Pareto-improving Risk selection in Social Health Insurance

Peter Zweifel
Peter Zweifel
Michael Breuer
Michael Breuer
University of Zurich

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Pareto-improving Risk selection in Social Health Insurance

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Abstract

Social health insurance traditionally imposes mandatory membership in a single pool in the aim of improving the welfare of high risks. However, this creates two problems, inefficiency of a monopolistic scheme and insufficient adaptation to individual preferences. Competition combined with a risk adjustment scheme can be used to improve efficiency. In the presence of preference heterogeneity, risk selection may improve adaptation to individual preferences, resulting in Pareto improvement over the pooling contract. This is shown to be possible both under perfect and imperfect risk adjustment.

References

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Funding

No external funding was declared for this work.

Conflict of Interest

The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Ethical Approval

No ethics committee approval was required for this article type.

Data Availability

Not applicable for this article.

How to Cite This Article

Peter Zweifel. 2015. \u201cPareto-improving Risk selection in Social Health Insurance\u201d. Global Journal of Management and Business Research - B: Economic & Commerce GJMBR-B Volume 15 (GJMBR Volume 15 Issue B6).

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Journal Specifications

Crossref Journal DOI 10.17406/GJMBR

Print ISSN 0975-5853

e-ISSN 2249-4588

Keywords
Classification
GJMBR-B Classification D 82
I 38
L51
Version of record

v1.2

Issue date
September 4, 2015

Language
en
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Pareto-improving Risk selection in Social Health Insurance

Peter Zweifel
Peter Zweifel <p>University of Zurich</p>
Michael Breuer
Michael Breuer

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