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Abkhaz Issue in the Constituent Assembly of Georgia

By Otar Janelidze

Gori State Pedagogical University

Abstract- By the time the autocracy fell (February 1917), Abkhazia, called the Sukhumi district, was part of the Kutaisi province. Even before the restoration of Georgia's state independence, among the Georgian political parties and society, there was an unshakable conviction that Abkhazia is an integral part of Georgia and it will have 'full internal independence, that is, broad autonomy'.¹The research was carried out within the framework of the Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation of Georgia Grant Project "Constituent Assembly of Georgia: Experience of Georgian Parliamentarism". Grant Code: FR-18-20157 It was on this basis that the relations of the Republic of Georgia with Abkhazia in 1918-1921 began to be built.

According to an official agreement on June 11, 1918, formalized between the Abkhaz National Council and the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic, Abkhazia was declared an integral part of Georgia and autonomous rights were recognized for it. The government of Georgia undertook obligations to provide military and economic assistance to Abkhazia.

Keywords: *georgian democratic republic, constituent assembly, abkhazia, autonomy, constitution.*

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ABKHAZ ISSUE IN THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF GEORGIA

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Abkhaz Issue in the Constituent Assembly of Georgia

Otar Janelidze

Abstract By the time the autocracy fell (February 1917), Abkhazia, called the Sukhumi district, was part of the Kutaisi province. Even before the restoration of Georgia's state independence, among the Georgian political parties and society, there was an unshakable conviction that Abkhazia is an integral part of Georgia and it will have 'full internal independence, that is, broad autonomy'.¹ It was on this basis that the relations of the Republic of Georgia with Abkhazia in 1918-1921 began to be built.

According to an official agreement on June 11, 1918, formalized between the Abkhaz National Council and the government of the Georgian Democratic Republic, Abkhazia was declared an integral part of Georgia and autonomous rights were recognized for it. The government of Georgia undertook obligations to provide military and economic assistance to Abkhazia. To coordinate actions, an authorized representative of the Georgian republic was in Sukhumi, and the minister for Abkhaz affairs worked under the Georgian government.

In February 1919, the supreme legislative body of the Democratic Republic, the Constituent Assembly, was created in Georgia based on equal, direct, and universal suffrage. Elections to the Constituent Assembly of Georgia in Abkhazia did not take place not in February 1919 or during the first by-elections in August of the same year. Voting in the Sukhumi district was only possible in April 1920 with the second by-election.

Abkhazian issues, political and economic issues related to the region were often on the agenda of the Assembly.

On March 20, 1919, the People's Council of Abkhazia adopted the 'Act on the Autonomy of Abkhazia' by which, 'Abkhazia is part of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, as its autonomous unit'.

The Constituent Assembly of Georgia discussed this document and approved it. By the end of 1920, the constitutional commission developed a draft regulation on the autonomous government of Abkhazia, which, together with the Constitution of Georgia, was approved on February 21, 1921. The Constitution of Georgia has legalized: an integral part of the Republic of Georgia - Abkhazia (Sukhumi District) in local affairs is given an autonomous right of government.

Keywords: *georgian democratic republic, constituent assembly, abkhazia, autonomy, constitution.*

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¹ The research was carried out within the framework of the Shota Rustaveli National Science Foundation of Georgia Grant Project "Constituent Assembly of Georgia: Experience of Georgian Parliamentarism". Grant Code: FR-18-20157

I. INTRODUCTION

Abkhazia is a historical corner of Georgia. For centuries it was part of the Georgian feudal monarchy. After the collapse of united Georgia (the end of the 15th century), an independent principality of Abkhazia was formed, formally part of the Imeretian kingdom in Western Georgia. In the 16th century, Turkey conquered Sukhumi, and from the 19th century, together with the rest of Georgia, Abkhazia was incorporated into the Russian Empire.

On May 26, 1918, after the restoration of the state independence of Georgia and the formation of the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Abkhazia became an autonomous unit of this republic.

It would seem that the issue under consideration has already been developed and studied, but unfortunately, this is not the case. Neither in Georgian nor Abkhazian historiography there are monographic studies based on primary sources that could unbiasedly illuminate the entire depth of the issue under consideration. For example, there is no reason to assert that the attitude of the political parties included in the Constituent Assembly towards Abkhazia has been sufficiently studied; The question remains open as to what impact the reforms of the social-democratic government of Georgia had on the socio-economic, social and political processes in Abkhazia. There is also a difference of opinion regarding the political status of Abkhazia in the Democratic Republic of Georgia before the adoption of the Constitution of 1921, although materials exist. The National Archives of Georgia contains many, still unpublished materials that could bring greater clarity to the controversial issues of the history of Georgian-Abkhaz relations. We also have a very significant source in the form of verbatim records of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, which were published in 1919-1920 and the last period were republished (7 volumes).

From the materials, it becomes obvious that the Abkhazian problems, political and economic issues related to the region, were often on the agenda of the Assembly. For example, the issue of Abkhazia was first raised on March 21, 1919, in a government declaration; in May 1919, at an extraordinary meeting of the Constituent Assembly, the issue of the current situation in the country in connection with the danger posed by Denikin was discussed and the issue of the situation in

Abkhazia was naturally discussed; In July of the same year, the parliamentary faction of the National Democratic Party addressed the Georgian government with a question concerning Abkhazia; In July 1919, the Constituent Assembly considered and approved a decree on the allocation of a loan to the Sukhumi District to combat an infectious disease, etc.

II. METHOD

The article examines how the issue of Abkhazia and its autonomy stood and was solved in 1918-1921. in the democratic republic of Georgia.

The research is based on the method of historical-comparative, retrospective, and content analysis, as well as critical comprehension and generalization of empirical material, presenting the issue from different angles.

III. DISCUSSIONS

The Constituent Assembly was the supreme legislative body of the Georgian Democratic Republic, formed based on a general election in February 1919. It determined the political image of the country, adopted dozens of laws, decrees, and other legal acts, developed and adopted the Constitution. Before the Constituent Assembly, the function of the legislative body was performed by the National Council of Georgia, which in October 1918 was transformed into the Parliament.

Even before the restoration of state independence, political parties and the National Council were firmly convinced that Abkhazia was an integral part of Georgia, and it would be endowed with full internal independence, that is, broad autonomous rights. In this regard, the speech of a member of the National Council of Georgia David Suliasvili at the congress of peasants of the Sukhumi region in March 1918 is noteworthy. According to him, Abkhazia will be a single integral autonomy, organized according to the national-territorial principle. The Georgian National Council will welcome such a decision of its fellows and is always ready to lend a helping hand to them (Ertoba, 1918 March 22).

From the very beginning, the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Georgia took a course towards the recognition of Abkhazian autonomy, which has been declared more than once. One of the government decrees noted: 'To publish an appeal of the government, which should indicate that Abkhazia is granted the right of popular representation and internal structure based on autonomy' (Gamakharia, 1991, p. 73). It was on this basis that relations with Abkhazia began to develop in 1918-1921.

Perhaps the question will arise: Could Abkhazia get real autonomy in the Democratic Republic of Georgia, which was formed in the form of a unitary state? Of course, she could, as evidenced by the

constitution adopted in 1921. However, there is another experience in the world. For example, in centralized, unitary Finland, the Aland Islands with a Swedish-speaking population have autonomy rights. A different type of autonomy exists in other European countries (Hepburn). For example, there are more than ten autonomous entities in unitary Spain (Aragon, Asturias, Galicia, Catalonia, Navarre, etc.); The constituent parts and administrative divisions of Great Britain are Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales. Autonomous rights are enjoyed by: The Faroe Islands and Greenland in the Kingdom of Denmark, the Azores in Portugal, Corsica in France, etc.

Before the formation of the Constituent Assembly, a formal agreement was drawn up between the authorities of the Democratic Republic of Georgia and the Abkhaz National Council (June 11, 1918), under which Abkhazia recognized itself as an integral part of Georgia and was granted autonomy rights. The Georgian authorities pledged to provide military and economic assistance to Abkhazia, the question of the political structure of which shortly on a democratic basis was to be resolved at a congress of the entire population of the autonomy.

The Constituent Assembly of Georgia at the very first meeting held on March 12, 1919, approved the Act on State Independence of Georgia adopted by the National Council. Among those who signed the act were deputies of the Constituent Assembly from Abkhazia: Dmitry Emhuari, Varlam Sharvashidze, Vasil Gurdzhua, Ivane Pashalidi, and Dmitry Zakharov, who entered the highest legislative body on the list of the winning Social Democratic Party.

Elections to the Constituent Assembly of Georgia in Abkhazia took place during the second additional vote in May 1920. As evidenced by archival materials, the electorate was determined to be 22 354 people, among them 21019 voters exercised the right to vote (National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archives, fund 1834, op. 2, case 17).

It turns out that the problems of Abkhazia, political and economic issues of the region were often on the agenda of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia. For example, the first word in connection with Abkhazia was said at the second meeting of the meeting on March 21, 1919, in a government declaration, which was presented to the meeting by the Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs Yevgeny Gegechkori. It noted: 'The government pays special attention to Abkhazia and Muslim Georgia. Our goal is to ensure special development in these parts of Georgia, to ensure internal management at the expense of local government bodies with a conscious connection with the Mother - Homeland. Thanks to the convocation of the People's Council, the basis for the settlement of the internal affairs of Abkhazia was created ... The government is confident that the annexation of these

territories and their cultural revival is a prerequisite not only for the normal development of the republic but even for its existence' (Constituent Assembly, volume I, 2019, p. 74). The government's appeal was also supported by the Socialist-Federalist faction. According to her statement, if we in Abkhazia and Muslim Georgia do not implement the declared self-government, this will lead to complications and we will not be able to unite the scattered parts of the country around us (Constituent Assembly, volume I, 2019, p. 86). The Social Revolutionaries limited themselves to a general declaration that 'the settlement of the issues of the outlying areas, the satisfaction of their national and cultural requirements will be the main concern of the faction of social revolutionaries' (Constituent Assembly, volume I, 2019, p. 96), and the leader of the National Democratic Party Spiridon Kedia admitted that the past policy of the authorities with respect to the outlying areas, including Abkhazia, it was characterized by compromise, 'based on the position of the class struggle and sowed an ideology of non-reconciliation in society' (Constituent Assembly, volume I, 2019, p. 87-88).

At the same meeting, the deputies got acquainted with the 'Act on the autonomy of Abkhazia' sent by telegram by the chairman of the People's Council of Abkhazia Arzakan Emkhvari. The document, adopted by the People's Council of Abkhazia on March 20, 1919, signed by an absolute majority, read: 'Abkhazia is part of the Democratic Republic of Georgia as its autonomous unit'. By the 'Act', the constitution of Abkhazia was to be developed by a mixed parity commission of members of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia and the People's Council of Abkhazia. The document came into force after its approval by both bodies (Constituent Assembly, volume I, 2019, p. 64; Magazine 'Literary Georgia', 1989, No. 11, pp. 155-156).

The 'Act on the Autonomy of Abkhazia' meant the self-determination of the region. Abkhazia, by the will of the majority of its population, recognized its presence in Georgia (Essays, 2007, p. 328). The 'Act' was recognized by the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, which from the day of its foundation stood on the position of not interfering in the internal affairs of Abkhazia. Abkhazian historiography does not take this circumstance into account and believes that the 'Act' remained on paper and 'this whole game of autonomy' was an illusion of self-government (Bgazhba, Lakoba, 2006, p. 150; Lakoba, 1990, p. 75).

However, an indicator of the real autonomy of Abkhazia was the fact that under the government of the Democratic Republic of Georgia the post of Minister for Abkhazia was established, which, on the recommendation of the People's Council, was occupied by Colonel Rafiel Chkhotua. At the same time, to coordinate actions, an authorized representative of the

Democratic Republic of Georgia was appointed in Sukhumi, and this responsible post was taken by one of the most famous Social Democrats, Isidor Ramishvili.

Quite a few facts can be cited to illustrate the autonomy of the People's Council of Abkhazia, among them: The Council, without agreement with Tbilisi, elected and approved the local executive power - the commissariat; by decision of the Council, the Sukhumi region became known as Abkhazia, the language of state institutions was temporarily preserved in Russian (Gamakharia, 1991, p. 82); The People's Council refused to hold the second by-elections to the Constituent Assembly of Georgia in Abkhazia (August 1919) (National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archives, fund 1834, op. 1, case 76, l. 7-9).

It was this circumstance that served as the basis for the statement of the Minister of Internal Affairs Noe Ramishvili from the rostrum of the Constituent Assembly: 'The People's Council operating in Abkhazia has legislative functions, therefore our government and our representative have no right to interfere in its affairs. The same idea, but more clearly expressed by representatives of the opposition parties: 'The Abkhaz Council considers itself a sovereign body. It slows down and hinders our influence and state activity in Abkhazia' (S. Kedia, National Democrat); 'In the person of the People's Council, Abkhazia has a Supreme legislative body, has a government, that is, all elements of an independent state' (L. Shengelaya - Socialist-Revolutionary) (Constituent Assembly, volume III, 2019, p. 120; 153).

At the same time, it should be noted that, based on the current situation, the Georgian authorities repeatedly violated the rights of the region (without agreement with the local Council, the appointment of General Georgy Mazniashvili to the post of Governor-General of Abkhazia, the direction of Benia Chkhikvishvili as Extraordinary Commissioner to Sukhumi).

Communist and modern Abkhaz historiography presents the entry of Georgian troops into Abkhazia as its occupation and believes that "after the overthrow of Soviet power, the Mensheviks established a military dictatorship in Abkhazia." The fact that the Georgian military contingent entered here at the request of the Abkhaz People's Council and saved the region from Bolshevik violence is not taken into account.

There was no unanimity in the People's Council of Abkhazia regarding the Georgian Democratic Republic. Party representatives had different positions. The factions of the 'Independent Socialists' and 'Internationalists' did not hide their anti-Georgian sentiments. Despite this, the socio-political processes in Abkhazia had a free development, the Sukhumi City Duma, city and rural self-governments (zemstvos) functioned, political organizations, trade unions of various institutions functioned, the first print edition was

published in the Abkhaz language, the newspaper 'Apsny', several dozens of schools, including an agricultural school (the Sakartvelos Republic, 1920 3 September), etc.

Another discussion of the current situation in Abkhazia took place in the Constituent Assembly on May 10, 1919. It was associated with the invasion of Abkhazia by the commander of the volunteer army, General A. Denikin (Denikin, 2002, p. 283). According to the Abkhazian historian: 'At the beginning of 1919, the volunteer army launched an offensive in the Gagra region to push back the Georgian troops over the river. Bzyb and will declare the Sukhumi district (Abkhazia) a neutral territory' (Bgazhba, Lakoba, 2006, p. 148).

In response, the Georgian government sent troops to Abkhazia, which occupied Gagra. In connection with this fact, the command of the allied forces, which at that time played the role of international arbiter in the South Caucasus, expressed dissatisfaction.

The People's Council of Abkhazia condemned the aggressive actions of the 'volunteer army, which brought with them 'enslavement and tsarism' (Ertoba, 1919 April 18). The newspaper 'Nashe Slovo', published in Sukhumi under the editorship of Dmitry Gulia, called Alexander Sharvashidze the 'traitor' and 'Judas of Abkhazia', who initiated the invitation of Denikin's troops to Abkhazia (Essays., 2007, p. 329).

The Georgian authorities clarified the allied command, stating that it is vital for the country's interests to take a strategically important line, 'which is historically ours and in relation to which the National Council of Abkhazia has decided that this line is the border of Abkhazia, which is part of Georgia as its autonomous unit' (Constituent Assembly, Volume I, p. 415).

According to Noe Zhordania, 'The Gagra region is the gateway of Georgia and we consider it a strategic border ... For centuries the Gagra gate was the border of Georgia and we cannot yield them'.

The Constituent Assembly fully shared this position and declared that the occupation of Gagra by Georgia was self-defense and 'the fulfillment of a sacred duty.

On July 4, 1919, the parliamentary faction of the National Democratic Party in writing addressed a question to the government of the country. The government took time to answer and the discussion of the issue took place only on August 2. Minister of Internal Affairs Noe Ramishvili spoke about the problem that had arisen. The entire political spectrum of the Constituent Assembly took part in the consideration of the issue. Spiridon Kedia criticized the government for failing to take into account 'the specific details of the borderlands of Georgia and their distinctive features from the center'. He also pointed out the errors of the agrarian reform in Abkhazia, where each peasant and

nobleman owned from 10 to 25 dessiatines, and the rest of the land was mainly rented by Turkish citizens, Armenians, and Greeks (there were also small Georgian /Megrelian tenants). The reform did not take into account the fact that 'this land is the property of the Abkhaz people, and they consider it as such. If the Abkhaz could still come to terms with the fact that part of the land went to the Georgians, he could not come to terms with the fact that his property would be transferred to the subjects of Turkey, the Armenians, and Greeks. ... In this regard, we hear a lot of complaints and reproaches in Abkhazia' (Constituent Assembly, Volume III, p. 122; 161).

According to Leo Shengelaia, 'From the outset, the government did not show the necessary tact and ability to streamline affairs in the outlying regions. ... With its special solicitude, it should have contributed to the appearance of a feeling of love among the inhabitants of the outlying regions for our Republic, by deeds to show their orientation. The authorities were systematically late in carrying out various reforms in the outlying regions, sending talentless propagandists and rude administrators there. ... Independent Abkhazia is absurd, independent Abkhazia will join Denikin on the very second day. ... Abkhazia must be granted broad autonomy' (Constituent Assembly, Volume III, p. 151-153).

The speech of Vasily Gurdzhua, a member of the Constituent Assembly and the People's Council of Abkhazia, was important. He said that the assertion that we would have taken the path of secession and strive for independence is not true. 'We understand very well that the interests of Abkhazia are closely linked with Georgia and consider ourselves not stepchildren in this republic, but equal citizens, its own children. ... Abkhazia as an autonomous unit, but a part of ... Georgia, only in its internal affairs will be independent' (Constituent Assembly, Volume III, p. 142).

Social Democrat Benya Chkhikvishvili, the extraordinary commissar of Abkhazia, said that in Abkhazia, where representatives of many nationalities live, the psychology of people is poisoned by enmity and mistrust, in such a situation great care is needed so that this enmity does not intensify. We could not achieve the impossible, we did what we could do, but this is not enough. All democracy of Abkhazia, regardless of nationality, stands on one platform and it is 'autonomous Abkhazia, but an integral part of the Georgian Democratic Republic' (Constituent Assembly, Volume III, p. 146; 149).

Interior Minister Noe Ramishvili admitted that 'some steps taken by representatives of various circles do not correspond at all to our interests, or, in particular, to the interests of Abkhazia. And in this case, the government always tries to find the common line that is necessary for the settlement of relations.' In the end, he remarked: "In the current situation, the government's

policy must be sober, without any haste' (Constituent Assembly, Volume III, p. 138, 141).

On January 14, 1920, an extraordinary solemn meeting of the Constituent Assembly took place, which was dedicated to the de facto recognition of the Democratic Republic of Georgia by the large European states. In connection with this fact, the People's Council of Abkhazia sent a congratulatory telegram to the Constituent Assembly of Georgia.

The government of the Georgian Democratic Republic has declared a monopoly on some strategic raw materials, including tobacco leaf. It took into account the establishment of firm purchase prices and the creation of an appropriate link that would deal with this matter. Apparently, the work in this area took place with certain errors, which was due to the fact that on January 27, 1920, the leader of the National Party Grigol Veshapeli introduced a parliamentary proposal to the Constituent Assembly: 'The monopoly on tobacco in Abkhazia is carried out abnormally, which causes great discontent both in production and among entrepreneurs. What measures is the government taking in this regard?' To this question, a government representative three days later gave the following explanation: 'if it turns out that the law is being violated and there is a riot, we will take strict measures and report the results' (Constituent Assembly, Volume V, 2019, p. 90-93).

On February 13 of the same year, Deputy Minister for Procurement Chavchanidze in the Constituent Assembly spoke in detail about the tobacco monopoly and cited evidence that local planters and tobacco producers are satisfied with the monopoly and that the planters at their congress clearly expressed a positive position. According to him, the monopoly turned out to be unacceptable for the so-called. buyers are speculators and they are trying to slow down its implementation. An analysis of the verbatim report gives grounds to say that the opposition deputy exaggerated the shortcomings, and the government representative did not perceive them as a serious violation, and the truth was somewhere in between (Constituent Assembly, Volume V, 2019, pp. 199-200).

The Constituent Assembly again returned to the problem of the tobacco monopoly on July 22, 1920. The debate was attended by: V. Tevzaya (social-dem.), Al. Asatiani (NDP), I. Lordkipanidze (Social Revolutionary), Assistant Minister for Provision of Chavchanidze (Constituent Assembly, volume VII, 2019, pp. 70-90).

The Constituent Assembly several times adopted a decree on the allocation of finance to Abkhazia for various purposes, including the 'Decree on the transfer of credit for the fight against an infectious disease in the Sukhumi district' (July 1919); to allocate one million rubles a month to the Abkhazian Commissariat, etc. (April 6, 1920) (Constituent Assembly, volume VI, 2019, p. 177; 193).

Serious attention was paid to the budget of the Republic of Abkhazia. It is noteworthy that the salary of a member of the People's Council of Abkhazia was 10 thousand rubles, and the monthly salary of a deputy of the Constituent Assembly was 7,600 rubles (Constituent Assembly, Volume VII, p. 100). The next task of the Constituent Assembly was to develop the constitution of Abkhazia.

The People's Council formed a constitutional commission, which unanimously adopted the main provision of the future constitution: 'Abkhazia is part of Democratic Georgia as its autonomous unit'. As for other issues, due to the difference of opinions, the commission was divided into two subcommittees and developed two different projects. The third - a conciliatory project was coordinated by the Abkhazian Commissariat (Menteshashvili, 1998, p. 80-94).

The Presidium of the Constituent Assembly assigned a group of five people to work with representatives of the People's Council on the draft constitution of Abkhazia. At various times, several delegations of the People's Council arrived in Tbilisi from Sukhumi (National Archives of Georgia, Central Historical Archives, f. 1861, d. 73, fol. 1-2; Mayilyan, 2009, p. 39), among them were separatist-minded deputies.

According to one of them, M. Turnava, in negotiations with the Georgian government on issues of autonomy and constitution, they tried to disrupt the agreement. 'Acting in this way, we were simultaneously looking for opportunities for relations with the RSFSR and joining it' (Toidze, 1996, p. 6).

The Georgian government listened to the views of each of the parties. A draft agreement was drawn up on the main provisions of management. It actually reflected the already established relations between the republic and the autonomy.

In February 1920 in Sukhumi, during his speech at the People's Council of Abkhazia, the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia, Noe Ramishvili, reiterated that 'the only basis for social and political construction in Georgia is the strengthening of the autonomous rights of Abkhazia' (Gamakharia, Gogia, 1997, pp. 101-102).

The historians of Abkhazia do not speak about the constitution of Abkhazia and about the document entitled "on the state of governance of Abkhazia", which was adopted by the People's Council of Abkhazia and were confirmed in the Constituent Assembly of Georgia in December 1920. The adoption of the Constitution of Abkhazia was delayed. Tbilisi was in no hurry to approve these documents until it brought into action the country's fundamental law, which was being worked on intensively.

In September 1920, the delegates of the People's Council of Abkhazia with a written statement turned to the Presidium of the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, in which they expressed a desire for the

following issues to be discussed at the upcoming session: 1) On the recognition of autonomous Abkhazia as a part of Georgia. 2) That in matters falling within the competence of the legislative body of Abkhazia, the action of the body would be completely independent. 3) Consider the Government of Autonomous Abkhazia as the local executive power.

The Constitutional Commission of the Constituent Assembly discussed the statement and decided: 1) The provision on the autonomy of individual parts follows from the general constitution of the state. Recognition of the autonomy of Abkhazia, that is, partial recognition of this or that principle, is impossible until the adoption of the Constitution as a whole, 2) The inclusion in the agenda of the Constituent Assembly of the issues included in the statement of the delegates of the People's Council is not allowed by the current parliamentary regulations. The principle of autonomy adopted in the draft constitution is fully ensured. 4) The provision on autonomy will be introduced and considered at the upcoming session of the Constituent Assembly (the Sakartvelos Republic, 1920 September 9).

By the fall of 1920, it became possible to reach an agreement on the draft Constitution. On October 16, after its detailed consideration and making certain adjustments, the People's Council adopted its own version of the draft constitution of Abkhazia. This document formed the basis of the project on the state of governance of Abkhazia (Central State Archives of Abkhazia, fund 39, op. 1, case 18, fol. 260-270. Chitaia, 2006). On December 21 of the same year, it was first approved by the small constitutional commission of the Constituent Assembly, and then by the Constituent Assembly itself. The 'regulation' emphasizes that 'Abkhazia, from the Mehadiri River to the Inguri River, from the Black Sea coast to the Caucasus, is considered an integral part of the Republic of Georgia and autonomously manages its internal affairs within these borders'.

On February 21, 1921, the Constituent Assembly adopted the Constitution of Georgia, which legalized: 'Autonomous administration shall be granted to the inseparable part of the Republic of Georgia - Abkhazia (Sukhumi region) in internal affairs.

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The study confirmed that during the existence of the Democratic Republic of Georgia (1918-1921) Abkhazia was an integral part of Georgia. Even though there were political and social groups with different interests in the region, and some of them were not satisfied with the status of Abkhazia in an independent Georgian state, the democratically elected Multi-Party and Multinational People's Council of Abkhazia adopted

the Abkhaz Autonomy Act on March 20, 1919, which stated: 'Abkhazia is part of the Democratic Republic of Georgia. as its autonomous subdivision'. 'The Act' was approved by the Constituent Assembly of Georgia, which from the day of its creation defended the position of non-interference in the internal affairs of Abkhazia.

True, the adoption of the Constitution of Abkhazia was delayed, but a draft Regulation on the governance of Abkhazia was prepared, which was first approved by the Small Constitutional Commission of the Constituent Assembly, and then by the Constituent Assembly.

On February 21, 1921, the Constitution of Georgia, adopted by the Constituent Assembly, legalized the autonomous government of 'an integral part of the Republic of Georgia - Abkhazia (Sukhumi region)'.

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The (In) Usefulness of the Arts and Human Sciences in Times of Crisis in Brazil: An Analysis based on the Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt

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Abstract- Based on the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt, we analyze the extent to which the arts and humanities are essential for the formation of a democratic public space and critical citizens in times of political crisis in Brazil. The objective is to understand the political importance of narrative and the impacts on action and discourse for the formation of public space. The concept of the man of mass, isolated and susceptible to ideological fanaticism. It exposes the importance of the arts and humanities in human relations and the dangers of these being dominated by totalitarian bias movements. It relates the ideas of Hannah Arendt and the impacts of the neoliberal capitalist model on the function of the state and on the private life of the performance society. It explains how hate speech implements cultural wars among the digital masses that favor the proliferation of anti-democratic and authoritarian ideas in Brazil. It shows how Fake News is responsible for the spread of anti-political rhetoric and conspiracy theories that impact the adoption of appropriate measures for the prevention and treatment of the population in the midst of the Covid-19 Pandemic in Brazil.

Keywords: *arts; human sciences; political crisis in brazil; political philosophy; hannah arendt.*

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The (In)Usefulness of the Arts and Human Sciences in Times of Crisis in Brazil: An Analysis based on the Political Philosophy of Hannah Arendt

A (In)Utilidade Das Artes E Das Ciências Humanas Em Tempos De Crise No Brasil: Uma Análise A Partir Da Filosofia Política De Hannah Arendt

Yasmim Salgado Santa Brígida ^α & Loiane Prado Verbicaro ^σ

Resumo- A partir da filosofia política de Hannah Arendt, analisa-se em que medida as artes e ciências humanas são imprescindíveis para a formação de um espaço público democrático e de cidadãos críticos em tempos de crise política no Brasil. Objetiva-se entender a importância política da narrativa e os impactos na ação e o discurso para a formação do espaço público. Conceitua-se o homem de massa, isolado e suscetível a fanatismos ideológicos. Expõe-se a importância das artes e humanidades nas relações humanas e os perigos dessas serem dominadas pelos movimentos de viés totalitários. Relaciona-se as ideias de Hannah Arendt e os impactos do modelo neoliberal capitalista na função do Estado e na vida privada da sociedade do desempenho. Explica-se como discursos de ódio implementam guerras culturais em meio às massas digitais que favorecem a proliferação de ideias antidemocráticas e autoritárias no Brasil. Demonstra-se como as Fake News são responsáveis pela difusão da retórica antipolítica e de teorias da conspiração que impactam na adoção das medidas apropriadas de prevenção e tratamento da população em meio à Pandemia de Covid-19 no Brasil. A pesquisa é bibliográfica qualitativa com análise doutrinária das obras de Hannah Arendt, dentre outros autores, livros, notícias, documentos e artigos científicos sobre a temática filosófica e

sobre o contexto político brasileiro. Conclui-se que o poder democrático só é efetivado quando a palavra e o ato são plurais, onde o domínio político permite as artes e as humanidades serem construtoras de cidadãos críticos aos fanatismos, à apatia política e à naturalização da opressão.

Palavras chaves: artes; ciências humanas; crise política no brasil; filosofia política; hannah arendt.

Abstract Based on the political philosophy of Hannah Arendt, we analyze the extent to which the arts and humanities are essential for the formation of a democratic public space and critical citizens in times of political crisis in Brazil. The objective is to understand the political importance of narrative and the impacts on action and discourse for the formation of public space. The concept of the man of mass, isolated and susceptible to ideological fanaticism. It exposes the importance of the arts and humanities in human relations and the dangers of these being dominated by totalitarian bias movements. It relates the ideas of Hannah Arendt and the impacts of the neoliberal capitalist model on the function of the state and on the private life of the performance society. It explains how hate speech implements cultural wars among the digital masses that favor the proliferation of anti-democratic and authoritarian ideas in Brazil. It shows how Fake News is responsible for the spread of anti-political rhetoric and conspiracy theories that impact the adoption of appropriate measures for the prevention and treatment of the population in the midst of the Covid-19 Pandemic in Brazil. The research is qualitative bibliographic with doctrinal analysis of the works of Hannah Arendt, among other authors, books, news, documents and scientific articles on the philosophical theme and on the Brazilian political context. It is concluded that democratic power is only effective when the word and act are plural, where the political domain allows the arts and humanities to be builders of citizens critical to fanaticism, political apathy and the naturalization of oppression.

Keywords: arts; human sciences; political crisis in brazil; political philosophy; hannah arendt.

INTRODUÇÃO

A partir da filosofia da cientista política Hannah Arendt, analisa-se em que medida as artes e ciências humanas são imprescindíveis para a formação de um espaço público democrático e de cidadãos críticos em tempos de crise política no Brasil.

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Arendt - que não era uma filósofa esteta - fez análises importantes no campo das relações humanas no que concerne à participação política, à condição humana no mundo, sobre a origem de sistemas totalitários e sobre a relação dos homens entre si e com as coisas.

Na primeira seção, expõe-se as percepções de Hannah Arendt sobre a importância política das artes e das ciências humanas na construção do espaço público democrático. Nessa seção, aborda-se o homem na vida pública, relacionando-o com o ato de fabricar e pensar, conceituando o homem de massa vazio em seu isolamento. Vê-se como as obras de artes e as humanidades são consideradas inúteis, por serem testemunhas da história. Demonstra-se, então, a importância da narrativa como aliada da história na formação do espaço público, considerando a periculosidade da educação e da iniciativa intelectual e artística para o totalitarismo.

Na sequência, adentra-se na questão da política como instrumento para manutenção do poder pela força e violência - pelo fanatismo - por meio da desumanização e a alienação da sociedade. Nesse sentido, aborda-se sobre como os governos de viés totalitário se utilizam das consequências do capitalismo neoliberal para a destruição da vida pública, e consequentemente, da vida privada. Em meio a isso, tem-se a explicação sobre a importância da ação e do discurso na criação de um espaço político e uma ação política pluralista, daí a função crítica e valorosa das artes e das ciências humanas para a formação de cidadãos políticos, com pensamentos democráticos.

Na segunda seção desta pesquisa, traça-se um paralelo entre as considerações de Arendt discutidas na seção anterior e o surgimento e difusão de ideias antidemocráticas, de viés totalitário, defendidas por movimentos políticos no Brasil contemporâneo. Relacionam-se os resquícios do modelo capitalista neoliberal na sociedade do desempenho com a proliferação de movimentos e ideais de cunho totalitário em meio às novas tecnológicas. Explica-se como os movimentos de cunho antidemocrático e autoritário usam o medo e o terror para governar as massas digitais, especialmente, por meio dos discursos de ódio e das guerra culturais.

O objetivo desta seção é mostrar como a narrativa, manipulada por Fake News, influencia na adoção de políticas públicas, especialmente, no que concerne à saúde - de prevenção do contágio e do tratamento da Covid-19, no Brasil. Em meio a isso, aborda-se a ausência do interesse da comunidade a garantir quaisquer direitos, explicitando a necessária ação política democrática por parte dos cidadãos brasileiros. Tal posição se constrói quando as artes e as humanidades oportunizam o pensamento crítico.

A pesquisa é bibliográfica qualitativa, com análise da obra “A Condição Humana” e “Origens do Totalitarismo: Antissemitismo, Imperialismo e

Totalitarismo” de Hannah Arendt, dentre outros autores, livros e artigos científicos sobre a temática filosófica. Utilizam-se, também, artigos científicos e notícias, dentre outros documentos para a análise do contexto político brasileiro.

