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Will Putin's Ukraine War Provoke Famine and Upheaval in Africa ?

By Dirk Kohnert

Abstract- Famines are almost always man-made often used as a deterrent. Since ancient times, food and hunger have been a weapon of war. Among the most notorious examples in Africa are the Herero and Namaqua genocide in German South-West Africa (now Namibia) from 1904 to 1908. It was the first genocide of the 20th century. Also, the subsequent famines in Biafra (South-East Nigeria, 1967-1969), when an estimated 1.5 million people starved to death, the 1980 famine in Uganda, one of the worst in African history, when 21% of the population died, and the recurring famines in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan since the 1990s have been burned into human memory. The use of food as a weapon was condemned as a war crime by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. Since most African countries are Least Developed Countries (LLCs), they will suffer the hardest in the aftermath of Putin's war in Ukraine, especially Africa's poor. They have already suffered the consequences of drought, the corona pandemic and Islamist terrorism.

Keywords: *russia, invasion, ukraine, africa, famine, international trade, global power, food power, arms deals, fragile state, islamist terrorism, egypt, morocco, algeria, tunisia, libya, south africa, cameroon, mozambique, ethiopia, kenya, uganda, somalia, namibia, nigeria, sudan, energy security, china, eu, usa.*

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Will Putin's Ukraine War Provoke Famine and Upheaval in Africa ?

Dirk Kohnert

Résumé- Les famines sont presque toujours causées par l'homme, souvent utilisées comme moyen de dissuasion. Depuis l'Antiquité, la nourriture et la faim sont une arme de guerre. Parmi les exemples les plus notoires en Afrique, citons le génocide Herero et Namaqua dans l'Afrique allemande du Sud-Ouest (aujourd'hui la Namibie) de 1904 à 1908. Ce fut le premier génocide du XXe siècle. En outre, les famines qui ont suivi au Biafra (Sud-Est du Nigeria, 1967-1969), où environ 1,5 million de personnes sont mortes de faim, la famine de 1980 en Ouganda, l'une des pires de l'histoire de l'Afrique, où 21 % de la population est morte, et les famines récurrentes en Éthiopie, en Somalie et au Soudan du Sud depuis les années 1990 sont gravées dans la mémoire humaine. L'utilisation de nourriture comme arme a été condamnée comme crime de guerre par le Statut de Rome de la Cour pénale internationale en 1998. Étant donné que la plupart des pays africains sont des pays les moins avancés (PMA), ce sont eux qui souffriront le plus des conséquences de la guerre de Poutine en Ukraine, en particulier les pauvres d'Afrique. Ils ont déjà subi les conséquences de la sécheresse, de la pandémie de COVID-19 et du terrorisme islamiste. Leur position déjà affaiblie sera exacerbée par les retombées de l'agression russe en Ukraine, qui ne fera qu'exacerber la faim et la pauvreté en Afrique. D'autant plus que l'aide internationale au développement risque de souffrir d'une réorientation massive de l'aide vers le réarmement. Enfin et surtout, la guerre de Poutine en Ukraine aura un impact majeur sur les relations UE-Afrique. Compte tenu des conséquences de la pandémie de Covid-19 pour l'Afrique, cela mettra encore plus à mal la confiance mutuelle entre les deux partenaires. Environ 86 % des Africains n'ont pas encore reçu deux doses de vaccin. Un nombre croissant de chefs d'État et de gouvernement africains ne voient plus les pays occidentaux comme des partenaires fiables.

Abstract- Famines are almost always man-made often used as a deterrent. Since ancient times, food and hunger have been a weapon of war. Among the most notorious examples in Africa are the Herero and Namaqua genocide in German South-West Africa (now Namibia) from 1904 to 1908. It was the first genocide of the 20th century. Also, the subsequent famines in Biafra (South-East Nigeria, 1967-1969), when an estimated 1.5 million people starved to death, the 1980 famine in Uganda, one of the worst in African history, when 21% of the population died, and the recurring famines in Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan since the 1990s have been burned into human memory. The use of food as a weapon was condemned as a war crime by the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in 1998. Since most African countries are Least Developed Countries (LLCs), they will suffer the hardest in the aftermath of Putin's war in Ukraine, especially Africa's poor. They have already suffered the consequences of drought, the


corona pandemic and Islamist terrorism. Their already weakened position will be exacerbated by the spill-over effects of Russian aggression in Ukraine, which will further exacerbate hunger and poverty in Africa. All the more so as international development aid to Africa is likely to suffer from a massive redirection of aid to rearmament. Last but not least, Putin's war in Ukraine will have a major impact on EU-Africa relations. In view of the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic for Africa, it will further damage the mutual trust between both partners. About 86% of Africans have yet to receive two doses of vaccine. A growing number of African heads of state and government no longer see Western countries as reliable partners.

Keywords: *russia, invasion, ukraine, africa, famine, international trade, global power, food power, arms deals, fragile state, islamist terrorism, egypt, morocco, algeria, tunisia, libya, south africa, cameroon, mozambique, ethiopia, kenya, uganda, somalia, namibia, nigeria, sudan, energy security, china, eu, usa.*

I. INTRODUCTION

Famines are regularly man-made. During the past century, war and totalitarianism produced more famine deaths than did overpopulation, economic backwardness and climate change (Ó Gráda, 2007). In case an autocrat is interested to reduce the capacity of a group to resist his policies, there may be only a thin line of interpretation separating an intended goal of killing by the intention of elimination through starvation (Conley & de Waal (2020). Notably in Africa, that still is in common perception the continent of crisis, *failed states* and starvation, famines are often induced by politics, last, but not least, by the power to command food through a variety of market and non-market institutional means (Watts, 1991).

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
Source: Grebmer, 2015: 24

Graph 1: Death toll from great famines, 1870s to 2010, by continent

Even *food aid* has been exploited by ruthless governments to subdue their citizens by leveraging their political support and converting food aid into political power. The highly ritualized grant of food aid may pervert a present-day political and economic order to a rule where it are finally the peasants who go hungry (Phillips, 2009).

In civil war governments and rebels often control humanitarian access. They either permit entry and protect aid workers or they block access. Thereby, aid workers frequently face greater personal dangers as they move in a dangerous terrain of warfare. Under these circumstances, the provision of food aid under riskier conditions can even result in “new famines” (Grebmer et al, 2015).

In the following, the main causes and effects of *Russia's war in Ukraine* as regards famine and economic, political and social development in Africa will be analysed, taking into account the multiple facets of *hunger*. Also, a succinct review of literature on food as a weapon of war will allow for understanding the serious impact of Russia's war on Africa. The regional focus will be on the *Maghreb*, *Egypt* and selected countries of *Sub-Saharan Africa*. To conclude, *Moscow's* use of *wheat* and energy as a geostrategic weapon to handpick African countries for cooperation as well as the EU's alternatives for using Russian and Ukrainian wheat will be outlined.




Source: Grebmer, 2015: 23

Graph 2: Global death toll from great famines, 1870s to 2010s

II. THE IMPACT OF RUSSIA'S UKRAINE WAR ON HUNGER IN AFRICA

For decades, Africa shows the highest *population growth* and the largest famine troubles in the world. Its population surpassed one billion in 2009, with

a doubling time of 27 years (growth rate of 2.6 % p.a.). At the same time, average *agricultural productivity* was the lowest worldwide. Moreover, Africa is likely to suffer substantially from *climate change* (Grotel, et al, 2021).




Source: worldometers, 2019¹

Graph 3: Africa's population growth, 1955 – 2020

Therefore, African countries are particularly vulnerable because they rely heavily on Russia and Ukraine for their wheat imports. The top African wheat import partners of Russia were *Egypt*, *Sudan* and *Nigeria* (s. Graph 4). In Egypt, a total of US\$ 3.02 bn of wheat

was imported in 2019, US\$ 1.44 bn came from Russia, and US\$ 773.4 m from Ukraine. In *Ethiopia*, where a total of US\$ 458.42 m of wheat was imported in 2019, \$ 142.01 m came from Ukraine and \$ 64.77 m from Russia (Leiva, 2022).



INVESTMENT MONITOR

Source: Leiva, 2022

Graph 4: Russia's top export partners of wheat and maize Top ten countries based on total value of exports, 2016-2020

Most African countries are *Least developed countries* (LDCs) that will suffer the hardest in the aftermath of Putin's war in Ukraine, in particular the *African poor*.¹ They had already to bear the


consequences of the *COVID-19 pandemic* and the climate crisis. The spill-over effects of the Russian aggression in Ukraine will increase hunger and poverty even further (Kappel, 2022). Higher energy and food prices, reduced tourism, and potential difficulty accessing international capital markets will increase vulnerability notably in African countries that have

¹ "Population of Africa (2019) – Worldometers". www.worldometers.info.; reprinted in 'Demographics of Africa', en.wikipedia

minimal policy space to counter these effects of external shocks (Kammer et al, 2022). The countries progress in reducing the *Global Hunger Index* scores are lowest in Africa, notably in *Sub-Saharan Africa* (SSA).

Therefore, South Africa's *Daily Maverick news* cautioned that the impact of Russia's Ukraine war will "be felt in every village and town of South Africa and the world". African oil- and gas-producing countries, like *Nigeria* and *Angola*, might profit from the rising energy prices. Also, with the price of Ukrainian sunflower oil

skyrocketing, buyers are switching to palm oil, which hit record highs on futures markets in early March 2022. *Palm oil* is a staple crop in *West Africa* (McNair, 2022). Yet, whether the poor and needy will also profit is highly unlikely given the gross inequality and widespread corruption prevailing in these countries². The cost of food and transport is likely to hit the roof, with knock-on effects on the prices of nearly all other products, pushing up inflation.



Source: Grebmer, 2015: 15

Graph 5: Country progress in reducing *Global Hunger Index* scores

Yet, famines are difficult to predict because of the multitude of intervening factors, ranging from agricultural production and trade estimates, market price variability, weather forecasts and conflicts. The two major sources of uncertainty were associated with complex weather phenomena and social and political conflict, with uncertainty in weather forecasts being twice as important as conflict. Case studies from the *Horn of Africa* revealed that complex weather phenomena were twice as significant as the conflict in food security projection errors (Krishnamurthy et al, 2020). Moreover, the specific land tenure arrangements complicate predictions. Thus, Man-made calamities such as decentralized extensive agricultural, pastoral activities and forest clearing contribute to environmental damages and consequent food shortages. Insecure land tenure often diminishes agricultural productivity

which, notably in times of drought, exacerbates famine (Azadi, H. et al, 2021). *Pastoralists* in *East Africa*, for example, experience food insecurity more frequently than do non-pastoralists (Coughlan de Perez, et al., 2019).


Especially bread prices are a major driver of political instability.² Already in the early 2010s, they had triggered the *Arab Spring*. In North Africa, the *Maghreb*

² According to governmental data from 2020, the overall Gini coefficient in Nigeria was 35.1 points as of 2019, based on World Bank estimate, i.e. rank 43 out of 159 (lowest inequality) (statista.com, 2022). Angola ranked 45, South Africa has by far the highest income inequality worldwide (rank 1) (indexmundi.com, 2022). As for corruption, Nigeria ranked 154, Angola 136 and South Africa 70 out of 180 countries; in 2021. Perceived corruption was most pronounced in South Sudan (rank 180) (Corruption Perception Index, Transparency International, 2021):

countries *Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia* and *Libya*, as well as *Egypt*, which all are heavily dependent on wheat, will probably be among the worst affected (Kohnert, 2022). On the other hand, there exists a long-standing close relationship with these countries which is reflected by close military cooperation. The largest African customers of Russian arms, in order of sales, were Egypt, Algeria, Sudan, and Angola. Along with Russia's support to Libyan warlord *Khalifa Hifter*, the commander

of the *Tobruk-based Libyan National Army*, this consolidated Moscow's presence along the southern flank of the European members of *NATO*. Thereby, it opened up Russia's influence in the eastern Mediterranean and enabled it to threaten strategic global junctions like the *Suez Canal* and *Bab al-Mandab Strait* at the *Gulf of Aden* (Nyabiage, 2022a). Therefore, it is not unlikely that Moscow will give these governments preferential treatment also concerning food exports.

Change in Wheat & Cereals Imports Ukrainian Trading Stop, Long-Term Effects



Source: Own calculations, KITE Trade Model.

Source: Heidland, et al, 2022


Graph 6: Change in wheat and cereals imports (in %)
Ukrainian trading stop, probable long-term effects

According to model analyses of the *Kiel Institute for the World Economy*, North African countries would be particularly affected (Heidland, et al, 2022). For example, more than 30 % of the wheat consumed in *Morocco* comes from the Ukraine which is the second-largest exporter of wheat to Africa. Also, *Tunisia* and *Egypt* would be hit hard. In *Tunisia*, wheat imports could permanently fall by more than 15 %, while imports of other grains would fall by almost 25 % in the simulation. In *Egypt*, the Ukrainian wheat export shortfall would result in over 17 % being imported, and imports of other cereals would decrease by 19 %. Cairo asked already the IMF for support in reminiscence of the bloody bread riots during the Arab Spring (Saleh, 2022). *South Africa* would import 7 % less wheat and over 16 % less other cereals. Imports of other cereals would be also lower in *Cameroon* (-14 %), *Algeria* and *Libya* (-9.6 %). Wheat imports would drop significantly in *Ethiopia* (-9.6 %), *Kenya* (-7.9 %), *Uganda* (-7.1 %), *Morocco* (-6.2 %), and

Mozambique (-6 %) (Heidland, et al, 2022; Schiller, 2022; Kohnert, 2022).

Putin's Ukraine war and the resulting Western sanctions already started to disrupt supply and pushed up prices worldwide, also in Africa. Wheat, corn, sunflower oil and fertiliser are among the products most affected, along with oil, compounding the impact of political instability and drought (Nyabiage, 2022). In *Egypt* for example, the commodity flow has been already disrupted in March 2022, both by the war and the sanctions against Russia. Before the war, Russia and Ukraine had supplied more than 80 % of *Egypt's* wheat needs for its estimated 102 million citizens, according to the US Department of Agriculture. *Egypt* buys 12 to 13 million tonnes of wheat annually. Quite aware of political implications, the government of *General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi* kept its subsidies on bread despite previous pressure from the IMF to drop them (Nyabiage, 2022).


Change in Wheat & Cereal Prices Ukrainian Trading Stop, Long-Term Effects



Source: Own calculations, KITE Trade Model.

Source: Heidland, et al, 2022

Graph 7: Change in wheat and cereal prices (in %)
Ukrainian trading stop, probable long-term effects



Grafik: Walter, jbeL. / Quelle: UN Comtrade

Source: Schiller, 2022

Graph 8: Dependency of Northern Africa on wheat from the Ukraine and Russia
(share of total wheat import and share in consumption in %)

Morocco, a lower-middle-income country, importing over 90 % of its energy and half its cereals, is also among the African states most exposed to the crisis. Yet, its impact is difficult to predict, because of the intervening effects of the Corona pandemic, the unsustainable size of public debt and inflationary

pressures, which are likely to intensify, especially if the conflict continues (Ali, et al, 2022).

TOP 10 UKRAINIAN EXPORTS	SHARE OF GLOBAL IMPORTS (%)	SHARE OF UKRAINIAN EXPORTS (%)	TOP 10 RUSSIAN EXPORTS (%)	SHARE OF GLOBAL IMPORTS (%)	SHARE OF RUSSIAN EXPORTS (%)
Vegetable oils	6.7	9.3	UN Special code*	14.2	13.0
Cereals	6.0	20.0	Manufactured fertilizers	12.5	2.0
Oil and fruit seeds	3.1	5.0	Coal/coke/briquettes	11.6	4.0
Iron and steel	2.3	18.8	Petroleum and products	10.9	45.5
Animal feed	1.8	3.0	Gas Natural & manufactured	8.7	6.8
Metal ores/metal scrap	1.1	8.3	Cork and wood	8.4	1.5


Source: Ali & Azaroual & Bourhriba, 2022: 3

Graph 9: Main Ukrainian and Russian exports and their shares of global trade

III. FOOD AS A WEAPON OF WAR

Already irrespectively of the potential effects of Russia's Ukraine war, food and starvation have been used as a weapon of war since Antiquity. The most infamous examples in Africa include the *Herero and Namaqua genocide* in German South-West Africa (now Namibia) from 1904 to 1908. It was the first genocide of the 20th century. Also, the subsequent *famines in South Sudan* in 1993, 1998 and 2017, caused by civil war and political unrest, have been engraved in the memory of mankind. Food has become such an inhuman weapon that the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court* of 1998 included it in article 8 (paragraph 25) as a *war crime* (Rivoal, 2015). Apart from military considerations, food can also be used in conflicts for geopolitical or domestic political purposes such as displacing populations within the same country or intentionally starving parts of its own population. This was for

example the case in Ethiopia in 1984 when massive amounts of food aid had been accepted and distributed only in specific parts of the country so that the populations had to move toward these regions (Rivoal, 2015). Similar politics had been used in *Southern Sudan* in 1993, 1998 and 2017 (Wikipedia) as well as in the *famine in Somalia* in 1992 connected with the Somali Civil War. An estimated 220,000 - 300,000 people died during this famine (1992 famine in Somalia, Wikipedia). Subsequently, during the East African drought in 2011 which caused a severe *food crisis* across *Somalia, Djibouti, Ethiopia* and *Kenya*, the livelihood of 9.5 million people was threatened. A major reason was that many refugees from southern Somalia had fled to neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia, where crowded, unsanitary conditions together with severe *malnutrition* led to a large number of deaths (2011 East Africa drought, Wikipedia).



Source: Famine Early Warning Systems Network – USAID, 23 July 2011

Graph 10: Projection of the 2011 East Africa drought for October-December

It is obvious that conflict is the main cause of persistent severe hunger. However, whether famine and hunger are also major drivers of conflict is less evident (Grebmer, 2015). Often famines are portrayed as direct or indirect impact of climate change, for example in the *Sahel zone*. However, the *Sahel droughts* are not just an effect of climate change, though it was without question a major cause, but also man-made famines, caused by transhumance and overgrazing, deforestation, and poor land management (McLaughlin & Purefoy, 2005; Eden Foundation, Sweden, 1994:1). Thus, environmental havoc induced land scarcity which itself increased segmentation between and within social groups. Thereby, the self-regulating forces of civil society, e.g. African traditional chiefs, and other domestic social, political and economic institutions were frequently weakened both in the formal and *informal* sectors. Altogether, these dynamics augmented social grievances, ethnicity and the social exclusion of the 'other'. They generated breakdowns for individuals and social groups, affected by lack of resources, which drove them to engage in violent conflict, as revealed also by case studies of South Africa and Rwanda (Percival, 1995).


Thus, drought, as the initial driver of the crisis, triggered a multitude of responses like crop failure, famine, starvation and often subsequent despotic actions of the rulers to counter political unrest. According to the *Bible* and the *Quran*, one of the oldest records of the consequences of great famines in ancient Egypt was that in the time of *Joseph* (7th – 5th century BCE) when people were enslaved by the Pharaoh's government. It forced its subjects to plough all available fields to preserve its people alive and furnish food. However, whether this allows for the general conclusion of *Pitirim Sorokin* (1889 – 1968), a renowned Russian-American conservative sociologist in post-war America, that 'calamities have on the whole a more favourable than an unfavourable selective effect on human stock' is highly questionable (Sorokin, 1942).

In the most serious cases, it finally resulted in acute socio-economic and political change like the Arab Spring uprisings in the early 2010s. The repercussions of this enforced change impacted also on other aspects of everyday life, like health issues, increased mortality, a transformation of religious beliefs and a political disorder. For example, the African Christian "*Ethiopian*" Church which originated already before the colonial conquest, widened its influence. New churches were founded and they increased their independence from established European Churches, notably in areas where African-White relations were strained (Pribyl, et al, 2019).

The early days of colonial rule in *Southern Africa* were especially prone to gross human rights violations by the Colonialists related to famines. Thereby, Africans

frequently associated the blights devastating the land with colonial expansion. The *Matabele* in *Rhodesia*, for instance, blamed drought, locusts and cattle plague on the establishment of the rule of the *British South Africa Company*. This was not without reason. The company had requisitioned, before and during the drought of 1895, *Matabele* cattle which fuelled the tensions up to March 1896. As strategic means of war, the British occupation troops destroyed local grain stores after the failed harvest of 1896, which aggravated the famine even more. During the same time African peasants in South Africa's *Langeberg region*, already famished by the drought, had been forced to pay *hut-tax* to the British. The latter's radical approach to stamp out the rampant *Rinderpest*, which especially threatened the *settler* farmers, led to further rebellions in summer 1896–97. Rumours and rebellion spread to other regions, including *Zululand*, *Natal* and *Basutoland* (now *Lesotho*). In 1898, the *Venda*, who settled close to the South African border with Zimbabwe were subjugated (Pribyl, et al, 2019).

IV. WILL RUSSIA USE WHEAT AND ENERGY AS GEOSTRATEGIC WEAPONS TO HANDPICK AFRICAN COUNTRIES FOR COOPERATION?



Source: Melikian, 2020


Graph 11: Production target in Russia, all grains (Mt) – optimistic scenario

Russia has the potential to destabilize the world over the food issue. However, 80 % of its grain exports are exported via Ukrainian ports like *Mariupol* and *Odessa*. Russia's bombing of these ports will impact on its exports (Admin, 2022). Regarding the Ukrainian delivery failure because of the war, Russia is also causing food shortages in many countries. Thus, Moscow announced in mid-March 2022 that it would restrict the export of wheat, barley, rye and other grains. African governments could be held to ransom by Moscow because of their high dependency on Russian wheat exports (Admin, 2022).

Moreover, Moscow was looking for new markets. For example, it had sent test batches of wheat and other agricultural products to different countries. Also, it strengthened its position in existing ones, such as countries in *North Africa*, *Turkey* and the *Middle East*. To hedge its 'closed shop', Russia tried to develop not only the ports of the *Black Sea* but also in the *Far East*,


the *Caspian* and the *Baltic* ports (Melikian, 2020; Lu et al, 2022).

To counter this threat, *Brussels* wants to try to close the global food gap as much as possible. Yet, the *EU* up to now is a net exporter of wheat. To increase production the *EU Commission* proposed to set up an aid package for farmers amounting to € 500 m. This, however, is difficult to match with the EU's competing environmental goals and its proposed switch to less intensive agriculture as part of the *Green Deal* climate and environmental package. As a consequence, about 13 % less food would be produced by EU member countries (Admin, 2022). Yet, the *German environmental party* argues that it would make more sense to limit the consumption of animal foods so that less agricultural land is required for animal feed. According to them, up to 70 % of the raw materials produced on agricultural land in Europe end up in tanks or troughs (Admin, 2022).



Source: Muftuoglu, 2021

Graph 12: EU soft wheat exports mn t




Source: Astrasheuskaya, 2021

Graph 13: Russia leads in global wheat exports

In the past, Russia had been a net importer of grain. The *Soviet Union* preferred to rely on imports and to pay no subsidies for the production of wheat. This changed when *Putin* launched a programme aimed at stimulating investment and developing agricultural production through state-led projects in 2004 to ensure 80 % to 95 % of self-sufficiency in key products, including grain (Astrasheuskaya, 2021).

The severe devaluation in the rouble in 2014 as a consequence of US and EU sanctions against Moscow after the annexation of Crimea made its exports cheaper. Also, Russia's counter-sanctions, banning

most food imports from the west, further boosted domestic producers with the effect that Russia became the world's biggest wheat exporter, passing the US and Canada for the first time in 2017. Thus, Russian grain became Moscow's new geostrategic weapon, comparable with oil. Putin declared proudly that Russia made its way across *Eurasia*, *Africa*, and *Latin America* as an agricultural export powerhouse, reducing its reliance on energy export, identifying new markets and extending its global diplomatic reach (Astrasheuskaya, 2021).



Source: Astrasheuskaya, 2021


Graph 14: Russia's wheat diplomacy, 2019 - 2022

For example, also *Saudi Arabia* opened its huge market for chicken and grain for Russian imports which now account for 10 % of Saudi Arabia's grain imports, mostly *barley*. Putin's *leitmotif* apparently was: all over Africa, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific countries, the Far East, the shortest and easiest way to satisfy your need is through supplies from Russia, i.e. not just 'oil and Kalashnikovs' as in the olden days of the Soviet Republic. Last, but not least, Russia gained an advantage over competing producers because of economic, political and environmental and *climate change* that made life more difficult for some of its main rivals. For example, US grain producers had one of their worst seasons in 2019 due to low margins and the trade war with *China*. Many American companies that previously relied on state support went bankrupt when it was removed and as world market prices dropped. Yet, in Russia, climate change opened up new frontiers for

more agricultural usage of land in the north with the melting of permafrost. This, apparently offset droughts in the south, at least to a certain extent. Regarding its landmass, Russia practised rather *extensive agriculture* without high inputs of fertiliser and chemicals but emphasized *bio food* production. Thus, it could respond to buyers growing demand for ecological food production (Astrasheuskaya, 2021).

V. EU'S ALTERNATIVES FOR USING RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN WHEAT

Within the EU, France is the largest producer and exporter of wheat. Inside Western Europe, Britain is the EU's third-largest producer. Up to Brexit, EU wheat exporting countries tended to compete for similar markets and France was the largest exporter to most of the UK's wheat trading partners (Dry Bulk, 2017).



Source: Dry Bulk, 2017

Graph 15: Wheat production quantity of France, Germany and the UK, 2007 to 2016

At least for consumers in EU member countries, a simple and effective solution for lacking wheat from the Ukraine and Russia would be available. According to Brussels, an 8 % reduction in the use of cereals for animal feed in the EU would save enough wheat to make up for the expected deficit (Greenpeace European Unit, 2022).

