I. Introduction

Africa is present in Brazil's international relations even before its organization as a national state, constituting the dynamic trade that operated outside the rules of the Portuguese colonial empire. During this period, the contacts were intense at both commercial and proximity among elites, especially those devoted to the slave trade. After the end of slavery and the slave trade, respectively in 1888 and 1850, Africa went through a long period of neglect on the part of Brazil, so that Alberto da Costa e Silva says the effort to rethink the Brazilian dialogue with the African continent, especially in political and diplomatic fields, date only from the eve of African independences, in the twentieth century.

Throughout the second half of the twentieth century the approach was improving progressively, ranging from the speech that found no support in the practical actions, in the 1960s, to a more pragmatic emphasis, in the 1970s, interspersed with some periods of estrangement. Meanwhile, in Africa, the independence processes unfolded, some milder, others with extreme violence.

In the twenty-first century, however, on both sides of the Atlantic the availability of internal conditions joins the political will and relations gain new momentum. Currently, the sophistication and complexity of international relations of states and domestic economies convert this new approach in direct investments, high-level visits, coordination of positions in the context of South-South relations, in addition to increasing trade, with a more sophisticated agenda compared with previous ones. This article aims to analyze the reunion between Brazil and Africa in the twenty-first century and the convergence of moments on both sides of the Atlantic which have created favorable conditions for the growth of bilateral relations.

II. The New Africa’s International Insertion

The international integration of independent Africa, as well as the process of independence of many of its countries, happened in the midst of the Cold War. This insertion occurred either through an attempt at autonomy, with the Non-Aligned Movement and the struggle for a New International Economic Order (NIEO), or with its internal conflicts as being instrumentalized by disputes between the two powers. In this sense, in the period of Détente, conflicts between the United States and Soviet Union were largely transferred to the peripheral countries, particularly those in Africa, attributing strategic character to the region.

The end of the Cold War, therefore, imposed a new condition to international relations in Africa. The loss of strategic importance that these countries had in bipolar disputes meant that, in the 1990s the continent was consigned to oblivion, and, thereafter, to deal with unfinished conflicts remnants of disputes between the old powers, which still were compounded by strategic marginalization, loss of ability to bargain, loss of economic importance, the consequences of the lost decade and the livelihood of colonial paradigms.

If in the Cold War period the existence of conflicts have led to disorganization and impoverishment of the continent, in the 1990s this situation was aggravated, because in these countries, not only the conflicts did not end, but also they lost the financial and strategic support of the great powers, which helped to maintain social cohesion. Conflicts, by the way, have become endemic, were aggravated or, in some cases, new conflicts arising from disputes over the control of the states. This situation abounded the "afropessimism" in analyzes about the continent. In this sense, the World Bank came to estimate that by the rate of the 1990s, it would take forty years for black Africa regained the level of the 1970s. (SARAIVA, 2008)

Given the "Saharan tragedy", it was multiplied the number of peacekeeping operations of the United Nations in Africa and the Great Powers, as well as the UN, engaged in humanitarian aid policies to Africa, which delimited the continent's participation in international relations that decade. Welfare proposals, mostly conditioned to liberal reforms, which channeled resources from rich countries to the region, were ineffective in combating the Africans problems and, face its failure, were being abandoned at the turn of the millennium.

At the beginning of the XXI century, passed the gap of the post-Cold War, Africa, in the words of Vizentini, gives a "new jolt" and takes on a new level of international integration. According to José Flávio Sombra Saraiva, there are three central concepts that fuel this transformation: gradual advance of democratization and containment of armed conflict; economic growth grounded in fiscal responsibility and social concern, and elevation in confidence of elites through new forms of cultural and political renaissance.

While the political aspect highlights the role of South Africa, Libya¹, Nigeria, Algeria and Senegal in the transformation of the AUO into the AU and in the launch of NEPAD, in economic terms, the South African industrial strength and substantial oil resources of Algeria, Nigeria and Libya were added to the strong increase in investment and trade promoted by China in particular, but also India, Brazil and Arab Countries. Moreover, Africa, as a traditional exporter of commodities and agricultural products, has benefited from the appreciation of some commodities and from the demand for strategic resources that Chinese growth imposes, which Africa has in abundance.

The South Africa post-Apartheid has also acted in world diplomacy aimed at reforming international institutions in order to provide a more multipolar world, where African countries have greater voice. This country also has been actively promoting multilateralism in Africa, for example, by the creation of the Community for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the growing number of multilateral conferences based in African countries.

All this resulted in a sharp acceleration in economic growth and more assertive international affairs of African countries. This is what is called the Rebirth of Africa.