I. ESVAZIAMENTO DO HOMEM FACE AO ISOLAMENTO: A (IN)UTILIDADE DAS ARTES E DAS CIÊNCIAS HUMANAS PARA A HUMANIDADE

Esta pesquisa busca apontar algumas percepções de Hannah Arendt sobre a importância política das artes e das ciências humanas na construção de um espaço público democrático. Nesta seção, aborda-se o homem na vida pública, relacionando o homem com o ato de fabricar e pensar - na sua relação consigo mesmo.

O objetivo desta seção é demonstrar o ato de pensar e julgar como elementos constitutivos das artes e humanidades, as quais são consideradas inúteis para os ideais totalitários - por explicitarem a banalidade do mal e testemunharem a história. Em seguida, conceitua-se o homem de massa - esvaziado e desumanizado em seu isolamento. Ao abordar a história, analisa-se a importância política da narrativa, evidenciando a ação e o discurso na formação do espaço público plural e da ação política.

Arendt afirma que o senso de realidade depende da aparência, da existência de um domínio público no qual as coisas possam emergir das trevas - da existência resguardada (apesar de que muitas coisas não apareçam na cena pública). Logo, o mundo público é aquele que é “comum aos homens” (ARENDR, 2012, p. 65).

A existência do domínio público e a transformação do mundo em uma comunidade de coisas gera uma relação entre os homens que depende da permanência. Sem a noção de transcendência nenhuma política é possível e nem o domínio público (ARENDR, 2012). Os homens ingressaram no domínio público porque desejaram que algo seu (em comum com os outros) fosse mais permanente que a própria vida (ARENDR, 2012).

O mundo das coisas é feito pelo homem - o artifício humano é construído pelo *homo faber* - tornando-se um lar para os homens mortais, cuja estabilidade suportará e sobreviverá ao movimento de permanente mudança de suas vidas e ações na medida em que transcende a mera funcionalidade das coisas produzidas para o consumo e a mera utilidade dos objetos produzidos para o uso (ARENDR, 2018).

A tarefa e a grandeza potencial de mortais residem em sua capacidade de produzir coisas - obras, feitos, palavras - que estão confortáveis na eternidade. Por sua capacidade de deixar feitos imortais, os

homens atingem a imortalidade que lhes é própria (ARENDR, 2018).

Ao perceber isso, Arendt afirma que a Era Moderna presenciou o fracasso do *homo faber* e do princípio da utilidade (ARENDR, 2018), porque o *homo faber* é utilitarista na maior parte do tempo (exceto no que concerne à arte), todos os seus objetos são feitos de acordo com uma espécie de demanda. Nesse contexto, a vida humana individual passou a ser meramente mortal, e o mundo menos estável e confiável (ARENDR, 2018).

Logo, Arendt conclui que o homem moderno foi jogado para dentro de si mesmo – alienado em relação ao mundo. A expropriação de certo grupo em relação ao seu lugar no mundo é um elemento da economia capitalista, onde a classe trabalhadora precisa ser produtiva e se preocupar apenas com as coisas do processo vital, que só é possível se a mundanidade do homem for sacrificada (ARENDR, 2018).

No advento da Era Moderna, a preocupação com a imortalidade, com a metafísica e com a eternidade se perdeu. O problema passa a ser o vazio do domínio público, o qual, na esfera política, passa a ficar sem finalidade: o homem deixa de ter interesse de fazer coisas em comum com os outros. Logo, a ascensão da sociedade trouxe o declínio do domínio público e do privado. O eclipse de um mundo público comum é fundamental para a formação do homem de massa, desamparado e perigoso na formação da mentalidade sem-mundo dos movimentos ideológicos de massas (ARENDR, 2018).

O isolamento, segundo Hannah Arendt, é quando a esfera política - local no qual os homens agem em conjunto para um interesse comum - da vida do homem é destruída. Assim, a característica perigosa do homem de massa é o seu isolamento, que em seu desamparo existencial tende ao “nacionalismo violento” (ARENDR, 2012, p. 446), ou a qualquer outra espécie de fanatismo. Fato é: a filosofia (mãe das humanidades) sofreu com a era moderna.

Outro sintoma da era moderna, decorrente do individualismo e alienação ao mundo, foi o comportamento nas relações humanas, com a crença de que só se deve respeito àquilo que se admira ou se preza, o que se constitui um sintoma da despersonalização da vida pública e social (ARENDR, 2018). Com tais características desse momento, o marco divisório da era moderna para o mundo contemporâneo é o “aumento do poder humano de destruição” (ARENDR, 2018, p. 333), que passa a ser capaz de destruir toda a vida orgânica na terra.

Mas onde entram as artes e humanidades nessa discussão? Hannah Arendt busca analisar as atividades da vida contemplativa para compreender o fenômeno da banalidade do mal.

Determinados objetos não possuem utilidade e resistem à igualação. Por isso, quando ingressam no

mercado de trocas são apreçados arbitrariamente: as obras de artes. As obras de arte são as mais intensamente mundanas de todas as coisas tangíveis; sua durabilidade permanece quase inalcançada pelo efeito corrosivo dos processos naturais, alcançando permanência através das eras (ARENDR, 2018).

A estabilidade mundana se torna transparente na permanência da arte, o pressentimento de imortalidade se torna tangível e presente para ser visto, escutado, falado e lido. O objeto de arte só existe de fato e pode permanecer no percurso histórico se aparecer no espaço público, isso porque ele possui um papel fundamental na concepção desse espaço: é aquilo que pode perpetuar - em face à ida e vinda de novos seres humanos - do mundo que temos em comum, como uma testemunha (LEITE, 2019).

No entanto, o que se faz relevante suscitar na presente pesquisa é a fonte imediata da obra de arte que é a capacidade de pensar. O pensar relaciona-se com o sentimento e transforma seu desalento mudo e inarticulado para adentrar no mundo e ser transformado em coisa; enquanto que a capacidade humana comunicativa libera no mundo uma apaixonada intensidade que estava aprisionada no si mesmo (*self*). Por isso, a obra de arte - como junção dessas características – “é uma transfiguração” (ARENDR, 2018, p. 209), com uma aura.

Nesse íterim, a autora analisa que o pensamento possui relação com a atividade de julgar, mas se difere da mera cognição (processo através do qual adquirimos e armazenamos conhecimento, são as ciências). A cognição sempre tem um fim definido, que pode resultar de considerações práticas ou de mera curiosidade; mas, uma vez atingido esse fim, o processo cognitivo termina; o pensamento, ao contrário, não tem outro fim ou propósito além de si mesmo, e não chega sequer a produzir resultados. O utilitarismo do *homo faber*, dos homens de ação e de alguns cientistas que procuram por resultados afirmam o quão inútil é o pensamento — realmente, “tão inútil quanto as obras de arte que inspira” (ARENDR, 2018, p. 212).

Contudo, a constatação de que tanto a obra de arte quanto o pensar são inúteis não implica que eles não sejam relevantes e significativos para a existência humana.

As obras de artes são consideradas inúteis porque não se equiparam aos resultados do trabalho - produzidos e consumidos quase que instantaneamente e integram o ciclo vital -, tampouco se igualam ao desgaste dos objetos de uso. Enquanto atividade humana, o trabalho relaciona-se com o processo vital do homem, com sua luta contínua pela sobrevivência (com bens que são consumidos, que garantem a subsistência e a perpetuação da espécie). O artista que fabrica não se volta para tais necessidades da vida humana (PASSOS, 2017).

A capacidade de pensar relaciona-se com o sentimento (*feeling*), mas ela transcende e transfere para o mundo algo muito intenso e veemente (*passionate*) que estava aprisionado no ser. O que transforma o pensamento em realidade é a fabricação, com ajuda das mãos humanas, que constroem as coisas duráveis do artifício humano – este fenômeno da reificação e materialização ocorre ao preço da própria vida.

O artista transforma uma infinidade de materiais num artefato – reificação –, mas nem por isso deixam de ser coisas. O processo de pensamento não é capaz de produzir e fabricar por si próprio coisas tangíveis, o que realmente transforma o pensamento em realidade e fabrica as coisas do pensamento é a mesma manufatura [*workmanship*] que, com a ajuda do instrumento das mãos humanas, constrói as coisas duráveis do artifício humano (PASSOS, 2017).

O que se percebe é que o *animal laborans*¹ necessita da ajuda do *homo faber* para facilitar seu trabalho e remover a sua dor, para edificar um lar sobre a terra. Os homens que agem e falam necessitam da ajuda do artista, dos poetas e historiadores, escritores, porque sem eles o único produto da atividade dos homens (a história que encenam e contam) não sobreviveria. Para o mundo ser um lar para os homens durante a sua vida na terra, o “artifício humano tem que ser um lugar adequado para a ação e o discurso” (ARENDT, 2018, p.216).

Essa relação é importante, pois, segundo Hannah Arendt, o homem constrói um mundo artificial justamente para superar a inevitável certeza natural² (sujeito à corrupção natural do tempo). Nesse mundo, há a possibilidade de serem criados feitos, instituições, histórias, leis, culturas, capazes de sobreviver aos tempos. É nesse cenário - de permanência - que é possível forjar espaços públicos onde os homens podem revelar o seu “quem” por meio de palavras e ações, formando ações políticas (ARENDT, 2005).

A ação possibilita a constituição de narrativas, relatos e histórias. À medida que a existência de cada ser humano age, pode ser lembrada, mas precisa de uma audiência e um espaço público. As artes menos materialistas, como a música e a poesia (performáticas) aproximam-se da atividade da ação.

Vejamos mais profundamente a importância da poesia nas relações humanas. Na poesia a recordação é diretamente transformada em memória. O meio pelo qual o poeta realiza essa transformação é o ritmo, através do qual o poema fixa-se na lembrança quase que por si mesmo. Essa proximidade com a lembrança viva permite que o poema perdure; sua memorabilidade determinará sua durabilidade na lembrança humana (ARENDT, 2018).

O artista, em especial o literato, tenta perpetuar sua própria existência materializando-se na forma das histórias que conta. Na tensão imposta pelo pensamento, no diálogo que a pessoa tem consigo mesma, surge a literatura. É por isso que a literatura, e a arte em geral, é capaz de capturar o lapso entre o passado e o futuro, não meramente refletindo um tempo, mas o adiantando e prevenindo-o.

Em vista disso, decorre a importância da narrativa, que é uma aliada da história, possuindo como objetivo salvaguardar a preciosa memória humana. Quando o homem ouve uma história – com a imaginação livre – ele a julga e toma uma decisão sobre que posição tomar. Em decorrência de sua influência na vida humana privada e pública, por ter em seu constitutivo o ato de pensar e julgar, as artes e humanidades são perigosas e inúteis para alguns.

Em “O Mestre e Margarida”, o escritor russo Mikhail Bulgákov (1891-1940) aborda sobre como é viver em meio ao regime totalitário na União Soviética. Um dos personagens principais, o Mestre, tem sua carreira destruída no ambiente literário soviético, onde os editores, críticos, literatos, escritores, artistas em geral, colaboraram com o início e manutenção do regime totalitário para não perderem suas carreiras (BULGÁKOV, 2019).

A iniciativa intelectual, espiritual e artística é perigosa para o totalitarismo. Por isso, mantém esses três elementos sob o seu controle. O domínio total não permite a livre iniciativa, substitui todo talento. Na União Soviética de então não havia liberdade política, especialmente, de pensamento, opinião e expressão (ARENDT, 2012).

O artista é um ser reflexivo que interroga a si mesmo sobre o sentido de suas criações e o destino delas. Este se assume responsável pelo destino da arte, como condição do mundo em que vive. Essa responsabilidade, seguida de atos, pode ocasionar gestos de revolta, atitudes de protesto. O artista atual põe em discussão a própria arte, a arte é uma dúvida, uma angústia que o agita (NUNES, 2016). É importante que a arte surja como denúncia de velhas e novas práticas de autoritarismo (BENJAMIN, 2015).

Com o pós 2ª GM, a lírica da poesia não é mais a expressão da individualidade, mas do sofrimento – com isso há a necessidade de elaborar o passado para dar voz ao sofrimento, ao luto. Na sua “Dialética Negativa”, Adorno explica que enquanto os homens

¹ Todos somos *animal laborans*, na medida em que estamos presos à animalidade biológica, diferentemente do *homo faber* e dos homens de ação (ARENDT, 2018).

² A fabricação diz respeito à capacidade humana de criar objetos duráveis que garantam a constituição de um mundo dotado de relativa estabilidade – onde a existência humana transcende o mero metabolismo com a natureza. Dando forma à matéria-prima os homens vão construindo artefatos. Esses artefatos podem ser de duas modalidades, servem para o uso e deterioram-se, ou são conservados e retirados do ciclo de uso e consumo – aparecem no espaço público como objetos de arte (LEITE, 2019).

vivem sua não emancipação, a liberdade da arte e da filosofia é “a capacidade de dar voz à sua não liberdade” (ADORNO, 2009, p. 24). A arte e a filosofia têm a tarefa de dar voz ao sofrimento humano, à sua finitude, desta forma, toda obra artística tem a potencialidade de dizer o que não se quer que seja dito, ao fazer isso, a obra de arte abre caminho para a transcendência do aparente, do que se apresenta como irrecusável em vista de impedir a realização da liberdade humana na vida política. As artes possuem sua poesia lírica na catarse do sofrimento.

É interessante perceber que tais coisas “inúteis” – como as artes e as humanidades – são consideradas perigosas, especialmente para os movimentos de cunho totalitários. Em certos locais e épocas, o fanatismo gerou a intolerância e o totalitarismo com relação ao “inútil”, a barbárie se volta contra as expressões de humanidade: bibliotecas (livros), obras de artes, monumentos (VERBICARO, 2021).

Assim, é devido ao domínio das artes pelo ideal totalitário que as maiores destruições de obras de artes foram, além das guerras, a ideologia perspectivista (a qual concentra-se numa parte, sem encarar de forma holística o fenômeno). A política, economia e religião podem vir a ser ideologias, ao buscarem a manutenção do poder pela força e violência; visto que a ideologia persuade não pelo argumento, mas pela emoção - pelo fanatismo - das pessoas que se encontram vazias. Nas artes, a ideologia deseja demoli-las, porque a arte se transforma numa arma de liberdade contra totalitarismos. Fato é que no período da Alemanha nazista, a arte moderna era a “arte degenerada” (CARDIN, 2021).

Em “O Mestre e Margarida” resta nítida a abordagem do autor em demonstrar como um regime totalitário pode impactar na vida privada das pessoas. No capítulo “O aparecimento do herói”, o Mestre entra em cena - *auter ego* do autor, que viveu circunstâncias parecidas -, e é descrito como um historiador, tradutor e escritor que buscava publicar a obra de sua vida (sobre Pôncio Pilatos), mas devido esta não estar nos padrões do realismo soviético, então, sua *persona* pública fica marcada como alguém que nunca será aceito no mercado editorial russo devido à divulgação, em jornais, de um péssimo romancista que tentava publicar sua obra sobre Pôncio Pilatos (BULGÁKOV, 2019).

Isso tem um profundo impacto psicológico no personagem, que primeiro sentiu vergonha, angústia, espanto, medo da perseguição (inclusive, medo do escuro), trauma em ver sua obra difamada e novas obras sendo publicadas constantemente pela editora. Depois, percebeu que nem os escritores ou os críticos eram livres para falar o que realmente pensavam, e passou a ter alucinações e doença psicológica (depressão). O personagem se vê obrigado a assumir outra identidade, renunciando até o seu próprio nome e

passando a viver refugiado num porão - sua carreira havia acabado antes mesmo de começar (BULGÁKOV, 2019).

Então, o Mestre não consegue emprego, não consegue ter uma crítica verdadeira e racional sobre seus escritos e entra numa espécie de depressão. Sua vida como uma pessoa digna havia acabado ali. A única coisa que ainda o fazia sobreviver era seu amor por Margarida. Mas até mesmo sua relação amorosa (vida privada) é abalada, pois, por amar Margarida, o Mestre não gostaria que ela passasse a vida em desgraça com ele naquele estado, resultando em sua fuga para onde possa desfalecer sozinho. A situação aí descrita é muito comum na União Soviética e é um espelho da biografia do próprio autor, que em vida não conseguiu publicar o livro “O Mestre e Margarida” – na década de 1930 - por ser um romance de denúncia crítica da realidade, tanto que sua obra só foi publicada após sua morte, por sua esposa (BULGÁKOV, 2019).

Visto isso, pode-se aferir que o hábito de contar tais estórias é uma atividade capaz de conferir significado a uma vida: à existência. A narrativa, então, revela um significado condensado, fragmentado, passível de infinitas interpretações. É por essa razão que Hannah Arendt está interessada na dimensão política da narrativa: naquilo que é contado em um espaço onde uma determinada história interessa a um corpo de pessoas por algum motivo, porque é esta narrativa que revela as ações do agente em palavras e assim compartilha uma experiência que se torna comum, graças ao próprio ato de contar.

A partir da perspectiva política e da relação entre narrativa e as artes, visualiza-se que a aura é uma espécie de transcendência que assinala a presença única e singular das obras de arte, mas que é banalizada na era da cultura de massa, com o desgaste da multiplicação do que seria singular e irrepetível: a perda da aura (NUNES, 2016). O poder da espetacularização se encontra na utilização da obra de arte como produto para um fim. A força persuasiva das imagens, das propagandas, na televisão e – especialmente – das redes sociais perpetuam “mitos” dos nossos tempos.

Numa era carregada de informação, por exemplo, a fotografia oferece um modo rápido de aprender algo e uma forma compacta de memorizá-lo, além disso, adquire imediatismo e autoridade maior que qualquer relato verbal. Em “Diante da dor dos outros”, Susan Sontag afirma que as imagens sobre alguma violência ou fato político podem servir para atizar o ódio contra os “inimigos”, pois para um fanático, a identidade é tudo que importa.

As fotos podem ser explicadas ou deturpadas por suas legendas. A autora afirma que, diante da ratificação das atrocidades cometidas pelo lado a que a pessoa pertence, a reação-padrão consiste em tomar as fotos como algo fabricado, algo que jamais ocorreu,

daí são criadas as teorias da conspiração (SONTAG, 2003). Fotografar é compor, dispor melhor os elementos da foto. Por isso que muitas imagens clássicas dos primórdios da fotografia de guerra foram encenadas, ou seus temas foram adulterados. Tal constatação vale também para a propaganda partidária.

Outro fenômeno ocorre quando determinado grupo de pessoas tem ciência de que algo será fotografado ou midiático (por televisão, pelos meios de comunicação digital e redes sociais) e aproveita tal oportunidade para cometer algum tipo de violência. Tal atitude é comum em meio a soldados (de todas as nacionalidades), que por terem ao lado câmeras, executam prisioneiros ou batem no inimigo para mostrar que estão cumprindo o seu papel; assim como por terroristas árabes. Além disso, o ato de fotografar presos políticos e contrarrevolucionários antes da execução foi comum no antigo regime da União Soviética (SONTAG, 2003).

Os dois fenômenos acima mencionados são importantes para o que se chama de memória coletiva: algo estipulado sobre como um acontecimento ocorreu – considerado relevante – por meio de fotos (desenhos, pinturas, documentos, etc.) que aprisionam a história em nossa mente. O motivo para tal é criar repositórios públicos para essas relíquias (SONTAG, 2003), assegurando que continuem presentes nas mentes das pessoas, como lembranças.

As ideologias criam arquivos de imagens comprobatórias, representativas, que englobam ideias comuns de relevância e desencadeiam pensamentos e sentimentos previsíveis (SONTAG, 2003). Daí a importância da propaganda e da narrativa para os movimentos totalitários, que precisam interpretar o passado conforme a sua própria “verdade”. Veremos, então, as consequências disso para a política de uma nação na próxima seção.

Tendo em vista tal constatação, Arendt discute a questão da narrativa - do que expressam as artes - relacionada com a história no domínio público (político). Pois, perpetuar as memórias significa renovar e criar memórias, por meio de fotos ou qualquer outro meio. Assim, povos vitimados desejam museus da memória (SONTAG, 2003). Auschwitz, por exemplo, mantém seus efeitos perdurando no tempo em virtude dos testemunhos de seus sobreviventes, ainda que enquanto momento histórico tenha se encerrado (BENJAMIN, 2015).

No entanto, faz-se mister retomar o que foi pontuado no início desta seção em relação ao homem no domínio público com a questão da fabricação e como isso impacta nas suas formas de viver e se relacionar. A grande questão é que Arendt apontou o perigo causador do declínio do *homo faber* na era moderna: a sua característica do isolamento. O isolamento é necessário para o *homo faber*, na medida

em que tal homem precisa trabalhar, mas quando se destrói a criatividade humana (a capacidade de acrescentar algo de si mesmo ao mundo ao redor), esse isolamento se torna insuportável. Isso pode ocorrer numa sociedade com valores ditados pelo trabalho, ou seja, onde todas as atividades humanas se resumem a trabalhar.

O ato de pensar é feito quando se está a sós, um diálogo entre o eu e o eu mesmo, que não perde o contato com o mundo dos seus semelhantes, que estão representados no eu (com o qual se estabelece o diálogo do pensamento). Mas, viver a sós pode levar à solidão, onde o próprio eu abandona a pessoa. Nessa situação, o homem perde a confiança em si mesmo como parceiro dos próprios pensamentos e no mundo, para que possa ter qualquer experiência. Assim, a capacidade de pensar e sentir se perdem (ARENDT, 2012). A desumanização e a auto alienação da sociedade comercial exclui o homem do relacionamento com os outros.

A compreensão de Hannah Arendt está em consonância argumentativa com outros pensadores, como Benjamim, Adorno e Horkheimer, por considerar ameaçada a cultura implementada na Modernidade, sustentada pela indústria do entretenimento.

O tempo correto desaparece na produção industrial; esta procede sempre em ciclos idênticos, pulsativos, potencialmente de mesma duração, e não precisa mais da experiência acumulada. A memória, o tempo e a lembrança são liquidados pela sociedade capitalista (ADORNO, 2010). A indústria cria produtos culturais (bens destinados a serem consumidos) em um processo que se assemelha ao metabolismo humano com o seu corpo: cíclico e eterno.

O processo de produção destinada ao consumo (aos interesses mercadológicos) faz com que a cultura seja efêmera e fugaz - apenas com a “utilidade” de entreter a massa. A cultura, sob o domínio de uma sociedade de massas, caminha junto a sua incapacidade de cuidar do mundo (devido ao seu egocentrismo e a sua alienação da realidade). A cultura é ameaçada quando todos os objetos e coisas seculares, produzidos pelo presente ou pelo passado, são tratados como meras funções para o processo vital da sociedade, como se estivessem somente para satisfazer a alguma necessidade (PASSOS, 2017).

O único esforço que sobrevive é o do trabalho, de se manter vivo; assim, a relação com o mundo humano define-se. O homem – unicamente como *animal laborans* - perde seu lugar no mundo político da ação e das coisas, o isolamento vira solidão (considera a vida humana como um todo).

O governo totalitário usa - especificamente - dessas consequências do capitalismo neoliberal da modernidade em seu favor, pois precisa destruir a vida pública pela solidão, e isso consequentemente destruirá também a vida privada. Consoante a isso, os

interesses da nação passam a justificar a eliminação da individualidade, do livre pensar, do pensamento crítico e reflexivo - os seres humanos passam a ser desimportantes e descartáveis. Esses elementos em conjunto ocasionam uma espécie de sensação de superficialidade da vida e da banalidade do mal (VERBICARO, 2021).

O domínio totalitário traz em si o germe da sua própria destruição (ARENDR, 2012). Os governos totalitários têm em comum o banimento dos cidadãos do domínio público e a insistência em que devem dedicar-se aos seus "assuntos privados"³ (ARENDR, 2018, p. 274). O *homo faber* e a sua extrema valorização do produto-produtividade, assim como o *animal laborans* e a valorização da vida, são "apolíticos e tendem a denunciar a ação e o discurso como ociosidade" (ARENDR, 2018, p. 257).

O poder humano corresponde à condição humana da pluralidade. Isso significa na limitação do vigor do indivíduo, porque a aspiração de onipotência implica sempre na destruição da pluralidade (ARENDR, 2018). Assim, a tirania impede o desenvolvimento desse poder humano, a violência destrói o poder e o espaço do domínio público; no final, isso também destruirá a tirania (ARENDR, 2018). O domínio totalitário não permite a pluralidade, motivo pelo qual o sistema não se sustenta e se destrói, pois a pluralidade humana é a condição básica da ação e do discurso (ARENDR, 2018), os quais necessitam considerar o duplo aspecto da igualdade⁴ e da distinção.

Os dois elementos da ação e do discurso são o que erguem o domínio público. A ação necessita do discurso; ela se inicia por meio da palavra e, ao agir e falar, os homens mostram suas identidades únicas - eles aparecem ao mundo -, e isso só é possível quando as pessoas estão com outras (no domínio público). Por outro lado, é no "completo silêncio e na total passividade que alguém oculta quem é" (ARENDR, 2018, p. 222). O silêncio é - em muitos casos - cúmplice da violência, do totalitarismo e potencializador da banalidade, porque gera sentimentos de indiferença, de esquecimento e de omissão.

Nas situações de crise geral ou guerra, que se apresentem como insolúveis e incessantes, as pessoas se tonam menos sensíveis aos horrores, visto que a compaixão exige a ação; caso contrário ela define, ou

³ Quando se trata de uma vida em domínio privado, isso significa estar privado de ser visto e ouvido pelas pessoas, privado de ter relações objetivas com os outros mediante um mundo comum de coisas. A questão é que na ausência de "outros", o homem privado não aparece, logo não existe. Este homem não tem importância ou consequência para os outros. Então, esse homem não está existindo no domínio público, não está fazendo parte da esfera política.

⁴ A igualdade no domínio público é uma igualdade entre desiguais, ou seja, demanda de um fator igualador que não é natural - neste caso, da igualdade política (ARENDR, 2018). O discurso e a ação revelam a distinção; são os modos pelos quais os seres humanos "aparecem" para os outros como homens (ARENDR, 2018, p.218).

seja, a sensação de impotência, de que não há nada a ser feito leva à apatia (SONTAG, 2003).

Nesse íterim, as histórias são o resultado inevitável da ação; é o contador da estória que percebe e "faz" a história (ARENDR, 2018). É por tal motivo que a sociedade precisa das artes e das ciências humanas: para formar cidadãos com senso crítico, interessados e ativamente participativos da política. São os professores, cientistas, filósofos, artistas que fazem a memória aparecer para o povo no espaço público - espaço em que os homens se reúnem na modalidade do "discurso e da ação" (ARENDR, 2018, p. 247), que precede o domínio público e as formas de governo.

Então, com esses primeiros apontamentos sobre a importância política das artes e das ciências humanas na construção do espaço público democrático, faz-se importante constatar o papel da ação e do discurso na vida humana privada e pública. Tendo em vista tal relação, aferiu-se o valor da narrativa como aliada da história, a qual objetiva salvaguardar a memória humana; mas também, a narrativa como auxiliar da capacidade humana de julgar e tomar decisões sobre qual interpretação/posição deve adotar. Assim, fica comprovado que a iniciativa intelectual e artística crítica são perigosas para o totalitarismo, o qual busca manter esses elementos sobre o seu domínio por meio da força e da violência fanática.

Destarte, os governos totalitários procuram banir os cidadãos do domínio público e reprovam a ação e o discurso. Com isso, eliminam a pluralidade do espectro político, logo, o governo totalitário usa do isolamento em seu favor, pois incentiva a superficialidade, o esvaziamento e a banalidade da humanidade. Na próxima seção, analisam-se as consequências do exposto para a situação política contemporânea no Brasil, por meio de algumas comparações entre fatos políticos e fenômenos sociais que estão em consonância com as observações de Hannah Arendt sobre o surgimento de movimentos e ideais de cunho totalitário em meio às novas tecnológicas e relações humanas.

II. A INSURGÊNCIA DE IDEIAS ANTIDEMOCRÁTICAS NO BRASIL: O QUE PRECISAMOS APRENDER COM OS APONTAMENTOS DE ARENDR EM TEMPOS DE CRISE POLÍTICA?

Esta seção trata da proliferação de ideias antidemocráticas defendidas por movimentos políticos no Brasil contemporâneo. Analisam-se os resquícios do modelo neoliberal capitalista na sociedade do desempenho no que concerne à função do Estado e à vida privada. Trata-se, ainda, da importância política da narrativa para o surgimento de movimentos totalitários. Aborda-se, então, a relevância dos discursos de ódio

para alimentar a guerra cultural pelas massas digitais que buscam a eliminação virtual do inimigo. Em seguida, relaciona-se o fenômeno das Fake News com o impedimento da implementação de medidas corretas de prevenção e tratamento das pessoas em meio à Pandemia de Covid-19.

Como já mencionado na seção anterior, alguns elementos da sociedade neoliberal capitalista possuem impactos nas relações sociais, no comportamento humano, que mudam a percepção do homem sobre si mesmo. As pessoas, no mundo contemporâneo, vivem sob um sistema de sociedade que preza pelo utilitarismo produtivista instrumentalizado por demandas do mercado que desprezam o valor das humanidades, por considerá-las inúteis (sem retorno econômico imediato) (VERBICARO, 2021).

A ditadura do útil adoce a arte, a criatividade do fazer artístico, o sublime, a capacidade do “maravilhar-se” e de “transcender-se”. No campo educacional (VERBICARO, 2021), o modelo educacional neoliberal - com fins de lucratividade - produz autômatos humanos, em detrimento de cidadãos capazes de pensar de forma crítica os fenômenos da história e da vida em sociedade - incapazes de compreender o significado dos sofrimentos e realizações humanas.

A ditadura do útil decorrente do modelo capitalista neoliberal impacta na forma como as pessoas vivem. Esse estilo de vida promove certos resultados utilizados por grupos e movimentos totalitários em seu favor e benefício. Veremos, nesta seção, a relação do modelo neoliberal capitalista com a era da informação e os movimentos totalitários.

O imperialismo econômico - base da política externa europeia no século XIX - deflagra a crise por “superprodução” de capital e do dinheiro supérfluo dentro das fronteiras nacionais (ARENDT, 2012). Esse fenômeno demonstra a necessidade do consumo para as relações econômicas, mas também para as relações humanas. O homem supérfluo é aquele que é facilmente substituído, é estatística e vira uma máquina de produção - onde seu trabalho o consome por inteiro.

O homem passa a ser uma empresa de uma só máquina de performance. A relação Estado-empresa se transmuta para o sujeito-empresa. O sujeito é aquele que é empreendedor de si e consumista, o qual produz sua própria satisfação baseada na competição, no individualismo, no produtivismo e na mercantilização que adoecem o homem, o tornam sem tempo e solitário, excessivamente ocupado. O homem contemporâneo é escravo da necessidade de recordes de produtividade, mas acima de tudo, é escravo de si mesmo. Essa busca excessiva e incessante pelo útil torna inútil a própria vida e sem espaço para realizações significativas e valorosas (VERBICARO, 2021).

Nesse raciocínio, Arendt se questiona se a pessoa é valorizada apenas pelo que produziu, visto que as pessoas atribuem significado valorativo às outras pela sua produção.⁵ Um exemplo desta situação é o universo da produção acadêmica, no Brasil, que condiciona alunos e professores a produzir em velocidade maquinária. Aqueles que conseguem ter uma estabilidade produtiva passam a competir consigo mesmo, com a sua obra, tendo em vista que necessitam bater novos recordes de produtividade. O *homo faber* torna-se escravo de sua produção técnica, e até mesmo de si.

O esquecimento do tempo e da memória é um fenômeno que possui resquícios na era contemporânea, aperfeiçoados pelas novas tecnologias e novas relações virtuais.⁶ Tais relações, além de conectar pessoas com o domínio público da internet, incrementam também a capacidade de alienação sobre o mundo (com as bolhas virtuais).

Por isso, o começo do século XXI é considerado neuronal, preenchido com doenças neuronais como a depressão, transtorno de déficit de atenção com Síndrome de Hiperatividade (TDAH), Transtorno de Personalidade Limitrofe (TPL) ou a Síndrome de Burnout (SB), as quais determinam a paisagem patológica. A sociedade do século XXI é uma sociedade do desempenho.⁷ O que causa a depressão do esgotamento é a pressão de desempenho: a pessoa fica doente devido ao imperativo do desempenho como um novo mandato da sociedade pós-moderna do trabalho. O sujeito de desempenho encontra-se em guerra consigo mesmo. O excesso de trabalho e desempenho agudiza-se numa auto exploração (BYUNG-CHUL, 2015).

⁵ Arendt aborda, ainda, o fenômeno da idolatria do gênio criativo - pelo *homo faber* - assinalando que o produto fabricado pode ser maior que ele mesmo (ARENDT, 2018). As “grandes pessoas” são julgados pelo que são, enquanto que os vulgares, pelo que conseguiram fazer e produzir; por isso esses últimos se tornam escravos e prisioneiros de suas próprias faculdades. O criador vivo concorre com suas próprias criações (as quais subsistem).

⁶ Um exemplo disso é visualizado conforme as tecnologias mais recentes proporcionam uma alimentação incessante de imagens de desgraça e de atrocidade, que a pessoa consiga ver em seu tempo de folga em face ao dia a dia mecânico (SONTAG, 2003). As pessoas podem desligar a tv não apenas pela indiferença às imagens e situações de violência, mas porque possuem medo. De fato, para muitas pessoas, na maioria das culturas modernas, a brutalidade física é um entretenimento, mas nem toda violência é vista dessa forma.

