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Climate Change and International Security: Consequences for Future Europe

By Elena Andreevska

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Abstract- The risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts are already taking place. The UN estimates that all but one of its emergency appeals for humanitarian aid in 2007 were climate related.

The science of climate change is now better understood. The findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change[1] demonstrate that even if by 2050 emissions would be reduced to below half of 1990 levels, a temperature rise of up to 2°C above pre-industrial levels will be difficult to avoid. Such a temperature increase will pose serious security risks that would increase if warming continues. Unmitigated climate change beyond 2°C will lead to unprecedented security scenarios as it is likely to trigger a number of tipping points that would lead to further accelerated, irreversible and largely unpredictable climate changes. Investment in mitigation to avoid such scenarios, as well as ways to adapt to the unavoidable should go hand in hand with addressing the international security threats created by climate change; both should be viewed as part of preventive security policy.

Keywords: clime change, security implications, UN system, EU's strategy.

GJHSS-A Classification: LCC: QC903

CLIMATECHANGEANDINTERNATIONALSECURITYCONSEQUENCESFORFUTUREEUROPE

Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:

Climate Change and International Security: Consequences for Future Europe

Elena Andreevska

Abstract- The risks posed by climate change are real and its impacts are already taking place. The UN estimates that all but one of its emergency appeals for humanitarian aid in 2007 were climate related.

The science of climate change is now better understood. The findings of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change[1] demonstrate that even if by 2050 emissions would be reduced to below half of 1990 levels, a temperature rise of up to 2ºC above pre-industrial levels will be difficult to avoid. Such a temperature increase will pose serious security risks that would increase if warming continues. Unmitigated climate change beyond 2ºC will lead to unprecedented security scenarios as it is likely to trigger a number of tipping points that would lead to further accelerated, irreversible and largely unpredictable climate changes. Investment in mitigation to avoid such scenarios, as well as ways to adapt to the unavoidable should go hand in hand with addressing the international security threats created by climate change; both should be viewed as part of preventive security policy.

The world as we knew it is coming to an end, and it's up to us how it ends and what comes after. It's the end of the age of fossil fuel, but if the fossil-fuel corporations have their way the ending will be delayed as long as possible, with as much carbon burned as possible. If the rest of us prevail, we will radically reduce our use of those fuels by 2030, and almost entirely by 2050. We will meet climate change with real change, and defeat the fossil-fuel industry in the next nine years.

If we succeed, those who come after will look back on the age of fossil fuel as an age of corruption and poison. The grandchildren of those who are young now will hear horror stories about how people once burned great mountains of poisonous stuff dug up from deep underground that made children sick and birds die and the air filthy and the planet heat up.

Keywords: clime change, security implications, UN system, EU's strategy.

INTRODUCTION

As concern mounts over the impacts of global environmental change on social and ecological systems, coinciding with a more fluid international security environment since the end of the Cold War, environmental change is increasingly being understood as a security issue.[2] This is as much a product of national security institutions seeking new raison d'etres as an issue concerning the danger posed by environmental change.[3] The majority of interpretations of environmental security focus on the way environmental change may interact with the same national security concerns that dominated the policy throughout the 20th century, in particular the way environmental change may trigger violent conflict.[4] However, as recent developments in environmental security research suggest, the concern for direct international conflict is misplaced, and the security impacts of environmental change will take less direct and more multifarious routes. Surprisingly, despite climate change being the most prominent and best-studied of the suite of environmental change problems, it has thus far received little systematic analysis as a security issue.[5] This paper seeks to offer such an analysis.

Both governmental views and relevant research on the security implications of climate change, by and large, approach the question from a perspective of interdependence between human vulnerability and national security. They identify five channels through which climate change could affect security: Vulnerability; Development; Coping and security; Statelessness; International conflict.[6]

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[1] The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, IPCC-59. IPCC — Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change.

[2] Security is an accentuated discourse on vulnerability. Like vulnerability, its assessment requires considering the risk of exposure, susceptibility to loss, and capacity to recover. However, like vulnerability and risk, it is more socially constructed than objectively determined. The distinction is that security is attached to the most important of vulnerable entities – for example the nation (national security), basic needs (human security), income (financial security) and property (home security). The process of discursively 'securitizing' vulnerable referent objects, and defining particular security). The process of discursively 'securitizing' vulnerable referent objects, and defining particular risks, is a political one. In a general, sense security is the condition of being protected from or not exposed to danger. It has historically been concerned with safety and certainty from contingency.

[3] See David Campbell, Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (Manchester University Press, 1992); Dabelko Geoffrey and Simmons Peter, "Environment and Security: Core Ideas and US Government Initiatives", SAIS Review 17 (1) (1997): 127-146.

[4] Tomas Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict", International Security 16 (2) (1991): 76-116.

[5] See Edvard Page and Michael Redclift, Human Security and Environment (Edward Elgar, 2002).

[6] UN General Assembly Report, A/64/350, 11 September 2009, pp. 1.

Clime change is best viewed as threat multiplier which makes worse existing trends, tensions and instability. The core challenge is that climate change threatens to overburden states and regions which are already fragile and conflict prone. It is important to recognize that the risks are not just of humanitarian nature. They also include political and security risks that directly affect European interests. Moreover, in line with the concept of human security, it is clear that many issues related to the impact of climate change on international security are interlinked requiring comprehensive policy responses.[7]

The European Union is in a unique position to respond to the impacts of climate change on international security, given its leading role in the development, global climate policy and the wide array of tools and instruments at its disposal. Also, the security challenge plays to Europe's strengths, with its comprehensive approach to conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict resolution, and as a key promoter of effective multilateralism.[8]

I. Threats

The effects of climate change are being felt now: temperatures are rising, icecaps and glaciers are melting and extreme weather events are becoming more frequent and more intense. The following section outlines some of the forms of conflicts driven by climate change which may occur in different regions of the world.

a) Conflict over Resources

Reduction of arable land, widespread shortage of water, diminishing food and fish stocks, increased flooding and prolonged droughts are already happening in many parts of the world. Climate change will alter rainfall patterns and further reduce available freshwater by as much as 20 to 30% in certain regions. A drop in agricultural productivity will lead to, or worsen, food-insecurity in least developed countries and an unsustainable increase in food prices across the board. Water shortage in particular has the potential to cause civil unrest and to lead to significant economic losses, even in robust economies. The consequences will be even more intense in areas under strong demographic pressure. The overall effect is that climate change will fuel existing conflicts over depleting resources, especially where access to those resources is politicized.

b) Economic Damage and Risk to Coastal Cities and Critical Infrastructure

It has been estimated that a business as usual scenario in dealing with climate change could cost the world economy up to 20% of global GDP per year, whereas the cost of effective concerted action can be limited to 1%. Coastal zones are the home of about one fifth of the world's population, a number set to rise in the years ahead. Mega-cities, with their supporting infrastructure, such as port facilities and oil refineries, are often located by the sea or in river deltas. Sea-level rise and the increase in the frequency and intensity of natural disasters pose a serious threat to these regions and their economic prospects. The East coasts of China and India as well as the Caribbean region and Central America would be particularly affected. An increase in disasters and humanitarian crises will lead to immense pressure on the resources of donor countries, including capacities for emergency relief operations.

c) Loss of Territory and Border Disputes

Scientists project major changes to the landmass during this century. Receding coastlines and submergence of large areas could result in loss of territory, including entire countries such as small island states. More disputes over land and maritime borders and other territorial rights are likely. There might be a need to revisit existing rules of international law, particularly the Law of the Sea, as regards the resolution of territorial and border disputes. A further dimension of competition for energy resources lies in potential conflict over resources in Polar regions which will become exploitable as a consequence of global warming. Desertification could trigger a vicious circle of degradation, migration and conflicts over territory and borders that threatens the political stability of countries and regions.

d) Environmentally-induced Migration

Those parts of the populations that already suffer from poor health conditions, unemployment or social exclusion are rendered more vulnerable to the effects of climate change, which could amplify or trigger migration within and between countries. The UN predicts that there will be millions of "environmental" migrants by 2020 with climate change[9] as one of the major drivers of this phenomenon. Some countries that are extremely vulnerable to climate change are already calling for international recognition of such environmentally-induced migration. Such migration may increase conflicts in transit and destination areas. Europe must expect substantially increased migratory pressure.

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[7] For example, the attainment of the Millennium Development Goals would be at considerable risk because clime change, if unmitigated, may well wipe out years of development efforts. See UN General Assembly Res. A/RES/55/2, 18 September 2000.

[8] See EU Doc. S113/08, 14 March 2008.

[9] Climate Change Could Force 216 Million People to Migrate Within Their Own Countries by 2050. Groundswell Report (worldbank.org).

e) Situations of Fragility and Radicalization

Climate change may significantly increase instability in weak or failing states by over-stretching the already limited capacity of governments to respond effectively to the challenges they face. The inability of a government to meet the needs of its population as a whole or to provide protection in the face of climate change-induced hardship could trigger frustration, lead to tensions between different ethnic and religious groups within countries and to political radicalization. This could destabilize countries and even entire regions.

f) Tension over Energy Supply

One of the most significant potential conflicts over resources arises from intensified competition over access to, and control over, energy resources. That in itself is, and will continue to be, a cause of instability. However, because much of the world's hydrocarbon reserves are in regions vulnerable to the impacts of climate change and because many oil and gas producing states already face significant social economic and demographic challenges, instability is likely to increase. This has the potential to feed back into greater energy insecurity and greater competition for resources. A possible wider use of nuclear energy for power generation might raise new concerns about proliferation, in the context of a non-proliferation regime that is already under pressure. As previously inaccessible regions open up due to the effects of climate change, the scramble for resources will intensify.

g) Pressure on International Governance

The multilateral system is at risk if the international community fails to address the threats outlined above. Climate change impacts will fuel the politics of resentment between those most responsible for climate change and those most affected by it. Impacts of climate mitigation policies (or policy failures) will thus drive political tension nationally and internationally. The potential rift not only divides North and South but there will also be a South - South dimension particularly as the Chinese and Indian share of global emissions rises. The already burdened international security architecture will be put under increasing pressure.[10]

Climate change calls for revisiting and reinforcing cooperation and political dialogue instruments, giving more attention to the impact of climate change on security. This could lead to greater prioritization and enhanced support for climate change mitigation and adaptation, good governance, natural resource management, technology transfer, trans-boundary environmental cooperation (inter alia water

and land), institutional strengthening and capacity building for crisis management.[11]

II. SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR THE UN SYSTEM

As climate change accelerates, its impacts exacerbate existing social, economic, and environmental challenges in many contexts, which can contribute to insecurity at local levels, or even internationally. Security concerns linked to climate change include impacts on food, water and energy supplies, increased competition over natural resources, loss of livelihoods, climate-related disasters, and forced migration and displacement.

Despite growing recognition of the interlinkages between climate change, peace and security, few examples of integrated programmatic approaches that address specific risks at the intersection of climate change and insecurity exist. Conflict and crisis affected contexts are more susceptible to being overwhelmed by climate change, but too often peacebuilding and stabilization efforts often do not consider climate-related impacts or environmental hazards. At the same time, insecurity hinders climate change adaptation efforts, leaving already vulnerable communities even poorer and less resilient to interlinked climate and security crises, but climate change adaptation initiatives often fail to fully integrate peacebuilding or conflict prevention objectives.

As climate change is increasingly recognized as a "threat multiplier" by scientists, political representatives, and civil society across the world, the United Nations Security Council held an open debate on Friday to discuss its concrete impact on peace and security, and focus on tangible ways to diminish the effects of global warming.

"The relationship between climate-related risks and conflict is complex and often intersects with political, social, economic and demographic factors," said Rosemary DiCarlo[12], the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in her opening remarks.

In 2009, UNEP partnered with IOM, OCHA, UNU, and CILSS to investigate the implications of climate change for livelihoods, conflict and migration across the Sahel region. The resulting report "Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel" (2011)[13] identifies 19 hotspots where climatic changes have been most severe over the past 20 years. It concludes that climate change effects on resource

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[10] Climate Change and International Security, Paper from the High Representative and the European Commission to the European Council, S113/08, 14 March 2008.

[11] Ibid.

[12] Rosemary A. DiCarlo, UN Political and Peacebuilding Affairs. Leadership | Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (un.org).

[13] Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel, IOM. Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel | IOM Publications Platform.

availability have already led to migration, and increased competition over scarce resources in some of the hotspots.

As a follow-up to this initial work, UNEP was requested in 2009 by the UN Secretary General to provide technical inputs to the drafting of the report to the General Assembly entitled "Climate Change and its Possible Security Implications" (A/64/350).

UNEP's Executive Director was invited to address the Security Council in 2011, a thematic debated which resulted in the Security Council Presidential Statement S/PRST/2011/15 on climate change. In the statement, the council requested the Secretary General to report on the possible security implications of climate change when such issues are drivers of conflict, represent a challenge to the implementation of Council mandates or endanger the process of consolidation of peace.

The next major international milestone was the report "A New Climate for Peace,"[14] commissioned by G7 foreign ministries, was launched in New York in June 2015. Based in part on substantive contributions by UNEP, the report identifies seven key compound climate and fragility risks that should form the basis for united action. These include local resource competition, livelihood insecurity and migration, volatile food prices and provision, transboundary water management, and unintended effects of climate change policies.

As a direct follow-up to the G7 report, UNEP established a partnership with the EU in 2017, with the aim of collaborating to strengthen the capacity of countries and international partners to *identify environment and climate-related security risks at global, national and community levels, and to programme suitable risk reduction and response measures.* The resulting five-year project was among the first of its kind to integrate climate change adaptation and peace-building objectives into analysis, planning and resilience-building initiatives in conflict-affected contexts. The project also made important contributions towards strengthening the capacity of key actors at international and field levels to identify and address climate-related security risks.

At the local level, UNEP worked directly with communities in North Darfur, Sudan and the Karnali River Basin, Nepal[15] to *pilot test integrated climate change adaptation and peacebuilding approaches.* The project combined climate change adaptation activities – such as the introduction of climate-smart agricultural techniques and water conservation methods, livelihood diversification and the development of sustainable water infrastructure – with inclusive approaches to dialogue,

conflict resolution, and natural resource governance with the aim of improving enhancing resilience to linked climate change, peace, and security risks. In both contexts, the project contributed to enhancing intra- and inter-communal trust and relationships and strengthened the capacity of local communities to resolve conflicts related to natural resources. Key to building resilience, the project also strengthened economic prospects of vulnerable groups through investments in climate-smart livelihood options.

At the global level, the partnership played an important role in *strengthening system-wide capacity to identify, assess and address climate-related security risks.* To meet the growing demand for training and expertise, the project developed a Massive Online Open Course[16] on designing and implementing inclusive approaches to addressing climate-related security risks, integrating the project's guidance and tools into a self-paced, online course that is the first of its kind globally. Drawing heavily on lessons learned and good practices identified through the project – and featuring elements from the pilot projects through interactive case studies – the course provides an introduction to climate, peace, and security linkages using an intersectional lens, as well as guidance on conducting integrated analysis and designing programmes to address these multifaceted challenges.

To further enhance system-wide capacity for integrated risk analysis, UNEP also developed the Strata data platform[17] to identify, map and monitor environmental and climate stresses potentially driving threats to peace and security. Strata offers the best available analytics and visualizations on where and how environment and climate stresses are converging with other factors of risk over space and time, to help field-based partners – national and regional bodies, political and peacekeeping missions, UN Resident Coordinators, UN country teams, EU Delegations and other stakeholders – to priorities practical risk mitigation and resilience-building measures. A prototype of Strata focused on Somalia was launched in February 2022 to support the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia and the UN Country Team, as well as environmental and peacebuilding civil society organizations in the country.

UNEP has made significant contributions to strengthening the evidence base on the gender dimensions of climate change and security, recognizing that climate-related security risks do not impact everyone equally. In June 2020, UNEP together with UN Women, UNDP, and DPPA launched the policy report Gender, Climate and Security: Sustaining Inclusive

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[14] A New Climate for Peace. A New Climate for Peace – Taking Action on Climate and Fragility Risks | adelphi.

[15] Climate Change and Security Risk. Climate change and security risks | UNEP - UN Environment Programme.

[16] Climate Change. Course: Climate Change, Peace and Security: Understanding Climate-Related Security Risks Through an Integrated Lens (unccelearn.org).

[17] Data Resources. Data Resources | UNEP - UN Environment Programme.

Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change,[18] illustrating the differentiated impacts and opportunities associated with climate-related security risks in unique contexts across the globe. The report helped to put gender on the agenda in policy discussions related to climate change and security on the one hand, and better integrate climate and environmental considerations into the Women, Peace and Security agenda on the other. At the local level, UNEP and partners tested a new approach to programming through the Joint Programme for Women, Natural Resources, Climate and Peace,[19] demonstrating that not only is gender equality integral for building resilience in climate and conflict-affected contexts, but also that climate change adaptation approaches can contribute to strengthening women's contributions to peace.

Finally, security risks related to climate change will not be evenly distributed and will affect some kinds of governments more than others. While local and regional consequences of climate change remain very difficult to predict, three types of nations seem particularly vulnerable to the security risks of climate change: least developed nations, weak states, and undemocratic states.

The United Nations' strategy for addressing climate change is to facilitate agreements among nations to: (a) mitigate those nations' greenhouse gas emissions, thereby stabilizing atmospheric concentrations of these gases at a safe level; and (b) help vulnerable nations adapt to the adverse consequences of global warming. While these goals are the right ones, the UN system is not acting with sufficient ambition or effectiveness to deal with the security risks posed by climate change.

III. THE EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY

Climate change is a key element of international relations and will be increasingly so in the coming years, including its security dimension. If recognized, it can even become a positive driver for improving and reforming global governance. As it is a global problem, the EU is advocating a multilateral response. Building on the successful Bali conference in Dec 2007 the EU needs to continue and strengthen its leadership towards an ambitious post-2012 agreement in 2009, including both mitigation and adaptation action by all countries as a key contribution to addressing climate security.

Possible actions that could be developed include:

- Focus attention on the security risks related to climate change in the multilateral arena; in particular

within the UN Security Council, the G8 as well as the UN specialized bodies (among others by addressing a possible need to strengthen certain rules of international law, including the Law of the Sea).
- Enhance international cooperation on the detection and monitoring of the security threats related to climate change, and on prevention, preparedness, mitigation and response capacities. Promote the development of regional security scenarios for different levels of climate change and their implications for international security.
- Consider environmentally-triggered additional migratory stress in the further development of a comprehensive European migration policy, in liaison with all relevant international bodies.

Climate change calls for revisiting and reinforcing EU cooperation and political dialogue instruments, giving more attention to the impact of climate change on security. This could lead to greater prioritisation and enhanced support for climate change mitigation and adaptation, good governance, natural resource management, technology transfer, trans-boundary environmental cooperation (inter alia water and land), institutional strengthening and capacity building for crisis management.

Possible actions that could be developed include:

- Further integrate adaptation and resilience to climate change into EU regional strategies (for example Northern Dimension, European Neighbour-hood Policy, EU-Africa Strategy, Barcelona Process, Black Sea Synergy, EU-Central Asia Strategy, Middle East action plan). Special attention should be given to the most vulnerable regions and potential climate security hot spots. The Global Climate Change Alliance between the EU and the most vulnerable developing countries should be built upon.
- Develop an EU Arctic policy based on the evolving geo-strategy of the Arctic region, taking into account i.a. access to resources and the opening of new trade routes.
- Examine the security implications of climate change in dialogue with third countries including through the sharing of analyses.[20]

On the 24 July 2020, the European Commission set out the new EU Security Union Strategy[21] for the period 2020 to 2025, focusing on priority areas where the EU can bring value to support Member States in

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[18] Gender, climate and security: Sustaining inclusive peace on the frontlines of climate change, 2020. Gender, climate and security: Sustaining inclusive peace on the frontlines of climate change | Digital library: Publications | UN Women – Headquarters.

[19] Joint Programme for Women, Natural Resources, Climate and Peace. jp_final_report_2021_mr_compressed.pdf (undp.org).

[20] Ibid. Supra 10.

[21] COMMUNICATION OF THE COMMISSION, A better workplace for all: from equal opportunities towards diversity and inclusion, European Commission, C(2017) 5300 final, Brussels, 19.7.2017. Brussels, 19.7.2017. communication-equal-opportunities-diversity-inclusion-2017.pdf (europa.eu).

fostering security for all those living in Europe. From combatting terrorism and organised crime, to preventing and detecting hybrid threats and increasing the resilience of our critical infrastructure, to promoting cybersecurity and fostering research and innovation, the strategy lays out the tools and measures to be developed over the next 5 years to ensure security in our physical and digital environment.

The new Security Union Strategy is built around the following objectives:

• To build capabilities and capacities for early detection, prevention and rapid response to security crisis.
• To focus on results
• To link all players in the public and private sectors in a common effort.

All these challenges are multifaceted and often interconnected. Our security is at stake, at home or overseas. We must be able and ready to protect our citizens, defend our shared interests, project our values and contribute to shape the global future. We need to redouble our efforts to we combine our diplomatic and economic instruments, including our sanctions regimes, with civil and military assets to prevent conflict, respond to crises, contribute to peacebuilding and support partners. We will also strengthen our cooperation with bilateral, regional and multilateral European security and defence initiatives that contribute to Europe's security.[22]

IV. CONCLUSION

Following are Secretary-General António Guterres' remarks at the Security Council[23] high-level open debate on the maintenance of international peace and security: climate and security, held today:

"I thank the Irish Presidency for organizing this timely debate. Last month, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change released a deeply alarming report. It shows that climate disruption caused by human activities is widespread and intensifying. The report is indeed a code red for humanity."

Much bolder climate action is needed ahead of COP26 [Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change] with G20 [Group of 20] nations in the lead — to maintain international peace and security. Our window of opportunity to prevent the worst climate impacts is rapidly closing. No region is immune. Wildfires, flooding, droughts and other extreme weather events are affecting every continent.

The effects of climate change are particularly profound when they overlap with fragility and past or current conflicts. It is clear that climate change and environmental mismanagement are risk multipliers. Where coping capacities are limited and there is high dependence on shrinking natural resources and ecosystem services, such as water and fertile land, grievances and tensions can explode, complicating efforts to prevent conflict and to sustain peace.

In Somalia, more frequent and intense droughts and floods are undermining food security, increasing competition over scarce resources and exacerbating existing community tensions from which Shabaab benefits. In the Middle East and North Africa, which are among the world's most water-stressed and climate-vulnerable regions, a major decline in precipitation and a rise in extreme weather events is harming water and food security.

Last year, more than 30 million people were displaced by climate-related disasters. Ninety per cent of refugees come from countries that are among the most vulnerable and least able to adapt to the effects of climate change. Many of these refugees are in turn hosted by countries that are also suffering the impacts of climate change, compounding the challenge for host communities and national budgets.

And as the devastation caused by the COVID-19 pandemic continues to cause immense suffering, it is undermining Governments' ability to respond to climate disasters and build resilience.

The threats are clear and present. But, it is not too late to act to ensure that climate action contributes to international peace and security. Let me highlight three absolute priorities in climate action.

First, we need unambiguous commitment and credible actions by all countries to limit global warming to 1.5°C to avert the most catastrophic impacts of climate change I urge all Member States to show more ambition in their nationally determined contributions by COP26 and to translate their commitments into concrete and immediate action. Collectively, we need a 45 per cent cut in global emissions by 2030.

Second, to deal with the already dire impacts of climate disruption on the lives and livelihoods of people all over the world, we need a breakthrough on adaptation and resilience. It is essential that at least 50 per cent of climate finance globally is committed to building resilience and supporting adaptation. This need is urgent, as growing climate impacts remind us daily. Annual adaptation costs in developing countries are estimated at $70 billion, and they are expected to reach up to $300 billion a year by 2030.

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[22] A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, Council of the European Union,7371/22, Brussels, 21 March 2022. pdf (europa.eu).
[23] Global Climate Crisis' Dire Impact on Peace, Security Calls for Bolder Collective Action, Secretary-General Tells Security Council. SG/SM/20926, 23 SEPTEMBER 2021. Global Climate Crisis' Dire Impact on Peace, Security Calls for Bolder Collective Action, Secretary-General Tells Security Council | UN Press.

Huge gaps remain in adaptation finance for developing countries. We simply cannot achieve our shared climate goals — nor achieve hope for lasting peace and security — if resilience and adaptation continue to be the forgotten half of the climate equation.

This neglect is seriously endangering our collective efforts on the crucial road to COP26 in November. Developed countries must uphold their promise to deliver — before COP26 — $100 billion dollars in climate finance annually to the developing world. And they must ensure this reaches the most affected populations. The quality of this finance is also key. Grant financing is essential, as loans will add to already crushing debt burdens in the most climate-vulnerable countries.

Third, climate adaptation and peacebuilding can and should reinforce each other. For example, in the Lake Chad region, dialogue platforms for cooperatively managing natural resources, supported by the Peacebuilding Fund, have promoted reforestation and improved access to sustainable livelihoods. In West and Central Africa, cross-border projects have enabled dialogue and promoted more transparent management of scarce natural resources, a factor of peace.

The United Nations is integrating climate risks into our political analysis, as well as conflict prevention and peacebuilding initiatives. The Climate Security Mechanism is supporting field missions, country teams and regional and subregional organizations to analyse and address climate-related security risks and shape integrated and timely responses.

Work is gaining traction in countries and regions where the Security Council has recognized that climate and ecological change are undermining stability. Our Regional Office in West Africa and the Sahel, in coordination with IOM [International Organization for Migration], UNEP [United Nations Environment Programme] and the UNFCCC [United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change], has launched a new initiative on peace, climate change and environmental degradation. This initiative will help the Economic Community of West African States, as well as other regional bodies and national and local governments, to harmonize efforts to reduce climate-related security risks in the sub region.[24]

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[24] Ibid.

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Mental Health and Immigration: An Integrative Review with Notes on Attachment and Grief

By Dr. Giseldal Isedal Lopes de Aquin

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Abstract- This study presents an integrative review of scientific literature addressing the relationship between mental health and the immigrant experience. The theoretical foundation is rooted in John Bowlby's Attachment and Grief Theory, interwoven with contemporary contributions on psychological suffering in contexts of both forced and voluntary migration. The bibliographic search involved a comprehensive screening across BVS, LILACS, BDENF, INDEXPSI, MEDLINE, and IRIS databases, using descriptors in Portuguese, Spanish, and English. Inclusion criteria focused on empirical studies published between 2000 and 2025 that explore the nexus between migration and mental health. The selected works were analyzed through four thematic axes: prevalent psychopathological symptoms; risk and vulnerability factors; protective strategies and coping mechanisms; and intersectional differences. The findings reveal recurrent patterns of anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress, and prolonged grief, often rooted in disrupted attachments, unprocessed losses, and a breakdown of belonging. In contrast, social support networks, religious or spiritual frameworks, and community integration emerged as stabilizing elements. Migration, more than a physical transition, frequently entails a multilayered grieving process.

Keywords: migrant suffering, attachment theory, mental health, loss, immigration.

GJHSS-A Classification: LCC: 111714

MENTALHEALTHANDIMMIGRATIONANINTEGRATIVEREVIEWWITHNOTESONATTACHMENTANDGRIEF

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Mental Health and Immigration: An Integrative Review with Notes on Attachment and Grief

Saúde Mental e Imigração: Uma Revisão Integrativa Com Notas Sobre Apego e Luto

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Resumo- Neste estudo, realiza-se uma revisão integrativa de produções científicas voltadas à relação entre saúde mental e experiência imigratória. O ponto de partida teórico repousa na Teoria do Apego e do Luto, desenvolvida por John Bowlby, entrecruzada com contribuições recentes sobre sofrimento psíquico em contextos de deslocamento humano — sejam eles compulsórios ou escolhidos. A coleta bibliográfica envolveu ampla varredura nas bases BVS, LILACS, BDENF, INDEXPSI, MEDLINE e IRIS, mediante descritores trilingues e critérios de inclusão centrados na interface entre migração e saúde mental, no recorte temporal de 2000 a 2025. Os estudos selecionados foram examinados à luz de quatro eixos analíticos: manifestações psicopatológicas frequentes; variáveis de risco e vulnerabilidade; estratégias protetivas e modos de enfrentamento; e marcadores interseccionais. Os resultados apontam para quadros persistentes de ansiedade, depressão, estresse pós-traumático e luto prolongado, geralmente ancorados em vínculos interrompidos, perdas não simbolizadas e descontinuidade do pertencimento. Como contraponto, redes sociais, espiritualidade e inserção comunitária revelam-se elementos de sustentação subjetiva. Mais do que deslocamento físico, a migração se mostra, frequentemente, como vivência de luto múltiplo. Sustenta-se, portanto, a necessidade de políticas e práticas que legitimem essas experiências de perda e favoreçam intervenções em saúde mental culturalmente sensíveis. A Teoria do Apego, nesse panorama, oferece base conceitual robusta para pensar o sofrimento migrante e orientar ações clínicas e institucionais.

Palavras-chave: sofrimento migratório, apego, saúde mental, perda, imigração.

Abstract- This study presents an integrative review of scientific literature addressing the relationship between mental health and the immigrant experience. The theoretical foundation is rooted in John Bowlby's Attachment and Grief Theory, interwoven with contemporary contributions on psychological suffering in contexts of both forced and voluntary migration. The bibliographic search involved a comprehensive screening across BVS, LILACS, BDENF, INDEXPSI, MEDLINE, and IRIS databases, using descriptors in Portuguese, Spanish, and English. Inclusion criteria focused on empirical studies published between 2000 and 2025 that explore the nexus between migration and mental health. The selected works were analyzed through four thematic axes: prevalent psychopathological symptoms; risk and vulnerability factors; protective strategies and coping mechanisms; and intersectional differences. The findings reveal recurrent patterns of anxiety, depression, post-traumatic stress, and prolonged grief, often rooted in disrupted attachments, unprocessed losses, and a breakdown of belonging. In contrast, social support networks, religious or spiritual frameworks, and community integration emerged as stabilizing elements. Migration, more than a physical transition, frequently entails a multilayered grieving process. The study thus highlights the urgency of public policies and mental health practices that validate these losses and support culturally sensitive interventions. Within this scope, Attachment Theory offers a consistent conceptual framework to understand migrant distress and inform both clinical and institutional care strategies.

Keywords: migrant suffering, attachment theory, mental health, loss, immigration.

Resumen- Este estudio presenta una revisión integradora de la literatura científica centrada en la relación entre salud mental y experiencia migratoria. El marco teórico se fundamenta en la Teoría del Apego y del Duelo de John Bowlby, entrelazada con aportes contemporáneos sobre el sufrimiento psíquico en contextos de migración forzada o voluntaria. La búsqueda bibliográfica se llevó a cabo en las bases BVS, LILACS, BDENF, INDEXPSI, MEDLINE e IRIS, utilizando descriptores en portugués, español e inglés. Se consideraron estudios empíricos publicados entre 2000 y 2025 que abordaran directamente la interfaz entre migración y salud mental. El análisis de los textos seleccionados se estructuró en torno a cuatro ejes: síntomas psicopatológicos prevalentes; factores de riesgo y vulnerabilidad; estrategias de protección y afrontamiento; y diferencias interseccionales. Los hallazgos revelan una alta incidencia de ansiedad, depresión, trastorno de estrés postraumático y duelo prolongado, asociados a la interrupción de vínculos, pérdidas no simbolizadas y quiebre del sentido de pertenencia. Como contrapeso, emergen redes sociales, religiosidad y participación comunitaria como elementos de sostén subjetivo. La migración, más que un desplazamiento físico, se configura frecuentemente como un proceso de duelo múltiple. Se refuerza así la necesidad de políticas públicas y prácticas clínicas que reconozcan dichas pérdidas y promuevan intervenciones culturalmente sensibles. En este contexto, la Teoría del Apego ofrece una base conceptual sólida para comprender el sufrimiento migrante y orientar acciones terapéuticas e institucionales.

Palabras clave: sufrimiento migrante, teoría del apego, salud mental, pérdida, migración.

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Introdução

A imigração, enquanto fenômeno atravessado por camadas múltiplas, não se restringe à dimensão geopolítica dos deslocamentos; ela escava, simultaneamente, a estrutura e a interioridade dos sujeitos, produzindo efeitos tangíveis nos processos que regem o equilíbrio psíquico. Num cenário global marcado pela aceleração dos fluxos migratórios — impulsionados por razões tão díspares quanto interconectadas: busca por trabalho, refúgio político, fuga de crises, projetos educacionais —, o deslocamento carrega, em si, ausências. Nem sempre visíveis, mas quase sempre indispensáveis na análise. Perdas — materiais e simbólicas — que se impõem como fardos emocionais, moldando paisagens de vulnerabilidade mental (Ferreira; Borges, 2022; Pereira; Filho, 2014).

A literatura é enfática: quando o migrar implica rompimentos abruptos, dissolução de laços familiares, exclusão social — o impacto psíquico se intensifica. O sofrimento emerge. Às vezes sutil, outras vezes em erupção. Ansiedade. Depressão. Estresse pós-traumático. Quadros de luto prolongado. E, não raro, o refúgio ilusório nas substâncias psicoativas (Kokou-Kpolou Et Al., 2020; Ferreira; Borges, 2022).

No entanto, não se trata apenas da dor individual. O sofrimento do imigrante é moldado por sistemas que operam com desigualdade: legislações restritivas, ausência de acesso a cuidados, práticas cotidianas de desvalorização simbólica. Esse emaranhado institucional e afetivo agrava o impacto da migração sobre o psiquismo (Pereira; Filho, 2014). Quando faltam redes de apoio e quando os marcos identitários se desfazem — linguísticos, religiosos, culturais, comunitários — instala-se o que poderíamos nomear de vazio estrutural. Um estado de descontinuidade subjetiva. Um campo fértil para o desamparo (Ferreira; Borges, 2022).

A teoria do apego, elaborada por Bowlby (1969/1982), oferece uma chave interpretativa potente para essa ruptura. Laços afetivos estáveis e confiáveis não apenas sustentam o desenvolvimento emocional — são eles próprios sustentáculos da segurança interna. A migração, ao provocar a separação dessas figuras, pode ativar intensamente o sistema de apego. O que se segue? Sentimentos de protesto, tristeza desorganizada, estados de ansiedade desarticuladora (Cassidy, 2013).

Nesse debate, Maria Helena Franco (2021) tensiona as categorias tradicionais do luto. Vai além da polarização entre o que se convencionou chamar de luto "normal" e o dito "patológico". Para ela, o luto é um fenômeno estruturalmente complexo e simbolicamente denso, cujas manifestações ultrapassam as fronteiras da normatividade clínica. Complicado, prolongado, persistente, traumático — são nomes que emergem para descrever facetas distintas da perda. No caso do imigrante, tais classificações revelam-se especialmente pertinentes, uma vez que sua trajetória é composta por sucessivos rompimentos e reformulações identitárias que resistem à categorização simples.

Com base nessas premissas, este artigo propõe-se a realizar uma revisão integrativa da literatura, examinando como a condição imigrante incide sobre a saúde mental. Entre os anos de 2000 e 2025, foram sistematizados estudos que evidenciam fatores de risco e proteção nesse processo. O que se busca, aqui, não é apenas a descrição dos efeitos, mas uma compreensão ampliada — que articule contextos, atravesse abordagens teóricas, dialogue com a clínica e com as políticas públicas. Um exercício de leitura crítica sobre o sofrimento migrante e suas interfaces invisibilizadas.

I. Metodologia

A presente investigação configura-se como uma revisão integrativa da literatura — modalidade metodológica que, ao romper com a rigidez dos recortes tradicionais, permite reunir, contrastar e articular estudos de naturezas distintas. Ao tomar como foco o impacto da experiência imigratória sobre a saúde mental, essa estratégia possibilita a construção de um retrato multifacetado do fenômeno em questão, desenhado a partir de evidências dispersas e abordagens diversas. A amplitude desse tipo de revisão não apenas enriquece a compreensão do objeto, como também favorece a detecção de lacunas conceituais e metodológicas ainda não suficientemente exploradas, oferecendo pistas férteis para futuras agendas investigativas (Whittemore; Knafl, 2005).

A busca por estudos relevantes não foi aleatória nem limitada a um conjunto restrito de fontes. Ao contrário, recorreu-se a uma varredura sistemática nas bases da Biblioteca Virtual em Saúde (BVS), com ênfase nas plataformas BDENF, LILACS, INDEXPSI, MEDLINE e IRIS. A estratégia de recuperação de dados ancorou-se em descritores controlados nos três idiomas predominantes na literatura especializada — português, inglês e espanhol —, combinados mediante operadores booleanos que permitiram cruzamentos entre os termos "Emigração e Imigração" OR "Emigración e Inmigración" OR "Emigration and Immigration" AND "Saúde Mental" OR "Salud Mental" OR "Mental Health". Esse desenho buscou maximizar a sensibilidade da busca sem comprometer sua especificidade temática.

Foram definidos, desde o início, critérios claros de inclusão: apenas artigos publicados entre 2000 e fevereiro de 2025, nos três idiomas mencionados, e que abordassem de maneira direta a articulação entre migração e saúde mental foram considerados. Estudos duplicados, editoriais opinativos, resumos de eventos

científicos e textos cuja análise não incidia substancialmente sobre o sofrimento psíquico de populações imigrantes foram descartados.

O número inicial de trabalhos encontrados foi expressivo: 48 estudos preencheram, em princípio, os critérios de relevância temática. Contudo, à medida que se aplicaram os critérios de elegibilidade de forma mais rigorosa, esse número foi sendo depurado. Ao final da triagem e leitura aprofundada, o corpus analítico consolidou-se em 31 artigos. Os 17 textos remanescentes foram excluídos por duas razões principais: ou não dialogavam de maneira efetiva com as categorias teóricas delineadas — risco, proteção, manifestações clínicas e interseccionalidades —, ou não estavam integralmente disponíveis em acesso aberto, o que impediu sua análise em profundidade.

A organização e análise dos dados extraídos desses 31 estudos seguiram um roteiro analítico estruturado, que incluiu variáveis como autoria, ano e país da publicação, população-alvo, delineamento metodológico, técnicas e instrumentos utilizados, principais resultados e possíveis implicações práticas. A etapa interpretativa, por sua vez, foi guiada por um processo de categorização temática de natureza indutiva. Buscou-se, nessa fase, evidenciar padrões recorrentes — fatores de risco e proteção, vivências de discriminação, separações familiares forçadas, barreiras no acesso a serviços de saúde, e experiências de luto vinculadas à migração. Todo esse percurso interpretativo foi conduzido em consonância com os princípios metodológicos da revisão integrativa conforme propostos por Whittemore e Knafl (2005), assegurando densidade analítica e coerência interna à síntese produzida.

II. Análise Integrativa da Produção Científica Sobre Imigração e Saúde Mental

Para conferir coesão à análise e profundidade à interpretação dos achados, os estudos foram organizados em quatro núcleos analíticos: (1) manifestações clínicas recorrentes, como depressão, ansiedade, estresse pós-traumático e uso de substâncias; (2) fatores de vulnerabilização — discriminação, precariedade documental, rupturas familiares; (3) dispositivos de proteção e recursos de enfrentamento, incluindo religiosidade, redes sociais de apoio e práticas culturais; e (4) marcadores interseccionais — gênero, faixa etária, etnia e geração migratória — como vetores de diferenciação da experiência psíquica.

A diversidade metodológica entre os estudos selecionados não apenas enriquece a tessitura analítica da revisão, como também amplia suas possibilidades interpretativas. O corpus é dominado por investigações empíricas, com notável predominância de delineamentos quantitativos (n = 17; 54,8%), voltados à mensuração da prevalência de transtornos mentais e à identificação de associações estatisticamente significativas com variáveis migratórias. Tais estudos ancoraram-se, majoritariamente, em surveys padronizados, entrevistas estruturadas e bases secundárias de ampla cobertura populacional, como as plataformas NLAAS, CIDI e NSAL, reconhecidas por sua robustez amostral.

Não menos relevantes, os trabalhos de natureza qualitativa — representando 35,5% da amostra (n = 11) — permitiram o acesso às nuances subjetivas da experiência migratória, abordando aspectos simbólicos, afetivos e narrativos do sofrimento. Por meio de entrevistas abertas, grupos focais, etnografias e análise de conteúdo, essas investigações iluminaram trajetórias de mulheres, adolescentes, refugiados e outros grupos em situação de vulnerabilidade. Três estudos (9,7%) integraram abordagens mistas, articulando dimensões clínicas e interpretativas; dois adotaram um viés teórico-conceitual, oferecendo marcos analíticos para o aprofundamento da discussão.

As técnicas de coleta utilizadas nos 31 estudos também revelam significativa heterogeneidade: 14 recorreram a entrevistas semiestruturadas ou em profundidade; ao menos nove mobilizaram instrumentos psicométricos validados — como o SRQ-20, OQ-45.2, PHQ-2, Harvard Trauma Questionnaire, Hopkins Checklist-25, entre outros. Seis artigos basearam-se em grandes bancos de dados secundários e três desenvolveram metodologias participativas, dialógicas ou de inspiração etnográfica. Quanto à amostragem, embora prevaleça o uso de conveniência, notam-se investigações quantitativas com amostras superiores a mil participantes, o que confere maior poder inferencial aos resultados.

Do ponto de vista geográfico, os estudos concentram-se majoritariamente no continente americano. Os Estados Unidos figuram com maior frequência (n = 12), seguidos por Chile (n = 4), México (n = 3), Brasil (n = 2), Guatemala, Colômbia e Peru (n = 1 cada). Dois estudos foram realizados fora do eixo latino-americano: um na Suíça e outro na China. Essa distribuição espacial reflete, em grande medida, os fluxos migratórios predominantes na contemporaneidade, sobretudo aqueles que partem da América Latina e Caribe rumo a destinos com estruturas institucionais desiguais ou políticas de acolhimento restritivas.

A heterogeneidade metodológica que atravessa o corpus analisado constitui um dos pilares interpretativos desta revisão. Ao permitir o cruzamento entre distintas epistemologias — quantitativa, qualitativa, mista —, a análise torna-se capaz de apreender tanto os contornos estruturais do adoecimento psíquico quanto suas expressões

vivenciais e simbólicas. Ainda assim, torna-se visível a escassez de estudos longitudinais, bem como a ausência de investigações multicêntricas comparativas, que poderiam elucidar os efeitos da migração ao longo do tempo e em diferentes territórios. Identifica-se, assim, a urgência de fomentar pesquisas que articulem métodos integrativos e enfoques interdisciplinares, atentos à complexidade das trajetórias migratórias e às múltiplas camadas do sofrimento mental que delas decorrem.

a) Transtornos Psíquicos Prevalentes Entre Imigrantes

No universo dos deslocamentos humanos, certos quadros clínicos surgem com notável recorrência entre populações migrantes. Destacam-se, nesse cenário, a depressão, os transtornos de ansiedade, o estresse pós-traumático (TEPT) e, em contextos específicos, o consumo problemático de substâncias psicoativas. O processo migratório — que raramente ocorre sem rupturas e perdas, tanto concretas quanto simbólicas — inscreve-se como catalisador de desequilíbrios psíquicos, cujas expressões são diversas e muitas vezes interligadas (Santillanes-Allande, 2017; Gulbas et al., 2016).

