Le RAle Instrumental Et Incitatif Du Reporting Socital Dans La Gestion Des Rsultats

Le RAle Instrumental Et Incitatif Du Reporting Socital Dans La Gestion Des Rsultats

Dr. Toukabri Mohamed

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Pr. JILANI Faouzi

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Tunis El Manar University

Le RAle Instrumental Et Incitatif Du Reporting Socital Dans La Gestion Des Rsultats

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Abstract

This article discusses the impact of the disclosure of social information on the accounting manipulations. We support the idea that earnings management damages the interests of stakeholders, therefore, officers who handle the results can not cope with the vigilance and activism of stakeholders as the use of social responsibility (CSR). In addition, CSR is a powerful tool that can be used to gain the support of stakeholders. Based on a sample of 682 U.S. companies listed , the Fortune 1000 for the period 1997-2008, we were interested to show that disclosure of social information justifying the strategic use of CSR by the officer who handles accounting figures. Our results show that the accounting practices of societal leaders strengthen the management of results and influence its direction and intensity.

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Funding

No external funding was declared for this work.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

No ethics committee approval was required for this article type.

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Not applicable for this article.

How to Cite This Article

Dr. Toukabri Mohamed. 2014. \u201cLe RAle Instrumental Et Incitatif Du Reporting Socital Dans La Gestion Des Rsultats\u201d. Global Journal of Management and Business Research - D: Accounting & Auditing GJMBR-D Volume 13 (GJMBR Volume 13 Issue D5).

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GJMBR Volume 13 Issue D5

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Journal Specifications

Crossref Journal DOI 10.17406/GJMBR

Print ISSN 0975-5853

e-ISSN 2249-4588

Keywords

earnings management Governance social reporting stakeholder theory

Submission ReceivedDecember 15, 2012
Peer Review Double Blind
Handling Editor
Accepted January 2, 2013
Published January 15, 2013

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v1.2

Issue date

February 4, 2014

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Article Matrices

Total Score: 107

Country: Tunisia

Subject: Global Journal of Management and Business Research - D: Accounting & Auditing

Authors: Dr. Toukabri Mohamed, Pr. JILANI Faouzi (PhD/Dr. count: 1)

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