## I. INTRODUCTION epistemological background, which is characterized by the dichotomy between theory and practice, as well as the appropriation of modern philosophical discourse and its subsequent implications for contemporary pedagogical thinking. Many ways of thinking about education were based on scientific methods, which meant that educational practice had to follow the rules of knowledge that were made outside of education. The idea of educational practice that I want to use as a guide for our research is very different from this modern and Western way of thinking. It is not merely a matter of incorporating the arguments of the authors; it is also a matter of engaging with the theoretical universe in which they are situated within the educational field. Firstly, Flávio Brayner's text introduces us to his research on popular education, which is informed by Hannah Arendt's perspective. Secondly, it introduces us to the contributions of Michel Foucault's thinking to Alfredo Veiga-Neto's consideration of the educational field's unique challenges. F. Brayner (Brayner 2010) has posited that it would be prudent to revert to the fundamental principles, and draw inspiration from Hannah Arendt, he says that education and politics only matter when they are used to changing people's ways of entering the world. The Arendt's concept of plurality as a human condition, particularly in terms of assimilating into the "plural human world", says that our shared experiences and links with each other are significant parts of what it means to be human. In other words, it means understanding both how unique each person is and how much we all share, as well as how important it is to work and interact with others. The same thing happens to A. Veiga-Neto (Veiga-Neto 2015) under Michel Foucault's influence, regarding practice as having intrinsic values and seeing it as a realm of human actions governed by regularities and rationalities that organize them differently. Structuralism's primary emphasis is on the concept of stable structures and fixed meanings in language, culture, and society. Structuralism argues that the relationships between elements within a system are the source of meaning, and that these systems have underlying, fixed structures that influence our comprehension and reality. Nevertheless, post-structuralist authors challenge this notion by asserting that meaning is never irrevocable and is always subject to a process of deferral and difference. Hence, it assumes there are points of convergence between Hannah Arendt's and poststructuralism's conceptions, paying particular attention on the theme about education and humanization. Consequently, it intends to outline the theoretical aspects involving the relationship between the concepts of thinking and educational practice, putting in debate the following three postulates: a) to assert that education possesses inherent immanence where particular regularities and rationalizations occur; b) consider language as a tool that allows us to imagine other ways of saying and doing education; c) educational practice is a place for learning human values of difference or plurality, highlighting the humanization position of G. Biesta (Biesta 2013) who moves away from the question of what the human subject is? Toward the question of how the human subject becomes present. ## II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: ### THEORY/PRACTICE IN BRAZILIAN EDUCATION Education, as a domain of study and challenge that arises from the human sciences, such as psychology, sociology, politics and philosophy, among others; is the most prevalent and widespread research logic among educational researchers. For this reason, many educational researchers have a restriction in accepting that there is a specific domain called education, identifying themselves as sociologists, psychologists, politics or philosophers of education. There are many examples of it in Brazilian education. One of the cases widely published in educational literature concerns education as a political act, and, in general, this is mediated by a specific political discourse. During the 1980s and 1990s, many educational proposals attempted to support the understanding that teachers could be an organic intellectual in the classroom. This statement indicated a conception of teaching that stems from a different domain, such as politics, and that the teacher's role in school would be comparable to that of other actors in the political realm. Paolo Nosela was the first to encourage this statement throughout Brazilian education. His publications[^1] reinforced the intention of appropriating Gramsci's concepts in Brazilian human sciences since the late 1960s, incorporating in the educational discourse the political proposal to prepare actors for the rise of the proletariat. He then criticized the different and distinct ways in which education has historically been carried out in Brazil, reproducing the interests of certain social groups, such as rapid and trivial training for the working class and preserving the elite privileges and power functions. The idea was so popular that Nosela (Nosela 2005) called it Gramsci's fashion style (gramsciamania) more than twenty years after his first publication in 1983. He said that over $40\%$ of postgraduate dissertations published in education in the 1980s were based on Gramsci's theory. The indicates that the objective of this undertaking was primarily focused on Gramscian elaborations and appropriations among intellectuals rather than in teachers' educational practices. Therefore, I believe that these modes of thinking serve as injunctions from political practice regarding what educational practice must be, thereby inferring that their significance is influenced by values (meanings) constructed outside of educational practice. It leads us to inquire about the conception of practice and its polarized association with theory as one of the influences of Plato's