⁷ A dialética da negatividade é o traço fundamental da imunidade, visto que o imunologicamente “outro” é o negativo, que penetra no “próprio” e procura negá-lo. Logo, com o desaparecimento da alteridade, vive-se numa época pobre de negatividades. A sociedade do cansaço (ativa) desdobra-se na sociedade do doping, isto é: o homem se transforma numa máquina de desempenho, que pode funcionar livre de perturbações e maximizar seu desempenho. O doping é a consequência dessa evolução, na qual a própria vitalidade é reduzida à função vital e ao desempenho vital. A sociedade do desempenho gera cansaço e esgotamento excessivos (BYUNG-CHUL, 2015).

Como se vê, o modelo de Estado soberano pautado no individualismo deixou resquícios na sociedade do desempenho. A governança neoliberal utiliza o mercado como razão do Estado e como espaço para a formação de um “indivíduo capital humano”, perdendo espaço a noção de “sujeito de direitos” e da dignidade como fundamento para a promoção de direitos e políticas integradoras, com o esvaziamento da atuação pública e a deslegitimação das instituições públicas. Isso exige que os cidadãos cuidem apenas de seus próprios afazeres; o objetivo é que o indivíduo pense em si e na sua relação com seus semelhantes a partir da lógica de custos, onde é influenciado pela sistemática negação do outro para se proteger (MELLO NETO, 2019).

Consequentemente, a totalidade dos riscos econômicos e sociais são transferidos aos indivíduos. Com isso, há a precarização de direitos sociais e universais, especialmente no que concerne ao serviço público de educação, visto que a implementação de políticas públicas se adequam a partir de determinadas compreensões do papel do Estado. Logo, uma compreensão individualista influencia diretamente nas fases do ciclo de realização de políticas públicas. Tal fato é preocupante, visto que não há interesse dos “valores” neoliberais em promover determinadas políticas referentes a direitos humanos, com ações que corrijam desigualdades e garantam a proteção dos grupos vulneráveis (MELLO NETO, 2019).

Tais constatações são facilmente percebidas no cenário atual brasileiro, onde vive-se uma desvalorização das ciências humanas e do sistema educacional (VERBICARO, 2021). O constante e progressivo contingenciamento de gastos para a educação e cultura revelam o desprezo pelas humanidades e, como corolário lógico, o desprezo pela própria humanidade.

O Governo do atual Presidente da República, em 2019, cancelou – em três momentos - 5.613 bolsas de estudos para pesquisas de pós-graduação financiadas pela Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (Capes), a qual teve corte em 19% do valor que fora autorizado em seu orçamento (RBA, 2019). Recentemente, o Presidente sancionou a lei orçamentária de 2021 com veto e bloqueio adicional em despesas discricionárias, com o maior corte no Ministério da Educação (2,7 bilhões), o que é sintomático (BRASIL, 2021), visto que as universidades públicas estão na linha de frente do combate à Pandemia⁸ do Covid-19.

⁸ A Associação Nacional dos Dirigentes das Instituições Federais de Ensino Superior (Andifes) afirmou que o orçamento discricionário de 2021 para as 69 universidades federais é 18,16% menor do que o destinado no ano de 2020 (CNNBRA, 2021). Acontece que – no mínimo - três universidades estão desenvolvendo vacinas nacionais contra a Covid-19, este é o nono ano consecutivo que a verba para a UFRJ é reduzida. Em nota, a reitoria afirmou que a instituição corre

O papel do Estado, pautado na lógica individualista, favorece o padrão moral burguês - de lógica hobbesiana – erguendo um homem julgado pelo seu valor/merecimento/preço, que é reavaliado pela estima da sociedade de acordo com a lei da oferta e da procura. Esse homem só pode realizar seus interesses pessoais com a ajuda de uma maioria específica, motivado por interesses pessoais – o desejo de poder. Daí porque o Estado se faz necessário perante a insegurança de tais homens (ARENDRT, 2012).

Essa situação se coaduna com a esfera política, particularmente em casos de movimentos e grupos de viés totalitário, que se beneficiam dos ônus do modelo neoliberal, fato que não está distante da realidade brasileira. A autora Hannah Arendt afirma que as ditaduras modernas usam o terror para governar as massas obedientes, como foi o caso na Alemanha nazista e na Rússia soviética – na última, a arbitrariedade do terror não foi determinada por uma raça específica, mas qualquer pessoa poderia se tornar vítima (ARENDRT, 2012).

Arendt explica que os movimentos de cunho totalitário são formações que visam à destruição do Estado, mesmo que aparentem ser um partido para atrair apoio da classe alta e do mundo dos negócios, cujo interesse é conquistar a máquina estatal – apoiando um líder para governar em apoio a essas classes (ARENDRT, 2012). Nesse sentido, a tomada de poder é uma etapa transitória, o fim prático é moldar o maior número de pessoas à sua estrutura e mantê-las em ação, visto que não existe uma “finalidade política” (ARENDRT, 2012, p. 456).

Em governos constitucionais, os movimentos totalitários podem usar o terror até certo ponto, pois precisam parecer plausíveis para um público que ainda não está isolado a outras fontes de informação. Apenas quando detém o controle absoluto, substituem a propaganda pela doutrinação e a violência para dar realidade às mentiras (ARENDRT, 2012). Todavia, nem tudo é mentira política para se eleger. Em muitos casos, Hitler foi sincero e claro na definição dos objetivos do movimento, e isso passou “despercebido pelo público” (ARENDRT, 2012, p. 475).

risco de paralisar as atividades. No caso da UFRJ, realizam-se testes moleculares padrão ouro por RT-PCR. O Hospital Universitário Clementino Fraga Filho instalou um novo CTI e mais de 100 leitos de enfermaria para tratamento da Covid-19, além de realizarem estudos pioneiros de vigilância genômica, identificando novas variantes dos vírus; desenvolveu testes sorológicos e vacinas com tecnologia nacional estão na fase de testes pré-clínicos. Em 2013, R\$ 12 bilhões foram investidos pela Capes e pelo CNPq, transformando o cenário da produção científica do país e, conseqüentemente, durante a epidemia da zika, o Brasil liderou o número de publicações relacionadas à enfermidade, o que permitiu a identificação de suas conseqüências fisiopatológicas, resultando em vidas salvas (UFRJ, 2021).

Frequentemente, em movimentos de cunho antidemocráticos, desde o seu surgimento, há a defesa de ações e ideias autoritárias e antidemocráticas. Nesse sentido, traçamos alguns paralelos com a ascensão de alguns grupos reacionários de extrema direita no Brasil, que possibilitaram o surgimento de ações ideias totalitárias no debate político massificado. Como exemplo, tem-se a constante exaltação de torturadores e de regimes militares ditatoriais, cuja defesa sempre foi explícita por parte do atual Presidente da República brasileiro.

O Presidente, em conjunto com seu ex-partido (Partido Social Liberal), surgiu - em meio à campanha presidencial de 2018 - com o lema "liberais na economia e conservadores nos costumes" e "Brasil acima de todos e Deus acima de tudo", acompanhados do ataque à ideologia de gênero (KALIL, 2020). Além disso, dentre suas propostas havia projetos de austeridade e privatizações; a flexibilização da posse de armas para a população e redução da idade legal para possuí-las; a defesa da propriedade privada; a luta contra a corrupção, e o apoio legal para policiais em exercício que matam suspeitos - Plano de Governo de Jair Bolsonaro (BRASIL, 2018).

Em muitas situações, é notável que o terror assuma forma do governo apenas no último estágio do seu desenvolvimento. A princípio, há a "ideologia do terror" (ARENDT, 2012, p. 29), voltada especificamente para a obtenção da adesão das massas, antes que o terror seja estabelecido.

Personalidades de cunho totalitário se identificam com o poder independentemente de seu conteúdo: possuem um "eu" fraco, por isso buscam compensação nos grandes coletivos e da cobertura destes. As pessoas conformistas, que possuem, acima de tudo, vínculo com instrumentos de qualquer estrutura de exercício do poder, são adeptos potenciais do totalitarismo (ADORNO, 2010).

Esses apontamentos, especificamente, são relevantes para entender o contexto brasileiro. Então, consideramos o conceito de "massas" de Arendt, a quem aquelas são compostas pela maioria das pessoas neutras e politicamente indiferentes (que não se filiam a partidos e nem exercem direito de voto). Os movimentos de viés totalitário recrutam essas pessoas abandonadas pelos outros partidos, que por sua vez possuem motivos para hostilizar todos os partidos (ARENDT, 2012).

Assim, a corrosão da democracia por dentro de si mesma é algo objetivo, e os movimentos que efetivam o retorno de regimes totalitários só conseguem o que pretendem porque as condições são favoráveis a estes (ADORNO, 2010).

Nesse sentido, o ato de aceitar a derrota da candidatura é condição *sine qua non* do processo democrático. Por isso, não aceitar a vitória do outro é o primeiro passo adotado em aventuras golpistas. No

Brasil, no dia 01/07, o presidente Jair Bolsonaro voltou a defender o voto impresso, em suas redes sociais, afirmando que não entregará a faixa presidencial a um sucessor, em caso de suspeita de fraude (ELPAISBRA, 2021). Tal dúvida sobre o sistema institucional, em especial, eleitoral é parte de seu projeto de aniquilamento das instituições democráticas.

Os movimentos totalitários dependem da força bruta, e que objetivam e conseguem organizar as massas. Enquanto o movimento permanecer inteiro, os membros fanáticos são impenetráveis aos argumentos; assim, o conformismo total e a identificação com o movimento elimina a capacidade de sentir, mesmo a tortura ou a morte (ARENDT, 2012, p. 438).

Dessa forma, os totalitarismos - e autoritarismos - preferem a força e não têm necessidade de refutar argumentos contrários (persuasão⁹), até mesmo a força da palavra ofensiva. Isso porque o debate ideológico com outros partidos é desvantajoso. Logo, esses movimentos buscam invalidar o Parlamento, convencendo o povo de que a maioria parlamentar não corresponde à realidade.

Diante dessas constatações, compara-se o uso recente dos chamados "discursos de ódio" no Brasil, por alguns movimentos de extrema direita que criam cidadãos hipnotizados pela defesa de narrativas opressoras, sejam eles cientistas, professores, filósofos, artistas, médicos, militares, etc. Esse discurso¹⁰ nasce dos preconceitos sociais e exacerbam-se em atitudes de ódio contra a existência e o convívio com essas pessoas na sociedade. Somado a isso, tal discurso incita e leva à violência.

⁹ Para os gregos, forçar pessoas pela força ao invés de persuadir eram modos pré-políticos de lidar com as pessoas na *pólis* (ARENDT, 2018), apesar de entenderem a liberdade de forma limitada à esfera política.

¹⁰ O discurso de ódio refere-se a uma expressão abusiva, insultuosa, intimidante, é um assédio e incita à violência e à discriminação. É dirigida contra as pessoas com base em sua raça, origem étnica, religião, gênero, idade, condição física, deficiência, orientação sexual, convicção política, dentre outros. Muitos agentes empregam tais discursos na Internet por causa do anonimato. Esse discurso provém de um conjunto de valores que enfatiza respeito pela autoridade, lealdade, obediência, ordem, controle social, patriotismo e a busca de segurança através do poder militar nacional. Essas tipo de discurso usam padrões duplos de pensamento. Os produtores de discurso de ódio podem ser classificados como "soldados", tal grupo é composto por pessoas financiadas por partidos políticos e outras organizações não-governamentais, costumam usar o discurso militar e atacam aqueles que são tratados indireta ou diretamente nas notícias on-line, jornalistas e outros produtores de comentários cujas convicções e comportamentos esses soldados desaprovam. Além desses, existem aqueles que são autorganizadores de produção de discursos de ódio, os "crentes", os quais seguem fielmente os seus modelos políticos e ideológicos atacando os inimigos, que querem completar a sua missão. Somado a esses, os "jogadores" são aqueles que usam o discurso como um jogo na comunidade online; e por fim, existem aqueles que usam tais discursos para chamar a atenção para os problemas sociais, os quais são motivados pela injustiça social (ERJAVEC; KOVACIC, 2012).

No entanto, esses discursos têm proporções maiores quando o candidato e o partido que concorre à Presidência da República apoia e usa esses discursos como forma de campanha eleitoral e de atuação política, especialmente, quando são eleitos¹¹.

Faz-se relevante constatar, neste ponto, que Arendt concorda com a observação de Platão – em Fedro - de que a verdade ocupa uma posição instável no mundo, pois opiniões decorrem mais da persuasão do que da verdade. Então, o papel do historiador é dificultado com os modernos manipuladores dos fatos, que usam os fatos indevidamente para demonstrar a sua opinião (ARENDR, 2012).

Essa situação é agravada ainda pelos “manipuladores de fatos” que estão escondido dentre as massas - que usam as redes sociais para seus fins e não precisam de identificação, pois as redes possuem algoritmos e a capacidade de viralizar as informações em tempos recordes para entregar o conteúdo às bolhas sociais.

As massas precisam ser “conquistadas” (ARENDR, 2021, p. 474) e retroalimentadas pelas propagandas e conteúdos midiáticos, são as massas digitais. Tal propaganda de massa – vinculada à formação das narrativas - não muda seu tema, apenas aperfeiçoa suas técnicas, como por exemplo, as redes sociais que são usadas de forma sistematizadas, propagando correntes “desinformando” as pessoas, canais de youtuber ou aplicativos especialmente voltados para alimentar o público com narrativas paralelas.

O primeiro critério para a escolha dos tópicos é o mistério. As massas modernas não acreditam no visível ou na experiência, apenas em sua imaginação - como por exemplo, os terraplanistas e os negacionistas da eficácia da vacina do Covid-19. O que convence os adeptos do movimento são os fatos na coerência do sistema do qual fazem parte (ARENDR, 2012)

A infantilização define o comportamento voluntarista das massas digitais que buscam a eliminação, inicialmente, simbólica e virtual do inimigo :

¹¹ O atual Presidente, em sua campanha eleitoral em comício no Acre, empregava frases como: “vamos fuzilar a petralhada”, a qual foi questionada pelo Ministro Ricardo Lewandowski, do Supremo Tribunal Federal, que deu dez dias para Jair Bolsonaro explicar sua fala. Em outras ocasiões, o candidato já havia incitado a violência contra a integridade sexual da mulher, alegou que as minorias devem ser caladas, dentre outras. Todas essas posições incitam seus seguidores a serem violentos e intolerantes para com os direitos humanos fundamentais das pessoas. Em seu Governo atual, é comum o seu ataque à atuação da mídia por revelar fatos ou informações que ponham em cheque os seus comportamentos e decisões sobre o país. O Presidente, ainda, nega a existência do período de Ditadura por Regime Militar de 1964, no Brasil – por isso, instituiu a comemoração ao dia do regime “com autoridade”. No entanto, este período de regime autoritário e totalitário é um fato histórico de um passado recente – apurado pela Comissão Nacional da Verdade, em de 2014, para investigar os crimes cometidos na época do Regime Militar em todo o território nacional.

a guerra cultural bolsonarista, que se beneficia da técnica discursiva, a retórica do ódio¹², a qual conduz o país ao caos social, à paralisia da administração pública e ao analfabetismo ideológico (é a negação da realidade e o desprezo pela ciência). Assim, o sistema de crenças binário, maniqueísta e irracional, favoreceu um número crescente de adeptos, onde muitos jovens e alunos reproduzem o que os mestres nas academias propagam, isto é: abrindo canais no YouTube, organizando *hangouts* e *podcasts*, notícias diárias, diuturnas, do WhatsApp, fortalecendo comunidades nas diversas redes sociais por meio de compartilhamento sistemático e recíproco, multiplicando o alcance de contas individuais e promovendo campanhas conjuntas de grande repercussão¹³ (ROCHA, 2021).

Essa juventude em ascensão se articulava formalmente através de centros de estudo, rapidamente convertidos em institutos de ensino. Tal onda reacionária foi estimulada pela vitória eleitoral de Donald Trump, nos EUA. Então, desde 2013 o cenário político brasileiro passou a lidar com o ativismo, que nega o sistema político como um todo (ROCHA, 2021).

Além disso, esse ativismo nega o pluralismo da ação e do discurso, acarretando a destruição do espaço público saudável – do diálogo pelo argumento – e cria fanatismos totalitários que alimentam as massas esvaziadas e isoladas em suas bolhas. Esse tipo de movimento incrementa a crise sócio-política e o enfraquecimento do sistema democrático.

A criação de notícias falsas muda a verdade histórica, sem sustentação em nenhuma base científica

¹² O uso de vocabulário chulo, pela humilhação pública dos adversários, a necessidade da desumanização dos oponentes, são técnicas de efeito retórico para propagar inverdades que, mesmo desmentidas, têm potencial para enganar um número expressivo de pessoas. A retórica do ódio é uma técnica discursiva que pretende reduzir o outro ao papel de inimigo a ser eliminado, a qual pode ser ensinada e transmitida (com elementos da desqualificação nulificadora e da hipérbole descaracterizadora). Taltécnica foi aprendida e multiplicada por *youtubers* e empregada nas redes sociais, por meio do mecanismo coordenado de *likes* e *dislikes*, alcançando a esfera privada através das correntes de *WhatsApp* e foi ampliada nos círculos políticos por meio do linchamento permanente do inimigo. A disseminação da retórica do ódio, difundida por Olavo de Carvalho, como forma de desqualificar adversários; o palavrão como argumento de autoridade; a reconstrução revisionista da história da ditadura militar; a identificação do comunismo como inimigo eterno a ser eliminado; a presunção de uma ideia bolorenta de alta cultura; a curiosa pretensão filosofante; a elaboração de labirínticas teorias conspiratórias de dominação planetária; a adesão iniciática a um conjunto de valores incoerentes.

¹³ São várias as estratégias empregadas nesses discursos de ódio, são elas: a rearticulação dos significado das notícias (os quais são usados para criar conflitos nacionalistas); a rearticulação de tópicos políticos domésticos, intensificando a luta cultural entre à direita e à esquerda (usando palavras imaginativas com conotações extremamente negativas para descrever a direita e a esquerda); a rearticulação de situações no campo da política doméstica em assuntos que dizem respeito à vida privada dos indivíduos; ataque a celebridades cujas opiniões ou comportamentos os comentaristas desaprovam (rotulados como homossexuais, alcoólatras e pedófilos, muitas vezes são histórias falsas) (ERJAVEC; KOVACIC, 2012).

– ou em pseudocientistas -, e cria mitos para justificar preconceitos e desigualdades que viram pautas ideologias totalitárias. A ideologia racista, na Alemanha, proveio de alguns patriotas e românticos, que despertaram no povo a consciência de uma origem comum (definida pela língua), onde era difícil distinguir o nacionalismo do racismo declarado. A burguesia alemã achou a “personalidade inata” para justificar a sua genialidade e desmerecer daqueles que não possuíam essas “qualidades nobres” (ARENDT, 2012, p. 247). O racismo é uma maneira de fugir à responsabilidade comum (ARENDT, 2012).

Além disso, a própria burocracia do governo gera a sensação de misticismo, onde o povo nunca sabe realmente por que algo acontece; não existe interpretação racional das leis, o que subsiste “é o evento brutal e nu” (ARENDT, 2012, p. 343). Nesse sentido, a atitude de líderes totalitários na Alemanha nazista e na Rússia soviética foi de transformar a instituição do Exército em função subordinada do movimento (ARENDT, 2012).

No Brasil, defensores de ideais totalitários dominam as técnicas de manipulação digital, criando e propagando o mito de que o cidadão brasileiro de bem é o que segue os padrões morais conservadores da família tradicional, ou seja, os que não se encaixam no padrão – o qual foi arbitrariamente estipulado por uma parcela que pleiteou ascender no poder aproveitando-se das desigualdades estruturais para propagar a sua ideologia – são os inimigos, são os destruídos pela retórica de ódio promovida nas mídias e redes sociais da forma mais vulgar, violenta e desrespeitosa que existe.

A agenda da campanha bolsonarista, conservadora e reacionária nos costumes, neoliberal na condução da economia e de orientação política de extrema-direita — foi aprovada pelos eleitores do presidente - que expôs seu programa sem censura, no caso: a retirada de direitos trabalhistas, a relativização dos direitos humanos, a negação de problemas ambientais, a defesa de posições autoritárias e um revisionismo histórico relativo à ditadura militar (ROCHA, 2021).

Nesse íterim, os partidos da política tradicional foram culpados pelas crises econômicas e sociais, equacionadas pelos escândalos de corrupção e o *Impeachment* de Dilma Rousseff. Com isso, houve o fortalecimento da retórica antissistema, antipartidária, anti-intelectual e antipolítica.

A corrupção, portanto, situa-se no centro dos argumentos desse menosprezo pelo sistema político; além das duas matrizes de valores das “qualidades nobres” nacionais: a religiosa (especialmente, o universo evangélico) e a militar¹⁴, as quais - se

adotadas nos espaços privado e público - recuperariam a ordem tradicional que não deveria ter sido interrompida e a visão de que a família tradicional está ameaçada (GALLEGO, 2021). No parlamento brasileiro, o crescimento exponencial da bancada evangélica é indissociável desse conflito de valores (ROCHA, 2021).

Isso demonstra que as particularidades de um território e povo não são observadas por sua historicidade, mas sim, como denotativas de uma pretensa cultura étnica dos povos sob o regime nacionalista. Nesse íterim, a cultura é vista e usada como instrumento de unificação social (TEIXEIRA, 2020). Essa associação estreita entre cultura e Estado passa a normalizar as funções do último de alimentador, controlador e dispensador universal da cultura no interior de seu território.

Os Estados buscam legitimação e consenso ao aparecerem como representantes da história nacional; corporações buscam a obtenção de dinheiro e, através de uma alta e renovável cultura, buscam construir uma imagem de sua expansão econômica. A própria cultura se torna parte do próprio léxico do conflito político. O discurso moral era instrumentalizado pelo político, e agora ocorre o contrário (KALIL, 2020).

Em meio a isso, têm-se as Guerras Culturais, que pregam uma operacionalização da política pelo cultural (TEIXEIRA, 2020). Conforme já mencionado na seção anterior, as artes e ciências humanas precisam estar sob o domínio de ideologias totalitárias.

A guerra cultural é a origem e a forma do bolsonarismo, mas, por isso mesmo, é sua queda. A guerra cultural é a negação de dados objetivos e, pela necessidade intrínseca de inventar inimigos em série (os defensores da ideologia de gênero e os comunistas), não permite que se articule um programa de governo com um mínimo de coerência e continuidade. As guerras culturais somente são inteligíveis no âmbito de autênticas batalhas ideológicas pelo estabelecimento de modelos normativos reacionários de família, arte, educação, lei e política (ROCHA, 2021).

segmento ocupou 10 ministérios (Ministério da Casa Civil, Gabinete de Segurança Institucional, Secretaria de Governo, Defesa, Secretaria geral da Presidência, Ciência Tecnologia e Inovações, Infraestrutura, Saúde, Minas e Energia, Transparência). Os militares ocupam a estrutura do Estado de maneira mais estratégica e intensa, como atores privilegiados para influenciar e mediar conflitos nas áreas do governo. Por mais que nem todos se filiem ao grupo que está no poder, muitos militares atuam como fiadores de Bolsonaro e como tutores do bolsonarismo em voga no país, fato que não os torna livre de responsabilidades. O caso do ex-ministro da saúde, general Eduardo Pazuello, é uma desmistificação da suposta competência política, intelectual e administrativa dos militares, visto que o general não possui formação nem os devidos saberes técnicos que o Ministério da Saúde demanda (deixou mais de 6,8 milhões de testes contra a COVID-19 vencerem em estoque, atrasou a definição sobre a compra de seringas, agulhas e insumos para a vacina) (FONACATE, 2021).

¹⁴ Os militares das Forças Armadas possuem maior presença na esplanada ministerial do Governo Bolsonaro. Até o final de 2020, esse

Logo, as artes e as humanidades (inclusive, o sistema educacional) são usadas, são atribuídas utilidade para essas, para fins de alimentação às massas e manutenção do sistema. Um episódio marcante na política recente, no atual Governo no Brasil, foi protagonizado pelo ex-Secretário da Cultura Roberto Alvim, que plagiou, em pronunciamento oficial, trechos de um discurso de Joseph Goebbels (Ministro da Propaganda do Führer nazista)¹⁵.

O *ethos* político desta extrema direita necessita da dialética da construção-destruição da figura de um inimigo interno e a limpeza correspondente do corpo social. O termo “direita” passou a ser disputado no Brasil, com a criação de partidos de cunho opressor e ultraconservador (KALIL, 2018), que se distanciam do perfil dos partidos tradicionais de direita. A retórica do grito da inimizade, desta base partidária, estava pautada no mito do líder que é íntegro e vai acabar com a corrupção no país (GALLEGO, 2021).

Apenas alguns merecem cantar o hino nacional e carregar a bandeira para que haja a salvação do país das ameaças comunistas, da diversidade de gênero, da luta feminista, dos defensores do meio ambiente e do desenvolvimento sustentável, dos pacifistas contra a legalização do porte de armas, do uso da vacina contra a Covid-19, dentre outras pautas que foram consideradas “inimigas e comunistas”, ou seja, são todos os que questionam, discordam ou criticam as ações do líder.

O Governo está fazendo uma espécie de releitura dos direitos humanos, com defesa da “nova política de direitos humanos”, mas, na verdade, tem-se a erosão das concepções dos direitos humanos, os quais exigem que a igualdade, a não discriminação, a pluralidade e a autonomia individual não sejam questões negociáveis.

No Brasil, a manipulação de fatos auxiliou a eleição de políticos. Além disso, o fenômeno das Fake News foi decisivo para a construção e readaptação dos fatos na história recente. O exemplo mais recente é o das vacinas para prevenir o contágio e contaminação por Covid-19. Há, no país, uma inquietação por entender a razão pela qual dados falseados encontram repercussão no debate público, e por compreender como quaisquer informações são passíveis de serem

operacionalizadas por tais interlocutores (TEIXEIRA, 2020).

O medo foi continuamente mobilizado pelo presidente brasileiro, conectando uma suposta conspiração comunista com a pandemia, criando narrativas em torno dos termos vírus chinês e da vacina chinesa, as quais resultam em sérios riscos para a saúde pública e para a democracia. Esses discursos conspiratórios são usados como discurso oficial do Estado, bem como em políticas públicas. Além disso, seus representantes midiáticos armam tensões entre a liberdade individual, a saúde pública e a comunidade científica (KALIL; SILVEIRA; PINHEIRO; PEREIRA; KALIL; AZARIAS; AMPARO, 2021)¹⁶.

A ênfase que a propaganda totalitária dá à natureza científica de suas afirmações é uma técnica publicitária dirigida às massas. A obsessão dos movimentos totalitários pelas demonstrações científicas desaparece assim que eles assumem o poder. Os nazistas dispensaram até mesmo os eruditos que procuraram servi-los; os bolchevistas usaram a reputação de seus cientistas para finalidades “não científicas” – transformando-os em charlatões (ARENDT, 2012, p. 478).

No Brasil, as duas situações acima foram empregadas por parte do atual Governo no combate à Pandemia: a dispensa de profissionais técnicos no Ministério da Saúde em meio à Pandemia e o uso de médicos aproveitadores para a defesa da narrativa do “tratamento preventivo”.

A rejeição oficial ao uso do medicamento cloroquina para o tratamento da doença SARS-COV-19 no mundo começou ainda no primeiro semestre da pandemia. Por outro lado, no Brasil o caminho foi o oposto. O Governo insiste – até o presente momento - na adoção de medidas ineficazes e prejudiciais para o combate à Pandemia, recomendando o uso da cloroquina, no aplicativo TrateCov, que sugeria a médicos a prescrição de drogas como hidroxiclороquina, cloroquina, ivermectina e azitromicina (o chamado “tratamento precoce”).

A propaganda é parte integrante da guerra psicológica (ARENDT, 2012), assim como o terror; logo, precisa ser empregada constantemente. Conforme analisa Susan Sontag, a guerra tornou-se uma atividade que não avança sem a ajuda dos equipamentos óticos de precisão crescente para localizar o inimigo. Não

¹⁵ O Governo demitiu o secretário, ao ver a repercussão negativa de seu discurso, tornando insustentável sua permanência no cargo. O ex-secretário afirmou que: “A arte brasileira da próxima década será heroica e será nacional. Será dotada de grande capacidade de envolvimento emocional e será igualmente imperativa (...) ou então não será nada. Em comparação, o discurso do líder nazista menciona que: “A arte alemã da próxima década será heroica, será ferrenhamente romântica, será objetiva e livre de sentimentalismo, será nacional com grande páthos e igualmente imperativa (...) ou então não será nada”, declaração feita em 1933, retirado do livro “Joseph Goebbels: uma biografia”, do historiador alemão Peter Longerich (ELPAISBRA, 2020).

¹⁶ O Presidente da república demitiu o Ministro Mandetta (médico) por divergências quanto ao combate ao coronavírus (CNNBRA, 2020). Em seguida, nomeou Nelson Teich como novo Ministro da Saúde (16 de abril de 2020), o qual pede demissão do Ministério da Saúde (15 de maio de 2020) devido à divergência quanto ao uso da cloroquina (CNNBRAB, 2020). Assim, o Presidente Jair Bolsonaro nomeou o general Eduardo Pazuello como Ministro Interino da Saúde (3 de junho de 2020) (BRASIL, 2020).

existe guerra sem fotografia¹⁷ - são atividades congruentes, procuram preservar o importante acontecimento histórico em detalhes nítidos¹⁸ (SONTAG, 2003).

Por várias vezes, o Presidente brasileiro se deixou fotografar e filmar com embalagens de cloroquina e insistindo em afirmar que o uso de máscara não era necessário, em desacreditar as vacinas desenvolvidas por diversos laboratórios do mundo¹⁹ e recusando – sistematicamente - a oferta de vacinas²⁰, além da recusa inicial em prover auxílio emergencial que permitisse a manutenção do isolamento à maior parcela da população e a desacreditação dos protocolos internacionais de prevenção ou de tratamento da COVID-19. A soma destes fatores (e muitos outros) gerou um efeito cascata: o aumento exponencial na curva de mortes por Covid-19.

Segundo a Organização Pan-Americana da Saúde (OPAS), as Fake News sobre o novo coronavírus são mais mortais que qualquer outra desinformação, pois, diante do cenário de uma pandemia para a qual ainda não havia imunizante ou medicamento, o acesso à informação confiável pode significar a vida ou a morte (OPAS, 2020).

Tais fatos analisados em uma ordem lógica são comparáveis aos métodos iniciais de sistemas totalitários. Isso é bastante significativo, pois, conforme Arendt aponta, o Pangermanismo - de Schoenerer - empregava a linguagem vulgar para atrair as camadas sociais mais vastas e diferentes (ARENDR, 2012, p. 333), além de usar da hostilidade a instituições estatais que o povo possuía, do racismo decorrente da "consciência tribal ampliada" e do antissemitismo (como arma política).

Para a ideologia totalitária, "a história oficial é uma fraude" (ARENDR, 2012, p. 466), é apenas uma fachada externa com fins de enganar o povo. Logo,

¹⁷ O problema dessas fotos de guerra é que elas circulam de modo diversificado, onde não há um espaço que garanta condições reverenciais para olhar tais fotos e mostrar-se plenamente sensível a elas (que não sejam espaços patrióticos de deferência aos líderes).

¹⁸ Historicamente, os fotógrafos ofereceram sobretudo imagens positivas da atividade guerreira e das alegrias de começar ou continuar uma guerra, em defesa do sacrifício dos soldados.

¹⁹ Visto que o ex-Ministro Ernesto Araújo, em artigo, sugeriu que a pandemia tinha como objetivo trazer de volta o comunismo e usou o termo "comunavírus" (VEJABRA, 2020). O artigo está disponível no livro "Política Externa: soberania, democracia e liberdade" – Coletânea de discursos, artigos e entrevistas do Ministro das Relações Exteriores de 2020, no site: <http://funag.gov.br/index.php/pt-br/2015-02-12-19-38-42/137-nova-politica-externa/3636-chegou-o-comunavirus-artigo-publicado-no-portal-metapolitica-17-08-04-2020>.

²⁰ O gerente-geral da farmacêutica Pfizer na América Latina, Carlos Murillo, confirmou em seu depoimento aos senadores da Comissão Parlamentar de Inquérito da Covid-19 que o governo de Jair Bolsonaro rejeitou ofertas de 70 milhões de doses da vacina Pfizer/BioNTech, cujas primeiras doses poderiam ter sido entregues em dezembro de 2020 - mas nenhuma das ofertas foi respondida pelo Ministério da Saúde (ELPAISBRAB, 2021).

fazem-se necessárias as "teorias da conspiração" – nada mais são do que enormes mentiras e falsidades - para justificar acontecimentos históricos que sirvam para o seu propósito ideológico, tornando-as fatos incontestes e negando a historiografia.

Esse fenômeno é manipulado pelos movimentos que trabalham como se o homem pudesse mudar o passado à vontade²¹ e a mentira passasse a ser "uma questão de poder e esperteza", de pressão e repetição incessante (ARENDR, 2012, p. 466). Daí, é notável a capacidade de absorção das massas para sustentar essas mentiras.

No entanto, o mais preocupante quanto às lições da autora para o Brasil atual é a pergunta: até onde os adeptos do fanatismo estarão dispostos a ir para sustentar suas mentiras? Pessoas comuns são capazes de cometer crimes quando esses passam a ser tarefas rotineiras – "banais" (ARENDR, 2012, p. 472).