A depressão, entre esses transtornos, desponta como o diagnóstico mais amplamente relatado. Relatos variam desde os de mulheres mexicanas vivendo em Nova York (Santillanes-Allande, 2017) até os de crianças e adolescentes estadunidenses, filhos de imigrantes em condição de irregularidade (Gulbas Et Al., 2016). Mas não apenas os que partem são afetados: pais idosos que permanecem em seus países de origem, como no México ou na China, também padecem com a ausência prolongada dos filhos que migraram. Para esses, a solidão toma forma clínica, como demonstram os achados de Antman (2009) e Zhou et al. (2014), indicando que o impacto da migração transcende o sujeito que migra e atravessa o tecido familiar de maneira transgeracional.

Já em relação aos transtornos de ansiedade, o padrão observado aponta para sua elevação significativa no pós-migração. Em estudo comparativo, Breslau et al. (2011) identificaram aumento expressivo na incidência de episódios de ansiedade e depressão entre imigrantes mexicanos nos Estados Unidos, especialmente entre os mais jovens. Tal evidência desafia a chamada "hipótese do imigrante saudável", ao mesmo tempo em que dá respaldo à teoria do estresse aculturativo como mediador do sofrimento.

No campo do TEPT, o que se observa é uma prevalência marcadamente elevada em segmentos mais expostos à violência estrutural. Crianças que enfrentaram a separação forçada de seus pais, como nos casos de deportação, mulheres usuárias de drogas expulsas dos EUA para o México e pessoas submetidas a contextos reiterados de desamparo institucional, compõem o grupo mais atingido (Gulbas Et Al., 2016;

Robertson Et Al., 2012; Santillanes-Allande, 2017). Em tais realidades, o trauma não é um evento isolado, mas um processo contínuo de esgarçamento dos vínculos afetivos, marcado pela instabilidade habitacional, precariedade econômica e riscos à integridade física e psíquica.

Outro aspecto relevante diz respeito à somatização do sofrimento mental. Bucay-Harari et al. (2020), em estudo com imigrantes latino-americanos em Baltimore, identificaram que a queixa de dor física frequentemente encobria estados emocionais graves, não verbalizados por barreiras culturais ou por ausência de espaços de escuta qualificada. A sintomatologia, nesse caso, desloca-se do plano simbólico para o corpo, configurando-se como uma linguagem alternativa de expressão do sofrimento.

No que tange ao uso de substâncias, sua presença aparece como comorbidade em determinados contextos. É o caso de mulheres deportadas, cuja vulnerabilidade se agrava drasticamente após o retorno forçado ao país de origem (Robertson Et al., 2012). A estigmatização, combinada à ausência de redes de apoio e ao isolamento social, compõe um cenário propenso ao uso disfuncional de drogas como tentativa de enfrentamento, ainda que ineficaz.

Conectando esses achados à teoria do apego de John Bowlby (1969/1982), compreende-se que tais manifestações clínicas são frequentemente respostas à desestruturação de vínculos primários. A separação de figuras afetivamente significativas, situação comum nos processos migratórios, ativa intensamente o sistema de apego. Protestos emocionais, estados ansiosos, luto — antecipado ou consolidado — emergem como desdobramentos psíquicos da perda relacional (Cassidy, 2013).

Ao examinar os contextos em que tais transtornos se manifestam com maior intensidade, evidencia-se o papel dos cenários marcados por deportações, migrações forçadas e rupturas abruptas de laços familiares. Nessas condições, a experiência subjetiva do sofrimento não apenas se agrava, mas adquire contornos específicos, atravessada por narrativas de perda, silêncio e desamparo.

Gulbas et al. (2016) oferecem uma contribuição ao analisar os efeitos da deportação parental entre crianças cidadãs estadunidenses, filhas de imigrantes mexicanos. Segundo os dados coletados, cerca de metade das crianças com sintomas de depressão mencionou estresse relacional com os pais, mesmo na ausência de separação direta. Já aquelas que vivenciaram a ruptura concreta destacaram, quase exclusivamente, o impacto da perda das redes escolares e da exposição à violência. Esses relatos ilustram como a migração forçada interrompe a continuidade afetiva e compromete os alicerces emocionais do desenvolvimento infantil, instaurando um

luto muitas vezes invisível, mas profundamente estruturante da dor psíquica.

Entre mulheres em situação de deportação, sobretudo aquelas que fazem uso de substâncias, como demonstrado por Robertson et al. (2012), delineia-se um panorama de múltiplas camadas de vulnerabilidade. Não se trata apenas da intensificação do consumo de drogas após o retorno forçado, mas de um colapso mais amplo: o enfraquecimento de redes de apoio, o cerceamento do acesso a serviços essenciais, e a exposição reiterada a contextos de risco — físico, social, simbólico. Conforme relatam as autoras, "o retorno forçado acentuou a instabilidade financeira e a sensação de abandono, gerando um ciclo de recaída e sofrimento psíquico contínuo" (Robertson et al., 2012, p. 505). Tais experiências, impregnadas por perdas involuntárias, dão forma ao luto migratório — expressão aqui entendida como desintegração de projetos de vida, desenraizamento territorial, cisão de vínculos e diluição da identidade social. O sofrimento que emerge, nesse quadro, não raro escapa à lógica sintomática convencional, assumindo a forma de autodestruição, silenciamento e fragmentação subjetiva.

No estudo de Santillanes-Allande (2017), o foco desloca-se para mulheres mexicanas imigrantes em Nova York. Ali, a depressão não aparece isoladamente; ela é tecida no cotidiano, atravessada por múltiplas formas de violência — doméstica, simbólica, institucional. A experiência migratória dessas mulheres não pode ser dissociada de seus papéis de gênero, renegociados, tensionados ou simplesmente impostos em um novo contexto social. Como indica a autora, "as estratégias de manutenção do modelo familiar tradicional, mesmo no exterior, criam um ambiente de sobrecarga emocional, desvalorização e sofrimento silencioso" (Santillanes-Allande, 2017, p. 858). O sofrimento, aqui, é estruturado na tentativa de preservar uma ordem que já não encontra chão.

Outro ângulo do impacto migratório manifesta-se entre os que ficam. Para os idosos no México ou na China, cujos filhos migraram, instala-se uma forma particular de perda — ambígua, sem nome oficial, mas profundamente sentida. Eles estão ausentes fisicamente, os filhos, mas permanecem presentes em expectativa, em lembrança, em ausência viva. Antman (2009) observou que pais mexicanos com filhos residentes nos Estados Unidos apresentaram deterioração nos indicadores de saúde geral e funcionalidade física, quadro fortemente vinculado à escassez de apoio cotidiano e ao sofrimento emocional decorrente da separação. Em outro contexto, Zhou et al. (2014) revelam que, para idosos chineses, "a saúde mental foi o fator mais importante na qualidade de vida, superando aspectos físicos e econômicos" (Zhou et al., 2014, p. 367). O rompimento dos laços intergeracionais, embora raramente nomeado como luto, evidencia um sofrimento estrutural, institucionalmente negligenciado, mas psicologicamente devastador.

Há, ainda, um problema epistemológico que perpassa muitas dessas análises: a inadequação de instrumentos diagnósticos padronizados — concebidos em contextos ocidentais — para captar manifestações de sofrimento em populações culturalmente distintas. Urzúa et al. (2016), em pesquisa com imigrantes colombianos e peruanos no Chile, verificaram maior índice de sintomatologia entre indivíduos considerados "assimilados". Tal dado, no entanto, exige cautela. A assimilação, entendida como aderência ao novo contexto, pode ocultar fraturas internas, conflitos não simbolizados, expressões de dor que escapam às categorias avaliativas ocidentais. As escalas, quando aplicadas sem crítica, silenciam formas alternativas de expressão — somáticas, espirituais, ou ancoradas na ruptura do pertencimento (Urzúa et al., 2016). Nesse campo, tornar-se sensível às mediações culturais não é opcional: é condição para não incorrer em epistemicídios que apagam saberes e modos de existir.

Em síntese, os contextos migratórios não apenas produzem sofrimento: eles o organizam, o modulam, o revestem de sentidos específicos. Quando esse sofrimento atravessa sujeitos marcados por outros eixos de vulnerabilidade — infância, gênero, velhice, dependência química —, assume feições ainda mais complexas, muitas vezes invisíveis às abordagens clínicas tradicionais. É nesse horizonte que a teoria do luto migratório, com raízes na psicologia do apego de Bowlby (1969/1982) e desenvolvida em chave contemporânea por autoras como Franco (2021), se mostra analiticamente potente. Pois o sofrimento do imigrante raramente se reduz à esfera do indivíduo; ele é, antes, tecido existencial, experiência histórica e violência institucionalizada. Reconhecê-lo como tal é o primeiro passo para a construção de práticas terapêuticas e políticas públicas que não perpetuem o silenciamento, mas que acolham, historicizem e transformem.

b) Fatores de Risco e Vulnerabilidade

Como visto, a análise dos estudos revisados evidencia que os imigrantes estão submetidos a um conjunto de fatores de risco psicossocial que operam de forma articulada, intensificando sua exposição ao sofrimento psíquico. Entre os principais elementos recorrentes destacam-se a discriminação estrutural, o status migratório irregular, a separação familiar prolongada, e as barreiras de acesso aos serviços de saúde mental, que configuram dinâmicas de vulnerabilidade social acumulada e exclusão simbólica (Blukacz; Cabieses; Markkula, 2020; Murillo-Pedrozo Et Al., 2021).

A discriminação percebida figura como um dos determinantes mais consistentes da deterioração da saúde mental em contextos de migração. Em estudo

com a população venezuelana residente no Peru, foi constatado que indivíduos que relataram sofrer discriminação apresentaram 2,4 vezes mais chances de manifestar sintomas de sofrimento mental, como ansiedade, estresse e medo, em comparação aos que não se perceberam discriminados (Mougenot et al., 2021, p. 6). Esse dado é reforçado por análise de correspondência com propensity score matching, que confirmou um aumento de 3,5 pontos percentuais na probabilidade de apresentar problemas de saúde mental entre os discriminados. A experiência da discriminação, nesse sentido, deve ser compreendida não apenas como um episódio individual, mas como mecanismo sistêmico de exclusão e deslegitimação simbólica da presença migrante.

Outro fator crítico é o status migratório irregular. Estudos realizados com imigrantes haitianas no Brasil demonstram que a ausência de documentação legal acarreta múltiplas privações, desde a inserção precária no mercado de trabalho até o acesso desigual aos serviços públicos de saúde. No contexto da pandemia de COVID-19, essas mulheres relataram "escassos recursos econômicos, preconceito e racismo" como determinantes que comprometeram sua saúde mental, ainda que tenham se sentido acolhidas pela população local (Souza et al., 2020, p. 5). Trata-se de um caso emblemático de desamparo institucional, no qual a acolhida simbólica da sociedade civil não é acompanhada por garantias efetivas de proteção social.

A barreira no acesso aos serviços de saúde também aparece como fator estruturante da vulnerabilidade. Em estudo exploratório com adolescentes migrantes em Santiago do Chile, identificou-se que, apesar de conhecerem o sistema de saúde, muitos não o acessam devido a barreiras burocráticas, falta de informação e discriminação institucional. Um dos relatos mais ilustrativos menciona que "ainda que saibamos onde ir, não sabemos se vão nos atender, porque sempre perguntam pelos papéis" (Obach et al., 2020, p. 4). A interseção entre juventude, imigração e condição socioeconômica precária gera um efeito cumulativo de marginalização, sobretudo quando o acesso à saúde depende de critérios documentais rígidos.

A separação familiar, por sua vez, produz efeitos psíquicos profundos, especialmente quando envolve pais ou filhos deixados para trás. Murillo-Pedrozo et al. (2021), em pesquisa com imigrantes venezuelanos em Medellín, revelam que a migração forçada, motivada por crises humanitárias e instabilidade econômica, impõe rupturas abruptas nos vínculos familiares, gerando sofrimento emocional e sensação de descontinuidade. A ausência de redes de apoio, somada à dificuldade de obtenção de emprego formal, torna-se um ciclo de precarização: "A situação migratória foi apontada como determinante central na

piora da saúde física, mental e bucal dos participantes" (Murillo-Pedrozo Et Al., 2021, P. 7).

Esses dados apontam para a centralidade dos marcadores sociais da diferença — tais como gênero, etnia, classe e legalidade migratória — como elementos que modulam o sofrimento psíquico dos imigrantes. A vulnerabilidade não é apenas uma condição estática, mas sim um processo dinâmico, acumulativo e institucionalmente reproduzido. A título ilustrativo, Blukacz et al. (2020, p. 10) argumentam que, no caso chileno, "a saúde mental se converte em um privilégio para as populações imigrantes, dada a insuficiência estrutural das respostas estatais frente às suas necessidades específicas".

Diante da complexidade do cenário migratório contemporâneo, torna-se insustentável qualquer leitura que restrinja os fatores de risco à saúde mental dos imigrantes a um diagnóstico clínico individualizado. Há que se romper com essa lente estreita. O que se impõe é uma abordagem crítica, interseccional, capaz de enxergar como os próprios dispositivos institucionais — entre eles, as políticas migratórias e os sistemas de saúde — operam ora como mecanismos de acolhimento precário, ora como engrenagens de exclusão ativa. Ausentes respostas públicas articuladas, tanto no plano da proteção social quanto da assistência, o que resta é o desamparo. Um desamparo estruturado, produzido e reproduzido por Estados que, embora reconheçam fluxos migratórios, muitas vezes não reconhecem plenamente os sujeitos que os compõem.

Situações como deportações forçadas ou deslocamentos não planejados ativam circuitos de luto que, quando invisibilizados ou não elaborados, prolongam-se em estados persistentes de sofrimento. E esse luto, migratório em sua origem, é quase sempre silenciado — abafado por discursos que priorizam a integração econômica, a regularização jurídica, a adaptação normativa. Fala-se em trabalho, fala-se em legalidade; pouco se diz sobre o que se perdeu para chegar ali.

Mas não é apenas a perda que fere. Os estudos revisados indicam algo mais grave: é o vazio institucional diante dessas perdas que se constitui como agravante. O sofrimento psíquico não é resultado exclusivo da subjetividade vulnerável, mas também da falência das estruturas coletivas que deveriam sustentá-la. Quando o Estado falha — seja por barreiras burocráticas, pela ausência de mediação cultural, ou pela inexistência de políticas públicas intersetoriais — instala-se o que aqui se denomina desamparo institucional (Blukacz; Cabieses; Markkula, 2020). Uma negligência que não se limita à omissão, mas que assume contornos estruturais, reiterados, muitas vezes naturalizados.

Diante disso, os fatores de risco à saúde mental devem ser entendidos não como eventos

isolados, mas como camadas de um processo de vulnerabilização acumulada. A migração, quando atravessada por marcadores como raça, classe, etnia e status legal, deixa de ser apenas deslocamento geográfico. Torna-se vetor de desigualdade, força intensificadora de desproteção. E, nesse entrelaçamento, o que adoece não é apenas o corpo — é a narrativa, o pertencimento, a possibilidade de elaboração simbólica das perdas vividas.

c) Fatores Protetores e Estratégias de Enfrentamento

Embora frequentemente atravessados por múltiplas camadas de vulnerabilidade, os imigrantes não se mantêm passivos diante da adversidade. Ao contrário: constroem repertórios de enfrentamento, mobilizam saberes e ativam redes que, em seu conjunto, operam como formas de resistência psíquica. Esses fatores protetores não se distribuem de maneira uniforme. Emergindo em planos variados — do íntimo ao institucional —, modulam-se conforme o gênero, a idade, a trajetória migratória e o tecido sociopolítico que define o país de chegada. A literatura examinada revela estratégias profundamente enraizadas em contextos culturais, que funcionam como contrapesos à dor e dispositivos de recomposição simbólica.

Entre os elementos mais presentes nos relatos está a religiosidade. Não apenas como crença abstrata, mas enquanto prática cotidiana, partilhada e estruturante. Em uma revisão teórica sobre o tema, Freitas (2013) salienta que "a religiosidade constitui um recurso interno e externo que promove conforto emocional, sentido de continuidade simbólica e mediação com o novo contexto cultural" (Freitas, 2013, p. 438). Para muitos, sobretudo os recém-chegados, ela se converte em elo entre mundos: o que ficou e o que se impôs; o conhecido e o estranho. Atua como continente identitário, território de pertencimento e fonte de sentido em meio ao luto migratório e ao desmonte de vínculos.

Entre jovens migrantes, os caminhos de proteção psicológica percorrem outras rotas. Redes transnacionais, vínculos escolares e coletivos culturais compõem o alicerce da resiliência juvenil. Khanlou (2003), em estudo conduzido no Canadá, defende que qualquer estratégia de promoção da saúde mental entre adolescentes migrantes precisa incluir a dimensão comunitária. "Ações baseadas em vínculos escolares, culturais e comunitários fortalecem o senso de pertencimento e identidade, fatores diretamente associados à prevenção de distúrbios mentais" (Khanlou, 2003, p. 11). O conceito de resiliência, nesse contexto, amplia-se: não é apenas resistência interior, mas resultado de apoios múltiplos — afetivos, simbólicos e institucionais — operando em consonância.

Outro eixo relevante refere-se às redes familiares e comunitárias, cuja força simbólica se estende mesmo na ausência física. O estudo de Franken, Coutinho e Ramos (2012), realizado com brasileiros em Genebra, evidencia que a manutenção de vínculos com conterrâneos e a comunicação constante com familiares no país de origem representam formas eficazes de enfrentamento. "A continuidade dos vínculos afetivos, mesmo à distância, atenua os efeitos da solidão e promove a sensação de amparo emocional" (Franken; Coutinho; Ramos, 2012, p. 214), afirmam os autores. Tais dados se alinham ao conceito de capital social transnacional, no qual o afeto desloca-se, mas não se dissolve; ele conecta geografias, preserva pertenças e atua como escudo psíquico frente à fragmentação identitária.

Também se destacam os efeitos positivos da inserção em ambientes culturalmente inclusivos. No caso de adolescentes inseridos em programas escolares com enfoque intercultural, observa-se um deslocamento: a diversidade deixa de ser problema a ser corrigido e passa a ser recurso a ser valorizado. Khanlou (2003) observa que "ambientes educacionais que validam a diversidade cultural contribuem significativamente para o fortalecimento da autoestima e da identidade dos jovens" (Khanlou, 2003, p. 9). Nesses espaços, o enfrentamento adquire caráter culturalmente situado — não se trata de adaptação plena ao novo, mas de negociação simbólica entre o que se leva e o que se encontra.

No entanto, por mais eficazes que essas estratégias possam ser, elas não são panaceia. Apoio religioso, redes de vizinhança ou vínculos familiares não neutralizam, por si só, os efeitos corrosivos da exclusão estrutural. A precariedade econômica, a insegurança jurídica, a ausência de políticas públicas consistentes tensionam até mesmo os recursos de enfrentamento mais sólidos. Freitas (2013) alerta que "a religiosidade pode oferecer recursos significativos ao enfrentamento psíquico, mas não deve ser romantizada como solução universal para as dificuldades enfrentadas por migrantes" (Freitas, 2013, p. 442). Há ainda os conflitos internos às próprias redes, marcadas, muitas vezes, por sobrecarga, ambivalência e tensões acumuladas em contextos de escassez compartilhada.

Diante disso, a leitura dos fatores protetores não pode prescindir da crítica estrutural. Se, por um lado, os imigrantes demonstram agência e engenhosidade ao reconstruir rotas de sentido e cuidado, por outro, tais esforços só se sustentam quando amparados por políticas públicas efetivas. Promover saúde mental entre migrantes é, portanto, reconhecer a potência de suas práticas culturais, mas também garantir condições materiais e simbólicas para que tais práticas não se esgotem no esforço individual. É nesse entrecruzamento — entre o que os sujeitos constroem e o que o Estado garante — que se define o horizonte ético e político de um cuidado verdadeiramente inclusivo.

d) *Diferenças Interseccionais*

A experiência de ser imigrante, longe de constituir vivência homogênea, desdobra-se em múltiplas camadas, atravessadas por marcadores sociais como gênero, nacionalidade, etnia, idade, classe e posição geracional. Não há um sujeito migrante genérico. O sofrimento psíquico, o acesso (ou sua negação) aos cuidados em saúde mental e as estratégias acionadas para enfrentamento não apenas variam — elas se reconfiguram em função desses marcadores, muitas vezes invisibilizados pelos sistemas públicos e pelas práticas clínicas hegemônicas. É precisamente a abordagem interseccional que permite iluminar essas sobreposições, revelando a lógica seletiva da vulnerabilidade.

Uma amostra clara dessa complexidade encontra-se no estudo de Alcántara, Chen e Alegría (2014), ao investigarem a relação entre mobilidade social percebida e episódios depressivos em diferentes subgrupos latinos nos Estados Unidos. Descobriu-se que a percepção de declínio socioeconômico após a migração impactava a saúde mental — e o fazia de forma desigual: porto-riquenhos e outros latinos foram mais afetados que mexicanos e cubanos. Como afirmam os autores, "a percepção de perda de status social após a migração pode ser um determinante independente da saúde mental, sobretudo quando combinada com barreiras de acesso a oportunidades nos países de acolhimento" (Alcántara; Chen; Alegría, 2014, p. 101). Não se trata apenas de perdas objetivas, mas de percepções subjetivas de queda e exclusão, que, somadas ao racismo estrutural e à precarização laboral, produzem efeitos psíquicos desiguais mesmo entre migrantes rotulados sob a mesma etnicidade.

Os entraves ao acesso também não se distribuem de maneira uniforme. Bucay-Harari et al. (2020), ao estudar uma comunidade latina emergente nos EUA, identificaram que mulheres oriundas do chamado Triângulo Norte da América Central — Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala — apresentavam taxas elevadas de diagnósticos relacionados a transtornos do humor e da ansiedade. Entretanto, raramente buscavam cuidados formais. Por quê? O medo da deportação, o estigma, as barreiras linguísticas. "A dor física era frequentemente utilizada como motivo para acessar os serviços, o que pode refletir altos índices de somatização de sofrimento psíquico em populações femininas imigrantes" (Bucay-Harari et al., 2020, p. 392). Nesse cenário, a dor desloca-se: ela não se cala, mas se traduz em sintomas culturalmente "aceitáveis", camuflando o que não encontra escuta.

O marcador geracional adiciona outra camada de complexidade. Urzúa, Boudon e Caqueo-Urízar (2016), ao explorarem estratégias de aculturação entre imigrantes colombianos e peruanos no norte do Chile, notaram padrões distintos conforme idade, origem e método de integração. A assimilação, tendência mais forte entre peruanos, esteve relacionada a maior sofrimento psíquico e dificuldades nas interações sociais. Já entre colombianos, prevaleceu a separação cultural — que, embora também gerasse tensão, implicava nuances distintas. Segundo os autores, a idade atua como moderadora: "indivíduos mais velhos tendem a manter vínculos com sua cultura de origem e rejeitar a assimilação, o que pode protegê-los parcialmente do impacto psíquico da migração" (Urzúa; Boudon; Caqueo-Urízar, 2016, p. 235). Em suma: manter raízes pode ser menos custoso que arrancá-las.

O fator geracional também aparece de modo contundente em Breslau et al. (2007), que compararam imigrantes mexicanos residentes nos Estados Unidos com aqueles que permaneceram no México. Constatou-se que os transtornos de humor e ansiedade eram mais prevalentes entre os primeiros — especialmente nas coortes nascidas entre 1970 e 1985. A explicação? Intensificação dos controles migratórios, recrudescimento das condições de recepção, precariedade prolongada. "A migração afeta de maneira mais intensa as coortes nascidas entre 1970 e 1985, sugerindo um efeito geracional relacionado à intensificação do controle migratório e à precarização das condições de recepção" (Breslau et al., 2007, p. 119). A história política inscreve-se no corpo.

Quando se entrecruzam gênero e geração, o impacto psíquico da migração torna-se ainda mais visível — e mais silenciado. Bucay-Harari et al. (2020) relatam que mulheres adultas migrantes, ao se tornarem cuidadoras principais em cenários de pobreza, vivenciam sobrecarga emocional, desproteção institucional e ausência de suporte social. Por sua vez, adolescentes não acompanhados — sem rede familiar, marcados por discriminações interseccionais — apresentam sintomas cumulativos, muitas vezes invisíveis, como apontado por Obach et al. (2020) em estudo com jovens migrantes em Santiago do Chile. A ausência de escuta institucionalizada para essa juventude imigrante produz uma espécie de apagamento do sofrimento, que se prolonga em silêncio ou se traduz em condutas patologizadas.

Os dados aqui reunidos indicam que os fatores protetores e estratégias de enfrentamento não operam em campo neutro. Seu acesso, ativação e eficácia variam drasticamente de acordo com a posição que o sujeito ocupa na hierarquia social e migratória. Como bem alertam Alegría et al. (2008), "os sistemas de saúde tendem a tratar os latinos como um grupo homogêneo, negligenciando as variações internas que são cruciais para o cuidado em saúde mental culturalmente competente" (apud Alcántara; Chen; Alegría, 2014, p. 95). Tal homogeneização, longe de ser inócua, reproduz a exclusão sob a máscara da universalidade.

Reconhecer as diferenças interseccionais na experiência migratória não é um apelo teórico. É exigência ética. É condição para nomear adequadamente o sofrimento, desenhar intervenções mais precisas e conceber políticas públicas que respondam, efetivamente, às vidas plurais dos que migram. Ignorá-las é perpetuar o apagamento. É consolidar sistemas de saúde mental que, embora proclamem equidade, produzem desatenção onde mais se precisa de cuidado.

III. A Experiencia Migratória e os Reflexos do Apego e do Luto

Migração, quando abrupta, imprevista, desconectada de qualquer possibilidade de preparação psíquica, atua como um gatilho fulminante sobre os circuitos do apego. Não se trata apenas de deslocamento geográfico; é o chão interno que se rompe. O pensamento de John Bowlby, formulado inicialmente para explicar os vínculos entre crianças e seus cuidadores primários, oferece aqui uma lente de rara potência: o apego não desaparece na vida adulta — ele se transmuta, se relocaliza, persiste.

Ao se perder, de forma compulsória, o vínculo com aquilo que representava amparo — um rosto, uma língua, um cheiro, um rito —, o organismo reage. Não como escolha racional, mas como reflexo de sobrevivência emocional. Bowlby (1982) conceituou esse processo em termos claros: a base segura some e, com ela, vem o protesto, o desespero, a ruptura da autorregulação. Não são apenas lembranças que faltam; é a própria arquitetura do sentir que desaba.

No rastro dessa perda — muitas vezes invisível, mas profundamente concreta — instalam-se as síndromes contemporâneas do desencaixe: ansiedade difusa, depressão persistente, sintomas de TEPT que não cessam, abuso de substâncias como tentativa de anestesiar o irrepresentável (Kokou-Kpolou Et Al., 2020; Ferreira; Borges, 2022). O que esses quadros compartilham? Uma perda que não foi elaborada, um luto suspenso em sua travessia, uma dor que não encontrou linguagem. Bowlby, mais uma vez, nos serve: o sistema de apego, sem reposição simbólica, permanece em alerta.

A contribuição de Kokou-Kpolou e colaboradores (2020) é contundente: adultos refugiados, expostos a perdas violentas e cumulativas, revelam taxas alarmantes de *Prolonged Grief Disorder* — luto que não cicatriza, pois não há ritual, nem nome, nem escuta. Quando o adeus não pode ser dito, o vínculo não se desfaz; ele se fossiliza na forma de sintoma. Franco (2021) denomina esse processo como luto complicado, e com razão: não é apenas o que se perde, mas o que se impede de ser lamentado.

Não bastassem as perdas, há o solo inóspito da chegada. Xenofobia, documentos negados, empregos instáveis, línguas que ferem. Como reconstruir vínculos nesse cenário? A base segura, agora, precisa ser inventada. E muitas vezes, não há matéria-prima. Ferreira e Borges (2022), ao analisarem a vivência de estudantes latino-americanos em mobilidade, apontam para uma dor menos espetacular, porém crônica: a ausência de familiaridade, o exílio afetivo, a solidão de quem tenta, dia após dia, reencontrar um norte emocional em terreno estrangeiro.

É nesse entrelugar — entre aquilo que se perdeu e o que não se consegue construir — que os fatores de risco se evidenciam. Desemprego, racismo velado ou escancarado, distanciamento de redes de apoio, desautorização simbólica. Cada elemento atua como erosão na estrutura psíquica (Pereira; Filho, 2014). O status migratório irregular, em particular, configura-se como uma violência contínua: mais que condição jurídica, uma vivência de clandestinidade emocional.

Destaca-se, nesse panorama, a dor quase inaudível dos que permanecem longe de seus laços originários. A separação prolongada dos familiares — sobretudo em contextos onde o reencontro é improvável — funciona como campo fértil para a instalação de angústia difusa, culpa, desamparo. O estudo de Ferreira e Borges (2022) é claro: o luto simbólico que emerge nesses contextos não é episódico, mas contínuo, quase geológico. E aqui, novamente, o olhar de Bowlby se mostra crucial. Sem a figura de apego, a co-regulação emocional — esse processo essencial de compartilhar afetos e sentidos — se interrompe, deixando o sujeito à mercê de um vazio que não cessa (Cassidy, 2013).

Pereira e Filho (2014) cunham, com precisão incômoda, o termo "vazio estrutural" para nomear o estado em que o sujeito, desprovido de suas âncoras identitárias — sejam elas linguísticas, culturais, espirituais ou relacionais —, vaga sem lastro em um novo território onde o reconhecimento é ausente e o sentido, instável. Trata-se de um vácuo simbólico, não facilmente preenchido. Quando os antigos códigos de pertencimento colapsam e nenhum novo repertório os substitui, o luto torna-se um campo não arado. Franco (2021) aponta: sofrimento sem nome, sem validação social, tende a se enrijecer em formas complicadas de dor — intransitáveis, insusceptíveis à cura.

E antes mesmo de atravessar fronteiras, há aqueles cuja biografia já acumula estilhaços. Refugiados vindos de guerras, perseguições, catástrofes políticas e humanitárias — sujeitos atravessados por perdas inomináveis, mortes violentas, desaparecimentos. Kokou-Kpolou et al. (2020) oferecem números alarmantes: mais de um terço dos adultos refugiados examinados manifesta sintomas compatíveis com *Prolonged Grief Disorder* (PGD). A dor, aqui, é composta. Múltipla e reiterada. Perdas familiares de primeiro grau, memórias de tortura,

isolamento no país receptor. Não apenas experiências de perda, mas falhas sucessivas no que Bowlby entenderia como tentativas frustradas de reconstituição do apego — uma ausência de continência que mina as possibilidades de reorganização psíquica.

Nem todos os lutos, contudo, doem da mesma forma. Gênero. Raça. Idade. Essas variáveis inscrevem-se no corpo da experiência migratória como vetores que ampliam ou restringem o sofrimento. Mulheres — sobretudo quando racializadas — não apenas atravessam as fronteiras: são atravessadas por elas. Violência sexual, informalidade laboral, solidão em contextos sobrecarregados de cuidado não compartilhado (Ferreira; Borges, 2022). Para as crianças e adolescentes, o luto se manifesta em fissuras mais sutis: quebras no percurso educacional, separações abruptas, perda da estabilidade parental. Medeiros e Fortes (2019) observam que, sem a presença consistente de figuras de apego, a arquitetura emocional do sujeito em formação tende à fragmentação.

Mas nem só de escombros é feita a travessia. A literatura também revela respiros. Pequenas engrenagens simbólicas que, quando ativadas, podem amortecer o impacto da perda. Bowlby (1982) já afirmava: o sistema de apego é adaptativo, busca reparar-se. E em alguns casos, consegue. Redes comunitárias, vínculos interpessoais emergentes, espaços de escuta institucional — todos esses elementos funcionam, ainda que parcialmente, como próteses afetivas. São substituições imperfeitas, sim, mas fundamentais.

A religiosidade, por exemplo, aparece reiteradamente como eixo organizador da experiência migratória. Ferreira e Borges (2022), ao analisarem a vivência de estudantes universitários, revelam que a interação com outros imigrantes, somada ao acolhimento institucional, oferece um espaço de ressignificação. A fé, em contextos de deslocamento forçado, não se reduz a crença: é cartografia existencial. Pereira e Filho (2014) captam essa dimensão ao descreverem a religiosidade como moldura simbólica que dá nome à dor, oferece direção e reinventa pertencimentos.

Eis, então, o paradoxo: quando o passado não pode ser reconectado e o futuro ainda é incerto, a construção de novos vínculos emerge como urgência e como resistência. Franco (2021) é assertiva — não se trata de esquecer, mas de refazer. Quando a dor encontra forma, quando o apego encontra outro corpo, outro lugar, outra linguagem, o luto deixa de ser prisão e se transforma em passagem.

IV. Conclusão

Atravessar fronteiras pode parecer, à distância, um gesto de coragem. Mas no íntimo da travessia, o que se instala é um terremoto psíquico — e seus tremores, silenciosos, reverberam no corpo, na fala, nos sonhos. Esta revisão integrativa delineia o modo como a condição de imigrante infiltra-se na saúde mental. Não como um evento isolado, mas como uma trama de sofrimentos: ansiedade que se arrasta, depressões sem nome, vestígios de traumas condensados em corpos tensos, lutos que não cessam, substâncias que anestesiam o inominável.

Ao se aplicar a lente da Teoria do Apego, concebida por John Bowlby, esses sintomas ganham contorno inteligível — não apenas clínico, mas existencial. Cada quadro de dor aponta para ausências: vínculos rompidos sem despedida, figuras de segurança obliteradas pelo deslocamento, uma arquitetura interna que desmorona por falta de sustentação afetiva. O migrar — compreendido aqui como corte, e não apenas deslocamento — equivale a um luto plural: pessoas deixadas, lugares perdidos, papéis esvaziados, idiomas silenciados. Uma perda que não se limita ao que morre, mas ao que se desenraiza.

Bowlby oferece mais do que um modelo explicativo; propõe uma ontologia relacional: perder o outro é, em alguma medida, perder a si. Se o ambiente receptor falha em oferecer novas âncoras — afetivas, institucionais, simbólicas —, o sofrimento não apenas perdura: ele se transforma. Torna-se crônico, se acumula, enreda-se em retraumatizações sucessivas (Kokou-Kpolou Et Al., 2020; Ferreira; Borges, 2022; Franco, 2021).

E o que intensifica essa dor? Não é apenas a perda, mas o contexto em que ela se dá. Racismo sutil ou escancarado. Leis migratórias excludentes. Falta de acesso a cuidados básicos. Ausência de reconhecimento social. Desamparo legal que se torna também simbólico. Tais elementos, longe de serem acessórios, constituem o solo em que o sofrimento germina — um solo estéril para o cuidado, fértil para o colapso.

Mas nem todo cenário é devastação. Entre as ruínas, brotam também pontos de sustentação. Redes informais, comunidades religiosas, grupos de apoio entre pares, espaços educativos e projetos de continuidade identitária atuam como pequenas ilhas de segurança emocional. Ainda que precárias, são elas que permitem ao sujeito, por vezes, reconstruir — com outros materiais, noutra geografia — uma nova base segura.

O recorte interseccional amplia a profundidade do olhar. O luto migratório não se distribui de maneira equânime. Há corpos mais expostos. Mulheres enfrentam a sobrecarga dos cuidados e a sombra da violência sexual. Crianças experimentam quebras na rotina afetiva e educacional. Idosos carregam memórias que não encontram tradução no novo contexto.

Pessoas racializadas convivem com a desautorização cotidiana de sua dor. Cada uma dessas experiências exige não apenas compreensão, mas ação. Políticas públicas que reconheçam a complexidade, a singularidade e o acúmulo dessas camadas de vulnerabilidade.

É nesse entrelaçamento entre teoria e urgência prática que este estudo finca sua aposta: a Teoria do Apego, longe de ser uma abstração clínica, deve ocupar lugar na formulação de estratégias de cuidado em saúde mental voltadas à população imigrante. Reconhecer as perdas desses sujeitos como lutos legítimos — ainda que não demarcados por mortes formais — é mais que uma exigência técnica. Trata-se de um imperativo ético. Reparar simbolicamente o que se perdeu não é apenas curar; é reconhecer que houve vínculo, e que houve dor.

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Violence, Bullying, and Sexual Harassment in Tourism and Hospitality Industry: A Global Perspective

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Abstract- The tourism and hospitality industry, while a cornerstone of global economic development and cultural exchange, is increasingly scrutinized for its endemic issues surrounding workplace violence, bullying, and sexual harassment. This sector, characterized by high employee turnover, precarious employment conditions, and power asymmetries between workers, guests, and management, presents fertile ground for such misconduct. Globally, frontline employees—often women, young workers, and migrants—are disproportionately affected, with incidents ranging from verbal abuse and intimidation to physical and sexual assault. Factors such as inadequate legal protections, cultural normalization of inappropriate behavior, and insufficient training or reporting mechanisms exacerbate the issue. Cross-cultural differences further complicate definitions and responses to misconduct, making it difficult to establish universal standards. This abstract examines the scope and dynamics of these challenges across different regions, emphasizing the need for multinational policy interventions, industry-wide codes of conduct, and a shift toward inclusive and safe work environments. Addressing these issues is not only a moral imperative but also a business necessity, as worker well-being is intrinsically linked to service quality, employee retention, and the industry's long-term sustainability.

Keywords: violence, bullying, sexual harassment, tourism, hospitality.

GJHSS-A Classification: HV6250.4.T68

VIOLENCEBULLYINGANDSEXUALHARASSMENTINTOURISMANDHOSPITALITYINDUSTRYAGLOBALPERSPECTIVE

Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:

Violence, Bullying, and Sexual Harassment in Tourism and Hospitality Industry: A Global Perspective

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I. Introduction

The tourism and hospitality industry is one of the world's largest and fastest-growing economic sectors, employing hundreds of millions of people across hotels, resorts, restaurants, cruise lines, airlines, travel agencies, and entertainment venues (Baum, 2015; WTTC, 2023). Characterized by high levels of interpersonal interaction, long and irregular working hours, and pressure to deliver consistent customer satisfaction, this industry depends heavily on the labor and emotional commitment of its workforce (Lugosi et al., 2016). Yet, behind its polished exterior lies a troubling and persistent undercurrent of workplace issues—most notably, violence, bullying, and sexual harassment. These forms of mistreatment are alarmingly widespread and often go unreported, unnoticed, or unpunished (Ram, 2015; Pizam et al., 2016; UNWTO, 2021).

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Workplace violence can include physical assaults, threats, intimidation, and verbal abuse, often exacerbated by factors such as alcohol consumption, stressful situations, and limited security (Pizam & Shani, 2016). Bullying typically manifests in the form of psychological aggression, humiliation, exclusion, or persistent criticism from supervisors, peers, or customers (Yagil, 2008). Sexual harassment, a particularly pervasive issue in the industry, includes unwelcome sexual advances, inappropriate comments, coercion, or physical harassment (Gettman & Gelfand, 2007; Ram, 2015). The cumulative effect of these behaviors can be devastating—not only to the victims but to organizations themselves, which suffer from increased staff turnover, decreased productivity, and reputational damage (Hoel & Einarsen, 2003).

What makes these challenges more difficult to combat is the normalization of abusive behavior in many workplace cultures. Employees are often socialized to tolerate mistreatment as part of their job (Guerrier & Adib, 2000). Frontline service workers, in particular, are trained to prioritize the comfort and satisfaction of guests, often at the expense of their own dignity and safety (Korczynski, 2002). Management may be complicit—whether by minimizing complaints, failing to act decisively, or engaging in the misconduct themselves (Poulston, 2008). In some cases, business interests and profits are prioritized over employee well-being, leading to a workplace environment where inappropriate behavior is excused or overlooked to retain valuable clients or avoid negative publicity (Baum, 2015).

The lack of effective legislation and enforcement mechanisms further compounds the issue. In many countries, labor laws do not adequately address harassment and violence in the service industry, or they are poorly enforced (ILO, 2022). Moreover, workers on temporary contracts, working informally, or employed through third-party agencies often fall outside the scope of legal protections (UNWTO, 2021). The result is a climate of impunity, where victims fear retaliation, loss of employment, or reputational harm if they speak out (Ram, 2015).

Despite the severity and scope of the problem, there is growing recognition—among scholars, activists, policymakers, and industry leaders—of the need to

tackle workplace violence, bullying, and sexual harassment in tourism and hospitality. Efforts to bring about change are evident in initiatives to develop comprehensive anti-harassment policies, provide employee training, strengthen legal frameworks, and shift cultural norms (ILO, 2022; UNWTO, 2021). Yet, these efforts are often fragmented, underfunded, or implemented unevenly across regions and organizations (Poulston, 2008).

II. Methodology

This study adopts a *qualitative, secondary data-based research methodology* to examine the nature, causes, and impacts of violence, bullying, and sexual harassment in the tourism and hospitality industry from a global perspective. The methodology is designed to synthesize existing knowledge from academic literature, industry reports, and institutional data to identify patterns, challenges, and best practices internationally. Secondary data was selected due to its ability to provide a wide-ranging, cross-cultural view of industry practices, allowing for comparative analysis across regions and organizational contexts.

a) Data Sources

The data for this research was gathered from a variety of reputable and relevant sources, including:

Academic Journals: Peer-reviewed literature from databases such as Scopus, JSTOR, Science Direct, and Google Scholar was reviewed to assess empirical studies, theoretical frameworks, and case studies.

Industry Reports: Publications from organizations such as the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO), International Labour Organization (ILO), World Travel & Tourism Council (WTTC), and Hospitality industry associations provided sector-specific insights and statistics.

News Articles and Case Reports: Global news platforms and documented legal cases provided context-specific examples and recent developments.

Company Policies and HR Guidelines: Publicly available documents from major hospitality brands (e.g., Marriott, Hilton) were analyzed to evaluate corporate strategies addressing misconduct.

III. Defining Key Terms and Concepts

A foundational step in addressing violence, bullying, and sexual harassment in the tourism and hospitality industry is to define and understand these terms in the context of workplace dynamics. Each of these issues involves distinct behaviors and consequences, but they are also interrelated and often occur concurrently. Clear definitions help distinguish between unacceptable conduct and misunderstandings, guide policy development, and provide a framework for

legal and ethical accountability (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2022; Ram, 2015).

a) Violence in the Workplace

Workplace violence is typically defined by the World Health Organization (WHO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) as any incident in which a person is abused, threatened, or assaulted in circumstances related to their work (WHO & ILO, 2002). In the tourism and hospitality sector, such violence can be physical, verbal, or psychological. It may come from customers, coworkers, supervisors, or even strangers (Pizam & Shani, 2016).

