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Social health insurance traditionally imposes mandatory membership in a single pool in the aim of improving the welfare of high risks. However, this creates two problems, inefficiency of a monopolistic scheme and insufficient adaptation to individual preferences. Competition combined with a risk adjustment scheme can be used to improve efficiency. In the presence of preference heterogeneity, risk selection may improve adaptation to individual preferences, resulting in Pareto improvement over the pooling contract. This is shown to be possible both under perfect and imperfect risk adjustment.
Peter Zweifel. 2015. \u201cPareto-improving Risk selection in Social Health Insurance\u201d. Global Journal of Management and Business Research - B: Economic & Commerce GJMBR-B Volume 15 (GJMBR Volume 15 Issue B6).
Crossref Journal DOI 10.17406/GJMBR
Print ISSN 0975-5853
e-ISSN 2249-4588
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Total Score: 102
Country: Austria
Subject: Global Journal of Management and Business Research - B: Economic & Commerce
Authors: Peter Zweifel, Michael Breuer (PhD/Dr. count: 0)
View Count (all-time): 139
Total Views (Real + Logic): 4277
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Publish Date: 2015 09, Fri
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This study aims to comprehensively analyse the complex interplay between
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