Outra característica importante é o sentimento do povo alemão após a 2ª Guerra Mundial, que passou por um complexo de culpa coletiva, caracterizado pela situação que minimiza o que ocorreu, ou utiliza argumentos no sentido de que as vítimas deram causa. Isso ocorre porque a responsabilidade sobre o ocorrido recairia aos apoiadores do movimento, igualmente – às massas. No entanto, a minimização da responsabilidade gera o desaparecimento da consciência da continuidade histórica, de uma humanidade sem memória. Tais motivações e os comportamentos não são racionais, na medida em que deturpam os fatos a que se referem, porém, eles são "racional" no sentido em que se apoiam em tendências sociais - quem reage deste modo se sente identificado com o espírito da época (ADORNO, 2010).

O povo brasileiro passa por um momento de luto coletivo, e em certa medida, por culpa no que concerne à cumplicidade em relação aos fatos que deram causa a mais de 500.000 mil mortes por contaminação pela Covid-19 (G1BRA, 2021). Tal sentimento de mortes em número exponencial, de início, foi manipulado por alguns adeptos do Governo para ser encarado de forma minimizada (CNNBRAC, 2020), mas que no momento atual é sentido de forma grave por toda a população.

A calamidade que abate um número significativo de pessoas no Brasil, além da calamidade causada pela Pandemia - no sentido que Arendt havia constatado - é a "perda de uma comunidade disposta e

²¹ O gesto de tentar esquecer o passado advém – muitas vezes - dos partidários dos que praticaram as injustiças, apesar de ser uma ação privativa de quem sofreu com tal injustiça. Os que justificam a vontade de esquecer o passado alegam que não é possível viver à sua sombra, pois terror não tem fim quando a culpa e violência precisam ser pagas com mais culpa e violência. Tal constatação é verdadeira, mas não se justifica esquecer o passado porque este – do qual se quer fugir - ainda está vivo (ADORNO, 2010).

capaz de garantir quaisquer direitos” (ARENDT, 2012, p. 405). Essa consequência tem como causa a conjuntura estrutural, que possui certos elementos facilitadores, como a indiferença aos negócios públicos, neutralidade política, a apatia criada pela sociedade competitiva de consumo, tudo o que facilita o caminho para as massas aderirem ao totalitarismo (ARENDT, 2012).

O poder que mantém a existência do domínio público é aquele que só é efetivado onde se tem a palavra e o ato, “onde a palavra não é vazia e os atos não são brutais, onde as palavras não são empregadas para velar as intenções, mas para desvelar as realidades, e os atos não são usados para violar e destruir, mas para estabelecer relações e criar novas realidades” (ARENDT, 2018, p. 248).

Daí porque é importante a ação política para uma sociedade antitotalitária. Para isso, o juízo político (sobre uma política ética de cuidado com o mundo) precisa ser estimulado, o que vai de encontro com a atrofia – e até mesmo a fobia – ao “falar sobre política” pelos cidadãos brasileiros, fato esse comum em Estados antidemocráticos. O êxito de movimentos de cunho autoritário entre as massas se beneficia desta indiferença e demonização da vida política responsável (VERBICARO, 2021).

As artes e as humanidades são capazes de construir cidadãos alertas, atuantes, críticos ao fanatismo e à naturalização da opressão, são uma fundamentação e um complemento para as ciências econômicas, exatas e biológicas. Tais discutem a instrumentalização econômica, a compreensão dos impactos das novas tecnologias nas dinâmicas laborais e sociais, preparam o homem para observar e entender a complexidade da vida, permitem a percepção crítica e o conhecimento das desigualdades estruturais, da precarização das relações trabalhistas e dos serviços públicos de saúde (VERBICARO, 2021).

Então, deve-se ressignificar o passado de forma crítica, o que significa que é importante lembrar o que ocorreu para que não seja repetido. A educação das ciências humanas (educação política) permite a reflexão crítica sobre a compreensão dos fatos do passado e do próprio presente (ADORNO, 2010).

Em épocas de crises, como a que o Brasil vivencia nos últimos anos, faz-se necessário reforçar o valor das humanidades, porque a educação humanista é desbarbarizadora e esclarecedora, logo é uma das condições para a vida democrática, que busca o consenso e a empatia e conferem a percepção da sociedade sobre o luto coletivo na Pandemia, onde as vidas perdidas não são meras questões de estatísticas.

III. CONCLUSÃO

A partir da filosofia política de Hannah Arendt, analisou-se em que medida as artes e ciências

humanas são imprescindíveis para a formação de um espaço público democrático e de cidadãos críticos em tempos de crise política no Brasil. Nesta pesquisa, abordou-se o ato de pensar e julgar como elementos constitutivos das artes e humanidades, as quais perpetuam a história. Ao tratar da história, analisou-se a importância política da narrativa – salvaguardando a memória - e seus impactos na ação e o discurso para a formação do espaço público plural e da ação política.

Com o advento da modernidade, o problema passa a ser o vazio do domínio público que gera o declínio do espaço público e privado, formando o homem de massa, isolado e mais suscetível a fanatismos ideológicos. Se o única coisa que sobrevive é o trabalho, o mundo humano define - o homem apenas como *animal laborans* perde lugar no domínio político da ação e das coisas. Logo, o totalitarismo é autodestrutivo. A ação necessita do discurso, das narrativas e da história.

Nesse sentido, foi exposta a importância das artes nas relações humanas, constatando-se que a arte deve também denunciar as práticas de autoritarismo, e que não seja utilizada com a finalidade de se perpetuarem mitos e mentiras. A narrativa, nesse caso, é uma auxiliadora da capacidade humana de julgar sobre qual interpretação/posição o cidadão deve adotar. Então, uma das necessidades das artes e das ciências humanas é formar cidadãos com senso crítico e ativamente participativos da política. Esse é o perigo das artes e das humanidades, as quais precisam ser dominadas pelos movimentos de viés totalitários, visto que, os governos totalitários excluem os cidadãos do domínio público, reprovam a ação e o discurso, eliminam a pluralidade do espectro político e banalizam a humanidade.

Em seguida, foi traçado um paralelo entre as ideias de Hannah Arendt com a proliferação de ideias antidemocráticas defendidas por movimentos políticos no Brasil contemporâneo. Abordou-se o impacto dos resquícios do modelo neoliberal capitalista na função do Estado e na vida privada - ao beneficiar a ditadura do útil pelo homem supérfluo na sociedade do desempenho, com o esvaziamento das políticas públicas para correção de desigualdades e garantia de direitos.

Nesse ínterim, tratou-se da importância política da narrativa para a proliferação de ideais e movimentos de viés totalitário, os quais se utilizam dos discursos de ódio para implementar as guerras culturais em meio às massas digitais. Os discursos de ódio – baseados em preconceitos sociais - são usados como armas políticas para apontar inimigos e defender narrativas que deslegitimam fatos da historiografia e pesquisas científicas para sustentar teorias da conspiração. A ideologia do terror usa dos algoritmos para alimentar as bolhas digitais com Fake News, as quais são

responsáveis pelo incremento: da retórica antissistema/anti-intelectual/antipolítica; da relativização dos direitos humanos; da negação de problemas ambientais; da defesa de posições autoritárias e de um revisionismo histórico (com a exaltação de torturadores e de regimes militares ditatoriais) pelo governo brasileiro.

Esse fenômeno atinge outras proporções quando se refere à questão da implementação de medidas corretas de prevenção e tratamento das pessoas em meio à Pandemia de Covid-19 no Brasil. Os discursos conspiratórios foram usados como discurso oficial do Governo para a realização de políticas públicas falhas, fato que resultou em sérios riscos para a saúde pública – especialmente por desacreditar e recusar o uso das medidas devidas e das vacinas apropriadas. Mas o perigo da permanência dessas narrativas no domínio público brasileiro está na minimização da responsabilidade, acarretando a formação de um povo sem memórias, e, conseqüentemente, uma comunidade indisposta e incapaz de garantir direitos - apatia política facilita a adesão das massas a ideologias totalitárias. Destarte, pode se concluir que o poder democrático mantenedor da existência do domínio público é efetivado onde se tem a palavra e o ato plural. Diante disso, defendem-se as artes e as humanidades como elementos capazes de construir cidadãos críticos aos fanatismos e à naturalização da opressão – com a banalização da vida.

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Evaluating Prospective Homestay Families in the U.S. and New Approaches to Further Enrich the Exchange Student's Opinion of America

By Martha Falencik

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Executive Summary- Determining the level of effectiveness in exchange programs has become increasingly more important to evaluators. Likewise, bilateral connectivity between the host country's people & institutions and the exchange student have benefitted from recent recommendations of comprehensive evaluations. However, the homestay family factor of the exchange experience lags in this area. In that regard, exchange programs could improve significantly from a broader and deeper understanding of the homestay experience, as seen from the host's perspective. In fact, citizen diplomacy is alive and active in the host's homes. People to people contact in these intimate settings can form attitudes, sentiments, and emotional attachments that should be measured as a mode to improve citizen diplomacy practices. From the aptitude of the host family to their level of community engagement, several elements are key to an ambiance where the exchange student can better adapt, learn, interact, feel, think, express ideas, learn about customs and community, familiarize with the language, and overall enhance their experience, hence their opinion about their host country.

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"The shape of the world, a generation from now, will be influenced far more by how well we communicate the values of our society to others than by our military or diplomatic superiority."

Senator William Fulbright, 1964¹

I. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

a) *Identifying the Objective and Hypothesis of the Evaluation*

This data-gathering tool seeks to explore ways to attract new homestay families to exchange programs. It also seeks to develop better strategies and practices in the homestay environment which will in turn, enhance the exchange college student's (age 18-24) opinion of American values. The short-term desired outcome of this evaluation is to uncover important gaps regarding how-to-prepare-before-you-host-an-exchange-student practices. The desired intermediate outcome is that, once such gaps are rectified, homestay hosts will be better informed

about the important role they play as civilian diplomats in U.S. nation branding and global engagement. Such KPI's² as shared trust and dynamic people-to-people interactions with the exchange student would have to be measured, accordingly. Consequently, the long-term goal is that future comprehensive homestay evaluations stimulate better global relations through informed, purposeful, enriched experiences in youth exchange programs.

I predict that the "Possible Homestay Families" evaluation will expose a lack of knowledge on the respondent's part about the overarching purpose behind exchange programs. These families are mostly willing to host so that they can experience different cultures, foods, music, languages, faiths, even politics, but are unaware of their impact on the exchange students' ultimate opinion of American values, hence their long-term, global impact.

b) *Isolating the Target Audience*

Homestay families everywhere can range from two parents with kids to a widowed grandmother. According to Carleton College's website, "twenty-something couples, a single parent with grown children, large extended families, or a retired couple all constitute (prospective host) families."³ While any of these might be the case, generally, females, being the more nurturing, detail-oriented gender,⁴ are the ones making decisions such as hosting an exchange student. In that light, this survey will be sent to 75 randomly selected women homeowners. They live in different urban areas throughout the United States and are relatively close to colleges and universities. This target audience is ideal because women homeowners are more likely to set the tone in the homestay atmosphere.

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¹ "Evaluating and Measuring the Impact of Citizen Diplomacy: Current Status and Future Directions," IIE Briefing Paper, 2011. <https://www.iie.org/Research-and-Insights/Publications/Evaluating-Measuring-Impact-of-Citizen-Diplomacy>. Pp 3.

² What is a Key Performance Indicator (KPI)?

³ Homestays | Off-Campus Studies | Carleton College

⁴ Different Brains, Different Behaviors: Why Women Lead Differently Than Men | HuffPost

c) *Building questions*

The questions will be divided into 5 categories:

I. 1-2 <i>Introductory information</i> (number of members in your household, distance to nearest university/college.)
II. 3-10 <i>Background information</i> (ethnicity, age, second language spoken at home, religious affiliation, income level, education level, study abroad, travel abroad.)
III. 11-16 <i>Preferences</i> (willingness to attend workshops to improve exchange practices, level of community engagement, enjoyment and attendance of cultural activities, conditions that would make it more likely to consider hosting an exchange student, level of family outdoor activities, likelihood of contact with exchange student once they are back in their country of origin.)
IV. 17-19 <i>Open-ended</i> (family description, benefits of hosting an exchange student, sacrifices made by hosting an exchange student.)
V. 20 <i>Direct global engagement statement</i> (homestay family's level of confidence; their impact on exchange student's opinion of America, hence their global influence.)

The survey contains 10 multiple-choice, demographically-driven questions. It asks 6 multiple-choice questions which delve into the prospective homestay family's level of participation in their community and travels abroad. The 3 open-ended questions are structured in such a way that the participants share their personalized, homestay family's dynamics, as well as their expectations of an exchange program experience. The 20th question is formatted as multiple choice with the desired outcome of extracting a swift and honest answer about the respondent's family dynamics and how they see themselves as a conduit to improve global public opinion about American values.

d) *Attachments*

Below, pages 17 & 20, please find (a): the "Possible Homestay Survey" and (b): the evaluation participation letter, disseminated to 75 women-homeowner participants.

II. EVALUATION RESULTS

The dissemination of 75 "Possible Homestay Survey" emails took place on March 1, 2021. Of the 75, 43 began and completed the survey, with a completion rate of 57%. Of the 43 completed surveys, 23 respondents answered the three open-ended questions. *Explanation of percentages with glance analysis (in bold & single-spaced)*

a) *Questions 1-16*

Q1: *How many people live in your home?* 60% of respondents live in a household of three to four family members. 31% of respondents live in a household of four or more. Only 9% of respondents live in a household of less than two family members. *I easily assumed that a family of four would be most ideal for people-to-people connections. I thought that the exchange student would by default, have more than one age group to find interests with. As it turned out, some of the open-ended responses debunked my prediction.*

Q2: *What is the approximate distance to the nearest university/college to your home?* 55% of respondents live

within five miles of a university/college, 21% within 5-10 miles, and 23% of respondents live within 10-15 miles of said learning institutions. *Over half of these homes are within 5 miles to university/college, ideal for exchange students to ride a bicycle, bus, or walk to campus.*

Q3: *What is your racial identity?* 50% of respondents are Latino/Hispanic, 31% White, Caucasian, 7% Black, African American, 7% Asian, 2.5% Pacific Islander, and 2.5% American Indian, Alaskan Native. *Asked as a routine demographic question, the outlier (analyzed below), sparked an onslaught of unresolved issues.*

Q4: *What is your age bracket?* 50% of respondents are 40-50 years of age, 26% are 50-60 years of age, 14% are 60-70 years of age, and 10% are 30-40 years of age.

Q5: *Is there a second language spoken at home?* 50% of respondents answered yes, 50% answered no. *Although exchange students hope to sharpen their English language skills, a second language spoken at home can be a good source of cultural exchange. However, if English is not the homestay's primary language, it can be problematic for the exchange student's English immersion expectations.*

Q6: *Is religion important to you?* 55% of respondents said they gave religion a great deal of importance, 21% said a moderate amount, 15% said a lot, 7% said not at all, 2% said a little. *For clarity purposes, I should have specified how many religious events the participants attend per week or month. The question was asked with a three-fold intention. First, faith and religion can be a fascinating conversation base between different cultures. Second, religious settings can be a strategic people-to-people connection aside from academia. For instance, the exchange student can mingle with youth their age and find outlets to further their American experience. On the other hand, the homestay can become too persistent about church attendance and imposition of their own religious beliefs which can create negative tension between them and the exchange student.*

Q7: *What is your income level?* 29% of respondents have a \$100,000-\$150,000 annual income, 29% have a \$50,000-\$100,000 annual income, 26% have a

\$150,000-\$200,000 annual income, 7% have a \$200,000-\$250,000 annual income, 7% have over a \$250,000 annual income, and 3% have an annual income of less than \$50,000.

Q8: *What is your highest level of education?* 33% of respondents have a 4-year degree, 26% have a professional degree, 17% have a two-year degree, 12% have done some college, 10% have a doctorate, and 2% have at least a high school diploma. *National percentage comparison shows 35% of Americans have a four-year college education level, quite close to this survey's findings.*⁵

Q 9: *Have you studied abroad?* 78% of respondents have not, 22% have studied abroad. *The national comparison is 10%,⁶ giving away the more selective nature of this pool of respondents.*

Q10: *How much have you traveled abroad?* 38% of respondents have traveled a moderate amount, 28% have traveled a little, 17% not at all, 14% a lot, 3% a great deal. *This question should have been more specific about quantifying the amount of travel.*

Q11: *What is your level of community engagement?* 45% average, 19% somewhat above average, 19% somewhat below average, 12% far above average, 5% far below average. *A high level of community engagement can create interesting conversations about domestic and international topics around the dinner table.*

Q12: *How often do you attend cultural events?* 62% of respondents never do, 23% do quite often, 5% never do, and 5% of respondents attend cultural events very often. *I expected a higher number since these families live in culturally rich and accessible urban areas.*

Q13: *Which factor would more likely compel you to consider hosting an exchange student?* 60% of respondents said family enrichment would be the factor that would compel them to consider hosting an exchange student, 23% said financial compensation, and 17% said geography of student would be the leading factor. *This response was a relief at first. As the analysis evolved, it became obvious that the family enrichment, for lack of training, is quite one-sided. The families are not taking into consideration the grave importance of their influence abroad through what they teach the exchange student about America.*

Q14: *How effective would it be for you to attend workshops to improve exchange practices?* 26% of respondents said it would be moderately effective, 26% said it would be very effective, 22% said it would be extremely effective, 19% said it would be somewhat effective, and 7% said it would not be effective at all. *It is*

quite good to see the willingness in this very needed portion of exchange program planning. However, a more viable solution would probably be an online, 30 minute required course before hosting an exchange student.

Q15: *How much do you and/or your family enjoy family activities?* 52% of respondents said their family enjoys family activities at an average level, 43% said above average level, and 5% showed a below average level of enjoyment when it comes to family activities. *A good counter balance to the low cultural outings rating.*

Q16: *How likely are you to keep in contact with the exchange student once they are back in their country of origin?* 67% of respondents said they would somewhat likely stay in contact with the exchange student once back in their (the student's) country of origin, 24% said extremely likely, 9% neither likely nor unlikely. *This is an easy gateway of long-term engagement in each other's cultures and current binational sentiments.*

b) *Questions 17-19: Open-ended statements (abbreviated)*

Q17: *Describe your family*

1. We are a fun, loving family of 4, very involved with baseball.
2. We are loving, respectful, and good members of the community. Faith is an integral part of our lives.
3. My family is loving and hard working.
4. We enjoy other cultures, family, friends, and the outdoors.
5. We love experiencing new cultures through food and traveling to different countries.
6. My family is busy, but happy.
7. Loving, generous, and kind.
8. We are a family of 5. We enjoy local adventures, like hiking, camping, and trying new things. We are involved in the community through Boy Scouts of America and various sports teams.
9. My family consists of my husband, two adult daughters, and me. I really enjoy their company, energy, enthusiasm, and conversations.
10. Fun, friendly, active and God Centered. We love food and music.
11. Our family consists of two loving moms and one 13-year-old daughter. We are fun-loving, open-minded people, and we love new experiences.
12. Fun, kind, giving, outgoing, and loving.
13. Active, busy, noisy, multigenerational household. We enjoy sports. We love animals so we have a house full. Saxophone playing, random singing, video games, computer playing, and working out teenagers.
14. My family is kind, generous, and open-minded.
15. Our family is diverse not only in ethnicity but age span of kids. We are warm and inviting to people and love to share experiences together and with the people we love. We are loud, passionate, and

⁵ Educational attainment in the United States - Wikipedia

⁶ 55 Study Abroad Statistics [2021 Updated] (ivypanda.com)

adventurous. We are committed and hardworking. We love people!

16. Adventurous, hungry for new experiences, curious.
17. I would consider our family to be steadfast, loving, caring and supportive. I would also consider our family to be somewhat personality eclectic. Everyone is so different and we definitely have differing views. Our approaches to communication and conflict resolutions can vary.
18. We are a typical hard-working blue-collar family.
19. My family consists of my husband, two teenage kids, and myself. We are a close family with similar interests. We enjoy day trips to the beach, taking hikes, and playing sports together. We value education, family, friends, and faith.
20. My family is very small, we are very close.
21. I'm married with 3 sons.

I was surprised at the level of detail from these responses. Reoccurring themes are fun, loving, outdoor activities, and conversations. All these are great qualities for homestay hosts.

Q18: *What benefits do you think you would extract from hosting an exchange student?*

1. Gaining insight to other cultures and meeting new people.
2. Friendship and cultural exchange with someone from another culture.
3. It would teach us about other cultures.
4. Cultural enrichment for us, and for the students we would be hosting.
5. When I was young, my parents hosted exchange students. It was an amazing experience to meet new people and learn about different cultures. In high school, I was fortunate enough to become an exchange student in Japan. I had an awesome experience and met so many people! I would recommend it to all.
6. To learn about another culture, to provide a safe place for a potentially vulnerable person to stay in a country foreign to him/her/them, and to be ambassadors for our country and culture.
7. Teaching them our American life.
8. In my case, I would get someone from France so I could practice my French.
9. Sharing with an international community.
10. My family would love to learn about new cultures.
11. The benefits I see are two-fold: To be able to learn about other cultures in a very personal way and to be able to offer the opportunity for students from abroad to know the beauty and diversity of our beloved city/state.
12. Learn a new culture, a new language and explore new foods.
13. Cultural understanding and appreciation.
14. Learning about another culture and different traditions.

15. Sharing our American culture from our mixed family's perspective.
16. I have hosted homestay students from China. I really loved doing it. The students were always great. I enjoyed cooking for them, taking them shopping and site-seeing.
17. Who knows perhaps you can make a lifelong connection with this person and by doing so, that would definitely be a benefit.
18. To learn more about another person and their culture.
19. I learned about the Chinese, Korean, and Middle Eastern cultures. The students taught me about their spiritual beliefs and their foods.
20. We have hosted before. We introduced them to the things around our community that we love so much.
21. The host family can learn about the exchange student's country and customs and can share their customs with the student.

Out of 21 responses to this question, 10 vaguely touch on the cultural effect the host family might have on the exchange student. For example, cultural enrichment for the exchange student (4), being ambassadors of sorts (6), teaching them our American life (7), sharing with the international community (9), granting them an opportunity to see the beauty of our state (11), cultural understanding and appreciation of both parties (13), or fostering a life-long connection (17).

Q19: *What sacrifices do you think you would have to make when hosting an exchange student?*

1. Privacy.
2. The biggest sacrifice would be privacy.
3. Time and finances would also be a factor.
4. Maybe time.
5. Moving things out of one of our rooms to make space.
6. Space.
7. Space and time.
8. Getting to know them and helping them feel comfortable in their new environment.
9. Space and open-mindedness.
10. Changing our schedule would be a sacrifice.
11. Privacy.
12. Sacrifice privacy and time.
13. Comfort.
14. Space could be an issue.
15. Privacy and personal space would be the biggest sacrifice.
16. Space.
17. Time.
18. Privacy and comfort.
19. Privacy, space, time, parenting.
20. Space
21. Privacy.

Recurring themes of question 19 responses are privacy, time, and space.

c) *Question 20*

Q20: *Exchange experiences can improve U.S. public opinion in the student's country of origin.* 50% of respondents strongly agreed with this statement, 35% somewhat agreed, 15% neither agree nor disagreed, somewhat disagree and strongly disagree showed a 0% response.

d) *The outspoken outlier*

Box 1

I am a single mom who has raised three children. We identify as a black/African American family deeply rooted in California. Coming into my house you will see family photos, lots of books, artwork on the walls from black artists that depict black people, and pets. We live by equity and inclusion of ALL people. Humanity is the core of how the children were raised and how we all live. I work as a corporate executive.

I have traveled all over the US and internationally. There is tremendous value in traveling to different countries, so I see the benefit of exchange. It allows for families to learn about other cultures as well as the student to learn about not only American culture, but also black American culture if they were to stay with a family like ours. In some instances, as a black family, our dinner conversation may be a little different than non-black families because our day-to-day experiences and exposures are going to be different. Other than that, we are a regular family that agrees, disagrees, laughs, plays, studies, and many other things that families do. They get to be immersed in the language and culture of an urban American family.

I see very little sacrifice in having an exchange student.

Personal Feedback on Student Exchange Program: We had an exchange student from Germany who was welcomed into the family with open arms. The young lady really struggled in getting comfortable. She didn't want to socialize with us in the evening and spent most of her time in the room. I had a conversation with my daughter to try to get more insight. It became evident to me that the lady was uncomfortable because she was with a black family. I know that Germany is not a diverse country and different ethnicities are not prevalent in the country. Understandably, the program contact would not disclose the race or ethnicity to an exchange student, but maybe they should have. The young lady requested to leave our home. I know my daughter may have had certain feelings about that, but I am certain she never knew why. I did not share my thoughts with my daughter.

I am not sure if a black family as a host for exchange students is popular, but I would suspect not. I would suspect that most exchange students come from families with money and I would also suspect that most exchange students are from European countries or Asian countries. There are many assumptions that I have made based on our personal experience and I would love to see data that eliminates my assumptions. It would be great to see more black families in the exchange student program that can host non-black students who feel comfortable enough to stay with such a family in order to dispel some of the racist beliefs that non-Americans have about black American families.

I strategically asked this question last so I could quantify the respondents' reaction to the realization that homestay interactions are important in U.S. endeavors to improve global opinion.

III. FINAL EVALUATION ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Taking every response into consideration, be it multiple choice, open-ended, or the outlier, the pressing observation gathered from this survey was the general prospective homestay host's lack of knowledge regarding their integral participation in citizen diplomacy. The central recommendation concluded from the survey's results would be the implementation of prospective homestay host training by a team of experts *by whom?* and longitudinal study types of measuring success in the homestay piece of the exchange student's experience in the United States. A recent study on homestay training, "Homework before hosting: the importance of host-training for sustainable tourism development," found the biggest challenge to be that "hosts do not have the skills and knowledge for the purpose of the homestay concept ... this challenge could be overcome by host-training to a large extent."⁷

When it comes to comprehensive prospective homestay evaluations, public diplomacy practitioners walk in uncharted waters. Nevertheless, these types of evaluations are crucial in order for exchanges to have successful short-term, intermediate, and long-term outcomes. I came across a very straightforward theory of change illustration in an article for the Council of American Ambassadors website, a Spectrum of PD objectives with realistic timescale:⁸

⁷ Homework before homestay: The importance of host-training for sustainable tourism development (diva-portal.org)

⁸ Council of American Ambassadors






Figure 1

This TOC depicts exactly what my argument lays out. The results of the “Possible Homestay Survey” indicate favorable levels of people-to-people contact within their family units and communities. These ground-zero practices are often more trustworthy than the PD central offices, according to the council of American Ambassadors.⁹ They can be easily emulated in an exchange, once the homestay host is properly trained and becomes ‘aware’ of the civilian diplomacy task ahead. With ongoing training, PD practitioners would implement longitudinal measures to ensure that ‘interest’ in the homestay to stay engaged with the global community through exchanges is active, alive, and well. The “Possible Homestay Families” survey also shows that they would likely keep contact with the prospective exchange student, another great bit of raw material to train, measure, and gain successful global dividends. In addition, new exchanges and ongoing evaluations will aid in long-term attitude shifts, behavioral shifts, and the all-desired call to action in which homestays are completely immersed in civilian diplomacy. These factors further strengthen my argument that with proper training, the homestay family will add to their civilian diplomacy tool box and enhance global opinion about American values. *Are you saying that there usually is no training?*

A very high percentage of respondents in this survey thought that attendance in to workshops would indeed, improve exchange practices. This leads me to think that online training would even be more of a viable practicum to propose to homestay families. In fact, I should have formatted the question as online training instead of workshops being that “today, three quarters of Americans have broadband internet service at home,¹⁰ and that the current pandemic has allowed for digital engagement to be that much more evolved.

Financial compensation seemed to be the least compelling factor when considering becoming a

homestay family. However, an article about Australian homestays, “International education: homestay theory versus practice,” posits that in essence, running a homestay is running a business and as such, “it is their (the homestay’s) responsibility to ensure that they are adequately trained in areas of cross-cultural communication and conflict management.”¹¹ Looking back at my survey questions, I should have considered asking how the homestay would manage uncomfortable conversations and/or cultural differences with an exchange student. This could have shed some light on, not only how to diffuse these scenarios but, how to elevate tense conversations that can potentially turn into insightful moments that mark the exchange student’s perceptions of American values. On that note, training homestay families about this business transaction can be a relevant motivator to join future training and longitudinal measuring in order to tackle these kinds of complex, cross-cultural issues and turn them into successful cultural diplomacy.

I would be remiss not to touch on the survey’s outspoken outlier. This homestay would have served well from pre-hosting training unclear. By the open-ended responses, I can tell this which? is a competent, inclusive, engaging, charismatic, enthusiastic, and curious family. The fact that it is a black-American family should have added to the German exchange student’s American experience. Lack of training on both sides is likely to blame for the debacle. What a missed opportunity! It would be interesting to, in the near future, train a small focus group, two or three black-American homestays, and measure their success pre and post hosting an exchange. Long-term success would be much harder to measure but worth while exploring.

Contrasting the results against my initial hypothesis, I stand by my belief that training prospective homestays should not be neglected because it benefits not only the homestay family and the exchange student in question, but also the civilian diplomacy practices

⁹ Council of American Ambassadors

¹⁰ Demographics of Internet and Home Broadband Usage in the United States | Pew Research Center

¹¹ RIC03173.doc (psu.edu)

whose ripple effects improve global opinion about American values. In retrospect, I should have first requested the opinion of homestay practitioners and U.S. homestay companies as a way to gain further

insight to help broaden my perspective before formatting the survey questions but, overall, my predictions ring true and my recommendations should be considered. *Agree*

IV. ATTACHMENTS

a) "Possible Homestay Families Survey"



How many people live in your home?

1-2

3-4

4+

What is the approximate distance to the nearest university/college to your home?

5 miles or less

5-10 miles

10-15 miles

What is your racial identity?

- White, Caucasian,
- Black, African American
- American Indian, Alaska Native
- Latino, Hispanic
- Asian
- Pacific Islander

What is your age bracket?

- 30-40
- 41-50
- 51-60
- 61-70
- 71-80

Is there a second language spoken at home?

- Yes
- No

Is religion important to you?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all



What is your income level?

- Less than \$49,999
- \$50,000 - \$99,999
- \$100,000 - \$149,999
- \$150,000 - \$199,999
- \$200,000 - \$249,000
- \$250,000 or above

What is your highest level of education?

- Less than high school
- High school graduate
- Some college
- 2-year degree
- 4-year degree
- Professional degree
- Doctorate

Have you studied abroad?

- Yes
- No

How much have you traveled abroad?

- A great deal
- A lot
- A moderate amount
- A little
- None at all

What is your level of community engagement?

- Far above average
- Somewhat above average
- Average
- Somewhat below average
- Far below average

How often do you attend cultural events?

- Very often
- Quite often
- Rarely
- Never

Which factor would more likely compel you to consider hosting an exchange student?

Family enrichment

Geography of student

Financial compensation

How effective would it be for you to attend workshops to improve exchange practices?

- Extremely effective
- Very effective
- Moderately effective
- Slightly effective
- Not effective at all

How much do you and/or your family enjoy outdoor activities?

Above average

Average

Below average

How likely are you to keep in contact with the exchange student once they are back in their country of origin?

- Extremely likely
- Somewhat likely
- Neither likely nor unlikely
- Somewhat unlikely
- Extremely unlikely

How do you describe your family?

What benefits do you think you would extract from hosting an exchange student?

What sacrifices do you think you would have to make when hosting an exchange student?

Exchange experiences can improve U.S. public opinion in the student's country of origin.

- Strongly agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Strongly disagree

Survey Powered By Qualtrics



b) *Evaluation letter to participants*

Dear Fellow Women,

March 1, 2021

My name is Martha Falencik. I am a Masters of Public Diplomacy student at the University of Southern California, Annenberg School of Communication and Journalism. I covet your participation in an evaluation I am currently conducting for a required course on "Public Diplomacy and Evaluation." Due to my experience as host to many foreign exchange students over the years, as well as my own opportunity to study abroad, I have developed a keen interest in educational and cultural exchange programs. Through this survey, I hope to gain a deeper understanding of the conditions that would make it more likely for families to consider hosting exchange students, as well as better practices that would enhance the exchange students' experience in this country, hence their opinion about American values. This ONLINE survey will take less than 10 minutes of your day. Below, please find the link where you will answer 17 multiple choice questions and 3 open-ended ones. Please, keep in mind that this survey will not reach further than my professor and that any of the information given is strictly confidential.

Thank you so kindly for your willing participation. I look forward to your prompt responses. In fact, *I would request that you complete this evaluation by March 5, 2021.* Please, feel free to contact me with any concerns or questions at falencik@usc.edu or (562) 252-5890.

Best regards,

Martha Falencik

Master of Public Diplomacy Candidate I 2021

University of Southern California





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Rethinking Prebendialism in Nigeria's Socio-Political Process: The Implication for Democratisation of South- South Region

By Dr. Harrison Otuekong Ataide & Dr. Martins Tom Enebong

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Abstract- This study examines Godfathers' impacts in the Nigerian socio-political process and the implication on the nascent democracy in the South-South Region. The design was exploratory, and the study was descriptive, combining secondary data from books and the internet. The study uncovered that godfathers were patron-occupying state offices as "pre-bends." They became the "gate-keeper"; determines the development initiative to be followed, and employed benefactors of privileges. This study's findings also indicated that the state's character and the natures of politics in Nigeria had impacted negative values, which now threatens the very foundation of the country's blossoming democracy, leading to unhealthy rivalry and competition among godfathers to have control over state powers using their favoured political godsons and denies the electorates of their right to elect a generally acceptable candidate. This act renders no free and fair elections. Also, the struggle for control of state powers has resulted in electoral violence in Nigeria, either before, or during, or after elections.