Throughout the first decade of this century, Africa had an average growth of 5% to 6%, their average inflation rates were contained in 6% and exports in 2006 and 2007 were 43% and 45% of GDP, while foreign investments correspond, on average, to 19.4% of GDP - a percentage very close to that of Brazil, although considered low for economic sustainability (SARAIVA, 2008: 88).

From the academic perspective, rebirth corresponds to a tendency of Africans to go over the waywardness of several experiments of imported models. The idea of using unprecedented opportunities permeates the new internal discourse of African intelligence.

Despite the changes, there are still some concerns that hover over the continent, as the issue of poverty, which in many countries is still worrying, the possibility of a new cycle of indebtedness, generated mainly by Chinese policy in Africa, little diversification of the African economy and the persistence of corruption.

Moreover, the international financial crisis has introduced new challenges. The African economy was not as affected as the developed countries, but there was a reduction of Chinese investments, offset by just advancing capital of the Persian Gulf. In short, the continent continues to live a cycle of growth, but it is precisely here that lies the challenge for the future, to the extent that one questions how growth will be maintained in the context of less international capital available for investments.

Even so, Africa has presented figures and both positive and innovative initiatives that lead the continent to be seen as the new frontier of capitalism.

The Rebirth of Africa and its new international role are grounded on two pillars, one internal - NEPAD - responsible for the spirit of self-management of the continent, without outside interference and promoting their own development, and an external one, which is the rediscovery of the continent by foreign investors and the process that has been called the "new scramble for Africa."

a) NEPAD - New Partnership for Africa Development

NEPAD is a program of the African Union, adopted in 2001, with autochthonous proposes and carried out by Africans. This document is related to the "Rebirth of Africa", because it represents an initiative of resumption of confidence and identity reconstruction of the continent. In this sense, African leaders claim to be taking the reins of their own destiny, refusing to accept economic and political disqualified leaders and be conditioned by circumstances.

According to José Flávio Sombra Saraiva (2002), to some extent, the NEPAD is not exactly unheard of in African politics, insofar as it is a strong contribution from previous projects, such as the African Renaissance, from the late 1990s, Omega Plan, of Senegal, and the Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP), of South Africa. Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa thus become protagonists of NEPAD Plan.

Despite having roots in other previous projects, NEPAD is a constructive reaction of African leadership in difficult times and Saraiva considers that there is some originality in the document.

Part of the recovery and reconstruction of the self-esteem of African identity, according to the document, depends on the consciousness of the African people in relation to their contribution to the world and the appreciation of it, is that Africa is the cradle of humanity, either by owning mineral, ecological and cultural resources. The self-confidence that Emerges, however, protects these resources in order to be used to generate wealth and well-being for Africans themselves.

The objective of NEPAD is to eradicate poverty and place African countries, both individually and collectively, on the path of sustainable growth and development and to halt the marginalization of Africa in the globalization process.

The agenda proposed by NEPAD seeks the renewal of the continent, based on national and regional priorities, namely: prevention, management and resolution of conflicts, democracy and human rights, through the development of clear standards of verification, transparency and participatory governance; macroeconomic stability; establishment of a transparent legal and regulatory framework in the financial markets and auditing public and private sector; promotion of education, technical training and health, with priority to the problem of AIDS, malaria and other diseases; promoting the role of women; promote infrastructure development, agriculture and diversification between agribusiness and manufactures; and strengthen the State to be able to create and enforce legal rules and maintain order.

Also NEPAD has ambitious goals, such as to achieve and maintain an average GDP of the countries in 7% pa in the fifteen years following the drafting of the document. Among the strategies to achieve these goals is the diversification of productive activities, stimulating competitiveness and increased exports.

All this depends on building a strong and competitive economy, which, in times of globalization, becomes a necessary condition to remove Africa from marginalization and so it can participate effectively in the global economy and international politics. NEPAD leaders identify that, if the enormous natural and human resources of the continent are used appropriately, it can be achieved equitable and sustainable development. This is a call for a new relationship of partnership between Africa and the international community, especially developed countries, aiming to overcome the past of unequal relations.

The idea of the project is to fill gaps in strategic sectors, namely: infrastructure, information technology and digital communications, energy, transportation, poverty reduction, education, reduction of brain drain, health, agriculture, environment, culture, science and technology. The state's role is highlighted in growth and economic development.

As for resources to be mobilized for this purpose, capital flows are identified as one of the strategic pillars. African leaders have identified the need to fill a gap of around 12% of their GDP with capital flows, most of which must come from outside the continent, in the form of debt relief, Development Assistance (ODA) and private capital (NEPAD, 2001). Regarding the latter, it is intended to give attention to investors' perception that Africa is a continent of high risk, treating the security of property rights and regulatory frameworks. Interim measures are planned to mitigate the risk, including credit guarantee schemes.

