet most omniscient in their own eyes. It is rigidifying belief that constricts both flexible thought and thereby an appreciation of one's own limitations in apprehending other and deeper insights. As Schopenhauer wrote, many people would rather die than think.

There are at least three reasons why traditional epistemology concentrated so exclusively upon the gnostic leitmotif when assessing cognition, rather than investigating the nature of semantikos, excepting only linguistic meaning or semantics, a major investigative topic since antiquity. That threefold rationale: (1) a motivational impulsion strives for cognitive closure qua certainty, which motive intrudes upon our introspective thought by fervently seeking and emphasizing "isles of truth" rather than their grounding semantikos; (2) folk psychology's categories of cognition, singular priority being given to "knowing with certainty" while taking for granted and hence obviously overlooking ratiocinative, semantikal themes; and (3) superficial naïve introspection seems indeed to divulge a faculty of certain knowing, reading that folk psychology construct into our apperceived thoughts. This last observation merits further consideration.

Let us try whether otherwise hazy and nebulous "certainty" might be more naturalistically interpreted and clarified by its bifurcation. Whenever an insight is formed via ratiocination, whether it expresses profundity or partakes of a more pedestrian character, there appears *pari passu* pervasive judgments therein, which may represent either *visceral belief* or *rational assent*. The former denotes Hume's (1739–1740/2000) "vivacity of impressions," i.e., intense sensory perceptions that by their very forcefulness determine which of various "ideas" are accepted as real or which behaviors should be undertaken.⁵

Sensorimotor schemata of both humans and infrahuman animals are in fact tailored to immediately presenting environmental exigencies, producing visceral belief upon relevant occasions, as (say) which foods to eat or what predator to avoid. These consequential primitive beliefs are a function of elementary behavioral conditioning, not of rational assent proper that devolves solely upon ratiocinative intellectual insight. A spectrum of rational assent may be envisioned: from the complete absence of affirmation due to outright chaotic interpretive meaninglessness; to an "uncertain" construct, i.e., one relatively incoherent, ambiguous, or disordered; to the moment of eureka qua "total comprehension." We italicize in passing the fundamental cognitive contrast between mere "instinctive" negotiations of the physical environment versus reason/able understanding of the intelligible cosmos.

So much for epistemic un/certainty. The Cartesian scheme now may be summarily discounted. *There is no actual cognitive function that answers to*

"knowing" and as certainty is the presumed issue generated by that fictitious form of cognition, it too must vanish into folk psychology's gnostic misconception. Accordingly it can be understood why indefeasible knowledge has never yet been produced or ever can be, individually or culturally. It may be said that even as our highest empirical expression of rational cognition, scientific knowledge, begins and ends only in hypothetical constructions, then this must be the essence of human ratiocination: to assimilatively and generatively understand continually higher orders of semantikos yet never to complete that progressive endeavor.⁶ Therefore, knowing and its product of certainty are definitive fictions most properly understood as confabulated delusions, though the origins of these in apperception and folk psychology are perfectly comprehensible.

An objection arises at once. "It is not sought to apprehend merely *cognitive* meaning -- there is sought in science and elsewhere, *confirmed* propositions. Not merely *to understand* in a bald sense the particulars of competing hypotheses, but to *know for certain* which of those meanings corresponds to reality — *that* is what Descartes and science itself are getting at." This demurrer confuses the issue. There is indeed objective knowledge but it comes from an actual cognitive function of understanding, not through a fictive one of knowing. The confusion arises by continuing to assert the very folk psychological categories in question — a *petitio principii*. What folk psychology calls *certain knowing* may be elucidated properly as *understanding within a context of probable confirmation*.

Thus, though there be no actually existent cognition that determines for all time absolute truths, yet undoubtedly we possess objective knowledge. There is first the formation of intelligible propositions and interpretive schemata; thence the establishment by empirical investigation of successive working hypotheses. This is the challenge posed to Semantiks: to delineate an epistemology of that objectively verified understanding, tendered only in terms of ratiocination and semantikos bereft of knowing and certainty. How might such vindicated objectivity manifest by understanding alone?

Undoubtedly we possess a cognition that grants an *order of probability* and nothing more to our equivocal inferences. If we assume im/probable inferences in place of consummating un/certainties, we may with justification consider junking the very posit of any cognitive faculty designated as generating certain knowledge, a faculty that appears to do little or no

⁵ This citation of Hume's construct does not mean that in any way I endorse his rather simplistic "skeptical" epistemology in which our causal inferences are depicted as having firmament solely upon empirical inductions. I am employing his characterization merely to highlight the non/rational nature of such "associative" belief.

⁶ The proposition that "meaning is inexhaustible" (David Bohm) is a metaphysical postulate, insofar as the intelligible universe itself is inherently open-ended as to its innumerable interpretations. And semantikos as understood intelligible relations is precisely the cognitive phenomenon that is to be elucidated through the programme of Semantiks.

explanatory work anyway and which is probably nothing except a holdover from folk epistemology. In other words, it should be tried whether probable hypotheses might be generated by ratiocinative understanding alone, shorn of any ostensible confirming function carried out or finalized by an epistemic spectre called "knowing."

In this way we obtain simplicity of hypothesis for our Semantikal schema. There would be only ratiocination elaborating semantikos in its various forms while the relative verification or refutation of inferential constructs would admit only of an ultimately indeterminate veridicality. The objective determination of relative truthfulness would be given by some integral and higher order function of the understanding itself, which is responsible in a first order function for the meaningful, intelligible construct's original generation.

A term for patterned forms from Gestalt Psychology, *gestalten*, emphasized the spontaneous organization of maximally coherent percepts. In visual perception these articulated gestalten are segregated into figures collectively constituting the sensory field "out there." Such sensorial gestalten are cognitively sublated and thereby obtain abstract conceptual significance; we recognize (say) the functional utility of rakes, thrown horseshoes, and edible apples. A concept is its own gestalt, the abstract equivalent of such percepts; and while percepts manifest as those articulated entities within sensory fields, concepts homologously compose their own conceptual fields called schemata.

A relative lack of coherence among cognitive gestalten is ap/perceived as ambiguity or incoherent vagueness, as with an incompletely understood homework assignment. A complete absence of initial ordering, or a subsequent disordering of formerly cohesive construction, is experienced as outright meaninglessness of which it may be presumed that there are as many varieties as there are of meaningfulness and ambiguity.