Keywords: *politics, godfatherism, democracy, democratic governance.*

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 360199



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Rethinking Prebendialism in Nigeria's Socio-Political Process: The Implication for Democratisation of South- South Region

Dr. Harrison Otuekong Ataide ^α & Dr. Martins Tom Enebong ^ο

Abstract- This study examines Godfathers' impacts in the Nigerian socio-political process and the implication on the nascent democracy in the South-South Region. The design was exploratory, and the study was descriptive, combining secondary data from books and the internet. The study uncovered that godfathers were patron-occupying state offices as "pre-bends." They became the "gate-keeper"; determines the development initiative to be followed, and employed benefactors of privileges. This study's findings also indicated that the state's character and the natures of politics in Nigeria had impacted negative values, which now threatens the very foundation of the country's blossoming democracy, leading to unhealthy rivalry and competition among godfathers to have control over state powers using their favoured political godsons and denies the electorates of their right to elect a generally acceptable candidate. This act renders no free and fair elections. Also, the struggle for control of state powers has resulted in electoral violence in Nigeria, either before, or during, or after elections. The candid view of this study that godfatherism, as practised in Nigeria, is a potential threat to the sustenance of democracy. The study suggested attitudinal change and positive perception of politics by these groups of people.

Keywords: politics, godfatherism, democracy, democratic governance.

I. INTRODUCTION

With the advent of the independent and democratisation process, Nigerian states were crippled and bedevilled by multiple problems such as leadership problems, low institutional quality or poor economic performance, unconstitutional change of government, political violence, etcetera. The state's low quality or performance is because of godfatherism, among others (Kopecky, 2011). The marvel of godfatherism has become a plague in the body politics of Nigeria. With the attainment of political independence, Nigeria's democracy has remained grossly unstable since the country returned to democratic rule in 1999, politics becomes personalised, and patronage becomes essential to maintain power.

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Godfatherism and regionalism politics has featured obviously in Nigeria's independent political history. Godfatherism has its poking glitches numerous, and it is one of the most significant glitches facing the Nigerian political system. The problem is that the godson is a stooge to the fatherism as the adage goes that he pays the piper dictates the tune (Edigin, 2010:174). The godson's failure to meet the godfather's demands is meted with punitive measures to the extent of denial of re- election. Godfatherism's politics, which has affected the socio-economic country's socio-economic and political development heightened in 1999 politics.

In their study, Ohio & Ojo (2016:11) disclosed that democracy in Nigeria had not been fully established, as godfatherism has endangered the democratic process and the socio-economic lives of the citizenry. Godfathers is a condition in the Nigerian political process influencing against the democratic establishment, intending to satisfy their selfish interest. They manipulate the democratic system and its operational mode by overpowering public officeholders. A good example is power control exercised by the governor and council chairman, making their subordinates dance to their tone. These political fighters' activities have deprived the people of voting for their ideal applicants as their leaders. They have not led to a corresponding flourishing of fundamental liberal values that are critical to the survival of democracy; it has brought about the transmogrification of authoritarianism, pushing democratic consolidation in Nigeria to the background as a result of godfatherism, which negates peaceful coexistence, law and order, and all tenets of the democratic process by obstructing candidate selection and even executive assortment as the government is installed; which has also directly affected the political arrangement and the national economy of the nation.

The politics of godfatherism is not a new phenomenon in the political movements of Nigeria. However, since the return to democratic rule, the country witnessed a heightened tempo in godfatherism's politics that reduced government legitimacy and voided the citizens' electoral value. According to Oke (2011:36), godfatherism has come to assume a dangerous dimension due to politics' monetisation. Godfatherism is one of the foremost dangers of modern democracy, and ironically, it only survives with government support

bringing an unresponsive leadership". Ohiole, and Ojo (2016:11) averred that democracy in Nigeria is not fully established. The principle of godfatherism has endangered democratic process and the socio-economic lives of the citizens".

Godfathers in Nigeria are encouraged by their resolution to regulate public policies in favour of their concerns. For instance, the primary objective of political godfathers is nothing order than grasping control of the treasury of a state. The godfatherism in Nigerian politics is primarily concerned with appropriating government contracts, political/public appointments, and plundering the state's coffers. These godfathers are in an advantaged position to decide the political fate and confidence of candidates aspiring to hold political offices. As such, those that are not only seen but confirmed to be loyal are not given a ticket to be the flag bearer of the party. This action ensures that the godsons will be answerable to them when elected into power. Some contenders defect to other parties because of these conditions where they do not have such influential figures that exacerbate them from their political aspiration (Okolie, 2006:171).

From the preceding expression, it is crystal clear that democracy is a kind of competition among the state's elites for state political control of power in Nigeria as a disaster of democracy which is traced to the political elite's failure as a class. Since 1954, there has been a fusion of the elite such that the political elite also institutes both the economic and social elite. To be sure, the emergent political elite since 1954 has dominated the political territory to the exclusion of new candidates. The old elite has to control the political passage. Where they are not opposing political positions, they desire to constitute themselves as the power behind the curtain, thereby leading to the phenomenon of 'godfatherism (Uadiale, 2012:94).

The phenomenon of godfatherism became a permanent feature in Nigerian politics and has assumed the quest by those that hold the pedals of power to have those they can manipulate to succeed them may have been responsible for the phenomenon. Nigerian politicians like to perpetuate themselves in office and, as a result, prefer to have their surrogates take overpower. Most of these surrogates surrendered their bodies and souls and made themselves helpful tools to serve their godfathers' ambition. Since politics have become a sure path to quick, ill-gotten wealth, many falls for it. When the surrogates begin to assert their independence, the after-effects of the power struggle become ant-productive to governance.

The worst of this is the impact of godfatherism on the willing young legions of youths ready to lay down their lives to sustain the place of godfathers in politics, business, and arcane environments such as Churches, mosques, Lodges, traditional institutions, and the likes, to have access to the pie. The godfather phenomenon is

so profoundly seethed in the country that all sorts of schemes, spiritual and arcane enactments are required to keep acolytes, godsons, political associates, friends, and loafers in line. Today, there are cultural groups, interstate associations, and national bodies with massive budgets that fund the godfather enterprise, which burgeons, pillage, and lay the foundation for depleting state and nationwide resources, resulting in the country's slide into a failed state.

Perhaps, to situate the godfatherism phenomenon in the country, we must turn the hand of the clock to 2003-2007 during the Obasanjo administration. After serving two terms, he brought in a successor he thought he could influence. Hence, this perhaps introduced a bizarre and treacherous tradition that has been duplicated, replicated, and improved by acolytes to hold the country in a firm grip of terror, impoverishment, underdevelopment, which has destroyed the political system. That decision to choose someone that he could influence almost tore the country apart. Luckily, the doctrine of necessity was adopted, leading to Dr. Goodluck Jonathan's enthronement as President.

President Mohammadu Buhari himself is a product of many godfathers that pull him from all sides, leaving him confused in managing his economy and governance. It is disappointing that no lesson has been learned from Godfatherism's negative effect on the polity. Even after the man who sought to perpetuate himself in office saw his acolytes rebelled against him and went separate ways. Instead, the field of godfatherism has become widened and emboldened by power mongers to include kidnapping, thuggery, election malpractices, and indescribable vices in high places.

In the South-South, politics, like many other zones, has borne the brunt of godfatherism in politics in such a manner that the key players became a threat to the same people they were elected to govern. For instance, in Akwa Ibom state, the altercation between Governor Udom Emmanuel and his erstwhile godfather, Senator Godswill Akpabio, caused shocks in the state's politics almost plunged the state into violence 2019 polls. Matters came to a lull when Akpabio left for the All Progressives Congress (APC) for greener pasture.

In the Bayelsa state, godfatherism's influence, and attendant negative effect is inestimable. An emerging political culture was in the offering in the early days of the State, but Godfatherism influence from within and outside, in collaboration with godsons circumvented the political growth. Protest votes against Senator Douyi Diri, the candidate Governor Henry Dickson allegedly imposed on the People's Democratic Party (PDP), resulted in Chief David Lyon's victory, Timipre Sylva's surrogate in the polls only for the Supreme Court to overturn it in favour of the PDP. In Edo state, the fight against godfatherism's strong hands has

been the albatross pushing the state's development backward. For a time, the People's Democratic Party (PDP), having godfatherism as a culture in the state, was taught how not to force an unpopular candidate on the people in an election lost to APC. Nevertheless, the APC did not learn that lesson either, as recent political development in the state indicates. The APC government of Mr. Godwin Obiasike decamped to the PDP due to a godfather who became wild in a desperate effort to replace a godson that fell out of favour.

Rivers state is the playground of godfathers, head or tail. The hegemonic battles of godfathers in the state are akin to medieval Europe, wherein Kings and Queens fought among themselves for spoils and Lords and Princes fought for sports. Their wars have left the state divided in its ethnic composition, fragmented politically, socially, and economically; because the godfathers and their godsons are engaged in a battle of self-annihilation. Nothing can assuage them, and nothing can reconcile them. The trend is unarguably the same in Cross River and Delta states.

The implication is that the South-South zone is perpetually subjected to unnecessary political battles rubbing negatively on good governance. The political infighting within the states in the precinct has destabilized, any organised political structures in place. The South-South communities are loose and fragile with Republican tradition, devoid of a solid historical and centralised authority. Therefore, the region is open to all sorts of influences, the good, the bad, and the ugly, are capable of being deployed to other uses.

The Nigerian Nationalist leaders and some Nigerian federalism builders, Obafemi Awolowo, Nnamdi Azikiwe, and Ahmadu Bello, who become godfathers after independence, were lionised, respected, worshipped, and idolised (Fawole, 2001). While people tried to exaggerate their impacts, and their persons looks more ordinary.

Chukwuma (2008) remarked that the godfather settles to dictate 'who gets what, when, and how in distributing scarce resources after the elections have been contested and won. Therefore, godfathers' role goes beyond the votes; and gets pretty robust and more evident. A political godfather has the abilities and capabilities to manipulate the electoral process favouring his chosen godson.

Applying this concept in Nigeria has resulted in democratic failures and disasters, being a denial of electing credible candidates and the imposition of mediocre into political and appointed positions. The most important experience received was pains, poverty, misery, poor service delivery, squalor, poor service performance, and delivery among all godsons. The whole scenario focuses on as been the promotion of political follow-follow mentality and the empowerment of disempowerment.

The competition between members of the political class accounts for most of the election-related violence in Nigeria. Furthermore, the competition for power becomes intensified as politics is a "do-or-die" affair by the political class. Also, the godfathers' domineering role in the country's politics underwrites the weakness and susceptibility of the political assemblies and establishments in Nigeria.

These weak and vulnerable political structures and institutions lack the willpower to enhance and encourage democracy in Nigeria. These weaknesses and vulnerabilities are responsible for fragile and weak democracy and the absence of socio-political development in the South-South region. Therefore, the study's main thrust is to examine the phenomenon of "godfatherism" and its impacts on Nigerian body politics, particularly the socio-political process in the South-South democratisation Zone.

II. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Godfatherism in Nigeria is a growing concern for scholarly literature on the concept. The literature on godfatherism portrays varied views and opinions. Nevertheless, a general socio-political perspective attempts an incisive definition of the term (Williams, 2004). He stated that godfatherism is seen as a practice that entails the sustenance of political and social relationships in which the subordinate looks onto the superior for the propagation and fulfilment of positive roles, desires, and interactions which binds both together or in which both have an equal stake but with the boss determining what the subordinate gets in the process.

a) *Conceptual Framework*

Like any other terminology employed by social scientists, this concept of godfatherism is a jargon that is not easily defined. Some related concepts of godfather and godson need some explanation. The godfather is a kingmaker, mentor, boss, and principal. He is someone who has built unimaginable respect and followers (voters) in the community and possessed a well-organised political platform and general acceptance from the electorate that could secure victory for candidates of his choice" (4:269).

Godfatherism is an association formed between a superior and a subordinate, where the person in charge has some level of influence on the subordinate due to the boss status. In another dimension, godfatherism implies a mutual relationship between individuals to determine which one is superior and the other being a subordinate who relies wholly on his principal partner for favours to attain his life goals. In politics, godfatherism portrays a power-based relationship. For instance, Ukhun (2004) emphasises that the implicit feature of godfatherism is power. He stated that "...power is the determinant or fundamental

feature of godfatherism and the power could be economic, political, and spiritual, voodoo etcetera" (Ukhun, 2004).

Dickson (2006) also noted that the philosophy of godfather is grounded in the sociology of traditional Igbo society. He further showed evidence of a prevalent relationship between the superior called 'Nnam-ukwu' (my master) and the subordinate called 'Odibo' (the servant) in the Igbo tradition. It is also a situation in which the younger person is taken care of by a more mature and experienced person for economic, social, and moral maturity. Therefore, the role played by the man in this kind of relationship is akin to that of a godfather. Thus, the triple cases showcase above show those persons of lesser social status attach themselves to another person of higher social integrity, usually for economic benefits. However, this practice is not alien to Nigeria but is strange in replicating this practice into our political system.

The politics of godfathers was to 'anoint' a godson to win an election through the godfather's influence, using his wealth, political structure, and political experience of the godfather. Olawawa observed that the politics of godfather has far-reaching adverse effects on the democratisation process in Nigeria than elsewhere. This argument is still probable today. Godfathers in this context are said to be influential individuals in the society who determines 'who, what, when, and how power is exercised. Many godfathers in present-day Nigeria operate like mafia by displaying violent scheming and aggressive 'politicking,' coupled with manipulating devices to have their way by any means. Their philosophy relies on Machiavelli's slogan, 'the ends justify the means. Their reign crisscrossed all spheres of the society: academics, legal, political and religious environment. On the other hand, Godson referred to the beneficiary and recipient of the legacy of a godfather.

Several academic scholars have defined the term godfatherism according to their perception and understanding of the idea. Abioye (2007), cited in Eke and Osaghae, stated that godfatherism is "a term used in describing the relationship that exists between a godfather and a chosen godson; being a kind of politics whereby an influential person in a ruling party will assist someone, usually a godson, to emerge as the party's candidate at all cost, whether by hook or crook. The godfather will assist his godson in emerging victorious in the election whether he is a popular candidate or not. Scott (1972) stated that godfatherism is a special case of dyadic (two persons) who are largely instrumental friendship so that an individual of higher socioeconomic status (patron or godfather) uses his influence, position, and resources to provide security, protection, and benefits for a person of lower status (client or godson) to win, and who for his part, reciprocates by offering general support and assistance, including personal

services to the patron or godfather". Olawale (2005) noted that present-day godfatherism is a primordial tradition taken to a criminal extent. However, Ajayi observed that godfatherism thrives across the globe. There is hardly any state devoid of godfathers' existence and influence, but the level of such impact differs from place to place. In America, the political candidates wiggle around, seeks group and individual endorsements for their candidacy. In some other advanced societies, group influence and confirmation could be more valuable than a powerful individual could. The fact remains that a prominent member of society still influences the social order in their voting pattern; notwithstanding, the features of patron-client politics remain constant; with a disparity in power-sharing, existing in the context of face-to-face personal relationship, incorporating a wide range of socio-political and economic forms of exchange, displaying kickbacks, and considering cost-benefit theory availability of vote-giver and vote-accepter. The godfather and godson relationship is not free-floating but rather contractual, written and, spiritually sealed with an oath in a 'shrine' in Nigeria or elsewhere.

Onubi (2002) noted that democracy means "rule by the people" thus, it is a government of the people and the people. Therefore, it is the majority government. Agbaje (1999) stated that democracy is an idea, process (series of events leading to change or course of action) of the government system.

Democracy is a way of life of a people making free choices of what one does, where to live, and how he uses his earnings; the operation of the institutions, be it the home, the church, local, state, and federal government; leveraging on the right of justified property ownership; having equality of opportunity social justice and fairness; absence of social and class barriers, and the solution of mutual glitches through the exercise of the permitted will of the people.

Democracy, just like godfatherism, is a concept that is not amenable to definitional unanimity, more so as there exist several versions of it. Common among the types are the Athenian classical democracy, Marxists-Leninist democracy, Liberal democracy, and lately, Radical democratic conception, to mention a few. Democratic discussion is in controversies, ideally is true democracy, given scholars' divergence of views on the concept and practice of democracy. For the sake of this study, however, we are concerned with liberal democracy, otherwise known as representative democracy and how the politics of godfatherism in Nigeria impede it.

Democracy is discussed in a liberal perspective as a form of government of a popular representation; or a form of government wherein supreme power is with the people, who indirectly exercised authority through a system of representation and delegated authority periodically, being a representative constitutional

government". Therefore, democracy is a government of the people, exercised by the people and for the people. This kind is a liberal democracy with some universal values of a free press, openness, transparency of government, accountability, equity, respect for the rule of law and constitutionalism, inclusiveness, participatory, consensus-orientation, efficient service delivery, and effectiveness. Thus, the concept of democracy in Nigeria has been misconstrued with the mere civil rule because the practice has not witnessed freedom of choice, constituted authority, respect for the rule of law, sagacity, and service delivery.

El-Rufai (2003), cited in Eke and Osaghae, noted that Liberal democracy's general concern is to provide the framework for the aggregation of the long-term interest of the majority in channelling public resources in the pursuit of that interest.

However, where the custodians of Liberal democracy are corrupt in their aggregate interests, which exists and persists, then the chances of development targets are missed, and the 'Hobessian' society would eventually emerge. Therefore, societies that have adhered to minimum liberal democratic principles have raised their living standards to a guaranteed level by observing and complying with simple rules, including private sector-led growth, investment promotion, macro-economic stability, and fiscal discipline deregulation of financial markets, and anti-corruption measures. Eventually, these become a stable and predictable judicial system and internal security.

Democracy aims to promote a sound and egalitarian society using an integrated effort by the masses towards a better society (Ademolokun, 2000). Admittedly, the principle of democracy is the only mechanism through which the interest, well-being, rights, and lives of the citizenry are unquestionably protected and guaranteed (Attah Amana et al., 2009). Democracy as a form of government started in ancient Greece (Athens) (Mbachu, 1990). Although the constitution guarantees freedom to form and hold an opinion, the Nigerian situation is such that the competitors for power have taken control of an issue beyond their competence. They are making personal profits out of it at the expense of corporate existence, economic revival, and nation-state integration. In this vein, other factors such as political and economic equality, fraternal feelings are key issues for a successful working of the democratic system. In other words, a democratic government should not only be responsible or acceptable to the "demos"-people or the masses-but indeed, political power itself and its expression should emanate from the popular will.

Fundamentally, democracy is a set of institutions that fulfil two essential requirements:

- (a) Elicit the accurate judgment of countless people as to who should represent them, and how the country

has to be governed. This type of democracy means minimum universal suffrage, political parties, and the organisation of new voting in fair elections at relatively frequent intervals; and

- (b) To ensure that those selected by the community do what the voters wants them to do or else be replaced if they do otherwise; which means that the process of governance in a democratic rule is fundamentally a dialogue between the leaders and the led.

However, Sergent (1975) saw democracy as:

- (a) Citizens involvement in political decision making;
- (b) There exists some degree of equality among citizens;
- (c) Citizens retention of some degree of liberty, and freedom;
- (d) A system of representation; and
- (e) An electoral system of majority rule.

Therefore, democracy entrenches and expands, or seeks to entrench and expand, the citizens' rights, ability, and capacity in a given society. It is always the best form of government whereby people elect their leaders in society. That is, the people exercise their governing power either directly or through representatives periodically elected by them. It, therefore, means that democracy provides institutions for the expression and the supremacy of the people or popular will on key issues bordering on social and policymaking. Democracy is concerned with freedom, but it is not freedom to be irresponsible.

Ademolokun (2000) aims to enhance a sound and egalitarian society through the masses' integrated effort towards a better society. Despite the differences in conceptualisation and of democracy and its practices, Ojo (2006) noted that all versions of democracy (liberal or capitalist, socialist and African brand) share the fundamental objectives of "how to govern the society and that power is in the hands of the people.

In a similar dimension, Chafe (1994) argues that democracy means that the people are involved in running their political, socio-economic, and cultural affairs. Perhaps the most basic idea in a democracy is that people are equal and have an equal right to lend a voice to say who rules and how. Therefore, real political authority comes from the people, and administration is legal only when the ruled consent.

The citizens' well-being largely depends on the extent to which the democratic institution is sustained and strengthened. Bonnie and Khinde (2007) said, because of good governance, selfless leaders and mutual trust between the leaders and led could be guaranteed if the citizens solely engineer choice of who should govern the society at any given time on one hand and a steady and sustained democratic machinery on the other hand. Though, every nation has embraced the principle of democracy because it is the only



mechanism through which the interest, well-being, rights, and lives of the citizenry could be unquestionably protected and guaranteed.

b) *Theoretical Framework*

It is a universal spectacle in management and social sciences to investigate facts within a theory and not in a secluded method. Theoretical orientation exists basically in bridging all the proofs to investigation (Goode and Hatt, 1952). In an empirical or hypothetical study, it is necessary to develop a sound theory explaining the wise concepts and relationships of variables in a study. The most essentiality of theoretical insight in a study is also pigeon-hold in the fact that social science research is theory-based, and its operations are guided by relevant principles of human behaviour (Goode and Hatt, 1952).

This study adopts the elite theory in examining the overbearing influence of godfatherism on Nigerian nascent democratic experiences. Vilfredo Pareto developed the concept in 1935. The theory supposes that power rotates among the elites at the masses' expense. Pareto (1935) argued that the political elites always insulate and isolate themselves from their social order and, by so doing, can reproduce themselves from within the same order. They do not allow non-elites to join their membership. They, therefore, maintain a safe, functional distance from the rest of the people. They reproduce themselves on either an individual and selective basis in the same process, referred to as the "circulation of elites." Their yardstick for elite recruitment is often parochial, and the process is a manner that does not interfere with the traditional order of the dominant elite class. Pareto (2006) went further to argue that the predominant group often frustrates all efforts at a collective circulation of elites and would relatively support individual recruitment.

However, Mosca (1939) disagrees with Pareto that elite recruitment is only possible individually. Pareto believed in the possibility of one social class replacing another and posited that a non-elite member could join the elite class through 'collective social mobility; which refers to the status that people attain because of their social, economic, and professional efforts. Mosca (1939) also believes that there are already many societies are 'sub-elite. These people facilitate communication between the elite and the non-elite and are potential tools for relatively large-scale elite recruitment. This argument makes it possible for both sub- elite and non-elite to become recruited into Nigeria's elite political class. The elite theory sees elites as players governing the state and national resources and occupying key positions related to power networks (28). Thus, the elite class's perception is more carefully connected to "the Weberian knowledge of power, understood as the competence of executing one's will, even against the will of the general populous" (29:696).

Godfatherism serves as a medium for such selective elite recruitment in Nigeria. The resultant effects of the above in Nigeria polity are under-development, abject poverty, acute youth unemployment, poor health prospects, and misinterpretation of politics.

The elite theory's relevance to this study is its ability to justify how godfatherism's politics facilitate people's transition into the elite political class. Liberalism in Nigeria promotes radical elitist democracy and a money-inspired electioneering system, leaving the masses as 'onlookers' and denying Nigerians the much-needed institutional, socio-economic, and political advancement (4). The elite theory is very much concerned with structures, especially authority structures. It is the assumption that elite class action has a causal effect on the relationship between the state and society since the elites have greater influence/control than the masses. According to Mosca (1939), the elite theory points to the concentration of power in the hands of a minority group that 'perform all political functions, monopolise power, and enjoy the advantages that power brings.' Thus, public policy is the value and preferences of governing elites. The Nigerian polity represents a situation where the welfare of the citizenry is wholly mortgaged for the interests of a few politicians with their mentors (godfathers). Therefore, the voters are penurious, and the crooked rich-godfathers are enriching themselves the more.

III. EFFECT OF GODFATHERISM ON NIGERIA'S DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION

The emergence of godfatherism in Nigeria posed a serious threat to democratic dividends and good governance's socio-economic development and stability. One of the most disturbing and damaging influences in the Nigerian fourth republic godfatherism was the campaigning for a really free, fair, and credible electoral process. The electorates as its right elects who governs them and represent their interests freely.

Chukwuemeka (2012) stated that the privilege associated with electing people of their choice to govern them are denied when godfathers foisted candidates of their preference and imposed such on the generality of the people, which is unwholesome to the tenets of democratic rule.

When public officers are unaccountable to the people, who voted them into public office, invariably, the loyalty of such public officer tilted towards their godfathers; which action negates one of the critical characteristics of governance and democracy. This scenario is inimical to good administration and political stability, due process, transparency, accountability, and predicated the rule of law, in public affairs management. Godfatherism has robbed the citizens of the honour of enjoying the dividends of democracy because the government has become reluctant to initiate and

implement policies that would advance the well-being of the citizens' generality, and this was as a result of the fact that godfatherism in Nigeria was predatory. The primary motive of volunteering into politics was to acquire wealth (money) from the resources of government to which their godsons held sway (Chukwumeka, 2012).

Consequently, the financial resource accruable to the state from the federation account, was for the betterment of the citizens' living standards, and was of paramount interest.

In case godsons refuses to settle their godfathers as agreed, hell will let loose. We draw instances from the case of Alhaji Olusola Saraki and Rtd Navy Commodore Mohammed Lawal between 2003–2007; Senator RashidiLadoja of Oyo State and Alhaji Lamidi Adedibu between 2003 and 2007; Chief Chris Uba and Dr 209 Chris Ngige between 2003–2006; and from Abakaliki Local Government Area, Ebonyi State, between Hon. Emma Uguru and Mr. Matthew Uguru, the Chairman from 2007–2011, whose stories were awful and devastating (Joseph, Ibeogu & Nwankwo, 2014).

The endpoint and consequences of these (godfatherism) in our polity are that of deterioration in economic activities of the Education sector, the Agricultural and health sectors, housing and security challenges leading to political wrangling, and blockade of infrastructural development etcetera.

IV. IMPACTS OF GODFATHERISM ON NIGERIAN POLITICS

The role of the political godfather in Nigerian politics has also worsened the socio-economic conditions of Nigerians. The phenomenon has bred political corruption, widens the gap between the rich and poor, and increased Nigeria's unemployment. Again, a wide range of political literature asserts that socio-economic conditions such as poverty, unemployment, and social exclusion, inequality in income and wealth, and erratic economic growth are a potential threat to democracy. Corruption, poverty and lack of development were some of the reasons cited by the military government of General Muhammadu Buhari 1984-1985 when they overthrow the civilian administration of Alhaji Shehu Shagari 1979-1983.

- i. Godfatherism is the co-operating association and tendencies of both the godfather and the godson in looting and siphoning resources met for the state's development into their private pockets.
- ii. Godfatherism has led to placing people in various governmental positions who do not have the necessary leadership qualities to bring about good governance and development. The godfather sits at home, setting the pace of development and influencing government decisions on who gets what, when, and how.

- iii. Another major problem of godfatherism is developing self and his immediate family members, abandoning the voters, the constituencies, and the nation. Hence, the electorates being coerced to work and sacrifice towards achieving the godfather's ultimate interest.
- iv. Many of our jobless youths are into godfatherism's activities, and commits acts of political violence and thuggery through promises of employment or other forms of illegal government patronage that never come to reality at last.
- v. Godfatherism in all standards over the years has resulted in the subjugation of qualified voters through brutes. It has always contributed to the final resolution of most of our public policies, thereby stimulating the idea of "one citizen having a single vote."
- vi. Godfatherism has nearly thrived in repudiating Nigerian citizens the chance to shape the decisions that concern them. It has splintered our blossoming democratic ideas and philosophies, and the ordinary electorates with their votes to give rather than money reducing them to incapability.
- vii. Godfatherism in Nigerian politics and management regulates all elections and who contest, wins, and get nominated to positions of authority or appointed to diplomatic offices.

Godfatherism has also resulted in our national importance turning to favour their interest, making the National Assembly less archetypal and less receptive to the citizens' groanings.

Nigeria today has the worst unemployment problem, deplorable roads, transportation problems, miserable infrastructures, medical services, educational system and standards, epileptic power outage, and the average Nigerian living standard does not reflect the oil wealth of the nation. All these results from godfathers' activities collaborating with their godsons to siphoned resources met the country's overall infrastructural development.

V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

a) *Conclusions*

A preponderance of political literature views asserts a correlation between godfatherism and the survival of democracy (Aurrel, 2005). Aurel (2005), for example, observed that godfather is the greatest threat to democracy in developing countries. The high-profile assassinations, arsons, and clashes between and within a political party, kidnappings, violence in rallies, campaign grounds, thuggery, and rigging of elections are signs of the pitiable and friable condition of Nigeria's democracy. These activities often perpetrated by thugs of godfathers to create a sense of insecurity among the electorates and limit the political space. The apparent outcome is the low turn-out of voters (political 'apathy) and

the withdrawal of honest, sincere, and credible individuals from the political scene. Perhaps, this explains why we now have mediocre political leaders.

This paper has revealed that the politics of godfatherism impedes Nigeria's nascent democracy. It has gained prominence and assumed a dominant feature of electoral politics and governance in the country. Consequently, it encourages corruption, breeds acute unemployment, electoral malpractices, abject poverty, and political instability. The patron-client relationship modelled a prodigious threat to good governance and the socio-economic and political development and stability of democratic domination.

One of the most disturbing and damaging influences of godfatherism in Nigeria was in the sphere of creating none sincerely free, fair, and credible electoral process in which the electorates has the right to electing representative candidates of their choice into public offices.

At present, both the godfather and the godson see politics from this perspective, which informed why the godfather is willing to invest his capital and influence. It was necessary to adopt uncivilised methods to get his godson to control state resources that enable him to accumulate wealth even to the detriment of society. In this same vein, the godson also accepts his stooge status as he sees his position as a means for self-aggrandisement²³⁹. This perception of politics is detrimental to the growth and development of democracy and society at large.

Closely linked to the above is the power of the state. The state in the third world wields too much economic and political power, which explains the intense struggle by members of the political class with the sole purpose of controlling the state for personal benefits.

b) Recommendations

From this point of consensus, there is a need for steps to address the problem. Given this, the paper recommends as follows:

- i. There should be rules governing Nigerian politics, and politicians should obey them. Nigerians have the right to enjoy the dividends of democracy, and the federal government has a positive role to play in the realisation of set goals.
- ii. Laws banning godfatherism in Nigeria's politics be enacted.
- iii. This study posits that there is a need for the redefinition of our value system. There is the need for everyone to change one's perception of politics as a shortcut to personal wealth.
- iv. Nigeria needs a purposeful leadership that has a vision of how to place its citizens at the centre of the political project without recourse to the patron-client relationship and sees the attainment of political power not just for acquiring sake but as a means to

serve the interest of its people irrespective of their ethnic origin.

- v. The politics of godfatherism should be discouraged, and our democratic institution should evade the politics of godfatherism of central government policies and programmes.
- vi. There should be rules governing Nigerian politics, and politicians should obey them. Nigerians have the right to enjoy the dividends of democracy, and the federal government has constructive roles to play in safeguarding the realisation of this goal.
- vii. The Federal Government should create sustainable jobs. Thus, the only panacea for democracy in Nigeria is massive economic and infrastructure development, justice, equity, and fair play in line with federalism's tenets.

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Electoral Democracy, Security Concerns and *Street Litigations* in Nigeria

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Abstract- The contestation of elections is considered to have both conventional and unconventional elements. As a matter of fact, disputes are considered an inherent part of an election and electoral litigation is a common feature of most electoral processes. Nigeria is not an exception to this observable trend as elections are coterminous with brinkmanship and legal fireworks. However, *street Litigation*, a form of trial by public opinion whereby people revel in passing judgments on political cases outside the four walls of the courtroom, is an emerging practice in the country. Thus, it presents an interesting research scenario in post-election security and litigation. This paper interrogates election security issues in Nigeria particularly as they relate to people's grievances and concerns. It also examines the periodic electoral violence and its effects on the electoral process with special focus on the combustible nature of *street litigation* in the country.

Keywords: *election, democracy, street litigation, security.*

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Electoral Democracy, Security Concerns and Street Litigations in Nigeria

Mike Omilusi ^α & Sunday Adunmo ^σ

Abstract The contestation of elections is considered to have both conventional and unconventional elements. As a matter of fact, disputes are considered an inherent part of an election and electoral litigation is a common feature of most electoral processes. Nigeria is not an exception to this observable trend as elections are coterminous with brinkmanship and legal fireworks. However, *street Litigation*, a form of trial by public opinion whereby people revel in passing judgments on political cases outside the four walls of the courtroom, is an emerging practice in the country. Thus, it presents an interesting research scenario in post-election security and litigation. This paper interrogates election security issues in Nigeria particularly as they relate to people's grievances and concerns. It also examines the periodic electoral violence and its effects on the electoral process with special focus on the combustible nature of *street litigation* in the country.