Institutionally, the plan has progressed, creating a secretariat based in South Africa, a Steering Committee, an Implementation Committee, and five task groups to identify and implement projects in the focus areas of the plan.

Interpretations about the importance of NEPAD ranges from the most optimistic, as to Saraiva that compared NEPAD to Marshall Plan, to the extent that they both wanted to sew the "frayed fabric of the economy and politics" of their target countries, to the vision of the pessimists, who consider the NEPAD as a piece of empty rhetoric.

The response from governments and international institutions, especially financial ones, was enthusiastic. But criticism arose on the part of intellectuals, social movements and NGOs within and outside Africa.

In Brazil, one of the most controversial voices in criticism of the document is Wolfgang Döpcke (2002), which states that the NEPAD takes globalization as inevitable and does not question it, accepting the liberal hegemonic discourse and integrating it to its proposal. He characterized NEPAD as an "Africanization of Western liberal proposals." Citing Hearald newspaper, Wolfgang Döpcke also criticizes the NEPAD, characterizing it as a "'vehicle of neocolonial imperialist countries to exploit and subjugate' the African continent." Furthermore, he states that, in relation to the concrete and sectoral priorities, the plan is conventional and development policies are similar to those of past decades. Saraiva, however, suggests a tonic of cautious optimism.

Given these interpretations, a balance that can be made more than ten years since the launch of the partnership is likely that his main legacy is the spirit of self-management that took leaders and African population, to a greater or lesser degree, depending on the country. Vizentini, citing the nationalist leader of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, states that "for the first time Africa is achieving some autonomy to reorganize itself based on a regional balance of power" and that is the uniqueness of NEPAD.

b) The Rediscovery of Africa

The world is watching with the utmost attention the international reintegration of Africa, so says Saraiva. It draws up in the continent a strong competition between new actors, who, rather than weakens it has increased Africa’s elbow room in international relations.

According Pio Penna Filho, the responsible for the rediscovery of Africa is undoubtedly China. The rapprochement between China and Africa dates back to the late 1980s and early 1990s, when the massacre of Tiananmen Square (1989) resulted in the isolation of China imposed by the West. Africa was seen by Beijing, then, as an alternative to overcome isolation, as it was one of the few regions of the world that did not come out against the massacre. The political counterpart, in the view of the African countries, was the presence of an ally on the Security Council.

Although the approach has been initiated by the political field, the predominance of the Chinese presence in Africa is in the economic area. According Saraiva, China landed in Africa in a structural way: Chinese State Owned Enterprises - SOEs were pioneers, but the private sector and subnational actors also have significant importance; major infrastructure projects generate millions of jobs, promote economic development and help in rebuilding after wars; Chinese goods, extremely cheap, allow Africans access to an level of consumption previously unimagined; and the Chinese financial aid, which was announced in 2009 in an amount of $ 10 billion, leaves Africans enables to refrain from request loans from IMF and be more selective with Western help. (VIZENTI, 2010)

Moreover, some characteristics of Chinese investments’ approach have proved an advantage of this country in Africa: the Chinese do not hesitate to invest in troubled areas, the Chinese oil companies are prone to employ large amounts of money and work in order to get rights for exploration and development in countries with large energy resources; companies associate indistinctly to national governments, public and private companies, in order to establish long-term local presence, although countries may seem unpromising immediately; and China does not care about the objections that the U.S. or other Western countries may do in relation to choice of partners.

The year 2005 is noteworthy in relation to Chinese investment in Africa. That year, landed on the continent about a thousand of Chinese companies and hundreds of thousands of workers from the same country. Since then, the Chinese presence is growing increasingly and expectations are that, with the global economic crisis that has been designing since 2008, China earns even more space in Africa, taking the space left by countries in difficulties.

The boldness of China comes to "invade" the spaces already consolidated as belonging to Westerners. China has acquired Swiss oil company Addax Petroleum, which controlled wells in Nigeria, Gabon and Cameroon, it presented a project to build an oil pipeline in Kenya, which will extract oil from Sudan and acquired rights over oil in Niger, and it discusses a partnership with Britain's Tullow Oil for exploration of oilfield discovered in Lake Albert in Uganda. (BOSCO, 2010)

One of the great advantages of China in Africa is the volume of demand for raw materials, minerals and oil, to fuel its rapid growth. Currently, from the ten main suppliers of oil to China, four are in Africa, namely Angola, Sudan, Congo-Brazzaville and Libya. According to Vizentini, Angola became the largest supplier of fuel to China, surpassing Saudi Arabia. Moreover, at the current rate of growth, China should further increase its energy deficit, which means a great potential for Africa.