Abstract conceptuality has a hierarchical structure comprising nested levels. The three generic and principal forms are concepts, schemata, and the culminating reticulate. The concept is an elementary unit of meaningfulness within this hierarchy; it consists of a discrete construct built by ratiocination. The schema is the next subsuming level of cognitive meaning that encompasses concepts and structures their "contextual meanings," e.g., a common noun qua concept within the denotation schema. Schemata qua abstract interpretive frameworks are epitomized by the various scientific models and theories. At the apex of conceptual meaning, the reticulate represents the totality of semantikal structure within an individual mind, i.e., the implicit articulation of all universes of discourse. The reticulate is the "total meaning" that constantly informs wakeful thought, an articulated cognitive

universality always implicitly accessible in its relatively seamless aggregate to one's conscious purview.⁷

Metaphorically, ratiocination as the impelling power of understanding "moves through" that implicit reticular totality of meaning at every moment of cogitation, even if only an infinitesimal fraction thereof is available to our conscious attentive focus at a given moment. By means of this omnipresent totality of semantikos, a lifetime of learning implicate with creative imagination can be brought to bear sometimes serendipitously upon an immediate perceptual content to "fathom its deepest meaning." Thus, Archimedes cried "Eureka!" upon witnessing a "mere" rise in bath water level, in which that visual-cum-tactile percept was sublated into a solution of the theoretical problem of specific gravity.

V. CONCEPTUAL MEANING AND ORGANIZATION

"Conceptuality" and "cognitive meaningfulness" were used above in an interchangeable fashion. This was not unintentional, for our working hypothesis is that *semantikos is conceptual in its inherent nature*. A simple empirical illustration of this is associative agnosia, in which perceptual ordering remains intact while the cognitive meaning of what is perceived is absent due to that pathology (in effect, disrupted sublation). Agnosia expresses a denuding privation of perception insofar as sensory contents are normally illumined by informative conceptuality and recognized by memorial elicitations.

Cognitive meaningfulness then is conceptual in substance and not perceptual as such, i.e., perceiving bereft of concepts is meaningless (Kant, 1787/1997, B15). Perceptual content is routinely *sublated*, i.e., made intelligible by being invested with semantikal import inside our conceptual reason. For example, the sensorial tones, melodies, harmonies, and rhythms of the Sixth Symphony are schema/tically ordered within our audition of Beethoven's compositional design; and tabulated, statistical empirical data originating in observation and experimentation are formulated propositionally and explained within schema/tic scientific hypotheses. *Perceptual content, insofar as it is sublated within conceptuality's orderings, becomes semantikos thereby, precisely to the intelligible depth of meaningfulness that is characteristic of our proprietary cognition called reason*. Perceptual phenomena transmuted into empirical facts by sublation subserve

⁷ Regarding such accessibility, in linguistics it is a commonplace observance that there is an indefinite number of reasoned and reasonable responses that can be generated from an equally indefinite number of questions asked about any topic upon which the interlocutor is informed. This facility represents the capacities of schemata informed by the implicit whole of their subsuming reticulate, i.e., by the vast repertoire of past learning — articulated cognitive meanings — set within an inexhaustible engine of plastic inferential understanding.

scientific hypotheses for reason yet only directly inform immediate behavior for all infrahuman species' behaviors. "Conceptuality" signifies here the architectonic, abstract intellectual ordering among all domains of semantikos within an individual psyche, inclusive of sublated perceptual contents.

Inherent in the structures of semantikos is a complementary dual nature. *Articulation* denotes that initial ordering in which each elemental concept or sublated percept "receives its cognitive due" in the functional whole schema that it helps to form in semipermanent fashion. *Integration* designates the "dictatorial" subsidiary procedure subsequent to articulation: force-fitted applications of the schema's relatively inflexible interpretive parameters are imposed so long as the cognitive template itself, when once formed, remains rigidified without fundamental modification. The extreme instance of that integrative modus operandi is called curve fitting and was given its historical exemplar with Ptolemaic epicycles, when the geocentric schema finally became unfalsifiable due to such interminable ad hoc reasoning. Any and every given construct of semantikos is both articulated in its origination and integrating in the schema's subsequent state of dynamic equilibrium.

This means that when a construct of semantikos is first generated, all the cognitive elements contributing thereto "donate" their individualized warp and woof to that systematic, holistic unity established among them. After that coherent semantikos (concept, schema) has solidified into an equilibratory state comprising its constituent gestalten, further "incoming" perceptual or conceptual elements are "interpretively channeled" into that relatively fixed framework. All structures of semantikos admit of this articulate-cum-integrate duality, including the overarching reticulate itself. The qualification of *semipermanence* alludes to the ever-present potential function of re/articulation, namely, to reorder extant semantikos at any level by busting up those fixed equilibria through acts of re/articulation called *creativity* in the vernacular, if the reordering be of original, comprehensive, and systematic conceptual compass.

VI. THE FORM OF SEMANTIKOS

The constructive form of cognitive ratiocination is the proverbial "path of least resistance," viz., the simplest directive pathways manifest throughout perception and conception (Kohler, 1947; Vernon, 1937). Whereas the Gestalt Psychologists treated of perceptual orderings inter alia, ex hypothesi only its homologue in conceptual formation constitutes semantikos as such. Otherwise inherently "meaningless" perceptual contents obtain such intellectual import solely by their sublation into those very concepts and schemata. Thus the meaningful utility of apples for

purposes of cider making is "seen" only by conceptual sublation of the red phenomenal objects; while associative agnosia renders one "blind" to such practical significance by divorcing perception from conception.

Ratiocination qua ordering principle tends to generate or assimilate maximal coherence among constituent cognitive gestalten. The essential character of its constructive process is subsequently manifest in the "formal goodness" (Pragnanz) of semantikal configurations. The resultant cognitive meaning shows an imprint of its generative cause. But what is this form? A hint is given by the parallel nature of percepts' holistic coherence and harmony, epitomized in the structured visual field. In Gestalt Psychology the various forms of perceptual organization, usually numbered at six, are grouped under a *minimum principle* (Kohler, 1947), termed the *law of simplicity*, denoting the simplest ordering assumed by the sensorial gestalten in a phenomenal sensory field. *Simplicity, coherence, inclusiveness, continuity*, and like terms bespeak that phenomenon we observe in all our cogitation, namely, a tendency of thought toward an economy of ordering, whether in language, conception, or hypothesis formation. Poincaré (1905/1952) assessed scientific hypothesizing in this light when he asked how it so inexorably obtained that out of all possible hypothetical scenarios, the great creators tend to alight upon only those few that are maximally "attuned" to the problematic in question.