Violence in this industry is often fueled by long working hours, high emotional demands, and the service-based nature of interactions with customers, which can become confrontational (Yagil, 2008). Examples include physical assaults (pushing, hitting, grabbing), verbal threats or yelling, and aggressive customer behavior—often under the influence of alcohol or drugs—as well as hostile confrontations between colleagues or between staff and supervisors (Guerrier & Adib, 2000; Poulston, 2008).

Due to the public-facing nature of many roles, especially in hotels, restaurants, and nightclubs, workers are particularly vulnerable to client-perpetrated violence. The risk is heightened in jobs that involve money handling, working alone, or late-night shifts (ILO, 2022).

b) Bullying

Bullying, also referred to as psychological or emotional harassment, involves repeated, deliberate actions intended to intimidate, degrade, isolate, or undermine another individual (Hoel & Einarsen, 2003). Unlike isolated conflicts or disagreements, bullying is systematic and persistent.

In the hospitality workplace, bullying might include constant criticism or belittling of an employee's work, social exclusion or silent treatment, spreading rumors or gossip, assigning impossible deadlines or unrealistic expectations, or threatening job security to control or coerce (Poulston, 2008; Ram, 2015).

Bullying can be vertical (between different levels of hierarchy) or horizontal (among peers). For instance, a manager may belittle a staff member in front of colleagues, or a group of employees might ostracize a new team member. In many instances, bullying is disguised as "tough management" or "joking around," making it difficult to identify and address (Guerrier & Adib, 2000; Yagil, 2008).

A unique challenge in the tourism and hospitality industry is the normalization of toxic behavior under the banner of maintaining standards or performance pressure, especially in high-end establishments (Baum, 2015; Poulston, 2008).

c) *Sexual Harassment*

Sexual harassment refers to any unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature that creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment (United Nations, 2020). According to the UN, sexual harassment includes both quid pro quo harassment (where job benefits are conditional on sexual favors) and hostile work environment harassment (where behavior creates an offensive atmosphere).

In the tourism and hospitality industry, this may involve inappropriate touching or groping, sexually suggestive jokes or comments, unwanted flirting or advances from customers or coworkers, sharing explicit content at work, and coercive behavior from supervisors implying professional rewards or threats based on compliance (Gettman & Gelfand, 2007; Ram, 2015).

Hospitality workers—particularly women, LGBTQ+ individuals, and migrants—are especially vulnerable. Many work in precarious roles and fear retaliation or job loss if they report misconduct (UNWTO, 2021; Pizam & Shani, 2016). Since the industry promotes "service with a smile," professional boundaries are often blurred, and inappropriate behavior may be tolerated or dismissed (Guerrier & Adib, 2000).

d) *Discrimination and Intersectionality*

While violence, bullying, and harassment can affect any worker, discrimination based on gender, race, ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, or disability can exacerbate these experiences. Intersectionality—a term coined by legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989)—explains how overlapping identities (e.g., being both female and a migrant worker) intensify vulnerability.

In hospitality, where the workforce is often diverse, systemic bias is common. Racialized workers may be assigned less desirable shifts, overlooked for promotions, or treated differently by management and guests (Baum, 2015; UNWTO, 2021). When discrimination intersects with harassment or bullying, the resulting harm is magnified, and reporting mechanisms become even less accessible.

e) *Customer-Perpetrated Misconduct*

Customer-perpetrated harassment is a major but under-addressed issue in the hospitality industry. Employees are often expected to tolerate inappropriate behavior to avoid guest complaints, negative reviews, or loss of business (Yagil, 2008; Ram, 2015). This includes enduring sexual comments, threats, or abuse without intervention from management, who may prioritize guest satisfaction over staff safety (Guerrier & Adib, 2000).

The "customer is always right" mentality creates a power imbalance that strips workers of agency and reinforces a culture where abuse is excused if it protects profits (Poulston, 2008).

f) *Cultural and Organizational Silence*

Organizational silence—when institutions fail to acknowledge or address internal issues—is widespread in hospitality. It is driven by concerns over brand reputation, unclear reporting structures, lack of faith in HR, and fear of retaliation or job insecurity (Morrison & Milliken, 2000; ILO, 2022). High turnover and informal work arrangements further discourage whistle-blowing.

This silence enables harmful behavior to persist and signals institutional complicity. When employers ignore complaints or downplay misconduct, it reinforces the idea that harassment and violence are normal parts of the job (Poulston, 2008).

g) *Emotional Labor*

Sociologist Arlie Hochschild (1983) introduced the concept of emotional labor, which refers to the management of emotions to fulfill job requirements. In hospitality, this often means remaining calm, cheerful, and polite—even in the face of mistreatment.

While emotional labor is central to hospitality service, it becomes exploitative when workers are expected to absorb abuse without support or redress. Over time, this leads to emotional exhaustion, stress, and burnout (Grandey et al., 2005; Zapf & Holz, 2006).

Understanding these concepts—violence, bullying, sexual harassment, discrimination, customer misconduct, organizational silence, and emotional labor—is essential for addressing the systemic roots of mistreatment in hospitality. These issues are not isolated incidents; they are shaped by workplace culture, economic structures, and entrenched power imbalances.

IV. Prevalence and Nature of the Problem

a) *Global Overview*

Workplace violence, bullying, and harassment in the tourism and hospitality industry are alarmingly widespread. According to a 2022 ILO report, workers in accommodation and food services experience significantly higher rates of violence and harassment than most other sectors. The study found that 1 in 3 hospitality workers had experienced verbal abuse, and over 20% reported sexual harassment—mainly from customers (ILO, 2022).

In the United States, a 2021 survey by UNITE HERE found that 58% of hotel workers had experienced sexual harassment (UNITE HERE, 2021). In the UK, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) reported in 2017 that 68% of hospitality workers under 25 had experienced workplace harassment, including sexual and verbal abuse (TUC, 2017).

In Asia and the Middle East, limited legal protections and cultural stigma contribute to under-reporting, but media and NGO reports suggest high

levels of abuse—especially among women and migrant workers (UNWTO, 2021).

b) Industry-Specific Characteristics

Several structural features of hospitality heighten the risk of misconduct:

Customer-Facing Roles: Constant guest interaction increases the likelihood of verbal or sexual abuse, especially when employees are discouraged from confronting misconduct (Yagil, 2008).

Alcohol and Nighttime Economy: Many jobs involve serving intoxicated patrons in late-night settings without adequate security, increasing risk (Pizam & Shani, 2016).

Gendered Labor: Women dominate in housekeeping, reception, and food service roles, where physical proximity to guests and isolation (e.g., in hotel rooms) make them particularly vulnerable (Baum, 2015).

Precarious Employment: High reliance on temporary, seasonal, and outsourced labor creates fear around reporting, especially among migrant workers whose visa status may depend on employment (ILO, 2022; UNWTO, 2021).

c) Common Forms of Violence and Harassment

Verbal Abuse: The most common form, often minimized as part of the service role, includes yelling, swearing, or threats from guests (Poulston, 2008).

Sexual Comments & Touching: Workers, especially women, frequently report unwanted touching or suggestive remarks—often from intoxicated guests (Ram, 2015).

Bullying by Managers: A top-down culture often enables abusive supervision, justified as enforcing standards, especially in kitchens and high-pressure venues (Hoel & Einarsen, 2003).

Online Harassment: As hospitality operations move online, workers now face cyberbullying through messaging platforms, review sites, and social media—an area with limited regulation (Yagil, 2008).

d) Underreporting and Silence

Despite the frequency of abuse and harassment in the hospitality industry, incidents are vastly underreported. Multiple intersecting barriers discourage victims from speaking out (ILO, 2022; Ram, 2015):

Fear of Retaliation: Workers fear being demoted, denied shifts, or blacklisted—especially in small or tightly networked labor markets (Poulston, 2008).

Lack of Trust in HR: Many employees view human resource departments as tools of management, not as support systems (Morrison & Milliken, 2000).

Normalization: Young or new workers may assume harassment is part of the job, particularly when such

behavior is minimized or laughed off by more senior staff (Guerrier & Adib, 2000).

Power Imbalance: Migrant workers may lack knowledge of their rights or face linguistic and cultural barriers that prevent them from reporting abuse (Baum, 2015).

Reputational Concerns: Organizations may discourage complaints or settle them quietly to protect their brand, often failing to discipline perpetrators (Yagil, 2008).

These conditions foster a *culture of silence,* where abuse is tolerated and victims remain unsupported.

e) Impact of COVID-19

The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing workplace vulnerabilities. As lockdowns, layoffs, and rehiring disrupted the hospitality workforce, employees were rehired under even more precarious conditions (UNWTO, 2021; ILO, 2022). New forms of abuse and stress emerged:

Enforcement backlash: Staff enforcing public health measures (e.g., masks, distancing) became targets of aggression from resistant customers (UNITE HERE, 2021).

Job Insecurity: Increased unemployment risk made workers more hesitant to report mistreatment or harassment (ILO, 2022).

Reduced Oversight: Skeleton staffing left fewer witnesses or support personnel during incidents, further increasing vulnerability (TUC, 2021).

However, the pandemic also spotlighted the essential nature of service work, prompting *greater labor activism* and advocacy for safe and fair working conditions in hospitality (UNWTO, 2021).

f) The Role of Intersectionality

Intersectionality—the concept that social identities (such as race, gender, class, and migration status) intersect to shape individuals' experiences—plays a key role in workplace harassment (Crenshaw, 1989). Not all employees face the same risks:

Racialized women often experience *dual discrimination* and higher rates of harassment and stereotyping (Baum, 2015; Ram, 2015).

LGBTQ+ workers are disproportionately subject to exclusion, slurs, or forced concealment of identity (Pizam & Shani, 2016).

Migrant laborers may not have adequate legal protections or language skills to report misconduct (ILO, 2022).

Young workers and interns are often seen as easier targets due to their lack of experience and social power (TUC, 2017).

Understanding how these overlapping identities impact risk is essential for creating *equitable and*

inclusive policies that address the full spectrum of worker vulnerability.

V. Root Causes and Contributing Factors

The tourism and hospitality industry, while often perceived as glamorous, unfortunately faces significant challenges related to violence, bullying, and sexual harassment. These issues are deeply rooted in a combination of industry-specific characteristics, power dynamics, organizational culture, and broader societal factors.

a) Industry-Specific Characteristics

High Stress and Demanding Work Environment: The industry is characterized by long, irregular, and unsocial work hours, intense service situations, high emotional labor, and often demanding physical work. This can lead to increased stress, burnout, and a heightened likelihood of conflict and aggression among staff and from customers. The intricate work environment in the hospitality industry, which includes volatile employment, uncomfortable working environments, stressful service situations, poor wages, long and unsocial work hours, emotional labor, the failure to adopt formal HRM mechanisms, and power imbalance, makes it a fertile environment for workplace bullying (Ram, 2018; Nimri et al., 2025).

Customer-Centric Culture ("Customer is King"): The strong emphasis on customer satisfaction can pressure employees to tolerate inappropriate behavior from guests, fearing negative consequences like reduced tips, poor reviews, or job loss. This creates an environment where customer misconduct can be overlooked or even implicitly encouraged by management. These service cultures imply that customers, as paying clients, may abuse and even make unwanted advancements towards workers without evident penalties, while workers are expected to tolerate it and remain silent (Kim et al., 2014), or even accept it 'as part of the job' (Poulston, 2008) (Ram, 2018). Because customer experience is often prioritised, customers are placed in a position of power where their behaviour can often be overlooked, creating a culture of tolerance where employees feel more pressure to put up with harassment from customers (Culture Shift, 2024).

Close Contact between Staff and Customers: The nature of hospitality involves frequent and often close interactions between employees and guests. This can blur boundaries, making employees, particularly front-of-house staff, vulnerable to unwanted attention and inappropriate behavior. Factors that contribute to the prevalence of sexual harassment in the hospitality sector include the nature of customer interactions– characterized by proximity and personalized service– which might create an environment where inappropriate

behavior may be ignored (Gilbert, Guerrier, & Guy, 1998; Ram, 2018) (EHL Insights, 2024).

Alcohol Consumption: In settings like bars and restaurants, alcohol consumption by guests is a significant aggravating factor, impairing judgment and increasing the risk of aggressive and inappropriate behavior. Along with high levels of young workers and female employees, the late-night nature of the industry which often involves alcohol... creates a breeding ground for sexual harassment and an industry wide culture that normalises this behaviour (Culture Shift, 2024).

Precarious Employment and Low Wages: A significant portion of the hospitality workforce consists of low-wage, "atypical" workers (e.g., part-time, fixed-term, or zero-hours contracts). This leads to job insecurity, making employees less likely to report incidents due to fear of retaliation or losing their income. Power imbalances associated with low-skilled, low-status work and insecure jobs may increase workers' vulnerability to sexual harassment because they fear that resisting or reporting it will negatively affect their income and employment (Ram, 2018) (ResearchGate, 2015). The hospitality industry workforce consists of large levels of low wage workers and is often the youngest workers in our society. They are also more likely to be 'a-typical' workers on a fixed term or zero hours contract, and therefore don't have the same rights as permanent employees (Culture Shift, 2024).

b) Power Imbalances and Hierarchical Structures

Employee-Customer Power Imbalance: As noted above, customers often hold a position of power. This leads to a power imbalance between service providers and customers, which is fundamental to the occurrence of workplace violence, such as abuse and harassment (Korczynski & Evans, 2013; Ram, 2018) (ResearchGate, 2015).

Hierarchical Workplace Structures and Abusive Supervision: Power disparities within organizations (management vs. frontline, experienced vs. junior) can foster bullying and harassment. Managers or supervisors who abuse their power or ignore misconduct contribute to a toxic environment. The hotel business is characterized by its labor-intensive nature, job-demanding, and hierarchical structure. As a result, WB targeting vulnerable employees, including trainees, frontline staff, and entry-level workers, is often considered commonplace or even an accepted aspect of the job (MDPI, 2025). Managers control the schedules of workers, making it difficult for vulnerable workers to avoid the perpetrators or to report wrongdoing (Culture Shift, 2024).

c) Organizational Culture and Lack of Safeguards

Tolerant or Permissive Culture: A culture where inappropriate behavior is normalized, trivialized, or even

implicitly accepted as "part of the job" is a major root cause. The hospitality industry is particularly susceptible to SH due to its entrenched acceptance of such behaviors, insufficient institutional sanctions, persistence of traditional gender norms, and notions of male sexual entitlement (PMC, 2025). The true scope of SH in the workplace is concealed by a conspiracy of silence between supervisors and establishment owners (Zhou et al., 2021) (Tandfonline.com, 2024).

Insufficient Institutional Sanctions and Inadequate Complaint Mechanisms: When organizations lack robust policies, clear reporting procedures, and effective enforcement, perpetrators face few consequences, and victims feel unsupported. Despite legislative efforts, only 10–20% of workers report instances of violence and SH (Eurofound, 2015) (Tandfonline.com, 2024). Evidence shows that sexual harassment goes unreported, incidents are not handled properly, or workers who report an incident experience retaliation (Eaton, 2004; Morganson & Major, 2014; Ram, 2018) (EHL Insights, 2024). Only small proportions who complained formally reported the perpetrator facing formal disciplinary actions – 10% informal warnings, 5% formal warnings, 6% fired or asked to leave. When there are negative consequences or poor outcomes when speaking up, it makes it more difficult to make a report in the future (Culture Shift, 2024).

Lack of Training and Awareness: Insufficient training on what constitutes violence, bullying, and sexual harassment, as well as on de-escalation techniques and bystander intervention, leaves both employees and management ill-equipped. Research highlights the importance of campaigns to raise awareness, pre-service education, and training (Geojournal of Tourism and Geosites, 2024).

Prioritizing Customer Satisfaction Over Employee Safety: When management focuses exclusively on customer satisfaction, employee well-being can be overlooked. As mentioned above, Because customer experience is often prioritised, customers are placed in a position of power where their behaviour can often be overlooked, creating a culture of tolerance where employees feel more pressure to put up with harassment from customers (Culture Shift, 2024).

Isolated Work Environments and Weak Social Ties: Certain roles or settings can increase vulnerability. Employees with weak managerial relationships and limited social ties among coworkers are also at greater risk of experiencing WSH (PMC, 2025).

d) Societal and Individual Factors

Traditional Gender Norms and Male Sexual Entitlement: Societal norms that perpetuate traditional gender roles and notions of male sexual entitlement significantly contribute to sexual harassment, with women disproportionately affected. The hospitality industry is particularly susceptible to SH due to its entrenched acceptance of such behaviors, insufficient institutional sanctions, persistence of traditional gender norms, and notions of male sexual entitlement (PMC, 2025). Socialization processes that encourage male dominance, as well as the societal and cultural acceptability of violence against women, are the root causes of sexual harassment (Geojournal of Tourism and Geosites, 2024).

Individual Characteristics: While not root causes themselves, certain individual traits can influence vulnerability or propensity. Factors such as perception and neuroticism were the individual-level characteristics positively associated with the sexual harassment experience" (PMC, 2025).Younger people are perceived as more sexually attractive. This is particularly true for the hospitality and tourism industry, which hires young employees for frontline junior service-related positions... Young employees are defenseless and susceptible to being sexually harassed by coworkers, supervisors and customers (Emerald Insight, 2025).

VI. Case Studies and Real-World Examples

Understanding the complex issues of violence, bullying, and sexual harassment in tourism and hospitality requires more than theoretical knowledge. Real-world case studies provide valuable insight into how these problems manifest across different contexts, exposing both the lived experiences of workers and the responses—or lack thereof—by institutions. This section presents several illustrative examples from around the world, highlighting various types of misconduct and showcasing the systemic failures that allow such behaviors to persist.

a) The "Hands Off, Pants On" Campaign – United States

One of the most well-known cases of organized resistance against workplace harassment in the hospitality sector took place in Chicago. In 2016, hotel workers—particularly female housekeepers—launched the *"Hands Off, Pants On"* campaign, demanding greater protection from guests who exposed themselves or sexually harassed staff while they were cleaning rooms.

The Campaign was Sparked by Disturbing Stories: Women reporting guests masturbating openly, attempting to grope them, or cornering them in rooms. Despite these incidents, many said that hotel management either ignored their complaints or discouraged them from filing reports to avoid upsetting high-paying guests.

As a result of worker organizing and union support from UNITE HERE Local 1, Chicago passed a city ordinance requiring hotels to provide *panic buttons*

for housekeepers and to adopt anti-harassment policies. This case demonstrates how collective action and media visibility can push local governments and employers to take concrete safety measures.

b) *Gordon Ramsay's Kitchen Nightmares – United Kingdom & USA*

While not a legal case, the reality television series Kitchen Nightmares, hosted by celebrity chef Gordon Ramsay, offers insight into the normalization of verbal abuse and bullying in hospitality settings. Ramsay's confrontational style—characterized by shouting, public humiliation, and insults—mirrors what many hospitality workers experience in high-pressure kitchens.

Although often justified as part of maintaining high culinary standards, such behavior can contribute to a toxic culture where bullying is accepted and even glamorized. Many young chefs have reported enduring similar treatment in real life, believing it is the norm or a necessary step toward success. This cultural trope—rooted in patriarchal notions of leadership—reinforces abusive dynamics within the industry.

c) *Racial Harassment at a Luxury Hotel – South Africa*

In 2019, several employees at a luxury hotel in Cape Town filed complaints of *racial bullying and harassment.* Black staff reported being referred to by derogatory terms, denied promotions in favor of less qualified white colleagues, and segregated into back-of-house roles to avoid being seen by international guests.

One case involved a guest complaining about the "appearance" of a Black front-desk worker, after which the employee was transferred without explanation. The incident triggered a wider investigation by labor rights activists, revealing systematic discrimination across the hotel group.

This case illustrates how racism intersects with harassment in hospitality, particularly in regions with a legacy of colonialism and apartheid. It also shows how employer practices can perpetuate structural inequality, even under the guise of meeting customer preferences.

d) *The Cruise Ship Industry – International Waters*

Cruise ships are often described as *lawless environments* when it comes to labor protections, especially for sexual harassment and assault cases. A 2018 investigation by The Guardian and NBC News revealed that dozens of cruise employees—mostly women from Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe—had reported harassment, assault, or rape by supervisors or passengers, only to be ignored or threatened into silence.

Because many cruise lines are registered in countries with lax labor laws (so-called *flags of convenience*), legal recourse for victims is extremely limited. Investigations are often internal, opaque, and biased in favor of the company. Victims may be deported at the next port, dismissed from their roles, or even held responsible for "disrupting service."

The cruise ship case underscores how *jurisdictional loopholes* and the isolation of workers can be exploited to avoid accountability. It also highlights the extreme vulnerability of migrant workers in highly mobile and unregulated environments.

e) *Airbnb and Host Misconduct – Global*

While often positioned as part of the "sharing economy," platforms like *Airbnb* have faced growing criticism for failing to protect guests and hosts from harassment and violence. One major concern is the *lack of oversight or employer responsibilities*—unlike traditional hospitality businesses, Airbnb does not directly employ workers, which complicates the issue of duty of care.

Numerous cases have emerged involving: Hosts making sexual advances on guests, guests harassing or threatening hosts, particularly women and no formal mechanism to report or investigate claims beyond customer service reviews

For instance, a 2019 vice report exposed a case in which a female guest in Europe was harassed by a host who refused to leave the apartment and later attempted to enter her room at night. Despite complaints, Airbnb offered only generic responses and refused to intervene further.

This case illustrates how *platform-based hospitality* models can obscure employer accountability, placing workers and users at risk without meaningful protections.

f) *Bullying in Culinary Schools – France and Japan*

Culinary education is another area where bullying and harassment often go unchecked. In both France and Japan—countries known for their strict, hierarchical kitchen traditions—reports have emerged of culinary students being subjected to verbal abuse, physical punishment, and even sexual misconduct by instructors.

In 2021, former students of a prestigious French culinary institute filed complaints about an instructor who screamed insults daily, grabbed female students' bodies without consent and threatened to fail students who complained.

In Japan, similarly, a major cooking school faced scrutiny when students described being hit with utensils, locked in refrigerators as punishment, or forced to clean for hours without food.

These examples show that the *roots of abuse can begin during training,* setting the tone for future workplace acceptance of mistreatment. If hospitality education programs tolerate or encourage abuse, it becomes embedded in professional norms.

g) *Sexual Harassment in Resort Settings – Caribbean and Southeast Asia*

Resorts in popular tourist destinations are often hotspots for sexual harassment, particularly where foreign tourists interact with local staff. Workers report harassment from both customers and managers, including demands for sexual favors in exchange for promotions or better shifts, physical assault in back-of-house areas and inappropriate touching or requests for photos.

In one 2020 case in the Dominican Republic, several female entertainers at a resort sued their employer after being forced to "entertain" VIP clients at private parties. The employer argued the job required "flexibility," and resort management turned a blind eye.

Tourism-driven economies, where jobs are scarce and the industry dominates GDP, can foster exploitative dynamics. Employees may feel unable to reject advances or report incidents for fear of being labeled uncooperative or losing their only income source.

h) *Positive Case: Marriott International's Global Safety Initiative*

In contrast to many of these negative cases, *Marriott International* has been recognized for implementing one of the most comprehensive safety and anti-harassment policies in the global hospitality sector. In 2018, the company launched a *Global Human Trafficking Awareness Training Program* and committed to providing *panic buttons* for all U.S.-based housekeepers.

In addition, Marriott has created anonymous reporting tools, offered multilingual anti-harassment training and introduced diversity and inclusion initiatives.

While not without its critics, Marriott's proactive stance shows that multinational corporations can lead by example when they prioritize employee safety and enforce accountability from the top down.

The real-world cases highlighted in this section offer a sobering yet essential look at the ways violence, bullying, and sexual harassment manifest across the hospitality industry. From luxury hotels in South Africa to cruise ships on international waters, these examples reveal patterns of abuse, corporate silence, and systemic failures. At the same time, they demonstrate the potential for change when workers organize, unions intervene, or companies embrace meaningful reform. In the next section, we will analyze the broader impacts of these behaviors—not just on individuals, but on organizational health and industry sustainability.

VII. Impact on Individuals and Organizations

The presence of violence, bullying, and sexual harassment in the tourism and hospitality industry has far-reaching consequences, affecting not only individual employees but also the broader organizational health and the industry's sustainability. These issues undermine workplace morale, productivity, reputation, and profitability, while simultaneously causing deep psychological, emotional, and financial harm to victims. This section explores the multi-dimensional impacts, emphasizing why these behaviors cannot be ignored or treated as isolated incidents (Baum, 2015).

a) *Psychological and Emotional Impact on Individuals*

For individuals, the most immediate and profound effects of violence, bullying, and harassment are psychological and emotional. Victims often experience chronic stress and anxiety, depression and suicidal thoughts, loss of self-esteem and confidence, sleep disturbances and fatigue, emotional exhaustion and burnout. These effects are not limited to the time and place of the incident. Victims often carry the trauma into their personal lives, affecting relationships, academic or career aspirations, and long-term mental health. Repeated exposure to harassment or bullying can lead to complex PTSD (Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder), especially in cases involving sexual abuse or power-based coercion. In some instances, victims become socially withdrawn, distrustful of others, or unable to maintain steady employment due to psychological instability caused by their workplace experience. Migrant workers and young staff, in particular, may be more vulnerable due to limited social support, language barriers, and financial dependency on the job (Hoel, Einarsen, & Cooper, 2003; Yagil, 2008).

b) *Physical Health Consequences*

The emotional strain caused by sustained workplace abuse often translates into physical health issues. Studies have linked exposure to toxic work environments to a variety of conditions, including headaches and migraines, cardiovascular problems, gastrointestinal disorders, weakened immune response, and musculoskeletal pain (especially when combined with physically demanding roles). Victims of physical or sexual violence may also suffer direct bodily harm, including bruises, sprains, or more severe injuries that can require medical attention. Moreover, the financial burden of healthcare, particularly in countries without universal coverage, further deepens the impact on affected workers (Kivimäki et al., 2003; Hogh, Conway, & Grynderup, 2016).

c) *Economic Impact on Individuals*

On a practical level, many victims of harassment or bullying are forced to leave their jobs or accept fewer hours to avoid their abuser. This can result in loss of income and job instability, difficulty finding new employment—especially in tight-knit local hospitality markets—and career stagnation or forced departure from the industry altogether. For women and

marginalized workers, this economic fallout can contribute to a cycle of poverty and vulnerability, especially if they are single parents, migrants, or heads of households. The fear of financial insecurity often keeps victims silent or compliant, allowing abuse to continue unchecked (McLaughlin, Uggen, & Blackstone, 2012; Guerrier & Adib, 2004).

d) Organizational Impact: Staff Turnover and Talent Drain

One of the most visible consequences of a toxic workplace is high employee turnover. Hospitality businesses already face challenges with retention due to seasonal work, long hours, and physically demanding conditions. When combined with workplace abuse, the turnover rate accelerates significantly. The cost of turnover includes recruitment and onboarding expenses, training new staff, loss of institutional knowledge and experience, and decline in service quality during transition periods. When talented workers—especially experienced women or multilingual staff—leave due to harassment, organizations suffer a loss of valuable human capital. Over time, this can damage a company's reputation as an employer, making it harder to attract top talent (Baum, 2015; Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf, & Cooper, 2011).

e) Impact on Team Dynamics and Morale

Bullying, harassment, and violence do not only affect the direct victims; they have a toxic ripple effect on entire teams. Colleagues who witness or hear about misconduct may feel unsafe or anxious at work, disillusioned with management, distrustful of reporting mechanisms, and powerless to intervene.

This leads to deteriorating workplace relationships, fragmentation of team cohesion, and a decline in overall morale. In many cases, bystanders develop a form of "moral injury," a psychological distress caused by observing injustice without being able to act against it. This erodes collective trust and can result in widespread disengagement (Lutgen-Sandvik, 2006; Rayner, 2002).

f) Productivity and Service Quality

A hostile work environment inevitably reduces productivity. Employees preoccupied with fear, stress, or trauma cannot perform at their best. Common outcomes include increased absenteeism and sick leave, lower engagement and motivation, mistakes or lapses in judgment, and poor customer service delivery.

In hospitality, where customer satisfaction directly affects revenue, even minor declines in service quality can result in bad reviews, fewer repeat customers, and a drop in reputation. Thus, failing to address internal abuse indirectly affects external business performance (Baum, 2015; Gilboa et al., 2008).

g) Legal and Financial Consequences

Organizations that tolerate or ignore workplace abuse face significant legal and financial risks, including: lawsuits and compensation claims, fines and sanctions from regulatory bodies, legal costs from settlements and court proceedings, and increased insurance premiums.

In some cases, companies may be held liable for third-party harassment (such as by customers) if they fail to implement preventive policies or take corrective action. Negative publicity associated with lawsuits can also deter investors, damage partnerships, and impact stock value (in the case of publicly traded companies).

A notable example is the 2020 case of a global hotel chain sued by multiple employees who alleged long-standing sexual harassment. The company ultimately paid millions in damages and was forced to undergo external audits of its HR practices, affecting its brand image and market share (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission [EEOC], 2021; Ryu & Johari, 2021).

h) Brand Reputation and Consumer Trust

In today's digital and socially conscious marketplace, reputation matters more than ever. Consumers increasingly choose to support businesses that demonstrate ethical behavior and respect for human rights. High-profile allegations of misconduct, especially if poorly handled, can lead to viral backlash on social media, negative press coverage, boycotts, and loss of customer loyalty.

Even if the initial story involves only a few employees or locations, reputational damage can affect the entire brand globally. Conversely, companies that actively protect workers and take a stand against abuse can build customer trust and loyalty, which contributes to long-term profitability (Tepper et al., 2008; Kandampully et al., 2011).

i) Industry-Wide Implications

At a macro level, systemic mistreatment of workers contributes to a negative public perception of the tourism and hospitality sector as exploitative or unsafe. This has several implications: Young professionals may avoid entering the industry, Training programs may struggle to attract students, Governments may impose stricter regulations, increasing operational costs and Unions and advocacy groups may call for boycotts or public scrutiny.

In the long run, if the industry fails to address these issues, it risks eroding its own labor pool and undermining its future sustainability. In an industry so reliant on human interaction, the human cost of abuse is also an economic one (UNWTO, 2019; International Labour Organization [ILO], 2022).

The impacts of violence, bullying, and sexual harassment in the tourism and hospitality industry

extend far beyond the immediate moment of abuse. They cause deep harm to individuals, fracture teams, reduce organizational performance, and damage brand reputation. More broadly, they threaten the industry's integrity and viability by perpetuating labor instability and deterring new talent. These behaviors are not merely ethical failures—they are strategic liabilities.

VIII. Legal and Ethical Frameworks

Addressing violence, bullying, and sexual harassment in the tourism and hospitality industry requires not only organizational reform but also a robust understanding of the legal and ethical frameworks that define employer responsibilities and employee rights. Laws vary widely by country and region, but there are common international standards and principles that can guide policy-making and enforcement. Ethical responsibilities, while not always enforceable by law, are equally vital in shaping just and sustainable workplace cultures.

This section outlines the global and national legal instruments relevant to workplace conduct in hospitality, explores corporate ethical obligations, and assesses the limitations of existing frameworks (ILO, 2019; OHCHR, 2011).

a) International Legal Instruments and Guidelines

i. *International Labour Organization (ILO)*

The ILO plays a central role in setting global labor standards. Its Violence and Harassment Convention, 2019 (No. 190) is the first international treaty to specifically address workplace violence and harassment, including sexual harassment. Key features include: A broad definition of violence and harassment, including psychological and gender-based abuse, protection for all workers, regardless of contractual status (including interns, trainees, and informal workers) and obligations for member states to adopt policies, legislation, and education programs.

Although ratification is voluntary, Convention 190 provides a powerful tool for advocacy and can pressure governments and employers to act (International Labour Organization [ILO], 2019).

ii. *United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights*

These principles outline the corporate responsibility to respect human rights, including freedom from harassment and violence. They stress the need for due diligence, grievance mechanisms, and reparative action when violations occur.

For multinational hospitality brands operating across borders, these principles encourage consistent global policies and accountability, regardless of local legal discrepancies (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights [OHCHR], 2011).

b) National Legal Frameworks

While international guidelines provide a foundation, most protections are enforced at the national level. Here's a comparison of some key jurisdictions:

i. *United States*

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964) prohibits workplace discrimination based on sex, race, color, religion, or national origin. Sexual harassment is considered a form of sex discrimination. Victims can file complaints through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). However, the burden of proof often lies heavily on the victim, and gig workers or independent contractors may fall outside the law's scope (EEOC, 2021; U.S. Department of Labor, 2022).

ii. *United Kingdom*

The Equality Act 2010 consolidates anti-discrimination laws and explicitly prohibits sexual harassment, victimization, and bullying. Employers are liable for acts of harassment by employees unless they can demonstrate they took "reasonable steps" to prevent it. New 2024 legislation also makes employers liable for third-party harassment (e.g., from customers), a critical development for hospitality (UK Government, 2024; Acas, 2024).

iii. *Australia*

Laws are governed by the *Fair Work Act* and *Sex Discrimination Act* 1984. The *Respect@Work* report in 2020 prompted legal reforms, increasing employer duties to prevent sexual harassment proactively. The *Australian Human Rights Commission* can investigate systemic workplace issues. The Respect@Work report (2020), led by the Australian Human Rights Commission, prompted significant legal reforms, increasing employer obligations to *proactively prevent* sexual harassment rather than just respond to complaints. As a result, new amendments in 2022 empowered the *Australian Human Rights Commission* to investigate *systemic workplace issues* and provided greater legal protection for workers across sectors, including hospitality (Australian Human Rights Commission, 2020; Australian Government, 2022).

iv. *Other Regions*

Scandinavian countries (e.g., Sweden, Norway, Denmark) have comprehensive labor protections, including mandatory anti-harassment training, strong whistleblower legislation, and significant employer liability for failing to protect workers (Eurofound, 2021).

In *parts of Asia, Africa, and Latin America,* laws may exist on paper but are often poorly enforced. Informal employment is widespread in hospitality, and migrant or low-wage workers frequently face abuse without recourse (ILO, 2021).

In *Gulf countries* such as the UAE, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia—where hospitality depends heavily on migrant labor—legal protections are limited by the

Kafala (sponsorship) system, which ties workers' legal status to their employer. This severely restricts freedom of movement, unionization, and access to justice (Human Rights Watch, 2020; ITUC, 2021).

c) Limitations of Legal Approaches

Despite the presence of these frameworks, legal mechanisms alone are *insufficient* to eliminate harassment and violence in hospitality workplaces. Several systemic challenges persist:

i. *Underreporting*

Victims often avoid legal processes due to *fear of retaliation,* cultural stigma, lack of language proficiency, or skepticism about the fairness of investigations. This is especially true in hierarchical workplaces or among migrant and younger workers (Fitzgerald et al., 1997; McDonald, 2012).

ii. *Burden of Proof*

In many jurisdictions, legal cases require the victim to present *extensive documentation or witnesses,* which is often unrealistic—particularly in cases involving *psychological harassment,* gaslighting, or coercive behavior that leaves no physical evidence (Hersch, 2011; McLaughlin et al., 2012).

iii. *Limited Protections for Vulnerable Workers*

Many hospitality workers fall outside the protection of traditional labor laws because of *informal employment* or seasonal status, classification as "independent contractors" and *visa dependencies* or lack of union representation

These categories leave workers especially exposed to abuse with little legal fallback (ILO, 2022; Standing, 2011).

iv. *Company Complicity*

Organizations sometimes avoid public accountability by *settling claims privately* using non-disclosure agreements (NDAs), which *silence victims,* allow perpetrators to continue working, and shield companies from reputational damage. This practice has come under global scrutiny in recent years (Baker & McKenzie, 2020; BBC News, 2019).

d) Ethical Responsibilities of Employers

While legal frameworks set the minimum standard, ethical obligations go beyond compliance. Ethical leadership in hospitality means creating workplaces rooted in *dignity, equity, and transparency* (Brown et al., 2005; Sims, 1992).

i. *Duty of Care*

Employers have a moral responsibility to ensure the *physical and psychological well-being* of their employees. This includes: Providing security measures (e.g., panic buttons, surveillance, trained security), fostering a psychologically safe environment with open communication, employee assistance programs, and confidential reporting systems, ensuring respectful treatment by *colleagues, managers, and customers alike* and failing to meet these ethical duties can have long-term consequences for employee health and organizational morale (ILO, 2022; Clark et al., 2020).

ii. *Transparency and Accountability*

Ethical Organizations Implement: Clear, multilingual anti-harassment policies, anonymous or third-party reporting channels, regular audits, feedback mechanisms, and climate surveys and l ack of transparency can damage organizational trust and lead to *employee disengagement and reputational harm* (Kaptein, 2008; Ethics Resource Center, 2021).

iii. *Cultural Sensitivity and Inclusion*

Hospitality is a global, multicultural industry, and ethical leadership includes respecting *diversity* without tolerating discriminatory or harmful cultural norms. Best practices include: Policies that are *inclusive of LGBTQ+ identities,* gender equity in leadership and promotions, training to reduce unconscious bias and cultural insensitivity and inclusive workplaces correlate with *higher retention, stronger performance,* and improved customer satisfaction (Mor Barak, 2015; WTTC, 2023).

e) Codes of Conduct and Industry Guidelines

i. *World Travel and Tourism Council (WTTC)*

The WTTC has published guidelines on *responsible tourism* and *employee safety,* calling on members to enforce *zero-tolerance* harassment policies, provide regular training and partner with local NGOs and advocacy groups.

Though voluntary, these guidelines offer *best-practice standards* that many multinationals refer in policy development (WTTC, 2023).

ii. *International Hotel and Restaurant Association (IHRA)*

IHRA promotes *ethical business practices* in hospitality. However, critics note that in the absence of enforcement mechanisms, these codes risk becoming "*performative*"—public statements with little operational follow-through (Bakan, 2004; IHRA, 2022).

Accountability remains a central challenge in translating industry codes into *tangible workplace protections.*

f) Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and ESG

Modern investors and consumers increasingly assess companies based on *Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG)* metrics. Social indicators include worker health and safety, diversity and inclusion performance and protection of labor and human rights.

Failing to address harassment can *lower ESG ratings,* reduce shareholder confidence, and affect capital access. Ethical labor practices are becoming a *competitive and financial imperative,* not just a moral one (Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance, 2021; Eccles & Klimenko, 2019).

g) The Role of Unions and NGOs

Unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) help close the *enforcement gap* in hospitality by *Unions* offering collective bargaining on safety, wages and grievance procedures, providing legal aid and advocacy and educating members on rights and reporting and *NGOs* running public awareness campaigns, conducting independent investigations and pressuring governments and corporations to implement reforms.

Examples:

UNITE HERE (North America) and *GMB* and *Unite the Union* (UK)

Notable contributions have come from *ILO-affiliated organizations* in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, where *migrant and informal workers are most vulnerable* (ILO, 2022; UN Women, 2020). Their work has contributed to legal changes, union formation, and international monitoring mechanisms.

IX. Prevention and Intervention Strategies

a) Prevention Strategies

i. *Clear Policies and Code of Conduct:* Establishing comprehensive, clearly communicated policies on violence, bullying, and sexual harassment helps set behavioral expectations and consequences. These policies must be accessible to all staff and guests (Kowalski & Limber, 2013).

ii. *Regular Training and Awareness Programs:* Mandatory training sessions for employees and managers on identifying and preventing harassment, bullying, and violence promote awareness and empower bystander intervention (Einarsen, Hoel, Zapf, & Cooper, 2011).

iii. *Confidential Reporting Mechanisms:* Providing multiple, confidential avenues for reporting incidents encourages timely disclosure and helps prevent escalation (Hogh, Hoel, & Carneiro, 2011).

iv. *Leadership Commitment:* Strong, visible leadership commitment to zero tolerance policies is essential for creating a respectful workplace culture and ensuring enforcement (Nishii & Mayer, 2009).

v. *Workplace Environmental Controls:* Designing safe work environments with adequate lighting, surveillance, and minimized isolated areas reduces opportunities for harassment or violence, especially for staff working alone or at night (World Health Organization, 2002).

b) Intervention Strategies

i. *Immediate and Safe Response Protocols:* Employees should be trained to intervene safely and support victims promptly while ensuring their own safety (Griffin & Clark, 2014).

ii. *Prompt and Impartial Investigations:* All reported incidents must be investigated confidentially and fairly to ensure accountability and prevent further harm (Einarsen, Hoel, & Notelaers, 2009).

iii. *Victim Support Services:* Providing counseling, medical, and legal support helps victims recover and feel safe returning to work (Barling & Frone, 2017).

iv. *Consistent Disciplinary Actions:* Applying disciplinary measures proportional to the offense reinforces the organization's stance against harassment and violence (Rayner & Lewis, 2011).

v. *Mediation and Conflict Resolution:* When appropriate, neutral mediators can help resolve conflicts without victim blaming (Bush & Folger, 2005).

vi. *Follow-Up and Monitoring:* Regular follow-up with affected employees and ongoing monitoring of the workplace environment help prevent recurrence and improve policies (Nielsen & Einarsen, 2018).

X. Conclusion

Violence, bullying, and sexual harassment are pervasive and deeply rooted problems in the tourism and hospitality industry. Addressing them requires more than legal reforms—it demands a values-driven transformation of workplace culture. Employers must move beyond performative compliance toward genuine ethical engagement. Industry associations must enforce their codes, and governments must close the legal gaps that leave workers vulnerable. Most importantly, workers must be empowered to speak out without fear. The industry's future depends not only on customer satisfaction, but on ensuring the safety, dignity, and well-being of the people who make hospitality possible.

The future of the tourism and hospitality industry hinges on its ability to create workplaces free from violence, bullying, and sexual harassment. Achieving this requires strengthened legal protections, cultural shifts, technological innovation, and inclusive policies that empower workers and involve all stakeholders. Transparent accountability, mental health integration, and proactive adaptation to changing workforces will sustain progress. Ultimately, a safe and respectful environment benefits employees, customers, businesses, and society at large, ensuring the long-term vitality and ethical integrity of the industry.

The tourism and hospitality industry, celebrated for its warmth, cultural exchange, and service excellence, paradoxically grapples with pervasive issues of violence, bullying, and sexual harassment. These challenges not only jeopardize the safety and well-being of millions of workers globally but also undermine organizational reputation, customer experience, and industry sustainability.

This study has explored the multifaceted nature of these workplace abuses, highlighting their root causes—ranging from the sector's labor dynamics and hierarchical power imbalances to customer interactions and cultural stigmas. Through a detailed examination of the consequences, we see how such misconduct damages individuals' mental and physical health, reduces productivity, increases turnover, and perpetuates systemic inequalities.

Legal frameworks, while foundational, often fall short due to gaps in enforcement, underreporting, and the vulnerable status of many hospitality workers, especially migrants and contract staff. Ethical responsibilities, corporate social responsibility, and labor union involvement emerge as essential pillars in bridging these gaps.

