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Cuba - 30 years of innovation

The Case of President Joaquim Torra I Pla

Highlights

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Cuba - 30 Years of Innovation and Socialist Goals

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Abstract- This article studies Cuba's 30 years of innovation and socialist goals. After the Introduction and before the Conclusion, the primary content of the article is divided into three parts. The first part looks at the general situation of Cuba's reform process over the past 30 years (1993-2023). The second part identifies, analyzes and demonstrates typical factors that directly impact the pace of development and expansion of cooperation in Cuba. The third part reviews and evaluates Cuba's prospects, orientation and development potential.

Keywords: cuba, factors, innovation, goals, politics.

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CUBA30YEARSOFINNOVATIONANDSOCIALISTGOALS

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Cuba - 30 Years of Innovation and Socialist Goals

Tran Anh Cong ^α, Tran Xuan Hiep ^σ & Nguyen Anh Hung ^ρ

Abstract- This article studies Cuba's 30 years of innovation and socialist goals. After the Introduction and before the Conclusion, the primary content of the article is divided into three parts. The first part looks at the general situation of Cuba's reform process over the past 30 years (1993-2023). The second part identifies, analyzes and demonstrates typical factors that directly impact the pace of development and expansion of cooperation in Cuba. The third part reviews and evaluates Cuba's prospects, orientation and development potential.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the past three decades, the process of socialist construction and reform in Cuba has had many positive changes. Both maintaining the core political ideological stance, and transitioning to a market economy; both focusing on national identity, and integrating and adapting quickly to international changes - have become fundamental trends and goals. This article researches, analyzes and evaluates the general situation of Cuba's reform process over the past 30 years (1993-2023), typical factors affecting Cuba and prospects, orientation, and room for development of Cuba.

II. GENERAL SITUATION OF CUBA'S INNOVATION IN THE LAST 30 YEARS (1993-2023)

Since the Cold War (after 1991), Cuba entered a period entire of disadvantages and difficulties when its ally the Soviet Union and the Eastern European socialist system collapsed. Cuba has wholly lost its close political partners, and its economy no longer has support from them (because before that, in Cuba's economy, the Soviet Union and socialist countries accounted for 80% of export turnover, providing 95% of gasoline, 57% of food, 51% of meat and most office tools, transportation, essential consumer goods (Thao, 2020)). To overcome this situation, since August 1993, leader Fidel Castro and the Cuban government have issued and implemented a series of crucial political adjustment and socio-economic reform measures: organization,

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rearranging the structure of the government apparatus; improving management in state agriculture; allowing expansion of individual occupations; healthy national finances; legalize the use of foreign currency among people.

Regarding the legal foundation, the Constitution 1976 is still applied as the legal framework of the political system, still, there were edits and supplements in 1992 and 2002 to be compatible with new situations and trends. In the revision of the Constitution 1992, the most essential amendment was to affirm and prove that the Cuban State is a secular state and not an atheist state (recognizing and legitimizing symbols and organizations, related religious functions and activities); and, eliminate some restrictions on foreign investment and grant foreign corporations limited ownership rights in Cuba if they enter into joint ventures with the regime. In the 2002 revision, the most essential amendment was the increased assertion that the current social regime in Cuba is permanent and irrevocable.

The 5th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (Partido Comunista de Cuba - PCC), which took place in October 1997, is considered an important milestone that initiated many adjustments, reforms, innovations of the entire Cuban political system after that. The Congress Document affirms that the typical political goals and ideals in Cuba cannot be changed, but at each different historical moment, there must be appropriate paths and measures. The principles of democratic centralism, criticism and self-criticism are considered the leading factors ensuring that the Party is a tightly organized and energetic strategic advisory body (Thao, 2020). It is necessary to strengthen party discipline, and effectively fight against bureaucracy, and corruption in the Party and State. Priority must be given to developing a team of practical officers, young officers, female officers, officers of color and knowledge officers. The government apparatus needs to be restructured to limit administrative bloat, overlapping functions, and streamline staffing by 30-40% (redundant people receive 70% of salary until assigned to a new job position). The aspect of democracy and human rights must be emphasized, first of all the right to live, to be met and cared for in terms of food; grow up happily and healthily; to become a valuable, helpful person for society; enjoy equality, dignity and development. For economic development, it is necessary to thoroughly grasp four principles: (1) Only state directional targets, not specific targets; (2) Use domestic efforts primarily; (3) Focus on enhancing production and business

efficiency as a critical task; and (4) Ensuring the socialist nature of economic reform processes.

Cuba still maintains the planned economic model, but there are many changes and more appropriate, practical, compelling directions. Accordingly, *first*, create a larger environment for forms of ownership and non-socialist production, business. *Second*, make the most of the possibilities to rectify, reorganize and consolidate the public ownership regime, consistently not turning to privatization. *Third*, add new nancial balances and macroeconomic tools to the thinking, practice of economic and business management.

In the field of foreign affairs, after the Cold War, Cuba gradually established and expanded diplomatic relations with most countries in the world, and actively participated in many globally and regional international organizations. Cuba prioritizes developing all-round relations with socialist countries in Asia (China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea); restore and diversify relationships (especially economic relations) with Russia and Eastern European countries (even though they no longer follow a socialist regime). Cuba also regained its role and strengthened relations with neighboring countries and Latin American countries, and that became favorable when in the first decade and a half of the 21st century, most governments of Latin American countries were led by leftist forces. In December 2004, Cuba founded and is a vital, crucial member of the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) - an alliance of many left-wing countries in Latin America. Cuba also has a unique, particular political, economic and social relationship with Venezuela when the left took power in the country from 1998 to present. In relations with the West, Cuba made a vital, a critical development when normalizing relations with Western European countries based on the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement signed with the European Union (UE) in March 2016. Cuba still maintains a determined struggle but responds flexibly to the US embargo policy that has changed over the years of presidents. Under President Bill Clinton (1993-2000) and President Bush Jr. (2001-2008), the United States increased the embargo on Cuba by implementing the Torricelli Act (issued in 1992) and Helms-Burton (1996). Under President Barack Obama (2009-2016), this policy was significantly relaxed, so that from July 2015, the two countries restored diplomatic relations and opened embassies in each other's capitals. However, under President Donald Trump (2017-2020), the policy of siege and embargo was applied again. The administration of President Joe Biden, who took over at the beginning of 2021, has continued to apply and even extend the embargo and strengthen sanctions since, Cuba suppressed of the protest movement in the second half of 2021.

In recent years, the Cuban context has had some important changes, typically the promulgating of

the new Constitution in April 2019 and the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in April 2021. The Constitution 2019 replaced the Constitution 1976 (and amendments and supplements in 1992 and 2002), with many new regulations: (1) Recognizing private property and creating a freer market; (2) Prohibit discrimination based on gender, race, national origin, sexual orientation, gender identity or disability (this is the regulation that led to the legalization of same-sex marriage); (3) Ensure women's reproductive and sexual rights and protect women from gender-based violence; (4) Defining marriage as creating a social and legal organization (a family with at least 2 members); (5) Allowing to hold/hold multiple nationalities; (6) Restore the presumption of innocence and suspension of detention in the judicial system (these provisions were last enshrined in the 1940 Constitution); (7) Identify the importance of climate and its threats; (8) Establish a separate individual position of President (previously this position was called Chairman of the State Council and was part of the collective State Council) and a separate individual position of Prime Minister (previously called the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, concurrently held by the Chairman of the State Council); (9) Establish age limits for candidacy and number of terms for the position of President (The President cannot hold power for more than 2 terms and must be no more than 60 years old when first running for election); (10) Transfer the authority of the head of the State Council to the Chairman of the National Assembly (from now on, the Chairman of the National Assembly is also the Chairman of the State Council and the State Council is the standing agency of the National Assembly); (11) Establishment of a provincial council consisting of provincial and city leaders; (12) The positions of provincial chairman and mayor (in charge of executive duties) are supplemented and separated from the position of chairman of the provincial and city councils (previously, the concurrent position of chairman of the provincial and city councils, responsible for both the legislature and the executive); (13) The President and Vice President of a province or city appointed by the President must be approved by the provincial or city government; and (14) Expand the term of district council delegates to 5 years (previously 2.5 years).

In the middle of April 2021, the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba occurred. The Congress passed resolutions as the basis for the country's development in the current and upcoming periods: (1) Political report of the Congress; (2) Ideological political functions and activities, and relationships with the masses; (3) Personnel policy; (4) Update the conceptualization of the Cuban socialist socio-economic development model; and (5) Guidelines for updating the socio-economic development model for the period 2021-2026. In particular, through this Congress, Cuba's

senior leadership team officially transferred power to the next generation - people more than 20 years younger than them (most were born after the 1959 revolution), typically the position of First Secretary of the Communist Party of Cuba was transferred from 90-year-old leader Raul Castro to 61-year-old President Miguel Diaz-Canel.

After the Congress, entering the second half of 2021, Cuba faced two significant challenges: the Covid-19 epidemic broke out, causing many adverse effects in all aspects, and protests broke out against the government largest over 60 years. *Regarding Covid-19*, this dangerous disease entered Cuba in March 2020 and quickly spread. As of September 24, 2021, 832,286 Cubans have been infected (of whom 7,048 have died) with an increasing incidence (for example, in the second week of July 2021, from 5 to 11, there were an average of more than 3,000 new cases per day (Thoa, 2021) - a worrying number when compared to the total population of Cuba which is just over 11 million people). Cuba has prepared five types of epidemic vaccines, of which two have been successfully tested (Abdala and Soberana 2). The government at that time organized vaccination for about half of the population and vaccinated everyone by December 2021. *Regarding the protests*, stemming from the lack of food and medicine, ineffective epidemic prevention methods and some less democratic measures by the government, on July 11-13, tens of thousands of Cubans in more than 50 municipalities nationwide have taken to the streets to protest (The Economist, 2021). The government crackdown left one person dead and hundreds arrested. On July 17, the Cuban Communist Party also responded by organizing a massive protest in support of the government in the capital, Havana, with the participation of more than 100,000 people (Nicoll, 2021).

In 2022, the protest movement will no longer recur, and the Covid pandemic has altogether declined, still Cuba must overcome the severe consequences left by this pandemic and deal with the strengthening of the US embargo. In just the first 14 months of US President Joe Biden's administration (January 2021-February 2022), losses due to the economic embargo imposed by the United States on Cuba amounted to 6.35 billion USD (equivalent to 15 million USD per day (Tuyen & Hai, 2022). On November 3, 2022, the 77th United Nations General Assembly passed a Resolution with a very high vote rate (185/193) calling for an end to the US economic embargo on Cuba.

Since 2017, the homosexual movement in Cuba has increased, demanding the legalization of same-sex marriage. The regulations on marriage and family in the new 2019 Constitution create conditions for that issue. On July 22, 2022, the National Assembly (Asamblea Nacional del Póde Popular - ANPP) voted to finalize the draft of the new Family Code, which includes regulations officially legalizing same-sex marriage. The draft was put to referendum on September 25; Obtaining a rate of

66.85% of supporters, on September 26, the President of Cuba signed the law, published it in the Official Gazette and from September 27, 2022, the new Family Code officially took effect. This result is a significant step forward in expanding and developing human rights in Cuba, making Cuba the first socialist country and the 8th country in Latin America, the 32nd country in the world to legalize same-sex marriage.

During October 27-29, 2022, Cuba successfully organized the 22nd International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties (IMWCP) in [the capital] Havana. The meeting brought together 142 delegates representing 73 communist and workers' parties of 57 countries across all continents, with the theme "Solidarity with Cuba and all struggling peoples. United, we will be stronger in the fight against imperialism, together with social movements and the masses, in the face of capitalism and capitalist policies, the threat of fascism and war; protect the peace, the environment, the rights of working people, solidarity and socialism".

On November 27, 2022, Cuba held elections for local people's council deputies. According to Cuba's National Electoral Council (CEN), the election was "a victory for the people" when it took place vibrantly, objectively, honestly with 5,728,220 voters (accounting for 68.56% number of people on the voter list), elected 12,422 delegates (with 44.1% female - this rate is higher than the 2017 election) who are responsible for directly managing issues, suggestions and complaints within the communities they represent. This is the first election held in Cuba since it restructured its electoral system and promulgated a new election law according to the 2019 Constitution. Local people's councils were officially established nationwide on December 17, 2022.

During the two days of December 9-10, 2022, the 5th Conference of the Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba, term VIII, took place in [the capital] Havana. The conference discussed the political, economic, and social situation in Cuba and the pioneering role of party members when facing difficulties; at the same time, discuss the strategy of innovating, enhancing and perfecting the Cuban Communist Youth Union (Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas de Cuba - UJC). The conference also addressed some outstanding issues in Cuba today such as dealing with crime and speculation, promoting food production, the electrical energy situation and drug control.

In 2023, from January, Cuba assumed the Chairmanship in 2023 of "The Group of 77 and China" - an alliance of 135 developing countries, designed to promote the collective economic interests of its members and create enhanced collective bargaining capacity at the United Nations.

On March 26, 2023, Cuba held the election of the Xth National Assembly (2023-2028), and this is also the first National Assembly elected according to the new provisions of the Constitution 2019 and the Election Law

2019. Yes. 6,148,876 Cuban voters (equivalent to 75.87% of Cubans eligible to vote) went to 23,468 polling stations to elect their highest representative. As a result, 5,565,640 votes (equivalent to 90.28% of the total votes) were valid, electing 470 National Assembly deputies (64% of which were new/first-time deputies) with an average age. 46 and 53% are female, 20% are young people under 35 years old and 95.5% have a university degree or higher.

In his May-June 2023 speeches, President Diaz-Canel affirmed that Cuba's current socio-economic situation is still complicated and must overcome and deal with many difficulties and challenges caused by the severe consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic and the US embargo policy. To be able to develop economically, he believes that Cuba needs to promote a plan for macroeconomic and social stabilization, including anti-corruption policies (especially among government officials, the military, and food processing industry, civil aviation, telecommunications, nickel plating industry, cigar manufacturing); anti-inflation; reduce budget deficit; overcome the gap between wages and purchasing power; increase available foreign currency; promote domestic food production, gradually moving towards self-reliance on food security; restore the role of state-owned agricultural companies; focus on investing in food production with domestic and foreign capital, and implementing actions to ensure nutrition and national food sovereignty; restore tourism industry goals to and above pre-pandemic levels (in the first 5 months of 2023, Cuba welcomed 1,441,362 international visitors, an increase of 177% over the same period in 2022, and set the target welcoming 3.5 million international tourists this year 2023 (Vietnam News Agency, 2023)).

III. FACTORS DIRECTLY AFFECTING CUBA'S SPEED OF DEVELOPMENT AND EXPANSION OF COOPERATION

There are many factors that directly impact the speed of development and expansion of cooperation in Cuba, typically the following factors:

a) *Adjustment of the political policy of the Cuban Communist Party*

The adjustment of Cuba's political policy is comprehensive but cautious, step by step, not hasty, continuing tradition but updating and closely following reality.

First, *determining the national vision is always a permanent and core issue for the country's political adjustments*. Through the 8th Congress (April 2021), the Communist Party of Cuba determined to continue Cuba's path to socialism, building a country with sovereignty, independence, socialism, democracy, prosperous and sustainable. To do this, there must be

four strategic pillars and driving forces for development: (1) Building an effective State, creating vital changes in production and international integration; (2) Developing infrastructure, human resources, science, technology, and innovation; (3) Promote human development and social justice; and (4) Protect natural resources and the environment.

Second, *determined to build a socialist society, not move towards a communist society*. In previous traditional socialist thought, "socialism" and "civilized communist society" were considered the two highest socio-economic forms of humanity, inseparable and inseparable. Successfully building socialism will lead to a transition to a communist society, building socialism to advance to a communist society. This view is increasingly unsupported by people who believe that a communist society [civilized] is a fantasy. The increasing viewpoint of abandoning the goal of moving towards communism in Cuba has prompted the official inclusion of this provision in the Constitution - the fundamental law, with the highest legal effect, regulating the main and crucial national issue. Supported by many people, the Communist Party of Cuba and the Constitutional Reform Committee [led by President Raul Castro] decided not to include the provision "moving towards a communist society" in Cuba's new Draft Constitution... But after many fierce debates about removing or still including this regulation at the 8th Central Conference of the Communist Party of Cuba in December 2018, most delegates still voted to maintain such a regulation, and the National Assembly The Assembly approved it and the new Constitution in April 2019. However, in reality, Cuba has abandoned the goal of "moving towards a communist society". In recent years, "socialism" is still frequently encountered in social life, while the word "communist society" is rarely mentioned. Even at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in April 2021, there was no mention of "communism" and "moving towards a communist society", while repeatedly affirming and emphasizing "socialism" and "the work of building a socialist society".

Third, *affirm the sole and supreme leadership of the Communist Party of Cuba*. In each country, if there is one-party politics, the ruling party will have a much easier time in existence, organization, and operation because it does not have to deal with, suffer losses from competing opposition parties such as in a multi-party country, at the same time the leadership of that ruling party will be more centralized (per the "principle of centralization" popular in socialist countries). Therefore, when Cuba built socialism, the old Constitution 1976 (with amendments in 1992 and 2002) of the Cuban State and the congresses and documents of the Communist Party of Cuba all clearly stipulated that the Party Communists are the sole and highest force leading the Cuban State and society. The new Constitution 2019

and the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in 2021 continue to affirm and institutionalize this issue.

Fourth, *build and develop Cuban national socialist ideology*. During the revolutionary struggle (1953-1962), the name, style, strategy and ideology of the late leader Jose Marti became the driving force and guideline of organizational tactics and revolutionary activities, under the command of Fidel Castro. Entering the period of socialist construction (1963-1991), Marxism-Leninism was widely spread and applied. Both of these ideologies (Marti and Marx-Lenin) are officially recognized by the Constitution, becoming the core political ideology of Cuba. In 2016, Fidel passed away, and nearly three years later, the new Constitution 2019 officially added his ideas to the Cuban national socialist ideology... Researchers also evaluate the form, value, and meaning attaching importance to building and developing Cuban national political ideology through the order of recognition in the Constitution. If in the Constitution 1976, Marxism-Leninism was recognized first, followed by Marti ideology, then by the time of amending the Constitution in 2002, Marti ideology was placed close to Marxism-Leninism. And in the Constitution 2019, the order, values, and meanings of the Cuban leaders' ideology are put first, respectively: Marti ideology (tradition, revolution, beginning) - Fidel ideology (revolution, practical, modern) - Marxism-Leninism (reference, selection, application).

Fifth, *rejuvenate the country's leadership team*. Until the end of the first decade of the 21st century, Cuba was still led by veteran members who were over 75 years old at that time: Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and other leaders of the revolutionary struggle (1953-1962). There is an urgent need to rejuvenate the national leadership team. Chairman Raul said that, besides victories, achievements, capacity, experience, opportunities..., health and age are also two essential factors of the leadership team, so since 2011, he has repeatedly proposed and proposed appropriate age levels for the Cuban national leadership: State leaders and members of the Party Central Committee must not be older than 60, Politburo members must not be more senior than 70 years old when taking office first position. This issue was considered and discussed during the 7th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba in April 2016 and implemented per the age-power logic sequence: transferring power from people holding high positions first, then lower positions; move state power first, then transfer party power (because the Communist Party is the political force, having power and leading the Cuban State; [but] state power is the nucleus of political power). In April 2018, Raul (87 years old) handed over the Chairmanship of the State Council to Diaz-Canel (58 years old), and in July 2018, Diaz-Canel appointed 5 Vice Presidents, including two new people in their 50s. Then, at the 8th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba, Raul resigned as First Secretary of the Party when

he was nearly 90, and Diaz-Canel (61 years old) succeeded him. Many members of the Party Central Committee and members of the Politburo of Raul's time who were over the age of 75 also resigned during this period (such as former Second Secretary Jose Ramon Machado Ventura, who is 91 years old, and former Vice President Ramiro). Valdes Menendez - 89, former Minister of the Armed Forces Leopoldo Cintra Frias - 80...). Thus, the age of the current Cuban Party and State leaders has been significantly rejuvenated, with the majority being in their 50s and 60s (compared to the previous leaders in their 80s and 90s).