But if coherence of gestalten effected by the minimum principle and formally expressed as Pragnanz is the essence of both perception and conception, this implies that that shared, more fundamental type of ordering at bottom of them both is contrary to the traditional epistemic distinction between their kinds. Indeed, there should be posed a question mark regarding the routine interaction of perceptual and conceptual modes of ordering, which unthinkingly we so take for granted. For where is there any connection or interaction that must necessarily obtain between concrete sensory fields and abstract cognitive paradigms? Simply because of their habitual pervasion throughout our experience via sublation, that mutual implication appears so natural as to pass unquestioned, excepting afflictions of clinical associative agnosia. A more penetrating suggestion would be that they have a shared ordering type, viz., the minimum principle that somehow allows for reciprocal informing of percepts and concepts and thereby underlies their cross-pollination. As examples, visual images qua embodied cognitive meaning can "mean" grand solutions of theoretical problems to receptive creators as Archimedes and Newton (Koestler, 1964/1967); and similarly Einstein cited vague kinesthetic sensations as mediating his insights.

Ex hypothesi, then, perception and conception would share the same minimum principle organon but

as differentiated applications of that common organizing form adapted to their specific contents' relative complexity, sensations versus abstractions – though again perception as such is inherently meaningless without its conceptual sublation, for only conceptuality constitutes *semantikos*. The cognitive homologue of spontaneous organization within organized perception would be that maximal coherence qua *Pragnanz* among concepts, hypotheses, schemata, paradigms (meta/schemata), and within the reticulate itself. We may postulate many such homologies between perceptual orderings and those of conceptuality's, using the assumption that it is the minimum principle that effects those goodly formed constructs. Various such homological instantiations of *Pragnanz* structures may be plotted.

Further, our reason manifests a proprietary ratiocinative compass that is "one" in expression throughout all the domains of its semantikal applications. Reason has a given intellectual subtlety indeed profundity that it may train on any subject within its proprietary cognitive purview. Thus music, speech, and conceptual comprehension in general share the same semantikal "width and depth" of abstract, systemic, and generalized meaning, which lesser species intrinsically cannot "fathom."

The exemplary culmination of our ratiocination's unitary organizing process operating within its many universes of discourse constituting reason's vast dominion is *insight*. As examples: (1) Ratiocinative insight manifests most fabulously in the context of creative and assimilative hypothesis formation. Perceptual data may also play a part in inducing the articulation of such conceptual schemata, as statistical and tabular formats would represent the sublated sensorial content and referent of empirical hypotheses. (2) There is even rational "sensorimotor insight" as when a musician "in a flash" has finally coordinated the fine-tuned afferent-cum-efferent, tactile and muscular execution of a difficult passage, a skill that is implicate with a paradigmatic matrix of music understanding. (3) Contrarily to musicianship, the sensorimotor coordination of toddlers first learning to walk is of course not an expression of rational insight insofar as their inchoate reason lies secluded in undeveloped potentiality. Such an elementary attainment would nonetheless constitute a genuine instance of early "ontogenetic insight," geared toward eventual clairvoyant and providential purposiveness of rational adulthood that uses bodily deployments toward its goals in the temporal world.

Thus all exhibitions of rational insight show one common *formal* capacity of ratiocinative ordering that articulates abstract concepts and schemata; while its more generic minimum principle orders perception and aesthetic understanding, *inter alia*. Within the various sciences reasoning's typical systematicity is too evident

to require elaboration, as assimilative and creative insight in (say) chemistry is no different in kind from that within physics respecting its essential logical, deductive, and comprehensive structural nature; their difference lies only in variegated contexts of application.

VII. SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND ITS TRUTHS

An illustration of definitive veridical *semantikos* vindicated by no absolute certainty may be given. The most plausible hypothesis concerning Plato's recounting in *Timaeus* of the Atlantis city-state is the perfectly naturalistic one that identifies it with the Aegean island of Santorin during its pre-Hellenic Mycenaean period (Galanopoulos and Bacon, 1969). Literary, archaeological, geographical, geological, chronological, and cultural evidence demonstrably converge in favoring that thesis. When such cohesiveness is obtained among "the facts" with their varied and sixfold qualitatively unique dimensions, it might even be said that such objective consilience is "too pretty" not to be true. In general, this signifies that *maximal cross-corroboration of the constitutive concepts ("facts") determines the probable truth of a successful hypothesis*. It is this relative best-fit that lies behind the plausibility of Ockham's razor and related aesthetic and organizational criteria qua *Pragnanz's law of simplicity*. Such criterial truthfulness and explanatory parsimony as Ockham's, then, would represent the conceptual expression of that same minimum principle ordering manifest in perceptual contexts as were investigated by the Gestalt Psychologists (Ellis and Koffka, 1950; Koffka, 1935; Kohler, 1947).

Semantiks can readily explain how relative veridicality of individual working hypotheses can manifest yet also how they can be superseded when progressively better models and theories are developed to overcome anomalies or to attain to greater explanatory compass. The better model is such because of its improved evaluative fit, i.e., the more optimal coherence among its constituent conceptual gestalten, relative to other models exhibiting inferior cohesion. Scientific progress consists of ever more comprehensive and accurate explanatory theories' internal consilience, which ultimately must break down at the limits of their conditional applicability. Those intellectual limits are hurdled through so-called paradigm shifts, namely, re/articulative creations of scientific schemata within or across squared, triangulated universes of discourse.