However, this apparently is no short-time fix for all sorrows. To change consumer habits takes a lot of persuading and time, as well as restructuring the agricultural industry that up to now prefers high profits from meat production. Enforcing the *polluter pays*

principle in the EU against the powerful agricultural lobby would be a lengthy and arduous task. As usual, Brussels followed the line of least resistance. In March 2022, the EU Commission, backed by several governments, announced € 500 million in financial aid to farmers facing drawbacks due to the Ukraine war, including special aid for the pork sector to keep prices high. It also wanted to loosen environmental protections in the *EU's common agricultural policy* and to delay the implementation of key elements of the *Green Deal* and the *Farm to Fork Strategy* (Greenpeace European Unit, 2022). In recent years, the European environmentally

orientated catering industry envisaged a policy labelled 'From farm to fork' or 'Farm to table' that allowed certified traceability of fresh meat and eggs by a fair, healthy and environmental-friendly food system. The crusade was

based on a *social movement* that promoted serving *local food* at restaurants through direct acquisition from the producer. Given the new wheat shortage, the movement might gain additional appeal.



Source: EU Commission (2022)

Graph 16: EU Farm to fork strategy

VI. CONCLUSION

The reactions of the countries concerned by Putin's Ukraine war have been mixed. The *sanctions* of *Western powers* remained without appreciable effect up to now. How will the countries hit by the supply shortfalls cope with this situation? As for the EU member countries, the response depends to a great deal on their political and economic guidelines already decided well before the war. *Germany* for example still shies away from stopping Russian gas and oil imports. Different German governments in the past decades had relied too much on good economic relations with Moscow, despite the critical votes of major allies. The controversial *Nord Stream 2* gas pipeline from Russia to Germany, running through the Baltic Sea, financed by *Gazprom* and German and other European energy companies is just an example. Now, Berlin is at pains to reconcile the demands of German environmentalists and of the co-governing German Green Party for an exit from nuclear and fossil-fuel energy with the actual need for timely delivery of energy. *France*, on the contrary, had relied already before the war on nuclear energy, as well as *Britain*.

The concerned African countries are in a more difficult situation also because of the indirect repercussions of Russia's aggression. For example, international development assistance for Africa is likely to suffer from a massive diversion of aid into rearmament, away from poverty alleviation (Heywood, 2022). The *World Food Programme* (WFP) had already reduced rations for refugees and other vulnerable groups in East Africa because of decreased funding and

rising food costs. Thus, WFP shipments from the Ukrainian port of *Odessa* would be affected, which had been destined for *West Africa*. The Norwegian Refugee Council for West- and *Central Africa* indicated that some donors were already inclined to cut aid to *Burkina Faso* by up to 70 % to support operations in Ukraine. The *UN*, for example, is more than US\$ 300 m short of its \$ 957 m funding target for assistance in the northern region of *Tigray, Ethiopia* (Brooke-Holland, 2022). The aftermath of Russia's aggression in Ukraine will impact on current and pre-existing humanitarian crises, including those in *Somalia* and *Ethiopia*. In the *Tigray* region alone, half a million people have died from war and famine in the past 16 months. The WFP procures half of its wheat from Ukraine. *Egypt*, for example, has reserves that will likely last until June 2022, thereafter costs could skyrocket. David Beasley, WFP director, revealed in March that his institution was already cutting food rations by 50 % because of a lack of funding even before the war (McNair, 2022).

As explained above, one of the immediate dangers for Africa will be related to the soaring bread prices that could trigger political instability like in the *Arab spring*. According to the *IMF*, global food prices will affect Africans disproportionately. Whereas expenditure on food accounts for 17 % of consumer spending in advanced economies, it amounted to up to 40 % in SSA. As many as 25 African countries imported more than one-third of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine. Moreover, domestic African agriculture production will be affected by rising fertiliser, pesticide, transport and fuel costs as well as supply-chain disruption. All together this will result in higher production costs and

subsequently in higher prices, increasing the pressure on state budgets, including food subsidies (Brooke-Holland, 2022). Other countries like Kenya are also concerned about other impacts the war and financial sanctions on Russia have, for example on Kenya's vital tea industry. Russia is among the top five consumers of its tea, helping Kenya to earn foreign currency (Heywood, 2022). Now it will have to find new outlets for huge quantities of black tea in record time for about US\$ 3.5 m of tea initially destined for Russia (Africa Intelligence, 2022).

Last, but not least, Putin's Ukraine war will have a significant impact on It not only encouraged unparalleled shifts in European economic, foreign, and energy policy but led also to greater solidarity within the EU and NATO. However, it may also risk distracting Europe's attention away from Africa. Just a week before Russia's invasion, European and African leaders had mapped out their common future, at the on 17–18 February 2022 in Brussels. A common vision of cooperation at eye level, labelled 'A Joint Vision for 2030', had been outlined. Now the world has changed, raising the stakes of that partnership (McNair, 2022) ³. Putin's war, combined with the impact of the _ on Africa, will have repercussions on the mutual trust between the EU and Africa. About 86 % of Africans still have to receive two vaccine doses. In Africa and the Middle East, the pandemic has already pushed between 29 million and 43 million people into extreme poverty. Some African leaders do no longer see Western countries as reliable partners, as South African President pointed out at the EU-AU 2022 summit (McNair, 2022).

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Zusammenfassung: Hungersnöte sind fast immer menschengemacht, oft werden sie zur Abschreckung eingesetzt. Seit der Antike sind Nahrung und Hunger eine Waffe des Krieges. Zu den berüchtigtsten Beispielen in Afrika gehört der Völkermord an den Herero und Namaqua in Deutsch-Südwestafrika (heute Namibia) von 1904 bis 1908. Es war der erste Völkermord des 20. Jahrhunderts. Auch die nachfolgenden Hungersnöte in Biafra (Südostnigeria, 1967 bis 1969), als schätzungsweise 1,5 Millionen Menschen verhungerten, die Hungersnot von 1980 in Uganda, eine der schlimmsten in der afrikanischen Geschichte, als 21 % der Bevölkerung starben, und die wiederkehrenden Hungersnöte in Äthiopien, Somalia und im Südsudan seit den 1990er Jahren haben sich in das Gedächtnis der Menschheit eingebrannt. Der Einsatz von Lebensmitteln als Waffe wurde 1998 durch das Römische Statut des Internationalen Strafgerichtshofs als Kriegsverbrechen verurteilt. Da die meisten afrikanischen Länder zu den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern (LLCs) zählen, werden sie unter den Nachwirkungen von Putins Krieg in der Ukraine am härtesten leiden, insbesondere der Armen Afrikas. Sie hatten bereits die Folgen von Dürre, Corona-Pandemie und islamistischem Terrorismus zu tragen. Ihre bereits geschwächte Position wird durch die Spillover-Effekte der russischen Aggression in der Ukraine noch verschärft, die Hunger und Armut in Afrika noch weiter verschärfen werden.

Dies umso mehr, als die internationale Entwicklungshilfe für Afrika wahrscheinlich unter einer massiven Umleitung der Hilfe in die Aufrüstung leiden wird. Nicht zuletzt wird Putins Ukraine-Krieg erhebliche Auswirkungen auf die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Afrika haben. Er wird, angesichts der Folgen der Covid-19-Pandemie für Afrika, das gegenseitige Vertrauen zwischen beiden Partnern weiter beeinträchtigen. Etwa 86 % der Afrikaner müssen noch zwei Impfdosen erhalten. Eine wachsende Zahl afrikanischer Staats- und Regierungschefs sieht westliche Länder nicht mehr als verlässliche Partner.



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An Overview of Armed Banditry in Northern Nigeria: A Case Study of Zamfara State

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Abstract- The paper examines armed banditry in Zamfara state. It also makes critical appraisal of the factors that led to the collapse of the peace deal entered in to between Zamfara state government and armed bandits. It also provides a historical background to the crises and incidences of armed banditry in zamfara state since 2011. The paper applies research methodology using secondary sources of data to enable the researcher capture facts from existing literatures. The researcher employs the use of Queer Ladder economic theory upon which the research is based on. The queer Ladder theory postulated by an American sociologist, Daniel Bell (1965), who coined that the functional significance of organized crime is as a desperate tactic for socio-economic empowerment and social climbing. The paper points out causes of armed banditry in Zamfara State to be Poverty, Illiteracy, and Unemployment, High quest of political power by the elites and under development of rural areas. The paper concludes that armed banditry in Zamfara State was as a result of the quest for economic satisfaction and social empowerment looking at the range of causes of this crimes as postulated by Bell's Queer Ladder theory. The paper also posits that banditry constitutes a serious threat to Nigeria's public safety and, by extension, national security.

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AN OVERVIEW OF ARMED BANDITRY IN NORTHERN NIGERIA: A CASE STUDY OF ZAMFARA STATE

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Abstract: The paper examines armed banditry in Zamfara state. It also makes critical appraisal of the factors that led to the collapse of the peace deal entered in to between Zamfara state government and armed bandits. It also provides a historical background to the crises and incidences of armed banditry in zamfara state since 2011. The paper applies research methodology using secondary sources of data to enable the researcher capture facts from existing literatures. The researcher employs the use of Queer Ladder economic theory upon which the research is based on. The queer Ladder theory postulated by an American sociologist, Daniel Bell (1965), who coined that the functional significance of organized crime is as a desperate tactic for socio-economic empowerment and social climbing. The paper points out causes of armed banditry in Zamfara State to be Poverty, Illiteracy, and Unemployment, High quest of political power by the elites and under development of rural areas. The paper concludes that armed banditry in Zamfara State was as a result of the quest for economic satisfaction and social empowerment looking at the range of causes of this crimes as postulated by Bell's Queer Ladder theory. The paper also posits that banditry constitutes a serious threat to Nigeria's public safety and, by extension, national security.

The paper recommends, among other things, that Government need to extend the provision of social amenities to key rural communities so that people in the rural communities can feel a sense of belonging. Government at all levels should come up with credible and implementable people-oriented policies and programmes to address the basic livelihood problems of poverty, unemployment and the likes. Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) approach to policing which means police and civilian task force should work hand in hand as a means of addressing the rising prevalence of banditry in Zamfara State.

1. INTRODUCTION

One of the most heart-warming issue that characterizes human living in Zamfara state since after the conduct of the 2011 general elections is the unending conflicts between Fulani herdsmen and Hausa rural settlers especially those residing along Dansadau, Zurmi, Shinkafi, Anka, Maradun and Tsafe forest. This conflict which up till now has not been clearly defined

Either by the government or people of the state started like a mere conflict of interest but later turned to bloody crises which led to the death of over 2000 lives. As argued by Kuruwa (2017) over five thousand lives have been lost to the crises since it started in early 2011 and despite interventions of the government and its

agencies has not achieved any attempt to end the conflict.

The tragedy which caused Zamfara state bad name among comity of other states in Nigeria, is considered as one of the most critical challenge that threaten the peace of the state. While hundreds of innocent people are living Zamfara State due to the fear of these armed bandits, hundreds of them continue to take advantage of the situation to rustle more cattle and other ruminant animals. From 2011 to date not fewer than 15,000 cattle were rustled by these suspected armed bandits living away the owners to survive in a state of uncertainty Daniya (2017 in Anka, 2017). In terms of destruction of lives and properties, not fewer than 36 communities along Dansadau, Zurmi, Shinkafi, Tsafe, Bakura and Maradun towns were burnt to the ground with their residents forcefully asked to migrate to alternative safer places Tukur (2017 in Anka 2017).

Despite effort by both the Federal and State Governments to curtail this ugly situation through the use of cohesive measures, the killings and brutality continue to take new dimension as the bandits continue to come with some new strategies of perpetrating their heinous acts. It was difficult for the security agencies to fight along the forest as the bandits understand the terrain more than the security agencies. Former Zamfara State Commissioner of Police Akila Usman Gwary once told NTA News that, security agencies in Zamfara state especially police and army are finding it difficult to fight the armed bandits along Dansadau-Birnin Gwari forest because, there is no access road in trying to reach out to these villages whenever there is report of attack and communication by even the security agencies operating along the forest was virtually impossible NTA (2014).

To alternatively manage the situation, the idea of peace deal and amnesty was initiated between the State government and the leadership of these armed bandits. The peace deal was initiated to enable the armed bandits surrender their weapons and embrace peace. Tangaza (2017) reported that, we have reviewed the impacts of the cohesive measures especially the use of the military and mobile police men and come to the conclusion that, the operation has not yielded the much needed result in spite of huge sum of money spent by the government and we opted for negotiation with the bandits as the best option to ensuring sustainable peace. The peace deal has however being described as failure especially with the resurgence of the fresh killings

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in some communities along Shinkafi, Tsafe, Dansadau and Maradun with multiple number of death and loss of properties. The new violence is described as the most tragic in the history of the state with brutal murders and sexual intimidation among women and children. In trying to give an account of their tragedy, the victims considered the nature of the operation by the armed bandits as the most inhuman maltreatment against humanity. As captured by Shehu (2017), they are sexually harassing our women. Sometimes they would ask a resident to take his daughter or wife to their camp to rape. No one dares to stop them.

This ugly development emerged at a time when people believed that, the peace deal entered in to between the state government and the bandits would serve as panacea to the crises. But why has the peace deal failed?

This is attributed to many factors among which include,

- i). Absence of the political will from the site of the government to implement the agreement it has entered with the bandits.
- ii). Non-implementation of rehabilitation and reconstruction measures to bring succour to the victims of these conflicts.
- iii). The re-arrest of some members of the bandits by Department of the State Security Services (SSS) after they have signed the peace deal with the state as argued by Shehu (2017), the peace pact was jeopardized after a close associate of Buharin Daji called Dogon Bangaje was intercepted arrested and detained by the DSS.

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The study adopted Queer Ladder Theory (QLT). This theory was influenced by an American sociologist, Daniel Bell (1965), who coined the idea of 'queer ladder' in an attempt to explain the functional significance of organized crime as a desperate tactic for socioeconomic empowerment and social climbing. This theoretical perspective has since fertilized into a popular theoretical framework widely used in contemporary crime studies. The basic assumptions of QLT are as follows:

- i). Organized crime is an instrumental behavior; it is a means to an end.
- ii). It is an instrument of social climbing and/or socio-economic advancement.
- iii). It is a means to accumulate wealth and build power. (Mallory, 2007).

Often ascribed to QLT is the notion that organized crime thrives in contexts where the government's capacity to dictate, sanction and deter crime is poor; where public corruption is endemic; and where legitimate livelihood opportunities are slim

(Nwoye, 2000; Lyman, 2007; Okoli and Orinya, 2013). Under these circumstances, the incentive to indulge in life of crime is high, while deterrence from criminal living is low. Put differently, the benefits of committing a crime surpass the costs and/or risks. This creates pretext for criminal impunity and franchise (Okoli and Orinya, 2013; Okoli and Okpaleke, 2014).

Applied to the purpose of this work, QLT enables us to come to terms with the prevalence of organized crime in Zamfara State. The theory will be used to look at the historical background of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Zamfara State.

III. HISTORICAL OVER-VIEW OF ARMED BANDITRY IN ZAMFARA STATE SINCE 2011

The history of armed banditry in Zamfara started since around 2009 but it became out of control in 2011 especially after the general elections. The causes of these unending conflicts are many even though people disagreed on causes to a varying extent. While many links the scenario to long term human conflicts between Fulani herders and farmers due to struggle of ownership of farm land and grazing areas, others see it as direct effect of reaction against socio-political and economic marginalization of the Fulani by their Hausa counterparts. As Kiruwa (2017) stated that, people tried to misconceive the cause of these conflicts in Zamfara and to say the facts, not all the attacks are carried out by the Fulani herders but because of the impression people have about our people, and every single action perpetrated in the rural communities is attributed to Fulani herdsman.

These acts of cattle rustling, and armed banditry has caused a lot of hardship and state of fear among the residents of the states. The miscreants who take advantage of the terrain of some of these areas rustled hundreds of thousands of cattle and other valuables as well as killed scores of people. Bello (2017) mentioned that, communities like Kwokeye, Bingi, Kizara, Mashema, Maji, Fanda, Haki, Matankari, Yar Katsina and many communities in Maru, Anka, Gusau, Tsafe, Birnin Magaji and Zurmi Local Governments were grossly affected. Apart from cattle rustling sometimes women faced constant intimidation and harassment including cases of rape and assault while children are forced to embark on unprepared migration due to the fear of the unknown. Shehu (2017) disclosed that, they are sexually harassing our women. Some time they would ask a resident to take his daughter or wife to their camp to rape and no one dares to stop them. From 2011 to date no accurate statistics could be provided as to the number of people killed through this act of armed banditry. Tukur (2017), opined that, people are killed in communities that are not even known to the security agencies and because of the nature of our community settlements, not all cases are

reported especially those that involved Fulani herders. Bello (2017) tries to highlight some flash points that are termed as victims of this banditry but could only cover a few. Below are updated incidences.

a) *Cattle Rustling Incidents and Bandits Attack in Zamfara State (2011-2018)*

Date	Incidences
Oct. 3, 2011	Bandits raid Lingyado village in Maru LGA of Zamfara State, killing 23 people.
Dec. 2011	Bandits attack Jangebe village of Gusau LGA killing 4 policemen and 2 children.
Jan. 26, 2012	Gunmen killed and set fire to 15 traders in Birnin Magaji in Shamushalle.
May 12, 2012	8 persons, 4 policemen killed in a shot out with suspected armed robbers and 5 other police men missing at Dansadau, Maru LGA.
June 11, 2012	Scores of motorcycle-riding bandits shot dead 26 residents of Dangulbi village, Garu, sabuwar kasuwa and biya in Dansadau District in Maru LGA of Zamfara State in what was said to be a reprisal attack.
October 30, 2012	Gunmen killed 20 people including the village head in Kabaro in Dansadau district in Maru LGA.
December 14, 2012	Gunmen on motorcycles shot 10 vigilantes patrolling in a market at Rukudawa in Zurmi LGA
January 05, 2013	Thirty gunmen on motorcycles gunned down seven people in raids on Makera and Usi villages in Birnin-Magaji District of Zamfara State in what was said to be a reprisal attack.
June 18, 2013	Gunmen attacked and killed 48 people in Kizara village in Tsafe LGA.
July- September, 2013	Gunmen killed 160 people and abducted 10 married women according to Zamfara State Governor
September 30, 2013	3 people killed by cattle rustlers in Buzuzu village near Bukkuyum LGA.
April 6, 2014	Gunmen killed over 200 people in Yar Galadima village at a meeting by traditional rulers and vigilantes
September 2014	Bandits killed 33 people, rape women and rustle cows at Akuzo, Zarfarawa-Girke, Kofa, Kundubau, Wonaka, Faru- Girke, Fegin Mahe, Kukar Gandu, Kanawa, Lafiya and Gora villages respectively
July 2015	Gunmen on motorcycles killed over 30 people, burnt houses and rustled cows and sheep at Kokeya and Chigama villages of Birnin Magaji LGA
February 6, 2016	Gunmen killed 50 villagers, rustled cows and burnt houses in a night attack in Kwanar Duste village in Maru LGA
May 6, 2016	Armed bandits killed people at Madada and Ruwan Tofa villages, according to police. Number of casualties not stated.
November 6, 2016	Armed robbers killed 10 traders from Kanoma town on their way to Talatan Mafara market. And a similar attack occurred in Shinkafi LGA earlier
November 7, 2016	Gunmen killed 40 gold miners at mining camp near Gidan Ardo village in Maru LGA
November 18, 2016	Gunmen rustled cattle and kidnapped 40 villagers in Maru LGA
November 19, 2016	25 people killed by cattle rustlers at Dole, Tudun Bugaje and Kwangwami villages in Zurmi LGA
2016	Armed men attacked villages in Sabuwa LGA and killed 13 people and stole their cows.
January 26, 2017	Suspected herdsmen killed hunters in Magazu village in Tsafe LGA in a bid to find one Rabo who allegedly stole their cow
September 22, 2017	Gunmen on motorcycles killed an official of FRSC at Tsafe LGA office of FRSC.

January 18, 2018	Gunmen on motorcycles killed 6 people, wounded 4 and abducted 2 sons of a federal legislator at Gora village in Maradun LGA
February 14, 2018	40 villagers travelling in a truck were killed and set on fire near Birane village in Zurmi LGA
January 29, 2019	Over a dozen killed, 13 kidnapped including a bride in Zurmi LGA
March 11, 2019	Gunmen killed 17 in Zurmi LGA
May 23, 2019	Bandits killed 11 and injured many in Ruwan Bore village in Talatan Mafara LGA
June 10, 2019	Bandits killed 23 in a reprisal attack on Tunga village Kauran Namoda LGA
January 16, 2020	Gunmen killed 14 in an attack on Babban Rafi Village Gummi LGA
March 2, 2020	Bandits attacked Kujami, Maru LGA, killed 2 people and displaced many.
June 21, 2020	Gunmen attacked Dansadau Maru LGA killing 15 people
July 8, 2020	Danfasa village in Maru LGA was invaded by gunmen killing 7, injured 13, 20 women abducted and many animals were rustled.
Nov. 22, 2020	Bandits kidnap 17 worshippers in Maru LGA of Zamfara State
Nov. 16, 2020	12 Police Officers were kidnap in Zamfara State
Oct. 21, 2020	22 were killed in Tungar Kwana Talatan Mafara LGA
Oct. 30, 2020	Bandits kill 1 and abducted 10 in Dankurma village in Zamfara State
Jan. 8, 2021	6 family members were kidnaped in Kaudari Maru LGA
Feb. 2, 2021	Bandits kidnap 27 Jangebe schoolgirls
Feb. 26, 2021	35 killed in an attack on Sabuwar Tunga, Maru LGA
April 21, 2021	30 were killed in an attack on four communities (Gobirawa, Gora, Rini and Madoti) in Maru LGA
Nov. 9, 2021	6 people were killed and many abducted in an attack on Rijija village in Gusau LGA
Nov. 29, 2021	Bandits attacked three communities in Gusau LGA killing 7 and several injured
January 9, 2022	200 were killed in an attack on Bukuyyum, Anka LGA
April 2, 2022	13 killed in an attack on three communities: Kadadafa, Rafin gero and Babban baye.
April 4, 2022	Gunmen killed 7 including son of retired commissioner of police in Tsafe town, Tsafe LGA
May 6, 2022	48 killed in an attack on Sabon garin Damari, Bakura LGA
May 8, 2022	7 killed in Faru village Maradun LGA

Source: Authors Compilation 2022

b) Causes of Insecurity in Zamfara State

Some of the major causes of armed banditry in Zamfara State as stated by CEDDERT, (2018) includes:

- Poverty
- Insensitivity of People in Power
- Rural Neglect
- Corruption
- Unemployment
- Illiteracy

Looking at these causes of armed banditry in Zamfara State, it is to be observed that the phenomenon of Banditry in Zamfara has been driven by criminal quest for economic accumulation in an environment that more or less condones and conduces crimes. This has been worsened by the prevailing socio-economic dissatisfaction and associated livelihood crisis in the state.

IV. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the paper ascertained that armed banditry in Zamfara State was as a result of the quest for economic satisfaction and social empowerment looking at the range of causes of this crime as postulated by Bells's Queer Ladder theory. This paper has established that the prevalence of cattle rustling and armed banditry in Zamfara State poses a serious threat to public safety and sustainability of national security in the state, region and country at large. This is in view of the destructive impact of such crime on life, livelihood, property, investment, as well as social wellbeing of the state. Thus, cattle rustling and armed banditry in Zamfara State passes for a crucial issue in Nigeria's national security. To address this problem, a few measures are hereby recommended:

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

In a state of uncertainty and unending crises, there are several measures government can adopt to mediate the menace. While the government look at stick and carrot approach as an option, a lot more needs to be done to address the cause root of the crises. In the case of the Zamfara crises critical measures need to be taken.

- i). Government at all levels should come up with credible and implementable people-oriented policies and programmes to address the basic livelihood problems of poverty, unemployment and the like.
- ii). New policies on land use need to be initiated to allow for fair access to land by both the farmers and Fulani herders.
- iii). Government need to immediately discourage mass migration of both the Fulani herders and farmers from their settlement by embarking on massive rehabilitation and reconstruction programmes which would be of immense benefit to the farmers and herders.
- iv). The government needs to move extra-mile in constructing more road network to link some isolated communities. This would enable both the security agencies and other donor aid agencies in accessing the communities during state of emergency or distribution of relief materials.
- v). The government also needs to have strong arrangement with the telecommunication outfits in an attempt to provide effective communication network so that people can be able to communicate to the relevant security agencies and government.
- vi). The government need to allow more roles for the traditional rulers to enable them adequately arrest emergency situations and report to the government for action
- vii). Government need to extend the provision of social amenities to key rural communities so that people in the rural communities can feel a sense of belonging.

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The Unity of the Six Opposition Parties in Turkey, the Analysis of their Consensus, and it's Meaning in Terms of Democracy

By Abdullah Murat Tuncer

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I want to analyze a critical analysis of the Nation Alliance, which is vital for democracy.

Keywords: *turkish democracy, opposition parties, partnership for democracy, consensus for democracy, opposition parties alliance.*

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Abstract Mainly since 2010, to prevent the erosion of Turkish democracy, six opposition parties allied and started joint work. This alliance has importance for the history of democracy in Turkey. In their second meeting, the leaders of the "Nation Alliance" parties, which published a consensus text in their first meeting, published the features they would look for in the candidate they wanted to nominate in 2023. The opposition alliance, known to have issues on which they disagree, and problems they agree, do not cover all opposition parties. The People's Democracy Party (HDP), the Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP), and the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) are looking for another alliance that unites socialist ideas. However, the socialist coalition also stated they could support the candidate against the ruling party in 2023.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Turkey has transitioned from democracy to anocracy (Tuncer 2022, DOI: 10.21275/SR22205223430). Six opposition parties came together and allied to correct the trend and protect democracy in the upcoming 2023 Presidential and Parliamentary elections to prevent this change. The ruling party, Justice and Development Party AKP and Nationalist Movement Party MHP, allied, called the People's Alliance, and passed every law they wanted through the parliament.