Sixth, *encourage organizations and people to participate in political activities*. Different from the period of revolutionary struggle (1953-1962) with very enthusiastic and vibrant participation in political activities combined with armed struggle of socio-political organizations and people, During the period of building socialism (1963-1991), the movement was much more "quiet". The reason is that during this period of nearly three decades, Cuban socio-political organizations were only "task-performing agencies" for the Communist Party, subject to the natural, complete direction of the Party and many limitations in work, activities. People are also hesitant to participate in political organizations and activities because participation must have specific goals, be public, and be consistent with the Party's goals. At the same time, many human rights and civil rights are needed. Their political activities are not regulated, limited, or prohibited by the relevant legal system, especially the old Constitution 1976; violations will be strictly handled and suppressed by the government. From 1992 until now, especially in recent years, in implementing political policy adjustments, the Communist Party of Cuba has become more open by encouraging organizations and people to participate in political activities. For organizations that have been considered "mission-sharing agencies" with the Party, their status, role, equipment, and more rights and responsibilities have been enhanced (especially the Committee to Protect the Cuban Revolution (Comités de Defensa de la Revolución - CDR) and Cuban Communist Youth Union). For the people, the legal system and the new Constitution 2019 expand, strengthen, and protect more human rights and civil rights, and are organized and encouraged by the Party to participate in exciting and popular political activities such as meetings, rallies, demonstrations, elections, referendums... These political activities are increasingly making Cuban politics more vibrant, diverse, and practical, however their impact has two present and sometimes very difficult to predict and control (for example, the homosexual socio-political movement that broke out in 2017 has brought significant progress in terms of concept, democracy and human rights to Cuba in September 2017). In September 2022, the Cuban government issued a new Family Code, legalizing same-

sex marriage; on the contrary, the Isidro socio-political movement, taking advantage of the consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic, rose to they protested against the government in more than 50 cities nationwide in July 2021, becoming the largest protest in Cuba in the past 60 years, causing political instability and adversely affecting the prestige and leadership power of the Communist Party and the State of Cuba).

b) Promulgation and implementation of new socio-economic policies

The promulgation and implementation of new socio-economic policies is also a fundamental factor, affecting many aspects of Cuba today. As early as April 2011, the 6th Congress of the Communist Party of Cuba drafted and approved the *"National Plan for Socio-Economic Development until 2030"*. By April 2016, the 7th Congress reviewed and introduced many amendments and supplements. By April 2021, the 8th Congress will continue to edit, update, and complete this plan with 200 appropriate and necessary issues (retaining 17, adding 18, amending 165, and removing 92 issues (My, 2021)), and at the same time passed two critical resolutions: *"Updating the conceptualization of the Cuban socialist socio-economic development model"* and *"Guidelines for updating Cuba's socio-economic model for the period 2021-2026"*. In the spirit of the proposed policies, guidelines, programs, and plans, many new socio-economic policies of Cuba are currently being promulgated and implemented, with the primary goals and contents: (1) Ensuring public ownership of primary/essential means of production and consolidating a socio-economic development model that promotes the effective operation of state agencies and the enterprise system, as well as for the increased and effective participation of society in policy-making; (2) Develop production and service provision activities that take full advantage of the country's strengths; (3) Increase efficiency and competitiveness in all economic sectors. Gradually build a more open mechanism and environment for economic sectors. Quickly expand many scopes and fields of activity for the private economic sector (previously, in economics, private individuals were only allowed to participate in 127 fields, but now this has increased to more than 2,000 fields (My, 2021)); (4) Develop production and commercialization of agricultural and fishery products, ensuring self-sufficiency in food; (5) Ensure, protect and prioritize the overall development of strategic industries; (6) Ensure continuity and cohesion in monetary, credit, price, exchange rate and tax policies. Gradually increase national savings and ensure financial investment funds; (7) Focus on prioritizing the implementation of monetary unification measures (from January 1, 2021, eliminating the parallel circulation since 1994 of two currencies - the national peso and the convertible peso, forming a single peso with an

exchange rate of 24 pesos = 1 USD). Reform wages and eliminate subsidies for many non-essential products; (8) Quickly eliminate prejudices about foreign investment (FDI). Diversify and expand FDI sources in the medium and long term. Considering FDI as an essential factor in national development; (9) Create conditions to develop and perfect the domestic market. Expand and diversify foreign trade activities and international cooperation; (10) Affirming and emphasizing that the sustainability of socialism can only be successful based on protecting values and improving labor productivity, creating more material wealth associated with public distribution equality, improving people's living standards and quality of life; (11) Ensuring necessary employment sources. Ensuring work is the individual need and perceived goal of each person; (12) Production resources must be evenly distributed geographically; (13) Always ensuring maintain the annual budget for social security at over 50% of GDP (as in 2017, it was 51% of GDP (Anh, 2021)); (14) Affirm, promote and concretize the principles of openness, fairness and equality in social security; (15) Consolidate and develop the achievements of the revolution in health, welfare and social support, education, culture, sports, entertainment, security and citizen protection.

c) The expansion and development of human rights and civil rights

In modern society, each citizen is like a primary cell of politics. Their role and level of political participation are proportional to the power they are equipped with - both in theory and in practice. Therefore, the affirmation and expansion of human and civil rights in Cuba today have developed the position, organization, and political activities of the people, becoming a vital factor influencing the political system. With the issue of human rights and civil rights, the new Constitution 2019 has removed many restrictions and prohibitions; edit and improve many rights recognized in the old Constitution 1976; at the same time, adding many new rights. Next, the documents of the 8th Party Congress in 2021 and laws (such as the new Election Law in 2019, and the new Family Code in 2022...) have developed, concretized, and put these regulations into practice, typically the following issues:

First, *recognize private property rights*. "Private ownership" is the occupation, use, and disposition of each human being about the means of production, consumption, and living, to meet their material and spiritual needs. Private ownership includes three types: individual ownership, small owner ownership and private capitalist ownership. Previously, in Cuba, only personal ownership was recognized, meaning that private ownership was not recognized (stipulated in Article 21 of the old Constitution 1976). At that time, two types of private ownership, smallholder ownership, and private

capitalist ownership, were considered illegal because it was believed that those two types of rights used the time and labor of others (when it comes to taking advantage of, taking advantage of, exploiting) to create income and assets for individuals, and at the same time this is also the basis and driving force for the formation and development of a capitalist society - contrary to the goal of building socialism in Cuba.

However, due to the need to adapt and develop, many factors have arisen that push the Cuban legal system to soon recognize private ownership with all three types, for two primary reasons: (1) Before the 1959 revolution, Cuba was a relatively developed capitalist country, with all types of private ownership. When the revolution succeeded and entered the process of building socialism, despite the extensive and robust application of the prohibition of smallholder ownership and private capitalist ownership, the government only achieved the following results, as a result, in terms of form, because these two types of ownership have existed commonly before and contribute together with individual ownership to create the true nature of private ownership, they still implicitly exist; and (2) After the Cold War period, the Cuban economy, in addition to the two main economic components of the state economy/state-owned economy and the collective economy/cooperative economy, was formed. Developing two other economic sectors: joint venture/associated economy and private economy/self-employment economy. The benefits, efficiency and objective necessity have made Cuba accept and increasingly create conditions for these two new economic sectors, especially with critical financial strategies and policies such as the National socio-economic plan until 2030 introduced by the Communist Party in 2011 or the Foreign Investment Law passed by the National Assembly in 2014... But the development of two new economic sectors (especially the private sector) will lack resources and face fundamental obstacles if private property rights are not fully recognized. This is an urgent need that is addressed in the provisions of the new Constitution issued in April 2019: officially recognizing the role of the free market and private property rights.

Second, *allowing citizens the right to hold multiple nationalities*. "Nationality" is a legal-political relationship that is long-term, durable, highly stable in time, and not limited in space between a specific individual/natural person and a certain government/state. Each individual can apply to renounce their current nationality with a legitimate need and reason or have their nationality revoked if they commit a serious crime related to honor, reputation, sovereignty, and national security. In addition, each individual can also apply for citizenship (naturalization) when they do not yet have citizenship; or use for two or more nationalities (multiple [national] citizenship) if relevant countries have

regulations allowing this. Multinationality is increasingly widely used due to the growing need for integration and globalization and the many benefits it brings to both individuals/natural persons and the state/government.

Previously, Cuba only allowed its citizens to have one nationality, Cuban nationality (specified in Article 32 of the old Constitution 1976). But this regulation conflicts with the growing demand of Cubans wanting to hold multiple nationalities and the government's efforts to call for investment from the Cuban diaspora community. Therefore, the new Constitution 2019 has formalized the regulation allowing holding multiple nationalities in Article 36: "Having another nationality does not mean losing Cuban nationality...". Currently, Cuba is drafting new nationality laws in the spirit of this provision of the Constitution 2019, including guarantees and precautions against adverse effects that the multi-nationality mechanism may bring (for example, for Cubans who hold both Cuban and US citizenship).

Third, *legalize the right to same-sex marriage*. Homosexuals (LGBT) are a significant segment of the population present in Cuban social life. Previously, they had a long period of discrimination from different strata of the population and extreme, unequal treatment by the government. However, by the mid-1970s, discrimination began to decrease gradually, homosexuals in Cuba became more sympathetic, and the government increasingly introduced active policies to help and support them: since 1979, homosexuality has been legalized; since 1993, homosexuals have been allowed to serve openly in the military; since 2008, the right to change gender has been recognized; since 2013, enforce anti-discrimination laws against homosexuals in labor and employment; from 2018 - in the provision of goods and services; from 2019 - in all other areas...

With issues related to homosexuals, "same-sex marriage" has many impacts and receives the most attention from society. Article 36 of the Constitution 1976 clearly notes: "Marriage is a voluntary union between a man and a woman who are legally married to live together..." and thus, same-sex marriage is illegal. But along with the trend of the government becoming more sympathetic and supportive of homosexuals, since the end of 2017, there has been a prominent public campaign by homosexual groups demanding to amend the Constitution to allow same-sex marriage. In July 2018, the National Assembly for the first time passed the new Draft Constitution, in which Article 68 only stipulates that marriage is a family marriage "between two people", without specifying their gender, and thus, indirectly legalized same-sex marriage. This issue is of interest and support to many people in Cuba's leadership team, including President Diaz-Canel. However, the regulation allowing same-sex marriage was removed by the National Assembly on December 18, 2018, right after more than 82% in a significant

referendum still wanted to retain Article 36 of the old Constitution 1976. There are many reasons for this mass opposition, but the most important reason is the influence and intervention of the Catholic church: priests are said to be the leaders in fiercely opposing same-sex marriage because their ideology and teachings always consider same-sex marriage to be “intrinsically chaotic and unacceptable” (Toan, 2021), and Catholicism is the state religion in Cuba with about 60% of the population according. Finally, in the new Constitution approved by the National Assembly on April 10, 2019, this regulation was amended to Article 82: “Marriage is a social and legal institution... based on free consent wishes and equality in rights, obligations and legal capacity of husband and wife...”. It can be seen that the amendment does not return to Article 36 of the old Constitution 1976, but still creates conditions for legalized same-sex marriage, but with more inclusive and indirect language.

On that basis, the homosexual movement demanding the legalization of same-sex marriage is still going strong. Also from May 2019, the government combined with the Cuban Bar Federation to launch a plan to complete the legalization of same-sex marriage. The critical activity is drafting a new Family Code (replacing the old Family Code implemented in 1975), which includes provisions officially recognizing same-sex marriage. By September 2021, the new draft Family Code was presented and unanimously approved by the National Assembly on December 21, 2021, and then launched for widespread social consultation from February 15 to February 6. June 2022, receiving about 61% of opinions supporting same-sex marriage. The Cuban National Assembly last voted to approve the draft of the new Family Code on July 22, 2022, and put it to a referendum on September 25, obtaining a vote of 66.85% (that is, about two-thirds) number of votes in favor. The new Family Code was officially issued, effective September 27, and the first legal same-sex marriage in Cuba was held on October 5, 2022, in Manzanillo. This result made Cuba the first socialist country, the 8th country in Latin America, and the 32nd country in the world to legalize same-sex marriage. This is a significant step forward in the expansion and development of human and civil rights in Cuba.

Fourth, *implement the “presumption of innocence” and “suspend detention” for the suspect.* “Presumption of innocence” (or “presumption of innocence”) is the assertion that every suspect is innocent until reasonably and legally proven guilty. “Suspension of detention” means that citizens have the right to request the court to suspend or cancel their detention document or block their rights if they find that document to be unreasonable and illegal. These are two basic principles that ensure human rights and citizens' rights before the law.

In Cuba, the capitalist government's Constitution 1940 stipulated these principles, still, the socialist government eliminated them in the Constitution 1976 and related legal system, leading to a one-sided situation, abuse of power, irresponsibility of administrative civil servants and court and procuracy officials in the process of reviewing the case (recognizing, prosecuting, investigating, prosecuting, adjudicating, executing judgments), leading to many cases being mishandled according to the law, heavy on imposing authority and creating injustice, causing damage and discontent to the people. The new Constitution 2019 has begun to rectify that situation by introducing provisions for the presumption of innocence and suspension of detention. Specifically, Article 95 affirms that all citizens are guaranteed “...the presumption of innocence until declared guilty through a final judgment of a court”. Article 96 notes: “Anyone who is unlawfully deprived of their freedom or property rights, either by themselves or by a third party, has the right to submit a written suspension of detention to a competent court, according to the requirements specified in the law”. In addition, citizens can, when necessary, “... bring an appropriate action or procedure against administrative and judicial decisions” (Article 94) and sue government agencies and individual civil servants, court officials, and procuracy, demanding legal settlement and compensation if these groups and individuals operate negligently, abuse power, and are irresponsible, causing negative impacts on rights and interests of citizens (Article 99).

d) *United States intervention*

From the early 16th century to the late 19th century, Cuba was governed and had to depend closely on the Spanish government because it was a colony of this European country, and from the late 19th century until now, although having become an independent country and gone through many political institutions/ regimes, Cuba has always been dominated, manipulated and interfered with by the United States.

In January 1959, the revolutionary movement under the leadership of Fidel Castro overthrew the pro-American Batista dictatorship and established the people's revolutionary government. The United States immediately aggressively implemented a series of intervention and sabotage measures: hostile propaganda, inciting people to evacuate, diplomatic isolation, economic embargo, support for terrorist groups, and air strikes on the capital Habana... and culminated in organizing more than 1,500 exiled Cuban reactionary troops to land on Giron beach in April 1961 to destroy the fledgling Cuban government. The landing was crushed and the Cuban leadership's willingness to confront and publicize the socialist nature of the revolutionary cause further angered the United States, making a comprehensive intervention in Cuba

throughout since then, it has focused on two primary areas: the economic embargo on Cuba (since February 7, 1962) and support for exiled Cuban reactionary organizations to sabotage and overthrow the Cuban government.

After more than half a century of tension, due to the needs of both Cuba and the United States, by the second term of US President Obama (2013-2016), relations between the two countries were more open and peaceful. In June 2013, the two sides agreed to promote an 18-month secret negotiation round (with the mediation of Canada and the Vatican). On December 17, 2014, Cuba and the United States normalized relations, ending half a century of confrontation. In April 2015, the United States removed Cuba from the list of "terrorist countries". In July 2015, the two countries opened embassies in each other's capitals. In March 2016, the US President visited Cuba for the first time after the 1959 revolution. In 2016, the US also abstained for the first time in voting to lift the embargo on Cuba at the United Nations General Assembly (previous times, all voted against it). During the two years 2015-2016, the two countries signed 22 cooperation agreements in the fields of anti-terrorism and drug trafficking, anti-informatics crime, sharing experiences in cancer treatment, oil spill prevention cooperation, security, and maritime cooperation (Vietnam News Agency, 2017)... The United States loosened many trade embargoes and eliminated some restrictions on money transfers, travel, customs, maritime regulations... for Cuba. The United States also limits, suspends, or completely stops many types of support for exiled Cuban reactionary organizations opposing the Cuban government (especially organizations based in the United States).

However, immediately after taking office in January 2017, new US President Donald Trump decided to tighten the embargo on Cuba and support exiled reactionary organizations opposing the Cuban government. The Trump administration has introduced and applied 243 additional economic embargoes on Cuba (My, 2022) and many incentives and funding for organizations that sabotage the Cuban government. The trade embargo during the last 20 months of Trump's term (April 2019-December 2020) caused a loss of 9.1 billion USD to Cuba (Nga, 2021). On January 12, 2021, at the end of the Trump administration's term, the US State Department added Cuba to the "list of countries sponsoring terrorism", along with warnings about control and severe sanctions that the United States will impose.

Although candidate Joe Biden, when running for US president in 2020, promised to lift restrictions on Cuba, when he took power on January 20, 2021, Biden did not do so and continued to maintain the restrictions, policies, and embargo measures against Cuba of the previous Trump administration. In June 2021, the Biden administration continued its tradition of voting against

the annual United Nations General Assembly resolution calling for an end to the US economic embargo on Cuba (this is the resolution passed for the first time). 29th with an absolute majority of 184 votes in favor, with only three abstentions and two against (the United States and Israel). Immediately after the large protest of the Isidro Movement against the Cuban government in mid-July 2021, President Biden declared his dissatisfaction with how the Cuban government handled and suppressed the government and promised to increase support for dissidents in Cuba. At the same time, he also introduced sanctions against a series of Cuban officials who once commanded, ordered repression of protesters, and loosened policies on immigrants from Cuba for political reasons. As a result, by the end of 2021 alone, about 300,000 Cubans (that is, nearly 3% of the country's population) had evacuated to the United States (Hang, 2023), many of them due to discontent and opposition against the Cuban government.

In mid-May 2022, the United States lifted a series of restrictive measures and embargoes against Cuba, typically 3 issues. *First*, the Biden administration re-established the Cuban family reunification program that was discontinued many years ago, accelerating visa issuance. *Second*, remove the limit on money transfers to Cuba: during the Trump administration, each person in the United States could only send back to Cuba a maximum of 1,000 USD per quarter - this limit will now end. *Third*, develop aviation relations, sharply increase flights between the United States and Cuba. However, soon after, on May 20, 2022, the Biden administration added Cuba to the list of a few countries in the world considered "not fully cooperating" in the fight against terrorism. The embargo policy against Cuba will still be extended in 2022 and 2023 (the US embargo policy is developed, suspended, or canceled by the government of this country... once a year, usually in September each year).

IV. PROSPECTS, ORIENTATION, AND ROOM FOR DEVELOPMENT OF CUBA

Looking at the process of building socialism, the reform process in Cuba over the past 30 years, and the typical direct impact factors, we can see Cuba's prospects, orientation, and development potential:

First, *insist on the sole and comprehensive rule of the Communist Party of Cuba and build a socialist regime with Cuban identity*. Specifically: (1) Strengthen, specifically, legalize the rule of the Communist Party and the single-party leadership regime in Cuba. Article 5 of the new Constitution 2019 recognizes this issue, but it is still general. It is necessary to promulgate additional laws and sub-law documents to concretize, and there should also be appropriate and essential explanations when the Election Law The current election in Cuba

stipulates that no political party (including the Communist Party) can nominate candidates in elections to state offices, but why is the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Cuba still nominated people to be elected by the National Assembly to key State positions; (2) Practicing and widely spreading core political ideas in socialist construction, especially ideas with Cuban identity and Cuban people - such as Marti and Fidel ideas; (3) Increase both the quantity and quality of party members. In recent years, the average admission of about 40,000 party members each year is a pretty positive increase in quantity. However, the quality of party members is still somewhat lenient, not guaranteed, and the number of elderly party members is quite large (42.6% of party members are over 55 years old) (Castro, 2021a); (4) Use and promote the effectiveness of activities of political-social-professional organizations, especially the Committee for the Protection of the Revolution and the Communist Youth Union of Cuba; (5) Leadership and strict management of media. The 8th Congress recognizes the role of the media (especially the internet) as a "double-edged sword": it can also be a tool for widely, quickly, promptly, and effectively transmitting guidelines and policies, the Party and State's plan to the people, can also be an effective tool for hostile forces to use propaganda against Cuba; and (6) Build and develop the great unity of the people around the Cuban Party and State.

Second, *focus on economic development, use the economy as the driving force for social development, gradually transition to a socialist-oriented market economy, avoid dependence on capital through capital, equipment, technology.* Specifically: (1) National economic development, along with the struggle for peace and steadfast ideological stance, are the critical tasks of the Party. Financial decisions must not depart from the revolution's ideals of justice and equality, nor must they weaken the great unity of the people; (2) Edit, supplement, complete and implement specific socio-economic policies/solutions proposed from the 7th Congress in 2016: maintain 17 policies, adjust 165 policies, eliminate remove 92 policies, add 18 policies and thus, reduce the overall 274 old policies/solutions into 200 new policies/solutions; (3) Address the harmful effects of bureaucracy and poor human resource management, which are the causes and conditions for the emergence of corruption and other illegal acts that hinder improve productivity and labor efficiency; (4) Overcome irrationalities in the structure of the economic model, creating enough motivation to encourage labor and creativity; (5) More actively deploy the process of updating the socio-economic model, moving towards a harmonious and appropriate combination between the characteristics of centralized planning with autonomy and decentralization management required at intermediate levels; (6) National ownership of the primary means of

production is the basis for the real power of workers. The state-owned enterprise system must prove in practice and strengthen its position as the dominant form of economy management. Implement a comprehensive reform of corporate structures to eliminate stagnation, permissiveness, lack of creativity, and passively waiting for higher-level instructions. Correct bad habits [both old and new], and at the same time, stimulate and promote the spirit of entrepreneurship and dynamism in the ranks of business and grassroots leaders, so that they become more and more autonomous, increase productivity, and achieve greater efficiency; (7) Promote productivity and operational efficiency of the state economic sector in areas that determine the country's development, while flexible and institutionalize non-state management forms. Forms of self-employment/self-employment are expanding significantly, with the types of licensed activities increasing from 127 to more than 2,000; (8) Having enough capacity to regulate the market through indirect measures and increasingly simplified administration. Turn the people's unmet or unsatisfied needs into leverage for domestic production establishments, based on practical and reasonable use of physical and financial resources; (9) Promote production nationwide (especially for food). Limit imports, increase exports with diverse and competitive products; (10) The State ensures the allocation of a significant source of foreign currency, and at the same time encourages remittances that Cubans living abroad send to relatives in the country; (11) Apply standard payment in the new currency CUP from January 1, 2021, but still maintain a certain level of trading in the old currency CUC (one of the two old currencies that were previously parallel) to overcome a negative situation in the past five years, using CUC to smuggle goods from abroad into Cuba and then resell them domestically at high prices; and (12) Continue to implement measures to encourage foreign investment. Eliminate rigidity, shyness, or passivity in foreign investment solutions. Soon amend, supplement or replace the 2014 Foreign Investment Law (Law No. 118) with a new, expanded, convenient, appropriate and more effective law.

Third, *comprehensively evaluate and implement social security issues; continue to promote its advantages in education and health.* Specifically: (1) Never allow measures that harm vulnerable people or leave anyone in a helpless/abandoned situation; (2) Overcome the phenomenon of waste and competition. Determining "saving" is the fastest and safest form of income. Adapt to what Cuba has and do not spend more than the country can provide; (3) The Cuban people's standard of living and consumption must be determined by legitimate sources of income and not by excessive subsidies or complimentary products and services. Eliminate the notion and need to rely [on government support] and level [subsidies and

social benefits] in the welfare regime in Cuba; and (4) Maintain a free education and healthcare system for the entire population. Consolidate and promote the development of achievements in education and health. Strengthen "educational diplomacy" and "health diplomacy" in foreign policy.

Fourth, *always be alert to plots and sabotage tactics of hostile forces at home and abroad.* Specifically: (1) Deeply deploy ideological security work, maintain the Party's leadership and the direction of socialist construction; (2) Prevent, identify, properly evaluate and provide appropriate and effective handling of hostile forces' plots and tricks to sabotage and overthrow; (3) Enhance vigilance and prevent sophisticated and covert forms of sabotage through the implementation of "peaceful evolution", civil society, private capitalism, religious freedom, democratic sponsorship...; and (4) Build a large, modern, complete internal security force, ready to detect, suppress and neutralize plots and tricks of sabotage and subversion by enemy forces.

Fifth, *expand international relations and cooperation based on coexistence, mutual benefit, and mutual development, without interfering or infringing on each other's internal affairs; especially maintain and promote relations with traditional friends and socialist countries and soon fully normalize relations with the United States.* Specifically: (1) Foreign policy must fully protect independence, fully demonstrate sovereign rights, and meet the needs and aspirations for solidarity and integration of the country and its people; (2) Respect the principles and regulations of the United Nations Charter and international law; pursue peaceful resolution of disputes; adhere to the principle of non-interference [directly and indirectly] in the internal affairs of other countries and respect the principles of national sovereignty, equal rights and self-determination of peoples; Committed to promoting friendly relations and cooperation between countries in the region, as well as with other countries, regardless of differences in political, economic and social systems or levels of development; promote the spirit of tolerance and peaceful coexistence; total respect for the inalienable right of all countries to choose their political, economic, social and cultural systems as an essential condition for ensuring peaceful coexistence among countries (Castro, 2021b); (3) Strengthen solidarity and cooperation and sharing with countries with leftist governments in Latin America, especially with Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, Mexico, Argentina and encourage, cooperate and support leftist forces cholera in this area; (4) Continue to encourage and support the struggle for freedom and independence of peoples and countries around the world, especially Palestine and Western Sahara (Sahrawi); (5) Appreciate cooperation with signi cant powers and powerful developing countries - especially countries in the BRICS bloc (Brazil, Russia, India, China,

South Africa). Close and close relations with Asian socialist countries (China, Vietnam, Laos, North Korea); (6) Desire to promote respectful dialogue and build a "new type" of relationship with the United States. Identify why the United States is still hesitant as it is today: (i) the US predecessor Trump administration tightened the embargo on Cuba, leaving consequences that the successor Biden administration cannot change suddenly/quickly, (ii) the political and economic ideologies of Cuba and the United States are very different and contradictory, (iii) if the United States fully normalizes with Cuba, it will have to pay a massive amount of compensation (Cuba demanding the United States compensate 302 billion USD due to the blockade and embargo policy - including 181 billion USD in human damages and 121 billion USD in economic damages, while the United States only demands 8 billion USD in compensation from Cuba about damage because Cuba nationalized some US private companies (Tuan, 2021)), (iv) The United States must return Guantanamo to Cuba, losing an essential geostrategic base/facility, and (v) it is difficult to find a suitable solution for the large number of Cuban exiles who oppose the Cuban government living in the US; (7) Continue to promote relations with the European Union (EU) based on mutual respect and support, especially developing cooperative relations in the fields of culture, agriculture, and renewable energy; and (8) Enhance Cuba's position in organizations in the Latin American region (ALBA, CELAC, OAS...); consolidate and develop Cuba's relations with neighboring countries in Central America and the Caribbean; soon bring Cuba into the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).