Western philosophical culture. Two contemporary educational theorists argue for this statement. Brayner (Brayner 2010) will discuss the influence of Plato's conceptions of theory and practice when examining the relationship between common sense and philosophical consciousness in Brazilian popular educational studies, pointing out theoretical elaborations that renew Plato's idea of a world divided into two parts: appearance and essence. He explains: "[...] to reach the truth, we would have to move from the first to the second through important work on our cognition and consciousness" (Brayner, 2010, p. 161). Brayner maintains that this matter played a significant role in the emergence of popular education in Brazil during the first half of the 20th century, primarily through the work of Paulo Freire, who remained his most influential theorist. He argued that the duality between theory and practice is central to pedagogy. As an example, P. Freire arguments, the dialogue in educational practice must lead subjects to more advanced stages of consciousness that can remove them from naive consciousness to critical consciousness. The duality, for Brayner, is not only found in that but also the diverse elaborations in Western thinking with an emphasis on modern philosophical discourse in its critical perspectives, as he said: The problem is that this idea will take on different forms, but they all refer to the original Platonic idea. In Marx, we find the concept of alienation and class consciousness; in Lukács, class itself and class for yourself; in Sartre, being-in-itself and being-for yourself; in Smyders, culture first and elaborate culture; in Gramsci, philosophical consciousness and common sense; and Paulo Freire, in the form of naive consciousness and critical consciousness (Brayner, 2010, p. 161, own translation).[^3] This critique, which I now endorse, refers to Foucault's conception of discourse, wherein specific authors are granted the privilege of defining that a consciousness is naive. In general, they see themselves as possessors of knowledge powers that enable them to determine what can be said or silenced and under what circumstances, thereby exercising a subtle dominance and regulating what would be possible in terms of discourse. In this sense, they must have access to a perfect representation of the world (essence), which will enable them to get out of their naive consciousness and convert their gaze towards the direction of light (theory), which should qualify them to see differently in the world in which they live. So, the educator must give a new meaning to his practice. In a distinct manner, Brayner (Brayner 2010) advocates for resuming common sense and reevaluating the correlation between education and politics. He opposes understanding education as an instrument whose objective is outside of it, and, simultaneously, granting a particular subject the exclusive right to access the truth. According to Hannah Arendt, he argues that education and politics have only meaning as action, paying attention to the fact that Arendt's concept of action is a proper and exclusive relationship that characterizes us as humans. As the author says: Education and politics only make sense as action! That is to say, one domain or the other are only realized in the encounter among men, so as to either "present the world" to those who come to it (the type of responsibility that Arendt called "authority"), or so that each one point of view would confront in the common space with other points of view with the different and plural meanings of the world, and with a view to building a sensus communis[^4]. (Brayner, 2010, p. 165, own translation). The second contribution stems from Veiga-Neto's (Veiga-Neto 2015) discussion regarding the correlation between theory and practice. He considers duality a false issue and alerts us to its falsity, not only due to its absence but also due to its significance in the realm of education. Instead of trying to figure out what the practice means outside of it, he thinks of it as having its own regularities and rationalities. This word describes a domain of human actions according to a regularity and rationality that organizes them in different ways. In terms of regularity and rationality, it has already become apparent that in any practice, or in more technical terms, inherent to any practice, there is always a theorization, even if it is obscure and indefinite for those who are not so familiar with these epistemic issues.\[^5\](Veiga-Neto, 2015, p. 118) Veiga-Neto (Veiga-Neto 2015) will initially deconstruct the theory-practice relationship, providing accurate notes on the etymology of words and showing that they have their origins in Western culture. He says the Greeks' dual understanding of reality was not new, as shown by the mythological idea of entrusting the gods with the responsibility of representing nature or human emotions. This led the men to invent a sacred space and time, later rationalized in the Platonic dialogues, which divided reality into two distinct dimensions, namely the epistemic (intelligible world) and the doxological (sensible world). From the things he says: It's possible to say that a part of ancient Greek thought, in its commitment to the construction of a rationality whose goal was to secure knowledge (epistemic) about nature and the human being, established philosophically the notion that reality is dual. On this means, there are two ways to know something: either having an opinion (doxa) which is just a belief or illusion, or having solid knowledge (epistemic), which is based on reason and true. (Veiga-Neto, 2015, p. 122, own translation) Brayner and Veiga-Neto critics believe that modernity incorporated this doctrine of the two worlds within the framework of the logical-philosophical and anthropological formulations of modern science. Consequently, the philosophical discourse of modernity will consider the rational subject to be the