Independent Fiscal Institutions in the Countries of Eastern-Central Europe

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Abstract

Improving the efficiency of budgetary management and preventing overspending that secedes from performance, are fundamental budget stability conditions and issues of strategic importance. “Rulebased” budget means more than merely a stipulation that public finance managements shall observe the rules of budget planning and execution and that the real and budgetary sectors of the economy are characterised by the rule of law. Rule-based budget requires the employment of numerical and procedural regulations by institutionally ensuring their respective observance. Regarding the latter we can declare that in Eastern and Central Europe the interest has grown recently for fiscal councils that have been shooting up like mushrooms and are believed to be almost like “the ultimate weapon” in fighting budgetary overspending. The demands for creating such new institutions at the same time undeniably represent criticism concerning the former processes of the planning mechanisms and their respective institutionalised solutions. This paper aspirations to provide a picture as regards to what extent can fiscal councils be regarded as a new type of organisation within the family of independent fiscal institutions (IFIs), that reflect institutional development and, in the public law of the new democracies having accessed the EU following 2004, mean the best solution to be recommended, i.e. the “best practice”.

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Funding

No external funding was declared for this work.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

No ethics committee approval was required for this article type.

Data Availability

Not applicable for this article.

How to Cite This Article

Prof. Dr. Arpad Kovacs. 2014. "Independent Fiscal Institutions in the Countries of Eastern-Central Europe". Global Journal of Management and Business Research - B: Economic & Commerce GJMBR-B Volume 14 (GJMBR Volume 14 Issue B7).

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Journal Specifications

Crossref Journal DOI 10.17406/GJMBR

Print ISSN 0975-5853

e-ISSN 2249-4588

Keywords
Classification
GJMBR-B Classification JEL Code: B15
E62
H15
H61
H63
L38
Version of record

v1.2

Issue date
November 6, 2014

Language
English
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Independent Fiscal Institutions in the Countries of Eastern-Central Europe

Prof. Kovacs
Prof. Kovacs University of Szeged