Among the agenda topics of the "Six-Party Table" were the proposal to amend the Election Law, the roadmap of the Strengthened Parliamentary System, the restriction of presidential powers after the transition to the parliamentary system, the determination of basic principles in the areas of possible cooperation, the principles and values regarding a possible alliance.

II. BRIEF HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN TURKEY

The first step in modern Turkey was taken by establishing the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on April 23, 1920. Then the Republic was established on October 29, 1923, by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.

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In the following periods, a single-party period was experienced until 1946, when multi-party elections were held for the first time in the history of the Turkish Republic (but open vote closed count). The first genuinely democratic election (closed voting, available count) occurred in 1950 (Çimen 2019).

The first of the military initiatives that caused a break in democracy was on May 27, 1960. Then, on September 12, 1980, a military coup was carried out. Apart from these coups, the army intervened in politics on 12 March 1971, 27 December 1979, 28 February 1997, and 27 April 2007. There were also failed military coup attempts on October 21, 1961, February 22, 1962, May 20, 1969, March 9, 1971, and July 15, 2016. The Jacobin secular vision of social and political order was the most crucial reason for military interventions (Heper 2016, Heper 2008).

Turkey's political system was based on separating the powers, legislature, executive, and judiciary.

But It is difficult to talk about real democracy except for the first periods of the Democratic Party until 1954, the first periods of Turgut Özal (between 1984-1989) and the first years when the 1960 Constitution was implemented, and finally, the 2002-2010 period of Justice and Development Party (AKP).

Justice and Development Party (AKP) has ruled Turkey since 2002. After some reforms, the AKP government showed growing contempt for political rights and civil liberties. Its authoritarian nature was fully consolidated following a 2016 coup attempt that triggered a dramatic crackdown on perceived leadership opponents. Constitutional changes adopted in 2017 concentrated power in the hands of the President.

As a result of the negativities experienced and the changes in the system, according to the 2021 Freedom House report, Turkey's new category is "not freedom."

The depoliticized way of regulating money, micro, and macroeconomic management was studied in parallel with introducing dependent financialization as the predominant capital accumulation regime until 2013. Since 2013, the governments have struggled with the combination crisis of authority and the state, leading to two changes: the mode of regulation has been re-

politicized, and the struggle within the power bloc has intensified. As a result, AKP implemented more ambitious survival strategies and deepened authoritarianism by changing the political regime from a parliamentary to a presidential system in 2017 and further authoritarian and consolidation efforts in 2019 (Akçay 2020).

The 15 July 2016 attempt has been a significant trauma for the country. The state of emergency declared after the coup attempt of 15 July was legalized after 2017 and converted to standard applications, weakening many elements such as the freedom to speak of a democratic regime and the right to protest and criticize.

The reforms, among other measures, abolished the position of Prime Minister and designated the President as both heads of state and government, effectively transforming Turkey from a parliamentary regime into a presidential one.

The new system, which was accepted with a referendum in 2017, brought difficulties to real democracy, weakened the parliament, and took a serious step toward the one-person system. According to the Freedom House report 2021, Turkey is a "not free" country (<https://freedomhouse.org/country/turkey/freedom-world/2021>). According to this report, prosecutions and campaigns of harassment against opposition politicians, prominent members of civil society, independent journalists, and critics of Turkey's increasingly aggressive foreign policy continued throughout the year. In December, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) called for the immediate release of Selahattin Demirtaş, leader of the Kurdish-oriented People's Democratic Party (HDP), who had been imprisoned since 2016 politically motivated charges; European Court of Human Rights decision was ignored. New arrests of HDP members and leaders were carried out during the year, adding to the thousands who have been detained since 2016. Thousands of people were arrested without evidence on terrorist charges (Tuncer 2022, DOI: 10.21275/SR2220 5223430).

It would not be right to talk about an Islamic party until the (Justice and Development Party) AKP government. Parties established in the history of democracy in Turkey Virtue Party (FP), Welfare Party (RP), National Order Party (MNP), Islamic Democratic Party (İDP), Democratic Party (DP), Motherland Party (ANAP), Justice Party (AP) and Felicity Party (SP) were established by people who adhere to Islamic values. However, they were not parties aiming to change the administrative system in Turkey. Most of these parties are forced closed and not alive now.

III. THE PARTNERSHIP OF OPPOSITION PARTIES, "NATION ALLIANCE"

The Republican People's Party (CHP), Democracy and Leap Party (DEVA), Democrat Party (DP), Future Party, İYİ Party, and Felicity Party (SP) came together to ally to return to Democracy and re-strengthen weakened democratic institutions. Against the "Alliance of the People" created by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the ultra-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), six-party unity named the alliance they started as the "National Alliance":

Within the framework of the Nation Alliance, the six-party leaders have met three times in the last two months, apart from the Technical meetings of the relevant people in their parties. In the first, the consensus text studied was explained. In the second and third, they discussed the details of the issues they agreed on. It was concerned for the last time what the characteristics of the person to be nominated in the presidential election to be held in June 2023 would be. The qualifications to be sought in the candidate focus on merit, democracy, and understanding of the law.

The course of the Orban regime in Hungary shows similarities with the Erdogan regime in Turkey. The opposition's mistakes in Hungary led to the start of the second Orban period (<https://balkaninsight.com/2022/04/08/democracy-digest-aftermath-of-hungary-election/>). Again, the errors of the left-wing parties in the French presidential election forced the French people to choose between two people they did not want, Macron and LePen (Tuncer 2022 DOI: DOI: 10.21275/SR2242 5180331). The components of the Nation Alliance must act by taking lessons from the examples of Hungary and France and be aware of their grave responsibilities.

IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSENSUS TEXT

On February 28, 2022, the Republican People's Party (CHP), Democracy and Atılım Party (DEVA), Democrat Party (DP), Future Party (GP), İYİ Party, and Felicity Party (SP) presented the "Reinforced Parliamentary System" report to the society.

There is a word. "If the king is good, there is no need for law; if the king is bad, the law has no effect." There is no need for constant new changes with qualified managers. The implementation will be wrong no matter how good you make laws with evil rulers.

Briefly, the titles of the critical analysis of the six parties' consensus text could be summarized below;

1. Even though the Strengthened Parliamentary System advocates the separation of powers, it undertakes tasks that prevent the power of the parliament from being as it should be. In particular, on six subjects give the Councils of Judges and

Prosecutors powers that should not be, by being actively involved in Justice and Law, which should be precisely above politics, in the appointment of the members of the Constitutional Court, the Council of State and the Supreme Court and the determination of the members of the Court of Accounts. There is a need to re-evaluate the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM) for the legal system and control mechanisms that should be kept above politics.

2. It is a contradiction in this text why the election threshold is 3%, and the treasury aid is foreseen for the parties that receive 1% of the votes. If there is a dam, it should be 600/1 (according to the Turkish Constitution, the number of deputies in the Parliament is 600). In other words, every party that gets enough votes to get one deputy should be in the parliament.
3. It is a severe mistake to create overseas constituencies to elect people who work abroad and have citizenship from different countries. Anyone who wants to take a seat in the parliament can return to his country and become a candidate.
4. Since the bag law application is misused, wrong results may occur. However, sometimes it is vital to save time in mandatory situations. Suggestions that will disrupt the system in criticism will not be correct.
5. It is said that the head of the final account commission will be from the main opposition party; however, the vote rates of the parties are taken as a basis for forming the ethics commission on a different page of the same report. This is a contradiction.
6. A simple majority is required to form a government, a constituent vote of no confidence, and an absolute majority are needed to overthrow the government. This is also a contradiction and will create meaningless troubles. The goodwill of future governments is only goodwill.
7. Recourse to the judges who have signed the decisions that sentence the state to compensation is a big mistake and will prevent fair choices. Lawyers will act with the instinct to protect each other. For wrong decisions and payments, a system that reflects the performance should be put instead of financial costs.
8. There is no civil initiative in the text. However, with the signatures of a certain number of citizens, laws and motions of no confidence should be given.
9. It is not stated that media owners cannot enter public tenders or engage in other professions.
10. Major mistakes were made in academic recommendations. This section has been written by people who do not know and have no experience with the top management and system at the university (Tuncer 2021)...

- A) University autonomy is scientific/academic autonomy. There can be no administrative and financial autonomy.
- B) The Interuniversity Council is like a council of more than 400 people and cannot function as Higher Education Council (YÖK).
- C) Private universities' problems and eliminating education inequalities are not included. Most Foundation Universities are holding universities, not real Foundation Universities.
- D) It is a big mistake that the academic staff chooses the rector only. If there is to be an election, all components of the university must vote.
- E) Dean's election is a big mistake. Deanship is an academic, not an administrative duty. Seniority and performance are essential. Especially the fact that the candidates have specializations suitable for the faculty to be appointed must be miswritten. It may be meant to mean license, not expertise. How to choose someone who specializes in Chemistry, Physics, Mathematics, or Statistics for the Faculty of Science? For example, a Medical Doctor should be appointed to the Faculty of Medicine, but this is a license. Specialization in the fields such as pediatrics, anatomy, physiology, and obstetrics, which discipline is suitable for the Faculty of Medicine? The purpose of eligibility must be licensing eligibility or compliance with designation criteria. We are a country that has experienced the dismissal of a urologist as the dean of the Faculty of Law.
11. It is an ethical problem because the parliament member can work in self-employed and individual businesses and earn money. This is Indefensible.

V. CONCLUSION

It is known that the government's unjust and unlawful interventions in the elections in the local elections held in 2019 and the previous general elections in Turkey (Kiran 2019). Such illegal and unfair intervention tendencies can be seen in weakening democracies. The Hungarian election wasn't also a fair fight (<https://www.politico.eu/article/hungary-election-level-playing-field-fair-observer/>).

The government's intervention in forming ballot box committees in the election law that has been in effect since 1950 is already casting a shadow on the 2023 elections (Official Newspaper-Resmi Gazette). One of the two critical issues in the new law is to organize the ballot box commissions as the AKP wants, and the second is to reduce the 10% dam, formerly 10%, to 7% to save the MHP, which was a severe loss of votes. Another significant change is the article that changes the conditions for parties to participate in the elections (Resmi Gazette). This article aims to prevent some opposition parties from griming in the polls. The

previous general elections in 2018 tried to prevent the newly established İYİ Party from entering the polls. Still, the government's attempt was blocked when ten deputies from the CHP switched to the İYİ Party and formed a group in the Parliament.

One of the judges who gave the verdict of the "Gezi Events" at the Istanbul Heavy Penal Court on April 25, 2022, is a parliamentary candidate from the AKP is the best indication that the days to come will be difficult in terms of democracy and law. This court tried Osman Kavala, who has been in detention for 4.5 years, according to Articles 309 and 328 of the Turkish Penal Code (www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-Turkiye-54468461). He was sentenced to aggravated life imprisonment for the case he was acquitted of before, according to Article 309, and was exonerated under Article 328, for which he is still in detention (Gazette Duvar). These events are essential indicators that the upcoming elections will never be fair. Opposition parties are responsible for preserving and reconstructing democracy and the rule of law.

However, despite the remarkable tolerance of the opposition parties CHP and İYİ Party, there are different opinions from SP, DP, DEVA, and GP. Finally, after the tension between the DP and the GP about the presidential candidate, meaningless statements came that there is still no alliance in DEVA; instead, there is an exchange of information. The People's Democracy Party (HDP), the Workers' Party of Turkey (TİP), and the Communist Party of Turkey (TKP) formed the third coalition of socialists continue. The DEVA Party is also working on a new alliance for a fourth right-wing coalition, which is not overtly.

The DEVA Party has hesitations about whether there is still an alliance. The weakest link in the chain seems to be Ali Babacan, the leader of DEVA.

The eyes, hopes, and attention of the voters, who are crushed under the economic and social problems, are on the opposition parties, undertaking a difficult task until the 2023 elections.

If these mistakes continue, it can be expected that the same thing that happened in Hungary and France will happen in Turkey in the 2023 elections.

The 2023 elections seem to draw vital lessons for the history of world politics.

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Israel, the Syrian Crisis and the Unbreakable Lebanese Syndrome

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ISRAELTHESYRIANCRISISANDTHEUNBREAKABLELEBANESESYNDROME

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Abstract- This article addresses Israeli strategic attitude with respect to the Syrian crisis, linking the historical conceptualization of Syria and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict with Israel's current strategic considerations and the effect of the "Lebanese syndrome" upon Israel's historical collective memory. Syria has always been regarded as Israel's archenemy due to its organic ties with revolutionary pan-Arabism and support for the struggle against the Jewish State. While Israel thus hoped that the "Arab Spring" uprisings would overthrow the Ba'ath regime or weakening it to the point of collapse, it has refrained from any military intervention, first and foremost because of what may be called the "Lebanese syndrome"—namely, the fear of renewed entanglement and a repeat of its bitter experience in the First Lebanon War.

I. ISRAEL AND THE "ARAB SPRING" UPRISINGS

The popular uprisings that erupted in Tunisia and Egypt took Israeli political, military, and academic bodies by surprise. Long known for its intelligence capabilities, Israel had not anticipated their outbreak and the undermining of Western-backed dictatorships. Its first reaction was thus shock at the overthrow of regimes it had long regarded as moderate, anti-Islamic, pro-Western, and in favour of peace with Israel. Israeli scholarly institutions and figures promoted widely circulated arguments regarding the organic link between the Israeli military establishment and academics with a particular interest in Islamic and Middle Eastern studies.

Israeli officialdom, media, and intellectual circles focused primarily on the events in Egypt, a neighbour of particular political, security, and economic relevance. While many feared the Islamic alternative in light of its potential impact upon the existing status quo, the outbreak of the revolution in Syria allayed Israel's concerns, giving rise to hopes for the collapse of the "axis of evil" stretching from Tehran to Beirut. The Islamist rise to power in Syria, in contrast, was regarded as a form of compensation for the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak's regime.

Although Israel's official reaction to the popular revolution in Tunisia was rather tepid, it sent a worrying signal regarding the uncertain fate of the region. The Israeli media and leadership exhibited little interest in the Tunisian revolution that ousted President Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, Tunisia being both geographical remote and playing a marginal role in the Arab-Israeli conflict.

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Israel's fear that the tide of popular uprisings would sweep across the Arab world began to change after the revolution erupted in Syria, however. Many regimes in the pay of or open to the West having already been overthrown March 2011, decision-making bodies in Israel viewing this as a threat to stability and a strategic shift threatening Israeli interests over the long term.

Before the Syrian uprisings, the Israeli perception of the Arab popular uprisings had been melancholic, bleak, and pessimistic. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly in September 2011, then Prime Minister Netanyahu extended his hand in peace to the Libyans and Tunisians in their attempt to establish democracy—as well as to the Syrians, Lebanese, and Iranians struggling against unjust oppressive regimes. Conspicuous for its absence in this speech was Egypt, Israeli's peace partner.¹

Discussion of the outbreak of the uprisings in Syria and the ensuing civil war lies beyond our present brief, numerous studies having already addressed this subject.² Still, to a large extent, the outbreak of the uprisings in Syria has been perceived as a form of "compensation" of sorts for the swift fall of the Mubarak regime—a supporter of stability in the region and promoter of peace. The longer the revolt has gone on, the more it has raised hopes in ruling Israeli circles that the regime's fall would weaken Iran's axis of evil. The two approaches are divided by an insurmountable fence—the bloody legacy of the Israeli Lebanese experience. The stamp this has imprinted on the Israeli historiographical discourse demonstrates the influence the Lebanese syndrome exerts.

II. WHAT IS THE LEBANESE SYNDROME?

Known in Israeli public and academic discourse as the First Lebanon War, this campaign is both perceived and presented as forming part of Israel's traumatic history. While this view finds expression in diverse contexts that lie beyond the scope of the present article, a number of historical details support the notion

¹ Cited in Lior Lehrs, *Egyptian Plague or Spring of Youth? The Israeli Discourse Regarding the Arab Spring* (Tel Aviv: Metaphim Institute, 2013), 4.

² For further information on the popular uprising in Syria, please to see: David Lesch, *Syria: The Fall of the House of Assad* (New Haven, 2013); Radwan Ziadeh, "Revolution in Syria: The Struggle for freedom in Regional Battle" in: John Davis (ed.), *The Arab Spring and Arab Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy* (London: 2013), pp. 93-111.

that the war constituted a national trauma. The titles of numerous books written in the first decade following its eruption—*A War of Deception*, *Another War*, *Snowball*, *The Lebanese Labyrinth*, etc.—reflect precisely such a reading. The syndrome can be summarized in five points:

- 1) The First Lebanon War was undertaken at Israel's own will and whim. Unlike Israel's other campaigns—1948, 1967, and 1973—the military operation undertaken by the IDF was not supported by a national consensus. Its voluntary nature thus caused much frustration and resentment. The controversy over the Second Lebanese War stemmed directly from that over the First, its goal being to fulfill the Great Oranim Plan.³ The fact that Israel initiated a war that did not, according to its critics, realize its aims, exacerbated the bitterness over the large number of casualties, harm to Israel's reputation, and ongoing enmeshment to which it led. Arye Naor, Israeli Secretary of State between 1977 and 1982 quotes a military officer close to Sharon as saying that, despite substantial reservations, Ariel Sharon's appointment as Minister of Defense was understood as indicating Begin's firm resolve to embrace the military option.⁴
- 2) It was a war of deception in two senses:
 - a) Ariel Sharon's appointment as Minister of Defense constituted a watershed in internal Israeli politics, being viewed as a duping of the Prime Minister, government, and Israeli public into a grandiose plan that never had any chance of succeeding. As veteran Israeli journalists Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari observe:

Born of the ambition of one willful, reckless man, Israel's 1982 invasion of Lebanon was anchored in delusion, propelled by deceit, and bound to end in calamity. It was a war for whose meager gains Israel has paid an enormous price that has yet to be altogether reckoned; a war whose defensive rationale belied far-reaching political aims and an unconscionably myopic policy ... [that] drew Israel into a wasteful adventure that drained much of its inner strength, and cost the IDF the lives of over 500 of its finest men in a vain effort to fulfill a role it was never meant to play.⁵
 - b) Israel was deceived and ultimately betrayed by her Maronite allies. Israeli historiography of the Jewish State's relations with Lebanon has largely theorized that Israel was misled in particular by the Phalanges led by Bashir Gemayel. As Jacques Neriah, Rabin's

political advisor and a great admirer of Gemayel, notes:

To a certain extent, Bachir was not honest about his real intentions, or at the very least was very unclear about his plans for peace. In Israel, they were convinced—and apparently there was something to support his assurance—that Bachir would strive for a very special relationship with Israel ... For this reason, from the very first day of the war, questions such as, "What are you doing? Why aren't they moving? Why aren't they liberating their capital city" bothered the Israeli prime minister.⁶

Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari sharpen the idea of Christian betrayal even further: "The Christian leaders misled Sharon into trusting in the [IDF's] power to impose sovereignty on the state, deceiving him with regard to their true intentions—even though today the party leaders claim that they explained the considerations and spoke clearly."⁷

The motifs of betrayal and deception form the central axis of Israeli accounts of the First Lebanon War. The core argument is that the Maronites—specifically the Phalanges—deliberately duped Israel, drawing it into the Lebanese quagmire in order to strike a mortal blow against the PLO and the Syrian army's military and organizational presence without any intention of keeping their word to join the fighting at some stage to remove the PLO from Beirut.

- 1) The entrenchment of the view that the Jewish State was dragged into a war with which it had nothing to do. This is reflected in statements made by two high-ranking officers who formed part of the command of the military operation in its first year. The sense of moral betrayal and deception by its Christian allies led to the belief—which became prominent after the siege of Beirut—that the war was both unnecessary and futile. Per Rabin's well-known thesis that Israel should "help the Christians help themselves," it was purely a Christian affair. Within a year, many Israelis had thus concluded that the State was sacrificing its young men on the altar of freedom or for the complex/ conflictual reality of Lebanon, entangled by the Maronites in a non-Israeli campaign.⁸
- 4) In addition to the military and political failure, the historical discourse regarding the First Lebanon War is grounded in the belief that Israel was convinced that the IDF could destroy the PLO and establish a pro-Israel regime that would lead to peace between Israel and other Arab states. These assumptions proved specious almost immediately after the IDF's

³ Ronen Dangur, "The Third War of Choice," *Haaretz*, 14 September, 2019 (Hebrew).

⁴ Arye Naor, *Cabinet at War: The Functioning of the Israeli Government during the 1982 Lebanon War* (Tel Aviv: Lahav, 1993) 25 (Hebrew).

⁵ Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari, *War of Deception* (Jerusalem: Schocken, 1984), 380 (Hebrew).

⁶ Jacques Neriah, *The Rise and Fall of Bachir Gemayel: Israel and the Lebanon Quagmire* (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 2018), 263 (Hebrew).

⁷ Schiff and Ya'ari, *War of Deception*, 388.

⁸ Yossi Alpher, *Periphery: Israel's Search for Middle East Allies* (Tel Aviv: Matar, 2015), 79. See also the interview with Amos Yaron, commander of the Beirut area, during the war.

entry into Lebanon. Israeli historiographical, media, and academic discourse regarding the Lebanon War also propounds that the human sacrifice was completely avoidable. Many Israeli public figures thus maintain that its instigators set unrealistic goals that exceeded Israel's military and political capabilities—first and foremost, a new political order in Lebanon. As Schiffer observes:

Israel's ability to influence the establishment of a strong Lebanese government was an illusion—a government formed under Israel's aegis that would last until the IDF left Lebanon. The Christians—of whatever denomination—only had a short-term interest in collaborating with Israel, nothing more. It is a mistake to think that the Christians are united in their worldview regarding what happens in Lebanon. Different factions exist that while appearing to cooperate with one another the moment the IDF departs and they have no one to depend on, will begin to argue amongst themselves. It is difficult to estimate the consequences.⁹

Israeli sociologist Gadi Yatziv, one of the founders of the Peace Now movement that emerged as part of the public protest against the First Lebanon War, espouses a closely corresponding line. In his view, while Israel set itself unachievable goals from the outset, the primary decision-maker sought to frame it in broad political and strategic terms, even promising that it would yield great benefits. While it is impossible to know whether this was a form of self-deception or a hoodwinking of the public, it heavily underestimated the limitations of the use of force—a misconception under which the government labored virtually from the day the IDF crossed the Lebanese border until the Sabra and Shatila massacres. The efforts to “make order”—whether on a trivial or significant level—solely by force of arms, thereby imposing a “new political order,” electing a President, “cleansing territory,” defeating the PLO, and signing a peace agreement with Lebanon on the basis of one successful war were all considered great folly as early as the end of the twentieth century and the end of colonialism. Today, they lie completely beyond the pale—even with respect to the superpowers. With regard to Israel, they are axiomatic principles. The premise guiding the government being unfounded, the goals of the war were unattainable. The latter were multitudinous, changing in light of events on the ground. Beginning as a modest operation to preserve peace in the Galilee, the operation rapidly expanded into an attempt to resolve security and political issues (in some cases even succeeding in addressing global terror)—then reverting once again to a number of unclear aims formulated ambiguously and expressed half-heartedly.¹⁰

Gemayel's assassination in September 1982 opened up a Pandora's box that compounded Israel's entanglement in Lebanon, damaging its international

reputation, creating intolerable economic burdens, and deepening the internal split within Israeli society. The enmeshment derived from Israel's incapacity to free itself from the yoke of its ongoing military presence in Lebanon devoid of any guiding strategic vision or direction. As Schiff and Ya'ari conclude:

A year after the war, Israel began the struggle to extract itself from the Lebanese quagmire. Such processes are often difficult and painful, proper assessment of the whole campaign only being possible right at the end. Israel sought to withdraw in stages, the goal being to halt the ongoing toll while gradually relinquishing a large part of the aims Sharon had set. The immediate test was of the government's ability to prevent this necessary step from becoming a total defeat, thereby weakening its position in future battles; to create a network and alliance in Lebanon going forward that would prevent Syrian patronage and a renewed terrorist base; and above all, to facilitate recovery and rehabilitation, both in the IDF and the political system, in order that such a war, in which Israel lost its way, its belief in its righteousness and confidence being shaken, would not recur.¹¹

Two years after the war, in light of Begin's deep disappointment that the war had not wiped out the PLO, established peace with Lebanon, and brought the idea of a Palestinian State to an end, Schiffer observed in similar vein:

At the end of the summer of 1983, Menahem Begin[']s ... estimations and expectations of furthering Israel's interests and securing the country firmly within the historical borders of Eretz Israel had come to nothing. The pact with the Christians in Lebanon had proven to be a broken reed, the PLO had not been destroyed, the danger of a Palestinian State had not been averted, and above all the division and splits within the people in the wake of the number of casualties and fear of a potential civil war—the worst of all scenarios in Begin's mind—all guided him in light of his moral motives to face reality and say with his last remaining breathe: I can't go on.¹²

- 5) The moral justification of the war also played a role. According to Arye Naor, Sharon's plan focused on Maronite cooperation rather than the destruction of the PLO. Four months before he entered office, Sharon had asserted that Syria had taken over Lebanon and was committing genocide against the Christians. This constituting an Israeli red line, Israeli was morally-ideologically obligated to help the latter.¹³

The linkage in the Israeli public's mind between a war that was not theirs and the ethical illusion of saving the Christians from genocide helps to explain the frustration that underlies the historical Israeli reading of the Lebanon situation. Rather than needing to engage in a military campaign or react in self-defense, Israel initiated an offensive of its own free will—*inter alia*, in

⁹ Shimon Schiffer, *Snowball: The Story Behind the Lebanese War* (Tel Aviv: Idanim, 1984), 162 (Hebrew).