most appropriate representation. Their interest will be directed towards the construction of a truth based on the organization of a scientific method, which has the function of validating statements because they are subject to its procedure. This context provided the foundation for the modern human and social sciences. It is not surprising that contemporary educational theorists encounter difficulties in departing from the alternative of reproducing this duality in its various forms. This is because ideas in education tend to favor the scientist (researcher), who holds the dominant position through the method translating theory into practice. After reading Veiga-Neto (Veiga-Neto 2015), I believe that the best way to criticize modernity is to navigate through different waters. He proposes that authors should cease their search for a more effective approach to translating theory into practice, and instead concentrate on the practice itself and the potential avenues for discussing it. ## III. IN SEARCH OF A CONTEMPORARY CONVERGENCE The critique pertaining to the duality between theory and practice expressed by Brayner and Veiga-Neto stems from the conviction that there are points of convergence between two philosophical traditions, specifically Hannah Arendt's thinking and poststructuralism writers such as M. Foucault, G. Deleuze, and J. Derrida. Ortega (Ortega 2000) argues that convergence exists due to criteria. He advocates for a distinct form of politics that does not depend on partisan affiliation and strives to comprehend the significance of public space. He contends that public space is a location where individuals engage in a productive clash of ideas and perspectives, creating a space of difference and confrontation. Therefore, public space is a zone of political resistance that encourages the development of novel approaches to community construction and imagination. For instance, in numerous social theories on education, schools are perceived as either a location for the perpetuation of dominant ideologies (Louis Althusser) or as a space for resistance and transformation to address the hegemonic ideology of the capitalist bourgeoisie (Antonio Gramsci). According to Ortega, subjects give in to social influences while also having the chance to develop and try out new forms of subjectivation in the face of what is perceived as diverse and plural. This is primarily because Ortega's perspective is one that is open to learning and, by extension, to its differentiation as a human activity. The issue of otherness is fundamental to the pedagogical relationship, as we are unable to foresee the identity of the other "student" we encounter. Politics, therefore, is an activity that enables us to invent and experiment, considering the fact that genealogical reconstruction is founded on an ontology that regards the present as an event. The objective is to resist the depoliticization of totalitarian systems and mass society (Arendt) or against contemporary subjectivizing practices, disciplines, and biopowers (Foucault). The concept of the present as an event emerged from Giorgio Agamben's 2006 conference titled What is Contemporary? (Agamben 2009) which was successfully executed during a seminar at the University of Venice in 2006. He uses a note from a course taught by Roland Barthes at the College de France to say that the present is not current. Barthes read Friedrich Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy and used his Uncurrent Considerations [Unzeitgemäßte Betrachtungen] to explain current events. Nietzsche's thinking was not limited to accepting the limitations of his era, but instead to critically examining the factors that exert an impact on the way in which his culture, society, and history shape the present. Agamben begins by saying, Those who are truly contemporary, who truly belong to their time, are those who neither perfectly coincide with it nor adjust themselves to its demands. They are thus in this sense irrelevant [inactuale]. But precisely because of this condition, precisely through this disconnection and this anachronism, they are more capable than others of perceiving and grasping their own time. (Agamben, 2009, p. 40). Consequently, contemporaneity is a singular association with its time in two distinct senses. Firstly, it gives us the conditions required for its imposition. Agamben uses a poem by Osip Madelstam called The Century to illustrate it. He says, "My century, my beast, who will manage to look inside your eyes and weld together with his own blood the vertebrae of two centuries?" (AGAMBEN, 2009, p. 43). Secondly, it means to maintain a distance as a precaution against the threatening gaze of this untamed beast, which intrigues us with a degree of discrepancy and anachronism, that is, because whoever is completely reconciled with his time, adhering to it perfectly, cannot see it and cannot keep his eyes fixed on it. The temporal connection enabled me to gaze into the eyes of the beast with my observations about modernity and comprehend how narratives of Western discourse about awareness have been appropriated in modern conceptions. Furthermore, I propose to confront this same beast located at the convergence of Hannah Arendt and post-structuralism and draw the lines of thinking established through practical educational experience, which I will be doing in the following section. Then, I consider educational practice to be an event; this implies that it is dynamic and contingent, meaning that learning never occurs in a predetermined or structured manner, but is always susceptible to modifications, adaptations, and unforeseen circumstances. ## IV. EDUCATION, LANGUAGE, AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE: OUTLINE OF A PROPOSAL This part should begin with an explanation of what I consider to be propositional. The notion of should be means that it will always be absent from affirmative human experiences because it leads us to affirm it