V. CONCLUSION

The past three decades have been a long period of change in Cuba's innovation, development, and socialist goals. It is directly affected by many factors, typically the adjustment of the Cuban Communist Party's political policy; promulgating and implementing new socio-economic policies; the expansion and development of human and civil rights; and, United States intervention methods and activities. At this issue, looking comprehensively, it can be seen that Cuba has a positive outlook with solid, clear directions and vast room for development, but at the same time it must also deal with and overcome no-small difficulties and challenges to complete the reform process and its socialist goals.

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The Discursive Construction of Republicanism through the Quotes of the President of the Autonomous Government of Catalonia after the 2017 Self-Determination Referendum. The Case of President Joaquim Torra I Pla

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Abstract- This paper addresses recourse to quotations as a polyphonic resource conveying a particular ideology. We argue that they serve to persuade audiences by eliciting an emotional response (*pathos*) that affects the transmission of *ethos*, both of the locutor (Maingueneau 2002b) and the community it claims to represent. By examining the quotes found on the President's official Twitter account and in his public speeches, we aim to identify the emotions that are semiotized by citations or "secondary aphorizations" (Maingueneau 2012). We later examine their intended persuasive impact on the target audience. In short, we conclude that "aphorizations" play a crucial role in the ideological construction of discourse in the political sphere.

Keywords: *aphorization, quotation, ideology, political opponent, opinion, represented discourse.*

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I. INTRODUCTION

This work is part of the doctoral thesis in linguistics written by the author at NOVA FCSH, *Discourse and Ideology in the UN: Discursive Built-up and Textual Broadcast*. It follows the approach of Text and Discourse linguistics proposed by the French line, namely Polyphony (Ducrot 1988), "enunciation scene" (2002a, 2007), and "aphorization" (2012) proposed by Maingueneau; textualization of Points of View (Rabatel 1998, 2007, 2012) and semiotization of emotions¹ (Rabatel & Micheli 2013a, 2013b). This paper aims to reflect on the use of quotations as a polyphonic phenomenon whose intertextual nature both constructs emotions and conveys ideologically shaped Points of View (hereafter POV) in a sample of political interventions of the President of the *Generalitat de Catalunya*², Joaquim Torra i Pla, since his election on May 16, 2018, after the self-determination referendum won by the supporters of a Catalan Republic. The selected period includes 88 quotes in 16 political speeches (06.06.2018 / 04.01.2020) and 38 tweets posted on the social network Twitter (27.09.2019 / 27.02.2020) in Catalan.

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¹ We understand emotions as the program of physical actions triggered by the mind - of an interpretative nature - in reaction to a stimulus, as defined by Damásio (1998).

² Not to be confused with the sovereign institution of the Principality of Catalonia, founded in 1359. This *Generalitat* is part of the constitutional monarchy of the Spanish State, established in 1977.

The proclamation of Torra resulted from the overthrow of the government of President Carles Puigdemont i Casamajó after the referendum of 01.10.2017. After the announcement of Catalonia's independence from the Spanish state, President Puigdemont adjourned it to initiate a negotiation phase. Nonetheless, the Kingdom of Spain intervened economically, politically, and legally in Catalonia on 28.11.2017, illegally calling elections in Catalonia.³ The President then won the 20.12.2017 elections government. However, the intervention of state judicial bodies prevented his proclamation and that of the two subsequent candidates, who were remanded in custody while Puigdemont was in exile in Belgium. The fourth candidate was Joaquim Torra i Pla, who began the legislature with the slogan "From restitution (of the legitimate government) to the Constitution (drafting the Charter of the Catalan Republic)." On 27.01.2020, the President was stripped of his seat in Parliament by court order, but he remained President, albeit without voting rights in the chamber.

II. METHODOLOGY

In this paper, we examine, from an enunciative perspective, how the locutor, as a speaking subject (Ducrot 1984), discursively constructs the "act of global enunciation" (Lundquist 1980, 1991) to convey a particular ideology. To this end, we will examine the embodiment of these acts, the texts. Our analysis will be conducted on a sample of texts in Catalan, including quotations, produced by a single locutor, President Joaquim Torra i Pla. The texts for the study consist of a series of 48 posts published on his official Twitter account between 09.27.2019 and 02.27.2020, as well as a collection of 13 political speeches delivered between 06.06.2018 and 04.01.2020. In total, the sample contains 88 quotes.

For this study, we adopt the discourse concept developed by Volochinov⁴ (1929-30 *apud* Bronckart

³ The President of the Catalan Parliament is the only person legally authorized to call elections for the Parliament in Catalonia.

⁴ In the words of Bronckart (2008:863), referring to Volochinov's interactionist approach: «Pour cet auteur, les phénomènes langagiers se présentent concrètement sous la forme d'énoncés et/ou de discours, qui constituent des révélateurs ou des matérialisations de la psychologie du corps social.»

2008) and Bakhtine (1984 *apud* Bronckart 2008). According to the authors, discourse is both a means to understand and represent the world and a tool for sociocultural change. Thus, discourse has a dynamic character. That is why we can define discourse as a sociological means (Volochinov 1929-30) resulting from the sum of culturally and historically situated utterances. That is because the discourse is conditioned by and represents the context of a particular epoch. This feature enables us to identify the ideology present at a specific historical moment. It also allows the subject to act socially through conscious linguistic intervention when shaping the discourse.

Volochinov points out that ideology at the enunciative level can be especially significant when observing syntactic constructions since the utterance is sociologically structured. In this case, the introduction of citations into the enunciative act affects both the syntax at the enunciation level and the content through the symbolism they convey, thus influencing the sense of the utterance and the emotional impact it can trigger. This analysis aims to show how a particular rhetorical resource, the quotation, plays a crucial role in the ideological construction of discourse. We argue that this is where we can find much of the ideologic and symbolic content aimed at building or reinforcing the *ethos* of a target community while activating *pathos*. In other words, they arouse empathy in the target audience. That is because ideology is not only a conceptual system but also has a material manifestation (Althusser 1971) that we can grasp through a discursive and, particularly, textual analysis.

According to the above, since ideology is present in discursive practices, it is subject to change for historical, cultural, and social reasons. As it is precisely in discursive practices where there is a constant negotiation over the meaning of symbols, i.e., linguistic signs (Volochinov 1929-30), we decided to structure our dialogical analysis mainly based on Maingueneau's theoretical proposals (2002a, 2007, 2012). The author addresses the topic of discourse and discursive genres by distinguishing between different discourse types depending on the sphere of use, namely political, religious, and others. Within each discursive type, a distinction is also drawn between instituted and authorial discursive genres (Maingueneau 2002a:321)⁵. In the case under study, the discourse type is political, whereas the discursive genre is "instituted" because there is no direct or immediate interaction (political speech or post).

On one hand, to Maingueneau, established genres depend on context and situation of production, namely the global scene (Maingueneau 1993). On the

other hand, each established genre, depending on the institution where the communicative act takes place, features a specific generic scene or a prototypical model. Consequently, the locutor has at its own disposal a series of standardized structures, a script (Maingueneau 2002a), to develop the enunciation according to a specific scene of enunciation. However, the enunciative act is not solely the result of the socio-discursive constraints established by the scene of enunciation within a given discursive genre. The locutor enjoys a certain degree of creativity we can spot when analyzing certain linguistic elements of the scenography (Maingueneau 1998), namely of the text, such as the quotes.

In light of the above, we shall begin our analysis describing the scene of enunciation and its components (Maingueneau 1998): global scene, generic scene, and scenography. Next, we will outline the quotations featured in the scenography, focusing on two essential aspects. Firstly, we will emphasize the transtextual and polyphonic nature of the quotes. Secondly, we will reflect on the potential impact of their use in the ideological construction of a collective and individual *ethos* as a means for activating *pathos* and triggering social action.

As far as the transtextual nature is concerned, we recall that citations are an example of the phenomenon of transtextuality described by Genette (ch. I *Palimpsestes*, 1982). The author considers it an inherent phenomenon in all texts since every text belongs to a textual tradition from which it retains certain aspects and modifies others. Historicity, hence, plays a decisive role in textual structure. In this regard, Genette defined five types of transtextual relationships, among which we stress the relevance of intertextuality (Kristeva 1969; Barthes 1973-1974)⁶ or the co-presence of two or more texts. To characterize intertextuality, the authors Authier-Revuz (1982) and Maingueneau (1987) proposed a further distinction that we consider relevant. They distinguish between manifest intertextuality, occurring when the words of a third party get transmitted through quotations or allusions within a specific text, and constitutive intertextuality, involving a text sharing elements with other earlier or later texts.

Quotation as a phenomenon of manifest intertextuality stands for dialogical socio-discursive continuity, for when it appears in a current text, it establishes a connection to existing texts from a historical and cultural point of view. Thus, each text is part of a continuum, of a tradition to which it legitimates and to which the text contributes. Due to the nature of

⁵ As part of the "instituted genres," the author includes authorial and routine genres (Maingueneau 1999), formerly two separate groups, the latter being monologue-based.

⁶ Kristeva (1986:36) also distinguishes between two dimensions of intertextuality: one horizontal, existing between the text and other previous or subsequent texts with which it forms a chain; the other vertical, between a specific text and other texts, more or less contemporary or distant in time susceptible of being interpreted as contexts for a particular text.

this research, we will focus on the study of manifest intertextuality, so we will not cover the study of other relations of transtextuality, even if present in the sample.

As mentioned earlier, quotes are not only a transtextual phenomenon but also a polyphonic one. The polyphonic nature of quoting was already the subject of consideration by Volochinov (1929). He addressed the authorial discourses and the discourses of others in literary works, showing the difficulties in delimiting, from a syntactic perspective, the boundaries between direct and indirect discourses (in the grammatical sense). Volochinov realized that the characterization of discourse types between the mode (grammatical) and the modality (stylistic) is unclear, sometimes overlapping. In an attempt to solve the issue of analyzing constructions in indirect discourse, he proposed a distinction between two modalities: thematic-analytical and analytical-discursive.

In the first modality, the author reproduces the other person's words objectively, using the stylistic resource of quotation. Meanwhile, in the second modality, the author creates a character that includes the author's assessments from a more subjective perspective. The latter acts as an utterer presenting its point of view. Nevertheless, from our perspective, a quote in the political discursive genre, despite being objectified, would fall under the analytical-discursive modality. The main reason is that this character stands for an utterer other than the locutor that conveys a concrete point of view, generally shared with the locutor.

In this way, we approach the study of quotations as manifestations of a common point of view. As for the relationship between locutor and enunciators, we base our analysis on the theoretical approach of Rabatel (1998, 2007, 2012). The author theorized about the textualization of POV, distinguishing a set of enunciators who appear in texts. Those enunciators may or may not share the author-locutor's POV. The enunciators that the locutor activates along the enunciative act represent a textual manifestation of his creativity. These enunciators inscribe various POVs (Rabatel 1998, 2007, 2012) in the texts through which the locutor enriches the scenography (Maingueneau 1998). Moreover, the set formed by the present POVs reveals the POV of the locutor and is part of the constitution of the discursive *ethos* (Maingueneau 2002b; Charaudeau 2008, 2009).

The importance of this analysis rests on the author-locutor's ability to create a text capable of gaining audience support through an identification process with the discursive *ethos* the locutor can shape. The more POVs the author considers, the more opportunities there are to reach a broader and more diverse audience. The locutor accomplishes it by choosing a variety of enunciators. For this reason, we seek to identify the nature of the relationship between the enunciators (quotes from the authors) and the author-locutor.

As a polyphonic phenomenon, the quotation not only introduces into the enunciative act the POV and symbolic charge of the new enunciator, the author of the quote but also adds the symbolic value of the sociocultural context of its earlier production. The POV expressed by this enunciator often represents a projection of the enunciator-locutor's own POV, which seizes on the symbolic charge of both the quote and its original author and sociocultural context to adopt their attributes and create a discursive *ethos* that benefits the locutor's political and social interests. The strategy used in practice is to compare two situations and apply the previously proposed solution or POV to the current situation.

As for *ethos*, defined in the Aristotelian sense of character, Maingueneau (2002b) considers that persuasiveness results from the audience identifying the speaker as a member of the same *ethos*. Thus, to be successful, the locutor must adapt his discourse to the audience's *ethos*. In this way, the author proposes to distinguish between the discursive *ethos* that develops during the enunciative act and the prediscursive *ethos* that results from the effect that a pre-existing *ethos* of the locutor at the beginning of the enunciative act can have on the creation of expectations on the part of the audience. For this reason, Maingueneau (2012) highlights that, especially in aphorization, the locutor adopts the *ethos* of the author of the citation. As a result, the locutor benefits from the public projection of the author's image, the discursive *ethos*. In other words, he assumes a particular moral or legal height that is universal in nature. Therefore, the POV conveyed by the quotation has a sententious character.

In the recently developed theory by Maingueneau (2012) on "textless sentences"⁷ or "detachable utterance / detached utterance," based on the concept of aphorization, the author explains that this is a polyphonic phenomenon involving the existence of an enunciator acting as a Subject. The result of this aphorization can be either an "aphorizing utterance or a textualizing utterance":

«[...] l'énonciation aphorisante est inévitablement intégrée à une énonciation textualisante. L'aphoriseur prend de la hauteur, il libère l'ethos d'un homme autorisé, au contact d'une Source transcendante, de valeurs au-delà des interactions et des argumentations. L'aphorisation implique un énonciateur qui se pose en Sujet ; réciproquement, un Sujet se manifeste comme tel par sa possibilité d'aphoriser.» Maingueneau (2012)

⁷ Concerning textless sentences, the author differentiates between two types: « (1) celles qui sont inséparables d'un support non-verbal, (2) les autres. » (Maingueneau 20013:101).

«L'énonciation aphorisante, ou aphorisation, se divise elle-même en aphorisations «primaires» (non détachée d'un texte) et «secondaires» (détachées d'un texte).» (Maingueneau 2013:100) i.e.: "primaires" (devises, slogans, maximes...) ou "secondaires" (extraites de textes: titres, petites phrases, citations célèbres...)» Maingueneau (2012, author's website version).

In this article, we will focus on citations known as secondary aphorizations or textual sequences detached from a source text. That is the case for quotes used in public speeches marked with quotation marks or introduced by a *dicendi* verb, but also for fragments of literary, narrative or poetic texts. Usually, secondary aphorizations, inserted in a new context, require from the recipient an interpretive effort (Maingueneau 2013:110). In other words, interpretation will depend on the ability of the recipient to mobilize sociocultural knowledge in order to frame the uttered citations in a particular pragmatic category.

Therefore, it is crucial for us to identify the author. Ultimately, it is the one responsible for the moralizing or hermeneutic sentence. So, if we aim to fully comprehend the symbolic power conveyed by both the author and the quote by means of the aphorization, we must be able to frame it in a specific pragmatic category. That is the key to understanding the conveyed *ethos* and ideology.

«En effet, qu'il s'agisse d'une aphorisation primaire ou d'une aphorisation secondaire, l'«aphoriseur» n'énonce pas pour un allocataire déterminé par un genre de discours, mais pour un auditoire situé sur un autre plan, qui n'est pas susceptible d'intervenir dans l'énonciation. Cet aphoriseur assume l'ethos du locuteur qui prend de la hauteur, de l'individu autorisé, au contact d'une Source transcendante. Il est censé énoncer sa vérité, soustraite à la négociation, exprimer une conviction. En lui tendent à coïncider sujet d'énonciation et Sujet au sens juridique et moral: quelqu'un se pose en responsable, affirme des valeurs et des principes à la face du monde, s'adresse à une communauté par-delà les allocataires empiriques qui sont ses destinataires, par-delà la diversité des genres de discours.» (Maingueneau 2013:109)

In this regard, Maingueneau (2013:113) points out that the use of a citation implies the introduction into the text of a phrase with an indisputable character whose symbolic force we will understand when we pragmatically categorize it into one of the three groups the author proposes: interpretative, informative and testimonial.

Given the nature of our sample, the quotes fall into the last two categories: informative and testimonial. In addition, the author makes a further distinction between these two categories, drawing a line between the current regime and the memorial regime (historical or wise), both of which are related to the encyclopedic knowledge required for their correct interpretation; the former being dependent on present-day socio-discursive conditions and the latter on a more or less distant collective memory. Thus,

«[...] au cadrage informationnel est associé l'Expert⁸, au cadrage testimonial ce qu'on pourrait appeler un «Existant»,

au cadrage historique le «Personnage», au cadrage sapientiel le «Sage».» (Maingueneau 2013:114)

After identifying the authors and placing them in one of the three categories: existent, character, or sage, we will group the secondary aphorizations according to the characteristics previously identified while studying the biographies and the quotations. That will allow us to highlight the traces of ideology drawn and transmitted in the interventions delivered by the locutor.

Regarding the language activity, the one aspect we would like to emphasize is the emotional factor. Emotions are a crucial aspect of the construction and transmission of knowledge. Individuals construct their knowledge through interaction with the environment. In other words, the mind consciously or unconsciously acquires knowledge through experimentation and experience. According to Culioli (1986:163), *«Il n'y a pas de cognition sans représentation et pas d'activité symbolique sans opérations,»* since the cognitive is inseparable from the symbolic. The experiential nature of knowledge, and thus its affective or emotional nature, plays a crucial role in the appropriation of the text by the recipient. The activation of *pathos* through linguistic means, such as quotations, triggers complex emotions in the target audience, as these are related to the community's value system (*ethos*). Hence, the locutor, aware of its importance, will put them into play to emotionally involve the audience. In this sense, we argue that aphorizations present in political utterances may serve to achieve such an effect.

The outcome of such activation can affect collective and individual identity, in the shaping of which linguistic ideology plays a central role, according to the thesis put forward by anthropologist and linguist Kroskrity (2005:501). According to him, the choice of linguistic means is an expression of ways of thinking about the world based on the ideals of a society that are achievable through social action. Because of this, we also want to consider whether the enunciators of the quotations are symbolic transmitters of determined emotions, either through the relevance of their historical figure or through their words.

To take into account the above aspects, we will put into practice the three-part analytical model of the way emotions can be semiotized developed by Micheli (2010, 2013a, 2013b), namely: *"émotion dite, émotion montrée, émotion étayée."* According to the author, the last one is the one that involves an argumentative dimension, derived from social and cultural conventions or the knowledge shared by a community. In the words of the author:

«[...] les énoncés qui disent l'émotion manifestent typiquement une relation prédicative entre, d'une part, une expression incorporant un terme d'émotion et, d'autre part, une autre expression désignant une entité humaine ou humanisable. Ils peuvent, de plus, contenir une troisième expression indiquant la cause ou l'objet de l'émotion. [...]

⁸ Expert = Expert; Existant = Existent; Personnage = Character; Sage = Sage.

dans le cas d'une émotion montrée, l'énoncé présente un ensemble de caractéristiques qui sont susceptibles de recevoir une interprétation indicielle, au sens où l'allocutaire est conduit à inférer que le locuteur [...] éprouve une émotion [...] une émotion peut être inférée à partir de la schématisation, dans le discours, d'une situation qui lui est conventionnellement associée selon un ensemble de normes socio-culturelles et qui est ainsi supposée en garantir la légitimité.» (Micheli 2013b:5, 8, 11)

In short, the author proposes a tripartite process to evoke emotion. We can translate it as "asserted emotion," "shown emotion," and "argued emotion." In the first process, the evoked emotion results from an expression that denotes it. In the second process, the elicited emotion results from a derived interpretation of a range of features that lend themselves to indexical interpretation. In the third procedure, the evoked emotion results from an inferred interpretation of a conventional situation according to a set of socio-cultural norms. However, we will keep the terms in French.

III. ANALYSIS

First, we will outline the scene of the enunciation under study. Our sample is homogeneous. All the texts share the global scene, namely the political type of discourse. Because of its political nature, it is a public address intended to persuade or affirm an ideology within the target community. At the same time, it aims to constitute a concrete *ethos* within it. Furthermore, the texts are classified in the "instituted genre of discourse," as there is no direct or immediate interaction between the interlocutors. However, they differ in the outcome, namely in the generic scene, because the texts result from acts of enunciation delivered in two different institutions.

On the one hand, there is a group of public political speeches delivered at formal meetings where the President has limited time to intervene, so he recurs to a previously planned monologue. On the other hand, the second group consists of posts on a digital service, *Twitter*, which allows other users of the same social network to intervene in the topic line, the hashtag, through comments that can eventually be answered by the locutor or by other users. Therefore, we are referring to two generic scenes that we will describe.

The political interventions were delivered in the exercise of political office in an official public setting and by oral transmission, with the official version posted on the government website in PDF format. The length of the speeches is not uniform, ranging from ten minutes to an hour. The place where the locutor spoke is also heterogeneous: in parliament, at an official event (award ceremony), in a televised institutional message or statement, at a conference (at university, at a business meeting, and so on). However, these diverse texts have some essential features in common. Therefore, we will

consider them as a single unit. They were all created in advance. That is, they are not spontaneous. In most of them, there is no possibility of direct interaction. The roles played by the participants are determined by social and institutional hierarchy and by the nature of the communicative event. Moreover, they are also subject to protocol constraints.

The generic scene for Twitter posts, a digital social network, has characteristics that differ from those established for official political statements. The President's posts on his official Twitter account allow registered users to send short texts (280 characters maximum since 2017), photos, videos, links, and other content. The publication is instantaneous, thus offering all followers of a specific account the opportunity to receive a notification and interact with it on a thread, usually marked with a hashtag. Such posts may be replies to a hashtag created by other users, edits to other posts, or sharing content that is not the author's own (distribution of posts from other accounts) but also the author's content. The role of the participants in this social network is quite democratic because all users are on the same level. It allows a certain level of interaction, even if mediated digitally. In this way, the President can interact with citizens virtually in an almost "direct" way, without protocol or hierarchical restrictions beyond the 280-character limit and compliance with ethical standards (it forbids promoting hatred or violence). We retrieved messages from 27.09.2019. until 27.02.2020.