¹⁰ Gadi Yatziv, “The War that Should not Have Broken Out,” in *Lebanon: The Other War*, ed. Rubik Rosenthal (Tel Aviv: Sifriyat Poalim, 1983), 93–94 (Hebrew).

¹¹ Schiff and Ya'ari, *War of Deception*, 388.

¹² Schiffer, *Snowball*, 164–65.

¹³ Naor, Cabinet at War, 26.

pursuit of a moral *ignis fatuus*. The fierce Israeli controversy that erupted over the morality of the First Lebanon War is predicated on the view that it was a voluntarily war that achieved none of its objectives—an ethical chimera and military and moral entanglement that led to human sacrifice and civilian massacres on a shocking scale.

The merging of these three dimensions accounts for the feelings of frustration and self-incrimination that have largely shaped Israeli public consciousness with respect to the Second Lebanon War. As Michael Walzer notes:

In the spring of 1983, I came to the Hebrew University to give a seminar on war and ethics to a group of students, the majority of whom had served in Lebanon (many had had to stop studying in the third semester, traveling back and forth between Jerusalem and the north). We read this book in its English edition and other very varied material, historical and political. I thought it was clear to all the students that according to the criteria laid out herein, the Lebanon war was unjustifiable. The theory of just wars inevitably places sharp restrictions on “wars of choice,” its principal purpose, indeed, being give an ethical explanation of that moment—at the point at which national leaders and even ordinary citizens are choiceless: the moment of self-defense. June 1973 is a prime example; June 1983 the opposite. We may posit that within a large war such as Israel’s Lebanon war, there was a smaller one—the four-kilometer war—that could be justified. But the small war did not take place; the big one did.¹⁴

Since the launch of the Syrian uprising, Israeli strategy towards the crisis has been intertwined with Israeli collective memory concerning the Lebanon civil war. The anxiety over the repetition of a military entanglement in Lebanon has subdued Israel from getting intervened in the Syrian chaos; despite the strategic interest in bringing down the Ba’ath regime or alternatively weakening it greatly, especially following the second Lebanon war, whereas more and more became totally persuaded that the regime has been heading to deepen the alliance with Iran and Hizballah.

III. SYRIA IN THE ISRAELI SECURITY MIND-SET: THE STRONGHOLD OF ANIMOSITY TOWARDS ISRAEL

As Gil Eyal demonstrates, Israeli Orientalism plays a major role in shaping the consciousness and mind-set of the Israeli security and political establishment. Specializing in the modern history of the region, Israeli Orientalists analyze the Arab-Islamic milieu from a strictly security perspective. This serves as a value criterion that determines the moral judgement of and political position towards the Arab milieu. As Eyal evinces, Israeli Middle Eastern experts have been

preeminent since the establishment of the State, not only formulating the Israeli public’s vision of the Arab world but also demarcating the cultural and political boundaries between Israel and its surroundings. Accordingly, experts and institutes of Middle Eastern studies play “a crucial role in shaping the dominant definition of reality through which Israelis perceive themselves and the Middle Eastern world around them”.¹⁵

This logic is clearly reflected in academic studies on the modern history of Syria. These have long been the forte of scholars embedded in every level of the Israeli security establishment, exemplified by figures such as Eliezer Barry, Moshe Ma’oz, Itamar Rabinovich, and Eyal Zisser. Avraham Sela, who held senior positions in the army and security establishment, follows the same line. In an article published in *Maarachot*, the Israeli Ministry of Defense journal, he argues that since it gained independence, Syria has promoted the issue of Palestine more than any other Arab State. In line with the League of Arab of States (LAS), the country has fulfilled all its financial obligations in this regard. It also has prominently supported the resolution calling for an economic boycott of the Zionist settlement enterprise in Palestine, becoming the first Arab State to enact boycott laws and sentence anyone found guilty of engaging in economic relations with the Zionist settlement enterprise in Palestine to death.¹⁶

The Syrian state also backed Fawzi al-Qawuqji’s efforts to form the Salvation Army, making Syrian army bases, particularly the Qatana encampment, available for training Palestinian fighters and volunteers.¹⁷ After February 1948, when it became increasingly clear that the Arab states would not fulfil their commitment to support the irregular forces that had entered Palestine, Syria and Iraq were the only two countries that sought to keep their word on Palestine.

Syrian ideology is also predicated on the struggle against the Zionist settlement enterprise. While the newly independent country failed to win the support of any of the superpowers, it rushed to provide the Salvation Army with material and weapons from its modest arsenals. As Sela observes, these were sometimes taken from statutory units of the Syrian army—the first unit of the Salvation Army to arrive in Palestine being led by a Syrian, Colonel Adib Shishakli, for example.¹⁸ Despite the Syrian army’s poor performance in the 1948/1949 war, Syria distinguished itself from other Arab states by its “extremist” position both during it and afterwards. Opposing the first truce

¹⁴ Michael Walzer, *Just and Unjust Wars*, trans. Yoram Bronowski (Tel Aviv: Am Oved, 1984), 8-9 (for obvious reasons, this passage does not exist in the original English version).

¹⁵ Gil Eyal, *The Disenchantment of Orient: Expertise in Arab Affairs and Israeli State* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), p. 185.

¹⁶ Avraham Sela, “Syria and the Question of Palestine: From the Establishment of the Arab League to the Armistice Agreement,” *Maarachot* 294–295 (1984): 46–51 (Hebrew).

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 48.

¹⁸ *Ibid*, 49.

and extension of the second, it was also the last Arab State to sign the armistice agreements with Israel in 1949.¹⁹

Sela's analysis closely parallels that of Prof. Moshe Ma'oz, who maintains that, despite its modest military capabilities, Syria took the lead in declaring an economic boycott of Israel and becoming the first Arab State to implement the LAS resolutions on the deployment of military forces on the border.²⁰ Following earlier scholars, Zisser points to Syria's ideological hostility as a hallmark of its attitude towards Israel and one of the central factors behind the eruption of the 1967 war. Deriving from Ba'ath principles, it is embodied in Damascus' refusal to recognize Israel's right of existence and engage in any negotiations to resolve the Israeli-Arab conflict. Even more important for our present purposes, it also forms part of the propaganda rhetoric that includes calls for wiping Israel off the map and a series of militant Syrian moves.²¹ The idea that Syria serves as a stronghold of enmity towards Israel cannot be separated from the existing links between Syria and pan-Arabism, particularly in the wake of the establishment of the United Arab Republic. As Be'eri observes:

Syrian unification with Egypt was an unprecedented event in modern history, two non-neighbouring countries unifying at the behest of the smaller. Although due to current circumstances and short lived, its roots lay deep in Syrian public consciousness, Damascus always being the prime object of any aspiration to create a great Arab or Muslim nation, constituting the active center and projector of unification.²²

Itamar Rabinovich holds Syria primarily to blame for the collapse of the peace negotiations during the 1990s.²³ According to the latter, Asad rejected the Israeli scheme and its economic aspects as directed against Arab nationalism. Forcibly dragged into the peace process, he negotiated with Israel "resentfully and grudgingly because it was something he had been forced to do."²⁴ Rabinovich thus portrays him as a reluctant peacemaker who only agreed to what he could not avoid, displaying his dissatisfaction with the way the political process was proceeding. Although Arab nationalism, Arab unity, revolution and Ba'athism have lost prestige in the Arab world, these principles are anchored in Syrian national identity and politics. Asad

was thus expected to toe the line.²⁵ The antithesis of Anwar al-Sadat, who was characterized by his vision of peace and reconciliation, he was a cautious tactician, his refusal to meet with his Israeli interlocutors and the severe restrictions he imposed on the negotiators obstructing the negotiations.²⁶

These historical reviews of Syria's initial positions towards the conflict in Palestine give weight to the dominant Orientalist perspective regarding Syria and its leading role in the conflict with Zionism and Israel. This perception thus supports the claim made within Israeli Orientalist and decision-making circles that Syria is a tenacious foe. Creative security strategic thinking being required to remove the threat to Israel posed by Syria and everything for which it stands, projects for fragmenting Syria commenced.²⁷

IV. DISMANTLING THE "AXIS OF EVIL"

Israel did not hide its glee over the uprising against the Assad regime—long regarded as the key link in the axis of evil extending from Tehran to Beirut. In December 2011, then Minister of Defence Ehud Barak optimistically announced that the Assad regime was so precarious that it would fall within a few weeks, fatally undermining the Iran-Hizballah axis.²⁸ From an Israeli perspective, he was convinced that it was better for the Baath regime to collapse than survive, even if the price was Hizballah gaining chemical weapons—the ultimate effect being a weak Iran.²⁹

Amos Gilead, political and security Head of Section at the Ministry of Defence, expressed a similar view. Underestimating the threat jihadist organisations might have posed if Islamists had taken power in Syria, he observed that "with due respect to such a danger, the threat posed by the Iran-Syria-Hizballah axis is much greater to Israel."³⁰ In reality, Israel is well aware of the risks involved if the Syrian regime does fall, the northern front having been quiet for the past four decades. Such a scenario would also raise questions regarding the future of its arsenal of strategic weapons (including long range missiles), the disintegration of the Syrian state, and instability along Israel's northern border.

²⁵ Ibid, 264–65.

²⁶ Itamar Rabinovich, *The Brink of Peace: Israel and Syria, 1992–1996* (Tel-Aviv: Miskal, 1998), 323–34 (Hebrew).

²⁷ Conceptualizing Syria as stronghold of animosity and antagonism towards Israel; led Israeli officials to suggest plans for disintegration of the Syrian state; see: Yusri Hazran, "A people that shall dwell alone: is that so? Israel and the minorities alliance" *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 56, Issue 3 (2020), pp. 396–411.

²⁸ Lahav Harkov, "Barak: Assad will be toppled within weeks," *Haaretz*, 2 January, 2012 (Hebrew).

²⁹ "Ehud Barak: "Better for Assad to fall even if Hizballah get chemical weapons," *Globes*, 22 August, 2011 (Hebrew).

³⁰ Amon Gilead, "Al-Qaeda activists waiting for the chance to take over Syria," *Walla News*, 2 April, 2013: <http://news.walla.co.il/?w=9/2629505> (Hebrew).

¹⁹ Ibid, 51.

²⁰ Moshe Ma'oz, *Syria: To Arabism and Back* (Ra'anana: Open University Press, 2011), 46–48 (Hebrew).

²¹ Eyal Zisser, "Syria – From the Six-Day War to the Syrian Civil War," *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 44.4 (2017): 545–58.

²² Eliezer Be'eri, *The Officer Class in Politics and Society of the Arab East* (Tel Aviv: Workers' Book-Guild, 1966), 100 (Hebrew). *Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society* (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 100.

²³ Itamar Rabinovich, *The Lingering Conflict: Israel, the Arabs, and the Middle East, 1948–2011* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2011), 264.

²⁴ Ibid.

Israel obviously hopes that the current Syrian regime will be replaced by a moderate "Sunni" one close to Saudi Arabia that can spearhead the confrontation with Iran and Hizballah.³¹ Michael Hertzog, former military secretary to Minister of Security Shaul Mofaz and office director to former Minister of Defence Ehud Barak, for example, proposed that an international force intervene in support of regional elements, backing the opposition and expediting the Syrian regime's downfall.³²

Former commander of military intelligence and current political affairs Head of Section at the Ministry of Security, Amos Yadlin maintains that, the Arab Spring having weakened the radical anti-Israel axis, Israeli should intervene militarily in Syria in order to oust Assad and halt his killing spree against his own citizens.³³ Assad's fall not only serves Israeli interests but also constitutes a moral responsibility—even when not supported by any international consensus.³⁴

Espoused by a high-profile Israeli military official, this perspective evinces that the primary factor determining Israel's position towards the Syrian crisis has been the strategic threat posed by Hizballah. As long as Syria serves as a stronghold, arms supplier, and devoted ally of the terror organization, a simple calculation demonstrates that the downfall of the regime in Syria will strike a severe blow at Hizballah. Israel would then find it easy to confront the latter, the balance of power between them having become completely disproportionate. When Israelis look at Syria, their focus lies on Lebanon, the Hizballah presence therein constituting a strategic threat to Israel's security and stability. The fall of the Syria regime would also inevitably remove the Syrian link from the "axis of evil," ultimately undermining and backing Iran in its own backyard—i.e., the Gulf region.

Prof. Moshe Ma'oz, expert in Syria's modern history, biographer of Hafez al-Assad, former chairman of the Harry S. Truman Research Institute for the Advancement of Peace at the Hebrew University, and former advisor to the Israeli government, is unconcerned by the Islamist rise to power. Citing the "enemy of my enemy is my friend" principle, he argues that Israel can turn this state of affairs to its benefit. If Israel responds to the Arab peace initiative and resolves the Palestinian conflict, it can develop a strategic coalition with the

Sunni Arab States to counter the Iranian threat in the region. This will only work on the basis of the two-state solution and Saudi peace initiative, however.³⁵

With respect to Syria, Ma'oz argues that the assumption of power by the Muslim Brotherhood's in the event of the fall of the Ba'ath regime would pose no threat to Israel, the movement being likely to join the forum of moderate Islamic states—including Indonesia, Turkey, and Tunisia—who side with the West. Most importantly, any regime it might form would undoubtedly be at odds with Hizballah and Iran, both of which back the Ba'ath regime. If the Muslim Brotherhood took power in Syria, Syria could become part of a regional coalition consisting of Turkey and Saudi Arabia—and perhaps even Israel—dedicated to stemming the Shi'ite tide.³⁶

This security-military logic is not the only factor that explains the Israeli establishment's positive response to the outbreak of the Syrian revolution and Syria's slide towards civil war, the ideological element also playing a major role. As Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defence, Avigdor Lieberman repeatedly called on the international community to intervene in Syria and put an end to the bloodbath, further proposing that Israel provide a safe haven for Syrian refugees along the border.³⁷ In July 2017, he declared that Israel could not allow the regime to continue because "as long as Assad is in power, Iran and Hizballah will remain in Syria."³⁸ Yuval Benziman of the Hebrew University holds that the "Arab Spring" introduced the idea that the Middle East is divided between the axis of evil (Iran and its regional allies and radical Islamic organizations) and the axis of moderates (primarily the Sunni Gulf monarchies).³⁹

This Israeli sense of *schadenfreude* and sympathy for the uprising, was manifested *par excellence* by former Director of General Intelligence Avi Dichter in a recorded TV appeal to the Syrian people: "I am distraught over the world's silence regarding the heinous crimes committed by the Syrian forces against innocent citizens." Rhetorically questioning Arab and Western power "Where is the Arab nation? Where is the Arab League? Where are the millions? Where is the United Nations?"—he also apologized to the Syrian people for Israel's failure to intervene in well-known regional causes.⁴⁰

³¹ In this context, see former military intelligence officer Eran Lerman's hypothesis regarding "states of stability" in Shlomo Prom and Ophir Winter, *Developing a Regional Alliance against Israel: Obstacles and Warning Signals* (Hebrew); p. 44. Ophir Winter, ed., *No One is Infallible* (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2019), 44 (Hebrew).

³² Michael Hertzog, "Grabbing the opportunity in Syria," *Haaretz*, 18 June, 2012 (Hebrew).

³³ B. Feller, "Amos Yadlin: The Arab Spring is more opportunity than risk," *Ynet*, 28 August, 2011: <http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4088468,00.html> (Hebrew).

³⁴ Elhanan Miller, "Ex-intel chief: Israel should punish Assad for killing civilians," *Times of Israel*, 13 May, 2014.

³⁵ Moshe Ma'oz, *Political Islam and the Arab Spring: The Israeli Discourse following the Arab Spring* (Tel Aviv: Mitvim), 4 (Hebrew).

³⁶ *Ibid*, 5–6.

³⁷ Minister of Foreign Affairs, "The Massacre in Syria is Unbearable," 4 March, 2014: <http://www.inn.co.il/News/News.aspx/234512> (Hebrew).

³⁸ *Jerusalem Post*, 2 July, 2017.

³⁹ Yuval Benziman, "Netanyahu's Attempt to Delink Arab-Israeli Relations from the Palestinian Issue," in *Israel's Relations with Arab Countries: The Unfulfilled Potential*, ed. Roei Kibrik, Nimrod Goren, and Merav Kahana-Dagan (Tel Aviv: Mitvim, 2020), 17: <https://tinyurl.com/y79wcthm> (Hebrew).

⁴⁰ Avi Dichter, "The Arab world is ignoring the Syrian people": <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3rGhmcZu6lw> (Arabic).

This gloating over Syria's fate has not turned into holistic intervention, however. *Contra* frequent statements, this circumstance does not reflect the fact that Israelis favour the regime's survival over its overthrow. According to Elie Podeh and Moshe Maoz, the trend prevalent within the Israeli public and ruling circles reflects the belief that the uprisings serve Israeli strategic interests, it thus being better for the two sides—the regime and the opposition—to continue fighting. In their view, the ongoing revolt and war suggest that the significant weakening of the Syrian army, the erosion of Hezbollah's power, the chemical weapons disarmament, and the regime's cutting of ties with Hamas all favour Israeli strategic interests. Both the official echelons and Israeli public hope that the regime will be replaced and the wish that it remains in a weakened state are predicated on the decision not to become directly involved in the war. The imprint of the Lebanese syndrome upon the Israeli consciousness functions as a real deterrent against any direct military intervention that might smack of the 1982 entanglement.⁴¹

Some Israeli analysts nevertheless take a different line, maintaining that the question of whether the regime is overthrown or survives is a marginal issue, overridden by two other issues: 1) preventing *takfiri* jihadist organisations from gaining access to the Israeli border; and 2) thwarting Iran and its allied militias from penetrating Syria, particularly along the border. This policy rested on the so-called "the devil we know" principle—namely, that the survival of the Syrian regime is preferable to its removal. Then Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon articulated this vision in opposing then US President George Bush's proposal to move from Iraq into Syria in order to oust the subsidiary Ba'ath regime in Syria. In his view, "The devil that we know" was better than any alternative or unknown future, particularly in light of Syria's incapacity to launch a military attack against Israel.⁴²

This policy began showing cracks in the aftermath of the Second Lebanese War, however. To Israelis, this reflected the depth of the strategic alliance between the Iran-led axes in the region. A central figure in the security and diplomatic establishment in Israel, Itamar Rabinovich, identified two schools of thought regarding the preferred Israeli outcome of the Syrian crisis: a) the regime's downfall was the best option for Israel in the long term, implying a weakened Hizballah and Iran in the region; and b) Although Rabinovich

espoused the second view, he warned against the consequences of getting involved, arguing that Israel's security and strategic interests must be maintained without any Israeli presence in Syrian territory.⁴³ The cautionary approach promoted by Rabinovich regarding Syria, undoubtedly reminds of the circumspect strategy adopted by Yizhak Rabin towards the Lebanese crisis of the 1970s; based on the principle of non-military intervention in Lebanon and "helping the Christians to help themselves."⁴⁴

Zisser's reading constitutes a continuation to that of his former. The regime's fall is perceived as undermining the axis of evil. In the words of Eyal Zisser:

In any case, those calling for shunning involvement in Syria or those hoping Bashar will stay in power have begun to be replaced by others urging that it would be best for Israel, and likewise the US and other Western countries, to let Bashar continue to bleed, and it may even be best if he falls, for that would weaken the radical axis in the Middle East, which would serve Israeli interests.⁴⁵

This reading corresponds to that of Itamar Rabinovich, expert in Syrian affairs, chief negotiator, and director of negotiations under the second Rabin government. Rabinovich posited that Israel had two options: not to intervene and preserve its critical interests or to aid armed opposition and expedite the overthrow of the regime. While the Israeli leadership was expected to adopt the second, in particular in light of the growing Iranian presence, the weak opposition and fear of repeating the Lebanese spectacle overrode the temptation to intervene in the Syrian crisis and attempt to determine the Ba'ath regime's fate.⁴⁶

Not everyone accepts Rabinovich's pessimistic outlook and focus on Iran's growing influence and Hizballah's enhanced combat capacity. Some believe that developments in the Syrian uprising favour Israel's security and military interests, the revolution not only destroying the Syrian infrastructure and economy but also reducing Syria's human, military, and combat capacities. The Syrian armed forces have dropped in number from around 290,000 at the time the revolution erupted to some 90,000 soldiers and combatants, almost 2,000 tanks and 60 percent of the air force capability also being lost. The Syrian revolution and descent into civil war have thus removed the last traditional threat to the security of the Jewish State, no

⁴³ Ibid.

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⁴⁵ Eyal Zisser, "The Crisis in Syria: Threats and Opportunities for Israel," in *Strategic Survey for Israel, 2012–2013*, ed. Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2013), 181.

⁴⁶ Itamar Rabinovich. "The USA and Israel in the face of Syria of Bashar al-Assad: Challenges, Dilemmas, and Options," *Landscape of Policies* 23.4 (2020): 69–71: <https://www.inss.org.il/publication/the-united-states-and-israel-vs-the-syria-of-bashar-al-assad-challenges-dilemmas-and-options/>

⁴¹ Elie Podeh and Moshe Maoz, *Bashir Against Bashar: The Failure of the Popular uprising in Syria and its Implication* in: Elie Podeh and Onn Winckler (eds.), *The Third Wave- Protest and Revolution in the Middle East* (Jerusalem: Karmel, 2017), pp. 167–68 (Hebrew).

⁴² Itamar Rabinovich. "The devil we know: The Israeli vision of the future of Assad's regime," *A View from Above* 427 (2019): 1–2 (Hebrew).

Arab army posing a threat to its security in either the short or the medium term.⁴⁷

Israel adopted a proactive course of action, constructing a wall and opening up communications with the armed opposition groups in the Golan Heights with a view to maintaining the *status quo* in the border area and preventing the return of government forces. As Iranian military intervention and Hizballah engagement in the fight against the Syrian opposition increased, Israel's concerns became more acute, its policy shifting from liaison to the extension of aid and assistance to opposition groups on the principle that "half a loaf is better than none": all alternatives—namely, return of the regime forces to the border area—are the lesser of two evils.

In spite of its apprehensions over being dragged into the simmering conflict in Syria, Israel eventually made its options clear, preferring any alternative to the continued existence of the Iran- and Hizballah-allied Ba'ath regime—even if these involved Islamist jihadist organisations. The worst case scenario was that the regime survived. In late 2017, the BBC and *Haaretz* released a detailed report regarding Operation Good Fence launched by the IDF in the Golan Heights in 2013. The special army unit created was tasked with liaising with the armed opposition groups and providing logistical and health assistance to these and Syrian civilians in the Syrian Golan Heights. Between 2013 and 2017, Israeli hospitals admitted some 4,000 injured Syrians, mostly young men wounded in combat.⁴⁸ According to an IDF statement, it delivered 450,000 litres of fuel, 50,000 tonnes of clothes, and 113,000 tonnes of food supplies to these elements. In addition to erecting a field hospital, it also paid monthly wages to combatants—the Fursan al-Joulani (Knights of the Golan) commander acknowledging that he had been paid US\$5,000.⁴⁹

Israel took no pains to conceal that it was motivated by more than purely humanitarian concerns, openly claiming coordination with opposition groups, including both Islamist and jihadist factions. Not only did it share the goal of overthrowing the Ba'ath regime with the Syrian opposition in all its form, orientations, and rationales, but the Good Fence operation also sought to win over the local population and refugees fleeing undesirable elements, the Syrian government, and allied groups. Israel's interest explicitly lay in creating a buffer

zone along the Israeli-Syrian border that would be empty of Syrian army personnel, pro-regime militias, Lebanese Hizballah members, and other forces allied with Iran.

The complexity and interweaving of the deterrent effect of the Lebanese syndrome and conceptualization of Syria as a stronghold of hostility and hatred towards Israel with the view that the uprisings form a historic opportunity for bringing about strategic change in Israel's favor is clearly reflected in Eyal Zisser's analysis of the events. This assumes even greater significance in light of the fact that Zisser embodies the link between academic Orientalism and the security establishment:

The reality that has engulfed Syria since the outbreak of the uprising against Bashar al-Assad's regime presents a host of complex dilemmas for Israel. Jerusalem may have seen the Syrian regime as hostile, if not dangerous, due to its membership in the axis of evil, along with Iran, Hizballah, and Hamas. Nonetheless, the same regime made sure to maintain total quiet along the shared border in the Golan Heights ... True, the fall of Bashar's regime could deal a severe blow to Iran and Hizballah, but at the same time, it could enable al-Qaeda-inspired terror elements to establish themselves along the Syria-Israel border ...⁵⁰

V. CONCLUSION

The outbreak of the Syrian uprising marked a paradigmatic shift in the Israeli perspective on the Arab uprisings, offering a real glimmer of hope of the collapse of the Tehran-led "axis of evil." In an attempt to explore the outcome of the Syrian crisis from an Israeli perspective, Ehud Yaari, an experienced Israeli journalist, argues that Israel emerged empty-handed from the crisis in Syria. Against all predictions, the regime has survived, the Iranian military presence continues, and Hizballah combat cells and units have taken up positions within Syria and along the border. According to Yaari, Israel committed a strategic blunder in failing to intervene in the Syrian civil war and deal a deathblow to the Ba'ath regime.⁵¹ Zisser similarly implies that Israel has missed a historic opportunity in taking the strategic decision not to intervene militarily in the Syrian civil war, thereby averting Assad's overthrow:

The imminent end of the civil war in Syria has prompted a sense amongst some Israelis of having missed an opportunity—the feeling that the country has refrained from intervening in a neighbouring country in order to overthrow Assad's regime and thereby strike a decisive blow against the axis of evil (Iran and Hezbollah), perhaps even shaping a new order in its image and according to its desires.⁵² The

⁴⁷ Avi Jager, "Syria: The Decline of the Last Conventional Threat," BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 1,707 (2020): 1–4.