Figures published in the article "China ups the Ante in Africa" and cited by Port Amaury de Oliveira (2008) give us an idea of the magnitude of the Chinese presence in Africa. Investments, both in trade, manufacturing and processing, natural resource exploration, development and communication, are of the order of $6.27billion.Thetradegrewfrom$ 11 billion in 2000 to $ 50 billion in 2006. The projects are 720 in 49 African countries, plus another 58 under construction, all funded by preferential loans. In addition, a China-Africa Development Fund will be created for Chinese companies wishing to open new business in Africa (OLIVEIRA, 2008:87).

However, there are many criticisms of the Chinese operations in Africa, both in relation to the fact that most countries' trade balance is in deficit and the quality of products, indebtedness caused by the Chinese loans and indifference and even violations of human rights protection schemes. Nevertheless, the impact of Chinese performance among most African countries is positive, being exalted, especially when compared to Europe.

In what concerns to India, despite the rediscovery of Africa is a typical phenomenon of the 2000s, this country has an outstanding performance on the continent since the 1990s. An example is the economic cooperation, led by the program Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation (ITEC), which was responsible for a project for small scale industries in Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, Kenya, Ghana and Ethiopia. More recently, the Indian Eximbank launched the Focus Africa to promote and meet Indian entrepreneurs to create business centers. (Vizentini, 2010)

The interest of India, like China’s, is underpinned by the need for energy resources, raw materials, agricultural products, markets and investment space. All this resulted from the strong economic growth of India. In this sense, according to Oliveira (2008), which differentiates India from China is the approach of their companies. While the former is more risk averse, the latter adopts a strategy that gives greater integration in domestic markets. This means that China opts for a strategy of greater control of the supply chain, both up and down, which creates the appearance of smaller enclaves and diffusion effects of the benefits of investments (OLIVEIRA, 2008:76)

Another difference between the two Asian emerging countries is that the Indian effort is driven primarily by corporate forces, while Chinese is the joint result of the levels of government, party and business. The result is that China obtains better performance.

South Africa, despite not being a foreign investor on the continent, has acted as an external actor in African countries individually and competes with the powers and emerging countries vying for space in Africa. South Africa is the largest economy in Africa, not only for its size but also because it is a hub for the distribution of imported goods to the rest of the continent. However, despite the South African economy is modern and has a good industrial base, it is still behind countries like China, India, Russia and Brazil. Still, Vizentini qualifies South Africa as leader of Black Africa and compares the performance of that country in its area with the immediate insertion of Brazil in relationship to South America (Vizentini, 2007).

In fact, South Africa post-apartheid, not only emerged as the most developed country in Africa, as happens to have a significant role in international politics, both seeking a seat on the Security Council of the United Nations, as forming alliances with other emerging as in IBSA and, more recently, by integrating BRICS.

At the regional level, SADC - South Africa Development Community is the locus where the prominence of South Africa is exercised. If on one hand the entry of South Africa in regional arrangement is a challenge given that disparities arise from differences in GDP, the huge trade surplus relative to other EU countries and dependent on other members have in relation to infrastructure ports and roads supplied by South Africa, on the other hand, its accession to the bloc added value to the organization, increasing linkages with the global economy.

The external actors presented so far do not represent all of the countries that invest and seek space in the African economy that is reborn. It may also be referred to the European countries, which were not analyzed because they are traditional actors on the continent, present since the colonial period, and for that reason are not exactly protagonists in the rediscovery of Africa.

Moreover, Brazil, which converges to its rise as an emerging country with the Rebirth of Africa, finds in this continent room to expand its investments and it is an actor who excels in the "race" for Africa. A more detailed analysis of the rediscovery of Africa by Brazil will be made in the next section of this article.

III. Brazilian Foreign Policy for Africa

After centuries of intensive contacts between Africa and Brazil, be it the slave trade, or the cultural influence of African slaves on Brazilian culture, relations between the two sides of the Atlantic were silenced for nearly a century. Although there are theoretical divergences², the so called Independent Foreign Policy - PEI³ (1961-1964) is a milestone for the return to contacts between Africa and Brazil. With it, Brazil has defined a specific policy directed to Africa, positioning itself in favor of decolonization and identifying common aspirations between Brazil and Africa in the areas of economic development, protection of commodity prices, industrialization and desire for peace. This position can be considered a milestone because previous governments adopted a position of alignment or, at least, not confrontation with the colonial powers. Moreover, the orientation of Brazilian foreign policy for Africa met the new needs created by industrialization process of the previous decades.