Both of the generic scenes mentioned above, despite the differences described earlier, have one feature in common that we consider crucial: the resulting acts have a media impact. News reports nowadays include references to the official statements of political representatives but also frequently quote and comment on their posts on social media, especially on Twitter. In addition to the influence that audiences experience during the political speeches in person or digitally, these statements amplify their impact by becoming the subject of a transtextualization⁹ process as they pass through the filter of journalistic media and become news.

The consequences are ultimately a prominent presence of political statements in society and the profiling of the politician himself, both through his communicative acts and through the transmission made by the media. As for Twitter, in addition to the posts themselves, journalists also value the impact these comments have had on the social network, prioritizing the controversial reactions over the original content of the post, namely the one that triggered the chain. That is why we included both in the same type of discourse.

⁹ Despite the obvious interest that the study of this further process of transtextualization can arouse, in this study we will not deal with it due to reasons of time and space.

The importance of its social impact determined the inclusion of the two generic scenes in our sample.

IV. SCENOGRAPHY: THE STUDY OF QUOTATIONS

Since the object of our analysis is the study of the aphorization, the question of the generic scene remains in the background. Scenography takes relevance in the enunciative act as it is in the text where creativity will reflect. The texts in the sample are different, but they all contain secondary aphorizations. Moreover, due to their nature, the quotes, in this case, are usually short and fit well with the format of the Twitter social platform, where posts are often limited to brief comments, aphorisms, or catchy phrases.

Quotations also respond to the strategy often used in political speeches to using aphorisms or slogans. These types of phrases aim to have an impact on the audience, as they tend to stick in the memory. Moreover, they are usually reproduced in the media and repeated by other politicians, so they become part of the encyclopedic knowledge of the community. Regarding citations, the locutor frequently picks them because of the author's prestige or hierarchical position in a political, historical, ethical, or moral perspective. The community perceives them as referents, sages, or leaders.

In summary, aphorizations are a polyphonic and transtextual device in which the locutor introduces a third enunciator who brings in a concrete POV that usually coincides with the locutor's POV, as is the case with the quotations studied in this paper. Therefore, the locutor capitalizes on the social image and symbolic charge of the author-enunciator of the quote to enhance his position and create a particular discursive *ethos*.

V. RESULTS

Next, we will comment on the results and illustrate them with a sample of 27 numbered examples. Our corpus consists of 88 quotations relevant to our study, reflecting on their use to convey ideology. Among these, we would like to highlight a case of "surassertion"¹⁰ (Maingueneau 2004) in an address by

the locutor (1), which will later become part of the citations published on Twitter by the same author-locutor. With this quote, the author underlines the illegality of the Electoral Board's intervention in the proceedings of the parliament and the removal of an elected President.

- (1) «*Però l'estat espanyol ha de saber que els Presidents els nomena i els cessa el Parlament. És a dir, els únics representants legítims de la ciutadania. I no permetré, ni acceptaré, que un tribunal i encara menys una junta política suplanti la sobirania dels catalans.*» (Institutional New Year's message, 30.12.2019).
- (2) «*Els Presidents de Catalunya els nomena i els cessa el Parlament. No permetré, ni acceptaré, que un tribunal -i encara menys una Junta política- suplanti la sobirania dels catalans.*» (Tweet 31.12.2019)

That is the only case we have noted in the entire analysis. As a rule, the locutor does not quote himself but prefers quoting other authors. As Maingueneau suggests, the locutor anticipates the transition to a citation for a concrete text sequence by overemphasizing it within a text, signaling its potential prominence (strong or weak).

The quote (2) referenced above comes from a text produced by the locutor. It can be defined as "strong detachment" due to the proximity, in this case temporal, between the aphorization and the original textual source. According to Maingueneau (2013:103), its use marks a specific POV about a controversial subject involving a particular *ethos* that highlights the figure of the enunciator, in this case, the locutor-enunciator. On this occasion, the controversy is the disqualification of the President by an Electoral Board (JEC, for its acronym in Spanish), a state administrative body¹¹.

Next, we will reflect on the relationship between aphorizations, ideology, and emotions. As might be expected, the remaining quotations come from different authors. After consulting their biographies, we have decided to classify them into three groups based on authorship. Nevertheless, some authors can belong to more than one group (Pau Casals and Eugeni Xammar, among others). Note that we have used the following code to ease interpretation:

¹⁰ Notion introduced at *Ci-Dit colloquium* in Cadiz (2004) and developed in *Citation et surassertion*, *Polifonia*, Cuiabá (Brésil), n° 8, 2004, 1-22.

«*Un fragment surasserté constitue un énoncé:*

- *relativement bref, de structure prégnante dans son signifié et/ou son signifiant ;*
- *susceptible d'être décontextualisé (il s'agit souvent d'énoncés génériques) ;*
- *en position saillante dans un texte ou une partie de texte ;*
- *dont la thématique doit être en relation avec l'enjeu essentiel du genre de discours, du texte ou de la partie de texte concernés : il s'agit d'une prise de position dans un conflit de valeurs ;*
- *qui implique une sorte d'amplification de l'énonciateur, liée à un ethos qui marque un engagement subjectif dont la modalité varie avec le type de discours concerné.* » (Maingueneau 2004)

¹¹ The functions of the Electoral Board (JEC) are to monitor the electoral process, under no circumstances can it intervene in the course of parliamentary action after the electoral process has been concluded to alter the results. Parliament members can only be dismissed by a ruling of a competent legal court and by firm resolution. In the case of the President of Parliament, only parliamentarians can decide or terminate their President.

t = tweet

a= allocution

cursive = renowned journalists

underlined = in exile

red = literary texts

bold = 13th-14th centuries

blue = Second Republic of Catalonia

green = Third Republic of Catalonia

25 Representatives of the Catalan institutions: 34 (18t/16a)

Ramon Muntaner (1a), Prat de la Riba i Sarrà¹² (1a), Lluís Companys (2t), Francesc Macià i Llussà (1a1t), Rafael Campalans (1t), Antoni Rovira i Virgili (1a2t), Lluís Nicolau i d'Oliver (1a), Pompeu Fabra i Poch (2a1t), Josep Benet i Morell (1t), Víctor Torres i Perenya (1a), Jordi Carbonell i de Ballester (1t), Lluís M^a Xirinachs i Damians (1t), Heribert Barrera i Costa (2t), Carles Puigdemont (1a), Oriol Junqueras (1a), Clara Ponsatí (1t), Raül Romeva (1a), Quim Forn (1a), Jordi Turull i Negre (1a2t), Josep Rull (1a), Carme Forcadell (1a), Dolors Bassa (1a), Mertixell Borràs (1a), Carles Mundó (1a), Joaquim Torra i Pla (2t).

21 Representatives of the Catalan culture, intellectuals: 28 (20t/9a)

Vicent Partal (1t), Enric Casasses (1t), Joan Margarit Consarnau (1t), Zoraida Burgos i Matheu (1a1t), Francesc Garriga i Barata (1t), Montserrat Abelló i Soler (2t), Teresa Pàmies i Bertran (1t), Josep Maria Llompart de la Peña (1t), Montserrat Roig i Fransitorra (1a), Manuel de Pedrolo (3a), Joan Vinyoli i Pladevall (2t), Eugení Xammar (1t), Ferran Soldevila i Zubiburu (1a), Agustí Escalasans i Folch (1t), Josep Carner (2t), Armand Obiols (Colla de Sabadell) (1a duas vezes), Màrius Torres i Perenya (1t), Lluís Solà i Sala (1t), Joaquim Ruyra (1t), Josep Vallverdú i Aixalà (1t), Cant de la Sibila do século XIII (1t).

20 Peace and human rights activists: 24 (3t/21a)

José Antonio Guevara (1t), Ramin Jahanbegloo (1a), Paul Engler (1t), Jordi Cuixart (2a), Jordi Sánchez (1a), George Steiner (1a), Nelson Mandela (1a1t), Václav Havel (2a), Howard Zinn (1a), Paulo Freire (1a), Jean Monnet Cognac (1a), Pau Casals i Defilló (1a), Robert Kennedy (1a), JF Kennedy (2a), Albert Camus (1a), Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1a), Stefan Zweig (1a), Óssip Mandelstam (1a), Rosa Luxemburg (1a), Sòcrates (1a).

Locutor privileges historical figures from the late 19th to the late 20th century, both locally and internationally, focusing on those who belong to the group of representatives of Catalan institutions, with 34 citations from 25 authors considered "existents, characters or sages" distributed in 18 tweets and 16 quotes in public speeches.

This selection of personalities and quotations arouses certain emotions in the target community. In particular, the complex emotions brought to the fore, the *pathos* meant to be triggered, can be summarized in three main themes: Freedom, Dignity, and Identity, as we will see throughout the analysis. In most cases, these are "*émotions étayées*" that require an

understanding of the historical meaning of the authors to be understood and comprehended.

Of all the enunciators, 16 were in exile (underlined), 10 took part in the government of the Second Republic of Catalonia¹³ (in blue), and 13 participated in the declaration of the Third Republic of Catalonia on 27.10.2017 (in green). However, the most quoted are the politicians and intellectuals of the Second Republic, first and foremost Antoni Rovira i Virgili, author of a quote that was repeated twice:

- (3) «No es tracta que els governants de Madrid ens governin millor o pitjor, sinó que deixin de governar-nos.¹⁴» (05.01.2020)

In my translation: "It is not a matter of the governors of Madrid govern us, but that they stop governing us."

Through it (3) a complex emotion, namely Freedom, is constructed by recourse to an "*émotion étayée*." The desire for Freedom, historically present in the Catalan nation¹⁵, is a shared knowledge of the community that helps to interpret these words, in which the use of the verbal periphrase "*deixa de + infinitive*" (stop doing something) and the negative construction "*no... sinó que...*" (not... but) stand out, implying two opposing forces aimed at semiotizing this emotion. The locutor also quotes in a tweet the message inscribed on Rovira i Virgili's epitaph:

- (4) «No em descoratjo, no renuncio, no deserto. I somnio en la més gran CAT, la més gran pel territori, la més gran per la llibertat, la més gran per la civilització.» (05.12.2019).

In my translation: "I don't get discouraged, I don't give up, I don't desert. And I dream of the greatest Catalonia, the greatest for the territory, the greatest for Freedom, the greatest for civilization."

¹³ The First Catalan Republic was declared on 16.01.1641, by Pau Claris i Casademunt, 94th President of the Generalitat de Catalunya, at the beginning of the Segadors War. According to new research (see Sapiens magazine n° 45), he died of poisoning and was the victim of a conspiracy. The Second Catalan Republic was proclaimed on 14.04.1931, by Francesc Macià i Llussà, the 122nd President of the Generalitat de Catalunya. He died on 25.12.1933. His successor was Lluís Companys i Jover (31.12.1933). The latter was assassinated by Franco's genocidal forces on 15.10.1940.

¹⁴ *Plantem-nos i avancem: és a les nostres mans*. On 04.01.2020, the President addresses Parliament in response to the threat of suspension by the Electoral Board (JEC).

¹⁵ Despite Archduke Charles' victory, after the Treaty of Utrecht (1713-15), he gave Catalonia to the Bourbon Philip V of Castile. With the Decrees of Nueva Planta (1707, 1715, and 1716), Philip V dissolved the sovereign political structures, the kingdoms of Aragon, Valencia, Majorca, and the Principality of Catalonia. For general information, the Principality of Catalonia dates its foundation back to the 9th century. It is the first medieval European state with a parliamentary system of government. The first constitutions' compilation dates from 1283, with the 1705 edition being the last one never derogated.

¹² President of the *Mancomunitat* of Catalonia (1914 – 1917). He suffered political repression for an opinion piece and was imprisoned.

The first secondary aphorization presents a common POV of the locutor and the author-enunciator on the form of government in Catalonia, which in turn includes the negation of the POV of those who agree with the established power, thus questioning the basis of a political and social conviction according to which the government is in the hands of Madrid politicians and not of the Catalan people. The second one conveys the POV of Rovira i Virgili, the locutor and the republican society. Moreover, the words of the epitaph build up a series of emotions, the desire for Freedom and the recognition of national and cultural Dignity. Those intended emotions are semiotized using a negative syntactic phrase "no... no... no..." in contrast to the four superlative structures "la més..." which aim to encourage the audience.

The President as locutor-enunciator also quotes three times Pompeu Fabra, a member of the Republican General Government in exile and author of the modern normative of the Catalan language:

- (5) «Només tindrem el que nosaltres sapiguem guanyar.» (repeated twice¹⁶) and (6) «si la llengua falla, fallarà tot.» (13.12.2019). Through these aphorizations, the locutor expresses the shared POV with Fabra about the difficulties of the Catalan struggle, among which he emphasizes the protection of the Catalan language.

In this sense, the second quote focuses on a concrete emotion, Dignity, semiotized by means of a conditional syntactic structure and the lexical choice of the verb to fail (*fallar*). This is identified with the defense of a concrete aspect of Catalan cultural identity, its language. Next, we find two quotes (7) from Lluís Companys which also build up the emotions of Dignity, Freedom and love for the homeland; semiotized through a poetic text with a syntactic negative structure to which the locutor adds the historical context of his execution by Spanish fascism:

- (7) «No admetis, doncs, condols, ni ploris. Aixeca el cap. moriré estimant-te.» A 2/4 de 7 del matí, just abans de disparar-lo, va cridar: "Per Catalunya!"

A quote from Francesc Macià used twice:

- (8) «El seny si no va acompanyat d'una ferma voluntat de combat només serveix per tapar covardies.» (20.08.2019)

and two more quotes from Heribert Barrera:

- (9) «Jo proclamo des d'aquesta tribuna que CAT té dret a l'autodeterminació.»
(10) «No vaig votar la Constitució, i com em va dir un dia Tarradellas, és l'honor més gran de la meua carrera política.»

If we examine the question of emotions conveyed by the secondary aphorizations of this group, we find that they have to do with Freedom and Dignity in the context of defending sociocultural identity. We can classify such emotions as "*émotions étayées*," for which it is necessary to know the historical significance of both the authors and their time, which is why they are considered "characters" and "sages" according to the historical and sapiential interpretative frameworks (Maingueneau 2013:114).

About the Third Republic, the President primarily quotes Jordi Turull with three aphorizations (11, 12) that also construct complex emotions through the current POV: Dignity and Freedom, semiotized by the lexical choice and the syntactic construction of the future, which has the appearance of a prophecy. They are thus "*émotions étayées*." But we also find "*émotions montrées*" (underlined) as hope and determination, conveyed through the lexical choice:

- (11) «*És el sentit que vull trobar a la presó, amb l'esperança i el convenciment que si #persistim ens en sortirem i el temps ens demostrarà que res haurà estat en va i tot haurà valgut la pena.*»
(12) «*Benvinguda la proposta de fer un altre referèndum.*» «*Confonen discrepància i crítica amb atac i falta de respecte. Aquesta confusió només es dona en mentalitats insegures o en mentalitats autoritàries.*»

The group of representatives of Catalan culture includes 21 authors and is the second largest regarding the number of aphorizations with 28 (20 tweets and nine quotes in speeches). One of the quotes belongs to the Catalan community since the 13th century, not to a specific author. It is a fragment of a liturgical drama and medieval ecclesiastical Gregorian chant, declared World Heritage in 2010, the song of the "Sibyl." However, most of the quotes, 20 in total (in red), correspond to fragments of literary texts that the locutor copies on his Twitter feed, 18 poems or excerpts, and one narrative fragment, for example:

- (13) «*Finalment submergida l'ombra del vell temps al fons orb del celler, compassarem la cadència del pas per camins ignorats buscant les genuïnes arrels a les paraules mítiques de pau i llibertat.*» Zoraida Burgos i Matheu (tweet 25.01.2020)
(14) «*En aquesta nit d'un Nadal fosc i trist jo us convido a obrir el finestral com un acte d'esperança. Fa fred. No es veu res. Tot és negre. Però si teniu voluntat d'escoltar, sentireu la veu de l'àngel.*» Eugeni Xammar. *Nadal de 1939*. (tweet 25.12.2019)

The remaining aphorizations are the opinions of the authors. In this case, the author highlights the POVs of Manuel de Pedrolo, a writer also known for his journalistic activity and political struggle against Franco's regime, quoted three times:

- (15) «*el combat és ara o no n'hi ha.*» (used twice on 04.01.2020)

¹⁶ Conference *El nostre moment* at the National Theater of Catalonia (04.09.2018); and the 51st edition of the Catalan Summer University (UCE) in Prada de Conflent. Closing ceremony to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the UCE (20.08.2019).

and Armand Obiols' quote, used twice:

- (16) «D'il·lusions només en tenen els febles; els forts tenen programa.»

In these examples, we see how the semiotized emotions are "émotions étayées," namely the determination and fatality of life.

Linguistically, the authors draw on the cultural relationship between light and hope ("obrir el finestral"), on the one hand. And darkness and oppression ("l'ombra del vell temps," "nit... fosc i trist... fred... negre") on the other. To the content is added the symbolic charge of the authors, who are considered "sages" according to the sapiential interpretative framework (Maingueneau 2013:114).

First, Obiols, a member of the "Colla de Sabadell," a group of intellectuals based in Sabadell who modernized Catalan cultural life through cultural actions at the beginning of the 20th century, went into exile during the 1936-39 war and died there. Secondly, Pedrolo, a writer who fought against fascism, defended the Catalan language and Catalonia's Freedom to the point of becoming an internal exile. Towards the end of his life, the latter decided not to grant interviews or publish articles if they were not about Catalonia's Freedom.

Most of the aphorizations are tweets intended as calendars of cultural events, but we would like to point out the presence of authors also known for their journalistic work in political speeches: Rovira i Virgili (3, 17), Roig (18) and Pedrolo (15, 19 and 21).

- (17) «Com deia Rovira i Virgili, **"No es tracta que els governants de Madrid ens governin millor o pitjor, sinó que deixin de governar-nos"**. L'autonomisme, el conformisme, és una opció legítima; però no és la meua i sostinc que tampoc no és la de la majoria dels catalans. No soc President per gestionar una autonomia. És per fer la República que jo vaig anar a una llista electoral el 21-D.» 51st edition of the Catalan Summer University (UCE) in Prada de Conflent. Closing ceremony to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the UCE. (20.08.2019)
- (18) «La cultura és el ciment també de la llibertat. Perquè no hi ha llibertat sense cultura, ni cultura sense llibertat. Quan Montserrat Roig deia que **"la cultura és l'opció política més revolucionària a llarg termini"**, volia dir això. Invertir en cultura és invertir en una societat més democràtica, més justa i més lliure.» Presentation of the Government's structure and composition in Parliament. (06.06.2018)
- (19) «Manuel de Pedrolo, de qui enguany commemorem el centenari del seu naixement, ho deia d'aquesta manera: **"No som lliures d'ésser lliures; hi estem condemnats."** Amb tota l'esperança i també amb tot el coratge pels dies que vindran, us desitjo una molt bona Diada.» Institutional message to commemorate Catalonia's National Day, September 11 (10.09.2018)
- (20 and 21) «Tota Europa ens està mirant per saber si som demòcrates de veritat i dignes de dirnos europeus o si no som més que això que la Junta Electoral Central vol que siguem. Avui és pertinent citar un dels grans polítics que ha donat

Europa, Václav Havel: **"Els drets humans s'han d'avançar als drets estatals."** La decisió és a les vostres mans, diputades i diputats. Deia Pedrolo que **"el combat és ara o no n'hi ha"**. Per defensar la democràcia, a vegades cal plantar-se per avançar. » Plantem-nos i avancem: és a les nostres mans. Addressing Parliament over the threat of incapacitation by the Electoral Board (JEC) (04.01.2020)

The third group includes 20 authors, three of them Catalan, known for their commitment to peace and human rights; it comprises 24 aphorizations, namely three tweets and 21 quotes, preferably inserted in political speeches. These secondary aphorizations deal with two main interdependent issues, namely the Declaration of Independence and the subsequent imprisonment and trial of political and civil representatives for this reason; on the other hand, they focus on a broader and more universal issue, the exercise of human and political rights.

The locutor-enunciator selected several authors to cite that fall under the interpretative testimonial framework. Five of them belong to the current regime because they are relevant figures who play a leading role in or comment on the events that followed the Declaration of Independence (imprisonment, repression, persecution). For this reason, we consider them "Existents". Thus, the words of Jordi Sánchez and Jordi Cuixart are echoed in the Presidential Institutional Declaration at the end of 1-O hearing in the Supreme Court on 12.06.2019 or in the conference "El nostre moment" at the National Theater of Catalonia on 04.09.2018.

The most quoted of this group is Jordi Cuixart (twice):

- (22) «Aquesta ha de ser la nostra actitud durant el judici oral al qual serem sotmesos: no pas defensar-nos sinó acusar l'Estat de vulneració flagrant dels nostres drets fonamentals i, alhora, interpel·lar el conjunt de l'opinió pública davant el retrocés democràtic que vivim. Els presos polítics i exiliats som una palanca democràtica: cal aconseguir que la comunitat internacional denunciï el nostre empresonament. No cedir a l'intent de silenciar la barbaritat jurídica de la justícia espanyola, amb acusacions desproporcionades i sense fonament.» (04.09.2018)
- (23) «Si la violència policial no va poder amb milers de persones el Primer d'Octubre, algú creu que una sentència farà que els catalans deixin de lluitar pel dret d'autodeterminació?» (12.06.2019)

Other "Existents" are José Antonio Guevara, referred to in a retweet of an article published in the digital newspaper Vilaweb, in which he calls for the release of prisoners; Ramin Jahanbegloo, referred to in the II General Policy Debate in Parliament on 25.09.2019, in which he characterizes Catalan independence; or Paul Engler, author of the book Handbook of Civil Disobedience, *Resistance Guide: How to Sustain the Movement to Win*, in a retweet of an interview published in the newspaper Vilaweb. The last

two "Existents" go hand in hand with the second theme central to this group, the defense of individual and civil rights, that is, human, social, and political rights, which are the subject of the secondary aphorizations of historical characters who fall under both the testimonial and sapiential regimes. Therefore, we consider them "characters and sages". We thus find sententious quotations that revolve around Freedom.

In this second group, the emotional factor becomes significant as the "sages" reflect on the nature of Freedom and its implications. In these aphorizations, the semiotized emotions are "*émotions étayées*". They require collective knowledge, the ability to connect sentences and historical events with experiences, to perceive the complex emotion that each of the aphorizations constructs. Considering all the quotations, we can summarize that the "Sages" portray the concept of Freedom as being associated with exercising human, civil, and political rights. Nonetheless, they also associate liberty with concepts such as responsibility, conscience, moral Dignity, sacrifice, improvement (of one's being and the community), hope (kindness, compassion, commitment, courage), or the association of risk and benefit, rebellion, and affirmation.