The extended epistemological implication is that the very constructions of hypothetical understanding as inherently open-ended forbid positing any "final comprehension." In other words, it is not merely a contingent fact that science has never yet attained to any irrevocable system of explanation; it is a principled impasse, at least insofar as the cosmos itself has no bottom to its intelligible substrate (Bohm, 1981). The

very function of ratiocination is to make the structures of cognitive meaning as concepts and schemata more mutually informative by their triangulated, squared desegregation; to broaden and order more coherently and comprehensively thereby our rational conception as a whole. Triangulation and sublation appear somewhat analogous in this sense: sublated perceptual contents, otherwise intrinsically meaningless yet when so transmuted by conceptual semantikos attain to empirically relevant factual status fit for hypothetical, scientific interpretation. Similarly, triangulation disambiguates not outright meaningless gestalten but instead ambiguous deliverances, both perceptual and conceptual.

The veracity of a semantikal model (concept, hypothesis, schema) would correspond to its intelligible object "out there" by dint of a *proportion* (Latin *ratio*, reason) between that construct's internal logical consistency and its objective referent's equivalent simplest form that that construct attempts to map. As Pragnanz's structurally coherent "goodness" obtains qua logical and evidential consistency within the interpretive model, so that inhering consistency in those intellective relations ideally obtains "proportionately to" the real world's intelligible structures and events thus conceived. As an initial shorthand expression of this "equal ratios" postulation, that proportion is sketched as follows. *Ideal hypothesis: law of simplicity = intelligible reality: least action.*

With this Semantikal epistemology, there is no need for recourse to ontological and quasi-mystical reputed identifications of gnostic knowing "in here" with its *certainly known* referents "out there."

A conceptual schema and its conceived "object" (intelligible relations) might then be disjoined spatiotemporally as mental understanding from its intelligible objective -- as neural sensory cortices are discontinuous with their perceived distal stimuli -- yet still manifest progressively attained proportionate correspondence in (simplest) kind and degree between successive working hypotheses and those intellectually comprehended referents. Thereby objective and veridical knowledge become established in stages by scientific and cultural creative advances. Thought and reality's ontological and epistemic disjunction would also explain why understanding can never be absolute but only "approximately correct." Knowledge is ever essentially tentative as the history of science documents, insofar as all scientific models cognitively "in here" can be only an hypothetical and probabilistic mapping of their intelligible reality "mirrors," never constituting their identity "out there."

Fundamentally, ratiocinative understanding and its understood reality are in formal coherence within an ontological potentiality that becomes progressively actualized through creators' insights and cultural institutions' teaching thereof. Accordingly there would be

an identity of sorts obtaining between "knower" and "known." The "preestablished harmony" between mind and world makes it possible for cognitive ordering to often successfully conjecture, hypothesize the most plausible interpretation of reality's many natural dimensions. Thereby the semantikal structures of our cognition, generated within the individual and collective understanding, attain to a holistic Pragnanz within conceptuality in toto, here called the reticulate.

Understanding as ratiocination is a *dynamic process* and not *immutable stasis* that proximately parallels the relations had among the intelligible objects and events composing universal cosmos thus intellectually squared. It may be seen by inspecting the nature of this correspondence that the hypothetical constructions generated must forever be approximate and successively unfold -- and never end -- via creative insight and culture. Again, such cognitive approximations are precisely what are observed both in mundane thought and in scientific chronicles.

Kuhn (1970) has distinguished the stages of hypothesis formation, consolidation, stagnation, and eventual overthrow of paradigmatic sciences. Often the initial impetus to revolutionize established theories comes about through recognizing confounding and intractable anomalies. Ptolemaic astronomy degenerated into a fixed universe of discourse that held incontestable sway over the catalogued astronomical data in its throes. That geocentric discourse epitomized the function of cognitive integration qua pejorative curve fitting, i.e., interpretive force fitting at its most hidebound. A creative act of Copernican insight liberated those empirical facts from the closed dynamics of the geocentric paradigm and by that act of re/articulation established a new schema/tic contextual meaning for those facts, namely, heliocentrism. Even more generally, the ousting of geocentrism paved the way for re/articulating the more superordinate medieval Weltanschauung that by ethos subsumed Ptolemaic astronomy's strictly astronomical universe of discourse. That Renaissance intellectual revolution pertained to a renovated reticulate, the highest semantikal structure within an individual mind; yet also was pertinent in a figurative sense to the collective psyche when applied to institutionalized acculturation within Western civilization.

Kuhn struggles to account for the transience of scientific knowledge within his implicit gnostic epistemology. For example, it may be asked that if the entire series of scientific paradigms be incomplete, how might veridical objective knowledge ever become attainable. With Semantikal epistemology there is posited an inherent open-endedness of cognitive meaning, read into and out of the intelligible universe (cosmos) that is admitted to be inherently inexhaustible - - re/articulated interpretive paradigms are necessarily incumbent forever. We are accordingly obligated to account for the objectivity of verified hypothetical

schemata (theories) that manifests at every stage of progressive science, when construed solely as vindicated probable semantikos, devoid of fictitious certainty.

How is such objective and confirmed ratiocination cognitively possible, given that ex hypothesi there is no ulterior and absolute truth determining function above that of ratiocinative understanding? J.J. Gibson (1966) showed that perceptual ambiguity is perfectly resolved in the real world of sentient organisms by multiple views of an object, determinately triangulated through locomotion and orienting movements of the head and sense organs. In these contexts, the perceptual best fit of a given scenario before us is a function of disambiguating the sensorial gestalten by means of those multiple vantages.⁸

More comprehensively, the so-called "cognitive" (perceptive) map (Hochberg, 1964) would be a phenomenal chart of such individual articulated perspectives within an individual mind, an implicit higher order perceptual construct qua field mapping of the percepts' collectivity that tacitly and informatively guides current environmental negotiation. By extrapolation, there is posited here a homological function for cognitive paradigms ("universes of discourse"), whose inclusive concepts and schemata are abstract templates rather than concrete ones, yet whose minimum principle has a common form with perceptually organized "cognitive" maps. *Ratiocinative hypotheses have been, when sharing perception's ideal Pragnanz format, most efficiently triangulated, disambiguated, and rearticulated by multiple interpretive "perspectives" within systematic cognitive multitasking, to bring about the maximally coherent schemata and hence probable truth.* For example: the present Semantiks model itself represents such an attempted systematic squaring of the extant cognitive sciences toward a more consistent paradigm regarding the nature of reasoning.