⁴⁸ See Sam McNeil, "Israel treating thousands of Syrians injured in war," *The Independent*, 8 April, 2017: <https://www.independent.co.uk/author/sam-mcneil>

⁴⁹ See BBC Arabic, "Israeli Good Fence operation in the Syrian Golan Heights," 15 November, 2017: <https://www.bbc.com/arabic/middle-east-41975936> (Arabic); see also: Udi Dekel, Nir Boms and Ofir Winter, Syria: New Map, New Actor (Tel-Aviv: INSS, 2015), P. 28; Amos Haarel, "The aid which IDF provides to the inhabitants of villages in the Golan Heights- not altruism, still comandable" *Haaretz*, 19 July 2017.

⁵⁰ Eyal Zisser, "The Crisis in Syria: Threats and Opportunities for Israel," in *Strategic Survey for Israel, 2012–2013*, ed. Anat Kurz and Shlomo Brom (Tel Aviv: Institute for National Security Studies, 2013), 168.

⁵¹ Ehud Yaari's lecture, given at The Shalem Academic College at Jerusalem, December, 4, 2019.

⁵² Eyal Zisser, *Syria at War: The Rise and Fall of the Revolution in Syria* (Tel Aviv: Ma'arachot, 2020), 368 (Hebrew).

reason for this, in his view, is the fact that “burned by the Lebanese experiment, Israeli leadership, both political and military is wary of interfering in any way in a neighbouring country.”⁵³

Although Israel decided not to intervene, either directly or covertly, in surrounding events unless its security interests were threatened, Israel was aware of the effect of taking military action against the regime. Its reluctance derives from strategic constraints rather than constituting a strategic option. Not reconciling its elation over the collapse of Syrian state sovereignty with the regime’s authority, it did not intervene to finish off the regime out of fear of the Lebanese syndrome. Israel increasingly wished for the breakdown of the Ba’ath regime. Still, the anxiety from the recurrence of the Lebanese syndrome has pounded Israel’s hands and limited its strategic options. This decision of non-intervention was reinforced by the fact that Syria is now no longer its most potent adversary. The inevitable affiliation between Syria, “the stronghold of animosity” towards Israel, and the strategic alliances of the Ba’ath Regime with Iran and Hezbollah, makes it so that the downfall of the regime is a strategic and even national aspiration for Israel. Israel’s governmental and media circles had exhibited much sympathy towards the uprising however, the state refrained from any active involvement against the regime. The fear of repeating “the Lebanon Syndrome,” in which the military is dragged into the chaos of a civil war was the reason no ambition to get the Israeli military involved arose. Thus, Israel had abstained from taking military action that could have potentially weakened elements that are hostile to Israel.

Despite the trend prompted by numerous cautions, the attitude taken by high-ranking officials, and prominent positions in the Israeli public sphere, Israeli scholars contend that public and governmental circles in the country adopt one of two approaches: a) a clear preference for replacing Assad’s regime due to the weakening of the “axis of evil”; and b) the regime, even if injured and bloodied, still serves Israeli interests, the continued uprisings and war further undermining its status and thus preventing it from posing a conventional threat to Israel. In both cases, Israel refuses to become directly involved militarily in the conflict in Syria. This stance is an immediate consequence of Israel’s longstanding entanglement in Lebanon. Israeli military intervention in the Lebanese second civil war in an attempt to influence Lebanese politics having been an abject failure, the State has become very wary of any “adventures” that might drag it into the “Lebanese quagmire” a second time (the first being in 1982).

In a report published on the ten-year anniversary of the outbreak of the uprisings/war in Syria, the authors—members of the Institute for National

Security Studies—recommended that Israel should take a dramatically new approach to Syria, abandoning the traditional attitude of sitting on the fence in favour of intervening in three strategically important regions—southern Syria, north-eastern Syria, and the Syrian-Lebanese border. According to this report, the present reality demands a reassessment of Israeli policy, non-involvement having become implausible on three grounds related to remaining of Assad in power and the increasing of Iranian involvement in Syria.⁵⁴ The report recommends that the Israeli government encourage and promote a broad initiative for removing Assad from power in exchange for international restraint and the Gulf States’ support for Syria’s rehabilitation. On this view, Israel must take short-term risks to prevent Iran from taking control of Syria—namely, increasing its involvement in the three regions noted above.

Israel has benefited from the developments of the Syrian crisis; nonetheless the reluctance from land one last blow on the regime can’t be disconnected from the bloody heritage of the Lebanese syndrome.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Udi Dekel & Carmit Valensi, “After a Decade of War in Syria, Israel Should Change its Policy” INSS Insight, No. 1451 (April, 2021), pp. 5-6.



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International Law and the Politics of Diplomatic Recognition of States and Government: Critical Discuss

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Abstract- A new state is born out from an existing State or an old State which disappeared and comes with a new name or by splitting an existing State into two States. If a new state enjoys certain rights, privileges and obligations then it must get recognition as a state, which is very essential. However, there are some minimum criteria required before a State is considered to be a State. A State must get the De Jure (when a state is legally recognized) recognition for considering a State as a sovereign State. Political thought plays an important role in this decision whether to grant recognition or not. For recognition as a State, it must enter into relations with the other existing States. Recognition is a unilateral act performed by the recognizing State's government. The creation of states and their subsequent recognition remain among the most problematic, yet important, aspects of international law and politics. It may be express or implicit. The act of recognition does not necessarily require the use of the terms recognition or recognize. Recognition is more than a word. A State may simply say that it acknowledges, regards, considers, deals with, or treats a group in a certain capacity, in order to convey its recognition.

Keywords: international law, politics, diplomacy, recognition of state and government.

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INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE POLITICS OF DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT CRITICAL DISCUSS

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International Law and the Politics of Diplomatic Recognition of States and Government: Critical Discuss

Vincent O.S. Okeke

Abstract A new state is born out from an existing State or an old State which disappeared and comes with a new name or by splitting an existing State into two States. If a new state enjoys certain rights, privileges and obligations then it must get recognition as a state, which is very essential. However, there are some minimum criteria required before a State is considered to be a State. A State must get the De Jure (when a state is legally recognized) recognition for considering a State as a sovereign State. Political thought plays an important role in this decision whether to grant recognition or not. For recognition as a State, it must enter into relations with the other existing States. Recognition is a unilateral act performed by the recognizing State's government. The creation of states and their subsequent recognition remain among the most problematic, yet important, aspects of international law and politics. It may be express or implicit. The act of recognition does not necessarily require the use of the terms recognition or recognize. Recognition is more than a word. A State may simply say that it acknowledges, regards, considers, deals with, or treats a group in a certain capacity, in order to convey its recognition. Recognition will be stalled indefinitely and only granted once domestic sovereignty is definitively and irreversibly established. It is only under these circumstances that the international legal criteria, however ambiguous, rather accurately determine secessionist success (though recognition's timing will remain uncertain). In sum, the international politics of recognition are essential in understanding which actors among the scores of potential new members will be accepted into the international community of States. To an important extent, nascent states are either elevated to State membership or excluded from it by powerful, existing members. In all, the essence of this paper is x-ray, among other things the position of law and politics in the diplomatic recognition of states and government in Africa. The paper addresses the concept of 're-cognitionality' to capture the reality and adequate nature of recognition practices in world politics. Finally the elements, theories, and processes of recognitions are reflected in this paper for purposes of clarity.

Keywords: international law, politics, diplomacy, recognition of state and government.

1. INTRODUCTION

State recognition is one of the oldest practices in international law and relations, and one of the most vexed concepts in international law. Since the middle Ages, political communities have interacted with each other as sovereign territorial states under an accepted system of rules (Brierly, 1955, Gëzim, 2021, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003). To determine

which entities are to be recognized as states subject to these rules has hence been a basic component of international relations? With the recent secession of South Sudan, the long-running discussion of state recognition is once again a pressing concern of foreign offices and topic of interest for international lawyers and political theorists. State recognition is currently a matter handled exclusively by the UN Security Council. In order for a political entity to be recognized as a state, a majority of members in the Council must vote in favor of recognition, without any of the permanent members vetoing this decision. As others have pointed out, the veto power as it presently works is morally arbitrary in that it distributes decision-making power inequitably. Furthermore, it prevents constructive deliberation by freezing discussions about recognition whenever it is clear that a permanent member will veto the decision (Keohane and Buchanan, 2004, Baylis, Steve; and Patricia, 2008). The question of the legal effect of recognition of new entities claiming to be "States" has been characterized for over a century by the "great debate" between the "constitutive" and "declaratory" schools of thought. While the former contends that a State only becomes a State by virtue of recognition, the latter - which is now widely accepted - argues that a State is a State because it is a State, that is, because it meets all the international legal criteria for statehood. In the first case recognition is status-creating; in the latter it is merely status-confirming. International lawyers and States do not always distinguish clearly between the requirements for recognition of an entity as a State (the criteria for statehood) and the requirements for recognition of a State, that is, the preconditions for entering into optional or discretionary - diplomatic, political, cultural or economic - relations with the entity (the conditions for recognition). While the former are prescribed by international law, the latter may vary from State to State (Talmon, 2008, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003, Lauterpacht, 1947, Talmon, 2004). The subject of recognition has been complicated by the use of several variants of the term, such as "*de facto* recognition," "diplomatic recognition," "*de jure* recognition," and "full recognition". Like "recognition," these terms can be given meaning only by establishing the intention of the State using them within the factual and legal context of each case. "Diplomatic recognition" is usually used to indicate a willingness to enter into formal diplomatic relations (i.e., exchange ambassadors, establish embassies, and so forth)

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(Talmon, 2011, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003, Evans & Capps, 2009, Dugard, 1987, James, 1986). On the basis of the above analysis, this paper set to interrogates the position of law and politics in diplomatic recognition of states and government with special reference to Africa. Accordingly, the elements, theories, and processes are reflected in this paper for purposes of clarity.

II. UNDERSTANDING RECOGNITION OF STATES AND GOVERNMENT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLITICS

The right of a *people* to self-determination is a cardinal principle in modern *international law* (commonly regarded as a *jus cogens* rule), binding, as such, on the *United Nations* as authoritative interpretation of the *Charter's* norms (McWhinney, Edward 2007). Despite the fact that many ethnic groups, movements and regions have sought to create their own sovereign state, only a very small fraction of ethnic groups seeking independence have managed to become internationally recognized states (Griffiths, 2016, 2019). In addition to 193 UN Member States, we have over 10 de facto and partially recognized states, and over 40 partially independent and non-self-governing territories (Caspersen, 2014). The term "recognition," when used in the context of recognition of States and governments in international law, may have several different meanings. While there is no exact definition of state recognition in a broad sense recognition entails, As (Gëzim, 2021) has noted, 'the resulting fragmented body of knowledge on state recognition has prevented the development of more comprehensive and reality-adequate accounts that take into account the politics, law, history, sociology and economics of state recognition in theory and practice.' The concept of recognitionality can be useful as a heuristic to look at state recognition as a process not entirely shaped by power, legal norms, institutions and material condition, but also constituted through diplomatic discourses, performances and entanglements (Gëzim, 2021) As Ryan D Griffiths (2019) argues, "there is an international regime which 'determines when an applicant has the right to withdraw from an existing state and join the club of sovereign states. Yet, making sense of diplomatic recognition requires looking at the micro-moves and everyday practices, spaces, emotions and personal diplomacy. It is not sufficient to only look at the legal and institutional rules. It requires acknowledging the multidimensional nature of recognition and opening up to different scale, forms and varieties of recognition, as well as capturing the contextual and temporal nature of such practices. By un-raveling the techniques and politics of re-cognitionality,..." is to capture the reality-adequate for recognition practices in world politics today.

Most importantly, existing literature lacks a critical outlook of state recognition as an un-codified norm and scattered practice in world politics. In a more inclusive sense 'the practice of states conferring recognition upon newcomers, which is considered to be an important element of independent statehood and a crucial blessing for admission to the international community of sovereign states' (Visoka et al., 2020). It denotes under international law, a process whereby certain facts are accepted and endowed with a certain legal status, such as statehood, sovereignty over newly acquired territory, or the international effects of the grant of nationality or 'a *unilateral* declarative political act of a state that acknowledges an act or status of another state or government in control of a state (may be also a recognized state).' Furthermore, 'recognition of states plays a central role in shaping world politics. It can be a cause of state death, birth, or resurrection. It can be a source of conflict and peace, a source of justice but also of discrimination and subordination. It can be a safeguard to state expansion and international order, but also can be a source of collective self-determination and liberation. It can reproduce the existing state system but also open up space for normative change and emancipation.' (Gëzim, 2021). International recognition plays a vital role in the political, security, legal, economic and socio-cultural development of states (Rezvani, 2015). It enables states protection under international law, 'access to multilateral bodies and the possibility to develop diplomatic and trade relations with other states. It may also indicate the recognizing State's willingness to enter into official relations with a new State or government, or manifest its opinion on the legal status of a new entity or authority, or both. While, international recognition might not guarantee successful statehood, its absence certainly poses many challenges for surviving an inhospitable international environment' (Craven and Parfitt, 2018). States which lack full international recognition are more likely to become subject to foreign military occupation and hybrid wars (Fabry, 2010). Limited diplomatic relations – an inherent condition of unrecognized states – undermines the capacity of these entities to enhance their political, security and trade relations with other recognized states, leading to economic stagnation, poverty and social isolation (Geldenhuis, 2009). Although the subject of state recognition is widely studied in law, comparative politics and area studies, there is still no consolidated research programme which critically interrogates the recognition of states in theory and practice. So far, the subject of state recognition has remained a sub-category of other research programmes, such as those examining international norms, sovereignty, secession, self-determination, international intervention, great power politics, preventive diplomacy, violent conflicts, ethnicity, identity politics and conflict resolution, economic diplomacy (Gëzim, 2021).

The subject matter has been complicated by the introduction of several variants of the terminologies in international law and relations. More elaborately, the 'seeking state recognition as diplomatic performance challenges the solid and reified accounts of recognition as an intentional act and opens up the possibility for exploring different agencies, stages and tactics involved in the practice of state recognition' (Gëzim, 2021). Here distinctions between "*de facto* recognition," "diplomatic recognition" and "*de jure* recognition" may be traced back to the secession of the Spanish provinces in South America in early 19th century. Like "recognition," these terms can be given meaning only by establishing the intention of the authority using them within the factual and legal context of each case (Talmon, 2000, Crawford, 2006, 1977, Guilhot Nicolas, ed. 2011).

Recognition is a unilateral act performed by the recognizing State's government. It may be express or implicit. There is probably no other subject in the field of international law in which law and politics are more closely interwoven. However, that does not mean that recognition, in the sense of expressing an opinion on the legal status of an entity or authority, is a purely political act that is within the discretion of the recognizing State.

Recognition, if unfounded in law (such as premature recognition) and backed by State activity, may constitute an internationally wrongful act which gives rise to State responsibility. Recognition of States must be distinguished from recognition of governments, each form having its own theories and practices (Talmon, 2000, Grant 1999, Hobach, Lefeber & Ribbelink 2007). But the term "recognition," when used in the context of recognition of governments, rebels or *de facto* authorities in international law, may have several different meanings. It may indicate the recognizing State's willingness to enter into official relations with a new group, or manifest its opinion on the legal status of the group, or both. Alternatively, recognition may simply be a means of expressing political support or approval (Talmon, 2011, Hobach, Lefeber & Ribblink, 2007).

Therefore, the recognition exchanged between States can take both implicit and explicit forms. By using the conduct of normal diplomacy, Statesmen might implicitly acknowledge others' status. These practices include the extension of diplomatic privileges, like exemption from prosecution, the signing of treaties, and the direct provision of aid according to international law. Most Statesmen however, disagree that the extension of diplomatic privileges implies recognition when none has been formally granted. Indeed, Statesmen often explicitly reaffirm that recognition has not been extended when their behavior seems to imply otherwise (Herbst, 2000). Explicit formal recognition then, rather than implicit recognition, presents the most incontrovertible evidence of external recognition and international acceptance. Formal recognition can be granted by

means of formal public statement or through formal documentation transmitted to the government of a new State. This method of recognition also activates a number of observable legal consequences, embassies are often established, members of diplomatic corps exchanged, etc. It is therefore also easily discernable when it has or has not occurred. In most cases, recognition is the unique purview of the executive and a State's leader will publicly declare that recognition has been granted (Herbst, 2000, Weber, 2004, Neff 2005, Shaw, 2003,). There are two traditional doctrines that provide interpretations of when a *de jure* sovereign state should be recognized as a member of the international community. The declarative theory defines a state as a person in international law if it meets the following criteria; one, a defined territory; two, a permanent population; three, a government; and four, a capacity to enter into relations with other states. According to declarative theory, an entity's statehood is independent of its recognition by other states. By contrast, the constitutive theory defines a state as a person of international law if it is recognised as such by another state that is already a member of the international community (Grant, 1999, Braumoeller, 2013). Several entities reference either or both doctrines in order to legitimise their claims to statehood. There are, for example, entities which meet the declarative criteria (with *de facto* complete or partial control over their claimed territory, a government and a permanent population), but their statehood is not recognised by one or more other states. Non-recognition is often a result of conflicts with other countries that claim those entities as integral parts of their territory. In other cases, two or more partially recognised entities may claim the same territorial area, with each of them *de facto* in control of a portion of it (as have been the cases of the Republic of China and People's Republic of China, and North and South Korea). Entities that are recognised by only a minority of the world's states usually reference the declarative doctrine to legitimise their claims (Grant, 1999, Neff 2005, Shaw 2003,). In many situations, international non-recognition is influenced by the presence of a foreign military force in the territory of the presumptive, self-declaring independent entity, so to make problematic the description of the country *de facto* status. The international community can judge this military presence too intrusive, reducing the entity to a puppet state where effective sovereignty is retained by the foreign power. Historical cases in this sense can be seen in Japanese-led Manchukuo or German-created Slovakia and Croatia before and during World War II. In 1996-case *Loizidou vs. Turkey*, the European Court of Human Rights judged Turkey for having exercised authority in the territory of Northern Cyprus (Grant, 1999). There are also entities which do not have control over any territory or do not unequivocally meet the declarative criteria for statehood but have been

recognised to exist *de jure* as sovereign entities by at least one other state. Historically this has happened in the case of the Holy See (1870–1929), Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (during Soviet annexation), among other cases. The recognition of the State of Palestine by over one hundred states is a contemporary example. Some states do not establish relations with new nations quickly and thus do not recognise them despite having no dispute and sometimes favorable relations (Neff 2005, Shaw 2003, Grant, 1999). Yet some states maintain informal (officially non-diplomatic) relations with states that do not officially recognise them. The Republic of China, that is, Taiwan is one such state, as it maintains unofficial relations with many other states through its Economic and Cultural Offices, which allow regular consular services. This allows the ROC to have economic relations even with states that do not formally recognise it. A total of 56 states, including Germany, Italy, the United States, and the United Kingdom, maintain some form of unofficial mission in the ROC. Kosovo, the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Sahrawi Republic, Somaliland, and Palestine also host informal diplomatic missions, and/or maintain special delegations or other informal missions abroad. In the U.S., such offices by unrecognized entities are required to be registered as foreign lobbyist organizations under the Foreign Agent Registration Act (FARA) and act as regular lobbyists (Grant, 1999).

The question of recognition of government normally arises only with regard to recognized States. When a State recognizes a new “government,” it usually acknowledges a person or group of persons as competent to act as the organ of the State and to represent it in its international relations. The only criterion in international law for the recognition of an authority as the government of a State is its exercise of effective control over the State’s territory. States may, however, continue to recognize a government-in-exile if an incumbent government is forced into exile by foreign occupation or the *de facto* government *in situ* has been created in violation of international law. Despite a trend in the literature to the contrary, there is still no rule of general or regional customary international law that a *de facto* government, to be a government in the sense of international law, must be democratically elected. Attempts to introduce such a requirement either by treaty (Central American Treaties of Peace and Amity of 1907 and 1923) or as a matter of national (Tobar, Wilson and Betancourt doctrines) or regional policies (Santiago Commitment to Democracy and the Renewal of the Inter-American System, OAS General Assembly Resolution 1080 of 5 June 1991) have failed (Dugard 1987, Evans & Capps 2009, Talmon, 1998). States may be roughly divided into three groups according to their recognition policy: States (such as the United Kingdom before 1980) that formally recognize governments;

States (such as the United States) that generally do not formally recognize governments but do so in exceptional circumstances for political reasons; and States (such as the United Kingdom since 1980, and other member States of the European Union) that formally recognize only States, not governments. The policy is reminiscent of the “Estrada doctrine” according to which States issue no declarations in the sense of grants of recognition in cases of change of regime but confine themselves to the maintenance or withdrawal, as they may deem advisable, of their diplomatic agents. Those States have not completely abolished the recognition of governments, only the making of official statements of recognition. They still have to decide whether a person or group of persons qualifies as the government of another State, especially where there are competing “governments” in the same recognized State or when there is an attempted secession and issues of governmental status and statehood are linked. In the case of the British government, its opinion on the legal status of a claimant may be determined on the basis of the nature of the dealings (non-existent, limited or government-to-government dealings) which it has with a claimant (Talmon, 2008, Evans & Capps 2009).

III. APPROACHES, THEORIES AND PERSPECTIVES OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

Recognition of statehood grants an entity international legal personality and binds it to comport itself according to the rules established by international law in its relations with other states and peoples. At the same time, it makes the entity eligible to enter into treaties and alliances with other states, as well as to participate in the development and enforcement of international law. Most importantly, recognition is an affirmation of an entity’s right to territorial sovereignty and integrity, and its right to exercise coercive jurisdiction within this territory (Brierly, 1955, Burchill, et al. eds. 2005, Chernoff, Fred. 2007). The rights and powers attached to statehood make it desirable for political entities to attain such a status. At the same time, the expectation that each new state will abide by the rules of international law makes it desirable to include as many qualified political entities as possible, insofar as this will further the goals of peace and stability. The Montevideo Convention of 1933 was a preliminary attempt to codify specific descriptive criteria for statehood: (i) a permanent population, (ii) a defined territory, (iii) a functioning government able to control the territory in question, and (iv) the capacity to enter into relations with other states on its own account (Brierly, 1955, Talmon 2004, Pettman, 2010, Weber, 2004, Shaw, 2003). Together, these four requirements defined a state, and presumably any entity aspiring to independent statehood that met these criteria would

automatically be regarded as a state under international law. This 'declaratory approach' is objective in the sense that whether or not an entity is considered a state depends on the empirical characteristics possessed by that entity. Furthermore, it is retrospective in that the international community is not actually granting the entity this status, but merely acknowledging what is already a fact (Chen, 1951, Talmon 2004, Shaw, 2003). Most scholars agree, however, that the present practice of recognition is not declaratory but constitutive. According to the 'constitutive approach,' an entity is considered a state to the extent that other states recognize it as such, since a new state cannot exercise rights and obligations against states that do not recognize it. In general, the present practice of recognition follows the constitutive approach. Consider the case of Palestine. Applying the Montevideo criteria for statehood, it becomes clear that Palestine should be considered a state, as it has a permanent population concentrated in a defined territory, a functioning representative authority (the PLO), and has already entered into various agreements with other foreign entities (Menon, 1994, Chernoff, Fred. 2007, Pettman, 2010, Weber, 2004).

However, as was already noted, its statehood bid is bound to be frustrated unless Israel and the United States choose to alter their policy of non-recognition. Regardless of whether or not the United States and Israel are right in denying recognition, it is clear that recognition in this case is a matter of policy discretion from the part of states on both sides of the controversy. As this example shows, the practice of recognition is often an opportunity for powerful states to express their approval or disapproval of a political entity, and thus, recognition ends up being a highly selective and strategic policy decision. Neither the declaratory nor the constitutive theory of recognition is entirely satisfactory. On the one hand, the constitutive theory lends itself to strategic manipulation by powerful states that have a vested interest in recognizing or not recognizing a political entity (Naticchia, 2000; Spears, 2004, Van der Pijl, 2014). Furthermore, there are logical and practical difficulties in asserting that an entity is a state according to some members of the international community (i.e. those who confer recognition) and not a state according to the rest. In this case, the entity would be subject to international law according to some states but would exist in a legal vacuum according to others. These inadequacies of the constitutive approach signal a need to establish an objective and impartial procedure for state recognition (Buchanan, 1999; Spears, 2004). On the other hand, the criteria established under the declaratory approach are too weak. Given that the new state is to be granted full sovereignty and international protection of its territorial integrity, the international community has reason not to welcome into the community of states entities that practice injustice,

internally or externally. A state that repeatedly engages in aggressive war against other states or systematically commits human rights violations against other peoples should not be granted the sovereignty rights and legal powers that come with being a member of the international community, because these acts are antithetical to the core principles of the international legal system. Likewise, by conferring statehood status to entities that employ their coercive powers internally to oppress their populations, the international community would in effect be acting as an accomplice in injustice (Buchanan, 1999; Spears, 2004, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003,). In both cases, the international community would be undermining the commitments to peace and justice that underlie the bulk of international law, and therefore recognition does not make sense in these instances. It is worthwhile to also mention a third approach to recognition proposed by Chris Naticchia. Naticchia (2000) advances a 'pragmatic' approach whereby the international community extends recognition only if such an act is expected to further peace and stability in the long run. This approach is act-consequentialist in the sense that the only consideration it regards as relevant in the decision of whether or not to grant recognition is the maximization of overall peace and stability. In this calculation, the extent to which the entity in question conforms to international standards of justice is a relevant factor only insofar as this behavior tends to further long-term peace and stability (Keohane, and Buchanan, 2004; Spears, 2004). As Buchanan (1999) correctly points out in his rejoinder to Naticchia, a rule-consequentialist approach whereby substantive rules are established is more likely to lead to peace and stability in the long-run than a case-by-case approach, which is not only prone to erroneous calculations but also bound to be politicized. Moreover, peace and stability cannot be pursued at any cost. Just like considerations of overall human welfare cannot trump individual rights in the domestic sphere, considerations of peace and stability cannot override the commitment to securing the basic rights and freedoms of a population (Keohane, and Buchanan, 2004; Spears, 2004).