Best practices demonstrate that sustainable change comes from comprehensive anti-harassment policies, robust training, safe reporting systems, leadership commitment, and technological innovation. Additionally, fostering diversity, equity, inclusion, and mental health support creates resilient and respectful workplaces. Collaborative efforts involving governments, NGOs, industry associations, and consumers further amplify impact.

Looking forward, the industry must strengthen laws, embed anti-harassment culture, leverage technology, empower workers, and remain adaptable to future workforce transformations. Transparent accountability and consumer engagement will be key drivers in ensuring a harassment-free hospitality environment.

In conclusion, eradicating violence, bullying, and sexual harassment in tourism and hospitality is not just a moral imperative but a strategic necessity for a thriving, ethical, and sustainable industry. Collective action, grounded in empathy, equity, and respect, can transform workplaces into safe havens where all employees can flourish and deliver the exceptional experiences that define hospitality's true spirit.

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Subjective Well-being of Patients with Pain Syndrome

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Abstract- Introduction: The conducted research revealed the influence of the main aspects of the emotional and somatic state on the subjective well-being of patients with pain syndrome. An intrapersonal approach to understanding the subjectivity of the nature of pain experience will make it possible to individualize psychological rehabilitation in order to alleviate pain and improve the quality of life for patients.

Purpose: Identification of intrapersonal factors that determine the subjective well-being of patients with pain syndrome.

Materials and Methods: The results of a survey of 118 outpatients regarding their subjective well-being were analyzed. The analysis included an assessment of the subjective experience of pain (its intensity, sensory and emotional components), the level of alexithymia, the severity of psychosomatic complaints and emotional state. Used: Subjective Well-Being Scale (A. Perrudet-Badoux, G. Mendelsohn, J. Chiche, 1988, McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ, adapted by Kuzmenko V.V. et al., 1986), Toronto Alexithymia Scale (G.J. Taylor 1985 and the Giessen Subjective Complaints List (GBB) in the adaptation of the V.M. Bekhterev Institute), the Differential Emotions Scale (DES, K. Izard) was used to search for statistically significant factors influencing the level of subjective well-being of patients. analysis of variance (One-Way ANOVA).

Keywords: subjective well-being, subjective experience of pain, emotional state, psychosomatic complaints, painful affect, alexithymia.

GJHSS-A Classification: LCC Codes: RC355

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Results: Despite the fact that in the analyzed sample the level of alexithymia varies from 39 to 89 points (M = 65.65; SD = 11.20), ($F_{(9, 109)}$ = 6.38; $p < 0.001$), subjective well-being showed a tendency towards a directly proportional connection with deterioration of well-being and a statistically significant connection with almost all tested emotions according to the DES (indicated in the table), as well as with the coefficient of well-being (M = 1.62; SD = 0.54), ($F_{(9, 109)}$ = 6.73; $p < 0.001$).

Conclusion: The main intrapersonal factors that determine the subjective well-being of patients suffering from pain have been sufficiently identified. The scientific substantiation of the subjective picture of pain will expand the tools for psychological diagnosis of such patients, taking into account their emotional state, painful affect and the presence of concomitant psychosomatic complaints in order to qualitatively improve rehabilitation measures.

Keywords: subjective well-being, subjective experience of pain, emotional state, psychosomatic complaints, painful affect, alexithymia.

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I. Introduction

The main reason for seeking specialized help is pain in all its manifestations, and this remains the case. However, subjective views on the nature of pain lead to disagreements about strategies for establishing a systematic relationship between physical and mental factors underlying its manifestations. Despite this, subjective assessment of one's health status remains the main criterion for well-being at all ages. Preserving and restoring health are everyone's right, and largely depend on quality measures aimed at improving human function.

The World Health Organization defines health as complete physical, mental, and social well-being [1]. Accordingly, acute and chronic diseases not only worsen a person's physical condition, but also negatively affect their mental and social lives. In particular, when these conditions cause excruciating pain, the WHO pays special attention to the treatment of pain syndromes, which has implications for public health and socio-economic spheres due to the high cost of painkillers [2]. However, it is also important to note that analgesics do not always solve patients' problems completely in the long term.

Independent studies show that the social functioning of an individual, their psychological state and physical well-being are closely related [3, p.50-53; 4, p.60-72; 5, p.213-218], while they do not depend on gender or age [6, p.84-102]. According to the WHO, the solution is to improve the quality and duration of rehabilitation as part of a strategy to improve public health, including subjective well-being [7, p.6, 11, 20]. The issue of research into individual rehabilitation and habilitation for patients is also included in the list of objectives of the State Programme of the Republic of Belarus to improve public health and demographic security for 2021–2025, which indicates the importance of scientific research into the quality of life for people with pain syndromes. Analysis of scientific research conducted over a 20-year period on the interaction between subjective well-being and pain, based on data published in the PubMed (https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) and CyberLeninka databases (https://cyberleninka.ru), revealed the interest of scientists in intrapersonal measurements of pain [9, p.120-129; 10, p.109-130; 11, p.569-597; 12, p.256-262; 13, p.477-487; 14, p.30]. Nevertheless, a quantitative assessment of

the subjective emotional nature of pain is still difficult due to the individual nature of its experiences [15, p.106-110; 16, p.887-893; 17, p.88; 18, p.502-511; 19, p.98-101; 20, p.157-161; 21, p.2597-2607; 22, p.17-21; 23, p.23; 24, p.223-230; 25, p.942; 26, p.138; 27; 28, p.43-49; 29, p.17176]. Thus, it remains insufficiently studied in modern scientific discourse. Some scientists [10; 11; 22] note an underestimation of the role of psychological resources in the treatment and prevention of diseases. They point out the importance of separating intrapersonal and interpersonal resources. Other studies [30, p.166-168; 11] focus on the differentiation of structural elements within the internal picture of disease, as part of an individual rehabilitation program.

Research by the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences [6] has shown that subjective well-being is closely related to self-assessment of health and life satisfaction. It is interesting that, despite the presence of unfavourable circumstances such as disability or age-related changes, which can lead to deterioration of physical well-being, people are still able to maintain their life satisfaction through the use of internal hypercompen-satory resources. This allows for individualization of the rehabilitation process and reduction of emotional suffering for the patient. Pain is not only limited to sensory discomfort but also associated with emotional, cognitive, and social functioning [17]. It is important to take this into account, as a decrease in physical well-being significantly affects an individual's daily life, their level of social and professional activity. This inevitably leads to feelings of subjective disadvantage. According to medical and psychological research (31, p.10-16; 32, p.5-12), it is worthwhile paying special attention to personalized approaches that take into account the individual characteristics of patients in order to facilitate the experience of pain as a marker for most pathological processes The problem of rehabilitation and habilitation of patients remains relevant and is the most important strategy for achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (7).

II. Purpose and Objectives

The aim of the study was to determine the intrapersonal factors that contribute to subjective well-being among patients with pain. Based on this aim, the following objectives were set:

1. Determination of the level of subjective well-being in patients with pain syndrome using the Subjective Well-Being Scale;
2. Assessment of the somatic state of subjects in terms of their subjective experience of pain (intensity, sensory and emotional components), severity of psychosomatic complaints;
3. Assessment of the emotional state of subjects and their ability to differentiate between their emotional experiences, as well as determination of the possible impact of alexithymia on subjective well-being;
4. Determination of the influence of the main indicators of emotional and somatic state on the subjective well-being of patients with pain syndrome.

III. Materials and Methods

The study was based on the results of voluntary participation of 118 patients aged 18 to 86 years, including 56 men (M=47.9, SD=18.09) and 62 women (M=46.5, SD=16.9). According to their medical history, 23% had degenerative-dystrophic diseases of the spine, 15% had injuries or fractures, and 37% indicated their diagnoses in the "other" column, while 25% did not provide any information about their health status. Pain was mainly localized in the extremities for 45% of respondents, back pain was reported by 18%, lumbar spine 13%, cervical and thoracic spines 9%, and headaches 6%. The rest noted "other" conditions. Only half (52%) of the respondents were taking medication at the time of the survey. The psychodiagnostic assessment of the patients' condition was carried out on the basis of a scale of subjective well-being (A. Perrudet-Badoux, G. Mendelsohn, J. Chiche, 1988). The assessment is carried out on an inverse scale, with high scores indicating marked emotional discomfort, and low scores indicating complete emotional well-being. This scale was adapted by M. V. Sokolova [33]. The assessment of the subjective experience of pain was carried out using the McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ, adapted by Kuzmenko V.V. et al., 1986) [34, p.36-39]. The ability to recognize and describe emotions was determined by the Toronto Alexithymic Scale (G.J. Taylor, 1985, adapted by the Bekhterev Institute). [35 p.163]. The emotional state of the subjects was studied according to the Scale of Differential Emotions (DES) by K. Izard [36, p. 226-227]. Somatic status and concomitant symptoms were assessed according to the scale of the Giessen questionnaire of psychosomatic complaints [35, p.17].

Statistical analysis of the data was carried out using SPSS Statistics 17.0 to search for statistically significant factors affecting the level of subjective well-being of patients in the experimental group. One-factor analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to identify these factors.

IV. The Results and Their Discussion

According to the results of the statistical analysis (see the table in the appendix), the level of subjective well-being is affected by the emotional state of patients, their ability to understand their emotions, the presence of psychosomatic complaints, and the intensity of pain.

Alexithymia manifests itself in difficulty differentiating between emotional experiences and can become a risk factor for maladaptive conditions [37, p. 165-176]. In the analyzed sample, the level of alexithymia varied from 39 to 89 points (M = 65.65; SD = 11.20). Based on the data obtained, increased values of the alexithymic level were associated with emotional discomfort, difficulty controlling emotions, and imbalance and inflexibility in attitudes (F (9,109) = 6.38, p < 0.001). Consequently, important components for achieving subjective well-being in patients are the ability to recognize their feelings and physical sensations, express emotional experiences with others [25], and have a sufficient level of imagination for psychological coping with pain [21]. A recent meta-analysis of the effects of mindfulness techniques on pain reduction conducted by German scientists [27] has shown the importance of awareness and acceptance of pain, as well as the possibility of conscious control over pain perception. Therefore, reflexive tools such as the "pain diary" are useful for patients with pain syndromes for self-analysis to better recognize, understand their pain and mood, and improve their life satisfaction [13].

As for the emotional state of patients, subjective well-being showed a statistically significant relationship with almost all the emotions tested according to DES, as well as with the coefficient of well-being (F (9, 109) = 6.73; p < 0.001). Despite the fact that all subjects had a positive well-being coefficient (M = 1.62; SD = 0.54), there was a directly proportional trend for a decrease in subjective well- being with a deterioration in wellbeing. Among positive emotions, interest had the greatest impact on the level of subjective wellbeing (F (9, 109) = 2.13; p < 0 .05) and joy had (F 9, 109 = 3.08; P < 0.01). At the same time, an analysis of the dynamics of indicators revealed that while the level of interest changed slightly with deterioration of subjective well - being, the level of joy decreased consistently. This means that when a person is experiencing severe emotional discomfort and little joy can bring them, they may show arbitrary and involuntary interest in something, becoming distracted from painful experiences [12; 26]. Acute negative emotions such as grief (F (9, 109) = 2.296; p < 0.05), anger (F (9, 109) = 3.27; p < 0.01), disgust (F (9, 109) = 3.25; p < 0.01), contempt (F (9, 109) = 2.14; p < 0.05), tend to increase sequentially with a deterioration in the patient's subjective well-being. The presence of anxiety-depressive emotions, such as fear (F (9, 109) = 3.49; p < 0.01), guilt (F (9, 109) = 4.13; p < 0.001), is also more pronounced in subjective distress. In the case of acute negative and anxiety-depressive emotions, it is difficult to talk about the causal nature of the relationship with the level of subjective well-being, since this dependence can work bilaterally. On the one hand, pronounced emotional discomfort worsens the experience of negative and anxiety-depressive emotions, and on the other hand, subjective well—being worsens in the presence of pronounced feelings of anger, grief, disgust, contempt, fear, and guilt. At the phenomenological level, pain and emotional state in themselves have no content (are not intentional), but possess only phenomenal properties characterizing subjective sensation [9]. If we approach it from the point of view of externalistic representationalism, then the phenomenal properties of pain and emotions will be determined by the direction of experiences, that is, they are determined by the external (social) context (for example, the socio-psychological benefits of illness) [11]. From the standpoint of internalist representationism, on the contrary, the content of inner sensations depends only on the subject [9; 26], that is, different patients may experience the same level of pain in different ways. This is why there is a paradox between the internal image of the disease and the subjective complaints of the patient [11; 15]. Such a dialectical approach can be useful instead of the objective approach in medicine in the selection of psychological tools [11; 22], since externalism emphasizes coping strategies and internalism emphasizes harmonizing the internal state.

Life satisfaction is influenced by psychosocial factors, which can be divided into psychological factors (emotional state, presence of affective disorders) and social factors (marital status, socio-economic status, chronic stress at work and home) [10]. As a result, a relationship was found between all indicators of the Scale of subjective well-being. Accordingly, the level of well-being of an individual directly depends on the levels of tension and sensitivity (F (9, 109) = 9.14, p<0.001), severity of signs of psychoemotional symptoms (F (9, 109) = 11.297; p < 0.001), tendency to mood swings (F (9, 109) = 15.37; p < 0.001) importance of social environment (F (9, 109) = 11.39; p < 0.001), self-assessment of health (F (9, 109) = 11.28; p < 0.001), and satisfaction with daily activities F (9, 109) = 11.63; p < 0.001).

It is important to note the pronounced relationship between the subjective well-being of patients and the signs of main psychosomatic symptoms, assessed using the Giessen questionnaire. The more intense the pressure of complaints (F (9, 109) = 8,89; p < 0,001, the more unhappy the patient feels. In this aspect, somatopsychic influence can be assumed. The presence of severe somatic pathology can aggravate emotional state [10]. In proportion to the deterioration of subjective well-being, the indicator of exhaustion increases (F (9, 109) = 11.57; p < 0.001), characterizing apathy and the need for rest. The presence of gastric complaints (F (9, 109) = 3.99; p < 0.001) significantly affects emotional discomfort. Cardiac complaints (F (9, 109) = 5.76; p < 0.001), are also accompanied by emotional distress. The rheumatic factor (F (9, 109) = 3.8, p < 0.001) in this questionnaire

directly characterizes pain and spastic symptoms, and its increase is proportional to the deterioration of subjective well-being in patients. Since it has been scientifically confirmed [10; 16; 23] that there is both somatopsychic and psychosomatic influence on the clinical dynamics of a disease, a personalized approach taking into account subjective picture of disease will increase effectiveness of therapeutic and rehabilitation measures.

Among the scales of the McGill Pain Questionnaire, the ranking index of pain on the Affective Scale ($F_{(9, 109)}$ = 3.27, $p < 0.01$) showed the greatest impact on patients' subjective well-being. However, neither the index of selected emotional descriptors nor the index of sensory sensations revealed significant relationships. This may mean that the patient's subjective well-being depends more on the intensity of pain affect than on sensory characteristics of pain perception. This observation can be used in the psychological rehabilitation of patients, directing therapeutic work on the emotional aspect of pain. According to the McGill Pain questionnaire, the dynamics of decreasing pain affect can be illustrated as follows: from "tiring" to "exhausting", from "terrifying" to "frightening", from "despairing" to "depressing", from "pain as torture" to "pain as a hindrance" and so on. Comparing the data obtained from scientific research [23; 29; 38, p. 9-13], we can conclude that rational-emotional psychotherapy or other variants of cognitive-behavioral approaches for working out irrational attitudes (dramatizing or catastrophizing painful experiences) can improve the subjective well-being of patients and accelerate their recovery. Relaxation techniques and meditative practices at the psycho-physiological level, by stimulating neuroendocrine processes, can not only reduce the intensity of affective experiences, but also increase the subjective sense of well-being [10; 18; 20]. The development of constructive pain management strategies, taking into account the psychological resources of the individual, will contribute to the assistance of patients to prescribed treatment and rehabilitation regimens.

It is worth noting that statistical analysis did not reveal the influence of gender or age on the level of subjective well-being, which coincides with the results of research conducted by the Institute of Psychology of the Russian Academy of Sciences [6].

Thus, according to the results of the study, subjective well-being in patients is determined by their emotional state. This includes the severity of positive and negative emotions, as well as anxiety and depressive emotions. It also includes the ability of patients to understand and express these emotions. In addition, the presence of a history of psychosomatic complaints worsens the assessment of subjective well-being. Stress levels, psychoemotional symptoms, mood swings, the importance of the social environment, self-assessment of health and satisfaction with daily activities also naturally affect. The affective experience of pain has a particularly negative effect on the patient's well-being. That is, it is the emotional component of pain, not the sensory discomfort of it.

V. Conclusion

Based on the conducted research, it is possible to not only judge the main intrapersonal factors that determine the subjective well-being of patients suffering from pain syndromes but also to develop an individual approach to their rehabilitation. This approach takes into account the emotional state of the patient, their level of alexithymia, the presence of concomitant psycho-somatic complaints, and pain affect. Thus, the relevance of the results obtained lies in the scientific substantiation of the subjective picture of pain and the expansion of tools for psychological diagnostics in order to personalize rehabilitation measures. Understanding the patient's emotional state, their ability to differentiate their emotions, and the affective component of pain experience can all form the basis for psychological work aimed at correcting the main factors affecting an individual's subjective wellbeing, improving their quality of life, and increasing the effectiveness of rehabilitation.

Application

Table 1: The Results of a One-factor Analysis of Variance: The Effect of Indicators of Emotional and Somatic State, Affective and Sensory Characteristics of Pain on the Level of Subjective Well-Being in Patients with Pain Syndrome as well as Alexithymia.

The Source of the Variation		Sum of Squares	Number of Degrees of Freedom	The Value of Squares	The F-Criterion	The Level of Significance
Tension/Sensitivity	Within groups	551,541	9	61,282	9,137	0,000**
	Between groups	731,047	109	6,707		
	Total	1282,588	118			
Signs of the main psycho-emotional symptoms	Within groups	1036,912	9	115,212	11,297	0,000**
	Between groups	1111,643	109	10,199		
	Total	2148,555	118			
Mood changes	Within groups	486,889	9	54,099	15,374	0,000**
	Between groups	383,548	109	3,519		
	Total	870,437	118			
The importance of the social environment	Within groups	651,621	9	72,402	11,387	0,000**
	Between groups	693,085	109	6,359		
	Total	1344,706	118			
Self-assessment of health	Within groups	563,749	9	62,639	11,275	0,000**
	Between groups	605,528	109	5,555		
	Total	1169,277	118			
The degree of satisfaction with daily activities	Within groups	832,093	9	92,455	11,629	0,000**
	Between groups	866,613	109	7,951		
	Total	1698,706	118			
Interest	Within groups	105,436	9	11,715	2,133	0,032*
	Between groups	598,547	109	5,491		
	Total	703,983	118			
Joy	Within groups	196,126	9	21,792	3,078	0,003**
	Between groups	771,740	109	7,080		
	Total	967,866	118			
Surprise	Within groups	92,803	9	10,311	1,228	0,285
	Between groups	915,062	109	8,395		
	Total	1007,866	118			
Grief	Within groups	125,519	9	13,947	2,296	0,021*
	Between groups	661,976	109	6,073		
	Total	787,496	118			
Anger	Within groups	221,218	9	24,580	3,266	0,001**
	Between groups	820,245	109	7,525		
	Total	1041,462	118			
Disgust	Within groups	183,920	9	20,436	3,251	0,002**
	Between groups	685,239	109	6,287		
	Total	869,160	118			
Contempt	Within groups	143,865	9	15,985	2,142	0,032*
	Between groups	813,295	109	7,461		
	Total	957,160	118			
Fear	Within groups	218,971	9	24,330	3,493	0,001**
	Between groups	759,248	109	6,966		
	Total	978,218	118			
Shame	Within groups	126,195	9	14,022	1,755	0,085
	Between groups	870,914	109	7,990		

	Total	997,109	118			
Fault	Within groups	275,421	9	30,602	4,130	0,000**
	Between groups	807,721	109	7,410		
	Total	1083,143	118			
The index of positive emotions	Within groups	864,075	9	96,008	3,300	0,001**
	Between groups	3171,320	109	29,095		
	Total	4035,395	118			
The index of acute negative emotions	Within groups	2321,905	9	257,989	3,568	0,001**
	Between groups	7882,061	109	72,312		
	Total	10203,966	118			
Index of anxiety-depressive emotions	Within groups	1591,928	9	176,881	3,802	0,000**
	Between groups	5070,660	109	46,520		
	Total	6662,588	118			
The coefficient of well-being	Within groups	12,097	9	1,344	6,733	0,000**
	Between groups	21,759	109	,200		
	Total	33,856	118			
Exhaustion	Within groups	1742,469	9	193,608	11,573	0,000**
	Between groups	1823,497	109	16,729		
	Total	3565,966	118			
Stomach Complaints	Within groups	328,318	9	36,480	3,988	0,000**
	Between groups	997,094	109	9,148		
	Total	1325,412	118			
Rheumatic Factor	Within groups	649,360	9	72,151	3,809	0,000**
	Between groups	2064,607	109	18,941		
	Total	2713,966	118			
Heart Complaints	Within groups	517,375	9	57,486	5,760	0,000**
	Between groups	1087,919	109	9,981		
	Total	1605,294	118			
Pressure of Complaints	Within groups	11174,760	9	1241,640	8,894	0,000**
	Between groups	15216,651	109	139,602		
	Total	26391,412	118			
Rank index of sensory pain sensations	Within groups	381,025	9	42,336	1,200	0,302
	Between groups	3845,563	109	35,280		
	Total	4226,588	118			
Index of the number of selected sensory descriptors	Within groups	76,018	9	8,446	1,203	0,301
	Between groups	765,377	109	7,022		
	Total	841,395	118			
The ranking index of emotional pain	Within groups	153,043	9	17,005	3,271	0,001**
	Between groups	566,655	109	5,199		
	Total	719,697	118			
The index of the number of selected descriptors of emotional sensations	Within groups	26,958	9	2,995	1,909	0,058
	Between groups	171,025	109	1,569		
	Total	197,983	118			
The real intensity of the pain	Within groups	17,079	9	1,898	1,576	0,131
	Between groups	131,241	109	1,204		
	Total	148,319	118			
The level of alexithymia	Within groups	5120,351	9	568,928	6,382	0,000**
	Between groups	9716,826	109	89,145		
	Total	14837,176	118			

Note: * p<0,05; ** p<0,01

Conflict of Interest: None declared.

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Defying the Divine: Rebellion against Vedic Authority in Indian Folktales

By P. Deborah Ann, Stephen Foster Davis & Sidney Shirly

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Abstract- Folktales often diverge from religious texts by challenging divine authority and foregrounding human agency. This paper examines two Indian folktales—"The Separation of Heaven and Earth" (Kadar) and "Why the Sky Went Up" (Kannada)—that subvert notions of divine superiority and depict rebellion against gods.

Through a comparative reading of Rig Vedic hymns and oral traditions, the study explores how these narratives reflect resistance to Brahminical Hinduism and its caste-based hierarchies. The analysis highlights motifs such as the pestle used in rice pounding, where domestic labor and ordinary voices symbolically displace cosmic order, undermining the supremacy of deities.

The paper argues that such folktales serve as counter-narratives, providing marginalized communities with an oral weapon against religious and social domination. By situating these tales within broader debates on folklore, caste, and resistance literature, the study contributes to an understanding of oral tradition as a vehicle for subaltern expression and cultural critique.

Keywords: brahminical hinduism, caste, rebellion, rig veda, folktales, oral tradition, humanism.

GJHSS-A Classification: LCC Codes: BL1150

DEFYINGTHEDIVINEREBELLIONAGAINSTVEDICAUTHORITYININDIANFOLKTALES

Strictly as per the compliance and regulations of:

Defying the Divine: Rebellion against Vedic Authority in Indian Folktales

P. Deborah Ann [α], Stephen Foster Davis [σ] & Sidney Shirly [ρ]

Abstract- Folktales often diverge from religious texts by challenging divine authority and foregrounding human agency. This paper examines two Indian folktales—"The Separation of Heaven and Earth" (Kadar) and "Why the Sky Went Up" (Kannada)—that subvert notions of divine superiority and depict rebellion against gods.

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I. Introduction

Belief in a higher power that orders the universe is a common feature across world religions. Monotheistic traditions such as Christianity and Islam proclaim the absolute supremacy of God, while Hinduism and Zoroastrianism similarly attribute creation and cosmic order to divine beings. Folklore, however, often complicates this pattern. Indian folktales, in particular, present a diverse range of perspectives in which gods may be revered, ignored, or even mocked, depending on the teller's cultural and social context.

In most Indian narratives, figures such as Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva from the Hindu pantheon, or the Sun and Moon as deities, appear frequently. Yet indigenous traditions often portray nature itself—the sky, the earth, and natural forces—as divine powers. These traditions developed independently of Aryan religion, even as contact with Vedic belief systems gradually shaped aspects of oral storytelling. (Dowson 344-45; Frazer 383-84, 423, 427). The result is a rich hybrid space where reverence, resistance, and reinterpretation coexist.

The present study focuses on two folktales, "The Separation of Heaven and Earth" (Kadar) and "Why the Sky Went Up" (Kannada), which exemplify this dynamic by depicting rebellion against divine authority. Unlike the Rig Veda, where Heaven and Earth are revered as cosmic parents, these tales attribute the separation of sky and earth not to gods but to human or communal action. This inversion reveals not only narrative creativity but also an implicit critique of Brahminical hierarchy and the caste system that accompanied Vedic religion.

While considerable scholarship has examined Vedic cosmologies and Hindu mythology, relatively little attention has been paid to how Indian folktales, particularly those from indigenous and marginalized communities, function as counter-narratives. Blackburn and Ramanujan describe folklore as "another harmony," where suppressed or subaltern voices subtly transform dominant religious symbols into spaces of cultural negotiation (3). By juxtaposing Rig Vedic hymns with oral tales, this paper explores how folklore reflects cultural resistance, reconfigures divine-human relationships, and affirms the agency of subaltern voices.

II. Notes on the Tales

This study examines two folktales that share a common motif of the sky's closeness to the earth: "The Separation of Heaven and Earth", a Kadar tale from Zacharias P. Thundy's *South Indian Folktales of Kadar,* and "Why the Sky Went Up", a Kannada tale recorded by A. K. Ramanujan in *A Flowering Tree and Other Oral Tales from India.*

The Kadar are an indigenous community living in the forests of the Western Ghats along the Tamil Nadu–Kerala border. Their oral traditions, as Thundy observes, are deeply interwoven with songs, rituals, and communal memory. By contrast, Ramanujan's Kannada collection reflects the storytelling traditions of agrarian communities in Karnataka, where narratives frequently

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combine cosmological motifs with the lived realities of rural life.

Both tales recount a time when the sky pressed close to the earth, obstructing human movement and making life unbearable. In each version, human action—rather than divine will—forces the separation of sky and earth. This motif not only challenges the Vedic narrative, in which the separation is the work of gods such as Indra, but also highlights the power of ordinary labor and collective voice.

III. Criteria for Selection

These two tales were chosen for their thematic coherence and symbolic force. Both dramatize a God-human conflict in which divine figures are defied, cursed, or displaced by human agency. Unlike other Kadar tales that deify the Sun, Moon, or Earth, "The Separation of Heaven and Earth" portrays the community itself as the agent of cosmic change. Similarly, "Why the Sky Went Up" emphasizes the suffering of ordinary people—a farmer, his daughter, and a grieving woman—whose actions and curses alter the order of the cosmos.

Particularly striking is the pestle motif, in which women pounding rice inadvertently push the sky upward. This image situates domestic, agrarian labor as a force capable of reshaping the universe, offering a gendered perspective rarely acknowledged in Vedic texts. It also illustrates how oral traditions transform everyday practices into cosmological metaphors, embedding resistance within the fabric of daily life. As Skaria observes in his study of forest communities, indigenous practices often carry symbolic weight far beyond their material function, acting as registers of both survival and resistance (112).

By foregrounding these tales, the study emphasizes how marginalized communities reinterpret mythological motifs not to glorify divine supremacy but to subvert it, offering a distinctly human-centered worldview.

IV. The Separation of Father-Heaven and Mother-Earth

The separation of Heaven and Earth is a recurring origin-myth across world cultures. Frazer notes that many communities once believed the sky and earth to have been united until a god or hero forced them apart (26). In the Rig Veda, this separation is attributed to Indra, who "parted twofold the eternal and united spheres of heaven and earth" (*Rig-Veda Sanhita* I.62.7). The texts exalt Dyaus (Heaven) as father and Pṛithivī (Earth) as mother, imploring: "O Heaven our Father, Earth our guileless Mother . . . bless us" (*The Hymns of the Rig Veda* VI.51.5).

These hymns depict the cosmic parents with awe and reverence, reinforcing divine supremacy. The select folktales, however, reverse this posture. Rather than celebrating Heaven and Earth, they portray the sky's oppressive closeness as a burden to humanity. The Rig Veda does not explain why separation occurred, but the folktales provide pragmatic reasons: unbearable heat, cramped space, and danger to human life. By doing so, they shift the focus from divine agency to human experience. This contrast underscores a tension between canonical religion and lived folklore.

V. Vedic Impact on the Select Folktales

While the Rig Veda attributes the ordering of the cosmos to deities such as Indra, Dyaus, and Varuna, the folktales mock or parody this divine authority. In "The Separation of Heaven and Earth", the Kadars face a sky so low that humans crawl "on all fours . . . like monkeys" (Thundy 4). To resolve this, they devise a communal act: pounding rice with mortars and pestles, lifting the sky higher with each stroke. In "Why the Sky Went Up", the problem turns tragic—a farmer dies from a cracked skull, his daughter is crushed, and a grieving woman curses the sky and sun until they recoil.

Both tales highlight how ordinary people—not gods—shape the cosmos. Their use of rice pounding, a domestic and agrarian activity often performed by women, is particularly telling. It suggests that everyday labor, especially women's labor, holds cosmological power. In contrast to Vedic hymns where gods perform heroic feats, these tales attribute change to collective effort, grief, and protest. The pestle motif, therefore, functions as a gendered and subaltern metaphor: ordinary human acts become instruments of cosmic transformation (Thompson 64).

The divergence between sacred text and oral tale also reflects social conflict. The Rig Veda speaks from the perspective of Aryan priestly elites, exalting divine order, while indigenous and marginalized communities narrated folktales that voiced frustration with oppressive conditions. By juxtaposing these traditions, the ideological divide becomes clear: reverence in Vedic hymns versus ridicule and resistance in oral storytelling.

VI. Rebellion Through the Folktale & Caste Conflict

a) Folktale as Oral Weapon

The selected folktales depict rebellion not through divine intervention but through human voices and actions. In "The Separation of Heaven and Earth", the Kadars confront the oppressive closeness of the sky with collective ingenuity, using pestles to push it upward. In "Why the Sky Went Up", grief and curses spoken by a woman compel the sky and sun to retreat. These episodes demonstrate how folktales act as an oral weapon: in societies where marginalized groups lacked access to written texts, storytelling provided a

means to challenge religious authority and reframe cosmic order.

The notion of ridicule and defiance is central. By attributing cosmological change to human protest rather than divine power, the tales mock Vedic hierarchies and empower ordinary voices. They reveal that resistance need not take the form of organized rebellion; it can be encoded in narrative, metaphor, and performance.

b) Caste and Resistance

The deeper context of this rebellion lies in India's caste history. The Aryan invasion around 1500 BCE established the Varna system, reducing original inhabitants to Shudras and Untouchables, while others fled into forests and became tribal groups (Clayton 4; Rajshekar 44). Excluded from temples, scriptures, and social status, these groups found in folklore a means of asserting dignity. Ambedkar emphasizes that the Untouchables and Tribals, though condemned by Vedic texts, sustained their own gods, culture, and identity, refusing assimilation into Brahminical Hinduism (9).

Against this backdrop, the folktales' defiance becomes clearer. The farmer, washerman, and grieving woman in "Why the Sky Went Up" are not noble figures but representatives of the lower strata—possibly Shudras or landless laborers. Their suffering under oppressive heat and their power to curse or command the sky reflect the lived realities of caste-bound communities. The tales suggest that the gods of the elite were unworthy of reverence when they caused human misery. Omvedt underscores that Dalit struggles for recognition were never confined to politics alone; cultural expressions such as stories, songs, and rituals were vital arenas of democratic resistance (54).

c) Ridicule of the Gods

Ridicule is perhaps the sharpest form of rebellion in these tales. In the Kadar narrative, the sky is shoved upward not by Indra or Varuna, but by villagers pounding rice. In the Kannada version, the gods' failure is even more pointed: the sun and sky mistake the cry of a washerman to his donkey for a divine command to halt. This moment overturns hierarchy—the voice of a low-caste laborer carries more weight than the decrees of gods.

Such ridicule directly undermines Vedic exaltations of divine omniscience. Varuna, praised in the Rig Veda for knowing men's thoughts and actions, appears ignorant in the folktale, unable to distinguish human cries. Gratitude, which in Vedic hymns is directed toward gods, is instead offered to the washerman whose accidental shout preserved life on earth. This shift in reverence illustrates how oral tradition redistributes authority from divine to human, from elite to subaltern.

d) Gendered Dimensions of Resistance

Equally significant is the gendered symbolism in these tales. Women's actions—whether pounding rice or cursing the heavens—initiate cosmic change. In a religious tradition where women were largely excluded from Vedic learning, folktales grant them agency as catalysts of transformation. Their domestic labor becomes cosmological, and their grief and protest reshape the universe. Narayan's study of Dalit women's cultural assertion emphasizes that grief and anger, voiced through oral traditions, often serve as political interventions in otherwise silenced spaces (88). This feminist dimension complements the caste critique, showing how multiple axes of marginalization intersect in oral narratives of resistance.

VII. Findings

The comparative analysis of Rig Vedic hymns and the two folktales reveals a stark divergence in how divine authority and human agency are represented. In the Vedic tradition, the separation of Heaven and Earth is a sacred act accomplished by powerful gods such as Indra or Varuna. By contrast, the folktales depict the same event as a human struggle against oppressive conditions, carried out through ordinary labor and collective resistance.

The figures in these narratives—farmers, washermen, grieving women—are not heroic deities but marginalized individuals. Their actions and voices displace divine authority and relocate power in the human sphere. This shift suggests that oral tradition functioned as a medium through which subjugated communities resisted caste hierarchies and questioned the supremacy of Brahminical religion.

Furthermore, the tales highlight the symbolic importance of everyday activities, such as rice pounding, and emotional responses, such as grief and anger, as catalysts for cosmic transformation. These motifs underscore the way folklore encoded both social protest and cultural survival. Sundar has shown, in her anthropological history of Bastar, that such oral traditions preserve memory and dignity precisely by opposing hegemonic religious and political narratives (147).

Taken together, the findings demonstrate that Indian folktales not only reinterpret mythological motifs but also operate as counter-narratives: they resist divine hierarchy, contest caste oppression, and affirm the dignity of human experience.

VIII. Conclusion

The folktales "Why the Sky Went Up" and "The Separation of Heaven and Earth" reveal how oral traditions challenge divine authority and reallocate power to ordinary people. In contrast to Vedic hymns that exalt Heaven, Earth, and the gods, these tales deny cosmic supremacy and foreground human experience—often that of the marginalized. By attributing cosmic change to the actions of farmers, washermen, and women engaged in domestic labor, the

narratives invert the hierarchies upheld by Brahminical Hinduism and its caste ideology.

The study demonstrates that folktales serve as counter-narratives: they ridicule deities, question oppressive practices, and grant dignity to voices excluded from Sanskrit tradition. In societies where the touch of a Shudra or Untouchable was considered polluting, folklore provided a space to reverse these ideologies by mocking divine order and celebrating human resilience.

These findings suggest that folktales were more than entertainment; they were instruments of cultural resistance. By juxtaposing Rig Vedic hymns with oral narratives, this paper shows how indigenous storytelling preserved subaltern perspectives and transformed myth into a vehicle of protest.

Ultimately, these folktales exemplify oral tradition as a human-centered narrative form that resists hegemonic ideologies and affirms marginalized voices. They remind us that the cosmos, rather than being exclusively shaped by divine will, can also be imagined—and reimagined—through the labor, suffering, and creativity of human communities.

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The Baʿth Archives - The End of Histories of Dictatorships? Revisiting State-Mosque Relations in Baʿth Ideology as a Test Case

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Synopsis- In 2010, two US-held archives of the Iraqi Baʿth regime were open to researchers: The Baʿth Regional Command Collection (BRCC) at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and the Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) at the National Defense University. By late 2024 seven books, a few Ph.D. dissertations, and a few articles, largely or mainly based on those archives, came out. All seven books are very valuable, each making an important contribution to our understanding of Baʿthi Iraq. This article reviews mainly those books through one lens: state-mosque, including regime-Shiʾa relations in Baʿthi ideology and practice. As part of this review, this article re-visits the party's rhetorical and operational ideology on state-mosque relations between its inception in the 1940s and its demise in 2003.

Before the archives became accessible to researchers, most historians of Iraq defined Saddam's Islamization "Faith Campaign" (1993-2003) as an ideological shift if not metamorphosis from secularism to Islam. Four, arguably five of the seven historians reviewed here believe that the archival information refutes this conclusion. Two of them see six decades of continuous, unbroken enmity to Islam, while three others see continuous, unbroken "deep love for Islam".

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Amatzia Baram

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Before the archives became accessible to researchers, most historians of Iraq defined Saddam's Islamization "Faith Campaign" (1993-2003) as an ideological shift if not metamorphosis from secularism to Islam. Four, arguably five of the seven historians reviewed here believe that the archival information refutes this conclusion. Two of them see six decades of continuous, unbroken enmity to Islam, while three others see continuous, unbroken "deep love for Islam". Either way, the Alladin Cave of the archives brought three of the seven to regard the regime's open media, on which their predecessors base their conclusions, as deceptive. In other words, they believe that the regime had at the same time a false public and a true secret ideology. The archives convinced one of the seven also that regime-Shi'a relations were substantially better than what his pre-archives predecessors described.

This article argues, first, that there is truth and deception in both types of sources. The challenge is to tell truthfulness from deceit. Second, the high value of the archives notwithstanding, it is the regime's public media that should be the historian's main source for regime ideology. Third, some contradictions that three of the seven scholas found between the archives and the regime's public media are no contradictions, others are not changing the big picture. This article's conclusion is, therefore, that the "old" views that in the 1990s Saddam did perform an ideological U-turn, and that regime-Shi'a relations were extremely difficult, are correct. Namely, that the archives do not change the big picture.

Even those who believe in Saddam's initial love for Islam, believe that, to the end, he was a staunch opponent of Islamism. This article argues that during the last decade of his rule he was an Islamist himself. In fact, in addition to his Islam, he sponsored two other Islams. His nurture of moderate Sufis is well-known, but it is suggested here that his Faith Campaign radicalized some of them. Less know is his encouragement for pro-regime radical "Wahhabis". Finally, two of the historians suggest that the regime managed to Ba'thize Iraq and Islam. It is argued here that Saddam Islamized the Ba'th far more successfully.

It seems that most research mistakes resulted from over-enthusiasm over the newly accessible secret archives. This led to placing in them too much trust and underestimating or ignoring important open records. At the same time, occasionally even key archival records were ignored. Mistakes result also from occasional insufficient acquaintance with Ba'th history and codes. This article is trying to present a different picture.

> "[T]he basic assumptions of Ba'thist intellectual history – mainly that one can read public statements and surmise from them an ideology [is mistaken]."[1]

> "[T]he Iraqi archival records reveal that Saddam's increasing instrumentalization of Islam [in the "Faith Campaign"] should not be attributed to an ideological shift."[2]

> "[Michel] Aflaq clearly had a deep love for Islam."[3]

> "In the 1990s the regime publicly launched a faith campaign but, simultaneously, behind the scenes, continued to be anti-religious and to repress any sign of real religiosity"[4]

> "The BRCC records show that [in the Faith Campaign] Hussein embraced Islam in order to suffocate it."[5]

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, two US-held archives from the Iraqi Ba'thist regime became accessible to researchers: The Ba'th Regional Command Collection (BRCC) at Stanford University's Hoover Institution and the Saddam Hussein Collection (SHC) at the National Defense

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[1]*I am grateful to my colleague Ms. Ban al-Maliki for the documents from the BRCC archive used here.
Helfont, Samuel. (2015). 'Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots of Saddam Hussein's Islam', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Princeton University, pp. 23–24, http://dataspace.princeton.edu/jspui/handle/88435/dsp01j6731609j, accessed February 12, 2018.

[2] Helfont, Samuel. (2018). *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, Islam, and the Roots of Insurgencies in Iraq*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 2.

[3] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 35; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 27.

[4] Sassoon, Joseph. (2012). *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 3.

[5] Faust, Aaron M. (2015). *The Ba'thification of Iraq: Saddam Hussein's Totalitarianism,* Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, p. 131.

University-based Conflict Research Records Center (CRRC). By late 2024 seven books a few articles and PhD dissertations were based primarily on those archives. The privileged first few to access these archives produced valuable studies, each making a high-quality contribution to our understanding of Ba'thist Iraq. Yet, this article argues that mainly three of those scholars in parts of their studies skidded into a critical methodological mistake when they dismissed the regime's open sources, while uncritically lionizing its archival records.

This article reviews the existing studies through one lens: state-mosque relations in Ba'thi ideology and practice. This provides an opportunity to re-visit the party's ideology and practice between its inception in the 1940s and its demise in 2003. Other lenses like education, culture, state-tribe relations, Iraqi patriotism (al-Wataniya) versus Arab nationalism (al-qawmiya), social policies, party organization and membership, military history, cannot be examined here for reasons of space.

Mainly Joseph Sassoon, Aaron Faust, and Samuel Helfont believe that they found substantial contradictions between the newly accessible archives and what their predecessors found in the regime's public media to justify contradictory conclusions. In all such cases they see the archival records as the final arbiters. Helfont explicitly, Sassoon and Faust implicitly, conclude that the regime's public records are misleading. In other words, as they see it, the regime had at the same time a false public and a true secret ideology.[6] If so, then the ramifications for the study of all totalitarian and authoritarian regimes before their archives became accessible to historians are enormous. The four other historians consider both source types as equally relevant.[7]

This article will try to show, first, that, contrary to the three scholars' preference for the archives, those are

the public records that provide the main outlines of the regime's ideology. Obviously, taken together, the two types of sources combined offer the best picture. While neither source type furnishes the simple truth, sometimes the open sources are more trustworthy, while other times the archives are. I am offering a simple rule-of-the-thumb how to gauge the reliability of the information we find in both types of sources. Secondly, this article argues that contradictions between the public and archival sources are few and far between. While they require an explanation, they do not change the larger picture as represented by the regime's public media. Thirdly, contrary to the belief of four or five of the seven scholars reviewed here, that between the 1940s (or 1968) and 2003 there was no Ba'thi "ideological shift", this article argues that there was such a major "shift", even an ideological metamorphosis, from secularism to Saddam-style Islamism.