The resumption of an Africanist policy by the Foreign Ministry was consolidated during Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism Officer (1974-1979). In this sense, the Brazilian vanguard in recognizing the independence of Angola in 1975, was a milestone. Thus, there has been "consistent practice", in the words of Saraiva, to what had been gestating in the level of speech during PEI. Africa in this period has been identified as an area of economic and strategic interests virtual and this was one time considered "the golden years" of African politics in Brazil (SARAIVA, 1999). This period marks the installation of the first Brazilian company in black Africa.

In the 1980s, however, the difficulties in maintaining the promising relationship of the 1970s were evident. The developmental model, which guided the diversification of partners of Brazilian foreign policy and Brazil's rapprochement towards Africa, showed signs of exhaustion (Saraiva, 2002). Both Africa and Brazil were affected by the debt crisis, and, in the case of Africa, the impact was aggravated by IMF adjustment plans and the conflicts of the Cold War. Still, some specific initiatives have been engendered, as the first Brazilian president's visit to the continent in 1983, when President João Batista Figueiredo travelled to Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Senegal and Cape Verde.

a) The selective choices of the 1990s and preparation to the present time

In the 1990s, Brazil's relations with Africa, which had gone through moments of great prosperity in the previous decades, enter in decline, which was called by Saraiva "look sleepy." (SARAIVA, 1999) The trade volume backed to levels of the years 1950/1960. (SARAIVA, 2010)

This decline is given by unfavorable contexts on both sides of the Atlantic. In Africa, the deep crisis, caused by foreign debt, the crisis of social epidemics, and the tumultuous political transitions to democracy, which in many cases resulted in violent civil wars, meant that the continent was increasingly sidelined from the international system.

Brazil in its turn has undergone a reorientation of its foreign policy, which ruled him out of their tradition to favor developmental characteristics of the Normal State⁴ and relations with developed countries. The emphasis is now on North-South vertical relations, instead of horizontal South-South relations, in that the orientation of Brazilian foreign policy of this period was to join the total insertion in neoliberalism and globalization. Moreover, it contributed to the declinein trade that followed the withdrawal of the State of export financing and the need to import oil from Argentina, in order to balance the economic weights inside the Mercosur. (Vizentini, 2010)

José Vicente de Sá Pimentel (2000) divides the vision of the framers of Brazilian foreign policy for Africa of that moment between nostalgic and doomsayers. The first emphasized the historical responsibilities and compared the 1990s with the 1970s, extolling the past at the expense of the former. The others gave emphasis to the catastrophic situation of crisis on the continent, having this as a factor that hindered the dialogue with the African continent. This last group was called by Saraiva as African pessimists, which, to this author, have dominated the Brazilian decision-making process over the decade.

Despite the extreme views, Brazilian foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s made selective choices, namely, South Africa, Angola, ZPCSA and CPLC. According to Pimentel selectivity was justified on the grounds that a sole African policy would not be the most appropriate in the face of such a great diversity among their countries.

South Africa is recognized by the strategic value of its geographical position and because it is the most traditional and main partner of Brazil in the continent. Angola, which in the 1990s had not yet resolved their conflicts remnants of independence, stands out by the Brazilian presence in UN Peace Mission in that country, by the presence of Brazilian investments, even in times of war, beyond the privileged relationship legacy from the fact that Brazil was the first country to recognize the independence of Angola.

Regarding ZPCSA, there was a gradual resumption of operation. The Zone, although it was formalized in 1986, was relatively forgotten in subsequent years, but with the revival meetings were held in 1990, 1994 and 1998. Finally, the CPLC, which despite its somewhat lax, in the words of Saraiva, has been consolidated as part of promoting cooperation between countries.

Despite the selectivity that characterized the period, each of the three governments of the 1990s had its peculiarities in relation to Africa and they deserve to be analyzed. Starting with Fernando Collor, who despite having initiated the fled from Africa and the reduction of the Brazilian diplomatic corps on the continent, he visited Africa in 1991, and the Brazilian government help in structuring the Navy's war of Namibia in the context of the process of independence. Regarding Collor’s visit to the continent, Saraiva said it is surrender to the forces of nationalism and a Brazilian diplomatic tradition of diversification of partners⁵.

With Itamar Franco, African politics have a sigh of engagement. It is in Itamar that ZPCSA is reactivated and the CPLP organized the Meeting of Portuguese Language Chancellors. Vizentini points out that the highlights of this government was the bilateral and multilateral support, via the UN, to the peace process and reconstruction in some countries, such as Angola. It should be noted also that most of selective choices that will characterize the year 1990 were drawn in the government of Mr. Franco.