IV. THE BASES, CRITERIA AND PROCESSES OF INTERNATIONAL RECOGNITION

Each state conducts its relations with other states on the basis of particular understandings of the legal status of those other states. In many instances, such understandings are uncontroversial and amount to a recognition of the *status quo*: the UK and its dealings with France, for example. Sometimes, however, a state can take a position which challenges the existing order, such as recognizing a new state, for example the claim of Kosovo in 2008 to constitute a state comprising territory formerly part of Serbia, or take a position which

rejects a claim itself challenging the *status quo*. For example, that of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus to constitute a state comprising territory formerly part of Cyprus. Recognition, then, can be an attempt to alter or reaffirm the existing order (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Birdsall 2009, Brownlie 2008, Crawford 1977, Crawford, 2006). There are two main international law aspects to the recognition process. One, recognition can play a role in the international legality of the object of recognition. Sometimes, a state is or is not a state legally because, amongst other things, other states have decided to treat it as such. Two, the recognition itself is regulated by international law, in that states are sometimes constrained in their choices when comes to recognition. These two aspects are related, and can come into tension insofar as states seek through recognition to create a new sovereignty arrangement which challenges the legal *status quo* and thereby is potentially at odds with their obligations to another state or group of states whose entitlements are being altered by this change (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Brownlie 2008, Crawford 1977, Crawford, 2006).

The starting point for understanding the legalities of any regime of recognition or non-recognition, then, is to consider what the object of that recognition or non-recognition itself claims to be. In the words a government is only recognized for what it claims to be. One cannot determine fully what the legal significance of recognition is to that being recognized, and whether this recognition is itself lawful, without first focusing more closely on the legalities surrounding the claim itself. As for self-determination, if the claimant state constitutes a self-determination unit (SDU), an entity that has a lawful right to external self-determination, then it may be regarded to lawfully constitute a state even if in some respects its conformity to the viability criteria is somewhat deficient. This would be the case, for example, with certain newly independent former colonial states in the post-Second World War era of decolonization, for example, the Congo (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010). By contrast, if the existence of the new state would involve a violation of self-determination, whether internal or external, then this may operate as a bar to statehood that would otherwise be valid on the basis of conformity to the viability criteria. So, for example, the claim of Rhodesia to independent statehood was invalid because, amongst other things, being constituted on the basis of an *apartheid* system of white minority rule, it violated internal self-determination (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003, Evans & Capps, 2009, Dugard, 1987, James, 1986).

Moreover, the existence of the international law rules restricting the use of military force have led to a position suggesting that the creation of a new state, or

the extinction of an existing state or the loss of its territory, will be invalid if brought about through the use of force and/or the conduct of military occupation. There are important difficulties and uncertainties, however, in distinguishing between lawful and unlawful uses of force, and considering circumstances where force is used to support the exercise of a claim to external self-determination, for example India in relation to Bangladesh. The UN Security Council also sometimes takes positions on these issues, although usually it is questionable whether this amounts merely to reinforcement rather than an alteration of the position that would exist anyway as a matter of general international law (Hobach, Lefeber & Ribbelink, 2007, Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010).

V. THE RELEVANCE AND CONSEQUENCE OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

The view of most international lawyers is that the position taken by other states, whether recognition or non-recognition; as to the creation of a new state or the continuance of an existing state is merely declaratory, not also constitutive of, the legal position in this regard. In other words, the usual position is to apply the criteria reviewed above, irrespective of the view taken on this matter by other states. However, most of those who adopt this 'declaratory' theory of recognition accept that recognition can have a constitutive role in certain marginal cases: it is capable of pushing things further in favour of a particular outcome towards which the existing criteria are pointing but which itself is not reached by considering them alone (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Jackson, and Georg, 2013). Thus, if an entity claims to be a new state, but is somewhat deficient in conformity to the viability criteria, recognition by other states in favour of its claim to statehood may tip the balance. This is especially significant given the presumption mentioned earlier against the creation of new states. In order for recognition to have this constitutive effect, however, it needs to be of a certain quantum, since this effect is based on the general notion that international law is made, and altered, only if one can identify a general trend across most, if not all, states. One would have to see, therefore, considerable recognition by states generally, ideally, although not necessarily, manifest through a decision by the United Nations to admit the claimant entity as a new member, something which presupposes statehood (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003, Evans & Capps, 2009, Dugard, 1987, James, 1986). The juridical significance of this recognition is relatively straightforward when focusing only the viability criteria. However, things are more difficult, when considering the policy-based criteria, since there is a potential for the two. The outcome suggested by these criteria, on the one hand, and that

suggested by recognition, on the other hand to be at odds with each other; for example, if recognition was at odds with the law of self-determination. On the one hand, entities can attain what amounts to external self-determination even if they don't have a right to this, and such an outcome, and its recognition, would be lawful provided other areas of international law are complied with (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Alexandrowicz, 2017).

However, if an outcome involves a violation of self-determination, it is at least arguable that recognition cannot have a constitutive effect. This is because self-determination is regarded as one of those special areas of international law that have *jus cogens* status, that is, it is non-derogable, incapable of being limited by other rules of international law other than rules which have the same status. As a result, even if, then, a significant number of states recognize such an arrangement, this will not have the legal role that, all things being equal, it would have in circumstances where there would be no clash with the law of self-determination (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Buchanan, 2004). In many cases of violations of self-determination, the violation itself leads to non-recognition (e.g., as previously mentioned, Rhodesia), and so a contradiction does not present itself. But, looking forward, this may be an issue, one hopes not, in the case of future arrangements with respect to the Palestinians and the people of the Western Sahara. One interesting and uncertain issue here is whether all aspects of the law of self-determination are relevant in the same respect. More generally, active non-recognition, that is, not just failing to recognize, but actively rejecting the validity of that which is being claimed can have a constitutive effect in de-legitimizing claims to statehood or alterations in the territorial entitlements of existing states. Just as states will often refrain from recognizing situations that are illegal, so the active rejection of such claims may not make much difference, if at all, to the legality of that being claimed; it is already illegal even if it may have significance in other respects (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Alexandrowicz, 2017, Buchanan, 2004). So the widespread international rejection of Iraq's claim to title over Kuwait in 1990, for example, amounted to the reinforcement of the existing position as a matter of international law. In circumstances where the law is less clear, however, recognition may perhaps bring clarity to the situation. When states are recognizing a situation, e.g. a claim to statehood, which directly implicates issues of sovereignty-as-title, the legal position depends in part on a distinction between matters which are mandatory in international law, and those which are left to the state's discretion (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Shaw 2003, Alexandrowicz, 2017, Buchanan, 2004). States are bound to respect the sovereignty of other states, which includes their territorial integrity and political

independence. If, then, an entity is a state as a matter of international law, all other states are bound to 'recognize' this, even if they object in some way to that state's legitimacy or some aspects of its policy. Equally, if an entity claims to be a state, but is not, and is formed of the territory that forms part of an existing state, then other states are bound not to recognize this because of their obligations owed to the existing state (Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003, Evans & Capps, 2009, Dugard, 1987, James, 1986, Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010). Certain other core obligations also operate on this basis, including, most obviously, the international law relating to the use of force. But in many areas of international relations, states remain free to limit their mutual relations. In these areas, then, states can, in effect, choose not to 'recognize' another entity as a state, even if, as a matter of the basic contours of their relationship, they are actually bound to do so. Sometimes such a policy is concerned with a political objection to what may ultimately be a lawful arrangement (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Evans & Capps, 2009, Dugard, 1987, James, 1986).

When, however, states in their recognition or non-recognition practice are taking a clear stand on the question of status itself, this has to be in conformity to the legal position of the entity in question in order to be lawful. Given the constitutive role that recognition can play, the possibility arises whereby, in effect, states are seeking through recognition to render lawful something that would otherwise be unlawful. It is doubtful that states can through recognition alone render lawful something that would be unlawful as a matter of the law of self-determination, because of the *jus cogens* nature of that law. Just as, and indeed because, the recognition would not itself alter the illegality of the situation, so the recognition would itself be unlawful (Wilde, Cannon and Wilmshurst, 2010, Shaw 2003). Recognition has many positive consequences for its recipients. Recognized States benefit from assets unavailable to unrecognized actors. These can take the form of both tangible goods and political influence. Only recognized States may make treaties with other States, military, economic or otherwise. Only recognized States can be full members of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) like the United Nations, the IMF and the World Bank. Recognized States are also uniquely able to bring grievances against other States for believed transgressions of international law at the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Similarly, only recognized States may receive loans from organizations like the IMF and World Bank. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is almost exclusively limited to the recognized States; and international trade flows and foreign aid tend to be filtered through recognized governments and States as well. All States benefit from their peers' recognition.

Recognition's practical import has also recently gained prominence regarding African States. External

recognition and the opportunities that come along with it allow new, weak States to consolidate their domestic power base where little existed before. These States did not enter into the system fully established. Instead, new States entered only partially formed in terms of capability and governance, but through the external legitimacy and substantive benefits provided by membership, those States become increasingly similar to the Weberian ideal. Thus in Africa, where independent Statehood is a relatively new phenomenon, borders have been highly resistant to change and new States have not emerged due to the powerful effects of legitimacy accorded existing States by widespread external recognition (Herbst, 2000). Recognition of a rebel group as the legitimate representative of the people, as a rule, confers several advantages: (1) it legitimizes the struggle of the group against the incumbent government; (2) it provides international acceptance; (3) it allows the group to speak for the people in international organizations and represent it in other States by opening "representative offices"; and (4) it usually results in financial aid. In the case of the NTC, there may be an additional advantage.

VI. LAW AND POLITICS OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW

First and foremost, recognition is a political act whereby a subject of international law, whether a state or any other entity with legal personality, expresses its unilateral interpretation of a given factual situation, be it the birth of a new state, the coming to power of a new government, the creation of a new Recognition by other States then, rather than (and sometimes in spite of) simple *de facto* control and authority, is an important initial distinction between States and non-State 'others' in the international system. The contemporary dynamics of secession and Statehood might be one of the most dramatic examples of the second image reversed; the international system and its members determine not only the form and function of institutions within States but potentially, who those States are to begin with. It is both theoretically and practically misleading to disregard the important social component of Statehood in favor of purely objectivist definitions. There are very few cases in recent history where new State members unambiguously met the theoretical or legal standards for Statehood, yet States have proliferated. The vagaries of the legal standards are partially responsible for the gap between law and practice, but it is also due to the fact that recognition was intended, and continues to be, a practice of mutual self-interest among States (Jackson, 1987, Jackson, and Georg, 2013). It probably comes as no surprise that recognition, like myriad other decisions statesmen make, might be politically motivated rather than based upon absolute standards of governmental capacity. Indeed, with rare exception political scientists

expect that self-interests guide the decisions of Statesmen, even where standards of appropriate behavior exist. Similarly, international lawyers bemoan the overtly political nature of recognition in practice and often attempt to rectify it through greater legal specificity. Perhaps Statesmen use the lure of system membership in order to gain economic or political favors from the new State. Perhaps a historical kinship with a particular secessionist group engenders sympathy and acceptance. Probably, certain systemic conditions within the international system predispose its members to greater and lesser support for recognition (Jackson, 1987, James, 2004, Meijknecht 2001, Milano, 2006).

Although there is little room for political motive within the current legal requirements for recognition in theory, there is little question that politics matter in practice. Self-interest has the potential to explain quite a bit about the determinants of Statehood, but not in the *ad hoc* (and often *post hoc*) manner that it is most commonly employed. States must consider other States' actions and reactions to their policies. While recognition is theoretically a bilateral contract between two States, many States must recognize a new State before it secures full membership in international society. In international relations, the dynamics of recognition can be thought of as a threshold model of sorts. Unanimous recognition is not necessary, but a "critical mass" of acceptance must be reached prior to full participation as a State within the international community. Once past the tipping point, Statehood is almost never revoked (Jackson, 1987, James, 2004, Milano, 2006). Each State's recognition is juridical equivalent, but the most important players constituting this "critical mass" are the Great Powers. Although all States are both members and progenitors of international society, the Great Powers constitute an extremely powerful sub-group within that population. In fact, some argue successful secession is impossible without the support of a powerful patron State. The Great Powers act as the gatekeepers of Statehood. Their decisions play a decisive role in recognition and, consequently, in defining 'Statehood's' meaning for its aspirants. This is true even if Statesmen are not conscious of the precedents themselves. When acting in concert, Great Power recognition decisions are not easily overruled (Jackson, and Georg, 2013, Jackson, 1987). When there is a harmony of opinion over recognition or a lack thereof, the international politics of Statehood will be uncontroversial and the Great Powers will make decisions consistent with the group consensus. States with support will be elevated into the international community and those without it will remain subject to the jurisdiction of other States. In other cases, recognition is more contested. The Great Powers often have competing motives and therefore differ over what constitutes a legitimate claim to Statehood. When there is a lack of consensus among the Great Powers, the

most important determinant of recognition will be the extent of domestic control and authority exercised by the secessionist regime (Jackson, 1987, Meijknecht 2001, Milano 2006).

In other words, recognition will be stalled indefinitely and only granted once domestic sovereignty is definitively and irreversibly established. It is only under these circumstances that the international legal criteria, however ambiguous, rather accurately determine secessionist success (though recognition's timing will remain uncertain). In sum, the international politics of recognition are essential to understanding which actors among the scores of potential new members will be accepted into the international community of States. To an important extent, nascent states are either elevated to State membership or excluded from it by powerful, existing members (Milano 2006, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003, Jackson, 1987).

VII. CASES OF RECOGNITION OF STATES AND GOVERNMENTS IN AFRICA

The Republic of Somaliland with an estimated population of more than 3.5 million people is located in the Horn of Africa. It became a British protectorate at the end of the nineteenth century when European colonial countries were competing for spheres of influence in Africa. It obtained its independence from Britain on June 26, 1960. More than 35 member states of the United Nations including its Permanent Members and many members of the European Union immediately accorded diplomatic recognition to Somaliland. However, Somaliland voluntarily merged with Somalia on July 1st, 1960 that became independent of Italy. The two countries established then the Republic of Somalia. The hopeful union of the two countries had ended in ten year war (1981-1991) and the utter destruction of Somaliland (Eggers, 2007, Caspersen & Stansfield 2011, Milano 2006). Following the collapse of the Union, Somaliland's political and traditional leaders with popular support decided in May 1991 to annul the Union and to reclaim the political independence of the country. And for the last twenty years, its hardworking people got engaged in a process of re-building the country; first community reconciliation and enhancing peace, repatriation of hundreds of refugees and displaced persons, the setting-up of democratic structures of government and rehabilitation of economic structure of the country. These democratic principles guarantee civil liberties, multi-party competition for elections and wide participation. For the last twenty years, Somaliland had stood the test of time. During this period, it conducted successfully periodic free and fair elections and its change of government was always characterized by Smooth transitions. At present, its economy is thriving with more and more exports to world markets (Eggers, 2007, James, 2004, Meijknecht 2001, Milano, 2006). In

May 2001, an overwhelming majority of Somalilanders re-affirmed their support for the separation of Somaliland from Somalia in a constitutional referendum. As is known, self-determination as an important concept allows peoples and nations to have a role in international affairs and supports respect for their democratic choice, contrary to the old fashioned state-sovereignty approach in international dealings (Cassese, Antonio, international law, 2005). Somalilanders are determined more than ever to defend their hard-won independence (Daar, nd, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003). Somaliland's claim to self-determination and independence is further strengthened by the application of the principle of *uti possidetis* that is a general principle of international law which supports the maintenance of colonially inherited boundaries. It accepts the sanctity of the boundaries in Africa. Similar to other African countries including Egypt and Syria, Senegal and The Gambia, Eritrea and Ethiopia and so forth, Somaliland withdrew from that Union with Somalia which is in a state of anarchy. Somaliland's declaration of independence is based on its earlier existence as a recognized state with demarcated borders, and is consistent with the Constitutive Act of the African Union. Somaliland's independence is therefore not secession, but a return to sovereignty (Daar, nd, James, 2004, Milano, 2006). The *de facto* independent republic of Somaliland is overwhelmed with problems due to its unrecognized status. Somaliland has been independent since the ouster of former president Siad Barre and the onset of Somalia's civil war in 1991. It conducts independently monitored local and national elections, recently enacted a new constitution, has a functioning police force and governs itself in a far more functional manner than Somalia. Secessionist Somaliland meets the legal criteria for Statehood in virtually every respect, but not recognized by any other State. The problems of unrecognized proto-States like Somaliland range from mundane to high politics. Even seemingly small bureaucratic arrangements between States can have large effects on the unrecognized (James, 2004, Meijknecht 2001, Milano, 2006, Herbst, 2000).

Although the Republic of Somaliland unambiguously meets the legal standards for Statehood, so long as most of the States in international society are not willing to recognize its independence, Somaliland's internal sovereignty means little for its external affairs. It cannot assert itself as a State any further than it already has. Yet it is not a full member of international society. It may be able to defend itself against outside invaders (like those from neighboring Puntland), but it has no legal standing upon which to do so under international law. For outsiders, Somaliland is simply one of many "tribal factions" in Somalia's chaotic civil war. Finally, even maintaining Somaliland's internal sovereignty is fraught with peril without external

recognition. It will not be afforded the resources, exclusively reserved for States, which might ensure its survival (Herbst, 2000). The Eritrean War of Independence (September 1, 1961 - May 29, 1991) was a conflict fought between the Ethiopian government and Eritrean separatists, both before and during the Ethiopian Civil War. The war started when Eritrea's autonomy within Ethiopia, where troops were already stationed, was unilaterally revoked. Eritrea had become part of Ethiopia after World War II, when both territories were liberated from Italian occupation. Ethiopia claimed that Eritrea was part of Ethiopia. Following the Marxist-Leninist coup in Ethiopia in 1974 which toppled its ancient monarchy, the Ethiopians enjoyed Soviet Union support until the end of the 1980s, when glasnost and perestroika started to impact Moscow's foreign policies, resulting in a withdrawal of help. The war went on for 30 years until 1991 when the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), having defeated the Ethiopian forces in Eritrea, took control of the country. In April 1993, in a referendum supported by Ethiopia, the Eritrean people voted almost unanimously in favor of independence. Formal international recognition of an independent and sovereign Eritrea followed later the same year (Connell, 2005).

Biafra, officially the Republic of Biafra, was a secessionist state in south-eastern Nigeria that existed from May 30, 1967 to January 15, 1970, taking its name from the Bight of Biafra (the Atlantic bay to its south). The inhabitants were mostly the Ibo people who led the secession due to economic, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions among the various peoples of Nigeria. The creation of the new country was among the causes of the Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Nigerian-Biafran War. The Land of Rising Sun was chosen for Biafra's national anthem, and the state was formally recognised by Gabon, Haiti, Cote d'Ivoire, Tanzania and Zambia. Other nations which did not give official recognition but which did provide support and assistance to Biafra included Israel, France, Portugal, Rhodesia, South Africa and the Vatican City (Douglas, 1994; Room, 2006). Over a dozen states has recently declared their recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC). Germany became the 13th state to "recognize" the NTC following Australia, Britain, France, Gambia, Italy, Jordan, Malta, Qatar, Senegal, Spain, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and the United States. France became the first country to recognize the NTC as "the legitimate representative of the Libyan people." Similar recognition was accorded by Qatar, the Maldives, Gambia, Senegal, Turkey, Jordan, Spain, and Germany. While a State cannot have two *de jure* governments at the same time, it can have a *de jure* government and a local *de facto* government or a representative of the State's people. This explains why States, which have recognized the NTC as legitimate

representative of the Libyan people, can nevertheless continue to recognize the diplomatic role and status of Qaddafi-appointed ambassadors and accept his representatives in international organizations as the representatives of Libya (Talmon, 2011, Caspersen & Stansfield 2011). Italy's statement on April 4, 2011, that it recognized the NTC "as the country's only legitimate interlocutor on bilateral relations," thus seems to have gone beyond the recognition by France and others. This was confirmed later when Italy declared that it recognized the NTC as holding governmental authority in the territory which it controls. France also upgraded its recognition, stating that from now on it considered the NTC as the only holder of governmental authority in the contacts between France and Libya and its related entities. This, in effect, amounted to recognition of the NTC as the government of Libya. On June 12, the UAE also recognized the NTC as a legitimate Libyan government. The country's foreign minister explained: "Based on this, UAE's dealing with the Transitional National Council (TNC) will take the form of a government-to-government relationship in all issues relating to Libya (Talmon, 2011). Whilst politics and law are closely intertwined in the question of recognition, this does not mean that recognition, in the sense of expressing an opinion on the legal status of a rebel group, is a purely political act within the unfettered discretion of the recognizing State. In the 1960s, the Organization of African Unity's Coordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa developed certain standards, albeit vague, for the recognition of national liberation movements fighting the incumbent government as the sole legitimate representative of a people which, it is suggested, may equally be applied to the recognition of the NTC. Thus, for the NTC to be recognized as the legitimate representative of the Libyan people, it must be the United Action Front against the Qaddafi government, i.e., it must be broadly based, have effective following and popular support throughout Libya, and must have reasonable fighting strength (Talmon, 2011, Verma, 2014). The main criterion in international law for the recognition of a rebel group as the government of a State is its exercise of effective control over the State's territory. As long as the NTC's control is limited to the eastern parts of Libya, with the capital Tripoli and western parts remaining under the control of Qaddafi forces, it may be recognized only as the local *de facto* government of the territory which it controls. Any recognition of the NTC as the *de jure* government of the State of Libya, while Qaddafi forces are still in control of the capital, seems premature and would arguably constitute an illegal interference in the internal affairs of Libya (Talmon, 2011). As in the first four months of the Libyan civil war the factual and political situation in Libya was uncertain, States were very reluctant to grant any legally relevant recognition to the NTC. This led States to invent a new form of

recognition of the NTC as a “legitimate and credible interlocutor,” “legitimate political interlocutor,” or “valid interlocutor” for the Libyan people. These terms apparently signified that the NTC was an “official negotiating counterparty,” a “relevant partner for dialogue,” a “discussion partner,” or a “credible voice for the Libyan people” (Talmon, 2011, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003, Verma, 2014). Unlike recognition as the representative of a people or as a government, such recognition is without significance in international law. This becomes clear from the fact that several States, whose policy is to recognize only States, not governments (such as Australia, Canada, Germany, Netherlands, and United Kingdom), had no problem with granting such “recognition.” The main purpose of this action seems to have been to express various degrees of political support. While in March 2011 the NTC was initially recognized only as “a” political interlocutor among others, or simply as interlocutors, this denomination was later changed to “the” political interlocutor. The change from indefinite to definite article was interpreted by the United States in June as a signal that its support for the NTC was “deepening”. However, any such recognition was still limited “to this interim period” (Talmon, 2011). States that recognize the NTC as the legitimate interlocutor for the Libyan people have sent “special representatives,” “diplomatic representatives,” “diplomatic envoys,” or “special ambassadors” to, and established permanent liaison offices in, Benghazi. While these representatives may have a diplomatic function, they do not have formal diplomatic status (which would require the NTC’s recognition as the government of Libya). Thus, the French Foreign Minister told reporters at a conference in London on March 29 that the French diplomat sent to the NTC was “not an ambassador because we have not formally recognised a state through the Transitional National Council”. States have also invited the NTC to open a “representative office” in their capital. Such offices are, however, not diplomatic missions and, for that reason, do not enjoy diplomatic status as of right. States are, however, free to grant NTC’s representatives working in their territory certain diplomatic privileges and immunities. In most countries, the grant of diplomatic privileges and immunities to non-diplomats requires special legislation. This may explain why the United Kingdom and others have so far granted the NTC only certain “administrative concessions” on minor issues such as access to parking spaces. Unless States recognize the NTC as the government of Libya, they cannot allow the representative of the NTC to set up office in the existing Libyan embassy without violating their obligations towards Libya under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Indeed, several of the States recognizing the NTC as the legitimate interlocutor for the Libyan people continue to recognize the Qaddafi government as the government of Libya

and host its diplomatic agents (Talmon, 2011). The Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) was proclaimed by the Polisario Front on February 27, 1976, in Bir Lehlou, Western Sahara. SADR claims sovereignty over the entire territory of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony; however, at present the SADR government controls only about 20-25% of the territory it claims. It calls the territories under its control the Liberated Territories. As of 2012, the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic has been recognized by **85** states. Out of these, **32** have since “frozen” or “withdrawn” recognition. Notably, 84 out of 193 (43.5%) United Nations (UN) member states, 38 out of 53 (72%) African Union (AU) member states, 18 out of 57 (32%) Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) member states, and 5 out of 22 (23%) Arab League (AL) member states have recognised SADR. Several states that do not recognize the Sahrawi Republic nonetheless recognize the Polisario Front as the legitimate representative of the population of the Western Sahara, but not as the government-in-exile for a sovereign state (Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, 2005). The republic has been a full member of the African Union (AU), formerly the Organization of African Unity (OAU), since 1984. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest and remains the only African country not within the AU since South Africa’s admittance in 1994. The SADR also participates as guest on meetings of the Non-Aligned Movement or the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership, over Moroccan objections to SADR participation. On the other hand, Moroccan “territorial integrity” is favored by the Arab League. Thus, the SADR is not a member of the Arab League, nor of the Arab Maghreb Union, both of which include Morocco as a full member. Besides Mexico, Algeria, Iran, Venezuela, Vietnam, Nigeria and South Africa, India was the major middle power to have ever recognized SADR, having allowed the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic to open embassy in New Delhi in 1985. However, India “withdrew” its recognition in 2000 (Coquia and Defensor-Santiago, 2005). Although it has no recognition from the United Nations, the republic has been a full member of the African Union (AU, formerly the Organization of African Unity, OAU) since 1984. Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest and remains the only African nation not within the AU since South Africa’s admittance in 1994. The SADR also participated in a conference of the Permanent Conference of Political Parties of the Latin American and the Caribbean, 2006, the SADR ambassador to Nicaragua participated in the opening conference of the Central American Parliament, 2010, and SADR delegation participated in meeting of COPPPAL and ICAPP in Mexico City, 2012. On July 9, 2011, South Sudan became the world’s newest state. Since the time of British colonialism, spanning from the late 19th century to the mid 20th century, the various ethnic groups that populated the country of Sudan enjoyed vastly unequal access to political power and

economic resources. Notably, the British had established two separate administrations, a progressive and commercial one in the north and a rudimentary and rather dysfunctional one in the South. The north's monopoly over the country's wealth persisted, and was indeed exacerbated, after Sudan's declaration of independence from Britain in 1956 (Grawert, 2008, Caspersen & Stansfield 2011). Emboldened by their superior economic status, the 'Arabs' in Khartoum sought to consolidate their ascendancy by imposing their Islamic culture and legal traditions on non-Arab and non-Muslim populations in the peripheral regions of the country. Southern Sudan, largely possessing a distinctive non-Arab culture, mobilized an armed resistance, the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA), against the 'Arab Center's' marginalization. This grass-roots militia and civilian-based movement fought for a unified, discrimination-free Sudan in a civil war that lasted 17 years, until the signing of the Addis Ababa agreement in 1972 granting limited autonomy to the south (Collins 2010). After 10 years of relative peace, Islamist fundamentalism resurged in the north under the Nimeiri military dictatorship, and the central government's persistent violation of the autonomy agreement reached at Addis Ababa reignited the civil war. This time, however, the south did not demand an end to discrimination but, instead, fought for complete independence. The second civil war lasted until 2005, culminating in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which re-established the south's autonomy until a referendum on independence could be held 11 years later. In January 2011, southern Sudan voted with a 99% majority to secede from the north, resulting in the definitive partitioning of country effective on July 9th of

that same year, and the admission of South Sudan into the United Nations three days later (Grawert, 2008; Collins 2010). Finally, president Barack Obama declared that the United States formally recognized the Republic of South Sudan as a sovereign and independent state on July 9, 2011. This followed the historic January referendum on self-determination for Southern Sudan, demonstrating full implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the North and South.

a) *The Historic Unrecognized or Partially Recognized States with De Facto Control over their Territory in Africa*

These lists of historic unrecognized or partially recognized states or governments in Africa give an overview of extinct geopolitical entities in Africa that wished to be recognized as sovereign states, but did not enjoy worldwide diplomatic recognition. The entries listed here had *de facto* control over their claimed territory and were self-governing with a desire for full independence, or if they lacked such control over their territory, were recognized by at least one other recognized nation. The criteria for inclusion in this list are similar to that of the list of states with limited recognition in Africa. To be included here, a polity in Africa must have claimed statehood, lacked recognition from at least one state, and either; had a population and an organized government with a capacity to enter into relations with other states; or had *de facto* control over a territory or a significant portion of the territory of an otherwise recognized sovereign state; or have been recognized as a state by at least one other state.

