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<journal-meta>
<journal-id journal-id-type="publisher">global-journal-of-management-and-business-research-d-accounting-auditing</journal-id>
<journal-title-group>
<journal-title>Global Journal of Management and Business Research - D: Accounting &amp; Auditing</journal-title>
</journal-title-group>
<issn publication-format="print">0975-5853</issn>
<issn publication-format="electronic">2249-4588</issn>
<publisher><publisher-name>Global Journals Publishing Group Incorporated</publisher-name></publisher>
<self-uri xlink:href="https://globaljournals.org/journal-seo-export/jats/78035.xml" />
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<article-meta>
<article-id pub-id-type="publisher-id">78035</article-id>
<title-group>
<article-title>A Theoretical Analysis of the Audit Committeeas Role in China</article-title>
</title-group>
<contrib-group>
<contrib contrib-type="author"><name><surname>Lee</surname><given-names>Pao-Chen</given-names></name><xref ref-type="aff" rid="aff1" />
</contrib>
</contrib-group>
<aff id="aff1">TAIWAN, Kainan University</aff>
<pub-date publication-format="electronic" date-type="pub" iso-8601-date="2014-01-15">
<day>15</day>
<month>01</month>
<year>2014</year>
</pub-date>
<volume>14</volume>
<issue>D5</issue>
<fpage>1</fpage>
<lpage>14</lpage>
<abstract><p>This paper aims to analyze the role of the Audit Committee (AC) in China by employing the following theoretical frameworks: managerial hegemony theory to examine whether ACs in China serve as a mere “rubber stamp”; the origin of agency theory to determine whether ACs are supported by the separation of ownership and control to act as overseers and supervisors; and to use resource dependence theory to assess whether ACs provide added value by acting as consultants and trainers in China. Telephone interviews surveying 330 listed companies in China yielded 61 interviews, and the research results reveal that the AC’s role supports both the resource dependency and agency theories but conflicts with managerial hegemony theory.</p></abstract>
<kwd-group kwd-group-type="author-generated">
<kwd>role</kwd>
<kwd>audit committee</kwd>
<kwd>supervisory board</kwd>
<kwd>corporate governance.</kwd>
</kwd-group>
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<title>Full Text</title>
<p>This paper aims to analyze the role of the Audit Committee (AC) in China by employing the following theoretical frameworks: managerial hegemony theory to examine whether ACs in China serve as a mere â€œrubber stampâ€; the origin of agency theory to determine whether ACs are supported by the separation of ownership and control to act as overseers and supervisors; and to use resource dependence theory to assess whether ACs provide added value by acting as consultants and trainers in China. Telephone interviews surveying 330 listed companies in China yielded 61 interviews, and the research results reveal that the ACâ€™s role supports both the resource dependency and agency theories but conflicts with managerial hegemony theory.</p>
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