Against its moral appeal as a framework for protection of civilians from humanitarian catastrophe, the responsibility to protect (RtoP) seems not to have escaped a wider political context. Thus, questions of why, when and how force should be applied have incessantly trailed several intervention operations NATO's intervention in Libya. While the political misgivings of the Libyan regime under Gaddafi were conspicuous, this study argues that the Libyan intervention was however executed without recourse to certain procedural implications; Resultantly, the Libyan debacle has not only contributed to global insecurity, but has equally hampered international consensus building, weakened regional bodies and heightened suspicion amongst world powers, which partly explains the current stalemate on the Syrian crisis. Hence, this study recommends that there is an urgent need to rethink NATO’s strategy in conflict management in Africa, and the imperative of institutional synergy between the United Nations and the Africa Union so as to bridge the institutional gaps, engender political will, and by extension the growth of the RtoP.