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1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND CONTEXT

The connections between elections and conflict have not been studied in a systematic fashion using a generally accepted framework of analysis. Such a framework would serve to marry the insights of the researcher with the requirements of the practitioner (Fischer, 2002:30). However, political scientists and development theorists link free, fair and credible elections to democratic governance, peace and development. In brief, they argue that free, fair and credible elections provide the basis for the emergence of democratic, accountable and legitimate governments with the capacity to initiate and implement clearly articulated development programmes (Orji and Uzodi, 2012:6). In reality, election remains one of the leading notable sources of conflict in West African countries. In fact, the preparation or holding of elections or even the declaration of results are moments in the life of a nation that are prone to live tensions which often lead to confrontations that threaten political stability and peace (Hounkpe and Gueye, 2010).

Elections involve a set of activities leading to the selection of one or more persons out of many to serve in positions of authority in a society (Hounkpe and Gueye, 2010). An election is a decision-making process by which a population chooses an individual to hold a

formal office. It is also the usual mechanism by which modern representative democracy fills offices in the legislature, executive and sometimes in the judiciary, and for regional and local government; therefore, alternatives are the essence of elections. Miles (2015) posits that electoral participation is a means for public feedback about government performance that extends beyond the policy platforms of political parties. Viewed from this perspective, voting is one means for the public to express their consent to be governed, regardless of the electoral outcome.

In many societies today where ethnic, religious, racial or class divisions run deep, democratic competition does indeed inspire and inflame political violence. Violence is often a tool to wage political struggles-to exert power, rally supporters, destabilize opponents, or derail the prospect of elections altogether in an effort to gain total control of the machinery of government. This is a reality in Nigeria today where incidences of violence in ethno-religious and communal conflicts in some parts of the country have become a major national problem. This is in addition to violent conflicts arising from electoral contests by the political class. With regards to electioneering, the country's democracy has grossly been bedevilled by flawed elections at all levels of government, having more of imposed leaders than elected. Elections are conducted as a means of alternating power among the competing political gladiators, mostly in a violent manner that reflects desperation and barbarism. According to Crisis Group (2011 cited in Omilusi, 2015:9), politicians' use of armed militias or youth gangs as protection and to harass opponents, intimidate voters and snatch ballot boxes is an ingrained campaign pattern in parts of the country.

It has also been observed that democratic transitions are problematic. Although democracy is an indispensable goal, the process of introducing democratic practices is inherently troubled. Such processes rearrange political competition, alter structures and power relations, and often exacerbate social problems rather than ameliorating them. The actual process of political reform is destabilizing, and in the short term there may be real and direct threats to peace in democratizing societies as a result of the uncertainty and competition that democracy introduces into unsettled social environments, in particular at times of economic stress. Rapid or ill-considered

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democratization can also be conflict-inducing (IDEA, 2006:63).

More often than not, in the course of transitioning to democracy, conflict has become an integral feature of electoral processes. Such conflict takes various forms, from physical violence to the mere threat of violence, perpetrated by a variety of stakeholders against various stakeholders and assets, too often with the collusion of the very state institutions mandated to prevent it (IDEA, 2015:38). For a number of historical and practical reasons, political identification in Africa tends to be organised along ethno-regional lines and political parties often compete to be able to bring benefits to their client networks. The ethnicisation of politics, often reinforced by politicians themselves, promotes competition for access to resources, rather than the institutionalised compromise that theoretically characterises a democracy (Brown and Kaiser, 2007).

By analogy, the electoral security concept relates to keeping electoral processes safe and protected from harm (2015:22). Although the level of political and psychological tolerance of security threats varies from country to country and is dependent on a number of factors, the free expression of the will of the people can hardly be expected when elections take place under severe security threats. This principle can be assessed by the type and degree of violence in the political system (López-Pintor, 2011:11). Many states in Nigeria have organised suppliers of violence for hire, fed by high youth unemployment and easy availability of weapons: from cults, areas boys and local chapters of the National Union of Road Transport Workers in the south to radical and other armed groups in the far north. Many of Nigeria's ostensibly elected leaders, according to the Human Rights Watch, (2007:2) obtained their positions by demonstrating an ability to use corruption and political violence to prevail in sham elections.

In Africa, and particularly in Nigeria, political violence has often occurred at all stages of electioneering campaign. It has been a feature of Nigerian electoral history recorded as early as the pre-independence elections in the 1950s. It is usually intended to eliminate, intimidate, or otherwise subdue political opponents so as to obtain an advantage in the political process (Muzan, 2014:219). Also, religious and ethnic tensions in turn contribute to the problem of electoral violence. Since the emergence of the Fourth Republic, national, state and local elections have often been accompanied by violence, whether during the campaigns, at polling stations, after the results are announced or during "rerun" elections ordered by the courts. At the state level, politicians often mobilize youth gangs to intimidate voters and opponents, a problem that has fueled criminal activity.

This essay examines the post-election security issues in Nigeria particularly as they relate to people's grievances and concerns. It is structured into seven

sections. Section one introduces the subject matter and sets the background for the discussion. In section two, clarifications of the major concepts are made with a view to setting a theoretical platform for further discussion while section three explains the periodic ritual of combining ballots and bullets during elections and the effects of this on the electoral process. The fourth section analyses the nature and context of post-balloting grievances in the country while section five examines the involvement of the security agencies within the context of election conflicts. Section six interrogates how street litigations have been informally entrenched in the post-election petition tribunals in the country. Section six makes some recommendations on how the electoral process can be reformed to accommodate the globally acceptable best practices while the last section concludes the article.

II. CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATION

a) *Election Security*

Democratic political institutions are those designed to ensure the popular authorization of public officials, and their continuing accountability and responsiveness to citizens. Popular authorization is achieved through regular competitive elections according to universal secret ballot, which ensure voters a choice of candidates and policies and give them the opportunity to dismiss politicians who no longer command their confidence. The role of political parties in this context is to help focus electoral choice by aggregating policies into distinctive programmes, to help select suitable candidates for public office, and to provide the continuity necessary for ensuring that the governmental priorities endorsed by the electorate can be realized- Electoral choice and electoral control will, however, be frustrated where no clear separation is maintained between party and government, or where there is no independent body such as an electoral commission with the powers to ensure that elections are "free and fair" and that their results are accepted by all contestants (Beetham, 1998:24).

There are many versions of democracies around the world (e.g. electoral, consultative) and on-going debates about the extent to which "one size fits all" with regard to democracy. The process a country goes through in attempting to become more democratic is referred to as democratisation. In order for a country to be truly democratic, all of its citizens-men and women- must be empowered to participate fully in the governance process (as citizens, voters, advocates, civil servants, judges, elected officials, etc.). According to Oculi (2015:7), the electoral exercise is a major tool for linking massive numbers of citizens into a collective moment of reviewing performances by past officials and sending signals to future leaders about their needs and aspirations. Thus, locations of voting centres,

procedures for registration and casting of votes, become moments for civic education. However, introducing guns and brazen snatching of ballot boxes are meant to deflate this sense of power and assert the impunity of authoritarian rule.

Security is therefore, indispensable to the conduct of free, fair and credible elections. From the provision of basic security to voters at political party rallies and campaigns to ensuring that result forms are protected, the whole electoral process is circumscribed by security considerations. In view of the scale of general elections, the number of people involved, election materials that need to be moved, difficulty of the terrain to be traversed, as well as the physical locations that need to be protected, such an operation is complex. It represents logistics and planning challenge that require a wide range of stakeholders, processes, locations, and issues in time and space. Whether we are talking of electoral staff, voters, or other stakeholders such as candidates and their agents, parties, civil society organizations, domestic and international observer groups and security agencies themselves (Jega, 2011: xx-xx1).

Election security (as distinct from the broader concept of Electoral Security) is specific issue of securing elections through physical security (protection and safety of election facilities and materials facilities); personnel security (Election Management board and other stakeholders); information security (computers and communication equipment) and election events involving day of elections, campaign and meetings. It also covers adhoc logistic services offer during election period (Yoroms, n.d:11). Sisk (2008 cited in Oni et al, 2013:50) defines electoral security as the process of protecting electoral stakeholders such as voters, candidates, poll workers, media, and observers; electoral information such as vote results, registration data, and campaign material; electoral facilities such as polling stations and counting centers; and electoral events such as campaign rallies against death, damage, or disruption. While electoral conflict and violence can be defined as any random or organized act or threat to intimidate, physically harm, blackmail, or abuse a political stakeholder in seeking to determine, delay, or to otherwise influence an electoral process, election security can be defined as the process of protecting electoral stakeholders, information, facilities, and events (Fischer, 2002:3).

b) *Street Litigation*

Elections in Nigeria are today coterminous with brinkmanship and legal fireworks. Post-election dispute resolution at the tribunals is, therefore, a key activity which brings final closure of the electoral process (Nwangwu, 2015:23). But in effect, street litigation, as an emerging trend in the country, is a form of trial by public opinion, whereby people revel in passing own

judgments in political cases, away from and outside the four walls of the courtroom. It is fast assuming a worrisome dimension in the country, as express positions soon attract oppositions, and litigious individuals exchange fisticuffs, insisting on superiority of own lines of reasoning, which they then expect others to admit hook, line and sinker! Strangely, the trend has produced quite a number of self-styled lawyers and judges amongst teeming supporters of major partisan camps and their candidates who, at the moment, might be facing the crucible of the nation's judicial system.

The concept of street litigation would appear to be an alternative system of justice, one which seems to be in stark contrast to the conventional court system the world over. While the regular court is issue-based, evidence-oriented, and methodical, the court on the street is essentially centred upon sentiments, nourished via reputation/party affiliation, revenge, public shaming, and probable tendencies of the crowd. In street litigation, the conventionalities of judicial system, particularly regarding method and procedure, are in abeyance, law easily and readily yields way to 'good and plausible' stories and, even though facts sometimes matter, there are no known standards of accuracy; neither is there any adherence to any known rules of evidence. For those who partake in street litigation, being often sympathetic underdogs is more important than being fair, as arguments are measured, for the most part, in relation to litigants' reputation consequent upon which the court delivers what could be regarded as reputational justice. Comments and positions are judgmental, sentimental and value-laden!

In Nigeria today, the controversy surrounding the prosecution of election petitions as well as high profile cases of official corruption and the outrage at the verdict clearly shows the inherent dissimilarity between the business conducted in the court of law and the outright misrepresentation in the 'people's court' where perception is reality, and where caricature and hyperbole are preferred to thoughtful deliberation. Incidentally, these celebrity cases are usually politicised by demagogues (litigants themselves) who obtrusively resort to playing on the emotions of the public to advance their political cause.

It should be stated that, most often, the resort to violence is often born out of frustration with the normal channels of redressing electoral grievances, especially with the dominant role of incumbency considerations in the electoral process. Rarely are persons responsible for violence and crime in the course of elections arrested and brought to justice. This encourages the resort to self-help by those who feel cheated (Ugochukwu, 2013:560). It has become increasingly necessary to recognize street litigation for what it is - an alternative crowd-enabled system of justice quite different from the traditional court system. No doubt, street litigation is fraught with dangers. It is more often than not

characterised by warped ideas of law, illogical arguments and reasoning as well as slipshod conclusions over cases which are clearly subjective.

III. THE PERIODIC RITUAL OF COMBINING BALLOTS WITH BULLETS

While competitive elections – once unheard of in many African countries – have become more frequent, they pose a heightened threat of electoral violence, particularly in countries without the necessary political and technical infrastructure in place to prevent or mitigate election-related violence (Sweeney, 2014:3). Chayes (2014:2) posits that Nigeria is not the only country where corrupt elites that have bent the levers of power to the service of personal enrichment have retained their grip on power by means of electoral exercises that were anything but democratic. Patently rigged elections frequently lead to explosions of violence. Algeria's bloody civil war was ignited when the military cancelled a 1991 election the opposition was set to win. In Kenya, the August 2017 election recorded scores of deaths arising from the violence that erupted after the incumbent, President Uhuru Kenyatta, was declared winner. Three of the country's previous four elections were marred by violence, including the 2007-2008 election when 1,100 people were killed and 650,000 displaced.

It is a truism that elections offer political parties and civic groups an opportunity to mobilize and organize supporters and share alternative platforms with the public. They also serve to encourage political debate. Free and fair elections are indispensable to democracy. For an election to be free and fair, certain civil liberties, such as the freedoms of speech, association and assembly, are required. Peaceful and efficient transfers of political power are also important elements of a true democracy. Although nuances apply to the world's various democracies, certain principles and practices distinguish democratic government from other forms of government (Mohammed, 2011:14).

In Nigeria, electoral competition is fierce, as those holding political offices have easy and unregulated access to vast pots of cash. Africa's largest oil producer earns \$30 billion-40 billion a year from oil, much of it disbursed without strict accounting. That has attracted a lot of crooks into politics (The Economist, April 14, 2011). Political competitors often employ financial inducements, fraud, intimidation and violence to capture election and secure control. The weight of political "godfathers" shape rivalries and the relative strength of various factions in local and national contests. The readiness of elites to stroke communal anxieties and to sponsor armed groups aggravates insecurity while the misconduct of politicians and parties incites frustration among average citizens. There is strong evidence from polling data that communal

identities are sharpened during election times, and tend to recede between elections. Moreover, heightened competition often aligns with greater tolerance for violence, whether seen as a defensive or belligerent act (Lewis, 2011:12).

Politics encourages competition not only at the national level, but also at the state and local levels, where the same patronage system holds sway, making elections true 'all-or-nothing' contests that have resulted in violent clashes motivated by the quest for power and its advantages. These clashes have taken place both within parties, as political candidates seek their parties' nominations, and among parties vying for seats in government. The perception that elections are truly zero-sum contests for access to resources, combined with a culture of impunity, has encouraged the use of violence by politicians to secure electoral success (Hazen and Horne, 2007:6).

In addition to the presence of willing protesters and weak state capacity to provide security and law enforcement, inflammatory remarks/messages emanating from political leaders and shared by community members provide basis for eruption of violence (Orji and Uzodi, 2012:29). Also, the political process has always heightened the potential for violence at every level of government. This trend percolates the entire Nigerian State where political elites mobilize the pool of unemployed youths, often along ethnic, religious and party affiliations, as a vital political resource. This underscores the great value attached to the utility of violence in politics, with political and electoral success often indexed to the capacity to threaten or unleash violence. For instance, the acrimonious political environment before the 2015 general elections fundamentally deepened pre-existing regional divides in the country, with party leaders exploiting ethnic and religious identities to shore up support. This eventually led to fierce electioneering, inflammatory rhetoric and, unsurprisingly, politically motivated attacks on party activists in some states of the federation (Barrios and Luengo-Cabrera, 2015:2)

Electoral violence in the country is primarily due to the perception of politics and political office as investment and as an avenue for the acquisition of extraordinary wealth through corruption, which is otherwise not possible through any form of legitimate vocation and enterprise. As a result of this perception and reality, Nigerian politicians turn electioneering and elections into warfare in which violence and ethnic, religious and other forms of primordial sentiments and prejudices are employed (Alemika, 2011). Most often, in doing this, they mobilise the youth along ethnic sentiments. These politicians, according to Okoye et al (2012:12), do rally their subjects and explain failure in terms of ethnic victimization. These people are often used as instruments for retaliation, hostility, chaos, upheaval and protests. They explain that as most

politicians become increasingly successful, ethnic attribution decreases as source of anchor or explanation of fate. On the other hand, as these politicians are displaced from the centre or in high government positions, the higher the attribution of responsibility to ethnicity.

A couple of empirical studies from the multi-party 1990s (e.g. Lindberg 2003, Wantchekon 2003, Wolf 2003 cited in Lindberg, 2004:14) corroborate the persistence of patron-client relations in electoral politics in Africa. Competition for political power essentially becomes competition for access to state controlled resources that are often in the form of extractable natural resources. Political offices in both national and local governments are regarded as lucrative posts or ventures raising the stakes of political competition even higher. Those who assume positions of power do not want to leave office because it is one of the few areas where economic opportunities are available while those outside the power circles attempt to use whatever means possible to access these economic opportunities. Incumbent parties with access to state resources divert such resources for the purpose of winning the elections (Coexistence International, 2008:14). Darren Kew (2005:150) writes that “rigged elections, one-party states, abuse of power became the norm, forcing excluded groups to find other alternatives to protect their interests, such as military coups, secession, and revolution.”

Political scientists have established a link between the integrity of elections and the outbreak of electoral disputes and violence (Norris 2014). Since electoral processes are fundamentally about the attainment of political power, often in high-stakes contexts, they can be a catalyst for conflict. It is within these contexts that social tensions are elevated, often provoking violence. This is particularly true when the electoral process itself is not perceived to be free and fair, or when those seeking to retain or gain political power have no reservations about resorting to the use of violence (EISA, 2010:6).

Little wonder, Nigerian elections have continually recorded representation deficit since 1999 just as the incidence of electoral fraud has taken centre stage in the country (Omodia, 2009). Also, violence has remained a recurring feature of electoral politics in Nigeria. The tendency to rely on violence as a weapon of electoral competition is aggravated, among others, by two factors. First is the perception of state power by the governing elite as an end in itself rather than a means to an end. The second is the immensity and ubiquity of state power and its exclusive control of the forces of coercion. These two factors have combined to make state power rabidly attractive and thus political contest is reduced to warfare (Animashaun, 2010:13).

Rigging has been conventionally accepted as part of the system in a country where a party that has

more of the manipulative strength out-rigs others. Awopeju (2011 cited in Omilusi, 2014:158) observes that the outcomes of many elections have been so fiercely contested that the survival of the country and democracy has been jeopardized. This sad history of election fraud has serious implications for Nigeria’s political future because the phenomenon rather than declining, keeps growing and becoming more sophisticated with every succeeding election. The principal forms of election fraud or irregularities were perfected in the elections of 1964, 1965, 1979, 1983, 1999, 2003 and 2007. Ladan (2006:53) posits that election rigging is a criminal conduct of subverting an entire process through massive, organized fraud usually with the active participation of officials of the electoral body. Elections are usually characterised by all forms of electoral malpractices and irregularities such as the manipulation of the laws and processes guiding the conduct of elections to suit particular outcomes, constraining the access of some participants and the resources at their disposal to reach voters for campaign purposes prior to election day, as well as stuffing of ballot boxes with ballot papers well ahead of actual voting (Oni, 2014:82).

These are the usual features of an election in Nigeria such that every right thinking person begins to wonder if any election had ever taken place after the exercise. And these always lead to violence. Electoral violence has been variously described as the bane of democratic consolidation in Nigeria. The zero-sum game with which electoral process in the country is characterized has assumed a very dangerous dimension with all political gladiators preparing for an election just the same way soldiers would have prepared for a war- recruitment, training of armed political thugs, stock-piling of ammunition, provision of fake security agents’ uniforms, among others. The toll of electoral violence- in terms of number of lives lost, property destroyed and injuries sustained- continues to undermine the survival of the country’s democratic experiment. The armed militia, neighbourhood vigilante, community defense and sundry cult groups that have mushroomed in different parts of the country since the late 1990s also play a significant role in electoral violence.

With the approach of every election, some youths are hired by local politicians, while others undertake independent acts of violence to demonstrate their capacities and thus capture the attention of any politicians who may need their services. In an atmosphere of almost total impunity, a thriving market for political violence has developed. The rules of supply and demand for political assassinations, kidnappings and other strategies of intimidation are freely applied throughout the country; those willing to enter this competitive market have to prove their competency and

added value by using distinctive tactics and technology (International Crisis Group, 2007:11).

What actually worsens this “do or die” phenomenon is the money-making venture status that political office in Nigeria has assumed. Apart from the holders of political office viewing the opportunity from the lens of an unflinching attempt to permanently eradicate family poverty- by corruptly enriching themselves- government has since 1999 astronomically reviewed upward, their salaries and entitlements. Local government chairmen and councilors, for instance, are like small gods in their communities considering the volume of money at their disposal, more so that they are practically accountable to no one.

IV. THE NATURE AND CONTEXT OF VIOLENT GRIEVANCES

While every conflict will have its specific context and features, there is broad consensus that factors related to grievances over such things as discrimination or inequality are to blame for the rise in contemporary internal conflicts, as well as factors related to opportunistic elite behaviour in pursuit of power. The debate over ‘greed and grievance’ has been eclipsed by an appreciation that the two approaches are not unrelated. In situations of weak states, unequal distribution of resources, unstable social relations, a history of violence, and the existence of continually excluded subordinate groups, the emergence of mobilized resistance or ‘political entrepreneurs’ who organize for violent conflict is more likely to occur. The consequences may be political breakdown, civil war, inter-group riots, acts of violence, mass protests against the state, and in the worst instances crimes against humanity (IDEA, 2006:27).

The grievance perspective is by far the most popular way of looking at violence by social scientists. While there are internal differences in definitions, interpretations, and conceptualization, most grievance theories focus on how individual and group grievances could provide incentives for violent protests. The most influential account in this perspective is the frustration-aggression theory, which states that aggression is always the result of frustration; aggressive behaviours such as violent protests result from frustration individuals feel when they are restrained from achieving valued goals (Yates 1962, Berkowitz 1962 cited in Orji and Uzodi, 2012:25).

When an electoral process is perceived as unfair, unresponsive, or corrupt, its political legitimacy is compromised and stakeholders are motivated to go outside of the established norms to achieve their objectives. Electoral conflict and violence become tactics in political competition (Fischer, 2002:7). Not only does electoral conflict undermine fragile democracies and generate humanitarian disasters, it can also have

disproportionate effects upon vulnerable populations who are the victims of conflict, including the poor, women, and young people, and displaced populations (Norris et al, eds. 2015).

It is noted that majority rule and elections themselves can be conflict-inducing: many conflicts have been generated by fears and uncertainties surrounding elections. The electoral system chosen in a particular context is crucial, affecting several major aspects of the development of a conflicted country’s politics, in particular the way in which a majority is constituted, the types of political parties that develop, and thus their ability to cut across lines of conflict, and the chances of elections generating stable and inclusive governing coalitions (IDEA, 2006:77). The electoral process does not end with voters expressing their suffrage, meaning the polls. There is also the whole post-electoral stage that can also be marred by violence and insecurity. It is therefore a very delicate phase especially in fledging countries and democracies (Hounkpe and Gueye, 2010:26).

During elections, the state, through its agents, unleashes terror on the citizens and brazenly steal their mandate. With their mandate stolen, the citizens’ responses sometimes include street protests. The state’s routine responses to this crisis of governance include ordering the police to shoot on sight the protesters. Thus what usually started off as a civil and peaceful expression of discontent by the electorate would result in killings of innocent and unarmed youths by the police (Olurode, 2009:294).

Electoral processes that are fair, responsive, and honest can be similarly victimized by conflict and violence. In either scenario, stakeholders use conflict, violence, and threat as means to determine, delay, or otherwise influence the results of the election. However, when conflict or violence occurs, it is not a result of an electoral process, it is the breakdown of an electoral process (Fischer, 2002:2). If the credibility of an election outcome is in doubt, political parties and voters may be more likely to resort to violence. Thus, post-election violent grievances center around or stem from disputes challenging either the authority of electoral actors; the fairness of electoral procedures throughout the electoral cycle; and/or the legitimacy of outcomes and thus of those winning office (mistrust in announced electoral results).

Similarly, ruling parties skew electoral competition to their advantage through many methods, some more crude than others. They may obstruct the opposition and its supporters, pressure ordinary citizens, use state resources to support incumbents, stack electoral commissions with their stalwarts, or control the media. The regime may directly attack opposition candidates, sending police forces to detain them or thugs to assault or even kill them (Calingaert, 2009). Also, ruling parties often benefit from unbalanced

coverage on television and radio, particularly from national television stations, which are the principal source of news for many voters. Election laws and regulations may call for balanced media coverage during the election campaign, but they are often inadequate or poorly enforced (*ibid*).

When elections are blatantly rigged and mandate stolen, the people experience a sense of frustration, marginalization, alienation and anger. It therefore becomes difficult to mobilize the same people that had been cheated, disempowered and humiliated for development purposes in the midst of heightened mistrust between the state and society (Olurode, 2009:296). Electorates everywhere seek to protect their mandate whenever this is believed to have been fraudulently tampered with. Of course, different scenarios are thrown up between developed and developing countries when it comes to mandate protection (*ibid*:299). Nigeria, like any other African country, has gone through torture road to democracy since independence. The oppositions have fought hard through the ballot boxes and, until 2015, it has been difficult to defeat an incumbent in Nigerian politics.

In past elections, Human Rights Watch (see HRW, 2004:7) documented a number of cases of human rights abuses “carried out directly by members of the security forces, mostly by the police, particularly the paramilitary mobile police, acting in collusion with ruling party officials”. For example, the Justice Uwais’ Report on Electoral Reforms (2008) points out that in some instances, the leadership of the Nigerian Police Force often issue instructions against the opposition by not granting them permits to hold political rallies, encourage policemen on electoral duty to intimidate and harass people on the day of polling. The usual concern, particularly in the last 16 years of this political dispensation, has been the need for security services to strike a balance between providing sufficient security for voters and scaring them away from the polls by over-militarizing their approach. Diamond (2014) contends that democratic elections require a level playing field. That must mean freedom to campaign. And it must mean strict neutrality of all the instruments of state security. Some observers, according to Anyanya (2013:27) rated the performance of the security agencies in post-election violence as inadequate and perhaps reflective of insufficient reading and anticipation of the coming crisis, some kind of “intelligence failure”.

In many countries experiencing electoral crimes, a culture of impunity persists for crimes of electoral malfeasance and violence. Without penalties for electoral crimes codified in law, and application of such to cases of perpetrators of electoral crime, ‘election as warfare’ phenomenon will endure. Orji and Uzodi (2012:12) observe that the Nigerian legal system and law enforcement agencies are not able to arrest, prosecute, and convict offenders; as such, victims of

violence normally receive little or no redress. Members of the security forces implicated in violations of civil and political rights, including electoral violence, are also not usually held accountable. The awareness of the possibilities of getting away with acts of violence has fostered unabated continuation of those acts. The opportunity to engage in violence in Nigeria is also enhanced by the weak capacity of the Nigerian State to provide security and enforce laws.

V. SECURITY FORCES AND ELECTION CONFLICTS

The general apprehension usually generated over the deployment of security forces to the polling stations arise from the background of the compromised nature of the security forces (Yoroms, n.d:36). However, experiences or experiments as well as performance in terms of the participation of security forces in electoral processes vary depending on the country (Hounkpe and Gueye, 2010:8). It should be pointed out that credible election requires, among other things, a high degree of neutrality, alertness, and commitment of security personnel to maintaining law and order and ensuring the security of voters, candidates, and election materials.

A variety of institutions play significant roles in maintaining public order and security (Rosenau, Mushen, and McQuaid, 2015:10). Today, the security sector is made up of the Uniformed Services, namely, the armed forces (comprising the Nigerian Army, the Nigerian Navy, and the Nigerian Air Force in a number of countries), the Nigeria police force (or gendarmerie), the prisons service, paramilitary groups, militia, and a new institution dubbed the “National Security Agency” or “State Intelligence Service.” For the armed forces in Nigeria, according to Ikuomola (2011:483), the primary role of the service under the 1999 constitution is the defense of the country against external aggression, but throughout the history of the republic, the armed forces have frequently conducted internal security operations.

It is a fact that the role of security agencies during elections is quite important and necessary to the security of the electoral process. This role has always been played since the onset of elections in Nigeria (Laseinde, 2014: xxi). The following, according to Oni (2014: 83-84), are some crucial roles that security plays in the electoral process: safeguarding of lives and properties of citizens during the electoral process; ensuring the safety of electoral officers before, during, and after elections; providing security for candidates during rallies, congresses, conventions, electioneering campaigns, and elections; ensuring and preserving a free, fair, safe, and lawful atmosphere for campaigning by all parties and candidates without discrimination; maintaining peaceful conditions, law and order around the polling and counting centers; providing security for electoral officials at the voting and counting centers;

ensuring the security of election materials at the voting centers and during transportation; and ensuring the security of all electoral materials, personnel, and citizens during registration of voters, update, revision, and any other electoral event.

Security is crucial to electoral integrity, but security forces have traditionally done little to prevent rigging or violence and have often been bought by politicians (ICG, 2011). In past elections, particularly since 1999, according to Anyanya (2013), the performance of the security agencies in post-election violence has always been inadequate and perhaps reflective of insufficient reading and anticipation of the coming crisis, some kind of "intelligence failure." For instance, the 2015 election, in spite of this security arrangement, was conducted amid impunity and partisanship, exhibited at all levels. As aptly observed by Hassan (2014), the security agencies were viewed as partisan at the national and state levels. There were allegations of police patrol vehicles carrying political parties/candidates stickers in certain states. The inspector general of police was also accused of partisanship with his handling of the House of Representatives' impasse and failure to recognize the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Hon. Aminu Tambuwal, as the speaker. In addition, the spokesperson of the Department of State Service (DSS), Marilyn Ogar, was accused of partisanship following several unsubstantiated allegations against the APC, which included claiming the party tried to bribe the DSS during the Osun State governorship election of August 9, 2014. Similarly, she alleged that APC was a sponsor of the Boko Haram insurgency (Hassan, 2014). The effects of the poor involvement of the security forces in the electoral process can be considerable and can trigger or develop a feeling of mistrust within the populace and even political stakeholders, especially those who do not feel close to positions in the ruling executive (Hounkpe and Gueye, 2010).

In previous elections, gunmen were used by political paymasters to eliminate opponents, intimidate voters, and stuff ballot boxes (Burgis, n.d). Due to their vulnerable economic situation and frequent frustration with what they see as limited prospects for the future, youths are frequently targeted by political actors who use violence as a political tool (Ohman, 2014:77). Some militia groups of political parties camouflage themselves as youth wings; others are overtly militant with political affiliations (UNECA, 2013:154). Generally, electoral violence in Nigeria is carried out mostly by gangs whose members are openly recruited, financed, and, sometimes, armed by politicians, state officials, and party officials or their representatives (Aniekwe and Kushie, 2011:20). As earlier indicated, there is the usual compromise by the security agents to aid and abet electoral fraud.

As observed by Buba (2013), "there is connivance between politicians and security agents to disrupt polls in areas/polling stations where they have weak support. This is usually done by creating violence in order to get the election results in such areas cancelled. Or they can out right create security situations that will make conduct of elections in such areas impossible." In such chaotic instances, voters are usually wounded, maimed, or killed. It has always been a bitter experience for the survivors, particularly when perpetrators are not punished by the state. In 2009, for instance, after the re-run governorship election in the Ekiti state, an amputated leg of a party member was brought to the election tribunal as one of the exhibits tendered by the defunct Action Congress of Nigeria. In spite of the fact that the party won the case, no compensation was awarded the victim by the court. This increasing politicization of the military, as noted by Omotola and Nyuykonge (2015), represents another dangerous dimension, particularly as it relates to electioneering.

It should be noted however, that the military's illegal involvement in elections is almost as old as independent Nigeria. It was accused of being widely used between 1962 and 1965 in parts of the North and West by the defunct Northern People's Congress (NPC), the party in power at the center, and this precipitated the crises and violence that culminated in the first military coup in January 1966 and the consequential Nigerian civil war. Also in 1983, the military was accused by the opposition parties of being used by the defunct National Party of Nigeria (NPN) federal government to "steal" votes from opposition strongholds. The government that was sworn in on October 1, 1983 lasted only three months before it was overthrown (Vanguard, 2015).

VI. POST-ELECTION PARTY LOYALTY AND *STREET LITIGATIONS*¹ IN NIGERIA

The unofficial assessments and verdicts of the so-called common people upon performances of political actors in elections, including contestants and the electoral bodies, have been a lifelong experience and seem now to typify everyday life here! Factually, the trend among the populace of subjecting entire election process, including whole participants - contestants and electoral bodies - to scrutiny on street sides and relaxation centres seems to be on the ascendancy. This is especially so as it affords people channels to express

¹ This concept is adopted as a result of the authors' election monitoring engagement in Nigeria since 1999. We had watched party loyalists and other stakeholders after elections, holding informal public election tribunal at different forums and argue, as law practitioners would do, why the outcome of an election be nullified, candidates disqualified, a re-run ordered or results upheld. Such procedures are usually rowdy and thus, conflict-laden. Yet, everyone goes home with different verdicts, depending on which conclusion favours one.

views and dissatisfaction on election issues freely and without the harness of official strictures.

As party loyalists and self-styled pundits across divides engage one another on issues regarding outcomes of recently held elections or likely outcomes of prospective exercises, tempers rise, sensibilities get shaped and sharpened, and the critical mass access uncensored cubits upon particularities of elections. Queries here quite often revolve about who should win or should have won, but did not in an election, what laxities on the part of the election umpire aided or hindered desirable outcome(s), who among the contestants did what to tilt results in particular ways, and such other assessments on conducts of critical stakeholders as likely to impinge or have indeed impinged specific outcomes of an electoral exercise.

However, the reality seems particularly noticeable among party faithful and social commentators in the aftermath of every contentious electoral outcome that has characterised the nation's political trajectory since the beginning of the fourth republic; a situation in which, in many instances, the court, rather than the electorate, becomes the determiner of election winners or losers. Such street courts have often possessed a lifespan with the duration of electoral cases in courts/tribunals. But sometimes, it outlives them.

Often, violence erupts and free-for-all becomes a norm when arguments and counter-arguments proceed freely from rival camps of deeply partisan elements, goaded not just by liquor which may have found its way down the system, but essentially by very possible behind curtains' benefits of and from favoured camps of actual contestants who assess such developments either as affirming their relevance or carrying potential utility even at tribunals!