The neural isomorphism of ratiocinative understanding would be sought by using the specified parameters obtained at this functional level of semantikal description. Contrariwise, if indeed knowing be not a real cognitive function then no neural substrate could ever be found, supposing any viable gnostic descriptive model might be devised for that purpose. Any attempt to plot neurological correspondences therefrom would be analogous to Ptolemaic curve fitting of astronomical observations into the geocentric paradigm, and that after the Copernican paradigm had been made known.

Semantiks has the promise of application to issues in cognitive psychology, just as the non-naturalistic, epistemic gnosticism apparently has no

such potential. The cognitive phenomenon wherein a perceptual search space is narrowed by verbal (discursive conceptual) instructions, after which the understanding does not follow a serial order of tracking but rather is attentively narrowed to a *relevant* focus, may be seen as an expression of constraining the parameters of semantikos; relevance being no other than directive and circumscribed cognitive meaning. How such is accomplished might best be researched by determining how the total understanding comprising both perception (sensory items) and conception (verbal instructions) is able to configure conscious attentiveness to bring about such relevant selectivity.

Finally, the concept of the schema has had a long and useful employment within cognitive psychology, in terms of accounting for the consolidation of memories via *meaningful* ordering and their efficient retention and recall thereby (Bartlett, 1932; Mayer, 1992). By my use of this term and construct, I reference precisely that same cognitive function though put into the more expansive interpretive context of Semantiks. Indeed the nature of memory as organized within schemata may be the best starting point for investigation of cognitive meaning inside the understanding considered globally, for memorially based learning constitutes the meaningfully organized repository of articulated semantikos in its essence. Learning is nothing else except the understanding in an essential action of assimilation of cognitive meaning, while memory is the organization, storage, and recollection of relevant meaning; relevance being meaning appropriate to a given context of schema/tic interpretation.

The above proposals are meant as adumbrative systematic modeling of interrelated semantikal phenomena involving cognitive meaning, ambiguity, meaninglessness, perception, and conceptuality inter alia. The confirmatory data for this interpretive scheme of Semantiks are obtained from various universes of discourse, including music comprehension (e.g., Pragnanz "closure" of ap/perceived dissonant tonal ambiguity, obtained through modulation's key resolution); humor apprehension (irony, e.g., the climaxing punchline as an inversion of meaning); and hypothesis formation (all the sciences constituting but one conceptual, theoretical meaning-type).

What is needed are not so many more "new facts" as the reinterpretation of such familiar ones. That means investigation of traditional epistemological and psychological problems in light of the phenomenon of cognitive meaning, rather than fixating its subclass of verified propositional and theoretical meanings as with the traditional gnostic philosophers' obsession with that inveterate hobbyhorse called "certain knowing." (Though investigation of Dewey's "isles of truthful meaning" qua hypothesis verification remains a legitimate topic for continued cogent epistemic investigation, though

⁸ Cf. Helmholtz's "perceptual inferences": percipients tend to see the most likely case of what is actually out there (Gregory, 1970).

situated now in a Semantikal orientation.) This involves an analysis of such cognitive parameters as meaningfulness, ambiguousness, and meaninglessness along the graded spectrum of semantikos in its myriad manifestations. More generally, it means recognizing the oceanic intelligible meaning that has always been in front of all rational beings at every moment of their wakeful conscious understanding, though we did not attentively focus in proper fashion and identify let alone emphasize its true monumental significance.

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Participation in Organizations B the Contribution to Academic Education using Social Intervention Methodologies

By Katianny Gomes Santana Estival, Joao Carlos De Padua Andrade,
Clara Campos E Campos, Jaiele De Jesus Dos Santos, Renato De Oliveira Rosa
& Solange Rodrigues Santos Corrêa

Universidade Estadual De Santa Cruz

Abstract- In the search for solutions that enhance the quality of life, entrepreneurship stands out as the process of creating something different and with value, having the entrepreneur as the main factor promoting the economic and social development of a country. The university extension is an example of the changes occurring in the academic field, corresponding to an educational and scientific process, with a differentiated knowledge that transforms society, relating academic and have experiences, using theory and putting it into practice. This article demonstrates the contribution of academic education using social intervention methodologies. Thus the importance of entrepreneurship and social business for the economic and social development of local actors deprived of entrepreneurial opportunities, promoted through the dynamics of university extension.

Keywords: *social entrepreneurship; social business; university extension; action research.*

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Participation in Organizations B the Contribution to Academic Education using Social Intervention Methodologies

Katianny Gomes Santana Estival^α, Joao Carlos De Padua Andrade^σ, Clara Campos E Campos^ρ, Jaiiele De Jesus Dos Santos^ω, Renato De Oliveira Rosa[¥] & Solange Rodrigues Santos Corrêa[§]

Abstract- In the search for solutions that enhance the quality of life, entrepreneurship stands out as the process of creating something different and with value, having the entrepreneur as the main factor promoting the economic and social development of a country. The university extension is an example of the changes occurring in the academic field, corresponding to an educational and scientific process, with a differentiated knowledge that transforms society, relating academic and have experiences, using theory and putting it into practice. This article demonstrates the contribution of academic education using social intervention methodologies. Thus the importance of entrepreneurship and social business for the economic and social development of local actors deprived of entrepreneurial opportunities, promoted through the dynamics of university extension. The Office of Projects (EPEC) of the State University of Santa Cruz (UESC), located in the south of Bahia, acts as a modifying agent that sees the potential of the site. Using the principles of university extension and action research, it develops entrepreneurial actions with a focus on two pillars: to enable the academic formation process of the participating students through the relationship theory and practice and the strengthening of the entrepreneurial spirit of the participating communities. In this context, the present article presents, in a brief essay, a brief account of the actions that EPEC performs with communities through university extension, seeking to foster entrepreneurship and disseminate social businesses in the Southern Bahia region, through intervention methodologies promotion of regional vocations and the empowerment of young people and women.

Keywords: *social entrepreneurship; social business; university extension; action research.*

JEL: *[M140] corporate culture; diversity; social responsibility.*

I. INTRODUCTION

How the economic system has changed over the years has brought with it many social and environmental problems, such as increasing social inequality and the degradation of natural resources. These themes have gained space in debates

and actions of public and private entities, and even society itself has acted to change this framework (Rosolenet al., 2014).

