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Managerial Entrenchment and Stakeholder Satisfaction Tunisian Listed Companies Case

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Managerial Entrenchment and Stakeholder Satisfaction Tunisian Listed Companies Case

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Abstract

The effect of CEO entrenchment has often been attached to the company owners wealth measured by financial performance. CEOs are more concerned about coalition members, and recognized the importance of integrating stakeholders into the evaluation system of managerial performance. In this paper, we focus on the evolution of governance systems by integrating stakeholders’ perspective. We illustrate the crossing from the “shareholder” approach to “partnership” approach as part of the activism of managers. Based on some managerial performance ratios as input, our approach is to use a combination of rough set theory, the genetic algorithm and support vector machines to predict whether satisfaction can be a factor that promotes CEO entrenchment. From a sample of 45 Tunisian companies listed during the year period 2008, we evaluate the stakeholders’ influence on the CEO entrenchment strategy. The proposed approach shows that a CEO who cares about his entrenchment, can provide very favorable conditions to em-ployees and customers who contribute to reduce his risk of being dismissed, to overlap his term of office and even exceed his retirement age.

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Funding

No external funding was declared for this work.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

No ethics committee approval was required for this article type.

Data Availability

Not applicable for this article.

How to Cite This Article

Dorsaf Ben Taleb, Mohamed El Ghourabi. 2013. "Managerial Entrenchment and Stakeholder Satisfaction Tunisian Listed Companies Case". Global Journal of Management and Business Research - A: Administration & Management GJMBR-A Volume 13 (GJMBR Volume 13 Issue 16 (A7)).

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Journal Specifications

Crossref Journal DOI 10.17406/GJMBR

Print ISSN 0975-5853

e-ISSN 2249-4588

Keywords
Classification
GJMBR-A Classification JEL Code: M00
M19
Version of record
v1.2

Issue date
May 14, 2013

Language
English
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Managerial Entrenchment and Stakeholder Satisfaction Tunisian Listed Companies Case

Dorsaf Taleb
Dorsaf Taleb
Mohamed Ghourabi
Mohamed Ghourabi