Iterative Combinatorial Auction for Two-Sided Grid Markets: Multiple users and Multiple Providers

1
Aminul Haque
Aminul Haque
1 Daffodil International University

Send Message

To: Author

GJCST Volume 18 Issue B1

Article Fingerprint

ReserarchID

CSTBR78FH

Iterative Combinatorial Auction for Two-Sided Grid Markets: Multiple users and Multiple Providers Banner
  • English
  • Afrikaans
  • Albanian
  • Amharic
  • Arabic
  • Armenian
  • Azerbaijani
  • Basque
  • Belarusian
  • Bengali
  • Bosnian
  • Bulgarian
  • Catalan
  • Cebuano
  • Chichewa
  • Chinese (Simplified)
  • Chinese (Traditional)
  • Corsican
  • Croatian
  • Czech
  • Danish
  • Dutch
  • Esperanto
  • Estonian
  • Filipino
  • Finnish
  • French
  • Frisian
  • Galician
  • Georgian
  • German
  • Greek
  • Gujarati
  • Haitian Creole
  • Hausa
  • Hawaiian
  • Hebrew
  • Hindi
  • Hmong
  • Hungarian
  • Icelandic
  • Igbo
  • Indonesian
  • Irish
  • Italian
  • Japanese
  • Javanese
  • Kannada
  • Kazakh
  • Khmer
  • Korean
  • Kurdish (Kurmanji)
  • Kyrgyz
  • Lao
  • Latin
  • Latvian
  • Lithuanian
  • Luxembourgish
  • Macedonian
  • Malagasy
  • Malay
  • Malayalam
  • Maltese
  • Maori
  • Marathi
  • Mongolian
  • Myanmar (Burmese)
  • Nepali
  • Norwegian
  • Pashto
  • Persian
  • Polish
  • Portuguese
  • Punjabi
  • Romanian
  • Russian
  • Samoan
  • Scots Gaelic
  • Serbian
  • Sesotho
  • Shona
  • Sindhi
  • Sinhala
  • Slovak
  • Slovenian
  • Somali
  • Spanish
  • Sundanese
  • Swahili
  • Swedish
  • Tajik
  • Tamil
  • Telugu
  • Thai
  • Turkish
  • Ukrainian
  • Urdu
  • Uzbek
  • Vietnamese
  • Welsh
  • Xhosa
  • Yiddish
  • Yoruba
  • Zulu

Heterogeneity and different ownerships of grid computing resources impose complexity in evaluating the market value of these resources. Auction protocols are proposed to meet this challenge efficiently. Auction models are also suitable for achieving better payoff and resource allocation for grid providers. Grid users and providers are usually geographically distributed. The number of users in grid computing could also be very high. Hence, models provide seamless support to multiple users and providers would be useful to promote grid computing. In this paper, we implement a novel First Price Open Cry auction (ascending-bid auction) that supports for multiple users and providers simultaneously. We explain about (i) bundle generation (resource packages by providers), (ii) creating corresponding agents to bundles, (iii) allowing users to choose their suitable bundles, and (iv) clearing bundles through solving winner determination problem. The simulation results predict when and how to map providers’ private values on resource bundles, such that maximum revenue and better utilization of idle resources.

12 Cites in Articles

References

  1. D Roure,M Baker,N Jennings (2003). The Evolution of the Grid, in Grid computing: making the global infrastructure a reality.
  2. R Buyya (2002). Economic-based distributed resource management and scheduling for Grid computing.
  3. C David,H Lyle (2000). Iterative combinatorial auctions: theory and practice.
  4. X Liu,L Zhao (2009). A Method Based on Iterative Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Resource Allocation in Grid Multi-agent Systems.
  5. S Middleton,M Surridge,S Benkner,G Engelbrecht,A Attanasio,G Ghiani,L Grandinetti,F Guerriero (2006). Auction algorithms for decentralized parallel machine scheduling.
  6. D Anubhav,D Grosu (2005). Combinatorial auction-based protocols for resource allocation in grids.
  7. A Alvin (2004). Resource Allocation in Federated Distributed Computing Infrastructures.
  8. G Peter (2005). Grid Scheduling and Resource Management.
  9. Y Sallez,T Berger,C Tahon (2004). Simulating intelligent routing in flexible manufacturing systems using NetLogo.
  10. R.-C Damaceanu (2008). An agent-based computational study of wealth distribution in function of resource growth interval using NetLogo.
  11. J Michael,T Nicholson,Jerry,R (2006). Experiences creating three implementations of the repast agent modeling toolkit.
  12. F Bellifemine,I Constantinescu,S Willmott (2000). A Uniform Resource Name (URN) Namespace for Foundation for Intelligent Physical Agents (FIPA).

Funding

No external funding was declared for this work.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

No ethics committee approval was required for this article type.

Data Availability

Not applicable for this article.

Aminul Haque. 2018. \u201cIterative Combinatorial Auction for Two-Sided Grid Markets: Multiple users and Multiple Providers\u201d. Global Journal of Computer Science and Technology - B: Cloud & Distributed GJCST-B Volume 18 (GJCST Volume 18 Issue B1): .

Download Citation

Issue Cover
GJCST Volume 18 Issue B1
Pg. 45- 54
Journal Specifications

Crossref Journal DOI 10.17406/gjcst

Print ISSN 0975-4350

e-ISSN 0975-4172

Keywords
Classification
GJCST-B Classification: G.0
Version of record

v1.2

Issue date

June 8, 2018

Language

English

Experiance in AR

The methods for personal identification and authentication are no exception.

Read in 3D

The methods for personal identification and authentication are no exception.

Article Matrices
Total Views: 6085
Total Downloads: 1510
2026 Trends
Research Identity (RIN)
Related Research

Published Article

Heterogeneity and different ownerships of grid computing resources impose complexity in evaluating the market value of these resources. Auction protocols are proposed to meet this challenge efficiently. Auction models are also suitable for achieving better payoff and resource allocation for grid providers. Grid users and providers are usually geographically distributed. The number of users in grid computing could also be very high. Hence, models provide seamless support to multiple users and providers would be useful to promote grid computing. In this paper, we implement a novel First Price Open Cry auction (ascending-bid auction) that supports for multiple users and providers simultaneously. We explain about (i) bundle generation (resource packages by providers), (ii) creating corresponding agents to bundles, (iii) allowing users to choose their suitable bundles, and (iv) clearing bundles through solving winner determination problem. The simulation results predict when and how to map providers’ private values on resource bundles, such that maximum revenue and better utilization of idle resources.

Our website is actively being updated, and changes may occur frequently. Please clear your browser cache if needed. For feedback or error reporting, please email [email protected]
×

This Page is Under Development

We are currently updating this article page for a better experience.

Request Access

Please fill out the form below to request access to this research paper. Your request will be reviewed by the editorial or author team.
X

Quote and Order Details

Contact Person

Invoice Address

Notes or Comments

This is the heading

Lorem ipsum dolor sit amet, consectetur adipiscing elit. Ut elit tellus, luctus nec ullamcorper mattis, pulvinar dapibus leo.

High-quality academic research articles on global topics and journals.

Iterative Combinatorial Auction for Two-Sided Grid Markets: Multiple users and Multiple Providers

Aminul Haque
Aminul Haque Daffodil International University

Research Journals