In the search for solutions that enhance the quality of life, entrepreneurship stands out as the process of creating something different and with value, having the entrepreneur as the main factor promoting the economic and social development of a country (Hisrich et al., 2009). Social entrepreneurship is one of the potential agents of social innovation in sectors that are not served by public services or by the lucrative private market in actions to eliminate or minimize social problems. Social business happen with the support of partnerships between different organizations, especially in the industry, such as donations, associations, and cooperatives. (Quintão, 2004).

In this context, the present work aims to show the project office (EPEC) of the Universidade Estadual de Santa Cruz (UESC), located in the municipality of Ilhéus, South Bahia, as a nucleus that develops the university extension sustained in entrepreneurship and social business with objective of promoting entrepreneurship and the dissemination of social affairs in communities in the Southern Region of Bahia, with the valorization of regional vocations and the empowerment of young people and women.

To obtain the results presented, we used bibliographical research on the state of the art of the discussions on entrepreneurship, social affairs and documentary research based on the reports of research and extension activities carried out by EPEC in the period from 2010 to 2016. The information obtained was analyzed in the year 2017, with consideration of the perspectives of entrepreneurship and social business on the results of the activities carried out by EPEC.

II. SOCIAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND SOCIAL BUSINESS

Entrepreneurship is saw as an essential piece in economic development, in which entrepreneurs are considered agents of social and economic change who can verify motivations in other respects beyond profit making and the formation of new goods and services for the community (Boszczowski & Teixeira, 2012).

*Author α σ ρ ω ¥: Universidade Estadual De Santa Cruz, Campus Soane Nazaré de Andrade, Ilhéus-Bahia-Brasil.
e-mails: ksgestival@uesc.br, jcpandrade@uesc.br,
claracamposecampos@gmail.com, jaiielesantos@outlook.com,
adm.renato.rosa@gmail.com*

Entrepreneurship encompasses three essential concepts: value generation, innovation, and the ability to develop and take advantage of opportunities (Quintão, 2004).

Social entrepreneurship is an innovative action focused on the social sphere, whose process is initiated from an adverse situation of the place and in the elaboration of a possibility to overcome this problem (Oliveira, 2004). Five characteristics of entrepreneurship are mentioned: being innovative; be viable; be self-sustaining; involve various individuals and segments of society; promote social impact, and enable results to be evaluated (Oliveira, 2004). Social entrepreneurship is a concept that does not have a unique meaning between academia, managers, entrepreneurs, and the general public. A social entrepreneur is not only a selfless person but also must show clear determination to contribute to society (Rodríguez & Ojeda, 2015).

According to Borzaga et al., (2012), the combination of the notion of the company with the social adjective generated new definitions characterized by different meanings for the concept of social enterprise. Thus, due to the lack of empirical and theoretical researches developed in the area, as well as to the lack of adequate statistical information to carry out studies, it is a concept still under construction given a multiplicity of partial overlaps.

The most commonly used terms are social entrepreneurship, social business, and social enterprise. Also, other concepts that combine business activities with the pursuit of social goals have emerged. Many terms are used to consult these types of companies, sometimes interchangeable and often creating confusion. The social entrepreneur and social enterprises overlap to some extent; these terms tend to be replaced by the term "social enterprise." Although the literature is not yet consolidated in this field, in time, it will be ready for an attempt to clarify (Borzaga et al., 2012).

Entrepreneur practice often requires creativity and experimentation, which can lead to new products, new services, or better processes. However, innovation is more than just a creative idea because only a few ideas survive and become an innovation. The ultimate goal is to lead to change, add value and improve processes, products, or experiences. Therefore, the term also implies execution. The social organization for innovation is an idea of transformation that works and generates social value.

Due to the importance of demanding transformative innovation, the decision to innovate must be tackled in a decisive way, way towards a social need. Also, social organizations must provide value for the effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, and fairness of the process. Thus means that the generation, selection, and implementation of ideas that become realities must produce the maximum social value, as in the case of social entrepreneurship, the concept of "social

innovation" has different meanings (Rodríguez & Ojeda, 2015).

A social business seeks to merge the creation of social value and the of economic value in the same organizational structure. The generation of social value can also be understood not only by the final consumer but by all stakeholders in the process, i.e. customers, employees, suppliers, investors, and society itself. A social business, in addition to meeting social objectives, must be able to generate resources to obtain a margin of profitability over productive operations. These types of institutions do not depend on donations. Also, dividends should not be withdrawn by shareholders / owners, since profits must be reinvested in the business (Yunus et al., 2010).

Social business has emerged from a North American perspective, where private organizations are dedicated to solving social problems and are usually new businesses of large companies already established in the market. In developing countries, another kind of business with a social impact emerges called the inclusive business.

This type of business involves the low-income population in the process of economic development in the scope of demand, such as customers and consumers, and the sense of supply, as employees. They establish links between business and the population, generating a relationship of mutual benefit to the local community (Petrini et al., 2016).

Barki (2015) observes some nomenclatures that can be applied to social business terminology: (i) businesses with social impact; (ii) inclusive business; and (iii) impact the business. Moraes Neto and Valentin (2013) emphasize that this new modality of entrepreneurship can contribute to the economic progress of the nations, through innovations that aim to boost human development, for example, initiatives that generate products and services directed to people living in situations socioeconomic vulnerability.

Based on Petrini et al., (2016), it was possible to verify that Social Impact Business has some peculiarities that differentiate them in relation to the other types of companies: (i) the types of products or services offered; (ii) customers; (iii) the level of the profit structure, (Table 1) presents a systematic proposal of some types of business with social impact.

Table 1: Business systematics with social impact

Components	Business to the bottom of the pyramid	Social business	Inclusive business
Products or Services	Any product or service for direct sale to the low income population.	To solve problems related to poverty (education, health, housing or financial services), the environment and people with special needs.	Any product or service, as long as it includes the low income population in the process of production, supply or distribution.
Customers	Exclusively for low income people.	Preferably low-income people.	Any customer: final consumers of any social class, or even companies that purchase the products / services.
Profit structure	Visa profits. There is dividend distribution.	It does not aim at profits.	Visa profits. There is dividend distribution.
Example	Large company that develops a new product for sale, destined to people of low income. One example is Coca-Cola sold at R \$ 1.00.	<i>Gramen Danone Joint Venture - Big companies invest money and knowledge in the yogurt manufacturing process. The product has a high nutrient content (benefit to malnourished children) and is sold to the low income population at an affordable price.</i>	Company that buys the raw material of low income people (lettuce). The employees who clean, pack and distribute the product are people from the poor community, so the social benefits generated are employment and income to producers and distributors.