according to the nature of what it is not yet. Nonetheless, it must be viewed from the perspective that the established order was established at a specific time and that, despite being predominant, it is not definitive. If I were to accept the contrary, I would be oblivious to the fact that the being is open, which would ultimately grant this order the right to inhabit a dimension that does not belong to it, that of the should be. Considering all that has been said thus far, it is important to note that to comprehend education beyond its adaptive role, we also need to comprehend it in its normative dimension. In other words, education also suggests a relationship with what ought to be, with formative intentionality that extends beyond following the status quo. Consequently, it is crucial to acknowledge that the declaration of a perspective is subject to constraints. First and foremost, the realm of possibilities contains a significantly smaller number of justifications for statements than the realm of reality. This is because certain perspectives that are formulated as chances are presented as what the subject should be, and it is only possible to speak through that which has not yet been perceived as real for the subject, except for limited experiences. Subsequently, the established order's dominance in the lives of subjects is so profound that negative criticism is even more apparent and expressive than propositional criticism. After carefully considering this view, outlining the relationship between thinking and educational practice is assuming as evidence — an indication of the path to be followed in research — that I have found in the two philosophical traditions mentioned above, accepting the thesis that there are convergences between them. To achieve this objective, I shall specifically focus my attention on the literary works pertaining to the theories of Hannah Arendt and poststructuralism writers like Michel Foucault, Gille Deleuze and Jacques Derrida, specifically on the interplay between humanization and education, examining how these traditions confront the subsequent propositions: Education has its own immanence; the function of language is to express the voices of education that allows us to conceive of other ways of saying and doing education; and educational practice is a place for learning the values of plurality or difference. ### a) Education has its own Immanence The first premise, that education has its own immanence, refers to the defense of education's discursive autonomy in attempts to confront education and pedagogy as scholarly endeavors of referencing representational philosophy throughout modernity. As an illustration, domains such as psychological and sociological knowledge were not only, but primarily, responsible for numerous elaborations regarding what constitutes education or pedagogy, as their theorists attempted to uncover the foundation for consolidation of these sciences throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. This way of thinking is problematic because they use rules from other domains to define terms like education, educational practice, educational subjects, teaching, learning and others. And, if I consider the influence of A. Gramsci's philosophy on Brazilian educational theorists following the same example debated before, I realize that education becomes an injunction of values whose purpose is to serve the political agenda. Education, therefore, is a means or instrument for a purpose that occurs before and beyond the educational act. I could explore this type of logic by selecting a novel objective and deduce numerous alternative methods of delineating it. Nevertheless, it is imperative that I accomplish two tasks: instead of seeking a narrative to portray these notions, I must comprehend the subject as an individual, resulting from its multiple dimensions. Regarding education, it is imperative that I comprehend it as an integral component of human development, a process through which individuals are molded according to their potential and nurtured during the educational process. In this regard, I propose that education is a domain that possesses its own immanence as a venue for engaging and contemplating on the subject (individuality) and education (human formation), emphasizing their significance in relation to other concepts and domains. One of the conditions that marks the specificity of education is exemplified by Gallo (Gallo 2008a) when he states that education is a meeting place for those who can or cannot enhance us. He asserts that certain encounters can bring us joy or sorrow, however, it is imperative to acknowledge that the encounter between two distinct individuals is an essential prerequisite for a successful educational endeavor. The author suggests that the human condition of the presence of others or the problem of otherness should be the starting point for our approach to education. This aspect of Arendt's work (Arendt 2005) received particular attention, since she defined the human condition by the specific circumstance of being surrounded by others. The term active life means three basic human activities: labor, work, and action. Initially, labor refers to the activity that corresponds to the biological processes of the human body, and its human condition is its own existence. Secondly, work refers to the artificial nature of human existence and produces an artificial group of things that are significantly distinct from the natural environment that inhabits and transcends every individual's existence. The human condition of work requires transformation. In essence, action is regarded as the sole activity that is conducted directly between men, without the involvement of objects or matter, and that corresponds to the human condition of the plurality. Hence, considering plurality as a human condition implies that everyone can approach it despite being subjected to the socialization of the dominant order. In