It is suggested here that most scholars' mistakes resulted from over-enthusiasm over the new source. As a result, three of the seven historians tend to believe that the archives provide straightforward answers, while the regime's open media is deceptive. This article argues that even when it comes to dictatorship, we can find truth in its public media. Conversely, often the dictatorship's secret archives lie. Moreover, because the open media is the main vehicle through which the regime can indoctrinate the population, the media, rather than the secret archives, is the main source for studying its ideology.

This article examines what in the open sources and archival documents convinced four or five of the seven historians that Saddam's 1990s Islamic "Faith Campaign" represented an uninterrupted ideological continuity. This article begins this historical journey by delving into the early lectures of Michel 'Aflaq, the party's Christian-born founder. It tries to decide whether he felt "deep love for Islam" and wanted Islam to serve as the party's legitimacy foundation, as believed by one, maybe two of our historians, or a staunch secularist as three other historians believe. There is a consensus that in the 1970s the Ba'th rule in Iraq was secular, but two historians, with some support from a third one, think that it was secretly Islamic, hiding behind a secular smoke screen. So, which was the Ba'th of the 1970s?

This article tries to shed light on research mistakes. In some cases, they result from scholars' failure to decipher regime codes. In others, their acquaintance with Ba'th history was insufficient. This article examines also what in the archives convinced one historian that his predecessors overstated the regime-Shi'a chasm. This article tries also to show that, in addition to the widely recognized two Islams that Saddam nurtured in the 1990s: a sharīʿa-light orthodoxy and Sufi Islam, he also promoted radical Salafi (or "Wahhabi") Islam. Finally, the conclusion of two of the

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[6] For example, Faust, A.M. *Ba'thification of Iraq*, p. 131-32 Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, pp. 3, 223–24, 264–65; Helfont, S. 'Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots', pp. 3, 23–24, 235; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 2-3, 21-22.; Helfont, S. and Michael Brill, "Saddam did not create ISIS: Getting the terrorist group's origin story right," *Foreign Affairs*, April 20, 2016, 5; Helfont, S. (2014). "Saddam and the Islamists: The Ba'thist regime's instrumentalization of religion," *Middle East Journal*, 68, 3, pp. 352–66.

[7] Khoury, D.R. (2013). *Iraq in War Time*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; Baram, A. (2014). *Saddam Husayn and Islam 1968–2003 – Ba'thi Iraq from Secularism to Faith*, Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Johns Hopkins University Press; and Blaydes, L. (2018). *State of Repression: Iraq Under Saddam Hussein*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Jordan, D. (2022). *State and Sufism in Iraq. Building a "Moderate Islam" Under Saddam Husayn*, London: Routledge Sufi Series, Routledge. In his book (p. xviii), Faust is not dismissing the open sources. He pays homage to the work of the pre-archives historians, and promises to assess their findings in the light of the archives. This article tries to assess his assessment.

historians is that the regime managed to Baʿthize Iraq, one believes that he Baʿthized Islam. This article argues that Saddam failed in his attempt to Baʿthize society, and his main success was that he Islamized the Baʿth.

I. Public or Archival Record as the Historian's Main Source for Ideology

Joseph Sassoon, Aaron Faust, and Samuel Helfont, with some support from David Jordan, challenge the view of most pre-archive access historians that Saddam's Islamic "Faith Campaign" was an about-face from the party's traditional secularism. Their predecessors blundered, they aver, when they trusted the regime's open media to gauge Baʿth ideology. Saddam led an extensive Islamization campaign over more than a decade. Yet, based on the archives, the three, maybe four, believe that it represented no meaningful ideological change.

Helfont states, correctly, that the Iraqi archives "are the only open archives of a modern Arab state." More problematically he states that those archives "suggest that relying on public policy and public statements - which is the standard method of studying such [authoritarian] states – is inadequate and can even be misleading."[8] All the pre-archive historians erred, Helfont believes, because they wrongly made "the basic assumption" that "one can read public statements and surmise from them an ideology."[9] Helfont further proclaims enthusiastically: "Fortunately, with the regime's internal documents we can differentiate between Saddam's tactical … views on religion" and his "more foundational stances upon which the regime based its actual policies." Then: "Public appearances were misleading."[10] For understanding the 1990s "Faith Campaign," he points out, we "no longer need to rely solely on the vague picture provided by the tightly controlled Iraqi press" or "one-off statements by regime officials, and other open-source materials." At long last," he concludes, "the archival records provide straight-forward information on this topic."[11] As will be shown below, while less emphatic, Sassoon and Faust, too, follow this line of thinking.

This article seeks to show that this view is mistaken, as are the conclusions derived from it. Below I shall try to show that the picture provided by the regime's open media on the "Faith Campaign" was

anything but "vague" and that the Baghdad media was not "tightly controlled" as claimed. Saddam's Baghdad was not Joseph Stalin Moscow. Furthermore, I suggest that even in Stalin's Moscow, the truly tightly controlled media represented his ideology. Finally, Saddam was not just some "regime official" as Helfont presents it. Also, his Islamist rhetoric and policies were anything but "one off" events. They were pervasive and, from June 1990, consistent.[12] Sassoon goes even further than Helfont in arguing that, even when the internal archival sources report on regime public policies and statements, they should be seen as misleading.[13] Faust lends much more credence to studies based on the regime's open sources,[14] yet even he lends far more weight to those found in the archives, that he believes contradict the open sources.[15]

If we adopt this approach, then all studies of nondemocratic regimes made before they disintegrate, and their archives are pried open, are very likely wrong. This is because they are based on the regimes' public media, which Sassoon, Helfont, and to an extent Faust, see as mere smoke and mirrors. To them, the truth lies in the archives. If they are right, we would need to trash all the existing histories of Communist China, Egypt since 1952, Erdogan's Turkey, maybe even the USSR, to mention only a few examples. In their stead we shall be left with a black hole. Still, if these historians are correct, then so be it. I argue, though, that they are mistaken. The public media statements of the Baʿth and their on-the-ground policies are not smokescreens and studying them is not a trap. This, because the public face of the regime was all that the public knew. Worse, while disparaging the regime's public records, ironically all three historians seem to show blind faith in the regime's newly accessible archives. As Helfont puts it most explicitly, they "provide straightforward information."[16] Below I shall try to show that both facets of this approach represent a methodological snare.

II. Ideological Continuity or Metamorphosis?

Joseph Sassoon, the first historian to publish an archives-based book, reports that the archival documents "allow us a more nuanced understanding … in every aspect of life in Iraq."[17] This is certainly true, but Sassoon goes far beyond nuance. In the light of the new archives, he reveals a profound error in the analysis of his pre-archive predecessors, who regarded the Faith

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[8] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 3. See also Helfont, S. S.R. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 2–3.

[9] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 23. See also pp. 22–4.

[10] Helfont, S. S.R. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 234–5, 247; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 183.

[11] Helfont, S. S.R. & Brill, M. "Saddam did not create ISIS," 5.

[12] See, for example, Khoury, D.R. *Iraq in War Time,* pp. 130-31; Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam*, pp. 210-221.

[13] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 3.

[14] For example, Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, pp. xviii, 5-6, 10, 40, 142-3.

[15] For example, Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, p.129.

[16] Helfont, S. and Brill, M. "Saddam did not create ISIS," p. 5. See also Helfont, S. "Saddam and the Islamists," 352–66 for the same view.

[17] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party,* p. 3.

Campaign to be an ideological U-turn from secularism to Islam. His innovation is a claim for Ba'th uninterrupted ideological continuity between 1968 and 2003 of hostility to Islam. He does not deny Islamization steps during the "Faith Campaign", but to him the Campaign was smoke and mirrors. "The regime", he writes, "publicly launched a faith campaign" in the 1990s. Yet, "simultaneously, behind the scenes, continued to be anti-religious and to repress any sign of real religiosity."[18]

Aaron Faust, too, admits that, since 1979, when he became president and until the 2003 end, Saddam waved an Islamic flag. In this he "did not try to apply traditional Ba'thist ideology." Yet, the change was not real. Saddam merely "pursued a Husseini Ba'thist version" of Islam.[19] This version included "tribal and religious rhetoric," as well as "policies to back up its words." He admits that "in some ways" Saddam "did 'tribalize' and 'Islamize' his regime."[20] Yet, he insists, the BRCC archive tells him that "Hussein's regime "did not so much 'Islamize' in the 1990s as expand its ongoing policy to Ba'thize religion."[21] "The BRCC records", he sums up, "show that Hussein embraced Islam in order to suffocate it."[22] By "embraced" he means "venerating religion in … rhetoric; patronizing cooperative religious leaders, institutions and educational systems; supporting unthreatening religious customs and rituals and spreading his own Husseini Bathist version of Islam." By "suffocating" he means "intense surveillance of religious clerics, institutions, and rites, cracking down hard when they felt threatened by a preacher or practice."[23] So, with some limited deviations from party doctrine, like Sassoon, Faust, too, sees some six decades of continuity of Ba'th anti-religious ideology and practice.

Helfont and Jordan have a contrasting view. They, too, believe that their pre-archive predecessors erred when they identified a U-turn, but the continuity they see is that of 'Aflaq's "deep love for Islam".[24] Saddam, Helfont insists, followed loyally in his mentor's footsteps. "'Aflaq's Ba'thist interpretation of Islam, with some slight variations, was the official religion of Saddam's Iraq. It remained so until the regime's downfall in 2003."[25] "The Iraqi archival records reveal", he contends, "that Saddam's increasing instrumentalization of Islam [in the 1990s] should not be attributed to an ideological shift."[26] Namely, what looked to the pre-archive historians like an ideological shift from

secularism to Islam in Saddam's Islamic "Faith Campaign" was no shift at all, only an "Instrumentalization" of an old Islamic, but not "Islamist" dream.[27] Blaydes agrees that "there is no evidence that Hussein or the Ba'th regime … displayed any sympathy for Islamism, Salafism or Wahhabism". Moreover, Saddam, she reports, "had an aversion to any form of Islamization throughout his time in power."[28] Jordan supports this thesis wholeheartedly.[29] He asserts that "promotion of Islamism" during Saddam's "Faith Campaign" was "nonexistent". Likewise, he is in full support of Helfont's thesis according to which, from the 1940s to the end, the party promoted "an abstract Ba'thī ideological understanding of an Arab Islam."[30] This "Arab Islam," Jordan tells us, rested on "secular principles."[31] To Jordan, Helfont "argues convincingly that the increasing role of Islam in Ba'th politics" in the Faith Campaign "reflects the regime's gradual and successful establishment of control over Iraq's religious landscape." This "high level of control during the 1990s", he goes even further than Helfont, "enabled the Ba'th to implement its own Faith Campaign to accelerate the spread of the *original* Ba'thī interpretation of an Arab Islam without the need for *any* ideological deviation or shift."[32]

Below we shall return to the issues of Islam, "Islamization and "Islamism". For now, it may be summed up that, while Sassoon and Faust see some six decades of continuous, uninterrupted ideological enmity to Islam, Helfont and Jordan, maybe Blaydes too, see some six decades of continuous, uninterrupted ideological love for Islam. Love for Islam notwithstanding, though, Helfont, Blaydes, and Jordan believe that there was no "Islamism" in the 1990s. If we accept Jordan's analysis, Saddam's Islam could not be "Islamism", because it was "secular" and "abstract".[33]

Unlike the four historians who see no significant ideological change, using both the archives and open media I see change so profound that, by 2003, the regime was no longer Ba'th. Saddam dragged the Ba'th kicking and screaming into an ideological and political metamorphosis. I see the Ba'th journey from the 1940s (or 1968) to 2003 as a tortured Odyssey from secularism to Saddam-style Islamism.

[18] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party,* p. 3.

[19] Faust, A.M. *Ba'thification of Iraq* p. 11. Also p. 131.

[20] Faust, A.M. *The Ba'thification of Iraq,* pp. 16-17.

[21] Faust, A.M. *The Ba'thification of Iraq,* p. 131.

[22] Faust, A.M. *The Ba'thification of Iraq,* p. 131.

[23] Faust, A.M. *The Ba'thification of Iraq,* p. 131.

[24] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 35; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 27.

[25] Helfont, *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 28.

[26] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: Saddam Hussein," p. 2.

[27] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 17; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 2; See also Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. i, and 2, 3, 11, 13, 14, 21, 23, 25, 30, 138, 139, 141, 144; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 14, 105, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114.

[28] Blaydes, L. *State of Repression:* p. 238, also p. 252.

[29] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p. 5.

[30] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p. 3.

[31] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p. 73.

[32] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p. 5. My emphasis, A.B.

[33] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* pp. 2-3; Helfont, S.R. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 2, 20, 37, 72, 106-7, and more.

What is "Islamism" then? I suggest that it is simply political Islam, or a meaningful dose of Islam in domestic politics. In addition to rhetoric and state symbols, it should be found in law, education, and culture. In addition to metaphors, it must be felt by the citizens in their daily lives. Below I shall try to show, first, that what Saddam did in the 1990s was political Islam. Secondly, that it was a clear U-turn from what Jordan defines correctly as the original Baʿth "secular principles". Thirdly, that Saddam failed in his effort to create what Helfont and Jordan call a "religious landscape," being a wide network of loyal ʿulama who would adopt and implement his Islam. Finally, for further study it is suggested here that Saddam failed in "Baʿthizing Islam". His "Baʿthist Islam" disappeared with him, and the phoenix birds that rose from the ashes of his regime were a Sunni-Shiʿi civil war, extremist Sunni Salafi insurgents, and violent and corrupt Shiʿi militias.

III. GROUND ZERO: WAS THE BAʿTH CHRISTIAN-BORN FOUNDER A SECULARIST OR A CLOSET ISLAMIC REFORMER?

Among the seven scholars discussed here, Helfont and I deal most with the thinking of Michel ʿAflaq (1910–89). Baram sees him as a staunch secularist.[34] As mentioned above, Helfont argues that from the party's beginnings in the 1940s and throughout his political life, ʿAflaq "clearly had a deep love for Islam".[35] Helfont therefore argues that what looks like an ideological shift from secularism toward Islam in the Islamic "Faith Campaign" of the 1990s was no shift at all. Rather, this was a late "Instrumentalization" of an old Islamic dream.[36] In his dissertation and book Helfont repeats it multiple times, occasionally a few times in one page, as if repetition is evidence.[37] David Jordan supports this thesis.[38] For their part, Sassoon and Faust understood from the same archives that the Baʿth always was and remained hostile to Islam.[39]

I argue that, while Sassoon and Faust are correct in that, until the early 1980s, the Baʿth was secular ist, even in some ways anti-Islamic, the pressures of the Iraq-Iran War and Saddam's perception of a growing religiosity in Iraq induced him to immerse country and party in Islam. The defeat in Kuwait and the international embargo deepened the crisis. By 2003 Saddam transformed Baʿth ideology and practice from secularism to Islam.

To understand what really happened between the 1940s and 2003 it is necessary to delve briefly into the Baʿth's ideological foundations. Helfont's claim that ʿAflaq was imbued with "deep love for Islam" presents two difficulties. Firstly, ʿAflaq, a Christian-born-and-educated Damascene, completed his higher studies in the Sorbonne in Paris. According to Hanna Batatu, there he was enamored with Marxism, and close to the French Communist Party. Back in Damascus, he abandoned Communism because the French Left had forsaken Syria.[40] It may equally be suggested that, being a shrewd politician, ʿAflaq realized that communist atheism had little appeal in the traditional Arab world. In a 1958 interview Aflaq disclosed that he was "deeply influenced" by the "universalist" thinking of Nietzsche and Marks, but upon returning home he realized that nationalism was "misunderstood" in Europe. So, he became a nationalist.[41] What he probably meant was that Arab nationalism that was not atheistic proved more attractive than Marxist internationalist atheism.

On that basis, it is difficult to believe that he wanted Islam involved in his founding of the Baʿth more than a necessary minimum. Secondly, as even Helfont admits, the ʿAflaqite branch of the Baʿth established a highly secular political system soon after they came to power in Baghdad in 1968.[42] If the party's founders were enamored with Islam, why did the Baʿth not set up its form of Islamic rule straightaway, rather than waiting until Saddam did so in the 1990s?

ʿAflaq's public lectures in the 1940s and early 1950s and the Baʿth 1947 founding constitution are the best sources for the founder's early thinking, with supporting evidence in the writings and memoirs of Baʿth veterans. It is suggested here that what these indicate is that, rather than loving Islam, ʿAflaq was terrified by it. One party veteran points out that his Christian background "gave a pause to many and was used against the party in conservative circles."[43] Another

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[34] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* pp. 26-45.

[35] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 35; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 27.

[36] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 17; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 2; See also Helfont, S.R. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. i, and 2, 3, 11, 13, 14, 21, 23, 25, 30, 129, 138, 139, 141, 144; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 2, 4, 5-7, 11-14, 22, 28, 32, 34, 105, 108, 110, 112, 113, 114.

[37] Confusingly, though, in an earlier magazine article, the "Instrumentalization" of Islam means something very different: that the introduction of Islam was to be found only in foreign relations and, therefore, it was purely technical, utilitarian, and lacking in "conviction." See Helfont, S. "Saddam and the Islamists," p. 353.

[38] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p. 5.

[39] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party* pp. 3, 223–24, 263–68; Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, pp. 131–32.

[40] Batatu, H. (1978). *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movement of Iraq*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 725–26.

[41] Yitzhak Oron, quoting ʿAflaq's interview with *Middle East Forum*, February 1958, in his *"Mifleget Ha-Tehiya Ha-Arvit Ha-Sotzialistit"* (The Arab Socialist Resurrection Party), in *Ha-mizrah He-Hadash (The New East)*, the quarterly academic magazine of the Israeli Oriental Society, Vol. 9, No. 4, (1959), 243.

[42] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 28–29; Helfont, S.R. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 21–22.

[43] Al-Fukayki, Hhani, (1993). *Awkār al-Hazīma: Tajribatī fī Ḥizb al-Baʿth al-ʿIraqi* [The sources of defeat: My experience in the Iraqi Baʿth Party], London and Cyprus: Riad el Rayyes Books, p. 63. Al-Fukayki consulted almost the whole leadership of the Baʿth of 1963, see pp.

senior Baʿthist reported that the Islamists accused ʿAflaq of being both an atheist and a Christian missionary and so, either way, an enemy of Islam.[44]

Still, whether he loved Islam or feared it, ʿAflaq, the Christian-born "founding father" of the Baʿth praised Islam profusely, which convinced Helfont of his "deep love for Islam." Whether out of love or fear, ʿAflaq had an additional reason to praise Islam. To recruit young Muslim-born members he needed to penetrate the Muslim majority community. Thus, a senior Iraqi party member remembers that, in 1959, ʿAflaq received a young religious Muslim recruit from Baghdad in Beirut and assured him of "the connection between the Baʿth and Islam and the fear of God,"[45] whatever that meant.

ʿAflaq's homage or lip service to Islam in the 1940s and 1950s sometimes went very far. Thus, for example, in 1943 he could be understood as calling for Salafist Islam, a return to the imagined pristine Islam of the forefathers when he said: "Every Arab presently is capable of living the life of the Arab Messenger." On the same occasion he also said: "Muhammad was all the Arabs, may all the Arabs today be Muhammad."[46] This could be Salafism but, equally, something else. If every Arab could be "living the life of the Prophet", rather than, say, "follow in the Prophet's footsteps", then Muhammad was not all that special. This could be seen as demeaning the Prophet. ʿAflaq said: "The Islamic movement as represented by the life of the esteemed Messenger is not a mere historical event for Arab life." Rather, it is "a true form and total, eternal expression of the nature of the Arab soul."[47] He also prophesized: "The Christian Arabs will [one day] know … that Islam to them is national culture with which they must fill themselves until they … love it" so that they "will be as dedicated to it as to the dearest thing in their Arab identity," and he added: "There will come a day when the Arab nationalists find themselves as the only defenders of Islam."[48] This may be understood as Islamizing Arab nationalism, but also as a call to save Islam and keep it purely spiritual by separating it from politics and from religious precepts, and turning it into a

personal and spiritual matter. It may also reflect a modernist belief in secularization, that is, the eventual disappearance of Islamic religiosity in favor of Islam as mere national-cultural-historical-spiritual heritage. Below I shall try to show that, while here ʿAflaq went far, he did not go beyond what Brubaker defines as religious language and imagery that can be understood metaphorically.[49]

In 1950 ʿAflaq published in the party's weekly an article that, for those who were not acquainted with his equivocal style, could mean profound Islamic devotion. "Observe how the Arabs were in the old days", he wrote. "They desired the sky and [therefore] ruled the earth." Then they lost both. "Today," he offered the educational lesson, "the Arabs will not rule their lives until they believe in Eternity. Ownership of their land will not return until they believe again in Paradise."[50] This could be interpreted as deep religiosity, but also metaphorically. By "Paradise" he probably meant the future united Arab mega-state. By believing in "eternity" he certainly meant believing in the eternity of the Arab nation. His twin slogans "One Arab nation with an eternal message", and "Nationalism is an eternal truth, not an historical phase" may serve as evidence. Yet, As one of his most impressive disciples explained, and as will be shown below, Islam to him was one of the past images of Arab nationalism.[51] Islam was the most powerful Arab cultural-historical memory, but it should still be treated as a memory. Indeed, in later years ʿAflaq expressed this notion when he replaced "Islam" with "heritage."[52] ʿAflaq also makes it crystal clear that "the secularism (al-ʿilmāniya) that we demand for the state" would succeed in "liberating religion from the vagaries of politics."[53]

Again, ʿAflaq argued: "As long as there is a tight connection between Arabism and Islam and we see in Arabism the body, whose spirit is Islam, there is no room for fear that the Arabs will be separated from their pan-Arab nationalism (al-qawmiya)."[54] Does this mean that Arab nationalism equates to Islam? If we go no deeper, we can make Helfont's mistake of reading such quotations as indeed "deep love" for contemporary Arab Islam.[55] However, ʿAflaq's close associates understood

11–12. See also Abu Jaber, K.S. (1966). *The Arab Baʿth Socialist Party – History, Ideology and Organization*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, p. 13.

[44] A four-hour interview with Tālib Shabīb (1934–1997), a Baʿth Regional Leadership (RL) member and foreign minister of Iraq during the 1963 reign of the Baʿth and military officers' coalition. The interview took place at the home of a Syrian UN diplomat in New York, on the night of September 19, 1994. See also *Al-Daʿwa Chronicle*, 22, February 1982, 1, accusing the Baʿth of adopting a "Christian and secular" ideology, with the intention of "the elimination of Islam as a political force."

[45] Al-Fukayki, H. *Awkār al-Hazīma*, p. 63.

[46] ʿAflaq, M. (1974). "Dhikrat al-rasūl al-ʿArabi" (The memory of the Arab Messenger), in *Fī Ṣabīl al-Baʿth* [On the path of the Baʿth Party], Beirut, Dar al-Taliʿa, 1974), p. 126.

[47] ʿAflaq, M. "Dhikrat al-rasūl al-ʿArabi," p. 124.

[48] ʿAflaq, M. "Dhikrat al-rasūl al-ʿArabi," p. 131.

[49] Brubaker, R. (2012), "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches", *Nations and Nationalism,* Volume18, Issue1, January 2012, pp. 10-13. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00486.x

[50] Oron, Y. *"Mifleget Ha-Tehiya Ha-Arvit,"* p. 250, quoting ʿAflaq's article in *Al-Baʿth*, June 17, 1950.

[51] A lecture by Yasin al-Hafiz, a Syrian party old-timer, at the party's branch in Deir al-Zor, east Syria, *al-Baʿth* weekly, March 28, 1950, quoted in Oron, y. *"Mifleget Ha-Tehiya Ha-Arvit,"* p. 250.

[52] See for example a whole book dedicated to Islam as "heritage": ʿAflaq, M. (1976). *Al-Baʿth wal-Turāth* [The Baʿth and heritage], Baghdad: Dar al-Hurriya.

[53] ʿAflaq, M. "Dhikrat al-rasūl al-ʿArabi," p. 167.

[54] ʿAflaq, M. in *al-Baʿth*, No. 455, 128.

[55] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 35–38, also 17, 20, 21, 31. Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 27, also 28–29.

this as love for the historical legacy of Islam that brought the Arabs to great heights, rather than as a wish to practice it.[56] Yet, such expressions brought many to suspect that he converted to Islam.[57]

To avoid such an interpretation, ʿAflaq also emphasized that Islam was only one phase in the glorious history of the Arab nation. "This nation," he explained, "expressed itself … many different times, in Hammurabi's enactment, *jāhiliya* poetry, Muhammad's religion, and the civilization of al-Ma'mun's [rationalist] era." During all those great epochs, the Arabs had "one sentiment" and "one purpose."[58]

Likewise, in a lecture in ʿAbd al-Nasser's Cairo in 1957, he proclaimed: "Calling for pan-Arab nationalism does not mean at all that we ignore or discard the heritage of the Pharaohs."[59] Arab "heritage" was Islam but other cultures too. This means that heathen Babylon, Pharaonic Egypt, polytheistic Arabia, and the religion of that Arab man, Muhammad, represented the same "sentiment" and "purpose." Islam was one of many displays of Arab power, humanity, and creativity throughout 4,000 years of history. It is not clear also where is God in ʿAflaq's narrative of Arab history. In his doctoral thesis and his book Helfont does not take these and many other secular or even atheistic hints in ʿAflaq's lectures into account,[60] but detractors of the Ba'th did. The Shiʿite Islamic Daʿwa party, for example, dubbed the Ba'th regime "neo-*jāhilī.*"[61]

ʿAflaq offered his most explicit support for secularism when he discussed the daily lives of the Ba'thists. He rejected atheism because it was toxic in the Arab world of the 1940s and 1950s, as shown by the limited success of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and the Arab communist parties. However, he also rejected the Islam of the *sharīʿa*: "Maybe we [Ba'thists] are not seen praying with the ones who pray or fasting with the ones who fast, but we believe in God because we are in dire need and painful yearning for Him."[62]

Helfont relates to this sentence writing that "ʿAflaq's ideas departed significantly from traditional interpretations and practices of Islam." Also: "His Islam did not rest on the scriptural or legal base of the Islamic

tradition."[63] This is obfuscating ʿAflaq's message. In the first place, in this sentence ʿAflaq implies that the Ba'thists believe in God not because He exists but because they need Him. This comes very close to atheism. In another lecture on God ʿAflaq exposes something else beneath his ostensible demonstration of piety: "The Muslim Arabs at the dawn of Islam won with a small number because God sent for them unseen warriors that the enemies could not see." Nowadays, however, "the unseen warriors fighting alongside the pioneers are the interests of the majority."[64] This means at least that God's miracles are no longer needed, and maybe that God is no longer needed.

Secondly, by exempting the comrades from religious duties ʿAflaq is draining Islam of its main content, its societal duties. Islam's most important precepts are widely considered to be its "five pillars": Reciting the *shahāda*, which is part of the prayers, praying, observing the Ramadhan fast, the *ḥāj* pilgrimage, and paying the *zakat* religious tax. *Zakat*, however, is paid only once a year and not by the poor. The *ḥāj* is required only once in one's lifetime and only from those who can perform it. So, fasting and praying are a must. Islam is a social religion, and its practicing needs to be seen in public. Therefore, joining the collective Friday prayer is very important. Eating during daylight during the month of Ramadhan, especially in public, is sinful. ʿAflaq implied therefore that party members were not necessarily practicing Muslims.

Furthermore: in Islam, alongside "commanding acknowledged virtues" (*al-amr bi-l-maʿrūf*), there is also "forbidding evil" or "forbidding from sin" (*al-nahī ʿan al-munkar*), or avoiding the forbidden (*ḥarām*). For example, avoiding daylight eating during Ramadhan, or consuming alcohol[65]. Muslim-born Ba'thists drank alcohol. In his memoirs, Hani al-Fukayki, an Iraqi Shi'i, complains that the Ba'th leadership was extremely strict - "close to Hanbalis" - in their demand that members must be respected and fully accepted members of their societies. Part of this was that members must not be known to heavily indulge in drinking alcohol (*al-shirāb*),[66] so moderate drinking was acceptable. Indeed, al-Fukayki tells us also that his first taste of *ʿArak Zaḥlawi* was in a party meeting in a member's private home in Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria,[67] so party veterans

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[56] See for example the Druze al-ʿAysami, S. (1973). *Fil-Thawra al-ʿArabiya* [On the Arab Revolution], 4th ed., Beirut, Dar al-Taliʿa, pp. 150–51, 173–74. Yasin al-Hafez, a senior party activist, in a lecture in the party's office in Deir al-Zor in eastern Syria, explaining that Islam is the past image of pan-Arab nationalism, *Al-Ba'th* weekly, No. 406, Damascus, March 28, 1950, Oron, Y. *"Mifleget Ha-Tehiya Ha-Arvit"*, p. 244.

[57] Oron, y. *"Mifleget Ha-Tehiya Ha-Arvit"*, p. 244.

[58] ʿAflaq, M. *Fī Ṣabīl al-Ba'th,* pp. 98–99.

[59] ʿAflaq, M. *Fī Ṣabīl al-Ba'th,* pp. 181–82.

[60] See also ʿAflaq, M. *Fī Ṣabīl al-Ba'th*, pp. 129–33.

[61] *Al-Daʿwa Chronicle* monthly by the party's European Information Committee, No. 22, February 1982, 1.

[62] ʿAflaq, M. *Fī Ṣabīl al-Ba'th*, p. 134.

[63] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 36. Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 27.

[64] ʿAflaq, M. *Fī Ṣabīl al-Ba'th,* p. 65

[65] Qur'ān, 5:90 says that alcoholic beverages, among other things, must be avoided: "O believers! Intoxicants, gambling, idols, and drawing lots for decisions are all evil of Satan's handiwork. So shun them so you may be successful." See https://quran.com/en/al-maidah/90.

[66] Al-Fukayki, H. *Awkār al-Hazīma*, p. 69.

[67] Al-Fukayki, H. *Awkār al-Hazīma*, p. 144–45. Opening our NY meeting, Talib Shabib poured for both of us glasses of Johnnie

introduced new recruits to alcohol, it seems. This evinces no "deep love for Islam."

‘Aflaq was trying to recruit his young Muslim-born disciples through ostensibly exhilarating Islamic symbolism and rhetoric. He invoked their Muslim childhoods' emotional world in the service of his secular pan-Arabism. He was clearly walking a fine line between nurturing his followers' Arab Islamic identity and rejecting Islam as a political identity and religious practice. "Islam," he explained, "is the spiritual heritage" of Arab nationalism and its "inspiration, its spiritual source." At the same time, though, referring to the Islamists, he warned, "the religious ideologies … are not serving the national cause, nor will they lead to a positive result."[68] ‘Aflaq knew his Muslim-born disciples well. Many years later Saddam expressed this kind of emotional attachment to the great history of early Islam. In his case it was the military aspect, and he was even critical of the Prophet, but he lived in history. In a conversation with his military General Staff he spoke with deep emotion on the unfortunate end of the military career of the fabled Khali\d bin al-Walid and the deaths of great heroes: "I am miserable and feel pain, because of the [unjust] removal [by the Prophet] of Khalid from command and the martyrdom of Hamza."[69]

I agree with Hanna Batatu when he suggests that what ‘Aflaq did was "the harnessing of the emotions called forth by Islam in the service of the Arab national movement."[70] Still, he took a risk. Two of the four main movement's slogans that ‘Aflaq formulated were double-edged swords. "Nationalism is love before anything else"[71] is not inspired by Islam. It seems to be inspired by the concept of agape (ἀγάπη), or unconditional love, that was borrowed from polytheistic ancient Greece and developed by early Christianity. In Christianity it means the highest form of love, the love of God for man and of man for God. ‘Aflaq had a thorough traditional Christian education during his primary and middle schooling. His choice of the Christian love concept was, probably, unconscious. In any case, it had no Islamic resonance.

"Unity, Freedom, Socialism" is a secular slogan. Yet "one Arab nation with an eternal message" (umma ‘arabiyya wāhida dhāt risāla khālida)"[72] is very different, as is "Arab nationalism is an eternal truth" (al-qawmiyya al-‘arabiyya haqiqa khālida).[73] Umma has been used since the Prophet's days to denote the Islamic nation and risāla is redolent of Muhammad the Messenger (al-rasūl)'s message, with khālida having strong religious connotations too. ‘Aflaq stopped short of fully endorsing the most secular slogan that many Ba‘thists believed represented the party, though he did not reject it either: "Religion is God's, the homeland is everyone's" (al-dīn lillāh wal-watan lil-jamī').[74] This means complete separation between "God" and the "homeland", or religion and state. When the "Father Founder" mentioned it, he was aware that in Iraq the Ba‘thi state's constitution of July 1970 stipulated that "Islam is the religion of the state". As will be shown below, the constitution was secular and yet, the regime made this concession. In the 1940s and 1950s, when the party was a tiny group of young men in opposition to the old social order, this separation between state and religion was a popular slogan. After the party became the state, ‘Aflaq had to be more careful.

Al-Fukayki tells us that upon reading ‘Aflaq's call to the Arab youth - "Let all the Arabs be Muhammad!" - he felt as if every Ba‘thist was a little prophet:

I shuddered … as if I heard the [divine] revelation again … I saw perfection and omniscience and loftiness and prophecy in every Ba‘thist. Despite my belief in secularism, I found no separation between pan-Arab nationalism and Islam. As little prophets, our eternal message meant the resurrection of the Arab nation.[75]

As ‘Aflaq very soon found out, this secular-religious combination was combustible. Already in July 1957, a restricted-access report prepared by a special party committee revealed that "in the minds of many, the meaning of the [Ba‘thist] ‘Arab Mission' has become confused with Islam."[76] As I show later, this came back to haunt ‘Aflaq in Baghdad until his death in 1989.

What was secularism to ‘Aflaq? Educated in France, it is likely that it was the strict version of secularism, the French laïcité, or complete separation between religion, as a purely personal issue, and all state affairs. Thus, for example, while in the US the slogan "In God We Trust" appears on every dollar note, this is unthinkable in France. In his early lectures he

Walker. This, at the home of a senior Syrian Ba‘thi. As I did not drink mine, he drank them both.
[68] ‘Aflaq, M. (1976). Al-Ba‘th wal-Turāth [The Ba‘th Party and heritage], Baghdad: Dar al-Huriya, p. 21.
[69] Baram, A. Saddam Husayn and Islam, p. 31. Based on an audio recording, CRRC SH-PDWN-D-00-028, recorded on August 25, 1981. Saddam meant the hero Ḥamza ibn ‘Abd al-Muṭṭalib ibn Hāshim ibn ‘Abd Manāf al-Qurashī (568–625), paternal uncle of the Prophet, who gave him the title "Lion of God and His Messenger." He was killed in the Battle of Uhud while protecting the Prophet. See similar nostalgia SH-SHTP-A-000-631, a discussion with senior officers in July or August 1988; SH-SHTP-D-000-757, with senior officers discussing the Arab way of war, sometime in 1993.
[70] Batatu, H. The Old Social Classes, p. 733.
[71] ‘Aflaq, M. Fī Ṣabīl al-Ba‘th, p. 111.

[72] The two latter slogans appeared on the top left side of every issue of Al-Thawra, the party's daily newspaper in Baghdad, 1968–2003.
[73] Hizb al-Ba‘th al-‘Arabi al-Ishtiraki [Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party], "Dustur Hizb al-Ba‘th al-‘Arabi al-Ishtirāki, April 7, 1947" [The Constitution of the Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party, April 7, 1947], in Nidhal Hizb al-Ba‘th al-‘Arabi al-Ishtiraki ‘Abra Mu‘tamarati-hi al-Qawmiya 1947–1964 [The struggle of the Arab Ba‘th Socialist Party through its Pan-Arab Congresses] (Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘a, 1971), Article Three.
[74] ‘Aflaq, M. Al-Ba‘th wal-Turāth, pp. 48–49.
[75] Al-Fukayki, H. Awkār al-Hazīma, p. 79.
[76] Batatu, H. The Old Social Classes, p. 823.

rarely was explicit in warning against religion in politics, but he still did: "The Arabs today," he said emphatically, "do not want their nationalism to be religious, because religion … is not the unifying connection for the nation (al-umma). Rather, it is the opposite: it might separate the one people (al-qawm)."[77] 'Aflaq introduced this idea even more clearly into the most binding document of the Ba'th, the party's 1947 founding constitution, which says:

> The national bond (al-rābiṭa al-qawmiya) is the only bond existing in the Arab state … which struggles against all other loyalties, [like] denominational and sectarian solidarities [al-'asabiya al-madhhabiya wa-l-tā'ifiya] … [and] tribalism.[78]

The party's constitution also explicitly promises full equality to all religions in the future Arab state. This means that article like "Islam is the state's religion", cannot exist in the state's constitution.

The party's founding constitution urges members "to aspire to a more glorious and exemplary (amjad wa amthal) future than the Arabs had ever achieved."[79] The Sunni Muslims see the Prophet's era as the peak of humanity's past and future. Calling upon the comrades to go beyond the Prophet was close to apostasy. God, Islam, and the sharī'a are not mentioned once, even when education, family, and social values are discussed. Thus, for example, under "Social Policy," procreation is "a trust given … to the family and then to the state" and "marriage is a national duty." Under "The Party's Policy in Education," education will be "based on scientific reasoning, free from superstition and reactionary traditions."[80] So, apparently, religion was there but hiding under "superstitions".

Helfont overlooks this evidence, including the point about "the only bond." Some 30 years later, in a party discussion in Ba'thist Baghdad, a comrade asked 'Aflaq: "How shall we reconcile the positive position towards religion with Ba'th secularism?" The founding father stated clearly that "Islam is our history and our heroism" and spoke of "an organic connection between Arabism and Islam," yet opined that "secularism means that the constitution and the laws do not prefer one faith, or school (madhhab) over another."[81] As will be shown below, in the 1990s many new laws did favor one faith over others. Helfont also ignores the fact that the Ba'th founding constitution left out God and Islam: It is implicitly atheistic.

Helfont is deeply impressed by 'Aflaq's wish to reform Islam: "Aflaq maintained that Ba'thism was a return to a clear and sound religion which is completely applicable to its original goals."[82] Helfont believes a Christian-born secularist, Communist-leaning, probably an atheist, intended to reform Islam. However, the Islam for which 'Aflaq felt "deep love" was not Islam at all, because it was strictly personal, devoid of religious precepts, and separate from politics. The only aspects of Islam that 'Aflaq urged were the cherishing of historical memory, spirituality, and a nebulous belief in some kind of God because the Ba'thists emotionally needed one.

Perhaps 'Aflaq's most bewildering sentence on this topic was: "[T]here is no Arab who is not a Muslim." So, the Christians, the Druze, and the 'Alawites, whose mother tongue is Arabic, are all Muslims too. A careful reading of the text, though, reveals it is not what it seems. The Ba'th situated Islam, he explains, "as a decisive moral, intellectual and social revolution in history." As such, Islam is "at the heart of Arab nationalism." "In this meaning, there is no Arab who is not a Muslim … Arabism means Islam in that sublime interpretation."[83] So, Islam to Arab nationalists is a cherished cultural heritage, but did all his readers fully understand this? Because of his equivocal rhetoric and profuse praise of Islam, 'Aflaq left an ambiguity in his wake that has beguiled and bewildered many, including Helfont.

Around half a century after he had sculpted the strictly secular founding constitution, 'Aflaq, in a 1986 secret pan-Arab leadership discussion, expressed an uneasy suspicion that Saddam could take advantage of his past ambiguous statements. He said, "I recently understood," why, in its early days, "the party [read: I] turned Islam into the most important thing in its platform." He admitted that in this way the party "expressed the popular … need." However, he warned, the Ba'th did this "without having the intention to practice it."[84] So, this was the same, true 'Aflaq after all those decades. He was a committed secularist to the end; He wanted no religious precepts, no sharī'a, and no Islamic state symbols. He wanted Islam removed from politics, as a historical memory, as a central part of Arab cultural and emotional worlds, but with the clerics and their rites confined to the mosques. So, how did his disciples interpret him when the Ba'th came to power in Baghdad in 1968?

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77 'Aflaq, M. Fī Ṣabīl al-Ba'th, p. 181.
78 Ba'th, Dustūr Ḥizb al-Ba'th, 27.
79 Ba'th, Dustūr Ḥizb al-Ba'th, 27.
80 Ba'th, Dustūr Ḥizb al-Ba'th, 27.
81 'Aflaq, M. al-Ba'th wal-Turāth, pp. 27–8.

82 Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 135; Helfont, S. Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, p. 107.
83 'Aflaq, M. al-Ba'th wal-Turāth, p. 28.
84 A recording of a Ba'th Pan-Arab Leadership meeting, Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) SH-SHTP-A-001-167, July 24, 1986, 73 to 75 minutes into the discussion. Helfont read or listened to this recording in his Ph.D. dissertation (p. 20) but missed this part of 'Aflaq's words.

IV. DID THE 1968 BAʿTH REGIME PERFORM A RELUCTANT "RETREAT" FROM ISLAM?

Helfont offers a highly innovative analysis of the Baʿth regime's approach to state-Islam relations during their first decade or so in power. When it came to power in 1968, because ʿAflaq felt such "deep love for Islam,"[85] the Baʿth committed themselves to the sharīʿa, and generally aspired "to tie the regime's legitimacy to Islam."[86] Yet, they did not. Why? As Helfont tells us, they did not dare satisfy their craving for Islam for fear that this would empower the "religious opposition" who "attacked Baʿthism as unislamic." "After clashing with these religious leaders," we are told, "the Baʿthists made a tactical retreat on matters of religion and attempted to remove Islam from the public sphere."[87] So, to Helfont, because the fledgling regime was so weak and vulnerable, and the "religious opposition" so powerful and dangerous, the Baʿthists decided to protect themselves by hiding their genuine craving for Islam, and pretended to be very secular. Another reason for the reluctant tactical retreat from Islam, we are told, was the regime's wish for Soviet favor.[88] Only in the 1990s Saddam, at long last, managed to create the needed foundation for an Islamic Iraq, so says Helfont. In his words, this was when Saddam achieved the "integration of Iraq's religious landscape", the religious establishment, into the regime's system. Helfont believes that this is what enabled Saddam, at long last, to implement in the 1990s the party's original dream of an Islam-rich regime. By "integration," Helfont means creating many "reliable" and "loyal" Baʿthi "Islamic scholars."[89]

There are a few difficulties with this theory. Most importantly, Helfont forgets to tell his readers that no document has ever been found in the archives to support this thesis. To prove that the Baʿth performed such a momentous tactical retreat from commitment to Islam into fake, anti-Islamic secularism, he bases himself only on the regime's open media. This is inconsistent with his dismissal of this media as a legitimate source.[90] Nor is there either archival or open media evidence that the Soviets encouraged the Baʿth regime to shift to secularism. Still, as I see it, had

Helfont's thesis been solidly based on the regime's public media, there would have been no problem with it. Yet, his evidence is based on a succession of historical mistakes.