The models proposed in Table 1 have some differences. The pyramid-based businesses are business models that target the commercialization of products for the lower-income classes. On the other hand, social and inclusive businesses have in activities that contribute to the improvement of social welfare, especially in populations in situations of socioeconomic vulnerability.

The authors Janchanet al., (2016) evaluated the interest of the students of the Administration course of the University of São Paulo - USP and it was possible to highlight that the social more that are believed to be the solution of social inequality and even to market problems lack a focus of research and dissemination of knowledge.

The main contribution of this study was the perception that there is a gap in management education in the training of managers through extension actions for work in social enterprises. It was also possible to conclude that there is a great demand to be met, with professionalism and an increase in the likelihood of consolidation of social business.

Currently, the teaching of entrepreneurship in social business is low due to the lack of knowledge of the teaching staff of higher education institutions in the country on these types of enterprises. There is also a lack of more research on the trends and perspectives of this type of enterprise (Janchan et al., 2016).

Given the context presented, it can be say that social businesses promote the inclusion of low-profit minorities in the formal market, aiming to improve the living conditions of this population or biodiversity in the long term (Comini, 2016). It is in this context that EPEC

is insert with the focus of enhancing the entrepreneurial spirit of communities with a reduced level of opportunities, seeking to strengthen local social businesses with the appreciation of regional vocations.

III. THE OFFICE OF PROJECTS AS A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGE AGENT

The scenario of Brazilian higher education innovates by offering students the opportunity to develop and apply their knowledge before they even complete their studies. The university extension is a example of the changes that have occurred in this academic field, corresponding to an educational and scientific process, with a differentiated knowledge, which transforms society and university, relating academic and experiences, using theory and putting it into practice (Serrano, 2010). As a two-way street, the extension provides the relationship between university and society, articulating teaching and research (Renex, 1999).

The extension has three main characteristics (Rocha, 2006): polysemic, for having more than one sense; controversial because it can be put the discussion and debate; and structuring, because, from the social knowledge, the university and the society are relate.

Also, the National Extension Plan (2000) indicates four orientations about university extension (Corrêa, 2007), namely: dialogical interaction; irreducibility between teaching, research and extension; impact and transformation; interdisciplinarity between models and concepts.

Through the university extension, EPEC carries out its activities with a team of students, both scholars and volunteers, teachers, and collaborators. In this

interaction, the students first undergo a training process to understand the dynamics of the communities and also how they should proceed (Figure 1).



Figure 1: EPEC students being trained to work in the design and execution of socioeconomic projects

IV. METHODOLOGY

The methodology of action of the EPEC has a base on action research, a form of approach that starts from the principle that socioeconomic and environmental challenges demand new research methods, capable of understanding socio-environmental complexity Thiollent and Silva, (2007) making possible to perceive of the real characteristics of

the analyzed communities (Mutimukuru- Maravanyikaet al., 2016).

There follows a cycle in which there is a systematic oscillation between acting in practice and investigating it (Figure 2). "A change ... is planned, implemented, described, and evaluated, ... learning more in the process, both in practice and in research" (Tripp, 2005 p. 446).




Figure 2: Demonstration of the cycles of action research used by EPEC

Action research emerged as a new methodological proposal within a context characterized by various theoretical and practical concerns that seek new forms of intervention and investigation (Baldissera, 2001), corresponding to an instrument to understand the practice, to evaluate it Abraham & Purkayastha (2012), and to question it, thus requiring forms of action and decision-making (Abdalla, 2005).

Its characteristics are situational since it seeks to diagnose a specific problem in a characteristic situation, with a view to achieve some practical result (Nichter, 1984; Novaes Gil, 2009).

Focused on the presuppositions of action research, teacher- oriented students perform (Figure 3): (i) participatory diagnoses to understand the reality of each community to be attended; (ii) systematization of results and discussion with communities; (iii) elaboration of projects aiming at fundraising; (iv) when projects are approved, execution of activities; (v) investigations into the activities carried out (difficulties and successes); (vi) presentation at technical and scientific events with the focus of dissemination of the actions carried out.



Figure 3: Diagnoses performed by the EPEC team in local communities (a and b), cutting and sewing structure (c) and fish processing center (d) assembled with funds raised through elaborated projects.

Specifically, EPEC, through resources derived from the projects developed, has promoted the creation of cutting and sewing units; centers of fish processing; multipurpose kitchens so that family farmers can prepare various foods and, consequently, add value to the products; boats and ice factory for fishermen; business plans with the aim of strengthening productive

dynamics; construction of houses for fishermen; and actions to support economic and solidarity enterprises.

These activities are accompanied by training, in which the students have a practical field to exercise the acquired theories, to strengthen the entrepreneurial spirit of the participants (Figure 4).



Figure 4: Participants in actions to train fisherfolk (a), evaluation of environmental characteristics for the development of community-based tourism projects (b) and follow-up of the project to build houses for people fishing (d).

The project of houses culminated in the construction of 70 properties (Figure 4d), aiming to replace the wooden dwellings (Figure 4c). With the

participation of several actors, the EPEC was the protagonist that allowed the union of private initiative, public sector and fishermen's interest in the execution of

the project, demonstrating that social entrepreneurship enables the interaction of several agents in favor of a common good.

In recognition of the work carried out, EPEC was awarded the following awards: Santander University

Solidarity Award 2014 and the III Brazilian Forest Service Award in Economics and Forestry Market Studies (Figure 5), both resulting from the research and extension of the EPEC.



Figure 5: Receipt of the Santander University Solidarity Award in October 2014 in São Paulo (a) and the Brazilian Forest Service Award in Brasília, March 2016 (b).

V. CONCLUSIONS

The results of the EPEC allow us to affirm that the promotion of entrepreneurship and social affairs constitute crucial strategies in the emancipation of actors. In seeking to incorporate entrepreneurial dynamics, EPEC generates returns to communities through income generation and elevate self-esteem. Another relevant aspect of EPEC's performance is the improvement of the training of students, since it provides, through participation in projects and direct contact with local enterprises and communities, the relation of the theories to the reality of the local dynamics.