other words, it can all open itself to a purpose that projects its beyond what is established, and this implies perceiving oneself as belonging to the conditions imposed by human existence. This equality pointed out by Arendt must be linked to the reflection that the subject makes of his task during his life. For example, although the subject is in a condition of non-freedom, he must aim to be free. To accomplish this, he must get closer to what is foreign to him, which can turn him towards the task of seeking his humanization. Ultimately, it is understood that Hannah Arendt's understanding of plurality (Arendt 2005) stems from the ontology of the human condition, describing it as natality. This refers to the fact that human beings are born into the world and that being born signifies a new possibility of action, thereby initiating possibilities that were not previously anticipated. Thus, plurality is a starting point, that is, a condition of entry into this world. In a convergent manner, Jacques Derrida's notion of difference enables us to contemplate the relationships we establish with objects of the world and with others that transcend the mundane, fostering creativity and recognizing the affirmation of difference as an ontological condition of our relationship with the world and with others. Peters and Biesta (Peters and Biesta 2009) collected notes on the interconnection between education and politics in the thinking of Jacques Derrida. They say that Derrida's works are a way to teach differences. One of the implications presented is the significant impact that this method of philosophizing had on a group of educators who were aligned with radical pedagogy. They include beside them (Peter and Biesta), Henry Giroux, Peter Trifonas, Denise Egéa-Kuehne, among others. Additionally, Skliar (Skliar 2006) shows it a path to explore that involves its perception of what education means, understanding it not only as a domain in which Derrida's ideas could be applied, but also by considering that education is the center of what it can understand as political humanism. This inquiry demonstrates Derrida's perspective on education and ethics. He is concerned about the unpredictable arrival of others, actively pursues humanism, and identifies himself with the legacy of enlightened humanism. He doesn't think about things in a metaphysical way that tells it's what to expect from others. Similarly, he believes that it is more political due to his willingness to inquire about others. I agree with Biesta's (Biesta 2012, 2013) suggestion that education is the place where people form themselves, treating the meaning of the human being as a question that is open to the presence of others. I can only get an answer when I'm involved and a part of this knowledge. Contrary to most knowledge, which is rooted in education and defines a goal whose meanings and issues are elaborated before and outside of one. The second postulate that I must confront pertains to the position that language occupies in our elaborations, as mediated by the philosophical traditions in question. I cannot approach this topic involving these two authors without referring to a debate that brought them together a long time ago. This is the assessment made by Derrida (Derrida 1996) in the text *Le monolinguisme de l'autre* of the interview given by H. Arendt to Günter Gaus in $1964^6$, wherein she asserts that 'the mother tongue cannot go crazy'. I would prefer not to debate all the specific questions raised by J. Derrida in relation to this statement because readers can access Gaffney's text (Gaffney 2015), which contains precisely the aspects involved. In my case, only one of these is of interest, and that is about the political meaning of our relationship with language. Gaffney (Gaffney 2015) says that Arendt's mother tongue plays a role in political life by saying that our first language refers to a radical singularity and, therefore, calls us to take responsibility for the world we live in. I recollect that in the fifth chapter of The Human Condition, H. Arendt devotes herself to the concept of action, emphasizing its symbolic nature, and asserting that the foundation of human relations is based on communicative interaction. In this sense, action encompasses speech as well, as it is through language that individuals articulate and coordinate their multifaceted relationship with objects and individuals. This enables them to assess the sincerity of the speaker and coordinate the actions of a multitude of agents. However, Gaffney (Gaffney 2015) also emphasizes that J. Derrida attempts to undermine the foundation of meaning that H. Arendt attributes to her mother tongue. J. Derrida argues that the attempt to claim a mother tongue is not only a maddening effort, but also an inherently violent effort that brings with it the colonial impulse to level differences. In Le monolinguisme de l'autre, one of his autobiographical works, Derrida (Derrida 1996) examines his personal experience with language as a French-speaking Algerian Jew. The leads him to conclude that we possess a singular language, but it is not ours. Furthermore, this love also possesses a violent colonial impulse. Even though I had to demonstrate a disagreement that influenced the thinking of these authors, this work serves the purpose of highlighting clues of the notion of language present in them, which aid us in charting a course towards a comprehension of education and educational practice. In this regard, it is noteworthy to mention that J. Derrida analyzed the significance of language with greater precision when he dealt with written texts and, in my opinion, far more than with spoken language. He asserted that there is no such thing as outside the text, assuming that language is the natural habitat of all his philosophical and literary research. According to Skliar (Skliar 2008), the philosophical inquiry of language was formulated by Derrida in his work Des tours de