Table 1: List of Historical Unrecognized States in Africa

Name	Period	Today	Notes
Azawad	2012	Recognised as part of Mali, controlled by Ansar Dine	Controlled territory in Northern <u>Mali</u> , it wasn't recognized by any state
Biafra	1967–1970	Part of Nigeria	Controlled territory in eastern <u>Nigeria</u> , recognized by five states (Gabon, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Tanzania, Zambia)
Anjouan	1997–2002, 2008	Now part of Comoros	Joined with the Comoros then seceded twice to gain independence. Anjouan rejoined the Comoros after talks during the first secession. After the second event, the secessionist government was forcefully removed.
Bophuthatswana, Ciskei, Transkei, Venda	1977–1994, 1981–1994, 1976–1994, 1979–1994	Now all part of South Africa	Former apartheid Bantustan homelands, formed and recognized only by each other and South Africa. Israel extended marginal recognition to Bophuthatswana and Ciskei by allowing both polities to build trade missions in Tel Aviv
Jubaland	1998–2001	Now part of Southwestern Somalia	Briefly declared independence in 1998 it rejoined the Transitional Federal Government in 2001.
Katanga	1960–1964	Part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Controlled the state of the same name within the former Belgian Congo after decolonisation
Mohéli	1997–1998	Now part of Comoros	Seceded in 1997 but quietly rejoined the next year.
Rhodesia	1965–1979	Now Zimbabwe	British Colony that unilaterally declared independence

Name	Period	Today	Notes
Republic of the Rif	1921–1926	Part of Morocco	Founded in September 1921, when the people of the Rif (the Riffians) revolted and declared their independence from Spanish Morocco. It was dissolved by Spanish and French forces on 27 May 1926.
Kingdom of Rwenzururu	1963–1982	Now part of Uganda	Was based in the Rwenzori Mountains between Uganda and Congo
South Kasai	1960–1961	Part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Controlled the state of the same name within the former Belgian Congo after decolonisation
Zimbabwe Rhodesia	1979	Now Zimbabwe	Short-lived version of Rhodesia (see above) that ended white minority government and introduced biracial government.

Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org>.

VIII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Recognition is a unilateral act performed by the recognizing State's government. It may be express or implicit. The recognition of the State is an essential procedure, so that the State can enjoy the rights and privileges as an independent community under International law. The recognition is it De Facto and De Jure, both provide rights, privileges and obligations. The act of recognition does not necessarily require the use of the terms recognition or recognize. Recognition is more than a word. A State may simply say that it acknowledges, regards, considers, deals with, or treats a group in a certain capacity, in order to convey its recognition. When a state gets De Facto recognition, its right, privileges and obligations are less but when De Jure is recognized by the State it gets absolute rights, liabilities and privileges. The recognition of the State has some political influence on the International Platform. Recognition will be stalled indefinitely and only granted once domestic sovereignty is definitively and irreversibly established. It is only under these circumstances that the international legal criteria, however ambiguous, rather accurately determine secessionist success (though recognition's timing will remain uncertain).

In sum, the international politics of recognition are essential to understanding which actors among the scores of potential new members will be accepted into the international community of States. To an important extent, nascent states are either elevated to State membership or excluded from it by powerful, existing members. There are many situations where powerful States create difficulties in recognition of a newly formed State. This can be withdrawn when any State does not fulfill the conditions for being a sovereign State. De Jure and De Facto recognition may vary from case to case. De Jure recognition can be given directly to the State; there is no necessity of De Facto recognition even if De Facto is considered as the primary step to achieve De Jure recognition. The mainstream knowledge on state

recognition states and government 'seeks to preserve the interests of existing powers at the expense of the rights and freedoms of subjugated peoples who see creation of a new state as a sanctuary for collective emancipation and escape from human rights abuses by the base state. By seeking to reproduce the existing state system and international order, present knowledge on state recognition is predominantly unable to question the ontology and epistemology of state recognition and the political, economic, social and normative multiplicities surrounding it' (Gëzim, 2021, Neff 2005, Schoiswohl 2004, Shaw 2003.). Understandably, existing theories and approaches are deeply committed to preserving existing international order and are sceptical to change the existing recognitional practices. This makes it difficult perhaps to even take into account or debate, let alone implement, many of the proposed ideas in this paper. Such scepticism should, if anything, motivate critical scholars to uncover the structures and actors as well as types of knowledge which prevent changes to the existing recognition regime and direct future research towards producing more emancipatory knowledge that contributes to global justice and better representation of subjugated states, peoples and communities in world politics (Gëzim, 2021).

Most importantly, future research should rethink the foundational knowledge on state recognition and include other alternative ways of knowing, acting and seeing state recognition in world politics. Such a change requires expanding the analytical tools as well as engaging in interdisciplinary and grounded research which rescales whose voices, interests, needs and rights matter the most. It also requires taking a bottom-up approach to understanding state recognition that is not captured by existing legal, doctrinal and normative knowledge on the subject (Gëzim, 2021). This is a huge task, but not impossible, a new road map worth pursuing by scholars and practitioners alike.

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COVID-19 and Human Security: Western Populism, Chinese Strong State and Africa's Submissive Populace

By Blessed Ashmond, Isaac Nunoo, George Sowah Boye & Bernice Quampah

University of Cape Coast

Abstract- The COVID-19 has been one pandemic that has greatly impacted the world and its economies since it was identified in 2019. This current research therefore sets out to investigate the COVID-19 and Human Security in relation to western populism, Chinese strong state and Africa's submissive populace. The study was undertaken in the University of Cape Coast (UCC) which is a diverse community of both Africans and Euro-Asians. Three categories of respondents are involved in this study namely: Africans (mainly Ghanaians), Euro-Americans and Chinese. Purposive sampling technique was used to interview respondents who are Chinese and Euro-American since they form a very small population and need to be specifically identified. The study also adopted simple random sampling for the respondents who are African (mainly Ghanaians) in a survey research. The study revealed that China's strong state in defeating the virus could be attributed to mandatory testing and quarantine for 14 days on arriving in China. Again, China was able to defeat the virus because of mobile hospitals and mandatory vaccination that the government implemented.

Keywords: covid-19, human security, western populism, chinese strong state, africa's submissive populace, university of cape coast.

GJHSS-F Classification: DDC Code: 614.5 LCC Code: RA644.S17



COVID19ANDHUMANSECURITYWESTERNPOPULISMCHINESESTRONGSTATEANDAFRICASSUBMISSIVEPOPULACE

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COVID-19 and Human Security: Western Populism, Chinese Strong State and Africa's Submissive Populace

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Abstract The COVID-19 has been one pandemic that has greatly impacted the world and its economies since it was identified in 2019. This current research therefore sets out to investigate the COVID-19 and Human Security in relation to western populism, Chinese strong state and Africa's submissive populace. The study was undertaken in the University of Cape Coast (UCC) which is a diverse community of both Africans and Euro-Asians. Three categories of respondents are involved in this study namely: Africans (mainly Ghanaians), Euro-Americans and Chinese. Purposive sampling technique was used to interview respondents who are Chinese and Euro-American since they form a very small population and need to be specifically identified. The study also adopted simple random sampling for the respondents who are African (mainly Ghanaians) in a survey research. The study revealed that China's strong state in defeating the virus could be attributed to mandatory testing and quarantine for 14 days on arriving in China. Again, China was able to defeat the virus because of mobile hospitals and mandatory vaccination that the government implemented. The Western world could not contain the spread and fatality rate of the virus because of their disregard to ensuring and following social distancing and other COVID-19 protocols and their insistence for their rights and freedom to engage in social life. Africa on the other hand submitted to the virus and learnt from the devastating experiences of the West and implemented policies to contain and control the spread of the pandemic. Policies such as strict enforcement of the adherence to the COVID-19 protocols and provision of quarantine and isolation centres for infected people account for Africa's submissive populace and her ability to contain the virus. Recommendations have been made for policy implication and this includes: governments could consider rolling out mobile hospitals to provide health care assistance to their citizens; provision of free testing and vaccination and investment in research to develop and come up with vaccination and medication for the COVID-19 virus.

Keywords: covid-19, human security, western populism, chinese strong state, africa's submissive populace, university of cape coast.

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I. INTRODUCTION

a) Background to the study

The coronavirus has challenged humanity. The virus was identified on March 11, 2020 and declared coronavirus disease and declared pandemic by the World Health Organisation (WHO 2020). Human Security as a result of the outbreak of the pandemic has been crucial and a matter of great concern to all countries due to high rate of infection of the virus. China is the first country to report an incidence case of coronavirus. However, China has been able to curtail the spread of the virus. Wuhan city which first recorded the outbreak has not seen any incidence of new case since 19th March, 2020 (Wu & McGoogan 2020). China at the moment records zero case of COVID-19 in their treatment and isolation centres. China has proven to be a strong state in her fight against the coronavirus (Wu & McGoogan 2020). The US President did not consider making budget allocation to provide test kits or contact tracing and also did not enforce laws on adhering to the COVID-19 protocols all in the name of freedom of movement (Brady 2020). The Education Secretary during the Trump administration as part of his policy exempted students with no records from COVID-19 relief aid, a policy that accounted for the spark and high infection rate of the virus in the US (Schwartz 2020) and in the United Kingdom, Boris Johnson's move to trivialise the COVID-19 led to escalation of infection cases and fatality rate in the United Kingdom. He chose populist tactics and laboured on prospects of unemployment and diminishing economic activity for the citizens to have their rights and freedom of movement and social engagement. There is a tradeoff between populist tactics and personal safety, public health and economic activity (Landler 2019).

African continent is dominated by developing and underdeveloped countries. The continent is deviled with poor health infrastructural facilities and qualified medical personnel in relation to China and western countries (OECD 2020). As a result of these infrastructural deficits and inadequate health personnel, Africa has acted urgently and put in place measures to contain pandemic. African countries introduced complete lockdowns, suspension of foreign travels,

closing of schools, religious meetings sports and other social gatherings. Africa submitted to the havoc of the COVID-19 pandemic in China and western countries and prepared and adhered to all the necessary protocols to contain the spread and the fatality rate of the pandemic.

Human security in the wake of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic could said to have been threatened as the populace are all running for a cover by ensuring social distancing. Family gathering and other social events are suspended for fear of possible infection. Schools and educational institutions had to close down and this situation has given birth to online teaching through *zoom* and other platforms. Board and Committee meetings for businesses and organisations are suspended. Online shopping has now become the order of the day as governments regulations prohibit overcrowding at shopping malls and supermarkets. Banks and other financial institutions encourage customers to patronise Automated Teller Machines (ATM). Restrictions on the number of persons attending any given events were imposed and violators of this directive from the governments were given stiffer punishments including a jail term (Nyabor 2020). In Ghana, church services and other religious activities were suspended and radio and television broadcast as well as Facebook interaction were adopted by many churches and other religious organisations to reach out to their congregants and members.

In Ghana, partial lockdown for some cities such as the Greater Accra and Kumasi was placed and the Police and other security agencies were empowered to ensure strict compliance by all citizens. In one of the nation's address, the President of the Republic of Ghana His Excellency Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo Addo reported that "We know how to bring back the economy. What we do not know is how bring back human life" (Akufo-Addo 2020). As many businesses and economic activities were affected because they have to close down, livelihoods of the people were greatly affected (Wilson 2020). The state and other political agents visited their constituents to extend their assistance in the form of food items, cash and personal protective equipment (PPE) to ensure the security of the citizens. Regular hand washing and compulsory nose cover were ensured at all public places and this was done through the provision of buckets, liquid soap and tissue papers donated by churches, other religious bodies, non-governmental organisations, corporate bodies and individuals (Bolton 2020). Citizens were cautioned to remain indoors and rarely come out as a measure to reduce their chances of being infected with the virus (Nietsche 2020).

b) *Problem statement*

The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and human security has been a global issue for discussion

by academics, political leaders, health professionals and social workers since its outbreak in 2019. The pandemic impacted negatively and continues to bite harder on the western countries due to their inability to stop the spread of the pandemic and populism (Bale 2020). The insistence for right and freedom of movement and social gathering partly account for high infection and fatality rates of the pandemic (Margulies 2020). The coronavirus was first identified in China and spread very fast in the Hunan city. However, inspite of the fact that the pandemic affected lives and economic activities of China, the country quickly handled and recovered from the havoc of the virus and has put it under barest minimum and absolute control. As at March, 2021 China's isolation and quarantine and treatment centres were empty of infection incidence cases (Salzberger & Ehrenstein 2020). China's strong state and quick intervention such as quarantine, transparency, solidarity and logistical and medical supplies may have accounted for the country's ability to defeat the virus (He 2020). It is an undeniable fact that Africa is dominated by third world countries which are struggling with poor health facilities and systems. As a result, the continent submits to the severity nature of the coronavirus and the havoc it has caused the advanced countries and took steps to implement and adhere to all the necessary protocols (McKenzie 2020). This may account for the continent's ability to contain the spread and fatality rate of the virus.

This current study therefore seeks to investigate the COVID-19 and Human Security in the Cape Coast Metropolis.

c) *Objective of the study*

The objective of the study is to investigate the COVID-19 and Human Security in relation to western populism, China's strong state and Africa's submissive populace. Specifically, the study seeks the following objectives:

- i. Investigate the inability of the Western world to curtail the infection and fatality of the pandemic.
- ii. Ascertain the ability of China to withstand and defeat the COVID-19 pandemic.
- iii. Determine Africa's policies which enabled them to stop the spread and fatality of the virus.
- iv. Make recommendation for policy implication.

The research questions that this current study seeks to answer are:

- i. How have human rights and freedom of the Western world contributed to their inability to stop the spread and fatality of the coronavirus?
- ii. What account for China's ability to defeat the COVID-19 pandemic?
- iii. How has Africa's submissiveness enabled them stop and control the spread and fatality of the COVID-19 pandemic?

The coronavirus is novel virus which has negatively affected the economies of almost every country and life. The study of this nature provides information for policy makers specifically Ghana, the appropriate measures taken by some countries like China with respect to how to curtail the infection of the virus. The study also provides useful information to policy implementers on how the virus got out of control in the western world and how Ghana could learn from the experiences of these countries. Policy makers would also be informed about how Africa conceded its weak health and financial stand and submitted to following the appropriate protocols to curtail the spread and fatality rate of the pandemic. Finally, this research adds to existing literature on COVID-19 and Human Security and how some countries were affected as a result of the response and approach to tackling the spread and fatality of the pandemic.

d) *Theory of COVID-19 and Human Security from the International Studies perspective*

i. *Critical theory*

The Critical Theory which stems from Realism enables to evaluate the security of humanity in a critical manner such as COVID-19. Critical Theory concerns itself with Human Security and foreign policy goals. As a concept, Human Security was proposed and popularised in the first half of the 1990s, when some optimism remained that, in a "new world order, a peace dividend was possible in which security defined as freedom from want as well as freedom from fear, fear of diseases and pandemic would be enhanced" (Maclean, 2006).

Critical Theory concerns itself with the "physical, institutional and ideological roots of the power and control" (Bostanoğlu & Okur, 2009). The basic issues of Critical Theory are hegemony, power, the relationship between the mode of production and power relations, power structures and emancipation. By focusing on the basic needs of the people, Human Security can be labelled as a policy towards "bio-political tyranny" (Duffield & Waddell in Peterson, 2006): "which uses the altruistic rhetoric found within the human security discourse to mask or legitimise interventionist, neocolonial, and neo-imperialist activities" which have been the focus and preoccupation of critical theory (Peterson, 2006).

e) *COVID-19 and Populism*

Some health and social sciences pundits during the early days of the break of the corona virus hastily posited that the pandemic would "kill populist politics" (English, 2020; Mead, 2020). The US President and the British Prime Minister have been classified by analysts as populists who are reluctant to face reality (Bolton, 2020). Cas Mudde, observed populism as "a highly diverse and heterogeneous phenomenon, would not

have one, unitary response to the pandemic" (Mudde, 2020). Indeed, if one looks at countries with populists in power such as Argentina, Hungary, Philippines and Italy it will be realised that no coherent actions are being taken by their government to combat the spread of the virus. Argentina and Fernandez are performing better to stop the spread and infection of the virus whereas Some of the countries are performing very well in their fight against the pandemic and this is reflected in high approval rates (e.g. Argentina, Fernández), while catastrophic and unreliable policies of other countries have led to escalation in death tolls (Syn, 2020).

Populism discussion in the United States about COVID-19 has been moderate. The former US President Donald Trump's administration cannot be said to be the one that has populism elements and this gave rise to a national right-wing protest movement to fill up this gap that Trump did not have. The Republican Party which emphasises neoliberalism is associated with populism and presented itself as a struggle between the citizens and the government officials, experts in the media and academia. (Wilson, 2020). President Donald Trump did not take the opportunity raised by the corona virus pandemic to derive executive powers (Brady, 2020). He has repeatedly sought to blame China for the spread of the virus. "I think they made a horrible mistake and they didn't want to admit it. We wanted to go in. This virus should not have spread all over the world. They should have kept it in their country" (Donald Trump as cited by Chalfant & Elis, 2020). Boris Johnson's victory in the general election of 2020 in Great Britain is considered a great deal of a recognisably populist strategy. His quest to simplify issues and break them into digestible concepts has been the approach of his governance and if this approach has worked for his quest for Brexit, it is expected that the same will work in the case of Covid-19 (Bale, 2020; Margulies, 2020).

f) *China's strong state and her defeat of the Covid-19 Pandemic*

China has been able to cut the domestic transmission of the Covid-19 virus in the whole country. This achievement is as a result of strenuous efforts and tremendous sacrifices and international support (Perez-Pena, 2020). China was the first major victim of the Covid-19 and therefore fighting it was going to be a challenge (Salzberger & Ehrestein, 2020). In the wake of the outbreak, China faced an either-or situation: Economic development or people's lives. The government of China is of the opinion that human life is priceless and thus an unprecedented anti-epidemic campaign against the pandemic was rapidly launched with the help of the citizens (Gao & Yu, 2020). The following provide a summary of China's strong state in the fight of the Covid-19 pandemic:

1. The Chinese government quickly quarantined Wuhan which was a hotspot for the spread of the

- virus and ensured that medical supplies were sent (Ng, 2020) including deployment of 42,000 medical staff from other provinces.
- Two hospitals equipped with 5G systems were built primarily for Covid-19 patients, advanced medical facilities and 2000 beds were built in the city within 10 days, while 16 makeshift hospitals (with 30,000 beds) were established to treat people who are asymptomatic. (Gu & Li, 2020).
 - Foreign travels and other social gatherings were suspended and temperature checks and mandatory wearing of face mask were ensured. People who had recently travelled to Wuhan were classified into high-risk groups and put under home quarantine for two weeks. (Hartley & Jarvis, 2020; Shaw, Kim & Hua, 2020).
 - China declared a nation-wide war against Covid-19 with the assistance from health personnel and volunteers; and providing logistics support; and citizen vigilance. (He, 2020).

The domestic transmission of the Covid-19 virus has been cut off on the whole in China. It was never going to be an easy job, but through strenuous efforts and tremendous sacrifices, as well as the sympathy and support from the international community, the goal was achievable (Perez-Pena, 2020). Covid-19 is a new kind of virus, and China was its first major victim. Therefore, China's war against the virus was inevitably going to be full of challenges, despite being able to identify the pathogen in record time (Salzberger & Ehrestein, 2020). In the wake of the outbreak, China faced an either-or situation: Economic development or people's lives. The Chinese leadership believes that people's lives are priceless and worth any short-term economic fallout. Thus an unprecedented anti-epidemic campaign, commanded and deployed by President Xi Jinping, was rapidly launched in China with the whole Communist Party and people from all walks of life joining in the great struggle (Gao & Yu, 2020). But how exactly was China's anti-pandemic strategy? The following provide a summary of China's strong state in fight of the Covid-19 pandemic:

Authorities of China saw it as an emergency to quarantine Wuhan and gave it all the necessary assistance the city requires. As the capital city and highly endemic area of the Covid-19, Wuhan was declared lockdown to curtail the escalating infection and spread of the virus in the city and beyond. The government constantly made sure that inhabitants of Wuhan do not travel outside the city and also ensured constant and timely supply of medicine and medical supplies, and basic necessities of life such as food, water and personal protective equipment (PPE) (Ng, 2020). Some of the measure that were taken to stop the overwhelming infection at Hubei province include deployment of 42,000 medical staff from other provinces

to assist with provision of health care assistance at Wuhan. Two hospitals which were powered by 5G systems and highly improved health facilities with estimated bed capacity of 2000 were provided in less than two weeks. Again 16 makeshift health facilities with about 30,000 beds were built for treating patients with mild symptoms. Compulsory health screening was done for about fourteen million residents of Wuhan by medical staff in Wuhan (Gu & Lin 2020).

The government of China extended partial lockdown measures to include that of Hubei province and eventually the entire country of China. At the time the covid-19 pandemic was heightened, authorities and political leaders of China provided transportation to link cities and provinces. Towns and villages were also put under absolute control and ensure the closure of public and other places of scenic interest such as gardens, museums, cinemas and restaurants (Gu & Li, 2020). The citizens were cautioned to stop unnecessary travels, social activities and gatherings. There was an insistence on compulsory wearing of nose masks. Other measures such as regular checking of body temperature were enforced before one is allowed to access public places like supermarkets and other public gatherings. Commuters to and from highly endemic area like Wuhan were seen to be in the category of high-risk groups and they were made to be isolated and kept under quarantine for two weeks. Symptomatic patients of covid-19 were quickly sent for treatment at health facilities that have been designated purposefully for treating covid-19 patients and the government of China made sure that treatment cost and other expenditure regarding this were absorbed by the state and not the individual patients (Hartley & Jarvis, 2020; Shaw, Kim & Hua, 2020).

The citizens of China through loyalty and corporation applauded and assisted the government's efforts in fighting the virus and this was done through provision of anti-epidemic measures and essential logistics (Lin & Wu, 2020). Regular updates on infection, fatality and recovery cases of the covid-19 virus were reported on the mass media and other outlets. The government also consistently updated the citizens on its efforts to control and curtail the further spread of the virus which has become a threat to the economic growth of China. All these measure put in place by the government yielded results and had the support from the citizens. The confidence of the people in the government grew up and they happily embraced the restriction measures which have been put in place to stop the spread of the virus. (Gao & Yu, 2020). As a way of curtailing personal contacts and face to face interaction, digital and online shopping and marketing were encouraged. The people of Wuhan therefore did not see the need to go out ones their basic needs were provided through volunteers and other government officials and this helped curtail the infection of the virus

as the citizens will not lose anything for not going out. Gu & Li, 2020).