The first historical evidence that Helfont provides to prove that the Baʿth desired Islam galore but retreated is the first (1968) Iraqi constitution under the Baʿth. Indeed, as he reports, it contains many Islamic components, including commitment to sharīʿa.[91] However, this had nothing to do with the Baʿth party's "deep love for Islam" or wish "to tie the regime's legitimacy to Islam." Helfont forgot to consider the power balance in the ruling elite during the first months of Baʿth rule. The 1968 constitution was dictated by the most powerful state institution, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). All its five members were middle-aged generals. President Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr and the others were all religious Sunni Muslims. Not all five joined the party, and even those who did, did so at a relatively ripe age (for example, al-Bakr was 46 when he did). Their connections with the party were tenuous. Nine months after an earlier (1963) Baʿth-ʿArif coalition gained power, the "Baʿthist" General al-Bakr collaborated with General ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif to remove the Baʿthists from the government and tossed many, including Saddam, into jail. In 1968, the Baʿthists swallowed their pride and collaborated with al-Bakr against the ʿArif regime, but al-Bakr was not a Baʿthist. I suggest that the RCC generals were in a hurry to issue a constitution in July 1968 and therefore borrowed almost the entire text on state-Islam relations from the constitution of their predecessor, the religiously minded ʿAbd al-Rahman ʿArif. Indeed, in terms of state-Islam relations, the two constitutions are almost identical.[92] Whatever the reason, the 1968 constitution was not Baʿthist.

Only in November 1969 the true Baʿthists - the Regional Leadership (RL) - assumed control of the RCC. RL Deputy Secretary General and Security czar Saddam Hussein became now also Iraq's vice president and deputy RCC chairman. Thus, the two leading institutions, the RCC and RL, came under the control of the young Baʿthists, ʿAflaq's disciples. The July 1970 second constitution was composed by Saddam and those younger Baʿthists, including, for example, the Christian Tariq ʿAziz, ʿIzzat Ibrahim al-Douri, Taha Yassin Ramadhan, and ʿAbd al-Khaliq al-Samarraʾi. As a result, in the 1970 constitution Islam was eradicated almost

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[85] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 35; Helfont, S.R. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 27.

[86] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 28–29; Helfont, S.R. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 21. See also p. 22.

[87] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 29; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 21–22.

[88] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 29; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 22.

[89] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 15, 45, 48, also 1–2; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 2-3, 131-45 (Ch. 8).

[90] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots", pp. 23–24.

[91] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 28–29. Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 21, see also 22.

[92] See the ʿArif constitution, *Al-Dustūr al-Muʾaqqat*, published in *Al-Waqaʾiʿ al-ʿIraqiyya* no. 949, May 10, 1964. For the biographies of the Iraqi Baʿth leaderships 1968-77 see Batatu, *Old Social Classes*, pp. 1086–88. For 1968–1986, see Baram, A. (1989). "The ruling political elite in Baʿthi Iraq 1968–1986," *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 21, 447–93.

entirely, and the sharīʿa disappeared. The young Baʿthists used this change as a battering ram against radical religious circles, rather than in any way out of purported fear of their formidability.

Helfont uses also the Baʿth's 1963 short-lived rule in Baghdad to support his claim that the nascent party was Islamically inclined. In 1963, he argues, they "repealed the Personal Status Law of 1959 because it was not in accordance with Islamic law."[93] In fact, the 1963 ʿArif-Baʿth coalition never repealed the law. It only introduced limited changes regarding polygamy and removed the non-Islam-compliant articles granting women equality in inheritance. All other provisions favorable to women remained in force.[94] Most importantly, the main clause of the 1959 law that had essentially moved matters of personal status from the religious to the state courts remained in place.

Helfont seems unaware also that the 1963 regime was not Baʿthist but a coalition with Arab nationalist officers like ʿAbd al-Salam ʿArif, most of whom were religious Sunnis. This meant that the Baʿthists had limited clout within the 1963 regime. Helfont seems likewise unaware that, because the party considered them a deviation from Baʿth doctrine, the changes in the law caused a profound rift in the ruling coalition. According to two RL members at the time, the RL objected strongly even to these limited changes. However, the religious generals overrode Baʿth objections.[95] So, unlike what Helfont says, the Baʿth party was against repealing even one non-shariʿa clause of the 1959 Personal Status Law.

More broadly speaking, the very concept of retreating from Islam out of fear of the Islamists is counterintuitive. Without documented support it cannot stand even as an assumption. We can learn what happens when a secular Arab regime is truly worried about Islamist opposition from the example of the Baʿth regime in 1970s Damascus. In 1972, President Hafiz al-Assad erased the sentence stating that "Islam is the state religion" from the constitution. Following massive Sunni demonstrations that threatened the regime, he backtracked and introduced a sentence stipulating that "the religion of the president of the republic is of the Islamic religion."[96] Had the Baghdad-based Baʿthis

feared the Islamists, as Helfont claims, they would have tried to appease them as al-Assad did. Instead, they became flagrantly secularist and crushed the Islamists with arrests, mass expulsions, and executions. Unsurprisingly, their secular policies enraged religious circles, Sunni as well as Shiʿite.[97] Had the Baʿth retreated into secularism to protect themselves against formidable "religious opposition," as Helfont suggests, it would have been suicidal.

Finally, David Jordan supports Helfont's thesis strongly but, inadvertently, provides evidence against it. He asserts that "the increasing role of Islam in Baʿth politics [in the 1990s] in fact reflects the regime's … successful establishment of control over Iraq's religious landscape", meaning over the religious establishment. Jordan agrees with Helfont that, at long last, this control "enabled the Baʿth to implement its Faith Campaign" that it always desired.[98] At the same time Jordan describes in detail how, beginning in 1971 but mainly since 1975, the regime succeeded in controlling the religious establishment, and in "secularizing" all "religious education". This was done with crushing effectivity as part of the "nationalization" of Islam.[99] So, if by 1975 the regime gained already tight control over the religious establishment, Jordan should ask why did they not introduce their alleged long-desired "Baʿthi Islam" then? Why wait for the second half of the 1980s or even the 1990s? Saddam could launch his "Faith Campaign" in 1968 or 1970, including crash-indoctrination of a loyal "religious landscape". Compared with 1973, in 1975 Iraq's oil revenues were almost quadrupled. The regime had all the resources it needed, but instead, as Jordan himself reports, they marginalized the ʿulama and launched a highly secular system.

Jordan accepts what many wrote before him, that ʿAflaq "considered Islam not as a religion in its … practices, but rather abstractly as the foundational spirit of Arabism."[100] This is a good definition. However, Jordan ignores Helfon's thesis that the fledgling Baʿth regime wanted to establish its legitimacy on Islam, including the sharīʿa.[101] This does not sound very abstract or spiritual. Unlike what Helfont and Jordan tell us, then, until the failure in Iraq's war against Iran, the party never sought much Islam. In fact, it was genuinely very secular, if not atheistic and even hostile to Islam, as the Central Report of the Party Regional Congress tells

[93] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 28; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 21.

[94] *Al-Waqāʾiʾ al-ʿIrāqiya*, 785 (21 March 1963), 1–2. For a detailed analysis see Anderson, J.N.D. (1960). "A law of personal status for Iraq," *International and Comparative Law Quarterly*, 9, 542–63; Efrati, N. (2005). "Negotiating rights in Iraq: Women and the Personal Status Law," *Middle East Journal*, 59, 4, 581.

[95] Al-Fukayki, H. *Awkār al-Hazīma,* pp. 129–30. This was confirmed in my interview with Talib Shabib, New York, September 19, 1994.

[96] *Al-Thawra,* February 21, 1973. Significantly, the regime of Islamist *Jabhat al-Nusra* under "Abu Muhammad al-Julani" (Ahmad al-Shara'), in power in Damascus since December 2024, adopted precisely this Assad definition in his provisional constitution.

[97] See for example, Ayat Allah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr in 1979 accusing the Baʿth of violating the sharīʿa as part of their enmity to Islam and calling for a united Islamic Sunni-Shiʿi revolution, *Al-Daʿwa Chronicle,* No. 3, July 1980, 2.

[98] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p. 5.

[99] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* pp. 71-73 and Chapter Two.

[100] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p.6.

[101] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 28–29. Helfont, S.R. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 21, see also p. 22.

us as late as June 1982.[102] The Iran-Iraq War, then the Kuwait crisis changed everything.

V. The Baʿth Regime 1968–83 and Islam: What Really Happened?

Sassoon's, Faust's, and my understanding of the secularism of the Baʿthi regime in its first 15 years is diametrically opposed to Helfont's and Jordan's. Faust states that, in 1968, the Baʿth was genuinely highly secularist and "pursued expressly anti-religious policies in line with the party's original national, socialist, secular ideology."[103] Among their anti-religious policies, he mentions "attacking the Shiʿi religious establishment, expelling … students and preachers, murdering Sunni and Shiʿi clerics … arresting the clerics' supporters … banning the call for prayer, [and] allowing the sale of alcohol in Shiʿi shrine cities."[104] All of this does not sound like Helfont's description of fear of the religious opposition. Sassoon implies a similar line to Faust's when he says that, in the 1990s, "behind the scenes, [Saddam] continued to be anti-religious." [105] So, he was anti-religious before the 1990s as well.[106] Helfont admits, as we saw, that the regime's policies were secular, but he struggles with a troubling question. If those policies clashed with the innate Baʿth "deep love for Islam", why were they supported by the comrades? He has an explanation: "The difficulty the Baʿthists faced – at least in Saddam's mind – was that their Party's view of religion was widely misunderstood."[107] In other words, to Helfont the comrades did not understand Saddam's and ʿAflaq's "deep love for Islam." Here again, Helfont provides no evidence, neither from archival nor from open sources. Below I show that, if we accept Helfont's view, then Saddam, too, did not understand his own "deep love for Islam."

The available evidence points in one direction: In the 1968–83 period the Baʿthists understood ʿAflaq and Saddam well and sought a secular state. Limited concessions to Islam notwithstanding, they achieved it. In 1969, the young Baʿthists introduced an entirely secular penal code[108] and, as already pointed out, the July 1970 Interim Constitution eliminated almost all

mention of Islam. By the mid-1970s, they had developed highly secular cultural and educational systems, with the latter downgrading religious studies to the lowest level. State education, media, state-sponsored figurative art, poetry, theater, military units and state ceremonies celebrated ancient Mesopotamian figures. Ishtar (Astarte), the Sumero-Akkadian goddess of sex and war, Tamuz, the god of re-birth, Gilgamesh, Hammurabi, Sannherib, Sargon, and Nebuchadnezzar became household figures. A German 19th century envisioning of Nebuchadnezzar's Babylon rose from the flat sands and salt marsh of the ancient city. A larger-than-life statue of the ʿAbbasid wine poet Abu Nuwas was established on the bank of the Tigris.[109]

In 1974, and more so 1977, the Shiʿite South exploded in massive anti-regime demonstrations. A decade later, in a closed-door meeting, Foreign Minister Tariq ʿAziz reminded his comrades why in the 1970s Saddam had defined the Baʿth secular doctrine more clearly than ever: "We had a powerful religious [Shiʿi] movement that hit us with bullets, so it became imperative … that we present an ideological position against it."[110] Indeed, in 1977, in a series of internal lectures to party cadres that were soon made fully public, Saddam, like ʿAflaq before him, paid homage to Islam and dissociated himself from atheism. At the same time, though, he warned against any attempt to imitate the religious parties and mix religion with politics: "We should go back to the origin of our ideology," he said.

What was "the origin of our ideology" to Saddam in 1977? The party, he explained, should be "proud of religion, without adopting policies for religion." He fulsomely rejected the *sharīʿa*, arguing that the Baʿth must not build "the theory of modern life … on the teachings of ancient jurisprudence." He argued:

> We should not force our treatment of the present worldly aspects of life into a framework of religious jurisprudence. The current social problems that we face … are quite different from those of the early Islamic times when the rules of jurisprudence were laid down … This … cannot be the rule for present life."[111]

This is consonant with the party's origins, like ʿAflaq's demand for "secularism" and in the text of the 1947 Baʿth Constitution. A few years later, in meetings

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[102] Arab Baʿth Socialist Party of Iraq, (1983). *The Central Report of the Ninth Regional Congress, June 1982*, Lausanne: SARTEC (translated from the Arabic), pp. 279–82

[103] Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, p. 129.

[104] Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, p. 129.

[105] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 3. And see Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* pp. 47-80.

[106] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, pp. 223–24, 259–60, 267–68.

[107] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 31; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 23.

[108] See *Iraq: Penal Code,* No. 111 of 1969, July 1969, available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/452524304.html, accessed August 19, 2023.

[109] For a detailed description and analysis see Baram, A. (1991). *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Baʿthi Iraq 1968–89*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press.

[110] CRRC, SH-SHTP-A-001-167, July 24, 1986, around 50 minutes into the discussion.

[111] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* pp. 130-31, quoting Saddam Hussein, "A View of Religion and Heritage," A lecture to the Baʿth Culture and Information Bureau, in Saddam Hussein, *On History, Heritage and Religion* (Baghdad, Translation and Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1981), pp. 28–29. See also pp. 13, 24, 27–28, 30–31. For an identical approach see *al-Thawra al-ʿArabiya*, the internal party magazine, July 1980, pp. 13–18.

with senior aids behind closed doors, Saddam even denied any need by the Baʿthists for "religiosity". What was needed, he said, was pride in the heroic achievements of early Islam. He added that "Allah is neither Sunni nor Shiʿi,… neither Catholic nor Protestant." He opined that most people (in the world) were no longer religious. Rather, they were following "other philosophies."[112]

The last time the party issued a secular, even anti-religious communiqué was in June 1982.[113] A sub-chapter in a party report entitled "The Religious-Political Phenomenon in Iraq"[114] is an atheistic psychological analysis of people who turn to religion and a broadside attack on all religions. Confronting the allure of Khomeini's Islamic Republic, veteran Baʿthists tossed aside ʿAflaq 's cautious claim to a non-specific, non-binding belief in God: "The religious phenomenon … among the youth and other social strata is … normal … given the romantic aspect distinguishing most of the youth during the adolescence." So, for the party, religiosity was the result of immaturity. The report adds that a "drastic transition from one era into another creates a state of confusion, tension, and imbalance. … In such conditions, many phenomena, including the religious one, appear." It further argues: "Religion and the religious attitude form an … atmosphere for attracting … negative cases." Furthermore, in religion, the Report explains, "an individual confused and puzzled by social transformations can find psychological ease."[115] So, religiosity represented mental affliction.

In "The Attitude Towards the Religious-Political Phenomenon," the party's Ninth Congress is caustic about the situation in Iraq.[116] Its resolutions are scathing against "some party members who are trying to appear religious." The party expresses concern. "Religious concepts began … to overcome Party concepts,"[117] and the "religious-political phenomenon" is growing "at all levels of the party."[118] The report asks: "If the religious conception and practices were considered by some comrades as moral and ideological alternatives to the Arab Baʿth Socialist Party … why did they choose the Baʿth party?"[119] This religiosity contradicted the party's

ideology, as there was not "any basis for this in the party's doctrine and tradition."[120]

So, unless we accept Helfont's idea that the Baʿth leadership "misunderstood" Saddam's and ʿAflaq's Islam, between the 1940s and the early 1980s there was, indeed, secular continuity. Even Khomeini's rise to power in Tehran changed little. Until early 1982, Saddam was still very optimistic that Iraq would win the war and thus saw no need for any political or ideological concessions to mass religious sentiment.

The June 1982 military withdrawal from Iran and the ensuing stalemate changed everything. The military stalemate tainted the Baʿth's prestige, and the economy was hit hard. This was when Saddam decided to sacrifice the Baʿth secular ideology on the altar of popular support. Initially it was limited, the result of a cynical calculation. In later years, following the shocking military defeat in Kuwait, the international embargo, and a renewed threat of a US invasion, the Islamization campaign was escalated.

VI. Saddam's "Faith Campaign": Preamble

The first foretaste of a deviation from Baʿthist secularism came at an international "Popular Islamic Conference" that the regime convened in Baghdad in April 1983. This was a crisis moment in the Iraq-Iran war, with Iraq forced to withdraw its forces from Iranian territory. The conference's politicization of Islam represented a major departure from established party doctrine. As Helfont describes it well, Saddam went even further when he addressed the conference. The very convening of the congress was a deviation from Baʿth ideology. Moreover, Saddam also promised that he would accept its resolution on how to end the Iran-Iraq War even before he knew what that decision was. It will be remembered that party ideology rejected any clerical involvement in political decision-making. To justify this, Saddam argued that consensus (*ijmāʿ*) among Muslims was a central principle of Islamic law, it superseded secular considerations. Therefore, he announced that it would be the basis for one of his regime's most vital political decisions, whether to end the war. "In doing so," Helfont explains correctly, Saddam "suggested that Islamic law overrode secular law."[121] Saddam admitted what he was doing was highly unusual and even apologized for it. His justification was that a consensus among Muslims "must be the right one."[122] Saddam went on to organize more such Islamic conferences in 1985, 1987, and 1990. Correctly again, Helfont points out that this was nothing short of accepting "the Iraqi regime's references and allusions to

[112] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, pp. 259–60. Sassoon does not acknowledge, however, that these atheistic views disappeared in the mid-1980s.

[113] Arab Baʿth Socialist Party of Iraq, (1983). *The Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress, June 1982*, Lausanne: SARTEC (translated from the Arabic), pp. 245–83.

Baʿth, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*,

[114] Baʿth, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, pp. 271–76.

[115] Baʿth, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, pp. 274–75.

[116] Baʿth, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, pp. 279–82.

[117] Baʿth, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, p. 279.

[118] Baʿth, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, pp. 279–80.

[119] Baʿth, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, p. 281–82.

[120] Baʿth, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, p. 282.

[121] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 254; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p.196-97.

[122] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 255; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p.197.

Islamic law as a binding set of rules."[123] This is very clearly irreconcilable with the Baʿth's foundations, as already shown, and seemingly why Saddam apologized for it. It is a mystery how Helfont sees in it continuity.

In July 1986, Saddam made an additional overture toward Islam at another crisis point in the war. This happened in a meeting of the party's pan-Arab Leadership.[124] Surprisingly, he met with strong opposition. He suggested an alliance with a hated and feared enemy, the powerful Egyptian and Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood (MB(. This had become necessary, he explained, as people were turning to Islam. "There is a public that is being influenced by what the men of religion are saying." The "men of religion" had "power to influence the people. Their prestige now has risen." In people's eyes, they have become "more precious than before." Religiosity had penetrated even into the ruling Arab regimes, he warned. This necessitated an overture to the MB.[125] Blaydes observes that in the meeting Saddam explains his initiative to befriend the Sunni Islamists in terms of an urgent political necessity: the "increase in piety among Iraqis", and the fact that the ʿulama "benefited from a … shift towards religion".[126] So, Saddam's Islamization was motivated by a cynical calculation. This seems to contradict Helfont's claim in his dissertation and book, with David Jordan's support,[127] that, like ʿAflaq, Saddam, too, from day one, was motivated by love for Islam.

One member supported the president, but most remained silent. Helfont offers that 1986 meeting as proof that ʿAflaq supported Saddam's suggestion, further proving his original leanings toward Islam. Helfont sees befriending the MB as consonant with the party's original deep love for Islam.[128] However, Helfont ignores ʿAflaq's tortured ambivalence evident throughout that meeting. For example, he jibed: "If we compromise, they [the MB] will not compromise as much."[129] Later he made it clear that befriending the MB was the opposite of the existing party policy: "We are coming close to laying down [new] strategy for decades … We want to have a dialogue with them and strengthen those [among them] who are the least bad and least mistaken." So, to ʿAflaq the MB are all "bad" and "mistaken", but some of them are less so. Then he

implied reluctance and surrender: "when we understand the strategic guidelines [Saddam's?] we will have no other choice but to proceed along these lines."[130] As already shown above, ʿAflaq explicitly warned in the discussion against the state "practicing" Islam.

Helfont ignores all this, as well as the strong opposition to Saddam's suggestion from two leadership figures. Foreign Minister Tariq ʿAziz and Secretary of the Sudanese Baʿth Badr al-Din al-Muddathir were emphatic that the MB was an existential threat and that no ties with it were possible. They turned their fire on the MB's core concept, the Islamic state. They argued forcefully that the MB's "religious state" and the Baʿth's "national state" were mutually exclusive.[131] ʿAziz reminded participants that the Baʿth was committed to the "democratic, national, pan-Arab (qawmiya) state and that Saddam himself had given speeches in the 1970s making it clear that the Baʿth position was diametrically opposed to that of the Brethren's "religious state."[132] Saddam had to calm his comrades' fear that he was jumping the secular ship, declaring: "We are establishing a state not through religion but rather a state for life." He assured them that the Baʿth "believes in religion," but only "as rituals." The Baʿth, he emphasized, "is not interpreting [politics] according to religion."[133]

Only in 1995, as part of his "Faith Campaign," Saddam made a landmark announcement that the Baʿth no longer opposed the Islamic state and pan-Islamic unity, provided that Arab unity came first.[134] This was only one of many other ideological changes that, as will be shown below, Saddam introduced in his 1990s Islamic "Faith Campaign." Even though Helfont uses this 1986 document in his Ph.D. dissertation, he missed these parts of it.

Helfont insists that, for the Baʿth since its inception, like for other Arab nationalists of his era, in the choice between the pan-Arab or the pan-Islamic state, "Precedence is the key word. The ideas were not mutually exclusive." As a glaring example he brings ʿAbd al-Rahman al-Bazzaz, who did not exclude a pan-Islamic state.[135] Jordan agrees with Helfont.[136] This I suggest is a mistake. The window to Pan-Islam was open to the moderately religious al-Bazzaz, or even to the sworn secularist Satiʿ al-Husari, because both were Muslim-born. The same was true when it comes to other

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[123] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 254–55; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 197.

[124] First mentioned in Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam*, pp. 190-207. See a recording of a Baʿth Pan-Arab Leadership meeting, Conflict Records Research Center (CRRC) SH-SHTP-A-001-167, July 24, 1986, 73 to 75 minutes into the discussion.

[125] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-001-167, July 24, 1986, 65-70 minutes into the recorded discussion.

[126] Blaydes, L. *State of Repression,* p. 247.

[127] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p. 5.

[128] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 20. This document disappears in his 2018 book.

[129] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-001-167, July 24, 1986, 29 minutes into the discussion.

[130] CRRC, SH-SHTP-A-001-167, July 24, 1986, 39–41 minutes into the discussion.

[131] CRRC, SH-SHTP-A-001-167, July 24, 1986, 31-34 minutes into the recording.

[132] CRRC, SH-SHTP-A-001-167, ʿAziz, beginning 41 and ending 55 minutes into the recording.

[133] CRRC, SH-SHTP-A-001-167, 8 to 10 minutes into the recording.

[134] CRRC SH-SPPC-000-660, January 25, 1995.

[135] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 235; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 183–84.

[136] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p. 5.

Muslim-born Arabs. This window, however, was hermetically shut to the Cristian-born ʿAflaq, and therefore to his disciples in the original Baʿth, as well as to the ʿAlawite Baʿthis Hafiz and Bashar al-Assad. Indeed, as shown above, in the 1986 Leadership meeting, ʿAflaq, Saddam, ʿAziz and Muddathir emphasized that pan-Arabism and pan-Islam were mutually exclusives. In 1995 Saddam went where Bazzaz did before him. Even this ideological change alone between 1986 and 1995 means that, contrary to Helfont's and Jordan's thesis, after 1986 there was a meaningful "ideological shift.

On February 23, 1988, the regime launched the first of eight stages of a war against the rebellious Kurds. The code name given to this series of battles was *Anfal*, or "Spoils of War," being the name of the seventh Qurʾān Sura that celebrates an early victory in 624 CE of the Prophet's army over the Meccan idol worshippers. Legitimizing a bloody operation that cost the lives of tens of thousands of civilians by implying that the Kurds were idol worshippers was another public indication of which way the regime was going.

In 1988 Saddam established Saddam University for Islamic Studies to educate a new generation of clerics who would "counter Khomeinism". The University was to belong to the Baʿthi and Saudi-sponsored Organization of the Popular Islamic Conference.[137] The establishment of an Islamic university was unprecedented under Baʿth rule.

That something even stranger was happening in Baghdad became evident in June 1989, when Baghdad announced the death of Michel ʿAflaq. The pan-Arab leadership issued a communiqué that, prior to his death, "the late ʿAflaq … embraced Islam as his religion." He and his comrades in the command did not want to announce this "out of … concern that this … would be given a political interpretation."[138] Had the leadership not wanted to give it "a political interpretation," it could simply have refrained from any mention of this death-bed conversion. As was disclosed to this author by Ambassador April Glaspie, who had served in Baghdad in 1989, ʿAflaq's elder son told her that he was taken by complete surprise: his father never told him of his conversion.[139] Apparently, having a Christian founding father became a cross too heavy for Saddam to carry.

In June 1990, on the eve of his occupation of Kuwait, Saddam provided the most indicative hint that he was entering an Islamic era. His speech at the 1990 Popular Islamic Conference that he convened in

Baghdad could not sound more distant from his 1977 advocacy of a *sharīʿa*-free state. "We are the party of God (*hizballah*) here and the party of God is the greatest and most powerful of all parties," he exclaimed. By 1990 Hezbollah, Khomeini's creation in Lebanon, had already earned worldwide renown, so Saddam's choice of identity for the Baʿth was nothing short of breathtaking:

> We here, my brothers, are the party of God. I am one of you and whatever the Muslim clerics (*al-ʿulamāʾ al-muslimūn*) will decide we shall turn into our way! … Whenever any local law clashes with the supreme law (*al-qānūn al-aʿlā*), the local law must be declared null and void … Whenever state patriotism (*al-waṭaniya*) in Iraq clashes with the supreme principles of Islam, it will be declared null and void … Whenever the practice (*sulūk*) that comes under the definition of pan-Arab (*qawmī*) practice clashes with the supreme principles of Islam, this pan-Arab practice must be changed and declared null and void in favor of the general [Islamic] law.[140]

So, the *sharīʿa* must reign supreme both in Iraq and across the Arab world. None of the historians discussed here mentions this speech. When compared to his 1977 that the *sharīʿa* is not applicable, in it, Saddam unequivocally declares for political Islam. This is a complete departure from the party's secular doctrine, and this was only the preamble.

VII. The Islamic "Faith Campaign" in Full Swing 1993–2003

Sassoon provides a report of the regime's "Faith Campaign," as reflected in its archives. In the 1990s, Sassoon reports, as part of the campaign, the Baʿth regime "publicly supported all religious activities and called for more conservatism and religiosity." Saddam, Sassoon goes on, adopted Islam "as part of his political oratory and used it to great effect."[141] However, Sassoon reports also of policies that go far beyond oratory. New mosques were built, and repairs were made to existing ones. Saddam even initiated the construction of the Mother of All Battles Mosque in Baghdad, intended to be the largest mosque in the world, and a 605-page copy of the Qurʾān with a text written with his blood. This Pharaoh-style mosque-building spree began during the international embargo years that caused a severe economic crisis. Sassoon also reports that the Iraqi flag was redesigned to include the inscription *allāhu akbar*. The rules regarding opening restaurants and nightclubs in Ramadhan were tightened. One hour a day of broadcasts was dedicated to religious programs. Important religious festivals,

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[137] A report sent by the Ministry of the Endowment and Religious affairs to the Secretary of the President, BRCC 029-1-6-0088, May 30, 1988. See also BRCC, 029-1-6-0078, August 6, 1988.
[138] *Baghdad Voice of the Masses* in Arabic, June 24, 1989, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-Near East and South Asia (NES), June 26, 1989, 10.
[139] A three hours' Interview with Ambassador April Glaspie, Tel Aviv, March 29, 1995.

[140] Saddam in a public televised address to an Islamic Conference in Baghdad, "al-Thawra, al-Jumhūriya," June 19, 1990. See also *Baghdad Domestic Service in Arabic,* June 18, 1990, in *FBIS-NES*, June 19, 1990, 19–20, 22.
[141] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 265.

"such as the Prophet's birthday were celebrated under the auspices of the president."[142]

Sassoon Continues: In 1994 the president established the Saddam Institute for the Study of the Holy Qur'ān that would soon become "part of the hierarchy of the party." At a graduation ceremony, Vice President ʿIzzat Ibrahim announced that the Baʿth was "not a religious party", but then: "We are the party of the Islamic message (*risāla*) and of the Arab message."[143] Hundreds of its students were middle- and higher-middle-level party cadres. Moreover, these party activists were given a year or two of leave to devote to studying at the Institute.[144] So, Saddam went beyond oratory and invested a great deal of the party's manpower, time, and treasure in his Islamization of the party cadres. As will be remembered, already in 1957, to the leadership's chagrin, many Baʿthists confused the party's secular "eternal message" with the Islamic one; Ibrahim's embrace of the Islamic message was a dramatic about-face.

Sassoon overlooked additional archival evidence. For example, some show how the entire state school curriculum was imbued with an Islamic spirit and children had to study the Qur'ān throughout their school years. He also failed to consider laws forcing judges and major merchants to pass tests in the *sharīʿa* or lose their licenses.[145] Sassoon also overlooks the party's internal order to members "not to charge interest (*al-ribā*)" on loans because these are "the instructions of Islam."[146]

Sassoon neither studied the open Iraqi media nor did he interview Iraqis. Doing so would have added much, including Islamization inside the party. For example, a report of Saddam's injection of Islam into the party by General Hussein Kamil, Saddam's close aide and the son of his paternal first cousin, who defected to Amman in 1995. In a meeting with United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) officials, he stated: "The government of Iraq is instigating fundamentalism in the country… Every party member must pass a religious exam. They even stopped party meetings for prayers."[147]

It is clear from Kamil's report that this was new and alien to the comrades.

In the summer holidays, elementary and high school students were sent to regime-approved mosques to memorize the Qur'ān and study simple exegesis in a traditional way. Pupils were taught how to pray, but only in Sunni fashion.[148] The regime's media reported on the new RCC Decree No.82 of July 7, 1994, that closed all places of entertainment not only during Ramadhan, but throughout the year. Even though alcoholic drinks were still on sale in special shops, consumption of them in public was banned, with offenders punished severely.[149] In the public media, leading clerics endorsed the decree for bringing the Iraqi people back to Islam, thus implying that beforehand both people and leadership strayed from the right path.[150] To disarm those Baʿthists who were still secularists, the regime's media provided also a social justification for the bans, arguing that the places of entertainment tempted the youth into crime.[151] The permission to buy spirits was probably the most important concession Saddam made to traditional Baʿth values. This concession was the result of a warning he received from his generals that "a total ban on alcohol will lead to a military revolt." As a result, officers kept ʿarak and whiskey in drawers in their offices, and alcoholic drinks were available in the Army and Navy Officers' Clubs (*al-nadi al-ʿaskari* and *al-nadi al-bahri*).[152]

Surprisingly, Sassoon also fails to mention the law imposing the amputation of the right hand at the wrist for theft.[153] Faust, too, is providing a long list of Islamization steps, but, amazingly he, too, is ignoring the *sharīʿa*-prescribed amputations.[154] This was the first in a host of measures that Islamized the secular Baʿthi 1969 Penal Code. In a later closed-door meeting, there was a proposal made to brand the amputees' foreheads. Saddam provided a secular argument that amputation and branding would curb widespread property-related crimes. Replying to questions, however, the president stressed that amputation was what the Qur'ān commanded, end of story. Saddam was no Qur'ānic scholar, so he must have prepared himself well, because he quoted the relevant Qur'ānic verse

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[142] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 265.

[143] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 266.

[144] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 267.

[145] CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-409, Saddam meeting with a guest, between April 27 and May 7, 2002.

[146] BRCC 01-2982-0000-0447, January 4, 1997. Helfont admits "the regime's attempt to limit usurious loans," and that usury is "traditionally forbidden in Islamic law." Yet, he adds: "However, the Baʿthists had forbidden these loans in their original constitution published in 1947." See Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 196. This is a mistake: the 1947 Ba'th Constitution forbids usury due to the socialist ideology of the party. Some 50 years later, legitimacy grew from Islamic law.

[147] A meeting in Amman between General Hussein Kamil and Dr. Rolf Ekeus, August 27, 1995, http://www.casi.org.uk/info/unscom 950822. pdf accessed March 7, 2024. Already in late 1988 Saddam stopped

some meetings for prayer. Interview in London with the then British ambassador to Iraq Sir John Moberley, September 30, 1990.

[148] A series of telephone interviews and e-mail exchanges in 2022 with Ban Ali, who was a primary school student in the 1990s. See also Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* 254, 321.

[149] Front page, *Al-Thawra*, July 8, 1994.

[150] For example*: al-Qadisiyya*, July 9, 1994.

[151] For example: *al-Thawra*, July 8, 1994.

[152] An interview with Najm al-Jubburi, one of Saddam's generals, Washington, DC, June 24, 2011.

[153] RCC Decree No. 59 of June 4, 1994, a*l-Thawra, al-Jumhūriya*, June 5, 1994.

[154] Conveniently Faust mentions "draconian punishments". Faust, A.M. *Ba'thification of Iraq*, p.132.

precisely.[155] The letter of the law did not mention the *sharīʿa*, but the Iraqi media justified amputation in the same two ways: As a measure to end property crimes and as a fulfillment of the Qurʾānic precept.[156] Gory photography of bleeding amputated wrists and the shocked amputees appeared on Iraqi television.[157] Even in the Baʿth archives, one finds cases of "thieves" having their hands amputated.[158] Finally, no law was enacted forcing women to wear the hijab. Yet, Saddam strongly encouraged women to "dress properly before God".[159] A visiting journalist reported that, due to the travails of the embargo and regime efforts, "More and more Iraqis are going to the mosque; more and more Iraqi women are wearing the veil."[160] Indeed, it emerges from interviews that many women began to wear the veil. The starting pistol was fired by Manal Yunis, the ultra-secular Baʿthi head of the women's union.[161] To sum it up so far, it seems that, unlike what we are told by Sassoon and Faust, Helfont and Jordan, maybe Blaydes, between 1982 and 2003 there was a significant ideological change, even metamorphosis from secularism to Islamism. Why did those historians err?

VIII. Do Regime Archives Invalidate its Public Media?

Let us examine the main evidence presented by Sassoon, Faust and Helfont (with some support from Blaydes and Jordan), that the "Faith Campaign" represented no ideological change.

One: Using the archives as his *Punctum Archimedis*, in a 2012 article Helfont reports that, contrary to the conclusion of pre-archives' historians, Saddam's "Faith Campaign" was neither an ideological change nor was it Islamism. Rather, it was mere "instrumentalization of Islam."[162] The main evidence for that is the fact that Islamization was limited to Iraq's foreign relations and, therefore, it did not apply to the Iraqis. This brings him to the conclusion that the regime's Islamization was a mere technicality devoid of "ideological conviction."[163] Hence,

there was no "Islamization". This thesis is supported by Blaydes, who agrees with Helfont that "Hussein had an aversion to any form of Islamization through his time in power, suggesting an instrumental regime motivation for the policy shift."[164] However, even in the same article, and much more so in his Ph.D. dissertation and book, Helfont admits that there was also extensive *domestic* Islamization during the "Faith Campaign."[165] Indeed, already in his 2012 book Sassoon reported extensive domestic Islamization.[166] Helfont had studied Sassoon's book before he published his *Middle East Journal* article.[167] Yet, he still reported that Islamization was limited to foreign policy. So, if domestic Islamization is the criterion for "ideological conviction", then there was much "ideological conviction" behind the Islamization after all, and there was an ideological change from the 1970s.

Two: A "behind the scenes" piece of evidence that convinced Helfont that what you see in the public media is not what you get is a 1996 closed-door meeting. In it, Saddam spontaneously responds to someone mentioning Louis Farrakhan's Islam: "By God, I do not like them. I do not like those who engage in politics under the guise of religion. I don't trust them." Helfont concludes that this proves his thesis that the open media is deceitful: "public appearances [of Islamism?] were misleading."[168]

In his Ph.D. dissertation and book Helfont tells us that Saddam was always a closet lover of Islam, who secretly wished "to tie the regime's legitimacy to Islam,"[169] but that only in the 1990s he managed to implement, or "Instrumentalize" this Islamic dream.[170] However, when discussing Saddam's Farrakhan quip he seems to tell us that, in the 1990s, Saddam was in fact a closet secularist. Helfont makes no attempt to explain this baffling contradiction. He leaves us only with his sweeping conclusion that "public appearances" by Saddam were "misleading". Namely, when you see a

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[155] CRRC SH-SPPC-D-000-448, 9–11, August 21, 1994.

[156] See, for example, the minister of *Awqāf al-Jumhūriya*, June 5, 1994; Uday Saddam Husayn ("Abu Sirhan"), *Babil,* June 5, 1994.

[157] *For example:* Human Rights Watch (1995). https://www.hrw.org/reports/1995/IRAQ955.htm, accessed July 17, 2022.

[158] A party document "Arresting a thief: A car was stolen, his right hand was amputated," BRCC 001-5-2-0088, June 10, 1995.

[159] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam*, p. 299.

[160] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam*, p. 252, quoting Kim Ghattas, "Iraqis Seek Refuge in Religion: Regime Has Co-opted Growing Religious Mood," *BBC*, April 25, 2002, reproduced in *Washington Kurdish Institute*, an electronic archive, April 26, 2002.

[161] Rohde, A. (2010). *State-Society Relations in Baʿthist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship*, London and New York, NY: Routledge, p. 104.

[162] See Helfont, S. (2014). "Saddam and the Islamists: The Baʿthist regime's instrumentalization of religion in foreign affairs," *Middle East Journal*, 68, 3, 352–366, in particular 352. The same thesis is very central also to Helfont's 2015 dissertation and 2018 book.

[163] Helfont, S. "Saddam and the Islamists," p. 353.

[164] Blaydes, L. State of Repression, p. 238, basing herself on Samuel Helfont and Michael Brill, "Saddam's ISIS? The Terrorist Group's Real Origin Story", *Foreign Affairs,* January 12, 2016.

[165] Helfont, S. "Saddam and the Islamists," p. 352. Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 1–2. Also: Abstract, I, 17, 20-23, 28, and more. Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 2–3, 105, 113, 127.

[166] Sassoon, J. pp. 265–67.

[167] See Helfont, S. "Saddam and the Islamists," *MEJ*, ibid, p. 354, notes 5,6,9.

[168] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 22, 235; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 183.

[169] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 28–29. Helfont *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 21. See also p. 22.

[170] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 17. See also pp. i, 2, 3, 11, 13, 14, 21, 23, 25, 30, 138, 139, 141, 144; Helfont, S.R. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 2, 4, 11, 13, 21-22, and more in chapters 6, 7. The meaning of "instrumentalize" changed radically between Helfont's *MEJ* article and his later publications. See below.

public appearance of Islamism, do not believe it. Then he announces triumphantly:

> "Fortunately, the regime's internal documents help to clarify which positions Saddam took for tactical reasons … and which views on religion represented more foundational stances on which the regime based its actual policies."[171]

So, was the Farrakhan quip "tactical" or "foundational"? What will it be, political Islam or separation of mosque and state? Helfont reports also, for example, that school textbooks described Saddam as a latter-day Caliph or prophet.[172] Was that "tactical" or "foundational"? Was chopping healthy right hands for theft "tactical" or "foundational"? When is "Tactical" becoming "foundational"?

Confusion reigns, but there is still need to explain Saddam's baffling Farrakhan quip. In the first place, this author does not agree that one secular quip in a closed-doors meeting proves that over a decade of Islamist speeches, laws, education, and culture "were misleading." Still, a historian must ask why did Saddam denounce his own policy? I suggest that he was aware that many party old timers were uneasy about his Islamic "Faith Campaign." He was given notice about the party's old-timers' objection already in the 1986 meeting of the pan-Arab leadership. Conveniently, 'Aflaq died in 1989, but others still objected.[173] Saddam wanted to indicate to them that deep inside he was still the same old secular Ba'thi Saddam. This is why he did not even define his campaign as "Islamic," but vaguely as "Faith." I doubt that his bizarre Farrakhan alibi convinced the comrades, but it convinced Helfont that the Iraqi leader was against "politicizing religion."[174] The Farrakhan quip betrayed a dilemma Saddam had, but it did not change the regime's new Islamic ideology and practice.

Three: The third evidence that convinced Helfont that "public appearances were misleading" is very important and should give us a pause. This evidence, though, contradicts Helfont's thesis and supports that of Sassoon's and Faust's, as it suggests that the party was and remained "to the end" anti-religious. As late as 1997, well into the Faith Campaign, Helfont found in the curriculum of party courses that the Ba'th retained some

of its secular ideology.[175] Helfont reports that a course on Islam included four "books" by Michel 'Aflaq from the mid-twentieth century, one "book" from 1977 by Saddam, and part of the 1982 report of the Ninth Ba'th Congress.

The most interesting and confusing lecture, "In Memory of the Arab Prophet" (1943), is among those that were included in the curriculum.[176] In it, 'Aflaq says: "Muhammad was all the Arabs, let all the Arabs today be Muhammad," and more such Islamist-sounding sentences. But he also says: "Maybe we are not seen praying with those who pray or fasting with those who fast."[177] When found in a 1997 curriculum, this clashed head-on with Saddam's Faith Campaign.

The 1977 lecture by Saddam that was found on the course reading list,[178] Saddam defined the Islamic jurisprudence as *passee de mode.* This, too, clashed with his Faith Campaign. Another source that was retained was the anti-religious chapter titled "The Religious Question" in the secular Resolutions of the 1982 Nineth Regional Congress.[179] The party warned that "Religious concepts" began "to overcome Party concepts."[180] The growing "religious-political phenomenon" was spreading "at all levels of the party," when the party was facing the "hostile religious-political phenomenon."[181] Also, as shown above, the Report includes an atheistic attack against religion.[182]

Helfont's interpretation of those secular and anti-religious texts is surprising. He sees all of them as blueprints for Saddam's Islamic "Faith Campaign."[183] But can Saddam's 1977 no-sharīʿa doctrine, or the Nineth Congress' assault on all religions, be a blueprint for his June 1990 commitment to the sharīʿa, and over a decade of Islamization? If anything, those documents, too, may show that Sassoon and Faust are correct and that in the 1990s Saddam had a secret anti-religious ideology.

Assuming that these reading assignments were taught, and not just left on the list, an explanation is in order. One possibility is that this was the initiative of angry senior Ba'thist old-timer, who protested in this way the leader's Islamization. There was enough disorder in the party in the 1990s that such an initiative could slip

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[171] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 234–35, 247. Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p.183.

[172] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 249–51. Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 193–94.

[173] See for example "Abu Sirhan," 'Uday Saddam Husssein's pen name, speaking for party veterans, *Babil*, July 19, 1994, quoted in Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam*, pp. 289-90.