Babel (1987), emphasizing the notion of translation as a debt that cannot be repaid (Skliar, 2008, p. 23). According to him, referring to the narrative recounted in the Book of Genesis regarding the myth of Babel, J. Derrida will utilize this narrative as a metaphor to convey that the Hebrew attempt to impose its language on other individuals would result in divine punishment, the dispersal of the tribes, and the condemnation of mankind to confusion, i.e., to the multiplicity of languages, while simultaneously acknowledging the insoluble and impracticable obligation of flawless translation. According to Skliar (Skliar 2008), the origin of this paradox can be traced back to Derrida's interpretations of the concepts presented in the Die Aufgabe des Übersetzers (the translator's work) by Walter Benjamin. According to Benjamin (Benjamin, 1992), the translator's responsibility is to ensure that the original text survives or even thrives in the survival that the translation gives it or intends to give it. I believe that each author's construction of language is achieved by considering what I consider to be the political function of language for education and educational practice. In Western culture, language has been approached as if it were something I could name, emphasizing one of its functions, which is to describe things, a kind of mirror of reality. From the perspective I point out in my reading of these authors, speaking of languages refers to something constitutive of our intervention in the world, and it is made up of the different ways in which each one places themselves in this world. Hannah Arendt describes it as how individuals articulate and coordinate their plural relationship with the things of the world, admitting in this the capacity to evaluate the sincerity of the person who speaks. J. Derrida's idea of a habitat (Skliar 2008), as an opening to multiple possibilities for understanding the other has allowed us to connect the issue of language with the issue of otherness in our way of speaking, intervening, and expressing the voices of education. ### c) Educational Practice is a Place for Learning Human Values of Plurality or Difference So, let's share the third idea: practice is a way to learn about different ways of being human. It's worth saying that learning here is thoroughly different from the most common meaning of this term in educational and pedagogical discourses in recent times. For example, Gert Biesta (2013) said that the discourse of learning abandoned a language of education and adopted a language of learning. According to the author, this resource was an attempt to adapt education to the demands of the information age. The intended meaning of the term learning differs significantly when referring to a place for learning human values of plurality or difference. Learning is a concept that G. Deleuze used to deal with the issue of signs in Marcel Proust's The Search for Lost Time. At the beginning of chapter three, entitled apprenticeship he states: "Proust's work is not oriented to the past and discoveries, but to the future and the progress of apprenticeship. What is important is that the hero does not know certain things at the start, gradually learns them, and finally an ultimate revelation" (Gilles Deleuze, 1972, p. 26). In this text, the word learning-apprenticeship in G. Deleuze's writings - means moving through different ideas and perspectives. It's not about remembering things from the past, but about learning in the future. The first step is to learn to philosophize in education, showing us how philosophy has played a role in education throughout modernity and how I can talk differently about the relationship between theory and practice. Gallo (Gallo 2008b) makes an accurate critique of how philosophy has been historically established in Brazilian teacher education, finding critical arguments in G. Deleuze about the task of philosophy when these are reduced to images of reflection or foundation. In the initial scenario, the act of reflecting on deprives philosophy of all the creative potential to establish alternative methods of doing education. Second, its criticism is aimed at two specific ways of doing philosophy: either by rescuing a certain conceptual elaboration from the history of philosophy and applying it to the educational phenomenon, thus as an application to the field of education; or by recapitulating what different thinkers have argued about education in their philosophies to provide a foundation for thinking about education today. There is no negative reaction on our part towards contributions regarding the optimal methods of comprehending and doing education. What I question is the role that reflection and foundation play in education because they extend to education and pedagogy the role that philosophy predominantly assumed in modernity as philosophies of the subject and representation. Following post-structuralism, I've seen a lot of skepticism towards this idea. For instance, in the text titled "Intellectuals and Power" (Foucault and Deleuze, 1979) G. Deleuze responds to a query posed by M. Foucault regarding a statement made by a Maoist militant regarding the extent to which Deleuze engages in politics. The Maoist militant asserts that Deleuze's work lacks any indication of this, in contrast to Foucault, who, according to the Maoist, had previously addressed the issue of reclusion in his previous works. Deleuze's response is noteworthy to us as it raises a question that has already been addressed in our works regarding the significance of theorizing in research and practice. This conversation reveals a lack of understanding, according to Deleuze: "Possibly we're in the process of experiencing a new relationship between theory and practice" (Foucault and Deleuze, 1979, p. 205). Therefore, Deleuze will demonstrate that the Maoists' mistake was to believe that an author like Foucault would have moved from the application of theory to