The "Sages" use opposites to build these emotions when juxtaposing slavery and empire to Freedom, oppression, violence, fear, resignation, and lies to truth or hope to rebellion. They all defend the path of civil resistance and the resource of nonviolent methods to ensure the exercise of rights. Internationally, stand out Václav Havel (20):

(24) «Havel defensava que "*cal viure en la veritat*", en tant que acte de resistència, de rebel·lió contra la mentida de la qual el mateix poder totalitari n'és presoner. Viure en la veritat permet als ciutadans crear una situació que confon tot règim i el fa reaccionar de manera inadequada. Per Havel, el poder que té "*la vida en la veritat*" és el poder d'acabar amb les estructures repressives, és el poder de retrobar la identitat i la dignitat reprimida. I aquest enorme poder rau al sí de cada persona.» (17.11.2019)

and Nelson Mandela:

(25) «En una carta de la presó estant, Nelson Mandela va escriure: "*Els honors són per a aquells que no abandonen mai la veritat, ni tan sols quan tot sembla fosc i lúgubre, que ho intenten una vegada i una altra, que no es deixen desanimar mai pels insults, ni per les humiliacions, ni tan sols per les derrotes.*"» (04.09.2018)

In sum, most aphorizations fall within the testimonial¹⁷ interpretive framework that circulates in the

media, as described by Maingueneau (2013:112): «*tend à réduire, voire à annuler, la dimension informationnelle, au profit de l'expression d'une conviction à la face du monde.*» Especially in the context of the memorial, historical, and sapiential regime, in which the enunciator is considered a character or sage with historical relevance, in this case, 44 of them.

When interpreting secondary aphorizations set in a historical framework, the audience must have an encyclopedic knowledge of the event where the quote is situated. In the sapiential framework, however, the aphorization manifests as a moralistic or hermeneutic frame conceived as the POV of a privileged Subject (Maingueneau 2013:114). Linguistically, we recover memory through the context in which we found the quotation. That is usually done through the use of an indirect style introduced by a *dicendi* verb (say, defend, write, and others) (24, 25) or the paraphrase of the author-enunciator (25), but also through the enunciative situation.

Next, there are the aphorizations that belong to the testimonial interpretative framework of the current regime¹⁸, in which the authors are relevant contemporary figures, "Existents," 22 out of a total of 66 authors who talk about what is in the news daily. That is because the author favors historical figures over contemporary ones to highlight similarities between historical events and the current situation.

It is worth highlighting the high presence of cultural ephemeris in the sample corpus, as 25 texts refer to cultural ephemeris and actions, including historical dates and commemorations (holidays, defuncts, so on) or celebrations (awards, cultural acts, and others) of authors and historical figures relevant to Catalan society and culture. Of those 25, there are 22 tweets (out of 38), and only four (out of 13) political speeches. The locutor wants to reaffirm the cultural and historical background of his community, the Catalan nation, by evoking these events over time and posting them on the social network Twitter, which allows him to constantly update information and rescue key moments, situations, and personalities from history.

The locutor thus uses Twitter as a sociocultural almanac. By recalling ephemerides in quotations, the locutor builds a complex emotion, an identity composed of love, Dignity, and a sense of belonging. Emotions are triggered when interpreting aphorizations, most of them (19 quotations) literary excerpts. These literary pieces, seen as a trigger of emotions, can also be interpreted as "*émotions étayées*" if we consider the symbolic charge

correspondre à deux grands cadrages: «historique», et «sapiential».» (Maingueneau 2013:113)

¹⁸«[...] c'est-à-dire qu'elles sont interprétables à l'intérieur du vaste interdiscours de «ce qui se dit», de ce qui est susceptible de nourrir les conversations ordinaires, les forums sur Internet ou les débats télévisés à un moment donné.» (Maingueneau 2013:113)

¹⁷«[...] «mémoire», où l'aphorisation est portée par une mémoire collective à plus ou moins long terme. Les aphorisations qui en relèvent sont référées à un auteur identifié, inscrits dans un Thésaurus de paroles vouées à la transmission. Ce régime mémoriel peut

they bestow when inserted into a contemporary context, for instance:

(26) «Viuré, si em vaga encar de viure, supervivent d'un cant remot. Viuré amb la cella corrugada contra les ires, contra el llot. Viuré dreçant-me com un jutge, només mirant, sense dir mot, com la paret en el seu sòtol, com una pedra en el seu sot.» Josep Carner (tweet 23.01.2020)

(27) «Amollo en la nit la veu amarga o la veu esperançada. I apreng a dir que NO. Que ja no és temps de plorar ni de lamentar-se, ni tampoc el de cercar excuses fàcils. I apreng a dir que NO.» Montserrat Abelló (tweet 24.01.2020)

Josep Carner (26), a poet and diplomat of the Republic, uses an "*émotion montrée*," determination, to semiotize a complex emotion, Dignity, through "a straight posture and a wrinkled brow." Historically, however, Carner gives the quote a symbolic charge. Carner remained loyal to the Republic's government and died in exile, defending his beliefs. Thus, the poem's determination is strengthened by what the author demonstrated in his life.

Similarly, in the case of the quotation (27) from a poem by Montserrat Abelló, she presents an "*émotion montrée*," sadness, with expressions such as "bitter voice, weeping or lamenting," while at the same time resorting to an "*émotion étayée*" through the construction "learning to say no." The author, as a historical character, has more symbolic weight. She fled to exile with her parents after 1939, where she worked as a poet, translator, and teacher (Chile). She carried out humanitarian aid activities for refugees (France and Great Britain) and returned to Catalonia in 1960, where she devoted herself to teaching in the Catalan language, facing the repression experienced by the Catalan language at the time. So, the locutor constructs a complex emotion: identity, using other emotions, Dignity, and perseverance; this being an "*émotion étayée*" because only those who know about the character quoted and her biography can perceive it.

In short, we argue that ideology is contained either in the quotes themselves (reflections, opinions, or political doctrine) or in how the locutor uses them. President Joaquim Torra i Pla uses secondary aphorizations not only to convey a certain *ethos* and trigger a particular *pathos* but also for ideological purposes, namely to:

- defend human rights from a Europeanist and universalist perspective;
- demonstrate his commitment to achieving political objectives by resorting to nonviolence;
- underline his belief that a Republic is the ideal form of government for Catalonia;
- defend and protect the Catalan cultural and linguistic uniqueness as part of the community's identity.

VI. CONCLUSION

To sum up, quotations understood as textless sentences are used by the locutor as a linguistic means to express and convey a particular point of view on a given situation. To that end, the locutor activates an enunciator who is in some sense considered superior to the purpose pursued by the enunciative act. Consequently, the locutor represents one enunciator, whereas the author of the quoted text represents a second one. The POV conveyed by the citation becomes part of both enunciators. Occasionally, as mentioned, when using negative utterances, aphorizations involve a third enunciator who represents the opposite POV, which may be a sociocultural assumption.

The sense of the text fragment that the locutor has recovered thus derives from its (re)interpretation in the new context. Aphorizing, however, has a certain implicit historical content and a symbolic charge (historical, cultural, and so on) that allows it to get re-evaluated since it creates continuity, from a historical-cultural perspective, in the community who receives it. Thus, aphorization is a polyphonic transtextual phenomenon capable of evoking a great deal of shared knowledge in a particular audience. This knowledge is rooted in a set of shared values and opinions. At the same time, it aims to evoke complex emotions resulting from the collective or subjective interpretation of it. The awareness of a shared background within a community leads the locutor to resort to aphorizations to trigger a specific set of thoughts and emotions that can move subjects to social action. Such a symbolic charge aims to reinforce the collective and individual *ethos* of the audience.

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ABBREVIATIONS

JEC	<i>Junta Electoral Central</i> (Electoral Board)
POV	Point Of View
UCE	<i>Universitat Catalana d'Estiu</i> (Catalan Summer University)

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Homicide Rates in Fragile Democracies: Reflections on the Paradoxes of Latin America

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Abstract- This article analyzes the relationship between the quality of democracy and homicide rates in Latin America. Our hypothesis is that governments with authoritarian tendencies in Latin America do not necessarily have higher homicide rates than those without these tendencies. Our research focuses analyzing the “quality” of democracy in four countries: Brazil and Colombia, categorized as “weak democracies”, and Peru and Bolivia, considered “hybrid regimes.” Secondary data obtained from the *Economist Intelligence Unit*, *Our World in Data* and the *World Bank Group* websites were used for this analysis. Findings indicate that weakening of institutions is an important contributor to homicide rates in weak democracies (Brazil and Colombia). However, this factor has less of an impact on homicide rates in hybrid regime countries (Peru and Bolivia), where the fragility of democracy coexists with lower homicide rates.

Keywords: latin america; fragile democracies; state institutions; homicides.

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Homicide Rates in Fragile Democracies: Reflections on the Paradoxes of Latin America

Jaime Luiz Cunha de Souza ^α & Luis Fernando Cardoso e Cardoso ^ο

Abstract- This article analyzes the relationship between the quality of democracy and homicide rates in Latin America. Our hypothesis is that governments with authoritarian tendencies in Latin America do not necessarily have higher homicide rates than those without these tendencies. Our research focuses analyzing the "quality" of democracy in four countries: Brazil and Colombia, categorized as "weak democracies", and Peru and Bolivia, considered "hybrid regimes." Secondary data obtained from the *Economist Intelligence Unit*, *Our World in Data* and the *World Bank Group* websites were used for this analysis. Findings indicate that weakening of institutions is an important contributor to homicide rates in weak democracies (Brazil and Colombia). However, this factor has less of an impact on homicide rates in hybrid regime countries (Peru and Bolivia), where the fragility of democracy coexists with lower homicide rates.

Keywords: latin america; fragile democracies; state institutions; homicides.

I. INTRODUCTION

This article seeks to analyze the relationship between homicide rates and different government regimes to determine if democracies with "weaker" institutions tend to have higher homicide rates. Research focused on data from four countries: Brazil and Colombia - both classified as "weak democracies" by the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU, 2022) - and Peru and Bolivia - classified by the same institute as "hybrid regimes." All countries suffer from the deterioration of democratic institutions, albeit to different degrees with a differential impact on homicide rates.

The term "weak democracies" refers to political regimes whose institutions formally exist but have flaws that compromise the consolidation of democracy. Flaws stem from factors, such as corruption, clientelism, inefficient governance and a loss of trust in public institutions (Boulding, 2010, Kapstein and Converse, 2008; Levitsky and Murillo, 2013; Waldmann, 2006). Also, present is political interference from powerful elites and a lack of state autonomy (Levitsky and Murillo, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2012). Although data sources make a distinction between "weak democracies" and "hybrid regimes," we decided not to focus our analysis on this distinction due to its tenuous nature; thus, for the

purposes of this theoretical reflection, all the countries mentioned are considered "weak democracies."

Analyses were based on secondary data extracted from the annual reports and historical series available on the websites of the *Economist Intelligence Unit*, *Our World in Data* and the *World Bank Group*, organizations with a long tradition of expertise in organizing data on social phenomena and global issues. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) is a research and consulting firm that provides economic and political analyses for organizations around the world; Our World in Data (OWID) is a non-profit organization that makes data on important global issues available to the public; the World Bank Group (WBG) is an international financial institution that provides loans and assistance to developing countries. These institutions are interested in issues related to democracy, crime and homicide rates, as these factors affect economic development, poverty and contribute negatively to economic development.

By analyzing the fragility of democracy in Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia, this article has the potential to contribute new insights to the social and political sciences. To date, little research has been conducted on the fragility of democracy and/or weakening of democratic institutions and their effects on violence, especially homicide rates. This discussion is particularly relevant today because some democratic countries, including those with consolidated democracies, are facing new challenges as authoritarian rulers come to power. At its core, our analysis focuses on the relationship between weakened democracies and homicide rates; we seek to verify if homicide rates in countries with authoritarian tendencies differ from those without these tendencies.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

Democratic fragility and the rise of authoritarian regimes are phenomena that marked Latin American history throughout the 20th century. These processes extended into the first decades of the 21st century, affecting various ideological orientations. According to Burchardt (2017), changes in ideological orientation do not substantially transform political practices in Latin America, as elites and various interest groups often alternate their terms in power. Thus, we observe only slight variations in the nuances of political practices in relation to previous authoritarian regimes. According to

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this author, even progressive governments, which once challenged conservative elites, end up adopting similar practices and, when in power, also engage in the task of undermining democratic institutions.

Waldmann (2006) points out that dictators in Latin America, regardless of their ideological affinities, have historically sought to weaken legal foundations and informal social norms; these changes help them impose their agendas more freely. Even with the wave of re-democratization in the 1980s, many Latin American countries were unable to establish solid democratic orders (Ibarra, 2011; Martins, 2015). Job (1992) and Santos (2014) argue that governments often fail to provide essential services for their people, thus creating a context conducive to instability and vulnerable to authoritarian take over.

In search of some degree of governability, state institutions become bargaining chips and are manipulated by those who wish to extract advantages from those in power. According to Ellis (2017), widespread corruption, a lack of transparency, and the absence of accountability generate widespread distrust (Jiménez, 2012; Lavalle and Vera, 2011; Willis, 2017). This, in turn, undermines government legitimacy and fuels political polarization (Murillo, 2019; Power and Jamison, 2005). In this context, opponents are persecuted obsessively and systematically; attempts are also made to limit independence and interfere with the division of powers (Vitullo, 2001).

According to Briceño-León (2012), institutional weakness and corruption lead people to resort not to justice, but to violence. The absence or inefficiency of justice encourages ordinary people, and even public officials, to take the law into their own hands. In this context, widespread transgression of the law is the most common response; at the same time, the state becomes complicit in illegalities due to its inability to carry out its function (Cruz, 2011; Weber, 2021).

According to Osorio (2013), security institutions are in a particularly delicate position because they are directly subordinate to the executive branch of government, making them susceptible to political and budgetary interference. This accentuates inefficiency, which leads to an increase in crime rates, in general, and homicide rates in particular. Opportunistic politicians take advantage of this context, using state weakness as a campaign platform. They propose themselves as saviors by mobilizing popular dissatisfaction, promising to solve problems with simplistic solutions. These solutions usually involve making democratic and legal parameters more flexible; sometimes these parameters are even eliminated, which, among other consequences, aims to legitimize an increase in police brutality. In this context, responsible public agents are not punished and may even be offered impunity (Blumstein, 2007, Lafree and Tseloni, 2006; Malone, 2013).

As the state loses its capacity to respond to the public, and state institutions fail to provide essential public services, faith in the democratic system and its legitimacy weakens (Magalon and Kricheli, 2010). In Latin America, ineffective law enforcement, widespread corruption and slow responses to crucial issues, such as the increase in violence and the strengthening of criminal organizations, create a highly unstable atmosphere conducive to the emergence of punitive non-state control (Elkins, Ginsburg and Melton, 2009; González Zempoalteca, 2023). To avoid assuming their institutional failure for good, Latin American states do take action, but in an extremely selective way. As a result, law enforcement is often poorly founded and precariously executed. The police are the closest and most visible state institutions to ordinary citizens and are the first to experience the effects of public distrust; thus, they are seen in the region as a thermometer for the quality of democracy.

In the region, police institutions are historically conservative and have had difficulty adopting democratic values; they act with "selectivity," which harms the poorest segments of the population. Attempts to investigate excess use of power against selective groups fails in the face of a corporatism, operating with a "self-preservation" instinct. In addition, these public agents deal with the lack of objective delimitation of their role as police in a democratic society (Reiss Jr., 1992; Yüksel, 2015).

Yet, the increase in violence and homicides in Latin American countries returning to democracy after decades of authoritarian regimes is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon. These issues cannot be entirely explained by the quality of democratic institutions. In some countries in the region, democratization did not signify profound reforms in the institutions. This, thus, allowed criminal organizations to grow stronger and occupy spaces of power where the state had limited presence (Berg and Carranza, 2018; Cruz, 2019; Pérez, 2013).

Gallo (2014), discussing the legacy of dictatorships in Latin America, argues that the transition to democracy in many countries in the region was marked by "amnesty" agreements that guaranteed impunity for perpetrators of human rights abuses during authoritarian regimes. This weakened the state's ability to maintain control and order. As a more recent component of this equation, we must consider the COVID-19 pandemic, whose impact has further exacerbated social tensions in the region, which may have contributed to the escalation of violence in general (Gomes and Carvalho, 2021).

In this sense, the increase in homicides following the return to democratic normality in Latin America can be attributed to a combination of factors, of which the quality of democracy is just one component.

III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This study takes a descriptive approach, using secondary data published by the EIU. In 2023, the EIU, the research and analysis division of The Economist Group, published a historical series on the democracy index of 167 countries, from which microstates were excluded because their populations were too small. The historical series constructed by the EIU is based on five categories: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, government functioning, political participation and political culture, with scores ranging from "0" for weak democracies to "10" for strong democracies.

We also used data from the historical series made available by the World Bank Group, which regularly systematizes data extracted from the Homicide Statistics of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). This data, in turn, is collected both nationally and internationally from the criminal justice and public health systems, as well as from other regional and international agencies, such as the Organization of American States, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO).

We also analyzed data from the Our World in Data, which uses government documents and reports from civil society organizations regarding the quality of democracies to construct democratic stability scores. The scores established by the OWID are the following: for countries with low stability (scores from 1 to 2.49), stability with flaws (scores from 2.5 to 4.49), regular political participation (scores from 4.5 to 6.49) and solid stability (scores from 6.5 to 8.49) and countries with excellent stability (scores from 8.5 to 10).

These institutes acquire data from the countries' governments. Some governments keep their data more up-to-date than others; thus, the tables and figures presented in this article show slight differences in their time frames. Brazil and Peru, for example, only have data up to 2020, and Colombia and Bolivia up to 2021. To further delimit the analyses of Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia regarding the general state and condition of their democracies, we focused on the "Government Functionality" category in the historical series from 2013 to 2021.

The four study countries were chosen because they all share borders with the Amazon region. They also have difficulties solidifying their democratic institutions and experience high crime rates due harboring routes for international criminal organizations. Given the geographical scope of the region under analysis, collecting primary data would be expensive, complex and time-consuming. Data collection would be further complicated by fragility of the institutions in these countries and the risks involved in penetrating territories full of illicit activities. Given this scenario, the choice of secondary data from international sources seemed the

most viable option – one which is also capable of providing a comprehensive view of the problems affecting the functionality of democratic institutions in these Latin American nations.

IV. RESULTS

Latin America experienced a sharp decline in democracy rankings between 2006 and 2022; towards the end of this period, more precisely between 2020 and 2021, this decline was more pronounced, possibly due to the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2022, the region's score improved slightly due to the suspension of pandemic-related restrictions, but this was not enough to completely reverse the general downward trend that has been observed since 2006.

Figure 1 shows the dynamics of this trend for the twenty-four¹ main countries, taking their populations as a reference.

¹ Latin America is usually considered to be made up of 20 countries, but this number increases when some dependent territories or nations are included or excluded; and even non-Latin colonized countries, the so-called Anglo-Americans. For this reason, Figure 1, constructed with data provided by the EIU (2022), brings together data from 24 countries.



Source: EIU (2022).

Figure 1: Quality of democracy in Latin America for the period of 2006-2022; values range from 1 to 10, where 10 is the best result and 0 is the worst result.

Data provided by the EIU (2022) shows that Latin America is facing a democratic recession, with its average falling from a peak of 6.43 in 2006 to 5.79 in 2022, which represents a 0.64-point drop in the quality of democracy. Over the fourteen years shown on Figure 1, the downward trend continued despite some moments of slight positive reversal, such as from 2006 to 2008 and from 2012 to 2015; however, when we consider the period from 2006 to 2022 as whole, we see a general downward trend.

Most Latin American countries saw a decline in their 2022 indices as compared to 2021; yet, nine countries saw growth and two remained stable. Although there are robust democracies in the region, such as in Uruguay, Costa Rica and Chile, whose


performance values raise the average, the general trend remains unchanged since these countries have small populations, representing only 4% of the regional population. It is important to note that 45% of the region's inhabitants live under "hybrid" or "authoritarian" regimes, while 62% of citizens live in countries that have experienced a drop in the quality of democracy.

Data displayed on Table 1 shows the quality indices, with reference to the "government functionality" aspect and the political regime adopted. Figure 2 shows "democratic stability" indices for the four studied countries, considering the effectiveness levels of democratic institutions and the degree to which they are accepted by citizens.

Table 1: Classification of countries according to political regime and government functionality between 2017 and 2021.

COUNTRY	General score	Position in ranking	Variation recent	Government functionality	Political regime
Brazil	6.78	51	-4	5.00	Weak democracy
Colombia	6.73	53	6	6.67	Weak democracy
Peru	5.92	75	-4	5.71	Hybrid political regime
Bolivia	4.51	100	-2	4.29	Hybrid political regime

Source: EIU (2022).



Source: Our World in Data. Stability of Democratic Institutions (2023)²

Figure 2: Stability of Democratic Institutions Index: Shows the effectiveness and efficiency of democratic institutions and the degree to which they are accepted by relevant social actors.

In the last four years, Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia have experienced social and political instability, which explains the trends observed on Table 1 and in Figure 2. In 2022, presidential elections in Brazil were extremely polarized due to the dispute between the incumbent president, the far-right politician, Jair Bolsonaro, who governed from 2019 to 2022 and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, a leftist-oriented former president who governed from 2003 to 2010 (Zilli and Couto, 2017).

Throughout his term in office, Bolsonaro cultivated distrust of the electronic ballot box system among his supporters and threatened not to recognize election results after his defeat; he even plotted a *coup d'état* to annul the results and remain in power. The *coup* attempt did not succeed, and Lula was inaugurated as the president; yet Bolsonaro's supporters invaded the capital, the National Congress and the Supreme Court buildings. These actions were aimed at mobilizing their supporters and the Armed Forces to join the *coup* attempt, but democratic institutions resisted. However, the calls for a *coup d'état* resonated with some sectors of the Armed Forces. Even though this group is a minority and not strong enough to achieve the *coup's* objectives, their actions brought the light the weaknesses of the Brazilian democracy.

Colombia has also faced instability, especially during the 2020-2021 period. Instability is related to challenges of the COVID-19 pandemic and a series of long-standing social and political problems, which have

combined to fuel an anti-system sentiment and the rejection of traditional party candidates. Against this backdrop, Gustavo Petro came to power in Colombia. The president-elect was a left-wing leader who began his political career as a trade union leader. However, when he took office, he adopted a pragmatic stance and formed a governing coalition with center-leaning parties. This guaranteed him a majority in Congress and facilitated the establishment of progressive reforms. Although social and political tensions were not completely eliminated, this strategy increased governability and reduced pressure on democratic institutions.


Peru's democracy was severely tested in 2021, when Congress voted and approved the removal of the president—the *third* impeachment attempt in his mere 15 months in office. Anticipating this outcome, President Pedro Castillo announced that he would close Congress and call early legislative elections just before his removal was to be voted upon. He planned to govern by decree, restructure the judiciary branch and impose a national curfew. These actions, representing a *coup* attempt, quickly failed and the Peruvian Congress removed him from office shortly after the announcement. He was then arrested and sentenced to 18 months in prison. Although the *coup* attempt did not materialize, Peru's democratic institutions were severely shaken during the fifteen months that Castillo was in power.