[174] Faust, for his part, was not fooled. His conclusion is that Saddam "tended to say the same things in public as he did behind closed doors." See Faust, A.M. *Ba'thification of Iraq*, p. 11.

[175] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 21–22; 244–46. Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 189–90.

[176] 'Aflaq, M. "*Dhikrat al-rasūl al-'Arabī*," pp. 122–34.

[177] 'Aflaq, M. "*Dhikrat al-rasūl al-'Arabī*," p. 134.

[178] Hussein, S. (1981). "A View of Religion and Heritage," A lecture to the Ba'th Culture and Information Bureau, in *On History, Heritage and Religion*, Baghdad: Translation and Foreign Languages Publishing House, pp. 23–34.

[179] Arab Ba'th Socialist Party Iraq, *The Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress June 1982,* 245–83.

[180] Ba'th, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, 279–80.

[181] Ba'th, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, 280–81.

[182] Ba'th, *Central Report of Ninth Regional Congress*, 274.

[183] Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 190.

through the net. More likely, though, is the possibility that the curriculum was approved by Saddam himself. Saddam's Iraq was not the USSR under Joseph Stalin. Unlike Stalin in his 1938 *The History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) - Short Course,* Saddam never tried to change the party's history to suit political expediency. For example, he never eradicated from the party's records the names of central comrades whom he later ordered to execute or assassinate.[184] Likewise, he never disowned his own speeches and decisions, even when they became politically awkward. He regarded the preservation of the legacy of the party as a matter of honor even when it became null and void.[185] So, it is possible that the party tutors told the young recruits that secularism had been the Baʿth doctrine but under the "Faith Campaign" it changed. If that was the ncase, we can only imagine the confusion of a junior party recruit.

Four: As we saw, to Sassoon and Faust Saddam's Islamic "Faith Campaign" was a smoke screen, behind which he "continued to be anti-religious and to repress any sign of real religiosity."[186] The evidence that convinced them was two-fold. Faust sees the establishment of religious institutions that promoted Saddam's Islam, and the cooptation of other ʿulama as one arm.[187] Both conclude that, despite the Islamizing *façon,* the regime continued to repress religious activists, movements, and practices.[188] The repression was indeed real, but there are three questions that the two historians refrain from asking. Firstly, whom did the regime repress. Secondly, was the repression secret, so that we are learning about it only from the secret archives. If it was no secret, then their predecessors must have already factored it in. Thirdly, was Saddam exceptional? Were there also other regimes that were generally recognized as Islamic, that repressed religious activities? If so, then maybe we cannot define Saddam of the 1990s as "anti-religious."

Sassoon tells us: "Religious ceremonies and special religious processions during Muharram … particularly in southern Iraq," were "mostly prohibited by the security organization, because they attracted large gatherings that could not be easily controlled. These

were "anti-religious activities."[189] True, but the reader is not told that "southern Iraq" is almost entirely Shiʿi, and that there are only Shiʿi mass gatherings on Muharram, mainly the ʿAshura. Faust is more precise, explaining that the Shiʿa were often the target, but he also claims imprecisely that generally the regime "suppressed popular religious practices they did not like."[190]

The ʿAshura is the mourning of the murder of the most beloved Shiʿi Imam, al-Hussein bin ʿAli, at the hands of the "Sunni" Umayyad Caliphate. These are potentially anti-Sunni events. Because the Baʿth regime was Sunni-hegemonic, anti-regime demonstrations on the ʿAshura were common. So, prohibiting it had nothing to do with "suspicion" of "any person with religious beliefs." Rather, this was about suspicion of any Shiʿi person who participates in those mass gatherings. We are also told that the authorities "were concerned [even] about funerals, realizing that large processions in Karbala could develop."[191] Here again we are not told that Karbala is a world Shiʿi burial site. So, again, we are not alerted that the limitations are imposed only on Shiʿi religious mass gatherings. We are told also that the regime defined certain religious ceremonies as "negative," or "deviant" practices that represented "defiance of Islam."[192] Indeed, many internal security instructions explain why such practices must be stopped.[193] However, again, we are not told that these derogative descriptions were applied exclusively to Shiʿi religious ceremonies, never to practices that are common to all Muslims. For example, no derogative expressions were ever directed against the Ramadhan fast-breaking (*Iftar*) evenings, or the two great festivals of ʿid al-Fitr and ʿId al-Adhha, or the Prophet's birthday. Sassoon also reports that there were orders to prevent "the spread of pictures of prophets and Imams."[194] Again, Sassoon does not tell us that no Muslim would produce the Prophet's pictures, and only the Shiʿis print and hang pictures of their Imams and religious leaders.

Furthermore, all those reports of restrictions clash with Sassoon's reports of other archival revelations describing the regime's generous support for other religious gatherings. For example, we are told that the important religious occasion of the Prophet's birthday was given lavish official support.[195] This is correct, and similar reports appeared in the open Baʿthi

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184 Following the 1991 defeat in Kuwait, the mass-uprising of the Shiʿa and the Kurds in March 1991, and the profound crisis in the party, Saddam ordered the publication of the party's history, based on its internal records. All the names of past and present party luminaries and their roles appeared there with no attempt to twist or conceal any of it: See "*Aḍwā ʿalā Niḍāl al-Baʿth*" [Shedding light on the struggle of the Baʿth Party] in *al-Thawra*, October 4, 11, 1992; January 3, July 7, 1993; April 10, 1994, and much more.

185 See, for example, his conversation with the Sudanese Islamist Hassan al-Turabi, CRRC SH-SPPC-D-000-217, July 18, 1991.

186 Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 3; Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, p. 131.

187 Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, pp. 131-41.

188 Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, pp. 3, 223–24, 264–65; Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq* pp. 131–32.

189 Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 265.

190 Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, p.139. In note 87 there he provides no Sunni occasions. See also p. 140.

191 Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, pp. 223–24.

192 Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 264.

193 See, for example, a top-secret order to prevent the traditional "marches on foot" to the Shiʿi holy places because this is "a non-civilized, un-Islamic phenomenon," BRCC 01-3134-0002-0008; --0009; -00032; -00048, all in 1997.

194 Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 223.

195 Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 265, see also 223–24, 262–64.

media. Where, then, is the regime's repression of "any sign of real religiosity?" The answer is that, in contrast to the Shi'i religious mass-occasions, the Ba'th regime provided rich support for celebrations of generic all-Islamic festivals, even in the Shi'i holy cities.[196] Also, unlike the Shi'i *'Ashura* and *Arba'in,* the generic Prophet's birthday, *'Id al-Fitr* and *'Id al-Adhha* have no sectarian anti-Sunni (and anti-regime) connotation. Therefore, no Shi'i riots against the Ba'th regime could be expected. Defining the regime as being "anti-religious" because it suppressed Shi'i religious mass-occasions therefore may be a mistake.

Furthermore, the reader is not told that the Prophet's birthday has been turned by the Sunni community in modern Iraq into a very central religious festival. The Iraqi monarchy already introduced it as a national holiday on 12 Rabi' al-Awwal. Al-Fukayki reports that the Sunnis "were pushed to exaggerate" celebrating the Prophet's birthday, when the Shi'i migrants flooded Baghdad under Qassem's regime, as a Sunni response to the Shi'i mass-commemorations in the capital's streets.[197] For the Ba'th Sunni-hegemonic regime, supporting the all-Islamic, but Sunni-colored Prophet's birthday was therefore a useful way to demonstrate both Sunni identity and generic Islamic religiosity.

Sassoon relates to this suppression as if it were a secret, that only the archives revealed to the new historian. This, too, is a mistake. The anti-Shi'i suppression was anything but a well-guarded regime secret. The proof of that is hidden in plain sight in Sassoon's own account. He reports of mass coercion and that in the "[Shi'ite] south and the [Kurdish] north" the regime "made an example of anyone caught giving help" to the opposition.[198] If mass coercion was meant to make an example of offenders, it had to be public.[199] The archives only add details. Sassoon claims that "the [archival] documents … clearly indicate that the declared policies … had other dimensions of which we were unaware."[200] While lionizing the archives and the new historian, the claim that the archives exposed hidden dimensions that show that the regime repressed "any sign of real religiosity" seems, therefore, to be a mistake.

We are told that the archival documents "give a remarkable insight into Saddam's obsession with the activities of religious groups in spite of the faith campaign." Reportedly, "religious activities of any kind were considered dangerous, and all mosques were kept under surveillance."[201] The archives, we are told, uncover "the suspicion with which the regime regarded any person with religious beliefs.*"*[202] The regime "monitored mosques" and "religious movements."[203] Monitoring was applied equally to Sunnis and Shi'is, we are told.[204]

These facts are well-founded, but not the analysis. The security organizations were on the lookout not because the groups were "Wahhabi" or Salafi, but because they were suspected of hostility to the regime. There is evidence that the regime sponsored at Saddam's Islamic University at least one Salafi, or "Wahhabi" group.[205] Support for Sunni Salafis or "Wahhabis" could even be found in the regime's open media. It was made public by 'Uday Saddam Hussein, who used an "anonymous letter to the editor" from a "reader" to criticize his uncle, the Minister of the Interior, for allowing "Wahhabis" to assemble and operate freely.[206] Unreported by Sassoon, even the archives confirm this phenomenon. For example, in a 2000 private letter to the president, Barazan Ibrahim Hassan al-Tikriti, Saddam's half-brother, objected to the president's policy of encouraging radical Salafi Islam.[207] There is also a recording in the archives of a private conversation between Saddam and a senior party official who complains that "Wahhabis" are being tolerated, even allowed to preach from the pulpit in (Sunni) mosques. Saddam did not seem surprised.[208] Maybe those were not exactly Wahhabis, but the descriptions leave no doubt that they were Salafi Islamists. This way the regime was trying to fight fire with fire.

Sassoon reports that "Wahhabism was banned from the early 1990s and the death penalty imposed on its followers."[209] While Wahhabism was, indeed, banned,

[196] See Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam*, pp. 73–80.

[197] Kingdom of Iraq (1936). *Dalīl al-mamlaka al-'Irāqiya li-sannat 1935–36 al-māliya* [Indicators for the Kingdom of Iraq for the 1935–36 financial year], Baghdad: Government Press, 56, 772; Al-Fukayki, H. *Awkār al-Hazīma,* p. 124. Under the Ba'th regime see Law No. 110 of 1972, *Official Holidays,* published in *Weekly Gazette* 39, 6. For lavish celebrations see, for example, *al-Jumhūriya,* December 6, 1984; Saddam's speech on the Prophet's birthday, for example *al-'Iraq,* October 12, 1989.

[198] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 224.

[199] See, for example, Isma'il al-Wa'ili (ed.) (2004). *Dustūr al-Ṣadr: Majmū' Khuttāb al-Juma'a allatī Alqā-hā al-Shahīd al-Sayyid Muḥammad al-Ṣadr fī Masjid al-Kūfā* [Al-Ṣadr's constitution: An anthology of the Friday sermons delivered by the martyr Muhammad al-ṣadr in the Kufa Mosque], Najaf: Maktabat Dar al-Mujtaba, p. 67.

[200] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 3.

[201] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 11.

[202] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 223.

[203] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 223.

[204] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 224, also 223.

[205] Interview and e-mail, May 28, 2019, 10:47 AM from Ambassador Miroslav Zafirov, who served as a UN diplomat in Baghdad in 2014 and 2015. Zafirov interviewed many Iraqis who had been in the know under Saddam.

[206] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* p. 290, based on *Bābil,* June 12, 1994, 12, quoted in FBIS-NES-DR JN1606122494, June 16, 1994.

[207] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* p. 334, based on Barazan's diary, last entry, dated October 21, 2000, CRRC SH-MISC-D-000-950, 4 (65 in the original diary).

[208] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-001-574 A meeting of senior Ba'this with Saddam, mid-1990s.

[209] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 11.

and some were executed, there is no evidence of any law that imposed "the death penalty" on Wahhabis. This is very meaningful, because, by contrast, RCC Decree No. 461 of March 31, of 1980 imposed capital punishment for membership in the Shiʻi al-Daʻwa Islamic Party.[210] The execution was automatic. Not so for real or presumed Wahhabis. To the security organs there were good "Wahhabis" and bad "Wahhabis," but only bad Shiʻi opposition activists. So, contrary to what Sassoon says, executions of Sunnis and Shiʻis were not even remotely "egalitarian."[211]

Finally, Saddam and the Baʻth regime were not unique in suppressing hostile religious movements. The same practice was adopted even by regimes that were originally carried to power on Islamic wings. Thus, for example, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini repressed the Mujahidin Khalq and the Hojatiya, both very religious Shiʻi groups. Likewise, in 1989 the Sudanese Islamic *coup d'état* of General Omar al-Bashir and Hassan al-Turabi arrested Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi and his supporters. Al-Mahdi was imam of the Ansar, a Sufi order that pledges allegiance to the deceased Sudanese *mahdī*. In 1999, al-Bashir ousted his former ally Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the Sudanese sister movement of the Muslim Brethren. And yet, no historian claimed that Khomeini, al-Bashir, and others were "anti-religious" and "repressed any sign of real religiosity." It is suggested here, therefore, that, however cynical Saddam may have been about his religiosity during the last decade of his rule, Iraq of his "Faith Campaign" was more Islamic by far than it had ever been since it became a nation-state in 1920.

IX. Deception and Truth in the Archives and the Open Media

Can the historian see the regime's public rhetoric and public action as representing its true ideology? At least regarding state-Islam ideology, Sassoon, Faust, Helfont and, arguably Jordan, suggest that the public media cannot be trusted. This author disagrees. There is deception in the regime's media, but the dictator has no other means to educate or indoctrinate the people on how he wants them to think of themselves and of him. Ideology can be misleading, conjured merely to serve a quest for power, or it may be genuine, a reflection of the regime's true goals, but either way, this is the regime's ideology. To complete the picture the people and the historian can observe the regime's "operational ideology," namely, its policy "on the ground". This makes it possible to gauge the

regime's commitment to its rhetorical ideology, and the public may accept or reject the leader's sincerity. Thus, for example, when Saddam's Republican Guard occupied Kuwait, people questioned the sincerity of the Baʻth public commitment to voluntary pan-Arab unity. Yet, whether deceptive, genuine, or checkered, what the public sees and hears is the regime's true ideology. By comparison, while of great interest for the historian, whatever the dictator says to his close associates behind closed doors carries far less weight. If we find a contradiction between the public and behind-closed-doors ideology, as long as the classified remains classified, preferring it over the public is therefore a profound methodological mistake. I suggest that public rhetoric and public action are far more important than classified records, because they are the only facets that the public is aware of.

Are the archival records "straightforward"? Sassoon, Faust and Helfont, maybe Jordan, seem to see the archival documents as the fountain of truth. If so, then this, too, is a mistake. On the value and limits of the Baʻth archives an experienced historian, who had the opportunity to study archives before, has this to say:

> What emerges … is a picture of a state and a party awesome in their ability to monitor and control dissent and … to reward loyal citizens... But that is more a picture that the state and the party wanted to believe than it is reality."[212]

Both kinds of sources must be read critically. The contribution of the archives is tremendous, but they are anything but inclusive, as we have only parts of them. Moreover, they are anything but "straightforward." Internal reports coming from the bottom to the top are sometimes false, designed to please the boss or push embarrassing facts under the carpet. At the same time, we sometimes find embarrassing confessions in the archives that ring true. While the open media usually provides regime propaganda, whether explicitly or implicitly, it often provides reliable information. One rule of thumb on how to identify a more credible report is to gauge how embarrassing it is to the regime. The more embarrassing the report, the more truthful it is likely to be because it exposes chinks in the regime's armor.

One example is refuting the party's claim that for the Baʻth, all Arabs, Sunnis, and Shiʻis alike, are equal. In an audio recording of a private meeting with Saddam, a senior party official complains that only Shiʻi, but no Sunni Islamists are being executed.[213] This is very embarrassing because it exposes the regime's hypocrisy. Ergo, this is very likely true. At the same time, taking at face value internal party officials' reports to the boss can be a mistake. For example, Sassoon accepts at face value archival reports that, following the 1991 Shiʻite mass uprising, the state of the party was good.

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[210] Amnesty International (1993). "Iraq: 'Disappearance' of Shiʻa clerics and students," https://www.amnesty.org/fr/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/mde140021993en.pdf, accessed July 18, 2022. The archives report many executions on the legal grounds of Daʻwa membership.

[211] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʻth Party*, p. 3.

[212] Khoury, D.R. *Iraq in War Time Iraq in War Time*, p. 17.

[213] CRRC SH-SHTP-A-001-574, a meeting in the mid-1990s.

As he puts it, the internal reports "do not indicate a fundamental change in the party's role, or that it was weakened, as some [pre-archives historians] have argued."[214] Yet, even as late as 1994, Saddam and a few senior party officials told the whole nation on the radio and television and in the press, that the party was going through a devastating crisis.[215] In such cases, this author's advice is to believe Saddam and his public media. At least, the historian must always suspect sanguine internal reports and be acquainted with the public media.

Another example of deception in the archives is that of party membership numbers. Sassoon again accepts the internal reports at face value. "Many have argued that the party weakened after the 1991 uprising, but the statistics clearly illustrate that recruitment continued at an intensified pace."[216] Indeed, following the 1991 uprising, the party bosses urged each branch to mass recruit. Yet, even two years after the uprising, the party's public daily newspaper complained that many of those counted as members shirked activities.[217] Even four years after the uprising, Saddam and senior officials still complained in the public media that many of those recruited were not committed Baʿthis.[218] To Faust's credit, he found some internal reports that admitted that only "few party members reported to their posts to defend Baʿthists and government installations."[219] Publicly admitting failure was not easy. I suggest that, unlike Sassoon, Saddam and his senior comrades were not fooled by the sanguine reports of their underlings. Apparently, they thought that papering over the profound crisis in the party may end in disaster.

A case in which the secret archives corroborate highly sensitive information that had appeared in the regime's public media is that of the sectarian profile of the party. Sassoon reports from the archives that even after the 1991 Shiʿite mass-uprising, "many Shiʿis were [still] part of the system to the [2003] end."[220] This information is correct. Sassoon is mistaken, however, in his conviction that this archive-based conclusion represents an innovation. Basing themselves on the regime's open media, two pre-archives' historians found out that Shiʿis had meaningful representation in the

party's leadership already in 1977 and at least until 1995. It was still substantially lower than the Shiʿi representation in the population, but it was meaningful. Following the 1991 uprising it shrank somewhat, but Shiʿis were still there. These historians reached that conclusion 23 and 15 years respectively before Sassoon discovered it in the archives.[221]

There were cases in which the Iraqi public media revealed embarrassing events that were not found in the party's internal records. In 1994, in its entertainment pages, the Iraqi press reported stage shows in Baghdad by transvestites. Saddam's strong hostility toward such people, whom he saw as offensive to Iraqi and Arab honor, was ignored. Likewise, in 1998 the media reported students' protests against Saddam's Islamic conservatism.[222] So far, no one found mention of either event in the party's internal records. Likewise, the historian can find in the Iraqi press strong attacks against the president's Islamization policies.[223] The Iraqi press, including the party's daily newspaper, also launched severe criticism of Saddam's policies of reviving the tribes and their shaykhs. It reported and defined those policies as nothing short of disastrous for national cohesion.[224] No such criticism has been found so far in the archives. So, the archives are not all that "straightforward", and Saddam's press was not as "tightly controlled" as Helfont thinks.[225] All the historian needs to do is read it.

A case where the international open media and the Shiʿi opposition are the historian's only guides is that of the blood-drenched repression of the Shiʿi March 1991 uprising. Sassoon says that the archives taught him that some of his pre-archives predecessors "overstated the Sunni-Shiʿi chasm" under the Baʿth.[226] He also became convinced that "Saddam Hussein was almost 'egalitarian' in his treatment of anyone considered or suspected of disloyalty."[227] In both observations Sassoon is lionizing the archives, while belittling the open sources, and in both cases he is

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[214] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 4.

[215] For example, *al-ʿIraq*, April 12, 1994, bringing Saddam's historical speech from April 13, 1991, quoted by Ronen Zeidel, R. (1997). "The Iraqi Baʿth Party 1948–1995: Personal and organization aspects," master's dissertation, University of Haifa, 199–200. And similar admissions of a deep crisis see *Al-Thawra,* July 22, Aug. 19, 1991; Jan. 8, 13, 1993, in Zeidel, "Iraqi Baʿth Party," 204–07. To his credit, Faust dug deeper and found in the archive such a party crisis, see Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq,* p. 5.

[216] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 51.

[217] *Al-Thawra*, May 28, 1993. Zeidel, "Iraqi Baʿth Party," 204–07.

[218] *Al-Thawra,* Feb. 26, Dec. 17, 18, 1993; Nov. 6, 1995; in Zeidel, "Iraqi Baʿth Party," 204–07.

[219] Faust, A.M. *The Baʿthification of Iraq,* p. 5.

[220] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 3.

[221] See Baram, A. "The Ruling Political Elite in Baʿthi Iraq 1968–1986," 447–93; Baram, A. (1991). *Culture, History and Ideology in the Formation of Baʿthi Iraq 1968–89*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, p. 15; Zeidel, "Iraqi Baʿth Party," pp. 277, 287-92. Sassoon's passion to demonstrate the omniscience of the archives and the treachery of the public media led him to misread and misreport Baram's media-based analysis (compare Baram, A. *Culture, History, and Ideology*, 15, with Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 3, note 5).

[222] Rohde, A. (2010). *State-Society Relations in Baʿthist Iraq: Facing Dictatorship*, London and New York, NY: Routledge, pp. 116–17; Achim Rohde, A. (2016). "Gays, cross-dressers, and emos: Nonnormative masculinities in militarized Iraq," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies,* 12, 3, 433–49.

[223] "Abu Sirhān," Uday's pen name, *Bābil*, July 19, 1994, quoted in Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* p. 289-90.

[224] See, for example, *Bābil*, October 21, 1992, October 10, 17, November 1, 1993; *Al-Thawra,* October 15, December 3, 1992.

[225] Helfont, S. & Brill, M. "Saddam did not create ISIS," p. 5.

[226] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, pp. 2–3.

[227] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 3.

mistaken. While the archives discuss the uprising,[228] no mention of its bloody suppression was found. It involved the killing and mass execution of 100,000–250,000 Shiʿites.[229] A similar massacre took place in Kurdistan, but no such cataclysmic event took place in the Sunni-Arab areas. Size matters. Consulting open sources would have provided Sassoon with the information that was too embarrassing for both the party's secret correspondence and open regime media to report.[230]

The conclusion of two post-archives historians is very different from Sassoon's regarding his claim that his predecessors "overstated" the "Sunni-Shiʿi chasm" under the Baʿth. We are told by Lisa Blaydes that the Iraq-Iran War (1980-88) exacerbated the already-existing Shiʿi alienation from the regime. From internal reports of war casualties it emerges that "Iraqi Shiʿa were more likely than their Sunni counterparts" to have died. "The differential war costs", she suggests, created "the conditions for the 1991 Uprising which represented a critical political rupture" between the Shiʿa and the regime.[231] But Blaydes in fact reports that even before the war, "under Baʿthist rule" Iraq witnessed a "sharpening [Sunni-Shiʿi] religious group attachment."[232] Her account is that of a saga of perennial crisis between large segments of the Shiʿi population and religious leadership and the regime throughout Baʿth rule.[233] So, perhaps Sassoon's pre-archives predecessors did not "overstate the Sunni-Shiʿi chasm" after all.

Trusting the internal reports unquestionably led Helfont to conceive his most central thesis. As he sees it, since 1968 Saddam's ideological conviction led him to plan for the Islamization of Iraq, in the way that he did eventually in the 1990s. However, for that he needed first to prepare a large loyal cadre of clerics. At long last, between the late 1980 and early 1990s, he achieved it. Then he launched his long-delayed "Faith Campaign". The new Baʿthi Islamic education institutions, Helfont tells us, "focused on ensuring that all students and staff

were loyal to the regime and possessed the correct political orientation."[234] At long last, "[t]he regime could fully indoctrinate these budding religious leaders" and "weed out those who had other agendas."[235] Helfont is impressed by the sanguine internal party reports that the Baʿth officials managed to create a cadre of "reliable" and "loyal" Baʿthi "Islamic scholars," *ʿulamāʾ*. In Helfont's words, this represented the "integration of Iraq's religious landscape" into the regime's system.[236] In this case Faust, too, takes at face value sanguine party reports that, by 1995, only 70 out of the 1,501 imams in the country…had any negative notations next to their names in the Bath files."[237] Jordan supports Helfont's theory.[238] As we saw above, since the indoctrination of the *ʿulamāʾ* was so successful, Helfont believes that this enabled Saddam, at long last, to implement the party's original dream of an Islam-rich regime., to Helfont there never was, therefore, an ideological metamorphosis, only "instrumentalization," the technical ability to implement an old dream.[239]

Yet, the archives often lay traps for the unsuspecting historian. Helfont's account of the indoctrination, monitoring and organization of the regime-sponsored clergy is a valuable contribution to our understanding of the regime. There is no reason to doubt his report that party officials reported both their activities and success.[240] However, much like Sassoon, he, too, mistook officials' reports for reality. So, a reality check is essential. Helfont himself is telling us that the first phase of recruitment failed: the regime tried to convince Baʿthis to become clerics, but they refused.[241] In its secular days, the party did a thorough job hammering anticlerical views into the members' consciousness. Having failed to recruit comrades, the regime turned to other men, apparently less loyal and more religious. Unlike Helfont, Saddam was not fooled by his underlings' reports. He knew or suspected that, despite his deep concessions to Islam, the efforts to "Baʿthize" the clerics failed. There is no other way to explain one of his last orders before the US invaded Iraq, in which he reveals his true judgment. He ordered that if the coalition forces entered Baghdad, in addition

[228] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, pp. 259–60, 283.

[229] An interview with General Wafiq al-Samarraʾi, Saddam's Chief of Military Intelligence who fled Iraq, in *FBIS-NES-DR*, December 20, 1994. The numbers are rising, though. In 2009 officials at the Iraqi Ministry of Human Rights indicated that there may be around 270 known but still-unopened mass grave sites in Iraq. See United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq, *Human Rights Report*, January 1–June 30, 2009, "Mass Graves," 10. For the human cost and destruction see also Jabar, F.A. (2003). *The Shiʿite Movement in Iraq*, London: Saqi Books, pp. 270–71.

[230] Sassoon himself reports in other places that "after the 1991 [Shiʿi] uprising, repression of the Shiʿis increased significantly" (*Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 260). Also, Saddam "became obsessed" with the possibility of another Shiʿi uprising (*Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 143).

[231] Blaydes, L. State of Repression, p. 81. See also pp. 82-130.

[232] Blaydes, L. State of Repression, pp. 237-238.

[233] For an extensive treatment of this issue see her chapters. 4, 5, and 9. And see Baram, A. *Saddam and Islam,* pp. 81-138, 270-81. Faust, A.M. *The Baʿthification of Iraq,* p. 141, and Blaydes, L. *State of Repression*, pp. 248-49, describe the regime's 1980s near-destruction of the Shiʿi religious universities in Najaf and Karbala.

[234] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 124; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 97.

[235] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 119.

[236] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 15, 45, 48, also 1–2; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 2-3, 131-45 (Ch. 8).

[237] Faust, A.M. *The Baʿthification of Iraq,* p. 141.

[238] Jordan, D. State and Sufism in Iraq, p. 5.

[239] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 17. See also pp. i, 2, 3, 11, 13, 14, 21, 23, 25, 30, 138, 139, 141, 144; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 2. Also pp. 4, 11, 13, 21-22, and more in chapters 6, 7.

[240] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 2; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 3.

[241] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 124; Helfont, S. *Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, p. 97.

to destroying the country's infrastructure, the comrades should infiltrate and "assassinate the imams and preachers of the Friday mosques and [other] mosques."[242] Had Saddam trusted his "loyal" *'ulamā'*, he would have ordered to protect them, so that under the American occupation they could use the pulpits to demand his return to power, but he did the opposite. So much for Saddam's trust in his "loyal" and "reliable" clerics. Helfont's whole thesis, supported by Jordan,[243] hinges on the theory that Saddam delayed the implementation of an alleged original Baʿthist Islamic dream until he had a "loyal" cadre of *'ulamā'*. Given Saddam's mass assassination order, this whole theory collapses under its own weight. This means that there had to be another explanation for the Islamic "Faith Campaign."

Remarkably, Saddam provided the explanation in the 1986 pan-Arab leadership meeting. As shown above, he explained that there was a need to befriend Sunni Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood because the public had become more religious and the clerics more prestigious. Already then, some comrades feared that he was contemplating Islamization to win popularity. However, to impose his newly found Islam, he needed a collaborative cadre of 'ulamā'. Helfont, Blaydes, and Jordan got everything in reverse. Instead of nurturing a cadre of "loyal" 'ulamā' to implement an old Baʿthi Islamic dream, Saddam did the opposite. In his search for popularity in a difficult moment, apparently in the late 1980s he decided to launch his Faith Campaign, being a massive deviation from the Baʿth secular tradition. To assist him in this endeavor he tried to create a loyal "religious landscape".[244]

X. Misunderstanding the Baʿthist Codes

The Baʿth party and later its Iraqi branch under Saddam developed unique codes. By immersing oneself in their public media, any researcher can easily crack these codes because they were meant to be cracked. However, in important cases, mainly Sassoon and Helfont did not do this. Only three examples are given here. One is, as discussed above, Helfont's misunderstanding the Bathi code of lavish praise showered on Islam, while trying to lock it up in the mosque, then control the mosque.

Another is a phenomenon that convinced Sassoon that "many" of his pre-archives' predecessors "overstated the Sunni-Shiʿi chasm."[245] Sassoon noticed that there is no "Sunni or Shiʿi" rubric in the party's "official forms in the archives." Sassoon concluded from that that the Sunni-Shiʿi problem was less significant than what his predecessors thought.[246] However, Sassoon should not have been surprised: the regime's media never added "Sunni" or Shiʿi to citizens' names. So, why should it be added to a roster of party members? Sassoon, though, is surprised. He confesses that he "could not understand … why sectarian identification was not referred to in the audiotapes of the leadership's private meetings when the Shiʿi [1991] intifada … was discussed."[247] There were cases of such mention in unscripted closed-door meetings that Sassoon missed,[248] but such cases were very rare. The terms "Shiʿi" and "Sunni" appear even more rarely in the party's written documents. Sassoon is puzzled: "My first reaction," he reports, was that "a high official had ordered these words to be excluded." That is, this exclusion was the initiative of a creative individual official. Sassoon's other guesses are that some senior Shiʿi officials might be offended and that Saddam emphasized "loyalty rather than religious affiliating." This does not explain what could be so offensive to a senior Shiʿi official if the definitions "Shiʿi" and "Sunni" are part of an application form. Finally, Sassoon says that Saddam's "persecution and repression of the Shiʿis stemmed from his incorrect belief that many would be influenced by the ideology of … Ayatollah Khomeini."[249] However, if the Shiʿis were indeed suspected as a collective, then including "Shiʿi" in party application forms and personal reports could serve as a useful security screening or warning, but this never happened.

In fact, the policy of silence over sect, particularly the Sunni/Shiʿi complex, existed in the regime's public media from its inception. This was also the case in Baʿthi Syria, with its Sunni-majority and ʿAlawite hegemony problem. The split among Arabic speakers along religious lines, Christian versus Muslims, had been treated extensively by ʿAflaq in his early days, but he avoided the Sunni-Shiʿi-ʿAlawite-Druze divide. The 1947 Constitution recognized the problem, but the solution was just forbidding "sectarianism." In Iraq, Shiʿites represent three out of every four Arabs. Refraining from using the sectarian affiliation did not

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[242] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* p. 297, based on CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-012, January 23, 2003. A top-secret communiqué no. 549, from the Presidential Office.

[243] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq,* p. 5.

[244] Helfont studied the 1986 pan-Arab leadership's meeting record, but he missed Saddam's explanation. See "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," p. 20. It disappears in his 2018 book. Baram (pp.190-207) and Blaydes (p. 247) acknowledge its importance to the understanding of Saddam's motivation for Islamization. Blaydes identified it correctly, but still, as we saw, supported Helfont's theory. Jordan ignores the 1986 document altogether.

[245] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, pp. 2–3.

[246] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 3.

[247] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 283.

[248] See the excellent BRCC-based study by Abbas Kadhim, A. (2013). "The Hawza under siege: A study in the Ba'th Party Archive," Occasional Paper 1 (June), Boston, MA: Boston University Institute for Iraqi Studies. Sassoon was unaware of this file. See also Saddam's private conversation with a senior Sunni party member, CRRC SH-SHTP-A-001-574, mid-1990s.

[249] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 283.

stem from a reality in which sect became meaningless: the opposite was the case. Sectarianism represented a formidable threat to pan-Arabism and Iraqi unity. Silence over sect was the result of the Harry Potter Voldemort syndrome of "He who Must Not be Named." The party dreaded it so much that it preferred to deny its very existence by erasing almost all mention of it.

This problem was particularly embarrassing during the first years of Baʿth rule, as Shiʿis were absent from the two highest institutions, the RCC and the RL. Since 1977, even though the regime remained Sunni-hegemonic, Vice President, Deputy Secretary General of the party's Regional Leadership, and Deputy Chairman of the RCC Saddam Hussein elevated a few Shiʿi old-timers to the RCC and RL. It was convenient, therefore, to stick to the party's code of silence, implying that because all Arabic speakers were just Arabs, the sectarian affiliation of the leadership was irrelevant. However, because the party could not describe the new members of the top institutions explicitly as "Shiʿis," they made sure that their names, birthplaces, and careers, would be enough to indicate their Shiʿi affiliation. This was another part of the Baʿthist code. Most or all Iraqis easily cracked it because the regime wanted them to crack it.

An example of reading Saddam's lips selectively as well as misunderstanding him and his regime in the wider context is Helfont's report of a closed-door meeting in March 1979. From Saddam's words in that meeting he concludes that, after a decade of reluctant secularism, Saddam at long last revealed his deep love for Islam. What Helfont saw in the archive contrasted "the Baʿthists' public statements." In 1979-1980, he reports, the regime's public secularism did not "reflect what the regime was doing behind closed doors." To prove it he quotes Saddam, who emphasized the importance of "religion, men of religion, and holy places." Behind closed doors the regime stressed "the importance" of "attending mosques" as well as "understanding the importance of religious occasions and participation in them."[250] But Helfont misunderstood the context and missed contrary Saddam quips. The context: six weeks earlier, on February 1, Saddam's nemesis, Ayatollah Khomeini, returned to Tehran. Saddam was deeply worried about his influence on the Iraqi Shiʿa majority. Archival documents from late 1979 and early 1980 told Sassoon that Saddam believed "that the Baʿth Party was losing young [Shiʿi] people to religion and that this constituted a serious threat …"[251] Saddam's sudden respect for religion reflected a true moment of hesitation and re-assessment. Baʿth

secularism, even more so than its Sunni hegemony, alienated many or most Shiʿis. Saddam seems to have believed that maybe by injecting Islam the regime might win Shiʿi support. Eight years later he will return to the same reassessment. However, in late 1979 and the early 1980s he decided to stick to his secular guns. In one internal party meeting, for example, he said: "A Baʿthist does not need religiosity for [mental] immunity". Instead, he offered pride in ʿUmar, the second Caliph (whom traditionally the Shiʿa reviled), apparently meaning Arab historical greatness. In another he was strongly against party members attending the mosque "as a group."[252] So, rather than coming out of the closet and revealing his secret love for the mosque, as Helfont suggests, facing a new mortal menace Saddam's 1979 was a year of distress and oscillation. Still, his security policy was to order that the party's most qualified spies infiltrate the mosques much more than before. This conclusion is supported by Blaydes, who reports that "the Baʿthists sought to both punish and penetrate religious groups targeted for monitoring."[253] Blaydes reports also that, just before the September 1980 start of the Iraq-Iran War, the Baʿthists recognized that "clerics could support regime interests", if they received "appropriate direction" from senior party members.[254] In other words, rather than becoming more religious in 1979, as suggested by Helfont, the Baʿthists were meeting with religious leaders, not to return to Islam but, rather, to provide the clerics with "appropriate direction" or, simply, political guidance.

Khoury, too, is reporting that, following Khomeini's rise to power the regime increased its efforts to infiltrate the mosques, especially in the Shiʿi south. She reports, for example, that on December 1, 1979, the Revolutionary Command Council held an extraordinary session. It addressed "the appeal of the Islamic Revolution" and delineated "a policy to combat it". This policy included "infiltrating mosques, establishing good relations with religious scholars."[255] Likewise, as we saw above, Sassoon reports from the same archives that "Religious ceremonies and special religious processions" were "mostly prohibited."[256] So much for "the importance of religious occasions and participation in them."

As shown above, the June 1982 Central Report of the Ninth Regional Congress, the highest party institution, was anti-religious. Although originally this was a secret internal document, Helfont and others may claim that the Report was eventually part of the deceitful public Baʿthi media. Yet, this was what all party members read and learned. Furthermore, there is much

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[250] Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots,"p. 19; Helfont, S.*Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein*, pp. 22–24, basing himself on *BRCC*, 003-1-1 (0409-0414), March 12, 1979. See also Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, p. 131.
[251] Sassoon, J. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party, pp. 267-68.

[252] Sassoon, J. Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party, p. 259.
[253] Blaydes, L. *State of Repression,*p. 238.
[254] Blaydes, L. *State of Repression*, p. 246
[255] Khoury, D.R. *Iraq in War Time,* p. 64, based on BRCC 023–4–4–0518, 0519 and 0522, BRCC 003–1–1–410 to 414.
[256] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 265.

archival evidence that remained secret that, even a few years after Khomeini's rise to power and into the Iraq-Iran war, the party remained secular. Sassoon reports that at least until 1982 Saddam and his comrades still expressed anti-religious views in closed-door meetings.[257] Helfont read Sassoon's book but missed this part.[258] The problem with Sassoon's reporting here is that he thinks that Saddam's secular, even anti-religious approach remained "to the end."[259] In fact, since the second half of the 1980s no anti-religious expressions were found.

XI. DID SADDAM BAʿTHIZE ISLAM AND IRAQ OR ISLAMIZED THE BAʿTH?

Sassoon gives the regime much credit. While he reports, convincingly that people had to say things in which they did not believe, less convincingly he also opines that the regime "succeeded to a large extent in forcing the majority … to adjust their values in order to survive."[260] It seems to this author that parroting regime slogans or keeping quiet is very different from adjusting one's core values. Faust is more emphatic. He argues that when the regime "embraced" Islam, it did this "in order to suffocate it." In Islam's place Saddam was "spreading his own Husseini Baʿthist version of Islam."[261] This is true, but was the regime successful? Faust reports that "the preponderance of evidence from the BRCC suggests that the Baʿthification of religion was, on balance, successful". Already by 1989, the Shiʿi Muharram activities "almost ceased completely". Then, after 1996 "the regime succeeded in keeping them under control", and they "never again seriously threatened the Baʿth as they did in the 1970s".[262]

Even if "Baʿthification" to Faust is mere deterrence through terrorizing, he is mistaken. In 1991 the whole Shiʿi south exploded in revolt that threatened the regime as never before. Likewise, Blaydes reports that in February 1999, following the assassination of Ayat Allah Sadiq al-Sadr, public protests lasted "into the summer". This aroused great regime concern as it included mass demonstrations, damage to property and even killing party members.[263] Those were not Muharram gatherings, but they were still sect-based protests. So, deterrence worked only very partially.

Still, much like Sassoon, Faust, too, defines regime success in far deeper terms than coercion. As we saw, he admits that it made concessions to Islam, but it "did not so much 'Islamize' in the 1990s as expand

its ongoing policy to Baʿthize religion."[264] Moreover: "The BRCC documents show that by 2003 Baʿthification had destroyed or emasculated most of Iraq's pre-1968 governmental, civil, social and familial institutions and value systems", replacing them with "Husseini Baʿthist versions".[265]

So, both historians seem to agree that the regime was not only anti-religious but, also, succeeded, either to "suffocate" and "Baʿthize" Islam, or force most Iraqis to "adjust their values." All this was revealed to them by the secret BRCC archive, in which the Baʿthi officials congratulated themselves and their bosses for a resounding success.

Yet, in the most important *public* Baʿthi disclosure of the 1980s it came out that the bosses were not fooled. Khoury and I provide ample details on how the 1982 Nineth Regional Congress sounded the alarm because many comrades were succumbing to religion.[266] The historian must not uncritically accept sanguine internal reports or easily reject open sources.

In 1986 Saddam, no other, reported to the Pan Arab Leadership that the Iraqis were becoming more religious and the clerics more influential. In 1990 he jumped on the Islamic bandwagon and declared that the shariʿa will reign supreme. In 1993 he launched his Islamic "Faith Campaign", which gave religiosity an extra push. Finally, on the eve of the American invasion Saddam ordered the assassination of all clerics if the regime is lost.[267] This evidence, that most of our historians ignore, seems to kill the thesis that Saddam Baʿthized Islam or succeeded in creating a loyal "religious landscape". The president himself knew that, despite regime indoctrination, at least the clerics did not buy into his "Baʿthized religion". It seems, therefore, that, while true that, through coercion and rewards, Saddam "Baʿthized" religion to an extent, for example by imposing political guidelines on clerics, or ignoring the shariʿa in certain cases, or introducing non-controversial Shiʿi–inspired elements. However, he seems to have failed in his mission to "Baʿthize" Islam and Iraq. Even still under the Baʿth, the Shiʿi revolts of 1991 and 1999 provided evidence of it. What happened with Baʿthism after 2003 requires much more study, but at least the religious establishments, Sunni and Shiʿi, have not continued any of Saddam's religious innovations. Outside the Sunni zones, Saddam's efforts to "Baʿthize" Iraqi society, too, seem to have failed. At the same time, Saddam managed to "Islamize" his party and regime in rhetoric and state symbolism, law, culture, education, and even party indoctrination. As a result, the

[257] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, pp. 259–60.
[258] Helfont, S. "Saddam and the Islamists," 354.
[259] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, pp. 3, 223–24, 263–68.
[260] Sassoon, J. *Saddam Hussein's Baʿth Party*, p. 226.
[261] Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, pp. 131–32.
[262] Faust, A.M. *The Baʿthification of Iraq,* p. 141.
[263] Blaydes, L. *State of Repression*, pp. 260-262:

[264] Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, p. 131.
[265] Faust, A.M. *Baʿthification of Iraq*, p. 12.
[266] Khoury, D.R. *Iraq in War Time,* p. 59; Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* pp. 156-61.
[267] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* p. 297, based on CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-012, January 23, 2003. A top-secret communiqué no. 549, from the Presidential Office.

Baʿth became less Baʿth than ever, if it was still Baʿth at all.