While low levels of violence which do not involve bodily harm or physical destruction of property are often noticeable, as in the case of intense debates/arguments by emotional rival party loyalists on electoral litigations, are sometimes noticeable and possible, subtle intimidation or threats of violence which proceed from and inherent in such gatherings are common and can go unnoticed across many communities where outcomes of election tribunals are speculated by die-hard party members. Many a time, if not properly moderated or contained on time by law enforcement arms, this type of argument can suddenly erupt, and has actually resulted in, fracas, causing security breaches, as have happened in many instances across the country.

Citizens are usually manipulated by political leaders who take advantage of staggering illiteracy and general ignorance among the populace, especially concerning important aspects of the electoral process. In many instances, even while they regularly attend court sessions (by staying around the premises), these

elements still depend on tainted report/brief from party stalwarts to form their own opinion and the basis of consequent arguments at other levels of engagement in their communities/wards.

For some of the youths among the debaters however, their level of education is an added advantage, as many of them are also members of free (newspaper) readers association. According to Oluwole (2014), newspaper stands "can be said to represent the proverbial African Village Squares which are supposed to be places for discussion, relaxation and reflection among members of the community". Many young and old people gather here to reflect and offer own opinions on newspaper headlines/stories. A critical period of electioneering turns such newsstands to street courts where issues of election tribunal are discussed and judgments passed upon parties in the exercise.

VII. ENSURING CREDIBLE ELECTORAL PROCESS

Competition and conflict are intrinsic to definitions of democracy. They are evident in the participation of citizens at the ballot box and in civic life, and the competition between candidates in elections for votes, those elected serving as representatives of the people in decision-making institutions. Democracy, defined as competition to secure majority rule, is an enduring concept in contemporary theory and practice, for good reason. However, democracy is not only about elections. It is also about distributive and social justice. If democracy fails to provide for justly distributed socio-economic development, human security is likely to be threatened.

For democracy to triumph, according to Diamond (2008) the natural predatory tendencies of rulers must be restrained by rigorous rules and impartial institutions. Some fundamental innovations are necessary to transform closed, predatory societies into open, democratic ones. Proponents of democracy both within troubled countries and in the international community must understand the problem and pursue the necessary reforms if they hope to restore the forward momentum of democracy in the world. Without fundamental reform of the electoral process, the same fraudulent practices and irregularities that deformed past elections will repeat themselves, perhaps in far more destructive and destabilizing levels.

As more citizens seek power, the level of competition and desperation will also increase, thus providing further impetus for electoral shenanigans and violence (Oko, 2009:57). A transparent vote count, high turnout, and professional election administration do matter. Corruption and vote-rigging can frustrate voters, and even trigger violent rioting and protests. But a more strategic and sustained focus on factors like gender inequality, poor leadership, refugee movements, or the

free flow of arms has a better shot at ensuring peaceful elections. Addressing these underlying drivers of violent conflict and changing the behaviour and attitudes of violent thugs or mischievous politicians, requires multi-year commitments (Claes, 2015).

Respect for the rule of law is another key pillar of democracy. It means that the same constitution and set of laws govern and protect everyone and that all citizens are equal. In January 2015, Professor Jega stated that, of the more than a thousand persons arrested for offences in the 2011 elections, about two hundred have been prosecuted. Thus, it has been recommended that a separate electoral offences tribunal with prosecutorial powers be created which will go a long way toward challenging the mindset that cheating at elections carries no consequences (Cooke and Downie, 2015:11).

To mitigate the security risks linked to the electoral process, every potential motivator of violence should also be identified, analysed, and assessed, and appropriate security plans should be established. Two types of security plans can be devised: a classic organization of the security forces within the regular chain of command, or the creation of a special force for the elections (such as in Togo in 2007 and Guinea in 2010). For both types of plans, legal requirements and regulations need to ensure the neutrality of the forces providing security and prevent abuse (IPI, 2011:10). Thus, as much as the relevance of security forces in electioneering may not be underestimated, a more civil approach/strategy should be factored into their operations with a view to ensuring a level playing ground and safety for all stakeholders in the electoral process. As a matter of fact, the early warning system to prevent post-election violence should be strengthened while security agencies need to improve on intelligence gathering.

Understanding the drivers of electoral violence helps to mitigate risk, promote aid effectiveness by helping to prioritize interventions, and build institutions which can encourage sustainable peace and stable states (Norris et al, 2015). It is, therefore, suggested that electoral security administration should be decentralized in order to be responsive to localized threats. Both civilian and security rapid response mechanisms should be established in order to deploy teams to hot spots and mediate electoral disputes or quell disturbances arising from post-election grievances. Also, election dispute mechanisms must be in place to adjudicate grievances and serve as a conflict prevention and resolution role in certifying the outcome of an election.

In order for elections to peacefully and credibly resolve the competition for governmental office and provide a genuine vehicle for the people to express their will as to who should have the authority and legitimacy to govern, governments must ensure equal protection under the laws on election-related rights, and effective

remedies when they are broken. Governments must take forceful steps to ensure the politically impartial and effective functioning of the whole range of state institutions, including public safety and security agencies, prosecutors and courts, as well as competent EMBs, to guarantee elections with integrity (Global Commission on Elections, Democracy and Security, 2012:40). Continued support of election management bodies and electoral systems will help alleviate suspicion and build trust among voters, thus reducing the chances for electoral violence.

Also, the military, police, and intelligence must be trained and equipped to wage the security response with the proper tools and strategy, and to target the use of force carefully and effectively. They must also be instructed and monitored to avoid needless civilian casualties, and they must be held accountable for violations of law and procedure (Diamond, 2014). Finally, due to the dynamism and complexity of electoral processes and election-related violence, electoral security efforts need to be tailored to address concerns relating to the specific electoral phases, the multiplicity of actors, and the motives and manifestations of threats.

VIII. CONCLUSION

It is established in this paper that elections since 1999 have been particularly characterised by instrumental use of violence. At the roots of electoral violence in Nigeria are several issues some of which do not have any direct relationship with the country's electoral process. These issues define the ways electoral violence can play out. It is noted that the opportunity to engage in violence in Nigeria is also enhanced by the weak capacity of the Nigerian State to provide security and enforce laws. In winner-take-all electoral systems like Nigeria, there is an *ipso facto* presumption that the losers will take little or nothing, which is often a legitimate concern. The stakes are seen as incredibly high, and there is a sense that one's economic future is directly tied to the success or failure of one's candidate. Thus, actively engaging political party leadership, party members, security forces and other stakeholders on the importance of peaceful elections is considered strategic in addressing post-election security issues. Such a task typically involves technical trainings on these stakeholders and a measure of diplomatic influence. However, while street courts may have become an unavoidable feature of the post-election security concerns in Nigeria, appropriate measures should be put in place by security forces to ensure such *street court proceedings* – which usually have the same duration with formal court cases on elections- do not resort to violence.

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
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Democratic Co-Optation and Electoral Risk in the Magdalena Medio Region. An Analysis of FARC-EP Post-Agreement

By Manuelita Barrios

Abstract- This article derived from a doctoral thesis, analyzes the way in which some clientelist practices of sectors of the traditional political elite and the actions of illegal armed actors: drug trafficking groups, FARC-EP, paramilitaries, ELN and GAO, have carried out co-optation processes in front of to political participation in Colombia, and more specifically in the 30 municipalities that make up the Magdalena Medio region, which is located between the departments of Antioquia, Santander, Bolívar and Cesar.

Keywords: political cooptation; democracy; political inequality; armed groups; electoral risk.

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DEMOCRATIC COOPTATION AND ELECTORAL RISK IN THE MAGDALENA MEDIO REGION AN ANALYSIS OF FARC EP POST AGREEMENT

Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:



Democratic Co-Optation and Electoral Risk in the Magdalena Medio Region. An Analysis of FARC-EP Post-Agreement

Cooptación Democrática Y Riesgo Electoral En La Región Del Magdalena Medio 2007-2019. Un Análisis Del Posacuerdo Con Las FARC-EP.

Manuelita Barrios

Resumen- Este artículo derivado de una tesis doctoral, analiza la forma como algunas prácticas clientelistas de sectores de la élite política tradicional y el accionar de actores armados ilegales: grupos de narcotraficantes, FARC-EP, paramilitares, ELN y GAO, han realizado procesos de cooptación frente a la participación política en la región del Magdalena Medio, que se sitúa entre los departamentos de Antioquia, Santander, Bolívar y Cesar. Este análisis se hace mediante un estudio cualitativo-documental, teniendo como base el empleo de mapas de riesgos electorales.

Palabras claves: cooptación política; democracia; desigualdad política; grupos armados; riesgo electoral.

Abstract This article derived from a doctoral thesis, analyzes the way in which some clientelist practices of sectors of the traditional political elite and the actions of illegal armed actors: drug trafficking groups, FARC-EP, paramilitaries, ELN and GAO, have carried out co-optation processes in front of to political participation in Colombia, and more specifically in the 30 municipalities that make up the Magdalena Medio region, which is located between the departments of Antioquia, Santander, Bolívar and Cesar.

Keywords: political cooptation; democracy; political inequality; armed groups; electoral risk.

I. INTRODUCCIÓN

Como hablar de democracia es hablar al mismo tiempo de política (Castoriadis 1998), este manuscrito tiene por objetivo principal, analizar la manera cómo la participación política ha sido cooptada en la región del Magdalena Medio¹, por las prácticas clientelistas de un amplio sector de la clase dirigente que se rehúsa a dejar el poder político, y también, por las acciones directas que han realizado grupos al margen de la ley como los narcotraficantes,

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¹ Conformada por 30 municipios: Regidor, Tiquisio, Río Viejo, Arenal, Morales, Santa Rosa del Sur, Simití, San Pablo, Cantagallo (departamento de Bolívar); La Gloria, Gamarra, Aguachica, San Martín, San Alberto (departamento de Cesar); Sabana de Torres, Rionegro, Puerto Wilches, Barrancabermeja, Betulia, San Vicente del Chucurí, El Carmen, Puerto Parra, Cimitarra, Simacota, Landázuri, El Peñón (Santander) y Yondó, Puerto Berrío y Puerto Nare (departamento de Antioquia)

las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) o paramilitares², el Ejército de Liberación Nacional (ELN) y los Grupos Armados Organizados (GAO).

Este análisis se hace a partir de tres categorías: 1) *de la democracia participativa a la cooptación de la democracia*, en la que se describe la forma cómo los grupos armados extralegales han cooptado la democracia y sometido las instituciones del Estado colombiano. 2) *riesgo electoral por factores de violencia en el Magdalena Medio (2007-2019)*, con las subcategorías: *presencia de grupos armados ilegales en la región del Magdalena Medio riesgo por desplazamiento forzado y riesgo por violencia política*, en la que se analiza mediante la geografía descriptiva los riesgos electorales presentados en las dos décadas del siglo XXI en la región objeto de estudio; y 3) *violencia y desigualdad política y social*, con la subcategoría *Índice de Pobreza Multidimensional y abstencionismo electoral*, la cual se centra en identificar el número de homicidios registrados en varios periodos, producto de la violencia política y la relación entre índice de pobreza y abstencionismo.

II. METODOLOGÍA

La metodología elegida fue la cartografía descriptiva, que permite visualizar la distribución espacial del comportamiento electoral, permitiendo ubicar dónde ocurre concretamente un fenómeno sociopolítico. Además, se puede utilizar para “comparar las dinámicas territoriales del voto, y para relacionarlas con otros procesos demográficos, económicos y socioculturales” (Sonnleitner 2013,113); y desde luego, para explorar la incidencia de los procesos socioculturales en la decisión de voto. Es así como la cartografía electoral permite “combinar métodos

² Las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP), y las Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) o paramilitares se desmovilizaron y se reintegraron a la vida civil; las AUC lo hicieron en el año 2006 y las FARC- EP en 2016.

tradicionales de la estadística y de la econometría con las herramientas de análisis de datos espaciales” (Sonnleitner 2013,113). Como instrumentos se utilizaron: el análisis documental (mapas de riesgos electorales, bases de datos electorales del Movimiento de Observación Electoral (MOE) y de la Registradora Nacional, así como la prensa escrita).

Los *mapas de riesgos electorales*, se usaron para ubicar geo-espacialmente el nivel de riesgo electoral por cada uno de los municipios de la región del Magdalena Medio, durante las elecciones locales y nacionales del periodo 2007-2019, Teniendo en cuenta la importancia de la variable del conflicto armado, en esta investigación se tuvo en cuenta los factores de riesgo que la MOE define como variables activas, que corresponden al contexto de violencia en el que se llevaron a cabo las elecciones: presencia de grupos armados ilegales, acciones unilaterales de grupos armados ilegales, desplazamiento forzado y víctimas de violencia política. Esto permitió evidenciar cómo variaron los riesgos electorales en cada uno de los periodos electorales, cuáles fueron los municipios más afectados, así como cuál grupo armado generó mayor grado de riesgo electoral, según el tipo de elecciones (locales o nacionales).

Para obtener los mapas de riesgo electoral, se utilizaron dos métodos: en primer lugar, se organizó la información en bases de datos según la categoría de estudio (riesgo electoral y resultados electorales por municipio); posteriormente, esta información se registró en el *software* ArcGIS, herramienta que permite elaborar mapas que integran información geográfica. A partir de lo anterior, se realizaron dos tipos de mapas, que contienen los riesgos y resultados electorales de elecciones locales, nacionales y del plebiscito en el periodo 2006-2019.

Se tomaron las bases de datos de riesgos electorales durante el periodo 2007-2019, a partir de las cuales se construyeron, por un lado, mapas consolidados que dan cuenta de los municipios que presentaron mayor frecuencia de riesgos por cada una de las variables activas; por otro lado, los periodos electorales que fueron más críticos, puesto que tuvieron un mayor número de municipios que presentaron riesgos. En este caso se clasificaron los riesgos como medio, alto y extremo.

III. DE LA DEMOCRACIA PARTICIPATIVA A LA COOPTACIÓN DE LA DEMOCRACIA

La democracia es un elemento fundamental de la política. Según (Castoriadis 1998), discutir acerca de ésta es hablar de política. En este sentido (Bobbio 1996, 14) la define como el “conjunto de reglas (primarias o fundamentales) que establecen quién está autorizado para tomar las decisiones colectivas y mediante cuáles procedimientos”. A partir de ello, el

autor plantea que esta es la regla fundamental de las mayorías, es decir, cuando una colectividad aprueba o desaprueba las decisiones a tomar.

Esto concuerda con la teoría tradicional de la democracia, la cual plantea que: “mientras mayor participación, mayor democracia y, por lo tanto, mejor gobierno.” (Molina Pérez e Ito Sugiyama 2010, 817). El tal sentido (Almagro 2016, 177) señala que “la existencia de una verdadera democracia está condicionada a la participación real e influyente del conjunto de los ciudadanos en la formación de la voluntad política” De esta manera, desde su concepción, la participación y la democracia son conceptos simbióticos. En concordancia con lo anterior, (Merino 2013) dice que la representación y la participación son un matrimonio indisoluble para la democracia, que se entrelaza de manera constante, principalmente a través del voto.

Sin embargo, dice (Pino 2017, 571) que debido al conflicto armado interno en Colombia “la democracia y la violencia política han sido dos fenómenos que se han desarrollado conjuntamente en los últimos sesenta años” No obstante, Colombia tiene ha tenido una de las democracias más sólidas al sortear los golpes militares y repeler la ofensiva insurgente, a pesar de que la violencia política y la democracia han establecido una simbiosis, con sus efectos y consecuencias (Pécaut 2001b).

De ahí la pregunta que se hace (Pizarro 2004, 206): “¿cómo explicar esta anormal convivencia entre estabilidad y violencia?” Porque la democracia puede ser compatible con el disenso y los conflictos en medio de la disputa por el poder político, pero no justifica todos los actos violentos. Pareciera que se ha naturalizado la violencia en el ejercicio de la participación política; por eso, para comprender el fenómeno de la cooptación democrática en Colombia, se deben analizar de manera paralela la incidencia que ha tenido la élite política y los grupos armados desde mediados del siglo XX—cuando surge la guerrilla, seguida de los paramilitares y narcotraficantes— que se extendieron por todo el país, teniendo injerencia en las corporaciones públicas, control del territorio y capturando la democracia en las regiones; afectado aquello que (Almagro 2016) llama “la existencia de una verdadera democracia”, ya que por diversos motivos se limita o restringe la participación política de los ciudadanos en sus territorios. Esta comprensión pasa por dos momentos: en el primero, se aborda la unión entre clientelismo y narcotráfico que imperó fuertemente en las décadas de los ochenta y los noventa; en el segundo, se analiza la incidencia de los grupos armados (paramilitares y guerrilla) en la democracia colombiana después de 1990.

En este orden de ideas, se puede clasificar el clientelismo y el narcotráfico como una primera forma

de cooptación de la democracia. Al respecto, (Medina 2010) explica el “matrimonio” que se dio, y aún permanece entre políticos y narcotraficantes para obtener y sostener el poder político en casi todo el territorio nacional, llegando a afirmar:

Si ya era bastante grave la situación cuando los caciques políticos y barones electorales sometían los aparatos administrativos del Estado en las respectivas entidades territoriales, disponían libremente de los cargos burocráticos, saqueaban y erosionaban los presupuestos, esto se profundiza cuando la capacidad de corrupción de la economía del narcotráfico penetra los territorios, corrompe la mentalidad de las élites económicas y políticas locales y regionales, infiltra y somete las instituciones del Estado encargadas de combatirlos, las somete a la lógica de sus intereses y se instala en los imaginarios populares a través de iniciativas de bienestar que le proporcionan reconocimiento y adhesión moral. (Medina 2010, 44)

En este sentido, es importante diferenciar, como lo hacen (Van Treek, y Yevenes Arevalo 2015), el concepto de “cooptación política” del de “clientelismo”: el primero tiene que ver con el control y el reparto de rentas menores del Estado en cabeza del poder central omnipotente. Es decir, la cooptación política en este caso es ejercida por la figura del presidencialismo o su gobierno con sus políticas públicas, donde el poder se centraliza y quita autonomía a los territorios de la periferia. El segundo concepto, el clientelismo, se centra en la compra de votos, las prácticas populistas o el uso patrimonialista de los beneficios del Estado para los grupos políticos y sus bases de apoyo.

En el caso de Colombia el concepto de cooptación política es más complejo, porque evidentemente hay decisiones, prácticas y políticas ejercidas desde el gobierno central que muchas veces auspician la cooptación de la autonomía de los entes territoriales, pese a que la Constitución Nacional, en su primer artículo, sostiene que Colombia es una nación participativa, pluralista, descentralizada y con autonomía en sus municipios, distritos y departamentos. Por eso, además de esta forma de cooptación ejercida desde el gobierno central se debe sumar, por un lado, la incidencia que han tenido grupos armados como las FARC-EP, el ELN, los paramilitares y los narcotraficantes, con el apoyo de una amplia clase política que ha establecido con ellos pactos o alianzas en los territorios periféricos y centros urbanos para mantener el poder político; por otro lado, está el hecho de que estos mismos grupos armados han considerado el poder político como un factor estratégico para justificar sus reivindicaciones subversivas y ganar legitimidad social (como en el caso de las guerrillas), o para obtener rentabilidad económica y apoyo estatal, político y civil, como es el caso de los narcotraficantes y paramilitares.

Lo anterior ha hecho que la participación democrática en Colombia sea cooptada por prácticas clientelistas de la élite política y por el accionar de

grupos de guerrillas, paramilitares y narcotraficantes; se podría decir que, recientemente, también por parte de los GAO³ en áreas metropolitanas y rurales. Por tanto, la diferencia que hacen (Van Treek y Yevenes Arevalo (2015) de las prácticas clientelistas de la cooptación política no es tan clara para la realidad colombiana, pues dadas las características del país, el clientelismo también hace parte de la cooptación de la democracia, en la medida en que con sus prácticas burocráticas de caciquismo ha incidido en el normal desarrollo de la democracia local, regional y nacional, que muchas veces ha exacerbado la violencia política, lo que a su vez limita los modelos de participación democrática mencionados por (Almagro 2016): el deliberativo, el directo y el pluralista.

Frente a esta realidad, muchos investigadores internos y externos al contexto colombiano han indicado que, la dinámica de los procesos políticos en el país se ha caracterizado por ser limitados y restringidos en varios momentos de la historia republicana. Uno de estos momentos fue el dominio que tuvo el Frente Nacional (1958-1974), en el que los partidos Liberal y Conservador se repartieron el gobierno y los poderes durante cuatro periodos gubernamentales, como una forma de resolución pacífica de la violencia armada que se venía llevando a cabo entre estos dos partidos desde 1946 (Pécaut 2001a; Pino 2017). Este dominio, según (Pino 2017), es una de las razones del surgimiento de los grupos armados, ya que en este periodo se configuraron nuevas formas de participación democrática excluyentes.

Esta restricción en la participación política que generó el Frente Nacional en la alternancia del poder político, únicamente entre dos partidos tradicionales, aumentó el fenómeno del clientelismo burocrático y, con ello, la cooptación del ejercicio democrático de varios sectores de la sociedad. A este clientelismo existente se le añaden sus relaciones cercanas con grupos armados para seguir asegurando la tenencia del poder.

La incidencia del clientelismo y de los diferentes grupos armados en Colombia es ampliamente abordada por (Medina 2010; Pino 2017; Duque 2013 y Pizarro 2004). Por ejemplo, (Medina 2010) explica que el auge del clientelismo de la clase política ha mezclado la democracia con la violencia política, afirmando que esta es una realidad surgida desde su nacimiento como Estado: “el país se movió desde los orígenes de la república en una órbita que gira frecuentemente entre la disputa política partidista, clientelar y corrupta y la confrontación militar sectaria” (Medina 2010, 43). Esta realidad de democracia y violencia política al profundizarse por décadas ha afectado la forma de hacer política en las regiones, apareciendo así el fenómeno de la cooptación política.

³ Anteriormente llamados Bandas Criminales

Que las prácticas clientelistas y los narcotraficantes hayan cooptado la democracia en Colombia es muestra de que las instituciones del Estado no han sido eficientes, dado que fueron permeadas por el narcotráfico; debido a esto, dice (Medina 2010), que el narcotráfico es una de las prácticas más corruptas que sobornó parte de la institucionalidad y que introdujo nuevas dinámicas al momento de hacer la política. La unión entre políticos y narcotraficantes instrumentalizó el poder público — legislativo, judicial y ejecutivo — mediante amenazas, intimidación, asesinatos y sobornos económicos, lo que afectó la participación democrática.

A esto lo llamó este mismo autor “captura del Estado”, ya que los tentáculos del narcotráfico se instalaron y se relacionaron con las élites políticas locales, regionales y nacionales para apoderarse de las alcaldías, gobernaciones, el Senado y la presidencia. Un ejemplo de la incidencia del narcotráfico en la alta esfera de la política nacional fue la elección del senador y narcotraficante Pablo Emilio Escobar Gaviria, jefe del Cartel de Medellín en los años ochenta, así como el sonado escándalo del Proceso 8000, donde narcotraficantes del Cartel de Valle financiaron la campaña presidencial del expresidente Ernesto Samper Pizano en 1994.

También la cooptación del narcotráfico se observa mediante el soborno, la intimidación, la amenaza y el asesinato de funcionarios públicos, con la finalidad de obtener favores conforme a sus intereses. Ello llevó incluso a decidir en algunos casos resultados electorales a favor de un determinado candidato; también encareció la forma de hacer política, al limitar la participación para aquellos que no tuvieran suficiente músculo económico. En consecuencia, es posible afirmar que el narcotráfico impuso formas alternativas de participación democrática que aún hoy se mantienen vigentes.

En tal sentido, afirma (Medina 2010, 48), “la capacidad de los recursos del narcotráfico ha permeado el conjunto de la sociedad colombiana en sectores estratégicos para el desarrollo de la vida social, económica y política”. Por su parte, (Duque 2013) dice que esta permeabilidad de la democracia se observa en la forma como estos actores extralegales interfirieron en los procesos electorales, mediante acciones coactivas de inducción del voto y de constreñimiento a la competencia que “afectaron las libertades de expresión, organización, asociación; la corrección en los procesos con prácticas de manipulación y fraude en los procedimientos de conteo y escrutinio” (Duque 2013, 26).

Lo grave es que este proceso de cooptación por las prácticas que utiliza, socava la legitimidad de las instituciones doblegando al mismo Estado, como pasó en la década de 1980 cuando grupos de

narcotraficantes con poder visible en la rama legislativa y judicial, trataron de someter al Estado colombiano a su voluntad, interés y caprichos, asesinando a políticos opositores, como es el caso del ex Ministro de Justicia de la época, Rodrigo Lara Bonilla (1984), a periodistas y policías. Al respecto, afirma (Medina 2010, 49):

El narcotráfico recurre a la corrupción blanda a través de un fluido amplio de dádivas económicas a funcionarios y empleados públicos, pero igualmente, no tiene ninguna dificultad para colocar en marcha mecanismos de intimidación y acción violenta como los utilizados por el Cartel de Medellín para doblegar al Estado a finales de la década de los 80.

Debido a ello, se comprende que la cooptación del sistema democrático colombiano es producto también de la debilidad de sus instituciones, puesto que se han dejado corromper no solo las tres ramas del poder público, sino también los organismos de control, la fuerza pública y los partidos políticos. Esto llevó a Duque (2013) a decir que lo que se ha presentado en el país es una deficiencia estatal:

En Colombia las deficiencias estatales se observan con la captura parcial por parte de actores ilegales y las características de los partidos políticos (la deformación de su tradicional función de representación, así como los vínculos establecidos por algunos de ellos y por congresistas y dirigentes locales entre otros, con organizaciones criminales) constituyen las variables que generan las limitaciones y los déficits centrales de la democracia, dándole el carácter de una democracia de submínimos, de subpoliarquía que, en la perspectiva de una democracia sin ley, se trata de una situación en la cual se combinan condiciones de ilegalidad con institucionalidad precaria. (Duque 2013, 28-29).

La unión entre la política y el narcotráfico en las décadas de los ochenta y los noventa a causa de la debilidad estatal permitió que la democracia se viera asediada (Pizarro, 2004; Pino, 2017), afectando no solo al régimen político sino también la participación política en las zonas periféricas y centros urbanos de Colombia. Por eso sostiene (Medina 2010, 48).

El poder corruptor de la mafia del narcotráfico que penetró toda la institucionalidad colombiana, transformó significativamente importantes procesos productivos y generó adhesiones sociales a través de sofisticados y burdos procesos de sometimiento de funcionarios e instituciones, dejó las intermediaciones para comprometer directamente élites tradicionales en inteligentes y planeados procesos de captura de dinámicos sectores de la economía y la política, haciéndolos partícipes directos de la industria del narcotráfico.

De esta relación entre la élite política y los narcotraficantes, surge desde 1990 hacia adelante una relación más estrecha entre líderes políticos y grupos armados como los paramilitares (Camacho Guizado, 1999; Dávila 2002), que viene a configurar el segundo momento de este apartado. En este sentido, (Medina 2010) recuerda que el origen de los paramilitares está

ligado con el surgimiento de grupos de narcotraficantes, lo que significó que las antiguas relaciones entre políticos con narcotraficantes pasaran a ser ahora más cercanas con estructuras paramilitares. Esta nueva relación entre la élite política y los paramilitares se da en plena apertura democrática; (Pino 2017) afirma que la apertura democrática que se vivió a finales de década de los ochenta y a comienzos de los noventa, dados los procesos de paz firmados con varios grupos armados, dio origen a procesos de descentralización y autonomía a las entidades territoriales: los gobernadores no eran elegidos por el ejecutivo nacional, y estos tampoco elegían a los alcaldes de su preferencia; lo anterior se daba mediante la participación del voto popular, lo que despertó celos en las diferentes castas políticas tradicionales.

Este celo de la élite política, movido por el marco de inclusión democrática que posibilitó la Constitución Política de 1991, al insertar mecanismos de participación con la finalidad de superar las restricciones que surgieron en la época de la Violencia y el Frente Nacional, condujo a que percibieran este proceso de apertura como algo que afectaba sus intereses en el mantenimiento del poder político, porque facilitó que sectores tradicionalmente excluidos propusieran candidatos o se presentaran a las corporaciones administrativas del Estado para elegir o ser elegidos. Esto desencadenó una alianza criminal que profundizó no solo la cooptación de la participación política y la institucional, sino que aumentó también la violencia política; en consecuencia, afirma (Pino Uribe 2017, 375):

La apertura política y las reformas de descentralización no terminaron con la violencia política, sino que esta se incrementó y el impacto de este tipo de violencia en el sistema político comenzó a ser visto como una amenaza central para el funcionamiento de la democracia.

A este hecho lo llamó (Medina 2010) coerción criminal del narco-paramilitarismo, pues a través de sus distintas estructuras sometió el poder local y regional por medio de la intimidación, el asesinato de políticos opositores, la inyección de grandes flujos de dinero a las campañas políticas, construyendo a electores para elegir a sus propios candidatos; para asegurar reconocimiento y así mantener el dominio territorial. Por eso apostilla este mismo autor:

La capacidad de coerción criminal del paramilitarismo a través de sus distintas estructuras fue sometiendo el poder local y regional, posesionándose a través de los funcionarios públicos y de elección popular, en el control de las instituciones, los planes y programas y los presupuestos públicos para colocarlos al servicio de sus propósitos de guerra, control territorial y enriquecimiento privado de sus comandantes. Las élites locales y los partidos políticos tradicionales y regionales les sirvieron para avanzar y consolidar el control de la institución estatal. Desde allí, comenzaron a distribuir puestos, adjudicar contratos y a

canalizar los recursos públicos para el beneficio personal. Su poder se extendió hasta consolidar mediante la intimidación armada fortines electorales homogeneizados por los mecanismos de violencia que fueron puestos al servicio de la clase política convertida en representante informal del paramilitarismo." (Medina 2010, 49-50)

Esto generó, según (Gutiérrez 2007), además de la violencia, un incremento de incertidumbre en las recientes fuerzas políticas excluidas que nacieron en medio de la apertura democrática, ya que percibieron amenazada su participación política y limitado el ejercicio de sus derechos civiles y políticos (Bejarano y Pizarro 1995), porque no tenían las garantías necesarias para hacer política. En este sentido, demuestra (Sánchez 1991) que la década de los noventa fue demasiado violenta: se asesinaron 72 candidatos que aspiraban a alcaldías; 92 concejales perdieron la vida junto a otros 14 funcionarios públicos; secuestraron a 100 personas, y 369 candidatos se vieron obligados a renunciar a sus aspiraciones políticas por intimidaciones por parte de los grupos armados.

Analizando estos hechos, (Bejarano 1996) afirman que la captura de la democracia por parte de los grupos paramilitares entorpeció el funcionamiento y el desarrollo natural del sistema electoral colombiano, ya que los únicos beneficiados fueron parte de la élite política y los paramilitares. Por esta razón (García 2007) al estudiar las relaciones entre políticos y paramilitares en algunas regiones llegó a concluir que los territorios con presencia paramilitar eran proclives a tener un aumento significativo de votación hacia los partidos tradicionales del agrado de este grupo armado. Por su parte, dice (Medina 2010) que los paramilitares utilizaron las alianzas políticas como una estrategia para ganar reconocimiento y legitimidad en el imaginario social colombiano, capturando las instituciones del Estado para asegurar impunidad frente a las actividades ilegales y, de esta manera, modificar el régimen político según sus intereses:

El narcoparamilitarismo comenzó a pensarse en el marco de una estrategia de captura del Estado como la única forma de asegurar los márgenes de impunidad para el desarrollo de sus actividades criminales y legales. Un modelo de sistema político mafioso capaz de permitirles moverse en los umbrales de lo legal y lo ilegal. Para ello era necesario infiltrar la institucionalidad hasta capturarla completamente, modificar el régimen político, garantizar su propio reconocimiento social e institucional como actor político incorporado "legalmente" a la sociedad. Los pactos de Santafé de Ralito, Chivoló y Pivijay constituyen parte de ese proyecto de captura estratégica del Estado dirigido en lo esencial a hacer viable la idea de refundar la Patria, construir un nuevo pacto social, fundar un nuevo Estado (Medina 2010, 50).

Se observa que la estrategia paramilitar que cooptó la democracia en Colombia y sus instituciones no solo obedecía a fines rentistas sino de control territorial, contemplando incluso la idea, según este



mismo autor, de establecer un nuevo *status quo* del sistema electoral y político en el país; por eso los pactos de Santafé de Ralito, Chivoló y Pivijay, entre congresistas, alcaldes, diputados y funcionarios públicos con paramilitares, para establecer distritos electorales y así asegurar el poder político y refundar el país, hacen parte de esa estrategia que restringió la participación política de muchos colombianos.

De modo similar las FARC-EP y el ELN, al igual que lo hicieron los narcotraficantes y los paramilitares, fueron actores armados que cooptaron la participación democrática en Colombia. Cuando (Pizarro2004, 229) afirma que “en decenas y decenas de municipios estos grupos armados solo permiten que puedan presentarse para cargo de elección popular quienes adhieran a sus proyectos políticos”, está haciendo referencia también a las FARC-EP y al ELN, que desde su expansión territorial desde mediados de los ochenta y con la apertura para la elección popular de gobernadores en la misma época, han incidido de forma directa en la dinámica política del país, puesto que, por un lado, “en las guerras de carácter revolucionario el interés estratégico del actor armado se centra en la posibilidad de controlar el poder político y el territorio con el fin último transformar el Estado y la sociedad” (Medina 2010, 50).