² The data available on the Our World in Data website was organized and initially published by the Bertelsmann Foundation (Bertelsmann Transformation Index 202 Available at <https://bti-project.org/en/downloads>)

Bolivia, for its part, has made efforts to restructure the state to be more inclusive of minorities, mobilizing both indigenous and peasant organizations. This inclusion has increased popular representation; yet, by challenging the current political order and negatively affecting the interests of the elites, it has also generated conflicts and have left some sectors unsatisfied. Coca-growers, for example, who have historically presented themselves as representatives of the peasantry, oppose the central government; their dissatisfaction is related to state repression of coca leaf production and threats to traditional access to and use of water, which was in the process of being privatized. Despite regular elections and a democratic constitution, Bolivia continues to be marked by limitations and inequalities. Bolivia has not

yet to overcome its historical exclusion of less privileged social segments, nor has it been able to control the power of the elites. Problems, such as state violence against popular demonstrations and a lack of access to essential services, such as health, education and water, continue to be factors that restrict and compromise the consolidation of the Bolivian democracy.

The conditions described above, and data shown on Figure 3 show an eclectic situation regarding homicide rates in the four study countries in 2013 and 2021. Amid long-standing social and political fragilities and in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, Brazil and Colombia maintained high homicide rates, while Peru and Bolivia have significantly lower homicide rates during this period.



Source: World Bank Group (2023).

Figure 3: Intentional homicides (per 100,000 people): Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, from 2013 to 2021.

Brazil and Colombia are considered “weak democracies,” yet are still better placed in the democracy ranking than Peru and Bolivia, which are considered “hybrid regimes.” However, there is a huge disparity between the rates of the former and the latter two. Brazil, for example, has numerous factors that influence homicide rates – ranging from poverty and social inequality – traditionally identified as drivers of criminal activity – to a culture of impunity, which produces a deep-rooted mistrust in the police and justice systems.

Between 2014 and 2016, Brazil faced an economic crisis and a substantial increase in crime. At the same time, political events linked to corruption scandals, such as those described in Operation Car Wash (*Operação Lava Jato*) provoked instability and led to demonstrations across the country. Reforms to the Social Security system were made in an effort to curb public spending; yet another important reform, the federal tax reform, was not put into action despite

sustained efforts (Barreira, 2019; Silva, 2021; Spaniol, 2019; Zanetic, 2017).

Previous studies on the incidence of crime, in general, and homicide in particular, point to the link between broader socio-economic and political factors and increased murder rates. Thus, we can infer that corruption allegations and the administrative irregularities that culminated in the impeachment of President Dilma in her second term could explain the homicide rates of this period – insofar as they represented a weakening of state institutions. From 2017 to 2018, poverty was reduced nationally, yet social inequalities and political instability in the face of widespread dissatisfaction with the Michel Temer government (he was the former vice-president who replaced Dilma Rousseff). Corruption scandals practically paralyzed the government until the beginning of 2018, when the new president took office. As a result, the quality of democracy continued to deteriorate.

From 2018 to 2022, under the government of Jair Bolsonaro, the country was plunged into a social, economic and political crisis that lasted the entire four years of his government. Factors contributing to this crisis included: mismanagement of the COVID-19 public health crisis, collision with the illegal exploitation of natural resources, state sponsored hate speech, the systematic production and dissemination of fake news and the indiscriminate release of arms and ammunition purchases. Paradoxically, Figure 3 shows that in 2019 and 2021, the homicide rate decreased: from 29.6 in 2016 to 20.8 in 2020. Despite remaining high, rates had fallen from 29.6 in 2016 - the year of Dilma Rousseff's impeachment - to 26.6 - recorded in 2018, the end of the Michel Temer government. These data show that as the quality of the Brazilian democracy declined, homicide rates also paradoxically decreased.

In Colombia we see the opposite occurring. Here the country experienced a slow but steady decline in homicide rates between 2015 and 2021, from 33.4 in 2013 to 27.5 in 2021. The decade beginning in 2010 was characterized by rapidly growing social and economic inequalities, occurring in tandem with stagnating economic growth. The latter resulted in greater income concentration and accentuated government delegitimization. While implementing fiscal austerity measures to deal the economic crisis, President Juan Manuel Santos' government began negotiations with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), which culminated in a peace agreement in 2016. This, directly or indirectly, consolidated the downward trend in homicide rates, as shown in Figure 3; here we observe a decrease from 33.4 per 100,000 people in 2013 to 26.0 in 2016, reaching 24.2 in 2020, with only a slight increase to 27.5 in 2021 (Norza Céspedes *et al.*, 2020; Ríos and González, 2021; Ríos-sierra and Bula-Galiano; Morales, 2019).

The decline in homicide rates in Colombia seems to confirm the link between the strengthening of democracy and the decrease in homicide rates, unlike what happened in Brazil. Here, the state increased measures to improve public safety, invested in the justice system and created the National Security Guarantee Commission (CNGS) - whose function is to coordinate security activities between various government agencies. Finally, investigative units within the Attorney General's Office, aimed at tackling organized crime and corruption, were created. Added to these actions was the aforementioned agreement with the FARC and the demobilization of its fighters, which has reduced the number of armed conflicts. These measures have helped, but rates still remain quite high, showing there is more work to be done.

Peru, in contrast to Brazil and Colombia, has historically had low homicide rates, even though its democracy is ranked far below them. An analysis of

Peruvian data from 2013 to 2020 shows a stable downward trend in homicide rates compared to Brazil and Colombia.

Peru has a tendency to mix formal democratic institutions with rulers who have authoritarian tendencies and high levels of corruption. It has been home to controversial elections with fraud accusations and acts of intimidation, all of which negatively affect public confidence in Peru's democratic institutions. The country invested in negotiations for a peace agreement with the Shining Path group. The group gained power in 1980; yet, its activities progressively lost intensity due to the arrest of its leader Abimael Guzmán in 1992. Although the conflict ended with a negotiated peace agreement, the accord failed to resolve the structural problems that motivated the conflict to begin with (Niño, 2020; Ríos, 2019).

Peru continues to be one of the largest cocaine producers in the world and drug-related crimes generally occur in remote areas, unlike Brazil and Colombia, where the most lethal effects of this illicit activity are felt in urban spaces. Thus, it is possible that a considerable proportion of homicides go unrecorded, which means that official rates are likely underestimated. Peru has just as many social and political problems as Brazil and Colombia; furthermore, its institutions are considered to be weaker than those of Brazil and Colombia, and yet Bolivia's homicide rates remain very low. These facts challenge the idea that weak democracies are correlated with high homicide rates. In the global democracy ranking, Peru occupies position 75, while its neighbors Brazil and Colombia occupy positions 51 and 53, respectively. The relationship between the functionality of the government - one of the factors that make up the institutional weakness index in Table 1 - and the homicide rates described in Figure 3 shows the extent of this apparent paradox more clearly.

Similarly, despite facing a difficult economic situation, being one of Latin America's main cocaine producers, and ranking well below Brazil, Colombia and Peru (as shown in Table 1 and Figure 3), Bolivia has even lower homicide rates than Peru. The reasons for these low rates may be related to informal, traditional ways of resolving conflicts that are still employed in isolated regions; here, punishment systems similar to vigilantism are often used. In addition, disputes between groups linked to the drug trade have little expression in the urban space due to the absence of a large consumer market (Rubin de Celis, Sanjinés Tudela and Aliaga Lordemann, 2012). However, even if we assume that many murders are not reported in official record, Bolivia has extremely low homicide rates, especially for a country with such a weak democracy - weaker than that of Brazil, Colombia and Peru.

Between 2015 and 2017, there was a slight increase in homicide rates due to a wave of violence linked to an increase in drug trafficking in urban centers,



further exacerbated by an increase in poverty and social inequality. This period was marked by political instability due to then-president Evo Morales' attempt at a fourth re-election. Between 2017 and 2021, as shown in Figure 3, there was again a downward trend in homicide rates, which can be attributed both to political changes and the impeachment of Morales and to improvements in the economy. However, these factors do not have sufficient explanatory power to account for why Bolivia has the lowest homicide rates despite being the worst-ranked country in the democracy indices among the four analyzed.

V. DISCUSSION

Although the literature on the quality of democracy predominantly focuses on the fragility of institutions as a relevant factor in homicide rates, the data from Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia indicate that the weight of this factor needs to be further considered.

It is difficult to pinpoint the precise causes of homicide and its rate of occurrence – in part due to the way that each society constructs its perception of the role of state institutions. Equally complex is the task of capturing the subtleties present in how different societies attribute guilt to those responsible for homicides and how these events become part of the public record.

Although we might agree that the quality of democracy is related to the robustness of its institutions, and that these can play a relevant role in homicide rates, we must be careful not to make statements which can be easily challenged by data, as is the case with the countries analyzed. Without these precautions, one could make the mistake of presenting a partial and therefore inadequate picture of the homicide problem in different countries. We would, in this case, be purposely ignoring the differences imposed by facts; here, the data presented do not confirm a possible link between weak democracies or weakened institutions and homicide rates.

Therein lies what we referred to at the beginning of this article as the paradox of homicide rates in Latin America. This approach, that centered on the idea of institutional weakness, fails to accurately capture the multi-causality of homicide rates, which are characterized by a degree of subjectivity that only qualitative research can more accurately explain; without this, data show merely generic and distorted panoramas.

Data gained from international agencies, such as those used in this work, represent an essentially quantitative approach; this method proved to have a weak and generic explanatory power. In fact, as the data from the countries analyzed clearly show, the quality of democracy alone does not define trends in homicide

rates. This quality appears as just one of the constitutive factors among many others involved in the dynamics of homicides.

We must question how the homicide phenomenon is usually portrayed; an inaccurate representation can lead to the formulation of public policies that are disconnected from the reality of the factors that contribute to homicide rates. For this reason, such policies become inefficient and irrelevant. We must challenge ourselves to consider why countries like Peru and Bolivia, which rank behind Brazil and Colombia in the ranking of democracies, have significantly lower homicide rates than the latter.

VI. CONCLUSION

This study sought to examine the complex relationship between the quality of democracy and homicide rates in four Latin American countries: Brazil, Colombia, Peru and Bolivia. Throughout the analysis, significant variations were observed in the overall scores with downward trends for some countries; this represents a challenge, as weaker democracies were shown to have lower homicide rates.

Although studies aimed at elucidating factors responsible for homicide rates often state that several variables contribute to this phenomenon, the fragility of democracy is still the main factor attributed to high rates. Yet, these studies fail to account for the contradiction that exists between these theoretical premises and data that show that homicide rates are lower in countries with weaker democracies.

This apparent contradiction suggests that the relationship between democracy and homicides is intricate and multifaceted. In addition to the strength of institutions and the quality of democracy, factors such as security policies, policing strategies, crime prevention programs and anti-drug trafficking policies play a significant role in determining rates. Socio-economic status, income inequality, access to education, employment and health services also influence the homicide rates. In addition, historical contexts of social conflicts, political polarization and the influence of transnational criminal organizations, such as drug cartels and organized crime groups, cannot be ignored. The ability of these groups to operate in a country and the effectiveness of government measures to combat them certainly have an important bearing on homicide rates.

However, a comprehensive understanding of the disparity in rates between countries requires a multidisciplinary approach that takes into account, not only the quality of democracy and the strength of institutions, but also a series of other interconnected variables of a subjective nature. Analyzing these factors in isolation is not enough to explain the complex dynamics of violence and homicide in Latin America. On



the other hand, understanding the role homicide plays in each society, as well as the various conceptions of justice, including those that are carried out in the absence of state institutions, may have greater weight in this matter.

The results of this study show the need for comprehensive public policies that address not only political and institutional issues, but also issues related to the peculiarities of cultural dynamics. Only through a holistic and collaborative approach, involving various sectors of society and with a wider range of methodological possibilities, will it be possible to effectively tackle the challenges related to understanding homicide rates in the region.

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The Transformation of Moldovan Migrant Communities into the Moldovan Diaspora in the European Union: The Main Directions and Mechanisms

By Tatiana Turco, Rodica Svetlicinai & Gheorghe Mosneaga

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Abstract- The article is dedicated to the analysis of the primary directions and mechanisms of transformation of moldovan migrant communities in European Union countries into the Moldovan diaspora. The authors identify, as primary mechanisms, the participation of moldovan migrants in the political and socio-economic processes of the country of origin; the development of the Moldovan communities' institutional potential; the policies of the Republic of Moldova for the consolidation of the Moldovan diaspora.

The Moldovan diaspora plays an important role in the political life of the Republic of Moldova, actively participating in its electoral processes. Its participation in the origin country's economic life mainly comes down to monetary transfers. At the same time, among members of the diaspora there are those that desire to invest in business and development projects. Moldovan diaspora associations are active in most European Union countries.

Keywords: Republic of Moldova, European Union, Moldovan communities, Moldovan diaspora.

GJHSS-F Classification: FOR Code: 160607



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Abstract- The article is dedicated to the analysis of the primary directions and mechanisms of transformation of moldovan migrant communities in European Union countries into the Moldovan diaspora. The authors identify, as primary mechanisms, the participation of moldovan migrants in the political and socio-economic processes of the country of origin; the development of the Moldovan communities' institutional potential; the policies of the Republic of Moldova for the consolidation of the Moldovan diaspora.

The Moldovan diaspora plays an important role in the political life of the Republic of Moldova, actively participating in its electoral processes. Its participation in the origin country's economic life mainly comes down to monetary transfers. At the same time, among members of the diaspora there are those that desire to invest in business and development projects. Moldovan diaspora associations are active in most European Union countries. As per the results of sociological research, Moldovan migrants do not actively participate in the activity of diaspora organizations, which is tied to both qualitative and quantitative factors.

Moldovan authorities promote an active policy for the consolidation of the Moldovan diaspora abroad. The authors note that the establishment of a developed legal and institutional base contributed to the provision of diaspora rights and the strengthening of trust towards the state institutions of the Republic of Moldova, the mobilization, utilizing, and recognition of the diaspora's human, social, and financial potential.

Keywords: Republic of Moldova, European Union, Moldovan communities, Moldovan diaspora.

1. INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Moldova became an active participant of migration processes in the 1990's. In the last 25-30 years a significant number of Moldovan citizens departed the country for the European Union, which led to the formation of Moldovan migrant communities in the destination countries. Gradually the process of transformation of those communities into a diaspora began to take place, diaspora organizations begin to appear; the diaspora started getting institutionalized. First and foremost, the

diaspora is striving to maintain the identity, language, and culture of its country of origin, but also contributes to the integration of migrants into the accepting countries.

Today, the number of Moldovan citizens residing abroad reaches more than a million people, of which 47% reside in European Union countries (Guvernul, 2023a). The EU attracts them with its work opportunities, high salaries, a developed democratic and social system, and policies that contribute to migrant inclusiveness. Moldovan labor geography in the EU looks as follows: Italy (the primary consumer of Moldovan labor migrants), Czech, Germany, Greece, France, Ireland, Spain, Portugal, and the UK. More than 80% of all Moldovan labor migrants are found in these countries.

The importance of a comprehensive analysis of Moldovan communities in the European Union, of the consolidation of their diaspora potential is determined by two primary factors: firstly, the diaspora identifies itself as a part of the people that resides in another state, and possesses its own strategy of interaction with both the host country and the country of origin. Secondly, diaspora organizations are formed, and their activity is directed at maintaining its members' ethnic identity, language, culture, traditions, etc.

It is important to clarify the difference between Moldovan communities and Moldovan diaspora, which, in Moldovan political science and practice are often treated as one and the same (Cheianu-Andrei, 2013). The state institutions of the Republic of Moldova employ the «diaspora = Moldovan communities abroad» formula, but this approach undermines the diaspora phenomenon in itself (Mosneaga, 2017, p. 17).

Migrant communities can be identified as social ethnic groups of migrants that have arrived to one country from another, and that have a common culture, the members of which identify as a singular, autonomous subject of social action (Dikun, 2014). The researcher R. Schwartz considers that the diaspora closely interacts with migrant communities, which is the basis for its development (Schwartz, 2007). This point of view is shared by V. Mosneaga, who notes that diasporas are maintained, consolidated, and developed through the attraction and integration of members of migrant communities. In his opinion diasporas

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institutionalize by way of deliberate collective activity aimed at maintaining relations/ ties to the homeland, the country of origin; at consolidation of their ethnic migrant communities in the host country, which manifests as participation in the diaspora associations' activities (organizations, institutions). Not all people that came from the country of origin (in our case, from Moldova) to the country of destination are a diaspora. Only those that seek to, and indeed, actively maintain their ties to their homeland, those who manifest and strengthen these ties are a diaspora (Mosneaga, 2017, p. 17).

Today the question regarding the regulation of migration flows, minimization of negative consequences of migration, development and implementation of state policy for the consolidation of the diaspora, as well as for the return and reintegration of Moldovan migrants is put at the forefront. At the same time, the Republic of Moldova is taking measures to utilize the positive potential of the diaspora for the sustainable development of the country of origin. The Moldovan diaspora is providing aid and collaboration to its home-country, both at a national and at a local level. It can become a functional development tool in the interest of its communities in the country of origin.

The issues in the formation of Moldovan communities and diaspora became the object of scientific analysis of Moldovan researchers starting with the second half of the 2000's. V. Mosneaga pioneered the research of three aspects (migration, Moldovan communities abroad, Moldovan diaspora in the European Union), both individually and in co-authorship with other scientists, and published numerous works on this subject (Mosneaga, Tsurcan, 2012; Mosneaga, 2017; Mosneaga, Mosneaga, 2019). D. Cheianu-Andrei charted the Moldovan diaspora in certain EU countries as well (Cheianu-Andrei, 2013).

Based on the results of the sociological researched conducted by the authors in 2022-2023 among Moldovan migrants in European Union countries, the article will analyze the primary destinations and mechanisms of transformation of Moldovan migrant communities into diasporas. Among these we identify: participation in political and socio-economic processes of the country of origin; development of the Moldovan communities' institutional potential; the policies of the Republic of Moldova on the consolidation of the Moldovan diaspora. Qualitative research was conducted among Moldovan migrants in European Union countries, as well as in the UK, Norway, and Switzerland, where there is a large number of residing and working citizens of the Republic of Moldova. In total, 513 respondents were interviewed.

II. THE PARTICIPATION OF MOLDOVAN MIGRANTS IN THE POLITICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC PROCESSES IN THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA

The dominant indicator of belonging to the diaspora is the migrants' deliberate desire to maintain their ties with their country of origin, to contribute to its sustainable development. In this regard one can speak of both the Moldovan migrants' participation in the political and electoral processes and of their socio-economic input into Moldova's development as a whole, and into its local communities in particular.

The forms of diaspora's activity in political and socio-economic processes of the country of origin are quite varied. Specialized scientific literature identifies different forms of diaspora participation in the life of the country of origin: voting; political representation; direct investments; remittances; financing; support or direct action (Gottschlich, 2006).

Turning to the analysis of Moldovan migrants' participation in the political process, we should note that the most widespread form of political activity in the communities is participation in elections, which allows migrants to exercise their right and gives them the ability to express their political attitudes, and to influence the political life of their homeland. For this reason the Republic of Moldova, like many other states, strives to reach out to its citizens that are staying abroad, in order to attract their support for the development of their homeland. In the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova the Moldovan diaspora is represented by three deputies.

We should underline that previously Moldovan communities abroad were viewed primarily as an object of political influence. Today this is gradually changing, with the communities becoming an increasingly important subject of political life of the Republic of Moldova. The number of Moldovan citizens abroad that participate in homeland parliamentary and presidential elections is constantly growing. As such, 212 thousand Moldovan migrants participated in 2021 parliamentary elections. The number of participants in the presidential (2020) elections was as high as 263 thousand. This allows the diaspora to influence the political and state decision-making processes in Moldova.

The diaspora's voting became the object of close attention of the Moldovan authorities in the last two decades. The current electoral system limits the possibilities of external voting, the sole variant of which is personal voting at diplomatic missions or at additionally-established polling stations. There are no other options for Moldovan citizens staying abroad nowadays, whereas other countries have already implemented the practice of e-voting, voting by post, by fax, by e-mail, etc.

Before 2010 there were 34 polling stations established outside of the Republic of Moldova. This allowed for the participation of approximately 16000 voters (1.09% of the total number of voters). In the early parliamentary elections of 2021, taking into account the increasing electoral activity of the Moldovan diaspora, 150 polling stations were opened in 36 countries, which was by 11 more than in the presidential elections of 2020. As an exception, Moldovan voters abroad could vote using their expired passports (ENEMO, 2021, p.11).

In the last presidential elections, in 2020, the Moldovan diaspora demonstrated a high degree of mobilization. More than 263 thousand members of the Moldovan diaspora participated in the second tour of the elections, and almost 93% voted for M. Sandu. Over the course of the entire history of presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova, no other candidate received such strong electoral support from the Moldovan diaspora. The diaspora not only actively took part in the elections, but it also determined the victor.

In the early parliamentary elections of 2021 the Moldovan diaspora univocally voted for the PAS, which amassed 86.23% of the votes abroad. However, it would be a mistake to assume the "Action and Solidarity" Party won only due to the diaspora. It won internally as well, and the diaspora reinforced its victory.

The migration of Moldovan citizens abroad continues. At the same time, their desire to maintain ties with their homeland, including by way of participation in elections raises the question on the multitude of forms of voting. The global electoral practice uses a variety of forms: personal voting; voting by post; voting by proxy; e-voting. In our opinion, personal voting is preferable for Moldovan migrants, who have access to polling stations, whereas e-voting and voting by post will allow diaspora members that reside too far from polling stations to also express their right to vote. This requires changes to be made in the legislation of the Republic of Moldova, however one should keep in mind that these kinds of voting carry not only great opportunities, but also great risks.

Unlike the Moldovan migrants' political activity, economic projects that contribute to the socio-economic development of Moldova have not yet received adequate attention from the Moldovan diaspora. At the same time, the issue of the diaspora's input into the Republic of Moldova's sustainable development became the object of the state's policy and attracted the attention of the scientific community.

Local and foreign scientific literature covers the influence of labor migrants' remittances on the economic development of the country of origin. Remittances act as one of the elements of the development equation, alongside direct foreign investments, liberalized trade, and management improvement (Olensen, 2002) and are the net profit for the recipient countries (Bourguignon, Levin &

Rosenblatt, 2009). Furthermore, in the opinion of D. Drbohlav, remittances are closely tied to social transfers, which include values, behavior, identity, and social capital that flows transnationally from the host country to the country of origin. By adopting these new values, rules, ideas, practices, and behavioral models migrants can enrich the society of their country of origin and contribute to the development of social relations (Drbohlav et al., 2017, p 528).

Moldova is among the top-10 largest beneficiaries of monetary transfers in the world. The current analysis is based on official data on Moldovan migrants' remittances through banks, as well as on estimates of the National Bank of Moldova (Table 1). During the period between 2005 and 2008 the volumes of remittances were continuously increasing and on average, they made 31% of the country's GDP. This peaked in 2006 when remittances reached 34.67% of the GDP (Luecke, 2009, p.5). A significant decline in the monetary influx was observed in 2009, which was the result of world economic crisis and its impact on the labor market and the labor migrants' income. In 2010 the influx of foreign currency again began to show signs of growth, the volume of monetary transfers through banks increased by 5.3% compared to 2009 (Extended Migration Profile, 2013, p.127).