practice. However, in the process of analyzing imprisonment and then experiencing it (he refers to the G.I.P. Project Prison Information Group), it was less a process of applying theory to practice, and, beyond that, it was structured in an extremely diverse way of conducting research, dealing with: "...a system of relays within a larger sphere, within a multiplicity of parts that are both theoretical and practical. A theorising intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness" (Foucault and Deleuze, 1979, p. 206). Following another conversation with Foucault, Deleuze subsequently confirms: "Precisely. A theory is exactly like a box of tools. (Foucault and Deleuze, 1979, p. 208). According to the author, it is imperative that this provides functionality beyond its own. He argues that the theory itself must cease being a theory. If the tool is not being utilized, it may be due to at least two reasons: either the tool is not serving us, or its function is not yet useful at this time. He says, echoing Proust: "...treat my book as a pair of glasses directed to the outside they don't suit you, find another pair; I leave it to you to find your own instrument, which is necessarily an instrument for combat. A theory does not totalize; it is an instrument for multiplication, and it also multiplies itself." (Foucault and Deleuze, 1979, p. 206). This position, which challenges the theory-practice relationship, leads us to the second movement of learning human values of plurality or difference, which finds echoes in Jacques Derrida's writing. Biesta and Kuehne (2001), emphasizing the notion of critical practice, assert that Derrida initially established a closed connection between deconstruction and responsibility, which was further developed and consolidated throughout his work. So, they say that: "This pedagogy, then, is a process that allows us to interrogate the institution of literature, of publishing and texting in relation to the subject and the citizen, and beyond that, to new forms of communication and media, and the concept of democracy itself." (Peters and Biesta, 2009, p. 09). Ultimately, it is worth noting that this statement does not serve to ensure us; rather, it opens us up to multiple avenues of comprehension, illustrating that a text cannot be closed and that the completeness of its comprehension is achieved by exposing it to the reading of others. A third movement is initiated when I discover evidence of a convergence between theory and practice with H. Arendt's writings and acknowledge that the processes of humanization are inherent to the action itself, namely, relationships with others are what make me human. Ortega (Ortega 2001, p. 230-231) states: "[...] the performative model (offered by Arendt) conceives the constitution of personal identity as a process coextensive with the action and not before it." (Ortega 2001, p. 230-231, own translate). According to Arendt, individuals reveal their individual identities and distinct personalities to the world through their actions. She illustrates this concept by distinguishing between work and action. In work, each person's individuality is restricted to a chain of natural needs imposed by biological survival, which is why we have roles to play, behaviors to follow, and functions to fulfill under the imperative of the finished product that erases the figure of the creator, leaving only evidence that he or she had certain skills and talents. Rather, individuals reveal their identities through words and actions, allowing each newcomer to the world to ask, who am I? Although action and discourse are closely linked, H. Arendt believes that discourse has the closest purpose to revelation because, without the ability to say, who am I? The action itself would lose its revealing quality because it lacks the conditions for attributing to the agent. Hence, it is imperative that I focus on two characteristics of action that Arendt (2005) discusses, namely, unpredictability and irreversibility. Action is open and unpredictable because it comes from the freedom and plurality of human beings. The act makes people start new things, but they can't control what happens because of their actions. It's like a chain reaction, where each action starts something new. The second characteristic pertains to its irreversibility. When I embark on a project, I can dedicate my efforts towards the creation of an artifact, and if we are not content, it can be destroyed or even recreated. In action, proceeding in the same way is impossible, since this has implications for a set of human relations with reactions and new actions that cannot be controlled, undone, or even interrupted. Hannah Arendt (Arendt 2005) shows us that one of the best-known responses of our philosophical tradition, Platonism, suggested elevating contemplation above the sphere of action by constructing a republic of philosophers. Plato recommended removing it from the realm of interpersonal interaction with the objective of releasing it from the entanglements and frustrations that arise from action, positing that freedom and integrity could be preserved. The fourth movement is contrary to what Plato suggests. Hannah Arendt (Arendt 2005) remains in favor of the mastery of human affairs and proposes relying on two faculties that are inherent to the action: forgiveness and promise. Considering the intrinsic relationship between these faculties, Hannah Arendt believes that irreversibility can be mitigated by assimilating the unintended consequences of the actor's actions and moderating the uncertainty of their results. To limit the unpredictability of both faculties, forgiveness and looking back at what happened absorbs the actor of what was done unintentionally while promising to look forward, trying to build islands of safety in a situation of uncertainty and an unpredictable future. ## V. CONCLUSIONS I now have sufficient arguments to present conclusively the aspects inherent in the