President Fernando Henrique Cardos- FHC had different approaches towards Africa along his two governments: in the first instance, Africa occupied a modest place, and in the second, during the second term, a certain inflection, which would be qualitatively deepened by Lula government's foreign policy. The actions that stand out are the more active participation of Brazil in UN peacekeeping missions, which most were in Africa; presidential visits, while maintaining selectivity; and the signing of the South Africa and Mercosur Framework Agreement.

Vizentini highlights that with the crisis of real (Brazilian currency) in 1999 and the change of posture of FHC in relation to globalization, which, in his speech, goes from "inevitable" to "asymmetric", Brazil and African states start to have greater convergence in world diplomacy and in multilateral fora, particularly economic ones. This shift in discourse and attitudes seems to be the point closest to the foreign policy of the next government. However, it should not overestimate the importance of this turnaround, considering that the great revival of Brazilian Africanist policy occurs under Lula, as will be seen in the next subsection.

b) The Lula Government's Foreign Policy for Africa

Lula's rise to power in 2003 represents in Brazil's relations with Africa a lifting in the Brazilian Africanist policy to the "state of art" (SARAIVA, 2010). This approach in Brazil-Africa relations is part of a context of major changes in Brazilian foreign policy as a whole, especially compared to the previous government. In this subsection, we will present the changes that the new government brought to the foreign relations of Brazil and then its implications for an Africanist policy and what it has to novelty compared to other periods.

According to Amado Luiz Cervo (2008), the Lula government's foreign policy fits the Logistics Paradigm. In this paradigm the state transfers the responsibilities of the state entrepreneur to society, which characterized the developmental paradigm. The State focuses on providing logistical support to enterprises, preferably, but not exclusively, to the private sector, for the purpose of strengthened it in international comparative terms. Interdependence with the globalized world, in this case, operates by aggregating national enterprises and international supply chains through direct investments abroad.

Besides the logistical approach of the Brazilian state, another feature of the foreign policy of the Lula government is the option for South-South relations. Accordingly, Tullo Vigevani and Gabriel Cepaluni claim that one of the main changes from Cardoso to Lula is the difference of perception and ideology of these leaders and their teams about the constraints and opportunities of the current international order. The thesis postulated by them is that

FHC's foreign policy advocated the idea of "autonomy through participation" in the international system, as opposed to the pursuit of "autonomy by distance", which prevailed until the end of Sarney’s tenure (VIGEVANI; OLIVEIRA, 2004; FONSECA JR., 1998), while Lula da Silva sought to place Brazil on the world stage accentuating autonomous forms, diversifying partners and Brazilian strategic options... emphasis on South-South cooperation to seek greater balance with countries of the North, making adjustments, increasing the country's international role and consolidating program changes in foreign policy. (VIGEVANI; CEPALUNI, 2007) (Free translation)

This strategy of the Lula government was named by the authors as "autonomy through diversification."

The Brazilian Africanist policy of Lula's government falls in both South-South approach and the Logistic State. To Saraiva (2010), foreign policy for Africa under Lula gained more permanent bases, near a state policy. The same author characterizes it as a very well balanced mix of idealism with realism. In the external environment, a new vision of globalization by both Brazil and Africa, farther from the neoliberal vision and closer to the real interdependence, which, according to Cervo (2008), gives the tone of the approach. Internally, on the other hand, there is a convergence of moments that favor the approach. In Africa, as it has been seen, the first decade of this century was characterized by relatively high rates of growth, restructuring of states and societies and end conflict. In Brazil, the economic growth of the decade was also significant and became more sophisticated than in other periods by the association of social programs, which improved the income distribution in the country, with the character of the Logistic State, which created conditions for expansion of national economy and that finds in Africa a field for this state more economically mature.

Vizentini (2010) provides some views about the African policy of the Lula administration:

a) Solidarity Dimension - On this view, the engagement with Africa would be an international extension of government social programs.

b) Diplomacy of prestige - On this view, the policy would have no substance and therefore would be a waste of time and money.

c) Business Diplomacy - According to this view, the African policy of the Lula government would be a kind of soft imperialism, which differentiate from the Chinese presence only in form and intensity.