China declared a nationwide fight against the Covid-19 and this was codenamed "People's War". Medical supplies were boosted and this includes: deployment and provision of healthcare staff to fight on the frontline; logistical support from officials and volunteers, and strict adherence of covid-19 protocols by the people of Wuhan who made sure that they are protected from each for possible infection. Each and every person considered the fight against Covid-19 as all hands on deck and a fight for all and not for a selected few. They saw the government to have performed his duty of providing medical care, constant disinfection and fumigation, provision of drugs and other personal protective equipment and it is therefore the turn of the people to also perform their part by strictly adhering to the directive from the government and other health officials. (He, 2020). China appeared to have been overwhelmed by the massive demand for medical supplies even though it is observed that the country is a healthcare manufacturing hub. There was an overflow of demand for medical supplies as China could not meet the excess demand for medical supplies promptly. The government then devised some strategies and measures to surmount this obstacles in curbing the infection cases of the covid-19 and this includes encouraging drug producers and other pharmaceutical companies to develop medicine and other Personal protective equipment and goods and service that were needed to combat the spread of the virus. Also excess supply of nose masks were purchased by the government to ensure that producers of nose masks do not run at a loss and discourage them to stop producing them even at the end of the upsurge of the pandemic in China. Furthermore, government directive and regulations which impose severe punishments for traders who increased prices of personal protective equipment were prescribed and this was ensured through provision of hotlines for consumer complaints (Huang, 2013).

g) *Africa's Submissive Populace in the fight of the COVID-19*

The high burden of infectious diseases, weak health systems, poverty and the arrival of the winter "flu" season in Southern Africa, are some major factors which particularly make the African continent one of the most vulnerable to the Covid-19 pandemic. According to the Infectious Disease Vulnerability Index (IDVI) 2016, out of 25 countries most vulnerable to infectious diseases, 22 are in the African region (WHO, 2020). Therefore, it could be reasonably hypothesised that the majority of the African populace will be at high risk of the Covid-19.

African countries have a weaker healthcare system when you compare them to the developed nations such as USA, the UK and China, which have

advanced health care systems. (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020; OECD, 2020; Boston Consulting Group, 2020). The limited testing capacity, shortage of trained staff required for diagnostics and intensive care units (ICU), inadequate ventilators and ICU facilities (needed in severe cases of COVID-19), lack of personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare workers and scarcity of funds for the health sector, are some of the Africa' core challenge in fighting the COVID-19 pandemic (Mo Ibrahim Foundation, 2020; OECD, 2020; Boston Consulting Group, 2020, McKenzie, 2020). The other misfortune for Southern Africa is the arrival of winter, as all respiratory viruses spread more effectively in the winter between May and September 2020 and therefore it is expected that the Covid-19 is likely to spread in Southern Africa between this period (Mendelson, 2020; Hopman, Allengranzi & Mehtar, 2020). The northern region of Africa may become fortunate because during summer this region becomes hot and is likely decrease the transmission of the virus (Mendelson, 2020; Gilbert, Pullano & Pinotti, 2020).

h) *Africa's submissive populace in the fight of the Covid-19: The case of the republic of Ghana*

Ghana's uneven socio-economic arrangements, health care system, socio-cultural practices and government's response account for the way Covid-19 has spread across the country (Khoo, 2020). The Covid-19 pandemic is airborne (World Health Organization 2020) and this makes populated and crowded urban settlements such as Accra, Kumasi and Takoradi susceptible to its spread. In addition to the overcrowding in these cities, globalisation which allows free movements of people across national borders could partly be attributed to the rise in infection cases. Ghana's first Covid-19 positive was announced in March 2020 and was alleged to have entered into the country by people who traveled from Nigeria and Europe (Ministry of Health 2020). The country was not prepared as it did not learn the devastation the Covid-19 caused China, India America and Europe. By the time the country realised, it has been overwhelmed by the pandemic. The government subsequently closed its borders for air, land and sea travels on 22 March, 2020 (Akufo-Addo 2020; Garda World News Alert 2020).

The government of Ghana announced a three-week lockdown in the country's major towns (Accra and Kumasi) which had recorded quite a number of infection cases of the virus in major from 30 March to 20 April, 2020 as a measure to curtail a possible community infection of the virus (Garda World News Alert 2020). Following the lockdown, schools, churches, funerals and other social gatherings in Ghana had to be banned and the citizens were encouraged to do mandatory testing (Akuffo-Addo 2020, Nyabor 2020). Some identified hospitals as well as testing centres were designated for Covid-19 in Ghana (Zhang, Nonvignon, &

Mao 2020). The national television and other media outlets consistently updated the citizens on daily infection, recoveries and death statistics update to the citizens. The President of the Republic of Ghana appeared on the national television broadcast every two weeks to address the nation on government's efforts to curtail the further spread of the Covid-19. Invitation for financial and logistical aids was made by the president and other civil society organisations.

II. METHODOLOGY

The study was undertaken in the University of Cape Coast, a geographical environment whose population is made up of multinational races- Africans (mostly Ghanaians), Chinese, Americans, Europeans etc. It is a diverse community which embraces multinational races. The University of Cape Coast (UCC) is located in the Cape Coast Metroplis in the Central region of the Republic of Ghana. The UCC started as University College of Cape Coast (UCCC). The idea to establish UCC conceived was by the first president of Ghana, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and his top officials and associates. He explained to the people of Cape Coast at Victoria Park on November 5, 1960 the unique role that the college would play in national development (UCC, Silver Jubilee Brochure, as cited by Kwarteng, Boadi-Siaw & Dwarko, 2012).

The University of Cape Coast was established in October, 1962 as a result of international commission appointed by the Ghana government in December, 1960. The UCCC was formally inaugurated on December 15, 1962, and placed in special relationship with the University of Ghana. Beginning in a few buildings taken over from a Teacher Training College located at the Southern section of the University of Cape Coast. The Government of Ghana, in 1964 assigned to each of the country's three public universities specific fields of operation, and in line with the emphasis on science education, the UCCC was renamed "The University College of Science Education" with special responsibility of training graduate teachers in Arts and Science for the secondary schools, teacher training colleges, polytechnics and technical institutions in Ghana. In 1966, following the change of government, the College reverted to its original name of the University College of Cape Coast (UCC Annual Publication 2018).

In 1970, the College Council recommended to the government to upgrade the College to full university status with power to award its own degrees. Presently, the University has structured its degree programmes by de-coupling the study of professional education courses from the main degree courses. The University is organised into seventeen (17) Faculties/Schools and five (5) colleges. The establishment of the collegiate system in UCC came into force in 1st August, 2014. The Colleges are: College of Humanities and Legal Studies;

College of Education Studies, College of Agricultural and Natural Sciences, College of Health and Allied Sciences, and College of Distance Education. Apart from the main stream academic departments, UCC also has directorates, sections and centres for administrative purposes.

The population of UCC is made up of staff (lecturers, administrators and other supporting staff) and students. The staff and students population in UCC is about 28,000 people (UCC Students Handbook 2020). Students are made up of about 25,000 and staff are about 3,000. There are three categories of respondents in this current study: Africans (mostly Ghanaians) who are staff and students on UCC campus, Chinese who are staff at the Confucius Institute in UCC and lecturers and students who are foreigners (specifically Americans and Europeans).

Ghanaians who are staff and students of UCC form the greater majority (26,000 which is about 92.9 percent) while the rest 2,000 people (both staff and students) constitute about 7.1 percent are foreigners including Chinese, Europeans and Americans. Given that the greater percentage of respondents of the population are Africans (mostly Ghanaians), the study adopts survey to collect data on Africa's submissive populace in relation to the COVID-19 and Human Security. In view of this, the study adopts administering questionnaire as method of data collection and the instrument involved here is the questionnaire. Again, since the number of Chinese and western participants (staff and students) in UCC form a very small percentage number (less than 100 population), the study purposively interviewed two Chinese and two Euro-Americans to obtain data on China's strong state and western populism in relation to the COVID-19 and Human Security. In view of this, the study used structured interview guide to obtain data from the Chinese and the Euro-Americans to obtain the above data. Interviewing makes it possible to explain and reframe the questions for a small population and for the purpose of soliciting detailed information as a result of having the benefit to ask probing questions (Mahr 1995). Interviewing as a qualitative research paradigm also involves inductive analysis meaning that critical themes emerge out of the data which required for thematic analysis of the data (Saratakos 2005).

Given the heterogeneous nature of the population of UCC and the target group (Africans, Chinese, Euro-Americans etc.), it is not possible to simple randomly select respondents who are Ghanaians or Africans even though they form about 92.9 percent of the total population of UCC. In view of this, a quota of 50 respondents were sampled to obtain data about Africa's submissive populace in relation to the COVID-19 and Human Security and the instrument used to collect data from these 50 respondents is the questionnaire. Quota

sampling is convenient and involves identifying specific subgroups as in the case of the nature of population of this current study which has more than three sub-groups to be included in the sample (Gravetter & Forzano 2009).

III. DATA ANALYSIS, DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION

a) Introduction

This section of the research work presents data analysis, discussion and interpretation of the COVID-19 and Human Security in relation to western populism, China's strong state and Africa's submissive populace. There are two levels of data gathering involved in this

present study ie interviewing and administering of questionnaire. The following paragraphs detail out the analysis, discussion and interpretation ensued in data gathering from Africans, Euro-Americans and Chinese in the University of Cape Coast.

b) Socio-demographic characteristics

There are two categories of respondents in connection with the target group in this current study. They are staff and students. The demand of this research also requires the target of Africans, Chinese and Euro-Americans in the University of Cape Coast. The table below gives the summary of the demographic characteristics of the respondents:

Table 1: Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents

Variable	Frequency	Percentage (%)
Gender		
Africans		
Male	38	76
Female	12	24
Chinese		
Male	1	50
Female	1	50
Euro-Americans		
Male	1	50
Female	1	50
Status		
Africans		
Staff	10	20
Student	40	80
Chinese		
Staff	1	50
Student	1	50
Euro-Americans		
Staff	2	100
Student	0	0

Source: Field Survey, 2021

From the table, males had a higher representation (76 percent) than females (24 percent) with respect to respondents who are Africans. Respondents who are Chinese and Euro-Americans had a balance gender representation.

c) COVID-19 and Human Security

i. Western Populism

One of the objectives of this current study is to investigate the COVID-19 and Human Security in relation to Western populism. Two respondents (one Euro-American and one British) were purposively selected from UCC campus. The respondents described the COVID-19 situation in the western countries as one that has deteriorated social relations and greatly affected human lives as many people have succumbed or lost their lives to the pandemic. The respondents (one American and one British) responded in this way in relation to the COVID-19 situation in the Western world:

The COVID-19 situation has been very dire. It has negatively affected the economy and deteriorated social relation of the people of the west.

Investigating whether the governments and health institutions of the western countries been able to handle and control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, the two respondents gave a positive response (yes) to this. As a way of probing into the respondents' response to the preceding question, they had this to say:

The Western world specifically America has the adequate health facilities and qualified personnel for our health facilities. Vaccines have been developed and administered whereas mandatory wearing of nose masks in public places have been enforced. The lockdown also helped to control the spread of the virus.

The COVID-19 pandemic impacted negatively and bit harder in the western countries as a result of their inability to contain the pandemic and western

populism. This is explained by the respondents as result of the quest for freedom to go about and do what they like and their initial disregard to social distancing protocol and mandatory wearing of the nose masks. The respondents further reported in connection to the western countries' inability to control the spread and fatality rate as follows:

Template zones which serve as high breeding places account for the spread of the virus. The quest for freedom to do whatever they want that is, freedom of socialisation and movement. The virus is also novel to the people of the west and by the time it was known, it had gotten out of control hence, the high infection and fatality rate of the virus".

The western populace in their quest for their rights and freedom succumb to the COVID-19 and in explaining this response, the respondents reported that since they insist on their rights and freedom of movement and since the virus transmits through movement, the infection and fatality rate also increased. In addition to this, the respondents reported as follows:

The careless abandon and complete disregard to social distancing and following the appropriate protocols.

In spite of the western populism which has contributed to the escalation and fatality rates of the pandemic, the governments of the western countries should have taken a cue from China's situation and implemented policies such as moveable or mobile hospitals and promotion of vaccination at the early stage of the pandemic. This, in the opinion of the respondents could have helped the western countries to curtail the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic. Again, the respondents were of the opinion that the western countries could have done the following as a way to curtail the spread and fatality rates of the COVID-19 pandemic:

There should have been an early lockdown, vaccines should have been developed earlier since the virus was identified in China in the year 2019.

d) COVID-19 and Human Security: China's strong state

The second objective of this current study is to ascertain the ability of China to withstand and defeat the COVID-19 pandemic. In responding to the COVID-19 situation in China, the respondents responded that the situation was very scary in the beginning but have been put under control and completely eradicated. The respondents' response could be summarised and quoted as follows:

The severity of the pandemic has been put under barest minimum. Infection cases and the virus is almost out of China as there are only 70 cases are in the country now.

As to whether the government and health institutions of China have been able to handle and control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, all the respondents (100 percent) responded in affirmation to this. In explaining this, the respondents reported as follows:

Immigrants to China are made to undergo mandatory 14 days quarantine after their test. You have to do blood test and quarantine at Dubai since there is no direct flight to China before you do another one in China ones you arrive there.

China's strong state and their ability to control the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic was explained because of one communist party which have been in place for several years and presents one powerful and united voice which could not have been possible in multi parties which present different opinions about the pandemic. The respondents also reported the following as reasons accounting for China's strong state and their ability to control the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic:

People of China believe that lives are important than anything. There are good medical facilities and services. China was able to control the pandemic and defeat the virus because they have big digital network which connect all data about the citizens. The one party system operated by China gives the government the peace of mind to plan and take long term decision for the people of China unlike Africa where there are many political parties which offer destructive and subjective criticism to incumbent party.

The study also revealed that China continue to record low infection and fatality rates of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic because Chinese government has implemented mobile hospitals and embarking on rigorous testing, mandatory quarantine and contact tracing. Chinese government in addition to the above, also embark on rigorous contact tracing, continuous enforcing the wearing of the nose masks, vaccination and enforcing hand washing. Investigating what China did and continue to do right in their attempt to curtail the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19, the respondents responded that, China began by building moveable hospitals, setting of research team on the nature of the virus, mode of transmission and appropriate vaccine to control the spread. China also provided adequate and useful information about COVID-19 to the citizens. It was also added that Chinese government provided free testing for infected community and also free test for patient who voluntarily decide to go to the hospital for a test.

e) COVID-19 and Human Security: Africa's submissive populace

The third objective of this current study sets out to investigate the COVID-19 and Human Security in relation to Africa's submissive populace. A quota sample size of 50 was used to elicit information from the respondents who are Africans on UCC campus. Out of this number, 45 of them who represent 90 percent describe the COVID-19 situation in Africa as dreadful. The rest (5 respondents) who represent 10 percent describe the situation of the COVID-19 in Africa as one that is little bit under control. In an attempt to investigate whether governments and health institutions of Africa have been able to handle and control the spread of the

COVID-19, 30 respondents who represent 60 percent responded in affirmation (yes) to this while the rest (20 percent) who represent 40 percent were of the opinion that governments and health institutions of Africa have not been able to handle and control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in the continent. Respondents who responded in affirmation (yes) explained that Africa governments and health institutions have been able to handle and control the spread of the pandemic because they adhered strictly to the COVID-19 restrictions. They also added that authorities of Kotoka International Airport in Ghana have been updating the government about the alarming rate of positive cases. The respondents who also reported that Africa governments and health institutions have not been able to control the pandemic on the grounds of lack of financial support, poor health facilities and over reliance on the western countries for aid and vaccines.

Forty-Five (45) respondents representing 90 percent were of the opinion that African populace have been able to handle the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Their reasons were given on the grounds of the restrictions that were imposed on them by the government. The rest of the respondents (5) who represent 10 percent however were of the opinion that African populace have not been able to handle the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Their reason was given on the account of daily reported infection and fatality rate in African countries. On the accounts of Africa's ability to control the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic, the respondents were of the opinion that proactive measures, more testing, adhering to social distancing, mandatory wearing of nose mask and strict adherence to the rest of the COVID-19 protocols are the reasons accounting for this. All the respondents (100 percent) were of the opinion that Africa populace have been able to submit to the COVID-19 in relation to human security. Their reason was explained that the COVID-19 affected their lives, socio-economic activities and livelihood of the western countries and China and therefore offered lessons for African populace to adhere to the restrictions and save lives and livelihood. The havoc that the virus has caused the world economic giants in terms of agriculture, transport, socio-economic and political impacts left them with no option than to take their destiny into their own hands and adhere to the restriction and follow the necessary COVID-19 protocols to curtail the spread and escalation of the virus.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the findings of the study, the following conclusions are made:

- i. Euro-Americans or the western populace have not been able to control the infection and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic in relation to human

security due to the complete disregard to the covid-19 protocols and insistence of their right and freedom to go about their normal activities. Also delay in implementing lockdowns from their beginning of the pandemic and late discovery of COVID-19 vaccine account for the western world's inability to control and defeat the virus.

- ii. China has been able to defeat and control the COVID-19 pandemic because of its strong state. A holistic and prompt approach to tackling the pandemic such as mandatory quarantine of 14 days after test and political will account for China's ability to defeat the spread and fatality of the virus. Again, free testing for infected communities, employing digital network and the value for human life all account for China's strong state and ability to control the virus.
- iii. The dreadful nature and the negative impact of the virus in China and western world made African populace to submit to the severity of the virus and put in place and adhere to the necessary protocols to contain and control the spread of the virus. Africa submits to its weak medical facilities and inadequate health staff in relation to the western world and China and implement strict adherence to the COVID-19 policies such as ensuring social distancing in cars and public places, mandatory washing of hands and suspension of social activities and gatherings. Africa's submissive populace in relation to the COVID-19 and Human Security is what made the continent put the spread of the pandemic abase.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the findings and conclusions drawn, the following recommendations are made:

- i. Africa and western world could consider introducing mobile hospitals to provide door step health services and healthcare assistance to their populace in this era of COVID-19 and beyond.
- ii. Free testing and vaccination could be considered by governments of African and western populace as a measure to curtail the spread of the pandemic.
- iii. Human rights and freedom are fundamental and basic constitutional provisions. However, where it becomes necessary for your freedom and certain rights to be curtailed to protect human lives, it should be enforced especially in this COVID-19 era where the virus transmits very fast through movement and social gatherings. It is therefore recommended for strict enforcement of the social distancing protocols as this recommendation has worked out for Africa in general and Ghana in particular.
- iv. Regular and continuous testing and health screening could be encouraged and probably

promulgated by all countries since the COVID-19 virus has come to stay with us. This will ensure early detection of infected people, isolate them and administer the appropriate medication to curtail the fatality rate among the African and Western populace. This mandatory testing and quarantine is what made China to control the infection and fatality rate of the virus.

- v. It is recommended that investment should be made into research to come up with appropriate vaccines and medication to treat the COVID-19 since the pandemic has come to live with us.

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APPENDICES

Appendix A

QUESTIONNAIRE FOR AFRICANS ON UCC CAMPUS

This questionnaire is designed to seek for information on COVID-19 and Human Security: Africa's submissive populace. The category of respondents to which this questionnaire is directed are staff and students of UCC who are African. The information provided in response to this questionnaire is solely for the purpose of academic work and respondents are assured of anonymity and confidentiality.

SECTION A: PERSONAL DATA

1. Sex

Male

[]

Female

[]

2. Status of respondent

Staff

[]

Student

[]

SECTION B

COVID-19 AND HUMAN SECURITY: AFRICA'S SUBMISSIVE POPULACE

3. How would you describe the COVID-19 situation in Africa?

4. Have the governments and health institutions of Africa been able to handle and control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic?

Yes

[]

No

[]

5. Explain your response in question 4.

6. Have the citizens of Africa been able to handle the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic?

Yes

[]

No

[]

7. Explain your response in question 6

.....

8. What account(s) for Africa's ability to control the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic?

.....

9. In your opinion, have the Africa populace been able to submit to the COVID-19 in relation to human security?

Yes []

No []

10. Explain your response in relation to question 9.

.....

Thank you very much for making time to respond to this questionnaire

Appendix B

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR WESTERNERS (EURO-AMERICANS) ON UCC CAMPUS

This interview guide is designed to seek for information on COVID-19 and Human Security: Western Populism. The category of respondents to which this interview guide is directed are staff and students of UCC who are from the western world (Euro-Americans). The information provided in response to this interview guide is solely for the purpose of academic work and respondents are assured of anonymity and confidentiality.

SECTION A: PERSONAL DATA

1. Sex

Male []

Female []

2. Status of respondent

Staff []

Student []

3. Country of origin

America []

United Kingdom []

Other Western country []

SECTION B

COVID-19 AND HUMAN SECURITY: WESTERN POPULISM

4. How would you describe the COVID-19 situation in the Western countries?

.....

5. Have the governments and health institutions of the western countries been able to handle and control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic?

Yes []

No []

6. Explain your response in question 4.

7. What account(s) for the western countries inability to control the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic?

.....

8. How does the western populace in their quest for their rights and freedom succumb to the COVID-19?

.....

9. In your opinion, what could the western countries have done to curtail the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic?

.....

Thank you very much for making time to respond to this Interview Guide

Appendix C

INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR CHINESE ON UCC CAMPUS

This interview guide is designed to seek for information on COVID-19 and Human Security: China's strong state. The category of respondents to which this interview guide is directed are staff and students of UCC who are Chinese. The information provided in response to this interview guide is solely for the purpose of academic work and respondents are assured of anonymity and confidentiality.

SECTION A: PERSONAL DATA

1. Sex

Male []

Female []

2. Status of respondent

Staff []

Student []

SECTION B

COVID-19 AND HUMAN SECURITY: CHINESE STRONG STATE

3. How would you describe the COVID-19 situation in the China?

.....

4. Have the governments and health institutions of China been able to handle and control the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic?

Yes []

No []

5. Explain your response in question 4.

6. What account(s) for China's strong state and their ability to control the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic?

.....

7. How does China continue to record low infection and fatality rate of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic?

.....

8. What did China do and continue to do right in their attempt to curtail the spread and fatality rate of the COVID-19 pandemic?

.....

Thank you very much for making time to respond to this Interview Guide.



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Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



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Career

Credibility

Exclusive

Reputation



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
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Acknowledgments

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The following is the official style and template developed for publication of a research paper. Authors are not required to follow this style during the submission of the paper. It is just for reference purposes.



Manuscript Style Instruction (Optional)

- Microsoft Word Document Setting Instructions.
- Font type of all text should be Swis721 Lt BT.
- Page size: 8.27" x 11", left margin: 0.65, right margin: 0.65, bottom margin: 0.75.
- Paper title should be in one column of font size 24.
- Author name in font size of 11 in one column.
- Abstract: font size 9 with the word "Abstract" in bold italics.
- Main text: font size 10 with two justified columns.
- Two columns with equal column width of 3.38 and spacing of 0.2.
- First character must be three lines drop-capped.
- The paragraph before spacing of 1 pt and after of 0 pt.
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- Large images must be in one column.
- The names of first main headings (Heading 1) must be in Roman font, capital letters, and font size of 10.
- The names of second main headings (Heading 2) must not include numbers and must be in italics with a font size of 10.

Structure and Format of Manuscript

The recommended size of an original research paper is under 15,000 words and review papers under 7,000 words. Research articles should be less than 10,000 words. Research papers are usually longer than review papers. Review papers are reports of significant research (typically less than 7,000 words, including tables, figures, and references)

A research paper must include:

- a) A title which should be relevant to the theme of the paper.
- b) A summary, known as an abstract (less than 150 words), containing the major results and conclusions.
- c) Up to 10 keywords that precisely identify the paper's subject, purpose, and focus.
- d) An introduction, giving fundamental background objectives.
- e) Resources and techniques with sufficient complete experimental details (wherever possible by reference) to permit repetition, sources of information must be given, and numerical methods must be specified by reference.
- f) Results which should be presented concisely by well-designed tables and figures.
- g) Suitable statistical data should also be given.
- h) All data must have been gathered with attention to numerical detail in the planning stage.

Design has been recognized to be essential to experiments for a considerable time, and the editor has decided that any paper that appears not to have adequate numerical treatments of the data will be returned unrefereed.

- i) Discussion should cover implications and consequences and not just recapitulate the results; conclusions should also be summarized.
- j) There should be brief acknowledgments.
- k) There ought to be references in the conventional format. Global Journals recommends APA format.

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Author details

The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

Abstract

The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

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A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, "What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?" Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

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Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

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Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

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Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.



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TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality human social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

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7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

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11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources.

Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

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22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

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To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.



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- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
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Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

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Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.



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- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
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- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
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Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

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This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

When a technique is used that has been well-described in another section, mention the specific item describing the way, but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to show all particular resources and broad procedures so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step-by-step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- Describe the method entirely.
- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.



Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

What to stay away from:

- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
- A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

If you put figures and tables at the end of some details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attached appendix materials, such as raw facts. Whatever the position, each table must be titled, numbered one after the other, and include a heading. All figures and tables must be divided from the text.

Discussion:

The discussion is expected to be the trickiest segment to write. A lot of papers submitted to the journal are discarded based on problems with the discussion. There is no rule for how long an argument should be.

Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."



Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

- You may propose future guidelines, such as how an experiment might be personalized to accomplish a new idea.
- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
- One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

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References	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring



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