Incentive Pay for Team Selling: A Model with Propositions

Alan J. Dubinsky
Alan J. Dubinsky * §
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Sungwook Min
Sungwook Min
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rene@saturn.yzu.edu.tw
[email protected]
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§ Purdue University

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Incentive Pay for Team Selling: A Model with Propositions

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Abstract

Although teamwork is necessary and often regarded as a crucial determinant in winning sales and building long-term relationships, the issue of how to design incentive pay for team selling has remains mostly because of “moral hazard” in team. We build an analytical model integrating behavioral motivation theory-in particular, expectancy theory-into an economic hazard model framework and proffer propositions pertaining to incentive pay for team selling. The analytical model suggests that a firm can induce the best efforts in a selling team. This potential increases as interaction intensity, peer pressure, membership stability, team size, and team uncertainty rise. The results suggest that the optimal team incentive rate inducing the best efforts increases when interaction intensity, team uncertainty, and team size decrease.

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Funding

No external funding was declared for this work.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

No ethics committee approval was required for this article type.

Data Availability

Not applicable for this article.

How to Cite This Article

Alan Dubinsky, Sungwook Min. 2014. "Incentive Pay for Team Selling: A Model with Propositions". Global Journal of Management and Business Research, Global Journal of Management and Business Research - E: Marketing GJMBR-E Volume 14 (GJMBR Volume 14 Issue E3).

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Journal Specifications

Crossref Journal DOI 10.17406/GJMBR

Print ISSN 0975-5853

e-ISSN 2249-4588

Keywords
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GJMBR-E Classification JEL Code: M31
  • Submission ReceivedDecember 11, 2013
  • Peer Review Double Blind
    Handling Editor
  • Accepted January 1, 2014
  • Published January 15, 2014
Version of record

v1.2

Issue date
June 30, 2014

Language
English
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Incentive Pay for Team Selling: A Model with Propositions

Alan Dubinsky
Alan Dubinsky Purdue University
Sungwook Min
Sungwook Min
  • Submission ReceivedDecember 11, 2013
  • Peer Review Double Blind
    Handling Editor
  • Accepted January 1, 2014
  • Published January 15, 2014