Many were the critics to the engagement of Brazil with Africa as it had a poetic or lyrical connotation, but both former President Lula, as former foreign minister Celso Amorim expressed in their speeches and state actions itself that relations with Brazil and the continent were based on specific interests and that Africa is a priority for Brazil. The connotation was neither patronizing, reproducing the speech to expiate the guilt of past colonial exploitation, nor exploiting, aiming at the exploitation of large reserves of natural resources. It was building a true partnership. (SILVA, 2009)

The concrete interests referred to in the official discourse can be seen in the growth of trade from $5billionin2002to$ 26 billion in 2008 (Amorim, 2009).

Besides the commercial field, relations have outstanding performance in the area of investment, mainly in oil, mining, infrastructure and services, cooperation in health, technology, diplomacy, security and defense. Vizentini, however, says that the most important pillars of this recent approach are the strategic and economic ones, in the sense that they are very important for the Brazilian world projection.

Within the economic pillar, trade relations have produced results that demonstrate the importance of the approximation of the African continent. By 2008, Brazil was the 11th partner in Africa and among the developing countries, only behind China and India. Regarding the previous government, the results of the change in the importance of Africa are patents: between 1995 and 2002 exports to Africa grew 76%, while between 2003 and 2009 it grew by almost 400%, whereas the performance of imports was somewhat more modest, with a growth of 260% in the first period, against 326% in the second. (MFA, 2010)

It is worth mentioning that most of Brazil's exports are manufactured goods (MDIC, 2009) and it is one of the strategic points of the engagement with the continent, since, historically, Amado Cervo (2008) points out that the power of attraction of Africa on Brazilian leaders is precisely in being a market for Brazilian manufactures, while they are rejected by the first world. Another strategic aspect can be demonstrated in the role of Africa during the international crisis, when, despite the flow of trade have reduced the decline in exports to the continent it was much smaller than the fall of Brazil's total exports, which resulted in a increased participation of African countries in absorption of Brazilian products. (MFA, 2010)

Concerning Brazilian Foreign Direct Investments (FDI), in 2006, for the first time in history, the volume of investments made was larger than received investments, reaching a record $ 32.3 billion (KPMG, 2008:4). This placed Brazil in the 12th position among the largest investors in the world, even ahead of China (KPMG, 2008:6). In Lula’s government, installing Brazilian companies in Africa played an important role in bilateral relations, as it was seen as an instrument to strengthen ties with the countries of the continent, being favored by presidential diplomatic policy. In this sense, Brazilian FDI through Africa grew 16,39% (FDC, 2010).

These results are not only fruit of the convergence of favorable moments on both sides of the Atlantic, Brazil has made major diplomatic investments, where, incidentally, lies much of the criticism of skeptics regarding the approach to Africa. There were conducted 28 visits of President Lula throughout his tenure and 67 visits by Foreign Minister Celso Amorim (MFA 2010), and much of the president's visits were accompanied by groups of businessmen, representatives from various ministries and intellectuals. The number of posts opened on the continent has grown and several stations that had been closed were reopened. The Brazilian government canceled the debts of some African countries in meeting the Millennium Development Goals, as in the case of Mozambique, which the pardon reached 95% debt (Vizentini, 2010). Moreover, the very structure of the Foreign Ministry has been changed: the former Department of Africa and the Middle East was divided, giving rise to a department exclusively for the African continent.

On the other hand, there were 48 visits by heads of state and government and 66 visits of African ministers of foreign affairs (MFA, 2010), almost identical to the number of visits of Celso Amorim, which shows great reciprocity of African states. In relation to the open of positions of African countries in Brasilia, only between 2003 and 2006, the number jumped from 16 to 25 (Vizentini, 2010). In the political area, Brazil has the support of the CPLC countries in various Brazilian candidates for positions in international bodies such as the Security Council of the United Nations and the Director-General of FAO (MFA, 2010).

With regard to international cooperation, a diplomatic investment relatively cheap in monetary terms, we should highlight the fact that Brazil has passed from the category of receptor to donor of cooperation. In large part, this change is linked to the initiatives towards Africa. Brazilian institutions like Embrapa, SENAI and Fiocruz are prominent actors in this process. The focus of the cooperation is the Portuguese Speaking African Countries (PALOP, in Portuguese), which receive 74% of Brazilian cooperation destined for Africa (Vizentini, 2010), especially in Mozambique, which is the second recipient of Brazilian cooperation in the world, only behind Haiti.

A prime example of how Brazil projects its global influence through diplomatic investment in Africa is the case of biofuels. In 2008, Brazil argued the importance of biofuels as a development opportunity for African nations and, in fact, Brazil has developed cooperation projects in African countries in this area, particularly through trilateral cooperation with developed countries. This, however, falls within the context of the Brazilian project to turn biofuels into an international commodity, which would be very advantageous for the Brazilian economy.