In 2018 and 2019 Moldovan migrants' remittances reached 16.05% of the GDP (IOM rapid field assessment, 2020, p.7). In the following years the share of monetary transfers in the GDP structure continued to decline, but it nonetheless remained an important source of income for many households in Moldova.

Remittances play an important role in reducing the deficit of the country's payment balance, contribute to the development of the service sector, and provide a minimal living standard for thousands of households in the Republic of Moldova (Ghencea, Gudumac, 2004). The inflow of financial resources coming from Moldovan citizens that work abroad, on the one hand contributes to the decline of absolute poverty, especially in the rural areas, but on the other hand, also contributes to the increase of inequality between households that receive transfers, and those that do not (Extended Migration Profile, 2015, p.47-48).

Table 1: Size of remittances into Moldova

Year	Flux of remittances to Moldova	Share in the GDP (%)
2000	178.600.000	13.8
2005	920.310.000	30.8
2006	1.181.720.000	34.6
2007	1.498.230.000	34.0
2008	1.897.300.000	31.2
2009	1.182.020.000	24.9
2010	1.244.140.000	25.1
2015	1.227.370.000	19.9
2018	1.266.840.000	16.05
2019	1.222.890.000	16.05
2020	1.486.740.000	15.8
2021	1.611.000.000	15.5
2022	1.745.000.000	15.4

Source: National Bank of Moldova Database. <https://www.bnm.md/bdi>;

The World Bank Data. <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BX.TRF.PWKR.DT.GD.ZS?end=2021&locations=MD&start=1995&view=chart>

According to the data of the National Bank of Moldova, in the second quarter of 2020 the largest share of transfers from European Union countries came from Italy – 31.6%, followed by transfers from Germany (24.0%), France (12.5%), Ireland (5.4%), Romania (3.7%), Czechia (3.4%), Spain (3.1%), Belgium (2.8%), Portugal (2.5%), Poland (2.2%), Greece (1.0%) and Cyprus (0.9%) (Money transfers from abroad, 2020) which confirms the geography of Moldovan labor migration to EU countries.

In poor countries, Moldova being one of them, the majority of remittances from abroad are mainly used for consumption. On the one hand, this leads to the improvement of households' living standards, but on the other, this is obtained not through economic activity, but through an influx of financial resources from abroad (Giuliano, Ruiz-Arranz, 2009).

The importance of remittances for Moldovan households is confirmed by the data of empirical studies. According to the results of the 2022-2023 survey, more than 70% of Moldovan labor migrants (often or occasionally) transfer money to Moldova. Every third migrant transfers money to Moldova often (30.3%), 42.6% of the respondents transfer money on occasion. 27.1% of the respondents do not transfer money at all. This shows that the process of family reunification is taking place, migrants are bringing to the destination countries not only their children, but also their own parents, and after this no longer have anyone left in Moldova.

However, the migration to the European Union and the financial wellbeing of Moldovan migrants were affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. As the research of the International Organization for Migration, conducted in April-May, 2020 shows, one of the direct consequences of COVID-19 was the cessation of

professional activity or the loss of employment, which was indicated by 47% of the respondents. This inevitably lead to a sharp decline of income, and 80% of the respondents that had previously conducted remittances to Moldova started transferring less, whereas 41% stopped transferring money altogether (Mosneaga, 2021, p. 163).

At the same time, in May, 2020, the National Bank of Moldova registered an explosion in the number of remittances, the total sum of which was of more than 120 million dollars. In January and February of 2021 the volume of remittances from labor migrants was of 219 million Dollars, which was an absolute record for Moldova (Record volume, 2023).

International experience shows that an important field for investment of resources received from migrants' monetary transfers is the opening of a business and entrepreneurship in the county of the migrant's origin. Working abroad the labor migrants obtain entrepreneurial skills that can be employed at home. However, the unpleasant investment and business climate that formed in Moldova does not contribute to the opening of businesses or to investment in projects by migrants or their family members. According to the research, only a small number of monetary transfers is used to finance entrepreneurial or investment activities, herewith migrants manifest a more active entrepreneurial spirit than their family members, to whom they transfer money. (Ghencea et. Al, 2004, p.64-65)

In the realization of entrepreneurial activity, migrants and members of their households are facing objective and subjective difficulties. Among the objective difficulties we can list the difficult socio-economic situation in Moldova. Among the subjective ones we can list: corruption, ineffective management, limited access

to banking services and trust in financial institutions, lack of qualified workforce (Blouchoutzi, Nikas, 2004, p.105). The financing of entrepreneurial activity is negatively influenced by moral risk problems and initially low income norms, which lead to the ruin of many Moldovan migrants' enterprises shortly after they were established (The socioeconomic impact, 2009, p.20).

Moldovan experts consider that although today monetary transfers remain an important source of fuel for the Republic of Moldova's economic growth, the authorities should focus more on attracting the Moldovan citizens' savings that are being kept abroad. These savings should be attracted into the Moldovan economy, which can contribute to the migrants' return home.

The way migrants and their family members that are staying in Moldova distribute the transferred money is another sign that they are not ready to invest in the development of entrepreneurship in the country of origin. The results of sociological research shows that the money received from migrants is being spent on food (62%), healthcare (61%), home repair and construction (45%), purchase of consumer goods (34%), and children's education (32%). In 2022-2023 only every seventeenth respondent indicated that monetary transfers were invested into land or agricultural equipment. Even less money is spent on production; the number of those that invested in manufacturing remains very low (2.4%).

At the same time, the presence of investments in the country of origin speaks of maintaining ties with the homeland, and at the same time is a stimulus for an eventual return to Moldova. Unlike remittances, entrepreneurial investments give members of the diaspora direct control over the use of their resources. Our research has shown that 18.4% of Moldovan citizens that reside in EU countries have investments in the Republic of Moldova. Furthermore, there is a category of Moldovan migrants that have the desire to invest in a business in Moldova (36%).

Over the course of the conducted survey we attempted to determine what causes the desire of Moldovan labor migrants to invest in a business in Moldova. The answers can be divided into three groups: 1) to have one's own business, which is a source of income; 2) to be able to live at home, with one's family; 3) to develop the country. Economic growth and political and legal stability in Moldova could contribute to investments. In general, it can be noted that having one's own business in Moldova is one of the stimuli for Moldovan migrants' return home.

III. THE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT OF MOLDOVAN COMMUNITIES' INSTITUTIONAL POTENTIAL IN EU27+ COUNTRIES

When it comes to the consolidation of Moldovan diaspora in European Union countries, a big role falls to the diaspora structures that have formed in many EU countries. In general, the Moldovan diaspora consists of 250 associations in more than 30 countries of the world.

Diaspora associations are quite varied and differ in terms of legal status, management model, and sphere of activity. However, specialized scientific literature practically ignores the subject of association typology. D. Dijkzeul and M. Fauser identify hometown associations, migrant development NGOs, and umbrella organizations. Their activity is directed towards different things; it is oriented at providing social services, has the potential for widespread action and carries a relatively inclusive character (Dijkzeul, Fauser, 2020, p.14).

Moldovan diaspora organizations are usually of the second type, but they are all united by the fact that they "play an important role in the realization of strategic action and goals in the field of diaspora, migration, and development. An integrating factor for all diaspora bodies is national and civil belonging" (Guvernul Republicii Moldova, 2016a). Diaspora associations act as the social institution that allows Moldovan communities abroad to consolidate into a diaspora. The formed diaspora influences the development of culture, economics, and democratic values of the migrants' home country (Mosneaga, 2021b, p. 239).

The process of formation of diaspora associations is tied to the desire of Moldovan citizens abroad to unite, to create bodies that promote and maintain language, culture, and traditions, bodies that provide migrants with informational and legal support. Gradually new associations began to appear, ones that distanced themselves from the goal of maintaining Moldovan identity and all things related to it, instead focusing on other socio-cultural interests. This testified to their increasing integration into the host country's society, as well as to their gradual transformation from Moldovan associations abroad into organizations of the host country's civil society (Cojuhari, 2018).

The activity of Moldovan diaspora organizations includes a wide spectrum of directions: establishment of cultural and lingual centers for promotion of national culture, traditions and customs, study of the host country's language for adults, and of Romanian for children; information services and legal consultations, both live and online; consultations in the field of entrepreneurship (opening and managing a business in Moldova or abroad); psychological support for migrants, members of migrant families, etc. (Cheianu-Andrei, 2013, p.37).

As the conducted research has shown, Moldovan diaspora institutions have their strengths and weaknesses. Among their strengths we can list their role as cultural and social mediators with the local community, as well as their ability to organize and mobilize people. Moreover, we can also mention the fact that the activity of Moldovan associations abroad is mainly relying on volunteers, who interact with migration services in the region and as well as various social actors.

One of the more notable weaknesses is the reduced interest of Moldovan migrants towards the organizations' activities. This was confirmed by our study: more than 90% of Moldovan migrants do not participate in the activity of Moldovan diaspora associations, in the host countries. Furthermore, compared to the 2016-2017 study (Turco, Svetlicinai,

2019), there was actually a decrease in the number of respondents that participated in Moldovan diaspora associations' activities (from 9.5% in 2016-2017 to 5.3% in 2022-2023).

If in 2016-2017 12.5% of the respondents considered themselves active members of Moldovan diaspora associations, the 2022-2023 survey has shown an almost three-fold decrease of this category of migrants (Table 2). In 2016-2017 approximately a third of the respondents indicated that they sometimes participate in diaspora organizations' activities. After five years the number of migrants in this category decreased almost thrice. In 2016-2017 more than half of those surveyed indicated that they only follow the organizations' events and news, but do not take active part in them. In 2022-2023 their number increased by almost 1.5 times.

Table 2: Degree of migrant participation in Moldovan diaspora associations' activities

	2016-2017 survey	2022-2023 survey
I am an active member of Moldovan diaspora organizations	12.5%	4.5%
I sometimes participate in events organized by Moldova diaspora organizations	29.5%	10.4%
I only observe the events and news of the organizations, but do not actively participate	58.0%	85.1%

Source: Sociological research conducted by the authors in 2022-2023

According to the results of the 2016-2017 survey, the primary reasons for non-participation among Moldovan migrants in the activities of diaspora associations were: lack of interest (34%); unfamiliarity with Moldovan organizations in the region that they reside in (42%); the belief that "it doesn't matter" (10%); other (13%).

The 2022-2023 survey demonstrated the increase of two respondent groups: those that are not interested in participating, and those, who do not think it is important to participate. It can be assumed that this stems from the fact that Moldovan migrants expected Moldovan authorities to support these organizations, something that did not happen, causing disappointment among the migrants. At the same time there was a decrease in the number of Moldovan migrants that indicated ignorance of Moldovan organizations in their vicinity and a big workload or lack of time, etc. as their main reasons.

Another weakness that can be listed is the issue of personnel and of association leaders' professional training, as well as the lack of financial resources. Having limited financial capabilities, diaspora leaders are using various means to obtain financing for their projects: the look for sponsors among business representatives in the host countries, present their projects to Moldovan state institutions (Bureau for

Diaspora Relations of the Republic of Moldova), seek financing with European bodies. However, as noted by diaspora representatives, thus far collaboration has been difficult (Mosneaga, 2017, p.122-123).

Another weakness of the Moldovan diaspora is its division on the political, geopolitical, and confessional spectrums. The political division between Moldovan diaspora associations is tied to the fact that diaspora associations are often oriented toward different political powers in Moldova (Korobkov, 2018), and strive to obtain various political benefits from this.

The division takes place along religious lines as well. We cannot ignore the fact that the church often follows its own interests. The division of the faithful into those that follow the Russian Orthodox Church and the Romanian Orthodox Church, the priests of which are at odds with each other, hurts the entire community abroad (Mosneaga, 2021b, p. 240). This is particularly sad when one takes into account the fact that Moldovan diaspora associations were often established within church parishes.

Another key problem of diaspora functionality is tied to communication, and the inability to successfully utilize the existing communications channels: the Internet, social networks, the telephone, and the newspapers published by the diaspora. Communication must take place in several directions: firstly, between

diaspora associations and Moldovan migrants staying in the host country; secondly, among the associations themselves; thirdly, between diaspora associations and state and non-state institutions of the Republic of Moldova; fourthly, between diaspora associations and state and non-state institutions in the host country (Mosneaga, 2017, p.129).

By accessing the website of the Bureau for Diaspora Relations <https://emoldovata.gov.md/lista-asociatiilor-diasporei>, we have determined the quantitative composition of Moldovan diaspora organizations in the EU27+ countries. In total, in EU countries, as well as in Norway, Switzerland, and the UK, there are 139 active Moldovan diaspora organizations that differ by number, field of activity, and degree of engagement (Lists, 2022). Among the aforementioned countries, the most organizations are registered in Italy (51), France (12), the UK (10), Spain (10), Romania (9), Portugal (7), and Germany (6).

In each of these countries the activity of Moldovan diaspora associations is characterized by certain particularities. The defining trait of *Italy* is a large number of educational centers, organized, among other places, in church parishes. If the first diaspora associations in Italy were concentrated on promoting Moldovan culture and traditions, the ones that came later were more socially oriented and engaged in promoting and protecting human rights. This speaks of a gradual qualitative transformation of the organizations; they become more complex, establishing networks. Yet the issue of communication among them persists.

According to the Bureau for Diaspora Relations, in *Portugal* there are seven registered Moldovan diaspora associations, but experts list other diaspora organizations also active in the country. In particular, they note the importance of the Asociația Culturală a Imigranților Moldoveni MIORITA din Portugalia, which provides assistance to migrants in legalization, social integration, and learning the Portuguese language. Recently there has been a growing interest in establishing industry-focused associations. The MOLDMED association that united Moldovan medics in Portugal is quite successful. Similar professional associations for teachers are also being established.

The Portuguese authorities provide assistance to diaspora organizations that are active in the country. The High Commissioner of Portugal for Immigration and Intercultural Dialogue provides daily financial aid to the most active organizations. Moldovan associations are always counted among the main beneficiaries (Mosneaga, 2021b, p. 240).

The particularity of *Germany* is that Moldovan citizens in this country prefer to communicate with their co-nationals online, via social networks, rather than live. This can be explained by the large number of students among migrants, who study in universities all across the

country and it is easier for them to communicate on the Internet.

Romania is the main direction for educational migration, and as such the Moldovan community there is represented by associations that unite the studious youth from many Romanian cities. The primary goals of these associations are to promote national, cultural, and civil values among youth, to facilitate the process of young people's integration into the host society, and collaboration with various organizations.

France is on the second place by number of students. A likewise large group consists of Moldovan medics, about 500 people. In the European Union France is a country that has a high percentage of Moldovan citizens that have established their own business.

Representatives of diaspora organizations in France are facing the same difficulties as their peers in other countries do, when it comes to their work. These difficulties are largely conditioned by the low level of Moldovan migrants' engagement in the organizations' activities. However, the majority of associations are an important source of information for Moldovan migrants, they promote Moldovan culture abroad, keep in touch with migration services of the destination countries, collaborate with different social subjects (Cotilevici, 2018, p.420).

Moldovan diaspora associations exist in other European Union countries as well, but firstly, their number is limited, and secondly, they do not have a lot of members. Most often their activity is directed at supporting Moldovan culture and traditions, informing and contributing to Moldovan migrants' integration in the destination country.

Of the countries that are not part of the EU that pose an interest for our research, the most Moldovan diaspora organizations are active in *the United Kingdom*. Experts note that the real number of Moldovan associations in this country is larger, because many of them were established and function online (Cheianu-Andrei, 2013, p.127; Mosneaga, 2017, p.113). Moldovan students in this country are quite active, which is important as the youth are not as strongly tied to their home country as the older generations of migrants are. It is vital that the young generation not lose interest in participating in the life of their home countries.

Unlike in other countries, diaspora organization members here are motivated to provide legal consulting on topics such as residence legalization and obtaining work permits, because in the UK this procedure is complicated. Another particularity of Moldovan associations in this country is the capability of obtaining financing for one's project on their own, without asking Moldova for financial support. In this regard an important role falls to the support of Moldovan business in the UK, which relies on the British mentality of social responsibility.



Moldovan diaspora organizations in the UK are characterized by a high degree of social activity. Moldovan migrants adopt the British orientation towards charity, which creates a factual basis for the consolidation of the diaspora, its establishment as an active actor in social processes.

Over the course of conducted sociological research respondents were asked to estimate the importance or unimportance of the goals that put forth by the Moldovan diaspora associations in the host countries. They were proposed to express themselves regarding the directions of activity of Moldovan diaspora organizations in the European Union.

The directions that concern the migrants themselves in the host countries received the highest support from the respondents. These are, first and foremost the support of migrant children's Moldovan education, and this index in 2022-2023 increased, compared to 2016-2017 (Table 3). This direction opens up a large field of activity for diaspora organizations that, in collaboration with the diplomatic missions of the Republic of Moldova in the host countries, can open Sunday schools and various courses for the study of language, history, literature, and traditions of Moldova (Turco, Svetlicinai, 2017, p.241).

Table 3: Estimation the importance of goals put forth by the Moldovan organizations in the host country

	Not important		Don't know/ cannot answer		Important	
	2016-2017	2022-2023	2016-2017	2022-2023	2016-2017	2022-2023
Support of Moldovans in order to organize their lives here	3.2%	11.5%	21.3%	17.4%	70.1%	70.7%
Support the Moldovans' ties to Moldova	7.1%	12.0%	17.3%	15.0%	75.7%	73.1%
Aid in Moldova's development	7.2%	11.1%	21.5%	21.3%	72.1%	67.7%
Support the Moldovan education of children (language, history, literature, etc.);	7.7%	9.2%	14.6%	9.6%	77.4%	81.2%

Source: Sociological research conducted by the authors in 2022-2023

Likewise, Moldovan migrants in EU counties note the importance of the "support Moldovans in order to organize their lives here" direction. The number of respondents that consider this important in 2022-2023 is increased slightly compared to the first survey.

The results of the 2022-2023 survey have shown a decline in the number of Moldovan migrants that consider maintaining Moldovan migrants' ties to Moldova an important direction of diaspora organizations' activity. This firstly demonstrates the shift of focus in favor of the host country rather than the country of origin, and the desire to integrate into the host society. Secondly, it indirectly confirmed the results of the previous survey, which have shown that migrants do not consider the consolidation of the Moldovan community an important direction of the organizations' activity.

In this regard it is important to solve the issue of mutually-beneficial collaboration between the diaspora associations and the Government of the Republic of Moldova. Diaspora associations act as the main vector of democratic change in Moldova, of its European future. They are capable of promoting the image of the Republic of Moldova abroad, its products, its culture, and traditions; to contribute to the conservation of the members' of Moldovan communities' ethno-cultural identity abroad.

When it comes to the Moldovan government, it must provide the necessary support to the diaspora associations abroad. Firstly, this means financial and informational support. Secondly, state bodies must assist in broadening the spheres of diaspora organizations' activity, training of employees and organization leaders, including among the second generation of Moldovan migrants. These measures will contribute to the inclusion of Moldovan migrants into the activity of diaspora institutions, to the consolidation of Moldovan communities in European Union countries.

IV. THE POLICIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE MOLDOVAN DIASPORA

In the consolidation of Moldovan communities/ diaspora abroad a large role is played by the policies of Moldovan state bodies in the field of migration and diaspora. The policies in the field of diaspora represent "the state's actions, implemented through various institutions, embassies, consulates, specialized agencies, transnational networks, etc., in partnership with interested parties and partners of the diaspora. The parties are being implemented based on mutually beneficial relations between the country of origin and the emigrants. Migrants are encouraged to participate in the

life of the origin country by way of attractive and functional political, civil, or social offers, access to social and moral resources, and the strengthening of their potential. The migrants' input into the origin country's development, on the other hand, is achieved through monetary transfers and investments" (Donu, 2018, p.435).

Experts identify several stages of evolution of Moldovan policy in the field of migration and diaspora. These are characterized by different goals, and objects and subjects of action Mosneaga, 2017).

The first stage (1990-1994): Its essence can be characterized as "Migration and security". At this stage migration was viewed and regulated in the context of security, protection of the local population from uncontrolled mass immigration to the Republic of Moldova from other regions in post-Soviet space. The legal and institutional framework in the field of migration begins to form at this stage. In 1990 the law "On migration" was adopted. In 1994 the Constitution of the Republic of Moldova enshrined the right of citizens for free entry to, and exit from Moldova (art.27), which was further detailed in the laws "On entry to and departure from the Republic of Moldova" (1994) and "On the legal status of foreign citizens and stateless persons in the Republic of Moldova" (1994). The regulation of migration flows was assigned to the Department for Migration of the Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Family.

The second stage (1995-2000): Migration continued to be viewed through the prism of security, however the subject was changed. The state shifted its focus from protecting the entire Moldovan population to protecting Moldovan labor migrants that are staying abroad legally. However, during this period the majority of Moldovan migrants were irregulars and the Moldovan state failed to find common ground with its European partners. As such, the goals established at this period were not achieved.

The legal framework for labor migration management was developed at this stage. Readmission agreements were signed within the framework of international collaboration. These established the procedures of mutual return of irregulars to their country of origin, or to the transit country through which they arrived.

The institution regulating migration was still the Department for Migration of the Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Family.

The third stage (2001-2006): In spite of the continued view of migration through the prism of security, the main goal of this period became the protection of both legal and illegal Moldovan migrants.

The legislative framework in the field of migration was improved: the Concept for migration policy (2002) was adopted, as well as the laws "On migration" (2002), "On preventing and combating

human trafficking" (2005), and others. Bilateral and multilateral agreements on collaboration in the field of labor migration were signed, international documents on the protection of labor migrants' and refugees' rights were ratified.

Changes were made to the institutional framework in the field of migration. In 2001 the State Migration Service was established, in 2002 – the Department for Migration of the Republic of Moldova, and in 2005 – the National Bureau for Migration.

This period was marked with the beginning of collaboration with Moldovan associations abroad. Starting with 2004 the Bureau for Interethnic Relations begins organizing Moldovan Diaspora Congresses in Chisinau.

The fourth stage (2006-2012): This stage's essence can be identified as "Migration and development", as for the first time the goal of Moldovan migration policy was to include migration into the larger scope of the country's sustainable development. Migration policy began to be viewed as a component of social policies; it became subordinate to national priorities and prospects of the country's sustainable development.

The legal and juridical framework of migration management continued to evolve: the laws "On labor migration" (2008), "On asylum in the Republic of Moldova" (2008), "On the status of foreign citizens" (2010), the National strategy in the field of migration and asylum (2011-2020), the various plans of action for the implementation of the adopted legal acts, and other documents were adopted.

In the framework of international collaboration, various bilateral agreements in the field of labor migration and social protection were signed. The purpose of these was to define citizens' rights to travel between countries and to fully benefit from social protection.

In 2009-2011 readmission agreements were signed with fourteen EU member-states, and with five non-EU states. The Republic of Moldova – European Union Plan of action for the liberalization of the visa regime (2011) was adopted, etc. Programs in the field of migration and diaspora began to be implemented within the context of EU initiatives.

