- Home
-
Board
- Editorial Board
- Apply For Reviewer
-
Research Publishing Standards
- Guidelines
- Peer Review Policy
- Short Guide to New Editors
- Retraction Guidelines
- Research Institute
- Recommendations for the Board of Directors
- Editor Research Audit and Service Assessments
- Guidelines for Journals Publishers
- Code of Conduct for Journal Publishers
- Commandment in Social Media
- Suggestions
- Authorship Disputes
- Rights and Responsibilities
- Editors Home
- Visibility
- Information
- Apply for Editorial
- About
- Call for Paper
- Research Community
-
Journals
- Computer Science
-
Medical Research
- A: Neurology & Nervous System
- B: Pharma, Drug Discovery, Toxicology & Medicine
- C: Microbiology & Pathology
- D: Radiology, Diagnostic Imaging and Instrumentation
- E: Gynecology & Obstetrics
- F: Diseasescancer, ophthalmology & pediatric
- G: Veterinary Science & Veterinary Medicine
- H: Orthopedic & Musculoskeletal System
- I: Surgeries & Cardiovascular System
- J: Dentistry & Otolaryngology
- K: Interdisciplinary
- L:Nutrition and Food Science
- Engineering
- Science Frontier Research
- Management
-
Human-Social Science
- A: Arts & Humanities psychology, public administration, library sciences, sports, arts, media, music
- B: Geography, Environmental Science & Disaster Management
- C: Sociology & Culture
- D: History, Archaeology & Anthropology
- E: Economics
- F: Political Science
- G: Linguistics & Education
- H: Interdisciplinary
-
Fellow
-
Support
Account
×
Pareto-improving Risk selection in Social Health Insurance
Social health insurance traditionally imposes mandatory membership in a single pool in the aim of improving the welfare of high risks. However, this creates two problems, inefficiency of a monopolistic scheme and insufficient adaptation to individual preferences. Competition combined with a risk adjustment scheme can be used to improve efficiency. In the presence of preference heterogeneity, risk selection may improve adaptation to individual preferences, resulting in Pareto improvement over the pooling contract. This is shown to be possible both under perfect and imperfect risk adjustment.