Despite being motivated by fairly pragmatic interests, that does not invalidate the mutual benefits of the rapprochement between Brazil and Africa, thus recipient countries also benefits from the allocation of infrastructure resulting from cooperation, the formation of national expertise and opening new possibilities for areas where economic development can earn. In the current international environment, it is important for Brazil to have strong partners who collaborate in building a multipolar international order (Vizentini, 2010).

In the security field, Brazil has acted through the CPLC and his work in the UN Commission for the peacebuilding, presiding the configuration for Guinea-Bissau. The revitalization of ZPCSA, in a context of reactivation of the American 4th Fleet in the South Atlantic, with the Luanda Action Plan making efforts to strengthen cooperation in the region, seems of great importance, but has not yet reached its full potential in the view of Vizentini (2010).

South American-Africa Summit is a cooperation mechanism between two priority regions for Lula’s foreign policy, bringing together representatives of the AU and UNASUR, and it finds its origins in the relationship between Nigeria and Brazil. Not coincidentally, these two countries co-chair the executive body of the mechanism, ASACOF. Also in South America, SACU and Mercosur signed preferential trade agreement in 2008. Moreover, Egypt has signed Free Trade Agreement with Mercosur and Morocco signed a framework agreement.

But what's new in this policy? How does it differ from the intense closeness between Brazil and Africa in the 1970s? In fact, the similarities are many. Brazil, as well as in the first decade of this century, was undergoing a period of great economic growth, the approach was driven by pragmatism (Responsible and Ecumenical Pragmatism Officer), and this turned into concrete actions, such as the recognition of Angola and the increased flow of trade.

However, Saraiva (2010) identifies six characteristics to show that this is not a repetition of the past. The first one is the fact that there is a coordinated strategy based on national interest and their protagonists, among them businessmen responsible for the expansion of Brazilian capitalism. The second one involves a conceptual shift, but also a practical one, in which east vicinity of Brazil are reactivated as one of the preferred regions for contact, cooperation and trade. The other feature is the revision of culturalist discourse in favor of a more structural approach and pragmatic. The fourth characteristic concerns the public, so that the current policy has more publicity and it is legitimized by political and social consensus, through institutions such as Parliament, universities, businesses and the general public. The fifth characteristic is the fact that Brazil is working on a South-South setting in order to enable the construction of a common interest between Brazil and Africa. Finally, the sixth feature is the rejection relationships merely instrumental, as occurred before.

This latter feature, together with the first, is perhaps the most relevant one, since in the 1970s relations were strongly motivated by the energy scarcity of Brazil, so that, as the country would adapt its energy to other sources and that oil prices were decreasing, relations with Africa were becoming less strategic and more neglected. With regard to coordination between government and private economic actors, it is the foundation of the Logistical State and it materializes itself in the growth of Brazilian direct investments on the continent.

IV. Conclusion

During the first decade of the twentieth century, Brazil's relations with Africa have intensified and deepened greatly. It was noted, however, that more than a big project, this increase was largely favored by the convergence of global economic growth, internal growth with stability of the Brazilian economy and the Rebirth of Africa, which produced significant growth rates of their GDP.

Despite this convergence of favorable moments, there was significant diplomatic investment of Lula's government, in a way to excel in relation to foreign policy for Africa by other governments. From the side of Africa, receptivity to these investments was also observed, including initiatives under NEPAD to promote such investments and make African countries more attractive from an institutional standpoint.

For both Africa and Brazil, the approach falls in broader international insertion and economic development strategies. NEPAD aims Africa to act more autonomously, reducing dependence on traditional powers, and boosting the economy of the continent, where the presence of Brazil fits the expectations. As an emerging country that seeks to expand its international investments, Brazil is presented as part of a new class of actors interested in investing in Africa, emerging countries, and as the country is interested in direct investments (FDI) and sectors that stand out are those of infrastructure and exploitation of minerals, Brazil also meets the profile of economic development envisaged by NEPAD.

Africa to Brazil is part of the strategy for South-South relations, in which Brazil seeks horizontal relations with developing countries, as opposed to vertical ones with developed countries. This profile of relationship gives more leeway to Brazil to give way to economic growth and the increasing internationalization of the economy. But Brazil has not only economical interests in Africa, it also has political ones, by seeking support and votes needed for reforms of global governance that Lula chose as priority.

Thus, the approach of Brazil and Africa in the first decade of this century is the result of favorable international and bilateral convergence of objectives and strategies on both sides of the Atlantic, which were captained favorably to the growth of bilateral relations. NEPAD and the foreign policy of Lula’s government were to meet one another and reinforced each other in order to refine the relations between Brazil and Africa.

Footnotes