This article addresses Israeli strategic attitude with respect to the Syrian crisis, linking the historical conceptualization of Syria and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict with Israel’s current strategic considerations and the effect of the “Lebanese syndrome” upon Israel’s historical collective memory. Syria has always been regarded as Israel’s archenemy due to its organic ties with revolutionary pan-Arabism and support for the struggle against the Jewish State. While Israel thus hoped that the “Arab Spring” uprisings would overthrow the Ba’ath regime or weakening it to the point of collapse, it has refrained from any military intervention, first and foremost because of what may be called the “Lebanese syndrome”-namely, the fear of renewed entanglement and a repeat of its bitter experience in the First Lebanon War.
This article addresses Israeli strategic attitude with respect to the Syrian crisis, linking the historical conceptualization of Syria and its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict with Israel’s current strategic considerations and the effect of the “Lebanese syndrome†upon Israel’s historical collective memory. Syria has always been regarded as Israel’s archenemy due to its organic ties with revolutionary pan-Arabism and support for the struggle against the Jewish State. While Israel thus hoped that the “Arab Spring†uprisings would overthrow the Ba’ath regime or weakening it to the point of collapse, it has refrained from any military intervention, first and foremost because of what may be called the “Lebanese syndromeâ€â€”namely, the fear of renewed entanglement and a repeat of its bitter experience in the First Lebanon War.