concepts of thinking and educational practice that I have outlined throughout the text and that are an expression of our learning movements. I began by showing that both Hannah Arendt and the authors of post-structuralism operationalize in their arguments a critique of the Western metaphysical tradition. As previously discussed in the second section of the text, this aligns with the coherence of our critique of the polarization of the theory-practice relationship prevalent in Brazilian educational thinking. The image I envision is that I do not need angels in heaven to illuminate the obscurity of human affairs. Indeed, I have discovered sufficient arguments within these two philosophical traditions to liberate the theory-practice relationship from the philosophies of the subject and representation that have shaped a significant portion of contemporary educational thinking. In contrast to Baron Münchhausen[^8], who got up from the mud with his hair, I intend to abandon this Western and modern endeavor that aims to establish a hook in the sky. I do not view the educational practice that is conducted in this place as merely a means or instrument to attain one goal constructed outside it, allowing one to discover the practice that is appropriate to the light cast on its territory. Moving away from this logic, therefore, means taking a stance against the modern and Western position, which has already been criticized in this text, according to which the theory-practice polarity would be resolved by a means that would allow some people to withdraw to reach the sacred realm of enlightenment, or theory, in preparation for a later immersion in the profane world, or practice. In contrast, our stance advocates for direct immersion in the profane world. To substantiate this, I cite the Arendt argument, which was previously mentioned and raised by Biesta (2013). He posits that action is what defines us as humans and proposes a solution to overcome humanism in Education by reorienting the focus from the question of what the human subject is to the question of where the human subject becomes present. My argument is that we can only be present in a world in which other humans also exist. I perceive that this relationship is a complex process of theoretical-practical relays that result from doing so. Its inherent characteristic is that human beings assign meaning to what is done and, consequently, produce discourses in these practices. Thus, it can be inferred that the act of speaking and acting are fundamental components of this process. Furthermore, it has been observed that the function of language is to convey the actions carried out in this context, expressing the voices of educational subjects. Additionally, the philosophical interaction between these two traditions has led us to understand education and educational practice in another way, which is neither better nor worse than other forms, but only claims the quality of being different. In this sense, action or practice have to do with human affairs. These authors have shown us that in this place we need to affirm that education has its specificities as a place of knowledge and practice. This is a gathering place for singular individuals whose uniqueness is mediated by an openness to the presence of others. Hence, educational practice is an adventure that unfolds in shifting terrain, as embarking on it signifies embarking on the adventure of the unpredictable and irreversible nature of practical human affairs and of unwavering openness to the presence of others. [^1]: Regarding this matter, please refer to the following works: NOSELLA, Paolo. Compromisso politico como horizonte da competência Tecnica. Educação & Sociedade, São Paulo, n. 14, p. 91-97, 1983. NOSELLA, Paolo. A escola de Gramsci. Artes Médicas: Porto Alegre, 1992. NOSELLA, Paolo. Compromisso politico e competência Tecnica: _(p.2)_ [^3]: O problema é que esta ideia assumira roupagens diversas, mas todas remetendo à ideia original platôrica: em Marx encontrar os aideia de alienação e de consciência de classe; em Lukács, classe em si e classe para si; em Sartre, ser-em-si e o ser-para-si; em Smyders, cultura primarye e cultura elaborada; em Gramsci, consciência filosófica e senso comum e, finalmente, em Paulo Freire, sob a forma da consciência ingêua e consciênciaética (BRAYNER, 2010, p. 161). _(p.3)_ [^4]: Edução e política são tém sentido quando ação! Quer dizer, tanto um domínio quando o及其他 se realizam no encontrar entre os homens para, ou "apresentar o mundo" a quem nele chega (o tipo de responsabilité que Arendt chamava de "autoridade"), ou para que cada punto de vista possa se confrontar, no espoço comum, com outros pontos de vista, com os不同类型 e plurais significados do mundo, com vistas à construição de um sensus communis. (BRAYNER, 2010, p. 165) _(p.3)_ [^5]: [...] estaPALavradesigna umdominio dasaconsoeshumanas,segundouma regularidadeeuma racionialdeqqueorganiza taisconsoesde differedenste maneiras.E,na medida em que estou falando emregularidade e racionialde,jacameçamosanosdar conta dequejunto com qualquerprática—ou,para dizer em termos maistecnicos: imanente a qualquerpratica—existe sempreuma teorização,por mais obscura e indefinidaqueela seaprente paraos olharesmenosacostumadoscomessasquestoesepistemologicas.(VEIGA-NETO,2015,p.118) _(p.3)_ [^8]: Baron Münchhausen, whose real name was Karl Friedrich Hieronymus von Münchhausen, was a German soldier in the 18th century who was known for telling incredible stories. His adventures were collected by Rudolph Erich Raspe and published in 1785, establishing him as a literary classic. I am referring to one of his most renowned scenes, in which he can purportedly drag himself out of a swamp by grasping his own wig. This narrative serves as a representation of his propensity to fabricate solutions that are impossible to implement and his propensity to recount unbelievable tales. _(p.9)_

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