The training of participating teachers is also improve by working directly with local demands. It is possible to observe greater use of regional cases in the disciplines taught in the undergraduate and postgraduate courses, as well as the increase of scientific publications and research projects that encompass the theoretical and empirical problems and discussions concerning the context of the target communities and the environment from where the EPEC acts.

The work with communities emphasizes university extension as a means of bringing the accumulated knowledge in the teaching centers to the local actors. These centers have capillarities in the collection of resources and in the capacity to propose socioeconomic improvements.

Thus, the focus on fostering entrepreneurship and social affairs in the context of participating communities tends to provide knowledge for the greater autonomy of people, especially young people and women. It is sought not to limit the practice of university extension as a welfare activity, but rather as an activity that drives change, especially to the improvement of income and quality of life of the populations.

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
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The title page must carry an informative title that reflects the content, a running title (less than 45 characters together with spaces), names of the authors and co-authors, and the place(s) where the work was carried out.

Author details

The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

Abstract

The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

Keywords

A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, "What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?" Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

Abbreviations

Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

Formulas and equations

Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

Tables, Figures, and Figure Legends

Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.



Figures

Figures are supposed to be submitted as separate files. Always include a citation in the text for each figure using Arabic numbers, e.g., Fig. 4. Artwork must be submitted online in vector electronic form or by emailing it.

PREPARATION OF ELETRONIC FIGURES FOR PUBLICATION

Although low-quality images are sufficient for review purposes, print publication requires high-quality images to prevent the final product being blurred or fuzzy. Submit (possibly by e-mail) EPS (line art) or TIFF (halftone/ photographs) files only. MS PowerPoint and Word Graphics are unsuitable for printed pictures. Avoid using pixel-oriented software. Scans (TIFF only) should have a resolution of at least 350 dpi (halftone) or 700 to 1100 dpi (line drawings). Please give the data for figures in black and white or submit a Color Work Agreement form. EPS files must be saved with fonts embedded (and with a TIFF preview, if possible).

For scanned images, the scanning resolution at final image size ought to be as follows to ensure good reproduction: line art: >650 dpi; halftones (including gel photographs): >350 dpi; figures containing both halftone and line images: >650 dpi.

Color charges: Authors are advised to pay the full cost for the reproduction of their color artwork. Hence, please note that if there is color artwork in your manuscript when it is accepted for publication, we would require you to complete and return a Color Work Agreement form before your paper can be published. Also, you can email your editor to remove the color fee after acceptance of the paper.

TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality homan social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of homan social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

5. Use the internet for help: An excellent start for your paper is using Google. It is a wondrous search engine, where you can have your doubts resolved. You may also read some answers for the frequent question of how to write your research paper or find a model research paper. You can download books from the internet. If you have all the required books, place importance on reading, selecting, and analyzing the specified information. Then sketch out your research paper. Use big pictures: You may use encyclopedias like Wikipedia to get pictures with the best resolution. At Global Journals, you should strictly follow [here](#).



6. Bookmarks are useful: When you read any book or magazine, you generally use bookmarks, right? It is a good habit which helps to not lose your continuity. You should always use bookmarks while searching on the internet also, which will make your search easier.

7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

8. Make every effort: Make every effort to mention what you are going to write in your paper. That means always have a good start. Try to mention everything in the introduction—what is the need for a particular research paper. Polish your work with good writing skills and always give an evaluator what he wants. Make backups: When you are going to do any important thing like making a research paper, you should always have backup copies of it either on your computer or on paper. This protects you from losing any portion of your important data.

9. Produce good diagrams of your own: Always try to include good charts or diagrams in your paper to improve quality. Using several unnecessary diagrams will degrade the quality of your paper by creating a hodgepodge. So always try to include diagrams which were made by you to improve the readability of your paper. Use of direct quotes: When you do research relevant to literature, history, or current affairs, then use of quotes becomes essential, but if the study is relevant to science, use of quotes is not preferable.

10. Use proper verb tense: Use proper verb tenses in your paper. Use past tense to present those events that have happened. Use present tense to indicate events that are going on. Use future tense to indicate events that will happen in the future. Use of wrong tenses will confuse the evaluator. Avoid sentences that are incomplete.

11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources. Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.



20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.



Mistakes to avoid:

- Insertion of a title at the foot of a page with subsequent text on the next page.
- Separating a table, chart, or figure—confine each to a single page.
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
- Avoid use of extra pictures—include only those figures essential to presenting results.

Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.



The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
- Defend the model—why did you employ this particular system or method? What is its compensation? Remark upon its appropriateness from an abstract point of view as well as pointing out sensible reasons for using it.
- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
- Briefly explain the study's tentative purpose and how it meets the declared objectives.

Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

As always, give awareness to spelling, simplicity, and correctness of sentences and phrases.

Procedures (methods and materials):

This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

When a technique is used that has been well-described in another section, mention the specific item describing the way, but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to show all particular resources and broad procedures so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step-by-step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- Describe the method entirely.
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.



Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

What to stay away from:

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
- A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

If you put figures and tables at the end of some details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attached appendix materials, such as raw facts. Whatever the position, each table must be titled, numbered one after the other, and include a heading. All figures and tables must be divided from the text.

Discussion:

The discussion is expected to be the trickiest segment to write. A lot of papers submitted to the journal are discarded based on problems with the discussion. There is no rule for how long an argument should be.

Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."



Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

- You may propose future guidelines, such as how an experiment might be personalized to accomplish a new idea.
- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
- One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

THE ADMINISTRATION RULES

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CRITERION FOR GRADING A RESEARCH PAPER (COMPILATION)
BY GLOBAL JOURNALS

Please note that following table is only a Grading of "Paper Compilation" and not on "Performed/Stated Research" whose grading solely depends on Individual Assigned Peer Reviewer and Editorial Board Member. These can be available only on request and after decision of Paper. This report will be the property of Global Journals

Topics	Grades		
	A-B	C-D	E-F
<i>Abstract</i>	Clear and concise with appropriate content, Correct format. 200 words or below	Unclear summary and no specific data, Incorrect form Above 200 words	No specific data with ambiguous information Above 250 words
<i>Introduction</i>	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
<i>Methods and Procedures</i>	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
<i>Result</i>	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
<i>Discussion</i>	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
<i>References</i>	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring



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