XII. Conclusion

This article tries to answer two main questions. First, when studying regime ideology, what should be the relative weight of open versus archival sources? Second, does the Islamic "Faith Campaign" represent a Baʿthi continuity or is it an ideological "shift" or even a volte-face?

a) The Relative Importance of Open Vs. Archival Records

This article argues that for the study of regime ideology, while the archives add nuance, the open records are the main source. I suggest that this is the case also with aspects of ideology mentioned here only in passing, like culture, education, and gender issues.[268] While Khoury, Blaydes, Jordan, and Baram do not discuss this issue explicitly, implicitly all four consider both types of records equally relevant. Sassoon, Faust, and Helfont opine that in certain periods, at least each being a decade long, the regime's public media and on-the-ground public action did not represent its true ideology. They believe that during the Faith Campaign, behind a smokescreen of religious ideology, the regime remained anti-religious. Helfont, for his part, is convinced that the Baʿth Party was religious from its inception, but during its first decade in power it cloaked its religiosity with a false mantle of secularism. Only in the 1990s, he argues, could it expose its true religious nature. In this article I tried to show that the evidence provided does not support the claim to a secret ideology, Islamic or secular. In other words, what you see in public is what you get.

As opposed to the secret records, the regime's open media and *modus operandi,* or operational ideology, were what the people saw and experienced in their daily lives, and what the public believed to be the regime's ideology. Secret meetings and operations, together with internal party indoctrination programs, represent part of the picture, but the public record represents the regime's main ideology. I also tried to show that contradictions between the public and the party's classified records are few and far between, and that the Islamization was imposed inside the party even more so than in the public sphere.

Rhetoric is manipulative, sometimes deceptive. Yet, the public and the historian can always judge theory against practice. The more rhetoric and practice complement each other, the more the public and the historian understand that this is the regime's true ideology. What party members are whispering to each other in the party's branches provides an important nuance, but this is not the mainstream regime ideology.

Imagine that an historian would find a secret confession by Joseph Stalin two years into his Collectivization project (1928-1940) that it was a disaster. As long as the policy and rhetoric continued, should this change the historian's view of Bolshevik ideology? In fact, on March 2, 1930, *Pravda* published Stalin's article "Dizzy with Success," in which he attacked operatives for collectivizing too fast. Still, collectivization continued unabated for an extra decade. Stalin's confession did not change the bulk of the Soviet rhetorical and operative ideology. Historians' view about Soviet ideology, therefore, did not change either. In Saddam's Iraq, despite public protests in the party and in universities, and despite his own closed-doors secular quips, the Faith Campaign kept marching on, to 2003. So, Islamization was Saddam's true ideology.

b) Ideological Continuity or Metamorphosis?

The secret 1986 Pan-Arab Leadership meeting provides us with Saddam's motive for his Islamization. It was nothing like "personal religious epiphany."[269] Rather, this was a pragmatic (or cynical) decision in a difficult moment. The war with Iran was going badly and the regime needed public support. Saddam identified growing religiosity in Iraq and decided to jump on its bandwagon. In later years, under the hammer blows of the defeat in Kuwait, the international embargo, and a threat of an American invasion, he seemed to have changed. Did he become a "born-again Muslim?"[270] A better definition is probably that he decided to hedge his bets and placate God, in case that He existed.[271] And yet, apparently to indicate to the party old timers that he was still the same old Saddam, he was seen occasionally on TV drinking with his closest underlings a colorless liquid from a glass. Was it water? Was it Zahlawi ʿArak? This strange display demonstrated the dilemma of a leader that introduced an ideological revolution hated by many party comrades.

Far more important than the personal convictions of the dictator were his Islamizing policies. Saddam's Islam was not that of the Muslim Brotherhood, Khomeini, or the Wahhabis. Rather, this

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[268] For gender see for example, Efrati, "Negotiating Rights in Iraq". For culture and gender, see Rohde, *State-Society Relations*; Rohde, "Gays, Cross-Dressers, and Emos". For education, see, for example, Achim Rohde, A. (2013). "Change and continuity in Arab Iraqi education: Sunni and Shiʿi discourses in Iraqi textbooks before and after 2003," *Comparative Education Review,* 57, 4, pp. 711–34; Baram, A. *Culture, History and Ideology*; Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* pp. 281–88; Helfont, S. "Compulsion in religion: The authoritarian roots," pp. 248–51.

[269] Blaydes, L. State of Repression, p. 238, misquoting Baram. Compare Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam* pp.190-208.
[270] Baram raised this question in Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam*, pp. 328-338.
[271] See Saddam's secret letter to God, CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-499, 2002, pp. 43–44 in the original, 22–24 in the translation. The letter was never made public and is very likely still buried in the southern wall of Saddam's Mother of All Battles Mosque in Baghdad.

was a compromise between Baʿth secularism and traditional orthodoxy, or a post-Baʿthi compromise with the sharīʿa. For example, one could still legally purchase a bottle of ʿarak in Iraq, and Saddam never retreated from his fascination with the glory that was heathen Mesopotamia. Family matters could still be tried in the civil courts, and the constitution was not touched. It also contained some Sunni-Shiʿi ecumenism like homage to Imams ʿAli and al-Hussein, supporting Shiʿi shrines, and state commemoration of the ʿAshura.[272] And yet, what he introduced in the 1990s was Sunni-inclined political Islam, or Islamism.[273] For the secular Baʿth this was a new ideology. ʿUday Saddam Hussein's complaint that his father was turning Baghdad into "a Saudi city" was an overstatement, but a dramatic about-face did take place.

To comprehend the full scale of the transformation, it is necessary – even if in a nutshell - to compare the 1970s with the 1990s. On the rhetorical and symbolic levels, in the 1940s ʿAflaq demanded "secularism for the state". In 1986, three years before his death, he did not change, as he warned not to "practice" Islam. The Baʿth 1947 Foundational Constitution warns against religion in politics, and in 1977 Saddam announced that the sharīʿa is passee de mode. Helfont and Jordan missed all that. Likewise, they missed the 1970s highly provocative secular culture that Saddam sponsored. For example, in 1972 the state commemorated Abu Nuwas, the Abbasid-era wine poet. In 1979 the party invited young couples to spend their honeymoons in the temple of Ishtar-Astarte, "the ancient Babylonians' goddess of love," where they will be inspired by "the atmosphere of love."[274] Islam was among the most neglected subjects in the educational system.[275] All this does not look like secret "deep love for Islam", but Helfont and Jordan do not consider it.

The most visible turning point to Islam came in 1990, when the president declared in his programmatic speech that Islamic law would trump state law every time. This is political Islam.

Helfont and Jordan, who believe that Saddam was Islamic but not an Islamist, could define it as meaningless rhetoric.[276] Sassoon and Faust, who believe that Saddam remained anti-Islamic, could define it as a smokescreen. But all four needed at least to

consider this programmatic speech. They do not even mention it.

Another critical issue of ideological U-turn that escaped Sassoon, Faust, Helfont and Jordan was brought up in the 1986 Leadership meeting, when Saddam and others emphasized that the contradiction between the "religious state" and the "national state" was irreconcilable. In 1995 and 1996 Saddam supported the ideal of a pan-Islamic state.

It may be argued again that those and other metamorphoses were merely rhetorical and that even the 1991 Islamization of the flag was merely abstract symbolism. I disagree because this will be the equivalent of saying that the Swastika or the Hammer and Sickle are mere abstractions. Yet, even if we accept this notion, the Baʿth regime went much further than rhetoric when it introduced practices that affected the daily lives of all citizens. Khoury reports that, since the late 1980s, the state repealed a few non-Islamic regulations that favored a widow of war martyr over his agnatic family.[277] Likewise, certain cases of bigamy no longer required court permission, and the justification was religious.[278] In the year 2000, after 32 years in which the regime encouraged women to join the workforce, Saddam ordered women out of government jobs. He argued that "keeping women at home gives the highest meaning to humanistic values". The Baʿthi General Union of Iraqi Women supported it.[279] Between the mid-1980s and 2003 sex education in schools stopped and family planning institutions were closed.[280] This, after decades of progressive family enactment. These, and other traditional gender regulations, brought Iraq close to what Friedland and Brubaker term "religious nationalism".[281]

When in 1994 car thieves, but then even private bankers were seen on TV shocked after they lost their healthy right hands, this forced people to take Saddam's Islamization very seriously. Indeed, the whole secular penal code of 1969 changed. Iraq of the 1990s saw Islamic punishments and punishments for infringements of Islamic precepts.

The public could no longer attend bars. Party comrades could no longer have social meetings over a

[272] Baram, A. Saddam Husayn and Islam, pp. 94-104, 270-71. In some years the president was shown on TV in Karbala mixing the qima, the free goulash served to the participants in the ʿAshura ceremonies.
[273] Children at school, for example, were taught to pray the Sunni way. See Baram, A. Saddam Husayn and Islam, pp. 282-83. Likewise, except for ʿAshura, no other central Shiʿi occasions, like the Arbain, or ʿId al-Ghadir, were mentioned.
[274] Al-Thawra, July 26, 1979.
[275] Baram, A. Saddam Husayn and Islam, pp. 66-70.
[276] See for example Helfont, S.R. Compulsion in Religion: Saddam Hussein, pp. 103-104, and Ch. 6. By contrast, Khoury, D.R. Iraq in War Time, pp. 130-31, and Baram, A. Saddam Husayn and Islam, pp. 210-221, see those speeches as signifying an ideological change.

[277] Khoury, D.R. Iraq in War Time, pp. 175-77.
[278] Baram, A. Saddam Husayn and Islam, p. 58. Marrying widows even if such marriages necessitated taking on a second wife was justified by arguing that Iraqi men were merely following the example of the Prophet. See Khoury, D.R. Iraq in War Time, p. 177.
[279] Rohde, A. State-Society Relations, p. 105. The state institutions were reluctant to implement this act. See Baram, A. Saddam Husayn and Islam, pp. 301-302.
[280] Baram, A. Saddam Husayn and Islam, pp. 303-305.
[281] Friedland R. 2002, "Money, Sex, and God: The Erotic Logic of Religious Nationalism", Sociological Theory, 20, 3, pp. 381–425. https://doi.org/10.1111/0735-2751.00169.
Brubaker, R. 2012, "Religion and Nationalism: Four Approaches", Nations and Nationalism 18, 1, p. 2–20. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2011.00486.x.

bottle of ʿarak. Parents of primary school children heard that classes became gender separate. The pupils were forced to study Qurʾān, including surahs about hell that gave them nightmares, and were sent to the mosque in summer.[282] Children's education, the crown jewel of any political system, was Islamized. Party indoctrination was abruptly thrown from strict secularism into compulsory Islamic immersion. The ʿulama were catapulted at a neck-breaking speed from isolation and disdain to power and prestige. All those changes went beyond rhetoric and symbolism, touching most Iraqis in their daily lives.

It seems that the "Faith Campaign" radicalized some groups. Saddam sponsored three Islams. His own, Salafi ("Wahhabi") Islam, and Sufism. Jordan shows that during the 1980s and the 1990s, when the Baʿth looked for "moderate Islam", they "ushered in a full revival of Sufism in Iraq."[283] But Jordan seems unaware of the significance of his report that under the regime's guidance "Sufi scholars promoted a sharīʿa-minded Sufism."[284] So, the "Faith Campaign" radicalized even some moderate Sufis. How "secular" is that?

The way the public saw the Islamization was not as a continued "anti-religious" policy, as Sassoon and Faust suggest, nor as continuous wish for an Islam-rich Iraq, as Helfont, Jordan and maybe Blaydes do. The public saw it as change. Some Shiʿis believed that Saddam's Faith Campaign was meant to impose Sunni Islam.[285] Other Shiʿis found that the Faith Campaign made it easier to attend the mosque and lead a religious life.[286] At least in Mosul, a Sunni-majority city, Sunni Islamists understood the "Faith Campaign" as permission to demonstrate strong sectarian bigotry, including anti-Christian attacks.[287] Whether approvingly or reluctantly, Iraqis saw the Faith Campaign as the regime's new policy or ideology.

For those four or five historians who see only little uninterrupted continuity, here is Saddam in his own voice. In a recording of a private discussion in 2002 with a visiting Sudanese Islamist cabinet minister, Saddam was frustrated. "Because the [Faith] Campaign went very smoothly," he complained, "our Arab and Muslim brothers did not notice the extent of the upheaval (al-

inqilāb) that we caused in the lives of the Iraqi people."[288] So, as Saddam described it, he gave Iraq and the party nothing less than a big jolt. Then he charged into the details how he imposed Qurʾān studies and sharīʿa tests on society.[289] Even though this recording was in the public eye since 2014, none of the "No Ideological Change" historians mention this archival document. It may be argued that Saddam was exaggerating to impress his visitor, but the reader does not have to take Saddam's word for it. As shown above, his open media and archives confirm that he did impose a profound change. An Iraqi Shiʾi scholar who lived there at the time supports Saddam's account. He tells us that indeed, in the 1990s Saddam introduced an Islamic about-face that astonished people.[290]

Finally, to what extent did Saddam's Islamic Faith Campaign contribute to the Sunni Islamist opposition to the American occupation and the Shiʾi-hegemonic new Iraq? Helfont and Jordan believe that there was no connection. Baram thinks otherwise.[291] So far, no evidence was found that in the 1990s Saddam planned for post-Baʿth Islamist insurgencies. Yet, after close to two decades of Islamization, with the disappearance of the regime, people and groups took it from there each in its own way. Here only two such groups will be mentioned. One is analyzed by Ronen Zeidel and Hisham al-Hashimi, two of the most reliable historians of post-Saddam Iraq. They showed that the military leadership of Al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI), later ISIS, consisted of Saddam's military, mostly Military Intelligence officers.[292] I suggest that almost two

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[282] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam,* p. 256, based on *Alif Bā*, March 2, 1994, 16–18; *Al-Thawra*, January 9, 1994.

[283] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq.* p. 10.

[284] Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq.* P. 15. See also Ch. 7.

[285] Eleven telephone interviews with Iraqis through 2022. Due to the small sample this result is very rudimentary.

[286] An e-mail message from Dr. Achim Rohde, February 6, 2024. In 2008 Rohde conducted a workshop for Iraqi school principals in Germany in cooperation with UNESCO Iraq Office. Most were religiously observant Shiʾis. Most related to the Faith Campaign with a degree of approval, as it became easier to live a religious life.

[287] Al-Aqeedi, R. (2016). "The once and future Mosul," *The American Interest* website, September 26, https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/09/26/the-once-and-future-mosul, accessed August 20, 2023.

[288] Baram, A. Saddam Husayn and Islam, pp. 258-59, based on CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-409, between April 27 and May 7, 2002. See also a senior Baʿthi admitting that the party performed an Islamic U-turn, Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam*, p. 252, quoting Kim Ghattas, "Iraqis Seek Refuge in Religion: Regime Has Co-opted Growing Religious Mood," *BBC*, April 25, 2002, reproduced in *Washington Kurdish Institute*, a Washington-based electronic archive, April 26, 2002.

[289] Baram, A. *Saddam Husayn and Islam*, pp. 258-59, based on CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-409, p. 23. The meeting took place between April 27 and May 7, 2002. See also CRRC SH-PDWN-D-000-812, p.195.

[290] See a critique by a scholar at the Research Center of Grand Ayatollah Shirazi in Karbala, analyzing Baram's 2011 WWC provisional article, Hamid, ʿA. (2019). "Al-ʿIrāq min al-ʿilmāniya al-mutashaddida ilā al-Islām al-siyāsī 1968–2003" [Iraq from militant secularism to political Islam 1968–2003], Karbala, 2019, in http://shrsc.com and https://m.annabaa.org/arabic/authorsarticles/18970, accessed April 22, 2019.

[291] See Jordan, D. State *and Sufism in Iraq.* pp. 2-3, reporting well the debate between him and Helfont on the one hand side, and Baram on the other.

[292] Zeidel, R. "The Dawaʿish: A Collective Profile of Islamic State Commanders", *Perspectives on Terrorism*, Vol. 11, no. 4 (August, 2017), http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/619/1220
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decades of Islamization made it easier even for secular military officers to use ultra-Salafi organizations as vehicles. The other group is *Jaysh Rijāl Al-Ṭarīqa al-Naqshbandīya,* the heart of Jordan's book. Based on Jordan's report, I suggest that the Campaign radicalize some of them. With the evaporation of the Baʿth regime, from a religious *Ṭarīqa,* some Naqshbandis quickly metamorphosed into a radical Islamic or Islamist fighting machine. Finally, as shown above, already in 1982, the party rang all the alarm bells because religion was infiltrating to its ranks at the expense of party ideology. In 1986 Saddam reported that the public was becoming more religious. This recorded discussion is one example of the high value of the archives, but recorded conversations must be fully listened to. The years following the Kuwait crisis, including the international embargo, added to the Iraqis' woes. A visiting journalist reported in 2002: "More and more Iraqis are going to the mosque; more and more women are wearing the veil." The journalist summed it up: "Iraqis Seek Refuge in Religion: Regime Has Co-opted Growing Religious Mood."[293] Borrowing from a different universe, the laws of physics tell us that when one jumps on a bandwagon, one provides it with extra kinetic energy. This, I suggest, is what happened with Iraq's Islam during Saddam's Islamic "Faith Campaign".

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25. Rohde, Achim. (2013). "Change and continuity in Arab Iraqi education: Sunni and Shi'I Rohde, Achim. (2016). "Gays, cross-dressers, and emos: Nonnormative masculinities in militarized Iraq," *Journal of Middle East Women's Studies,* 12, 3, 433–49.
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Global Journals is in partnership with various universities, laboratories, and other institutions worldwide in the research domain. Authors are requested to disclose their source of funding during every stage of their research, such as making analysis, performing laboratory operations, computing data, and using institutional resources, from writing an article to its submission. This will also help authors to get reimbursements by requesting an open access publication letter from Global Journals and submitting to the respective funding source.

PREPARING YOUR MANUSCRIPT

Authors can submit papers and articles in an acceptable file format: MS Word (doc, docx), LaTeX (.tex, .zip or .rar including all of your files), Adobe PDF (.pdf), rich text format (.rtf), simple text document (.txt), Open Document Text (.odt), and Apple Pages (.pages). Our professional layout editors will format the entire paper according to our official guidelines. This is one of the highlights of publishing with Global Journals—authors should not be concerned about the formatting of their paper. Global Journals accepts articles and manuscripts in every major language, be it Spanish, Chinese, Japanese, Portuguese, Russian, French, German, Dutch, Italian, Greek, or any other national language, but the title, subtitle, and abstract should be in English. This will facilitate indexing and the pre-peer review process.

The following is the official style and template developed for publication of a research paper. Authors are not required to follow this style during the submission of the paper. It is just for reference purposes.

Manuscript Style Instruction (Optional)

- Microsoft Word Document Setting Instructions.
- Font type of all text should be Swis721 Lt BT.
- Page size: 8.27" x 11'", left margin: 0.65, right margin: 0.65, bottom margin: 0.75.
- Paper title should be in one column of font size 24.
- Author name in font size of 11 in one column.
- Abstract: font size 9 with the word "Abstract" in bold italics.
- Main text: font size 10 with two justified columns.
- Two columns with equal column width of 3.38 and spacing of 0.2.
- First character must be three lines drop-capped.
- The paragraph before spacing of 1 pt and after of 0 pt.
- Line spacing of 1 pt.
- Large images must be in one column.
- The names of first main headings (Heading 1) must be in Roman font, capital letters, and font size of 10.
- The names of second main headings (Heading 2) must not include numbers and must be in italics with a font size of 10.

Structure and Format of Manuscript

The recommended size of an original research paper is under 15,000 words and review papers under 7,000 words. Research articles should be less than 10,000 words. Research papers are usually longer than review papers. Review papers are reports of significant research (typically less than 7,000 words, including tables, figures, and references)

A research paper must include:

a) A title which should be relevant to the theme of the paper.
b) A summary, known as an abstract (less than 150 words), containing the major results and conclusions.
c) Up to 10 keywords that precisely identify the paper's subject, purpose, and focus.
d) An introduction, giving fundamental background objectives.
e) Resources and techniques with sufficient complete experimental details (wherever possible by reference) to permit repetition, sources of information must be given, and numerical methods must be specified by reference.
f) Results which should be presented concisely by well-designed tables and figures.
g) Suitable statistical data should also be given.
h) All data must have been gathered with attention to numerical detail in the planning stage.

Design has been recognized to be essential to experiments for a considerable time, and the editor has decided that any paper that appears not to have adequate numerical treatments of the data will be returned unrefereed.

i) Discussion should cover implications and consequences and not just recapitulate the results; conclusions should also be summarized.
j) There should be brief acknowledgments.
k) There ought to be references in the conventional format. Global Journals recommends APA format.

Authors should carefully consider the preparation of papers to ensure that they communicate effectively. Papers are much more likely to be accepted if they are carefully designed and laid out, contain few or no errors, are summarizing, and follow instructions. They will also be published with much fewer delays than those that require much technical and editorial correction.

The Editorial Board reserves the right to make literary corrections and suggestions to improve brevity.

FORMAT STRUCTURE

It is necessary that authors take care in submitting a manuscript that is written in simple language and adheres to published guidelines.

All manuscripts submitted to Global Journals should include:

Title

The title page must carry an informative title that reflects the content, a running title (less than 45 characters together with spaces), names of the authors and co-authors, and the place(s) where the work was carried out.

Author details

The full postal address of any related author(s) must be specified.

Abstract

The abstract is the foundation of the research paper. It should be clear and concise and must contain the objective of the paper and inferences drawn. It is advised to not include big mathematical equations or complicated jargon.

Many researchers searching for information online will use search engines such as Google, Yahoo or others. By optimizing your paper for search engines, you will amplify the chance of someone finding it. In turn, this will make it more likely to be viewed and cited in further works. Global Journals has compiled these guidelines to facilitate you to maximize the web-friendliness of the most public part of your paper.

Keywords

A major lynchpin of research work for the writing of research papers is the keyword search, which one will employ to find both library and internet resources. Up to eleven keywords or very brief phrases have to be given to help data retrieval, mining, and indexing.

One must be persistent and creative in using keywords. An effective keyword search requires a strategy: planning of a list of possible keywords and phrases to try.

Choice of the main keywords is the first tool of writing a research paper. Research paper writing is an art. Keyword search should be as strategic as possible.

One should start brainstorming lists of potential keywords before even beginning searching. Think about the most important concepts related to research work. Ask, "What words would a source have to include to be truly valuable in a research paper?" Then consider synonyms for the important words.

It may take the discovery of only one important paper to steer in the right keyword direction because, in most databases, the keywords under which a research paper is abstracted are listed with the paper.

Numerical Methods

Numerical methods used should be transparent and, where appropriate, supported by references.

Abbreviations

Authors must list all the abbreviations used in the paper at the end of the paper or in a separate table before using them.

Formulas and equations

Authors are advised to submit any mathematical equation using either MathJax, KaTeX, or LaTeX, or in a very high-quality image.

Tables, Figures, and Figure Legends

Tables: Tables should be cautiously designed, uncrowned, and include only essential data. Each must have an Arabic number, e.g., Table 4, a self-explanatory caption, and be on a separate sheet. Authors must submit tables in an editable format and not as images. References to these tables (if any) must be mentioned accurately.

Figures

Figures are supposed to be submitted as separate files. Always include a citation in the text for each figure using Arabic numbers, e.g., Fig. 4. Artwork must be submitted online in vector electronic form or by emailing it.

PREPARATION OF ELETRONIC FIGURES FOR PUBLICATION

Although low-quality images are sufficient for review purposes, print publication requires high-quality images to prevent the final product being blurred or fuzzy. Submit (possibly by e-mail) EPS (line art) or TIFF (halftone/ photographs) files only. MS PowerPoint and Word Graphics are unsuitable for printed pictures. Avoid using pixel-oriented software. Scans (TIFF only) should have a resolution of at least 350 dpi (halftone) or 700 to 1100 dpi (line drawings). Please give the data for figures in black and white or submit a Color Work Agreement form. EPS files must be saved with fonts embedded (and with a TIFF preview, if possible).

For scanned images, the scanning resolution at final image size ought to be as follows to ensure good reproduction: line art: >650 dpi; halftones (including gel photographs): >350 dpi; figures containing both halftone and line images: >650 dpi.

Color charges: Authors are advised to pay the full cost for the reproduction of their color artwork. Hence, please note that if there is color artwork in your manuscript when it is accepted for publication, we would require you to complete and return a Color Work Agreement form before your paper can be published. Also, you can email your editor to remove the color fee after acceptance of the paper.

TIPS FOR WRITING A GOOD QUALITY SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH PAPER

Techniques for writing a good quality homan social science research paper:

1. Choosing the topic: In most cases, the topic is selected by the interests of the author, but it can also be suggested by the guides. You can have several topics, and then judge which you are most comfortable with. This may be done by asking several questions of yourself, like "Will I be able to carry out a search in this area? Will I find all necessary resources to accomplish the search? Will I be able to find all information in this field area?" If the answer to this type of question is "yes," then you ought to choose that topic. In most cases, you may have to conduct surveys and visit several places. Also, you might have to do a lot of work to find all the rises and falls of the various data on that subject. Sometimes, detailed information plays a vital role, instead of short information. Evaluators are human: The first thing to remember is that evaluators are also human beings. They are not only meant for rejecting a paper. They are here to evaluate your paper. So present your best aspect.

2. Think like evaluators: If you are in confusion or getting demotivated because your paper may not be accepted by the evaluators, then think, and try to evaluate your paper like an evaluator. Try to understand what an evaluator wants in your research paper, and you will automatically have your answer. Make blueprints of paper: The outline is the plan or framework that will help you to arrange your thoughts. It will make your paper logical. But remember that all points of your outline must be related to the topic you have chosen.

3. Ask your guides: If you are having any difficulty with your research, then do not hesitate to share your difficulty with your guide (if you have one). They will surely help you out and resolve your doubts. If you can't clarify what exactly you require for your work, then ask your supervisor to help you with an alternative. He or she might also provide you with a list of essential readings.

4. Use of computer is recommended: As you are doing research in the field of homan social science then this point is quite obvious. Use right software: Always use good quality software packages. If you are not capable of judging good software, then you can lose the quality of your paper unknowingly. There are various programs available to help you which you can get through the internet.

5. Use the internet for help: An excellent start for your paper is using Google. It is a wondrous search engine, where you can have your doubts resolved. You may also read some answers for the frequent question of how to write your research paper or find a model research paper. You can download books from the internet. If you have all the required books, place importance on reading, selecting, and analyzing the specified information. Then sketch out your research paper. Use big pictures: You may use encyclopedias like Wikipedia to get pictures with the best resolution. At Global Journals, you should strictly follow here.

6. Bookmarks are useful: When you read any book or magazine, you generally use bookmarks, right? It is a good habit which helps to not lose your continuity. You should always use bookmarks while searching on the internet also, which will make your search easier.

7. Revise what you wrote: When you write anything, always read it, summarize it, and then finalize it.

8. Make every effort: Make every effort to mention what you are going to write in your paper. That means always have a good start. Try to mention everything in the introduction—what is the need for a particular research paper. Polish your work with good writing skills and always give an evaluator what he wants. Make backups: When you are going to do any important thing like making a research paper, you should always have backup copies of it either on your computer or on paper. This protects you from losing any portion of your important data.

9. Produce good diagrams of your own: Always try to include good charts or diagrams in your paper to improve quality. Using several unnecessary diagrams will degrade the quality of your paper by creating a hodgepodge. So always try to include diagrams which were made by you to improve the readability of your paper. Use of direct quotes: When you do research relevant to literature, history, or current affairs, then use of quotes becomes essential, but if the study is relevant to science, use of quotes is not preferable.

10. Use proper verb tense: Use proper verb tenses in your paper. Use past tense to present those events that have happened. Use present tense to indicate events that are going on. Use future tense to indicate events that will happen in the future. Use of wrong tenses will confuse the evaluator. Avoid sentences that are incomplete.

11. Pick a good study spot: Always try to pick a spot for your research which is quiet. Not every spot is good for studying.

12. Know what you know: Always try to know what you know by making objectives, otherwise you will be confused and unable to achieve your target.

13. Use good grammar: Always use good grammar and words that will have a positive impact on the evaluator; use of good vocabulary does not mean using tough words which the evaluator has to find in a dictionary. Do not fragment sentences. Eliminate one-word sentences. Do not ever use a big word when a smaller one would suffice.

Verbs have to be in agreement with their subjects. In a research paper, do not start sentences with conjunctions or finish them with prepositions. When writing formally, it is advisable to never split an infinitive because someone will (wrongly) complain. Avoid clichés like a disease. Always shun irritating alliteration. Use language which is simple and straightforward. Put together a neat summary.

14. Arrangement of information: Each section of the main body should start with an opening sentence, and there should be a changeover at the end of the section. Give only valid and powerful arguments for your topic. You may also maintain your arguments with records.

15. Never start at the last minute: Always allow enough time for research work. Leaving everything to the last minute will degrade your paper and spoil your work.

16. Multitasking in research is not good: Doing several things at the same time is a bad habit in the case of research activity. Research is an area where everything has a particular time slot. Divide your research work into parts, and do a particular part in a particular time slot.

17. Never copy others' work: Never copy others' work and give it your name because if the evaluator has seen it anywhere, you will be in trouble. Take proper rest and food: No matter how many hours you spend on your research activity, if you are not taking care of your health, then all your efforts will have been in vain. For quality research, take proper rest and food.

18. Go to seminars: Attend seminars if the topic is relevant to your research area. Utilize all your resources.
Refresh your mind after intervals: Try to give your mind a rest by listening to soft music or sleeping in intervals. This will also improve your memory. Acquire colleagues: Always try to acquire colleagues. No matter how sharp you are, if you acquire colleagues, they can give you ideas which will be helpful to your research.

19. Think technically: Always think technically. If anything happens, search for its reasons, benefits, and demerits. Think and then print: When you go to print your paper, check that tables are not split, headings are not detached from their descriptions, and page sequence is maintained.

20. Adding unnecessary information: Do not add unnecessary information like "I have used MS Excel to draw graphs." Irrelevant and inappropriate material is superfluous. Foreign terminology and phrases are not apropos. One should never take a broad view. Analogy is like feathers on a snake. Use words properly, regardless of how others use them. Remove quotations. Puns are for kids, not grunt readers. Never oversimplify: When adding material to your research paper, never go for oversimplification; this will definitely irritate the evaluator. Be specific. Never use rhythmic redundancies. Contractions shouldn't be used in a research paper. Comparisons are as terrible as clichés. Give up ampersands, abbreviations, and so on. Remove commas that are not necessary. Parenthetical words should be between brackets or commas. Understatement is always the best way to put forward earth-shaking thoughts. Give a detailed literary review.

21. Report concluded results: Use concluded results. From raw data, filter the results, and then conclude your studies based on measurements and observations taken. An appropriate number of decimal places should be used. Parenthetical remarks are prohibited here. Proofread carefully at the final stage. At the end, give an outline to your arguments. Spot perspectives of further study of the subject. Justify your conclusion at the bottom sufficiently, which will probably include examples.

22. Upon conclusion: Once you have concluded your research, the next most important step is to present your findings. Presentation is extremely important as it is the definite medium though which your research is going to be in print for the rest of the crowd. Care should be taken to categorize your thoughts well and present them in a logical and neat manner. A good quality research paper format is essential because it serves to highlight your research paper and bring to light all necessary aspects of your research.

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Informal Guidelines of Research Paper Writing

Key points to remember:

- Submit all work in its final form.
- Write your paper in the form which is presented in the guidelines using the template.
- Please note the criteria peer reviewers will use for grading the final paper.

Final points:

One purpose of organizing a research paper is to let people interpret your efforts selectively. The journal requires the following sections, submitted in the order listed, with each section starting on a new page:

The introduction: This will be compiled from reference matter and reflect the design processes or outline of basis that directed you to make a study. As you carry out the process of study, the method and process section will be constructed like that. The results segment will show related statistics in nearly sequential order and direct reviewers to similar intellectual paths throughout the data that you gathered to carry out your study.

The discussion section:

This will provide understanding of the data and projections as to the implications of the results. The use of good quality references throughout the paper will give the effort trustworthiness by representing an alertness to prior workings.

Writing a research paper is not an easy job, no matter how trouble-free the actual research or concept. Practice, excellent preparation, and controlled record-keeping are the only means to make straightforward progression.

General style:

Specific editorial column necessities for compliance of a manuscript will always take over from directions in these general guidelines.

To make a paper clear: Adhere to recommended page limits.

Mistakes to avoid:

- Insertion of a title at the foot of a page with subsequent text on the next page.
- Separating a table, chart, or figure—confine each to a single page.
- Submitting a manuscript with pages out of sequence.
- In every section of your document, use standard writing style, including articles ("a" and "the").
- Keep paying attention to the topic of the paper.
- Use paragraphs to split each significant point (excluding the abstract).
- Align the primary line of each section.
- Present your points in sound order.
- Use present tense to report well-accepted matters.
- Use past tense to describe specific results.
- Do not use familiar wording; don't address the reviewer directly. Don't use slang or superlatives.
- Avoid use of extra pictures—include only those figures essential to presenting results.

Title page:

Choose a revealing title. It should be short and include the name(s) and address(es) of all authors. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations or exceed two printed lines.

Abstract: This summary should be two hundred words or less. It should clearly and briefly explain the key findings reported in the manuscript and must have precise statistics. It should not have acronyms or abbreviations. It should be logical in itself. Do not cite references at this point.

An abstract is a brief, distinct paragraph summary of finished work or work in development. In a minute or less, a reviewer can be taught the foundation behind the study, common approaches to the problem, relevant results, and significant conclusions or new questions.

Write your summary when your paper is completed because how can you write the summary of anything which is not yet written? Wealth of terminology is very essential in abstract. Use comprehensive sentences, and do not sacrifice readability for brevity; you can maintain it succinctly by phrasing sentences so that they provide more than a lone rationale. The author can at this moment go straight to shortening the outcome. Sum up the study with the subsequent elements in any summary. Try to limit the initial two items to no more than one line each.

Reason for writing the article—theory, overall issue, purpose.

- Fundamental goal.
- To-the-point depiction of the research.
- Consequences, including definite statistics—if the consequences are quantitative in nature, account for this; results of any numerical analysis should be reported. Significant conclusions or questions that emerge from the research.

Approach:

- Single section and succinct.
- An outline of the job done is always written in past tense.
- Concentrate on shortening results—limit background information to a verdict or two.
- Exact spelling, clarity of sentences and phrases, and appropriate reporting of quantities (proper units, important statistics) are just as significant in an abstract as they are anywhere else.

Introduction:

The introduction should "introduce" the manuscript. The reviewer should be presented with sufficient background information to be capable of comprehending and calculating the purpose of your study without having to refer to other works. The basis for the study should be offered. Give the most important references, but avoid making a comprehensive appraisal of the topic. Describe the problem visibly. If the problem is not acknowledged in a logical, reasonable way, the reviewer will give no attention to your results. Speak in common terms about techniques used to explain the problem, if needed, but do not present any particulars about the protocols here.

The following approach can create a valuable beginning:

- o Explain the value (significance) of the study.
- o Defend the model—why did you employ this particular system or method? What is its compensation? Remark upon its appropriateness from an abstract point of view as well as pointing out sensible reasons for using it.
- o Present a justification. State your particular theory(-ies) or aim(s), and describe the logic that led you to choose them.
- o Briefly explain the study's tentative purpose and how it meets the declared objectives.

Approach:

Use past tense except for when referring to recognized facts. After all, the manuscript will be submitted after the entire job is done. Sort out your thoughts; manufacture one key point for every section. If you make the four points listed above, you will need at least four paragraphs. Present surrounding information only when it is necessary to support a situation. The reviewer does not desire to read everything you know about a topic. Shape the theory specifically—do not take a broad view.

As always, give awareness to spelling, simplicity, and correctness of sentences and phrases.

Procedures (methods and materials):

This part is supposed to be the easiest to carve if you have good skills. A soundly written procedures segment allows a capable scientist to replicate your results. Present precise information about your supplies. The suppliers and clarity of reagents can be helpful bits of information. Present methods in sequential order, but linked methodologies can be grouped as a segment. Be concise when relating the protocols. Attempt to give the least amount of information that would permit another capable scientist to replicate your outcome, but be cautious that vital information is integrated. The use of subheadings is suggested and ought to be synchronized with the results section.

When a technique is used that has been well-described in another section, mention the specific item describing the way, but draw the basic principle while stating the situation. The purpose is to show all particular resources and broad procedures so that another person may use some or all of the methods in one more study or referee the scientific value of your work. It is not to be a step-by-step report of the whole thing you did, nor is a methods section a set of orders.

Materials:

Materials may be reported in part of a section or else they may be recognized along with your measures.

Methods:

- o Report the method and not the particulars of each process that engaged the same methodology.
- o Describe the method entirely.
- o To be succinct, present methods under headings dedicated to specific dealings or groups of measures.
- o Simplify—detail how procedures were completed, not how they were performed on a particular day.
- o If well-known procedures were used, account for the procedure by name, possibly with a reference, and that's all.

Approach:

It is embarrassing to use vigorous voice when documenting methods without using first person, which would focus the reviewer's interest on the researcher rather than the job. As a result, when writing up the methods, most authors use third person passive voice.

Use standard style in this and every other part of the paper—avoid familiar lists, and use full sentences.

What to keep away from:

- o Resources and methods are not a set of information.
- o Skip all descriptive information and surroundings—save it for the argument.
- o Leave out information that is immaterial to a third party.

Results:

The principle of a results segment is to present and demonstrate your conclusion. Create this part as entirely objective details of the outcome, and save all understanding for the discussion.

The page length of this segment is set by the sum and types of data to be reported. Use statistics and tables, if suitable, to present consequences most efficiently.

You must clearly differentiate material which would usually be incorporated in a study editorial from any unprocessed data or additional appendix matter that would not be available. In fact, such matters should not be submitted at all except if requested by the instructor.

Content:

- o   Sum up your conclusions in text and demonstrate them, if suitable, with figures and tables.
- o   In the manuscript, explain each of your consequences, and point the reader to remarks that are most appropriate.
- o   Present a background, such as by describing the question that was addressed by creation of an exacting study.
- o   Explain results of control experiments and give remarks that are not accessible in a prescribed figure or table, if appropriate.
- o   Examine your data, then prepare the analyzed (transformed) data in the form of a figure (graph), table, or manuscript.

What to stay away from:

- o   Do not discuss or infer your outcome, report surrounding information, or try to explain anything.
- o   Do not include raw data or intermediate calculations in a research manuscript.
- o   Do not present similar data more than once.
- o   A manuscript should complement any figures or tables, not duplicate information.
- o   Never confuse figures with tables—there is a difference.

Approach:

As always, use past tense when you submit your results, and put the whole thing in a reasonable order.

Put figures and tables, appropriately numbered, in order at the end of the report.

If you desire, you may place your figures and tables properly within the text of your results section.

Figures and tables:

If you put figures and tables at the end of some details, make certain that they are visibly distinguished from any attached appendix materials, such as raw facts. Whatever the position, each table must be titled, numbered one after the other, and include a heading. All figures and tables must be divided from the text.

Discussion:

The discussion is expected to be the trickiest segment to write. A lot of papers submitted to the journal are discarded based on problems with the discussion. There is no rule for how long an argument should be.

Position your understanding of the outcome visibly to lead the reviewer through your conclusions, and then finish the paper with a summing up of the implications of the study. The purpose here is to offer an understanding of your results and support all of your conclusions, using facts from your research and generally accepted information, if suitable. The implication of results should be fully described.

Infer your data in the conversation in suitable depth. This means that when you clarify an observable fact, you must explain mechanisms that may account for the observation. If your results vary from your prospect, make clear why that may have happened. If your results agree, then explain the theory that the proof supported. It is never suitable to just state that the data approved the prospect, and let it drop at that. Make a decision as to whether each premise is supported or discarded or if you cannot make a conclusion with assurance. Do not just dismiss a study or part of a study as "uncertain."

Research papers are not acknowledged if the work is imperfect. Draw what conclusions you can based upon the results that you have, and take care of the study as a finished work.

o   You may propose future guidelines, such as how an experiment might be personalized to accomplish a new idea.
o   Give details of all of your remarks as much as possible, focusing on mechanisms.
o   Make a decision as to whether the tentative design sufficiently addressed the theory and whether or not it was correctly restricted. Try to present substitute explanations if they are sensible alternatives.
o   One piece of research will not counter an overall question, so maintain the large picture in mind. Where do you go next? The best studies unlock new avenues of study. What questions remain?
o   Recommendations for detailed papers will offer supplementary suggestions.

Approach:

When you refer to information, differentiate data generated by your own studies from other available information. Present work done by specific persons (including you) in past tense.

Describe generally acknowledged facts and main beliefs in present tense.

The Administration Rules

Administration Rules to Be Strictly Followed before Submitting Your Research Paper to Global Journals Inc.

Please read the following rules and regulations carefully before submitting your research paper to Global Journals Inc. to avoid rejection.

Segment draft and final research paper: You have to strictly follow the template of a research paper, failing which your paper may get rejected. You are expected to write each part of the paper wholly on your own. The peer reviewers need to identify your own perspective of the concepts in your own terms. Please do not extract straight from any other source, and do not rephrase someone else's analysis. Do not allow anyone else to proofread your manuscript.

Written material: You may discuss this with your guides and key sources. Do not copy anyone else's paper, even if this is only imitation, otherwise it will be rejected on the grounds of plagiarism, which is illegal. Various methods to avoid plagiarism are strictly applied by us to every paper, and, if found guilty, you may be blacklisted, which could affect your career adversely. To guard yourself and others from possible illegal use, please do not permit anyone to use or even read your paper and file.

Please note that following table is only a Grading of "Paper Compilation" and not on "Performed/Stated Research" whose grading solely depends on Individual Assigned Peer Reviewer and Editorial Board Member. These can be available only on request and after decision of Paper. This report will be the property of Global Journals

Topics	Grades		
	A-B	**C-D**	**E-F**
Abstract	Clear and concise with appropriate content, Correct format. 200 words or below	Unclear summary and no specific data, Incorrect form Above 200 words	No specific data with ambiguous information Above 250 words
Introduction	Containing all background details with clear goal and appropriate details, flow specification, no grammar and spelling mistake, well organized sentence and paragraph, reference cited	Unclear and confusing data, appropriate format, grammar and spelling errors with unorganized matter	Out of place depth and content, hazy format
Methods and Procedures	Clear and to the point with well arranged paragraph, precision and accuracy of facts and figures, well organized subheads	Difficult to comprehend with embarrassed text, too much explanation but completed	Incorrect and unorganized structure with hazy meaning
Result	Well organized, Clear and specific, Correct units with precision, correct data, well structuring of paragraph, no grammar and spelling mistake	Complete and embarrassed text, difficult to comprehend	Irregular format with wrong facts and figures
Discussion	Well organized, meaningful specification, sound conclusion, logical and concise explanation, highly structured paragraph reference cited	Wordy, unclear conclusion, spurious	Conclusion is not cited, unorganized, difficult to comprehend
References	Complete and correct format, well organized	Beside the point, Incomplete	Wrong format and structuring

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