The primary state institution charged with regulating diaspora issues, starting with the second half of 2006, became the Bureau of Migration and Asylum of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. During the period the mandate in the field of diaspora was also held by the Ministry of Labor, Social Protection and Family of the Republic of Moldova (Vremis et al, p.204-208). In 2012 a specialized institution – the Diaspora Relations Bureau (BRD) – was established within the State Chancellery.

The fifth stage (2013 - present): The essence of this stage is still "Migration and development", but unlike in the previous stage, the primary goal now is to support

the diaspora, to motivate its participation in the country's development. The consolidation of the diaspora contributed to its establishment as an independent actor of Moldovan migration policy.

During this period the "Diaspora – 2025" National strategy (Guvernul, 2016a) and the Plan of action for its implementation were adopted. These act as the baseline documents of the Republic of Moldova's policy in the field of migration, development and diaspora.

The visa-free regime with the European Union (2014) created new opportunities for Moldovan labor migration into the European Union. Agreements in the field of labor migration and social protection were signed with a number of EU countries.

We should note that the transition towards policies concerning diaspora was inspired by both international factor, and local context. This is tied to the changes of the global approach to migration, the transition from a quantitative "migration policy" to a qualitative "diaspora policy". National context is tied to the formation and development of the Moldovan diaspora, and the need of appropriate policies. The influence of these factors had an effect on the institutional reform, the need to delineate the functions of specialized governmental bodies that implemented the policy in the field of migration and diaspora (Mosneaga, 2018, p.94).

Regarding the development and implementation of these policies, in the Republic of Moldova there is a solid institutional framework with a large number of interested parties. The primary state institution here is the Diaspora Relations Bureau, established at the diaspora's request. The Bureau coordinated the government's actions in the field of migration, diaspora and development, contributing to the preservation and assertion of the ethnic, cultural, and linguistic identity of Moldovan citizens abroad, and the use of the diaspora's human and financial potential. The Diaspora Relations Bureau developed and is implementing numerous programs: Diaspora Engagement Hub, «DOR», Diaspora Business-forum, Diaspora congresses, Diaspora days, etc.

It is important to note that on the national level, state policies in the field of diaspora, migration and development are being developed and promoted using an integrated approach, as well as through the functional obligations of profile ministries, central public authority bodies and institutions (Guvernul, 2016b): the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration, the Ministry of Labor and Social Protection, the Ministry of Internal Affairs (the Bureau of Migration and Asylum, the Border police), the Ministry of Economic Development and Digitization, the Ministry of Education and Research, the Ministry of Health, and others.

The analysis of the Moldovan state's role in the field of migration and diaspora policies has shown that

initially the state did not possess an effective and complex approach to the phenomenon of migration, including the component of support in regards to diaspora. Under the influence of international institutions and the realization of the necessity of collaboration with the diaspora, Moldovan authorities began to actively elaborate a state policy regarding the diaspora. In this context we can underline the Government Decision 200 from 26.02.2016 on the approval of the National strategy "Diaspora-2025" and the Plan of action for its realization for 2016-2018, where the "new approach" to the policy concerning diaspora is reflected.

The national strategy "Diaspora-2025" contains the new priorities of Moldovan policy in the field of diaspora: development of a strategic and organizational framework in the field of diaspora, migration and development; promotion of diaspora rights and strengthening trust; mobilization, and use of the diaspora's human potential; direct and indirect attraction of the diaspora to participate in the sustainable economic development of the Republic of Moldova (Guvernul, 2016a).

Experts identify several aspects in the implementation of the new approach to the policy in the field of migration, diaspora and development. Firstly, it is the shift from quantity to quality. This means the diaspora is viewed not as a subject requiring support, and not as a beneficiary of state policies, but as a partner in development policies. Secondly, the accent was shifted towards the mobilization of the diaspora's civic spirit for the realization of socially-significant activity. Thirdly, it is the development and realization of the diaspora's human potential (Mosneaga, 2017, p.182). According to the new approach, migrant return does not actually mean physical return, instead the important part is that they've maintained their ties to the homeland, transferred the knowledge and skills they've accumulated abroad, and contributed to the development of the Republic of Moldova. For the implementation of this approach it is necessary for the Diaspora Relations Bureau to actively collaborate with other Moldovan state institutions, with NGOs, international organizations, and all interested parties involved in working with migrant communities and diaspora abroad.

An important instrument in the realization of the policies in the field of migration, diaspora and development are the various programs that are being implemented by the Moldovan state bodies. In 2010 the "PARE 1+1" program was launched, its purpose is to attract monetary transfers into the Moldovan economy and it is aimed at labor migrants or their first-degree relatives that are willing to invest into opening or expanding businesses in Moldova. The program functions on a 1+1 algorithm, where every Moldovan Leu that, invested via migrants' monetary transfers is supplemented by another 1 MDL that serves as a grant.

The grants in the program can sum up to 250 000 MDL. In this regard, the state acts, on the one hand, as a donor, and on the other, as a partner for diaspora members.

The priorities of PARE 1+1 encompass the following fields: establishment and development of businesses in the rural area; increasing the level of awareness among labor migrants and monetary transfer beneficiaries in the Republic of Moldova concerning the possibilities of developing one's business in the country of origin; increasing the entrepreneurial skills of labor migrants and monetary transfer beneficiaries; stimulating the establishment and development of small and medium enterprises; facilitating labor migrants' and monetary transfer beneficiaries' access to financial resources; creation of new workplaces; employment of new technologies, transfer of know-how, innovations (Baltag, Burdelnii, 2022, p.39).

Within the framework of the program support was offered to 739 enterprises and 1815 business-initiatives were co-financed; 2649 received specialized training; a total sum of 367.67 million MDL were offered in funds; 1080.15 million MDL were invested into the economy; 564 labor migrants were offered assistance in returning home (Baltag, et al, p.30).

It should be noted that more than half of all PARE 1+1 program beneficiaries are enterprises managed by migrants' relatives. On the one hand, this can indicate that the labor migrants might eventually return home. On the other, the established enterprises represent a type of investment into the migrants' country of origin with the purpose of obtaining an additional income (Vicol, Pistrinciuc, 2021). Almost half of all entrepreneurs (49%) in the Program are young people below the age of 35, 84% of the beneficiaries reside outside of Chisinau, 32% of the participants are women (571 enterprises were established and/ or are managed by women), 61% work in European Union countries (ODIMM, 2020).

The government of the Republic of Moldova strives to include all the different segments of the diaspora, for which reason it developed a number of programs in the fields of gender equality and youth. In 2016 the Ministry of Economic Development launched the «Women in business» program, which is directed at reducing gender inequality and at developing women's entrepreneurship, especially in the rural areas. Within this Program's framework 614 contracts received financing, a sum of 89.47 million MDL were approved as grants; 138.83 million MDL were invested into the economy, and more than 2000 new workplaces were created (Baltag, et al, p.30).

With the purpose of retention of youths in Moldova, especially in the rural areas, its integration into the country's economy by way of supporting the development of entrepreneurial skills, in 2009 the Organization for Small and Medium Enterprises Sector

Development (ODIMM) launched a special program for young people aged between 18 and 35, called "Start for Youth: a stable enterprise at home". Within this program's framework 400 young people obtained access to grant financing in sums of up to 180 thousand MDL, and more than 1700 young people received entrepreneurial training and consulting on the process of investment project development (Young, 2022).

Another Moldovan government program oriented at the younger generation of the Moldovan diaspora abroad is the DOR (Diasporă*Origini*Reveniri) program. Its goals are to increase awareness among the second generation of migrants on the cultural identity, national traditions and values, as well as to establish emotional ties between the Republic of Moldova and the young members of the diaspora.

Over the course of 2013-2023, more than 1000 children and young people aged between 12 and 16 from more than 25 countries, including Moldova, took part in the DOR program. However, despite the Moldovan government institutions' attempts to popularize national culture, values, and traditions among the second generation of Moldovan migrants, the limited number of participants in the Program speaks of a low interest on the part of Moldovan citizens abroad. For the most part this is tied to the fact that the majority of Moldovan migrants are oriented at fully integrating themselves into the host country's society, and as such, most of their efforts are directed toward this goal.

With the financial support of the Swiss agency for development and collaboration, at the start of 2016 the Bureau for Diaspora Relations and the International Organization for Migration launched the themed-grants program "Diaspora Engagement Hub" for Moldovan citizens residing abroad. Starting with 2020, beside the foreign aid, the Program is also funded out of the Moldovan budget. The purpose of the Program is to support and motivate members of the Moldovan diaspora to realize their ideas in Moldova, thus utilizing the diaspora's human and professional capital.

In order to support the associative environment of the diaspora for the development of lingual, cultural, and emotional ties with the Republic of Moldova, ten educational diaspora centers in seven countries, including in five EU countries (Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, France) and in the UK were established as part of the program's framework. The establishment of educational centers in the diaspora implies study of the Romanian language, of Moldovan culture, traditions and customs by the second generation of Moldovan migrants.

Another Moldovan government program directed at utilizing the human and financial potential of the diaspora for the country's socio-economic development is the Diaspora Acasă Reușește (DAR) 1+3 program, which is being implemented since 2019

under the aegis of the BRD. The financial resources (local donations and donations from the diaspora) are directed toward socially-oriented projects in Moldova in a ratio of 1:3 (each 1 MDL donated by the diaspora is supplemented by 3 MDL coming in from international donors/ the government/ local authorities). Thus migrants, using collective monetary transfers to support the local development of their country of origin, are becoming key non-governmental subjects to offering goods and services.

Currently, as part of the "DAR" program there are 30 projects being implemented in 41 localities of the Republic of Moldova, these are aimed at arranging recreation areas and sports grounds; repairing public buildings and roads; setting up and reconstructing water supply and electric power systems, and others. The total cost of the projects is 37.4 million MDL in accordance to the 1+3 formula, of which 4.1 million MDL were brought in by the diaspora, and 9.9 million came from the government (Guvernul, 2023b).

Despite the implementation of the various programs involving the diaspora, our sociological survey shows a low level of Moldovan migrants' awareness of Moldovan state initiatives that concern Moldovan citizens abroad. Only 12% of the respondents residing in European Union countries stated that they were aware of these initiatives. However, when asked of which Moldovan government initiatives they were aware of, even those that gave a positive reply were unable to name any specific initiatives.

The partnership between the state and the diaspora is realized through such mechanisms of participation as Diaspora congresses (taking place bi-yearly since 2014), Business-forms (bi-yearly since 2014), Diaspora investment forums (since 2014). Such events allow the diaspora to interact with the Moldovan government, and to launch new initiatives and projects for those that work both in the country and abroad.

It should be noted that in spite of their confidence in their own abilities, Moldovan migrants abroad are expecting the Moldovan government to provide them with support. First of all, they expect informational support: on the availability of workplaces in Moldova (45%); on the changes of the social protection situation in Moldova (44%); on the possibilities of return to Moldova (32%). The collected data indirectly speaks of the attitudes of Moldovan migrants regarding their return home. As such, one of the main priorities of state policy in the field of diaspora, migration and development must be the establishment of conditions for the implementation of the return migration mechanism.

However, as the survey shows, approximately half of the migrants (47%) have no wish to return to Moldova. The reasons for this are the socio-economic and political instability in the country, the high level of

corruption, the uncertainty of tomorrow (47.7%); a stable future in the host country (27%); familial reasons ("my family is here"; "I have no one left in Moldova") (8.9%).

Currently Moldova cannot provide a stable socio-economic development, but the authorities can provide political stability and an unchanging course toward the country's modernization, which will reduce the pace of migration. The state must employ various means in order to motivate migrants to invest in the country of origin. Furthermore, the knowledge-intensive industries should be developed, especially the field of Informational Technologies. The diaspora can be attracted to stimulate export from the Republic of Moldova.

Taking into account the migrants' rhetoric such as "we will return when conditions will be created", the Diaspora Relations Bureau, in tandem with other state institutions, encourages the diaspora to also participate in the creation of beneficial conditions for the return, and communicates to those that wish to contribute to the changes in their homeland. It is necessary to make more active use of the accumulated positive experiences, to spread the best practices in the activity of the diaspora, of Moldovan businessmen that invest their financial capital into their home country's development.

The political, economic, and social changes that have taken place in the region and internationally, as well as the necessity to actualize the goals and actions listed in the National strategy "Diaspora-2025", with consideration for challenges and achievements, conditioned the development of the Program for 2024-2027, for the implementation of the Strategy.

Taking into account the national experience of interaction with the diaspora, the international standards and best practices in this field, the goal of the Program is defined as attracting the diaspora toward the sustainable development of the Republic of Moldova. Firstly this is to be done through the diversification of the levels and channels of attraction to the development processes on the central and local levels. Secondly, this is to be done by providing support and assistance to the associations of Moldovan diaspora abroad. The realization of these goals will contribute to the strengthening of interactions between the state, the central and local public authorities, the civil society, and the diaspora with the ultimate goal of sustainable development of the Republic of Moldova.

V. CONCLUSION

This article reviews the main directions and mechanisms of transformation of Moldovan communities into the Moldovan diaspora, in the European Union. It analyzed the participation of Moldovan migrants in the political and socio-economic

processes in the country of origin; the development of institutional potential of Moldovan communities; the policies of the Republic of Moldova for the consolidation of the Moldovan diaspora.

The Moldovan diaspora plays an important role in the origin country's economic and political life. The number of Moldovan citizens abroad that participate in parliamentary and presidential elections in the Republic of Moldova is constantly increasing. Such active inclusion of the Moldovan diaspora into the homeland's political life speaks of its support of Moldova's European vector, its willingness to become an active subject in the process of democratization in the Republic of Moldova.

The economic participation of the Moldovan diaspora in the origin country's development amounts primarily to monetary transfers. Investments and development projects could become another, higher level of migrant participation in the country's sustainable development; however they did not yet receive appropriate attention from the Moldovan diaspora. Taking into account the fact that a third of Moldovan migrants are ready to invest in the Moldovan economy, the authorities must create a beneficial investment climate, and develop financial instruments for the attraction of investments.

Moldovan diaspora associations are active in the majority of European Union countries. For the most part their activity is directed toward the increase of the diaspora's organization, maintenance of ethno-cultural identity of Moldovan communities abroad, provision of migrants with information and legal support.

The sociological survey of 2022-2023 has shown that the overwhelming majority of Moldovan citizens are unfamiliar with the activities of Moldovan diaspora associations. This is the result of both quantitative (small number of organizations) and qualitative (weak organization, location in capitals and big cities, insignificant support) factors. On the other hand, the Moldovan migrants themselves manifest little interest, and do not strive to participate in the activity of these organizations.

The policy in the field of diaspora, as a standalone direction of the Republic of Moldova's migration policy, begins to stand out in 2013. The creation of a developed legal and institutional framework allowed the guarantee of the diaspora's rights, the strengthening of the diaspora's trust in the Republic of Moldova's authorities, the mobilization, employment, and recognition of the diaspora's human, social, and financial potential.

The results of the empirical research show that a significant portion of Moldovan migrants will not return home. The migrants have socialized and integrated into the host countries; they have good salaries and investments, and have no wish to start over from zero. For this reason, one of the directions of the Moldovan state's policy in the field of migration, diaspora and

development should focus on the consolidation of the diaspora, on utilizing its social and financial capital for the sustainable development of the Republic of Moldova.

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Associates of FSSRC/ASSRC are scientists and researchers from around the world are working on projects/researches that have huge potentials. Members support Global Journals' mission to advance technology for humanity and the profession.

FSSRC

FELLOW OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL

FELLOW OF SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL is the most prestigious membership of Global Journals. It is an award and membership granted to individuals that the Open Association of Research Society judges to have made a 'substantial contribution to the improvement of computer science, technology, and electronics engineering.

The primary objective is to recognize the leaders in research and scientific fields of the current era with a global perspective and to create a channel between them and other researchers for better exposure and knowledge sharing. Members are most eminent scientists, engineers, and technologists from all across the world. Fellows are elected for life through a peer review process on the basis of excellence in the respective domain. There is no limit on the number of new nominations made in any year. Each year, the Open Association of Research Society elect up to 12 new Fellow Members.



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Authors must ensure the information provided during the submission of a paper is authentic. Please go through the following checklist before submitting:

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Acknowledgments

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Authors can submit papers and articles in an acceptable file format: MS Word (doc, docx), LaTeX (.tex, .zip or .rar including all of your files), Adobe PDF (.pdf), rich text format (.rtf), simple text document (.txt), Open Document Text (.odt), and Apple Pages (.pages). Our professional layout editors will format the entire paper according to our official guidelines. This is one of the highlights of publishing with Global Journals—authors should not be concerned about the formatting of their paper. Global Journals accepts articles and manuscripts in every major language, be it Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Greek, or any other national language, but the title, subtitle, and abstract should be in English. This will facilitate indexing and the pre-peer review process.

The following is the official style and template developed for publication of a research paper. Authors are not required to follow this style during the submission of the paper. It is just for reference purposes.



Manuscript Style Instruction (Optional)

- Microsoft Word Document Setting Instructions.
- Font type of all text should be Swis721 Lt BT.
- Page size: 8.27" x 11", left margin: 0.65, right margin: 0.65, bottom margin: 0.75.
- Paper title should be in one column of font size 24.
- Author name in font size of 11 in one column.
- Abstract: font size 9 with the word "Abstract" in bold italics.
- Main text: font size 10 with two justified columns.
- Two columns with equal column width of 3.38 and spacing of 0.2.
- First character must be three lines drop-capped.
- The paragraph before spacing of 1 pt and after of 0 pt.
- Line spacing of 1 pt.
- Large images must be in one column.
- The names of first main headings (Heading 1) must be in Roman font, capital letters, and font size of 10.
- The names of second main headings (Heading 2) must not include numbers and must be in italics with a font size of 10.

Structure and Format of Manuscript

The recommended size of an original research paper is under 15,000 words and review papers under 7,000 words. Research articles should be less than 10,000 words. Research papers are usually longer than review papers. Review papers are reports of significant research (typically less than 7,000 words, including tables, figures, and references)

A research paper must include:

- a) A title which should be relevant to the theme of the paper.
- b) A summary, known as an abstract (less than 150 words), containing the major results and conclusions.
- c) Up to 10 keywords that precisely identify the paper's subject, purpose, and focus.
- d) An introduction, giving fundamental background objectives.
- e) Resources and techniques with sufficient complete experimental details (wherever possible by reference) to permit repetition, sources of information must be given, and numerical methods must be specified by reference.
- f) Results which should be presented concisely by well-designed tables and figures.
- g) Suitable statistical data should also be given.
- h) All data must have been gathered with attention to numerical detail in the planning stage.

Design has been recognized to be essential to experiments for a considerable time, and the editor has decided that any paper that appears not to have adequate numerical treatments of the data will be returned unrefereed.

- i) Discussion should cover implications and consequences and not just recapitulate the results; conclusions should also be summarized.
- j) There should be brief acknowledgments.
- k) There ought to be references in the conventional format. Global Journals recommends APA format.

Authors should carefully consider the preparation of papers to ensure that they communicate effectively. Papers are much more likely to be accepted if they are carefully designed and laid out, contain few or no errors, are summarizing, and follow instructions. They will also be published with much fewer delays than those that require much technical and editorial correction.

The Editorial Board reserves the right to make literary corrections and suggestions to improve brevity.



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It is necessary that authors take care in submitting a manuscript that is written in simple language and adheres to published guidelines.

All manuscripts submitted to Global Journals should include:

Title

The title page must carry an informative title that reflects the content, a running title (less than 45 characters together with spaces), names of the authors and co-authors, and the place(s) where the work was carried out.

Author details

The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

Abstract

The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

Keywords

A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, "What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?" Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

Abbreviations

Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

Formulas and equations

Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

Tables, Figures, and Figure Legends

Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.



Figures

Figures are supposed to be submitted as separate files. Always include a citation in the text for each figure using Arabic numbers, e.g., Fig. 4. Artwork must be submitted online in vector electronic form or by emailing it.

PREPARATION OF ELETRONIC FIGURES FOR PUBLICATION

Although low-quality images are sufficient for review purposes, print publication requires high-quality images to prevent the final product being blurred or fuzzy. Submit (possibly by e-mail) EPS (line art) or TIFF (halftone/ photographs) files only. MS PowerPoint and Word Graphics are unsuitable for printed pictures. Avoid using pixel-oriented software. Scans (TIFF only) should have a resolution of at least 350 dpi (halftone) or 700 to 1100 dpi (line drawings). Please give the data for figures in black and white or submit a Color Work Agreement form. EPS files must be saved with fonts embedded (and with a TIFF preview, if possible).

For scanned images, the scanning resolution at final image size ought to be as follows to ensure good reproduction: line art: >650 dpi; halftones (including gel photographs): >350 dpi; figures containing both halftone and line images: >650 dpi.

Color charges: Authors are advised to pay the full cost for the reproduction of their color artwork. Hence, please note that if there is color artwork in your manuscript when it is accepted for publication, we would require you to complete and return a Color Work Agreement form before your paper can be published. Also, you can email your editor to remove the color fee after acceptance of the paper.

TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality human social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of human social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

5. Use the internet for help: An excellent start for your paper is using Google. It is a wondrous search engine, where you can have your doubts resolved. You may also read some answers for the frequent question of how to write your research paper or find a model research paper. You can download books from the internet. If you have all the required books, place importance on reading, selecting, and analyzing the specified information. Then sketch out your research paper. Use big pictures: You may use encyclopedias like Wikipedia to get pictures with the best resolution. At Global Journals, you should strictly follow [here](#).



6. Bookmarks are useful: When you read any book or magazine, you generally use bookmarks, right? It is a good habit which helps to not lose your continuity. You should always use bookmarks while searching on the internet also, which will make your search easier.

7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

8. Make every effort: Make every effort to mention what you are going to write in your paper. That means always have a good start. Try to mention everything in the introduction—what is the need for a particular research paper. Polish your work with good writing skills and always give an evaluator what he wants. Make backups: When you are going to do any important thing like making a research paper, you should always have backup copies of it either on your computer or on paper. This protects you from losing any portion of your important data.

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10. Use proper verb tense: Use proper verb tenses in your paper. Use past tense to present those events that have happened. Use present tense to indicate events that are going on. Use future tense to indicate events that will happen in the future. Use of wrong tenses will confuse the evaluator. Avoid sentences that are incomplete.

11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources.

Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.



20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium through which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

INFORMAL GUIDELINES OF RESEARCH PAPER WRITING

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.



Mistakes to avoid:

- Insertion of a title at the foot of a page with subsequent text on the next page.
- Separating a table, chart, or figure—confine each to a single page.
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
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- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
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Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
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Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

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The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.



The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- Explain the value (significance) of the study.
- Defend the model—why did you employ this particular system or method? What is its compensation? Remark upon its appropriateness from an abstract point of view as well as pointing out sensible reasons for using it.
- Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
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Approach:

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This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

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Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
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- To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.



Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
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- Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
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- Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- Do not present similar data more than once.
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- Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

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Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

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Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

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- Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
- Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
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- Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

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<i>Introduction</i>	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
<i>Methods and Procedures</i>	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
<i>Result</i>	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
<i>Discussion</i>	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
<i>References</i>	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring



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