Por otro lado, no se puede olvidar que las FARC-EP y el ELN han sido actores armados cuyo nacimiento se debe a motivaciones políticas, por lo que se puede decir que su cercanía con la participación política es de vieja data, de ahí que sostenga el Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica-CNMH (2013) que para el caso de las FARC-EP, parte de su actividad ha influido en los poderes de la política local, en especial desde 1991 con la expedición de la Constitución Política que permitió la apertura democrática y descentralizó recursos directos para las administraciones locales y regionales, viendo esto las FARC-EP como una oportunidad estratégica para influir en las corporaciones públicas.

La actividad política de las FARC se mantuvo y cobró un nuevo impulso al tratar de influir en los poderes locales y regionales, buscando además responder a los desarrollos de la nueva Constitución, que introducía nuevos mecanismos para la participación en la política local y colocaba importantes recursos en los fiscos municipales. (CNMH 2013, 257)

La injerencia de las FARC-EP en las corporaciones públicas locales y regionales es una forma evidente de cooptación de la democracia, porque secuestraron, asesinaron, amedrentaron a políticos y funcionarios públicos y sabotearon procesos electorales (García, 2007). Esto demuestra que los intereses de las FARC-EP en los territorios no se redujo solamente a operaciones tácticas guerrilleras sino que:

Simultáneamente [las combinó con el] desarrollo de un modelo de control que les permitió cumplir con funciones de Estado. En algo más de quinientos municipios del país, las guerrillas lograron establecer unas relaciones de poder que les permitió controlar directa o indirectamente a los alcaldes (gobernadores), negociar con ellos los planes de desarrollo, el orden de prioridades de la inversión y los regímenes de contratación. (Medina 2010, 49)

Lo anterior le abrió la posibilidad a las FARC-EP para, en primer lugar, dejaran de estar confinadas en zonas de colonización donde inicialmente se desplazaron para disputar con fuerza el dominio territorial frente a la avanzada de los grupos paramilitares; en segundo lugar, cooptar las instituciones democráticas, mediante el saboteo electoral, las amenazas y el apoyo a candidatos de su preferencia conforme a su proyecto revolucionario. En este sentido, dice (Medina 2010) que organizaron redes de personas que respondieran a sus orientaciones e instalaron en los espacios decisivos de las administraciones públicas a contratistas, funcionarios y empleados públicos para obtener mayor poder político y control. No en vano dijo en su momento el máximo jefe de las FARC-EP, Manuel Marulanda en una entrevista retomada por (Aguilera 2013, 96):

Nosotros somos la autoridad en una gran parte del territorio nacional. Usted lo puede presenciar visualmente en todos los frentes nuestros. Usted va a una inspección de policía, llegan dos guerrilleros y el inspector les dice: tengo un problema y necesito que me lo ayuden a arreglar. La autoridad en estos territorios es de la guerrilla. Los alcaldes no pueden trabajar mientras no hablen con la guerrilla de cómo hacer un buen gobierno. En la práctica somos otro gobierno dentro del gobierno por eso estamos buscando el reconocimiento como fuerza beligerante.

Estas acciones de la guerrilla, que ellos justifican válida dentro de su proyecto revolucionario, generó resultados negativos para la participación democrática; al igual que lo hicieron los narcotraficantes y paramilitares, las FARC-EP limitaron la participación política de muchos ciudadanos en todo el territorio nacional donde ellos tenían presencia, ya que según Pino (2017) y Duque (2013) la intervención guerrillera cooptó varios niveles del régimen político donde el soborno y la corrupción se hizo evidente por parte de algunos funcionarios. Sostiene Medina (2010) al respecto:

La injerencia de las guerrillas en la gestión pública municipal y departamental fue adquiriendo nefastos resultados cuando detrás de los avales para ocupar cargos, gobernar o ejecutar contratos, se generaron procesos de enriquecimiento personal a través de prácticas corruptas de funcionarios, contratistas y trabajadores de la administración pública (amigos de la guerrilla) y, cuando la misma guerrilla, ávida de recursos para su sostenimiento, fue socavando los presupuestos municipales, las transferencias y las regalías a través de contratistas cooptados que se consumían los recursos de obras que

quedaron a mitad de camino o nunca fueron iniciadas. (Medina 2010, 51)

De lo anterior se infiere que, aunque en ocasiones las guerrillas asumieron el papel de órgano de control del Estado en algunas regiones periféricas, al pedir cuentas de las gestiones de los funcionarios públicos y contratistas, no se distancia mucho de las prácticas burocráticas y corruptas que emplearon otros actores armados que saquearon las finanzas públicas y restringieron la participación política.


IV. RIESGO ELECTORAL POR FACTORES DE VIOLENCIA EN EL MAGDALENA MEDIO (2007-2019)

La forma como algunas prácticas de las élites políticas y el accionar de grupos armados han cooptado la participación política en Colombia, permiten analizar este fenómeno también desde los mapas de riesgos electorales, pues, como se ha señalado, el surgimiento y expansión de estos grupos elevó los índices más altos de violencia que se han sentido también en las dos primeras décadas del siglo XXI.

Según la (Misión de Observatorio Electoral-MOE 2018, 31) por mucho tiempo “las instituciones

estatales sufrieron niveles preocupantes de debilidad e incapacidad, a la vez que las agrupaciones guerrilleras y paramilitares obtuvieron un poder insólito”. En este contexto, en 2006 se creó la MOE, la cual ha venido desarrollando mapas de riesgo electoral con el fin de identificar, prevenir y reaccionar ante los problemas que puedan afectar la normalidad de las elecciones.

A partir de ello, el Grupo Técnico de Mapas de Riesgo Electoral de la MOE, distinguió dos variables: activas y pasivas (ver figura 1). Las primeras, corresponden al contexto de violencia en el que se llevaron a cabo las elecciones, las cuales implican el efecto directo de los grupos armados ilegales, como el desplazamiento forzado y la violencia en contra de líderes sociales y periodistas. Las segundas, se refieren a las anomalías que se presentaron durante las elecciones que, por su atipicidad y su recurrencia, permiten inferir que se cometieron fraude electoral; de esta manera, “una afluencia exagerada de votantes puede deberse a formas de constreñimiento (presiones y amenazas sobre los electores) o de corrupción sobre los su fragantes (como la famosa compra de votos)” (MOE 2018,32).



Fuente: (MOE 2018).

Figura 1: Estructura de los Mapas de Riesgos Electoral

Tomando como base la metodología usada por la (MOE 2018), respecto a los riesgos de mapas electorales, en esta sección se analizó las variables activas relacionadas con las elecciones locales y nacionales entre 2007 y 2019. A partir de ello, se tomaron las bases de datos de riesgos electorales durante ese periodo, para construir por un lado, mapas consolidados que dan cuenta de los municipios, que presentaron mayor frecuencia de riesgos por cada una de las variables activas; por otro lado, para establecer los periodos electorales que fueron más críticos según la presencia de actores armados, puesto que tuvieron

un mayor número de municipios que presentaron riesgos, que se clasificaron como medio, alto y extremo.



a) Presencia de grupos armados ilegales en la región del Magdalena Medio

Las elecciones locales y nacionales entre 2007 y 2019 en la región del Magdalena, se han caracterizaron por tener presencia de grupos armados ilegales: FARC-EP, el ELN y los GAO, los cuales han realizado acciones violentas unilaterales o de combate en el marco de las elecciones.

El mayor riesgo electoral por presencia de las FARC-EP en la región del Magdalena Medio se dio en las elecciones locales de 2007 y las nacionales de 2010, en las que el 50% (15) y el 70% (21) de los municipios de la región, respectivamente, presentaron algún tipo de riesgo, mientras que se evidenció una disminución significativa en los posteriores procesos electorales. El municipio que presentó mayor riesgo consolidado durante este periodo fue San Pablo, ubicado al sur del departamento de Bolívar, seguido de los municipios de Simití y Arenal; en Antioquia, Yondó; en Santander, Barrancabermeja, y en el Cesar, Aguachica (Ver mapa 6). Según la (MOE 2011) la estrategia de este grupo armado ha apuntado más al



saboteo de las elecciones, bien sea por la realización de acciones armadas, la generación de problemas de orden público o la declaración de paros armados.

La disminución significativa de riesgo electoral a partir de las elecciones locales de 2011 está relacionada con el inicio de los diálogos de paz entre el gobierno de Juan Manuel Santos (2010-2018) y el grupo guerrillero FARC-EP. Esto generó el fenómeno que la (MOE 2018) denominó “riesgos por vacíos de poder” dejados por este grupo armado guerrillero, a partir de su desmovilización en 2016, los cuales fueron llenados por el ELN (ver mapa 1) y los GAO en lugar del Estado.



Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos de riesgo electoral de la (MOE 2007-2019)

Mapa 1: Riesgo consolidado por presencia de las FARC-EP. Elecciones locales-nacionales (2007-2019)



Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos de riesgo electoral de la (MOE 2007-2019).

Mapa 2: Riesgo consolidado por presencia del ELN. Elecciones locales-nacionales (2007-2019)



En concordancia con lo anterior, se identificó un aumento considerable de riesgos electorales por presencia del ELN en los municipios del Magdalena Medio, en especial durante el plebiscito. Los municipios del sur de Bolívar fueron los que presentaron mayor frecuencia de ocurrencia de este tipo de riesgo durante las elecciones 2007-2019, en particular: Morales, Simití, Santa Rosa del Sur, San Pablo y Cantagallo. En este territorio ha hecho presencia histórica el Frente de Guerra Darío de Jesús Ramírez Castro del ELN, el cual se caracterizó por dinamizar y promover la participación de las comunidades en los asuntos públicos, buscando “copar y penetrar las entidades administrativas y de gobierno regional y municipal para condicionarlo y bloquearlo” (Rangel 1999, 38). El ELN se ha caracterizado por llamar al abstencionismo; sin embargo, en las elecciones de 2010 manifestó sus intenciones de hacer proselitismo.

Por su parte, los GAO tuvieron su mayor incidencia en las elecciones nacionales de 2010, aun cuando se había logrado la desmovilización de las Auto Defensas Unidas de Colombia- AUC (paramilitares) en 2006, por lo cual se presentó riesgo en el 63% (19) de los municipios de la región; de estos Barrancabermeja fue el que tuvo mayor recurrencia de presentarse riesgos que afectarían las elecciones en el periodo 2007-2019 (ver mapa 3). Según la (MOE 2010, 113):

A partir de 2006, los nuevos grupos armados derivados del paramilitarismo se empezaron a constituir bajo diversos nombres a lo largo del territorio nacional, aún desarrollan ciertas actividades similares a las de sus antecesores en materia de violación de derechos humanos (homicidios, amenazas a líderes sociales, reclutamiento de menores, etc.), pero no en la misma escala que las autodefensas, básicamente porque la población ya se encuentra amedrentada con el control territorial que lograron obtener sus antecesores.

Por otro lado, llama la atención que mientras que el riesgo por presencia de GAO disminuyó de manera sustancial en el país, aumentó en los municipios de Santander y sur de Bolívar. Según la (MOE 2010, 113) “la mayor expresión de la interferencia electoral de las AUC fue la llamada parapoltica, que concentró su mayor expresión a partir del año 2000”. Cabe mencionar que los GAO se ubicaron en los municipios en los que tenían mayor presencia los grupos paramilitares, lo que facilitó que pudieran coaptar las elecciones, a partir del temor y miedo que se había generado hacia estos grupos. Es importante mencionar que, en un principio, estos grupos realizaron acciones armadas con el fin de presionar a los electores para que votaran por un grupo determinado; sin embargo, en las elecciones nacionales de 2010 su accionar se basó en la financiación de campañas y la coacción económica del votante. Lo anterior teniendo en cuenta los altos recursos obtenidos por parte del narcotráfico.

Según la (MOE 2010) existen tres razones por las que el riesgo por presencia de los GAO no ha sido tan explícito: primero, están ubicados en territorios en los que tienen una fuerte presencia; segundo, existe un grado de aceptación de la parapoltica; tercero, no ha sido fácil comprobar su financiación a las campañas políticas. Esto sumado al hecho de que no cuentan con una estructura formal que permita conocer, mediante un comunicado formal, sus intenciones políticas como sí lo hacen los grupos guerrilleros, por lo cual se considera que “el peligro está en que de alguna manera logren coaptar las instituciones mediante un bajo perfil armado, pero [con una] alta influencia económica” (MOE 2010,116).



Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos de riesgo electoral de la (MOE 2007-2019)

Mapa 3: Riesgo consolidado por presencia de los GAO. Elecciones locales-nacionales (2007-2019)

b) *Riesgo Por Desplazamiento Forzado*


Uno de los mayores indicadores de cooptación política es el desplazamiento forzado. Según la (MOE 2010, 130): “los desplazados no tienen garantías para ejercer el derecho al voto en las zonas de las cuales fueron expulsados por hechos de violencia asociados al conflicto armado interno, y no tienen facilidades para votar en las ciudades en las que se refugian”. Esto es preocupante porque en la región del Magdalena Medio, en el periodo 1994-2006, fueron expulsadas 103.564 personas por parte de los grupos armados (Dávila 2007).

Lo anterior motivó a que se revisaron los datos de desplazamiento forzado en las elecciones durante el periodo 2007-2019 con base en dos índices, el de intensidad y de presión, estos permiten medir el impacto que ejerce el desplazamiento sobre los municipios: el primero mide el número de personas expulsadas sobre el total de la población del municipio por cada mil habitantes; el segundo mide el número de personas que llegan a un municipio sobre la población por cada mil habitantes.

En ese sentido, se halló que las elecciones de 2007 fueron las que presentaron el mayor número de


personas expulsadas en la región del Magdalena Medio, con mayor intensidad en el municipio Cantagallo (199), seguido de San Pablo (165), Yondó (105) y Simití (87) (ver figura 2). En este periodo también se registró el mayor número de recepción de personas desplazadas, principalmente en el municipio de San Pablo (118), seguido de Santa Rosa del Sur (44), Puerto Parra (41) y Barrancabermeja (40) (ver figura 3).

Sin embargo, llama la atención que los municipios de San Pablo y Landázuri fueron los únicos que registraron un riesgo electoral por desplazamiento forzado en 2007, mientras que en las elecciones de 2015 fue más notorio el riesgo electoral por esta problemática. Por otro lado, se identificó que no hay una relación directa entre esta problemática y el porcentaje de abstencionismo en las elecciones locales de 2007, puesto que hubo una mayor abstención en los municipios en los que se evidenciaron menores índices de desplazamiento forzado, como es el caso de San Vicente de Chucurí, Río Viejo y Puerto Berrío, los cuales presentaron un porcentaje de abstención del 55%, el 54% y el 53%, respectivamente.



Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos del (Registro Nacional de Información 2007-2019).

Figura 2: Índice de intensidad municipios del Magdalena Medio (2007-2019)




Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos del (Registro Nacional de Información 2007-2019).

Figura 3: Índice de presión municipios del Magdalena Medio (2007-2019)

Estos resultados permiten identificar la presencia de los grupos armados ilegales en los municipios de la región del Magdalena Medio, lo cual se evidencia en los altos índices de desplazamiento forzado; sin embargo esto no fue óbice para limitar la participación de la población en las urnas. Esto se

puede verificar en mayor medida en el municipio de Cantagallo, el cual en 2007 tuvo un índice de intensidad de desplazamiento forzado de 199 y un porcentaje de abstencionismo del 26% (Ver figura 4).





Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos del (Registro de Nacional de Información y la Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil 2007).

Figura 4: Índice de intensidad y presión de desplazamiento forzado vs porcentaje de abstención elecciones locales (2007)

San Pablo fue el municipio que registró mayor frecuencia de ocurrencia de riesgos electorales en el periodo 2007-2019, al mismo tiempo que fue el municipio que recibió el mayor número de personas desplazadas y el segundo que expulsó la mayor cantidad. Esto está relacionado con la disputa territorial entre los grupos armados en este territorio. Los

periodos electorales que presentaron mayor cantidad de municipios en riesgo por desplazamiento forzado fueron las elecciones locales de 2015 y 2019, lo cual coincide con los riesgos electorales por la presencia del ELN en este territorio (Ver mapa 4).





Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos de riesgo electoral de la (MOE 2007-2019).

Mapa 4: Riesgo consolidado por desplazamiento forzado. Elecciones locales-nacionales (2007-2019)

c) Riesgo Por Violencia Política

Esta variable da cuenta de los hechos de violencia cometidos contra los candidatos políticos, servidores públicos y población civil por parte de los grupos armados ilegales. En este caso, se considera como riesgo extremo las acciones cometidas contra los candidatos políticos evidenciados en amenazas, secuestros, asesinatos o atentados contra sedes de campaña, así como los hechos violentos contra la población civil. Como riesgo alto se incluyen los hechos cometidos contra servidores públicos y a mandatarios públicos (alcaldes y gobernadores). En riesgo medio se ubicaron aquellas acciones violentas dirigidas contra la fuerza pública.

Se identificó que, aunque fueron pocos los municipios que registraron riesgos de violencia política, estos se caracterizaron por tener un riesgo extremo, es decir, se registraron acciones violentas contra los candidatos políticos. En este caso se detectó que las elecciones de 2007, 2016, 2018 y 2019 fueron las que presentaron la mayor cantidad de municipios con este tipo de riesgo. Los municipios que tuvieron mayor frecuencia de riesgos en las elecciones 2007-2019 fueron Barrancabermeja y Aguachica (mapa 5).



Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos de riesgo electoral de la (MOE 2007-2019).

Mapa 5: Riesgo consolidado por desplazamiento forzado. Elecciones locales-nacionales (2007-2019)

Según la (MOE 2019) en el periodo comprendido entre el 27 de octubre de 2018 al 25 de octubre de 2019 se registró que 532 líderes políticos, sociales y comunales fueron víctimas de algún tipo de violencia. El 44% (233) de los líderes políticos fueron víctimas de violencia de política, la mayoría del partido de derecha Centro Democrático, el cual registró 28 amenazas, cinco atentados y un asesinato, seguido del partido de izquierda Colombia Humana-UP, quienes recibieron 30 amenazas. Sin embargo,


[...] los partidos políticos más afectados con hechos letales son el Partido de la U (4 asesinatos y 3 atentados), el partido FARC (3 asesinatos y 3 atentados), partido Liberal (4 asesinatos y 1 atentado), el partido Cambio Radical (2 asesinatos y 3 atentados) y el partido Conservador (2 asesinatos y 2 atentados). (MOE 2019, 9)

Estos datos son relevantes porque muestra como a pesar de firmado el acuerdo de paz entre el Estado colombiano y las FARC-EP, donde se constata que la violencia y el desplazamiento forzado ha disminuido, aún se observa hechos de violencia política. También.

V. VIOLENCIA Y DESIGUALDAD POLÍTICA Y SOCIAL

Según datos del Registro Nacional de Información (RNI), que permite consultar la población

incluida en el Registro Único de Víctimas del conflicto armado colombiano, en el periodo 2007-2019 se registraron 1938 homicidios en la región del Magdalena Medio; el 50% de estos ocurrió en 2007 y, a partir de este año, se evidenció una disminución significativa en el número de homicidios registrados, de manera que en 2019 solo se registraron 6 casos. Por su parte, los municipios de Barrancabermeja (344), Aguachica (265), Puerto Berrío (214), San Pablo (133) y Santa Rosa del Sur (116) fueron los que presentaron mayor número de homicidios registrados (figura 5).




Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos del Registro Nacional de Información.

Figura 5: Homicidios en periodos electorales (2007-2019)

Con el fin de identificar el grado de incidencia del conflicto armado en la participación política se comparó el número de homicidios registrados en las elecciones de 2007 con el porcentaje de abstencionismo (Ver figura 6). Al respecto, no se halló una correlación positiva entre estas dos variables, puesto que municipios como el Carmen de Chucurí registraron un abstencionismo del 55%, aunque

presentaron cero casos de víctimas de conflicto armado. Sin embargo, se evidenció que esto no aplica para todos los municipios; se identificó una correlación directa entre homicidios y porcentaje de abstencionismo en los municipios de Barrancabermeja y Aguachica, los cuales en ese periodo registraron un riesgo electoral medio por presencia de las FARC-EP.



Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos del RNI y la Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil.

Figura 6: Correlación abstencionismo y homicidios durante las elecciones de 2007

Los efectos de la relación violencia política-violencia criminal limita la participación democrática, lo que a su vez aumenta la desigualdad política, hecho preocupante ya que los regímenes democráticos fundamentan sus ideales en principios como la libertad, la justicia y la igualdad. Por tanto, la (Organización de los Estados Americanos -OEA 2015) considera que la democracia está fundamentada en un principio reforzado de la igualdad para posibilitar, entre otros aspectos, el ejercicio de los derechos políticos y para romper con las grandes concentraciones de poder reservadas en ocasiones para una élite política que es

mezquina frente a las condiciones sociales de muchas personas en condiciones de pobreza y exclusión social.

Cuando a los ciudadanos se les garantiza el ejercicio de sus derechos políticos en los sistemas democráticos, es una puerta abierta para crear condiciones reales en las que la ciudadanía puede entrar en la disputa por el poder político y aumentar su calidad de vida, ya que con la recompensa monetaria derivada de su trabajo puede suplir sus necesidades básicas. Esto implica que la participación política no se centra únicamente en mirar si los ciudadanos votan o no en una determinada campaña electoral; también

tiene que ver con las formas de exclusión que crean desigualdad política, producto de la violencia.

Esto permite inferir que la existencia de fenómenos como la violencia, además de limitar la participación política como es evidente en muchos países en Latinoamérica, también aumenta los niveles de pobreza y exclusión social. Al respecto, la (OEA 2015), por un lado, refiere que la falta de equidad en la participación electoral perjudica los principios básicos de igualdad política y de representación; por otro lado, afirma que

Si una democracia coexiste con altos niveles de pobreza y exclusión, lo que se está diciendo en realidad, es que los derechos fundamentales de una parte importante de la población no están siendo respetados. Ello, para empezar,

crea obstáculos muy gravosos para la participación, movilización y representación política de los afectados [...] la falta de vigencia de derechos básicos de la ciudadanía es sugerente de que el proceso democrático no está representando adecuadamente los intereses de los diferentes grupos. (OEA 2015, 12)

Y es que, al observar la violencia política en Colombia, se puede inferir que desde hace décadas atrás los derechos políticos de algunos ciudadanos no han sido respetados, ya que muchos son asesinados, intimidados, y peor aún, obligados a exiliarse a países como Estados Unidos, México y naciones europeas. La tabla N° 1 que toma como corte histórico los asesinatos políticos entre 1986 y 2002, da cuenta también de esta realidad.

Tabla 1: Asesinatos políticos (1986-2002)

Actividad política	Sin afiliación registrada	Partido Liberal	Partido UP	Partido Conservador	Otra afiliación	Partido Político de Esperanza, Paz y Libertad	M-19
Alcalde	100	31	8	16	4	0	0
Concejales	277	208	50	120	22	7	5
Militantes y activistas	20	6	159	3	77	114	13
Dirigentes políticos locales	144	87	53	38	9	4	2
Otros funcionarios del Estado	199	11	4	6	2	0	0
Candidatos a Concejo	52	18	5	9	6	0	2
Dirigentes políticos departamentales	32	34	10	10	3	0	1
Candidatos a alcaldías	38	14	5	11	7	0	1
Diputados, concejales	7	19	8	8	4	0	0
Congresistas	1	8	7	7	0	0	0
Dirigentes políticos nacionales	2	6	6	6	0	0	1
Otros	5	8	1	2	0	0	0
Total	877	450	316	236	134	125	25
Porcentaje	38,0	15,7	10,5	8,0	4,5	4,1	0,8

Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de datos de la (CHCV 2014).


Esto es una evidente muestra de desigualdad política y de debilidad institucional, pues pareciese que la violencia es en ocasiones superior a los principios de libertad, justicia e igualdad, fundamentos de los regímenes democráticos.

a) *El Índice de Pobreza Multidimensional y abstencionismo electoral*

El Índice de Pobreza Multidimensional (IPM) es una forma de medir los niveles de desigualdad y pobreza. Este indicador mide cinco dimensiones: condiciones educativas del hogar, condiciones de la niñez y de la juventud, salud, trabajo y condiciones de

vivienda y acceso a servicios públicos. En 2005 el IPM nacional fue del 49%, mientras que el promedio de los municipios del Magdalena Medio fue del 76%, es decir un 27% más alto. Analizando la participación en relación con el IPM, de los 30 municipios de la región, aquellos del sur de departamento de Bolívar fueron los que presentaron porcentajes más altos niveles de abstencionismo, en particular, Tiquisio (95%), Regidor (88%) y Arenal (88%). De estos municipios, Tiquisio (73%) y Arenal (66%).





Fuente: elaboración propia a partir de base de datos del Departamento Administrativo Nacional de Estadística (DANE) y la Registraduría Nacional del Estado Civil (2005, 2018).

Figura 7: Comparación IPM 2005 y 2018 con porcentaje de abstencionismo 2005 y 2018

Por otra parte, en 2018 el IPM en el ámbito nacional fue del 19,62%, lo que evidenció una mejoría significativa de las condiciones de vida de la población, puesto que disminuyó en un 29,38% con respecto a 2015. En el Magdalena Medio también se presentó una disminución considerable, al pasar del 76% al 45%, lo que representa una disminución del 31%. En este año los municipios que presentaron mayores porcentajes de hogares con privaciones fueron Tiquisio (73%) y Arenal (62%) en Bolívar, y El Carmen de Chucurí (59%) en Santander. De la misma manera que en las elecciones nacionales de 2016, en las de 2018 los municipios que presentaron mayores porcentajes de abstencionismo fueron Tiquisio (61%) y Arenal (58%).

Además del IPM es importante señalar que el Departamento Nacional de Planeación (DNP) (2017) ha categorizado los municipios con el fin de identificar sus niveles de desarrollo, a partir de seis componentes: funcionalidad urbana, condiciones de vida, económico, ambiental, institucional y seguridad. A partir de estos se establecieron tres tipologías: los municipios con desarrollo robusto, intermedio e incipiente. De esta manera, el 67% (20) de los municipios tuvieron un desarrollo intermedio, el 30% (10) incipiente y solo el 3% (1) un desarrollo robusto, lo cual corresponde al municipio de Barrancabermeja.

Al respecto, es de destacar que hay una coincidencia en que los municipios que tienen desarrollo intermedio e incipiente se caracterizan porque más del 50% de su población es rural, siendo los municipios de Bolívar (89%), el Peñón (83%), Betulia (78%), Landázuri (76%), Rionegro (75%), Tiquisio (73%) y Arenal (73%) los de mayor concentración de la población rural, mientras que Barrancabermeja (10%), Puerto Berrío (10%) y San Pablo (12%) los de menor concentración.

De esta manera, a diferencia de las cifras de desplazamiento forzado y homicidios se registró una relación positiva entre pobreza y abstencionismo. En consecuencia, en los municipios del Magdalena Medio durante el periodo 2007-2019 se evidenció una reducción significativa en los IPM; asimismo se aprecia que existe una relación entre el índice de pobreza y la abstención a votar en las elecciones presidenciales. Los municipios con menores IPM, en promedio, tienden a participar de manera más activa en las jornadas democráticas del país.

Al respecto, es importante señalar que, si bien se evidenció una disminución significativa de los indicadores de pobreza, los municipios del Magdalena Medio se caracterizan por tener bajos ingresos, además de que una gran parte de la población vive en el área rural, lo cual está relacionado con las dificultades de acceso para llegar a los lugares de votación, así como con los altos costos en los que puede incurrir el desplazamiento para acceder a las urnas. Esto se puede explicar mediante la teoría de elección racional, la cual considera al voto como un cálculo entre costos y beneficios; en esta lógica se interpreta que los electores consideran que es mayor el costo que desplazarse a las urnas que el beneficio que se podría obtener de ello, en especial en el hecho de que su voto sea determinante para los resultados de la elección.

VI. CONCLUSIONES

La región del Magdalena Medio dada su ubicación estratégica ha sido de gran interés para los grupos armados al margen de la ley: narcotraficantes, FARC-EP, ELN, paramilitares y GAO, quienes han realizado procesos de cooptación de la democracia, limitando de este modo la participación política y debilitando las instituciones del Estado. Además, han

generado riesgos electorales visibles en el desplazamiento forzado, la violencia política y la intimidación constante debido a la presencia de estos mismos grupos; sin embargo, estos riesgos no son homogéneos para todos los municipios. Por ejemplo, en 2007, Morales, Simití, Santa Rosa del Sur, San Pablo y Cantagallo (departamento de Bolívar) presentaron fuertes desplazamientos forzados, no aconteciendo este mismo hecho en otros entes territoriales de la misma región.

El análisis de los riesgos electorales entre 2007-2019 permiten identificar, que el Acuerdo de paz entre el Estado colombiano y las FARC-EP, generó una disminución significativa de los riesgos por presencia de este grupo armado; empero, esto permitió que se aumentara el riesgo por presencia del ELN y de los GAO para llenar el vacío de poder dejado por las FARC-EP.

Si bien es cierto que la región del Magdalena Medio, tuvo el mayor riesgo electoral en 2007 por las acciones de las FARC-EP, se evidencia actualmente una disminución a pesar del dominio territorial que ejercen otros actores armados.

Se constata que los municipios de la región del Magdalena Medio, respecto al resto del país tienen características muy particulares, porque, primero, las acciones de los GAO en 2010 disminuyeron en todo el territorio nacional, excepto para esta región; en este año se comprobó que los GAO financiaron varias campañas electorales y realizaron coacción económica del votante. Segundo, se identificó que entre 2007-2019 no existió siempre una relación directa entre abstencionismo y presencia de grupos armados, porque hay municipios donde no se registró un elevado número de acciones violentas y su participación electoral en comicios fue baja. Tercero, hubo municipios que no registró homicidios en intervalos de tiempos, y su abstencionismo fue alto como pasó con el municipio de Carmen de Chucurí, que para el 2007 los niveles de abstencionismo llegaron al 55%. Cuarto, se encontró una relación entre el índice de pobreza y altos nivel de abstención a la hora de votar para elecciones presidenciales.

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
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
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
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
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
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TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality homan social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of homan social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

5. Use the internet for help: An excellent start for your paper is using Google. It is a wondrous search engine, where you can have your doubts resolved. You may also read some answers for the frequent question of how to write your research paper or find a model research paper. You can download books from the internet. If you have all the required books, place importance on reading, selecting, and analyzing the specified information. Then sketch out your research paper. Use big pictures: You may use encyclopedias like Wikipedia to get pictures with the best resolution. At Global Journals, you should strictly follow [here](#).



6. Bookmarks are useful: When you read any book or magazine, you generally use bookmarks, right? It is a good habit which helps to not lose your continuity. You should always use bookmarks while searching on the internet also, which will make your search easier.

7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

8. Make every effort: Make every effort to mention what you are going to write in your paper. That means always have a good start. Try to mention everything in the introduction—what is the need for a particular research paper. Polish your work with good writing skills and always give an evaluator what he wants. Make backups: When you are going to do any important thing like making a research paper, you should always have backup copies of it either on your computer or on paper. This protects you from losing any portion of your important data.

9. Produce good diagrams of your own: Always try to include good charts or diagrams in your paper to improve quality. Using several unnecessary diagrams will degrade the quality of your paper by creating a hodgepodge. So always try to include diagrams which were made by you to improve the readability of your paper. Use of direct quotes: When you do research relevant to literature, history, or current affairs, then use of quotes becomes essential, but if the study is relevant to science, use of quotes is not preferable.

10. Use proper verb tense: Use proper verb tenses in your paper. Use past tense to present those events that have happened. Use present tense to indicate events that are going on. Use future tense to indicate events that will happen in the future. Use of wrong tenses will confuse the evaluator. Avoid sentences that are incomplete.

11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources. Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.



20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.



Mistakes to avoid:

- Insertion of a title at the foot of a page with subsequent text on the next page.
- Separating a table, chart, or figure—confine each to a single page.
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
- Avoid use of extra pictures—include only those figures essential to presenting results.

Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.



The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
- Defend the model—why did you employ this particular system or method? What is its compensation? Remark upon its appropriateness from an abstract point of view as well as pointing out sensible reasons for using it.
- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
- Briefly explain the study's tentative purpose and how it meets the declared objectives.

Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

As always, give awareness to spelling, simplicity, and correctness of sentences and phrases.

Procedures (methods and materials):

This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

When a technique is used that has been well-described in another section, mention the specific item describing the way, but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to show all particular resources and broad procedures so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step-by-step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- Describe the method entirely.
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.



Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

What to stay away from:

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
- A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

If you put figures and tables at the end of some details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attached appendix materials, such as raw facts. Whatever the position, each table must be titled, numbered one after the other, and include a heading. All figures and tables must be divided from the text.

Discussion:

The discussion is expected to be the trickiest segment to write. A lot of papers submitted to the journal are discarded based on problems with the discussion. There is no rule for how long an argument should be.

Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."



Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

- You may propose future guidelines, such as how an experiment might be personalized to accomplish a new idea.
- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
- One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

THE ADMINISTRATION RULES

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CRITERION FOR GRADING A RESEARCH PAPER (COMPILATION)
BY GLOBAL JOURNALS

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Topics	Grades		
	A-B	C-D	E-F
<i>Abstract</i>	Clear and concise with appropriate content, Correct format. 200 words or below	Unclear summary and no specific data, Incorrect form Above 200 words	No specific data with ambiguous information Above 250 words
<i>Introduction</i>	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
<i>Methods and Procedures</i>	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
<i>Result</i>	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
<i>Discussion</i>	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
<i>References</i>	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring



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