Quine-Kripke-Plantinga on Essence
Propositional attitudes are of two distinct kinds, de re and de dicto. As our given sensedata do not have any meaning of their own and dependent on some suitable description itself, so for Quine, neither de dicto nor de re essence is possible. Objects do not possess property necessarily, these features are not the intrinsic feature of the object itself, for them necessity was specific to a particular conceptual scheme, it is ultimately determined by the particular scheme of beliefs imposed on a barrage of sensory stimulations. Necessity resides in the way we talk about the thing not in the thing itself. In Kripke’s theory de re essential properties are not required to be analytic, i.e., they do not require to be conceptually connected with each other. They are meaningful, not by virtue of their conceptual content; they are meaningful in so far as they underlie the varying properties of an object in different conceivable universes. The natural extension of the possible worlds interpretation to de re is known as ‘identity across possible world’ or ‘trans-world identity’.
